1 - CBRN - Introduction PDF

CBRN:
Introduc/on
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Ø Paul K. Kerr, NBC Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends,
CRS Report for Congress, 20 February 2008.
Ø The Nuclear MaNers Handbook.
Ø Dana A. Shea, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of
Characteris/cs and Effects, CRS Report for Congress, 13
September 2013.
Ø Edward M. Eitzen, Use of Biological Weapons.
Ø Radia/on Safety Handbook, RSU, Ben-‐Gurion University of
the Negev.
Ø Joint Publica/on 3-‐40: Countering Weapon Mass Destruc/on,
U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, 31 October 2014.
Ø Plamen A. Demirev, Andrew B. Feldman, and Jeffrey S. Lin,
Chemical and Biological Weapons: Current Concepts for
Future Defenses, John Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Vol.26,
Nbr.4, 2005.
Ø Malcom Dando, Bioteror and Biowarfare: A Beginner’s Guide,
Oneworld Publica/ons, 2006.
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Background

The changing reality of asymmetric threats facing the na/on in
the 21st century is best reflected by the September 11 aNacks
and the subsequent distribu/on through the U.S. Postal service
of anthrax-‐spore–laced leNers.

These events, as well as earlier occurrences (e.g., the Aum
shinrikyo aNacks in Tokyo in 1995), highlight the need for rapid
development of effec/ve and efficient approaches to defending
military and large civilian popula/ons against current and
emerging chemical/biological weapons (CBW)
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Many of the current methods for the produc/on and
dispersal of CBW are based on well-‐established,
inexpensive, and accessible technology from the 1950s.

in contrast, adequate responses to these threats require the
most advanced scien/fic and technological achievements in
disciplines as diverse as supercomputer modeling of
atmospheric processes to molecular biology.
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The pillars of the na/onal CBW defense program have
been iden/fied as:
Ø Threat awareness
Ø Preven/on and protec/on
Ø Surveillance and detec/on
Ø Post-‐aNack response and recovery
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Nuclear power is unique. The ability to harness nuclear energy
has changed the world. The peaceful applica/ons of nuclear
power for the developed and developing world have been an
unprecedented game changer and have accelerated the
development /meline of many na/ons through increased
access to energy resources and advanced technologies.

Similarly, the ability to use nuclear energy for military purposes
has fundamentally altered the interna/onal security
environment since the employment of nuclear weapons by the
United States during World War II.
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Radioac/vity is defined as spontaneous nuclear change as a
result of which a new nucleus or element is formed. The
change is accompanied by the emission of par/cles and/or
electromagne/c radia/on.

Radioac/vity is a characteris/c of unstable isotopes (atoms
of the same element but with differing numbers of neutrons
in their nuclei) that ‘choose’ to enter a more stable state by
a process of radioac/ve decay, also known as disintegra/on.
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Chemical Weapons

These weapon are either synthe/c or biologically derived
(natural) chemical compounds that are lethal in doses of much
less than 1 g per person when inhaled, ingested, injected, etc.
The modes of ac/on of CW are very rapid and require
immediate response— almost instantaneous detec/on,
individual protec/on, treatment, and decontamina/on.

The homogeneous nature of CW agents makes the
development of sensor systems simpler than for BW agents.
Compared to BW, however, CW possess lower lethality; it is
es/mated that 100 kg of anthrax spore powder, released on a
clear and calm night, can affect an area of about 300 km2,
which projected over greater Washington could result in more
than 1 million deaths.
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In contrast, the release of a 10-‐/mes larger quan/ty, 1000 kg
of sarin gas, would affect an area less than 8 km2, resul/ng in
about 3000 deaths.

The task of detec/ng a CW agent is also simpler than for a BW
agent, given the rela/ve simplicity of a homogeneous chemical
composi/on, allowing the physical proper/es of the agent to
be exploited for rapid detec/on and discrimina/on from
background materials.

On the other hand, detec/on of low vapor pressure chemicals
(e.g., CW precursors) s/ll presents technological challenges in
the field. in addi/on, while not specifically characterized as
warfare agents, many toxic industrial chemicals could be used
by terrorists as weapons of economic disrup/on and to wreak
havoc on a popula/on.
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Rela/ve Development of Chemical Weapons Technologies
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Chemical Material Produc/on Technology Parameters
Biological Weapons

It has been recognized that more than 1400 infec/ous
organisms, among them more than 200 viral and 500
bacterial species, can be pathogenic to humans.

