Magpale, Jr. v.
Civil Service Commission (215 SCRA 398) that: At present, therefore, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to
After Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, (204 SCRA 965 [1991]) the
extent of the authority of respondent CSC to review the decision of
MSPB is now a settled matter.
The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal
or separation from office, rather, the decision exonerated petitioner
and ordered him reinstated to his former position.
Consequently, in the light of our pronouncements in the aforecited
cases of Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission and Paredes vs. Civil
Service Commission, the MSPB decision was not a proper subject of
appeal to the CSC.
Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred
by law to hear and decide the case.
Under P.D. 807 or "The Philippine Civil Service Law," the CSC has no
appellate jurisdiction over the MSPB's decisions exonerating officers
and employees from administrative charges.
DELOS SANTOS VS SPS SARMIENTO
The scope and limitation of the jurisdiction of the HLURB is well-
defined.
Its precursor, the National Housing Authority (NHA), was vested
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957 with exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and business specifically the
registration of subdivision or condominium projects and dealers,
brokers and salesmen of subdivision lots or condominium units;
issuance and suspension of license to sell; and revocation of
registration certificate and license to sell. Its jurisdiction was later
expanded under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344[41]
hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of
action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties.
The cases over which HLURB has jurisdiction are those arising from
either unsound real estate business practices, or claims for refund or
other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman, or
demands for specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer,broker or salesman.
In addition, these cases must involve a subdivision project,
subdivision lot, condominium project or condominium unit.
The HLURB without jurisdiction where the complaint filed did not
allege that the property involved is a subdivision or condominium
project or a subdivision lot or condominium unit.
SPS YAP VS FIRST E-BAN CORP
So as not to create any misunderstanding, the point should be
underscored that the creditors obvious purpose when it forecloses
on mortgaged property is to obtain payment for a loan which the
debtor is unable or unjustifiably refuses to pay.
The rationale is the same if the creditor opts to sue the debtor for
collection.
Thus, it is but logical that a creditor who obtains a personal judgment
against the debtor on a loan waives his right to foreclose on the
mortgage securing the loan.
Otherwise, the creditor becomes guilty of splitting a single cause of
action for the debtors inability (or unjustified refusal) to pay his debt.
Nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa. No man shall be
twice vexed for one and the same cause.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide: to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural
redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts
Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. A party may not and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
institute more than one cause of action.

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. If two or more

suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing
of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others.

For nonpayment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a

single cause of action against the debtor.

This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with
execution of the security.

In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands,
the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage.

But both demands arise from the same cause, the nonpayment of
the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of
action.

Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements,

the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the
same obligation.

Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single

breach of that obligation.

The creditor] then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up
his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the
debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the
mortgage.

If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent
complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints
simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another