All toxins and microorganisms (live viruses, bacterial spores,
vegeta/ve bacterial cells, etc.) currently considered a threat
to the na/on are classified by the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) into three /ered categories (A, B, C).

Agents belonging to category A are considered to be the most
dangerous and the easiest to convert into potent BWs.
The second highest priority agents are in category b and
include those that are moderately easy to disseminate, result
in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates, and
require specific enhancements of CDC’s diagnos/c capacity
and disease surveillance.

The third highest priority agents in category C include
emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass
dissemina/on in the future because of availability, ease of
produc/on and dissemina/on, and poten/al for high
morbidity and mortality rates and major health impact.
A biological aNack is more lethal the longer it remains
undetected (par/cularly if the agent is transmiNed directly
from person to person). By the /me obvious manifesta/ons
of a disease can lead to unambiguous diagnosis by medical
professionals, quaran/ne, preven/on, and treatment
op/ons are severely limited.

Loss of life can be minimized if a BW aNack is detected
early; however, early detec/on is par/cularly difficult for
BW agents, since most are biological organisms. pathogenic
organisms contain essen/ally the same chemical and
biochemical compounds as nonpathogenic organisms,
requiring sophis/cated analysis to differen/ate the two
groups at the molecular level.
In addi/on, early symptoms of an infec/on caused by a BW
agent are typically nonspecific (e.g., resembling the
common flu), as the human body musters the same
defenses against various invading microorganisms. When
the symptoms become more specific to a BW agent, the
effec/veness of medical treatment is much diminished.
Category A

The Public health system and primary health care providers
must be prepared to address various biological agents,
including pathogens that are rarely seen in the united states.

These highest-‐priority agents include organisms that pose a
risk to na/onal security because they can be easily
disseminated or transmiNed from person to person, result in
high mortality rates, have the poten/al for major public
health impact, might cause public panic and social disrup/on,
and require special ac/on for public health preparedness.
Disease/agent:
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)
Plague (Yersinia pes/s)
Smallpox (Variola major)
Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)
Viral hemorrhagic fevers (Filoviruses [e.g., ebola, marburg]
and Arenaviruses [e.g., Lassa, machupo])
Category B

These second highest priority agents include those that are
moderately easy to disseminate, result in moderate morbidity
rates and low mortality rates, and require specific
enhancements of CDC’s diagnos/c capacity and disease
surveillance.
Disease/agent
Brucellosis (Brucella species)
Enterotoxemia (Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxins)
Foodborne diseases (e.g., Salmonella species, Escherichiacoli
O157:H7, Shigella)
Glanders (Burkholderia mallei)
Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)
PsiNacosis (Chlamydia psiNaci)
Q fever (Coxiella burne/i)
Ricin poisoning (Ricinus communis [castor beanplant])
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B poisoning (Staphylcoccus aureus)
Typhus fever (RickeNsia prowazekii)
Viral encephali/s (alphaviruses [e.g., Venezuelan equine
encephali/s, eastern equine encephali/s, western equine
encephali/s])
Waterborne diseases (e.g., Vibrio cholerae, Cryptosporidium
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Category C

The third highest priority agents include emerging pathogens
that could be engineered for mass dissemina/on in the future
because of availability, ease of produc/on and dissemina/on,
and poten/al for high morbidity and mortality rates and
major health impact. examples of diseases caused by these
emerging infec/ous agents are Nipah virus and hantavirus.
CBW threats vary greatly in physical proper/es and mechanisms of
physiological ac/on
SEB = Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B
Over the next 10 to 20 years there is a risk that advances in
biotechnology will augment not only defensive measures but
also offensive biological warfare agent development and
allow the crea/on of advanced biological agents designed to
target specific systems—human, animal, or crop.
Diverse informa/on sources need to be integrated to provide a rapid,
adequate, and relevant response to a CBW aNack.
A set of typical bioanaly/cal procedures, grouped in three separate modules, that
comprise the essen/al steps in CBW sample prepara/on protocols.
Nuclear Weapons

The atomic bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were
fission weapons. The nuclei of atoms consist of protons and
neutrons, with the number of protons determining the
element (e.g., carbon has 6 protons, while uranium has 92)
and the number of neutrons determining the isotope of that
element.

Different isotopes of the same element have the same
chemical proper/es, but very different nuclear proper/es. In
par/cular, some isotopes tend to break apart or fission into
two lighter elements, with uranium (chemical symbol U) being
of par/cular interest.
All uranium atoms have 92 protons. U-‐238 is the most common
isotope of uranium, making up 99.3% of naturally occurring
uranium. The 238 refers to the atomic weight of the isotope,
which equals the total number of protons plus neutrons in its
nucleus. Thus U-‐238 has 238 – 92 = 146 neutrons.

U-‐235 has 143 neutrons and makes up almost all the remaining
0.7% of naturally occurring uranium. (U-‐234 is very rare at
0.005%, and other, even rarer isotopes exist, some of which
have only been produced in the laboratory.)
U-‐235 is the valuable isotope from a nuclear weapons or
nuclear power point of view because it can serve as the
primary fuel for a weapon or power plant, while U-‐238
cannot.

When a U-‐235 atom absorbs a neutron, it breaks into two
smaller atoms plus some number of neutrons. This spliung or
fission also releases “atomic energy” that can produce
electricity or an explosion.1 On average, such a fission of a
U-‐235 atom produces about 2.5 new neutrons.

If all released neutrons are absorbed by new U-‐235 atoms, an
exponen/ally growing chain reac/on sets in, with the number
of atoms involved growing from 1, to 2.5 (on average), to 2.52
= 6.25, etc.
Axer 10 “genera/ons” over 10,000 atoms have fissioned, axer
20 genera/ons over 100,000,000 atoms have fissioned, etc.
But, as depicted in the diagram, some neutrons escape
without adding to the chain reac/on (the one with an X on the
right in step 2) and some are absorbed by U-‐238 atoms (the
one with an X on the lex in step 2) and do not produce
addi/onal neutrons to add to the chain reac/on.

By absorbing an addi/onal neutron, the U-‐238 atom becomes
U-‐239 which we will deal with later. The important point right
now is that it does not produce addi/onal neutrons.

If, on average, each fission leads to more than one addi/onal
fission, the chain reac/on grows exponen/ally and releases
large amounts of energy.
Atomic forces within the nucleus are much stronger than chemical forces.
U-‐235 in an atom bomb therefore liberates much more energy than
exploding the same mass of TNT. The bomb used on Hiroshima contained
approximately 50 kg (100 pounds) of U-‐235, yet packed the explosive
power of 15,000 tons (30 million pounds) of TNT.

If all of the U-‐235 fuel had fissioned, the yield would have been 500
kilotons. The actual yield was only 3% of that figure because, as the
weapon exploded, most of the U-‐235 was dispersed before it could
capture a neutron and contribute to the chain reac/on.
The above discussion points out that what is usually called
cri$cal mass is really a cri/cal mass density. Axer a bomb based
on U-‐235 explodes, most of the U-‐235 is s/ll present. It is just
too thinly dispersed to maintain a chain reac/on. Too few
neutrons are captured by other U-‐235 atoms to maintain the
chain reac/on. That same idea is at the heart of the “gun
assembly” atomic bomb depicted below.

Two subcri/cal masses of uranium are at either end of the gun
barrel. One is shaped like a bullet, while the other is a hollow
cylinder target that just fits around the bullet. Conven/onal
explosives shoot the bullet down the gun barrel, where it mates
with the target. The two subcri/cal masses, when brought
together rapidly, form a supercri/cal mass, resul/ng in a chain
reac/on and an atomic explosion.
Note that prior to igni/on the bomb has more than a cri/cal
mass worth of uranium, but it is divided into two pieces that
are too far apart for neutrons from one to cause fission in the
other.

As already noted, U-‐238 is usually not useful as atomic fuel, but
cons/tutes 99.3% of naturally occurring uranium, with most of
the remaining 0.7% being U-‐235. Naturally occurring uranium
therefore cannot be used in a weapon or most power plants,
and must first be enriched to a higher level of U-‐235.

The most prevalent nuclear power plants today are light water
reactors (LWR’s) that need uranium enriched to about 3-‐4%
U-‐235, known as low-‐enriched uranium (LEU). Bomb-‐grade fuel
must be enriched further, preferably to 90% U-‐235, which is
called highly-‐ enriched uranium (HEU).
Unfortunately, the same technology used to make LEU for
nuclear power (e.g., the gas centrifuges used in Iran’s nuclear
program) can be modified to make HEU for weapons.

The Nuclear Non-‐Prolifera/on Treaty (NPT) requires signatories
other than the US, Russia, the UK, France and China to forgo
the development of nuclear weapons, but recognizes the
“inalienable right” of all na/ons to develop nuclear technology
for peaceful purposes.

The close connec/ons between peaceful and military
applica/ons of nuclear technology make dis/nguishing
between those aims extremely difficult, and that is a par/cular
problem with uranium enrichment.
Mohamed ElBaradei, the former Director General of the
Interna/onal Atomic Energy Agency, has referred to
enrichment as the Achilles’ heel of non-‐prolifera/on. Iran, for
example, can claim that its enrichment program is needed for
its domes/c nuclear power program and does not violate its
NPT requirements.

Yet, its ability to enrich is likely to make it a “latent nuclear
power” (a na/on that could build a bomb in short order,
should it choose to do so) in the near future.
HEU is par/cularly dangerous from a prolifera/on point of view
because weapons based on it are likely to work without any
tes/ng. The HEU weapon used on Hiroshima on August 6,
1945, was never tested before use. The nuclear test explosion
on July 16, 1945, at Alamogordo, New Mexico (codenamed the
Trinity test) was of the more complex plutonium design
described below.

The ManhaNan Project scien/sts did not have enough
confidence in that design to use it on Nagasaki without first
running a full-‐scale test. North Korea’s two atomic tests have
been with plutonium weapons, and the low yield of the first
test – on the order of 1 kiloton – is evidence of the need to test
such weapons before deployment.
The most useful fusion reac/on in a nuclear weapon is for a
deuterium nucleus to fuse with a tri/um nucleus. All together
those two nuclei have two protons and three neutrons. When
they fuse, they produce a helium nucleus with two protons and
two neutrons, and an extra neutron that is ejected.

The extra neutron adds to the fission reac/on and makes use
of the U-‐238 tamper shown in the diagram. This is an excep/on
to the general rule that U-‐238 is not useful as bomb fuel.
U-‐238, by itself, cannot be used in a weapon, and requires
either HEU or plutonium. The fusion of the deuterium and
tri/um nuclei releases a large amount of energy, which is what
makes the weapon explode.
The first “hydrogen bomb,” codenamed Ivy Mike, was anything but a bomb
as can be seen in the picture below. To get an idea of the apparatus’ size,
note the men near the lower right hand corner of the picture. It was
intended solely as a proof of concept, which purpose it served well with a
yield of slightly over 10 megatons.

The evolu/on of nuclear weapons over the years, showing how they have
been miniaturized. It is hard to comprehend that the 475 kiloton W87
warhead shown shown in the lower center of the figure is small enough to
fit in a backpack, yet can destroy a city.
The diagram shown below traces the steps in the detona/on of a
thermonuclear weapon based on lithium deuteride, and is also
op/onal reading. In the second step, HE stands for High Explosives.
Radia/on

The par/cles and the electromagne/c radia/on that are
emiNed as a result of radioac/ve decay are called radioac/ve
radia/on. Radioac/ve radia/on is characterised by its ability to
cause ionisa/on (emission of an electron from the atom) when
it traverses any medium.

Ionisa/on is the process by which the radia/on loses energy,
and is also the process responsible for the damage caused by
radioac/ve radia/on.
Radioac/vity is not a new phenomenon. The planet Earth, from
the moment of its crea/on, has been con/nuously exposed to
radioac/ve radia/on from a variety of sources: cosmic
radia/on, radia/on caused by the decay of radioac/ve isotopes
(such as uranium) in the ground and in the oceans, and even
from radioac/ve isotopes occurring naturally in our own bodies
(such as an isotope of potassium).
The various elements are dis/nguished by the number of
radioac/ve isotopes they possess. Thus, for example, hydrogen
has 3 isotopes in all, of which only one is radioac/ve, while
lead has 32 isotopes, of which just 3 are non-‐radioac/ve
(stable).
Table of The Isotopes of Hydrogen
I Thank You

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