The Context of the

Phenomenological Movement
 PHAENOMENOLOGICA
COLLECTION FONDEE PAR H. L. VAN BREDA ET PUBLIEE SOUS LE
PATRONAGE DES CENTRES D'ARCHIVES-HUSSERL

80

HERBERT SPIEGELBERG

The Context 01 the PhenomenologicalMovement

Comite de redaction de la coHection:

President: S. IJsseling (Leuven);
Membres: M. Farber (Buffalo). E. Finkt (Freiburg i. Br.),
L. Landgrebe (Köln). W. Marx (Freiburg 1. Br.),
J. N. Mohanty (New York), P. Ricoeur (Paris), E. Ströker (Köln)
J. Taminiaux (Louvain), K. H. Volkmann-Schluck (Köln);
Secretaire: J. Taminiaux.
 HERBERT SPIEGELBERG

The Context ofthe

PhenomenologicalMovement

111981
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Spiegelberg, Herbert.
The context of the phenomenological movement.

(Phaenomenologica; 80)
Collection ofpreviously published studies which have been revised by the author; intended as a
companion vol. to his The phenomenological movement.
Includes bibliographical references and index of names.
CONTENTS: ComJ)'arative studies: "Intention" and "intentionality" in the Scholastics,
Brentano and Husserl; Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies; Husserl's phenomenology and
Sartre's existentialism; Husserl and Pfander on the phenomenological reduction; [etc.].
1. Phenomenology - Collected works. 2. Husser!.
Edmund, 1859-1938 - Collected works. 1. Title. II. Series.
B829.5.S635 142'.7 80-18655

ISBN 978-90-481-8262-6 ISBN 978-94-017-3270-3 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-3270-3

Copyright © 1981 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

Originally published by Martinus Nijhoff, Publishers bv, The Hague in 1981
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1981

All rights reserved. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or other-
wise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Springer-Science+Business Media, B. V.
 To The Memory of
JOHNWILD
1902 - 1972
Pioneer of Existential Phenomenology
in America
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ix
Preface xi

PART I: COMPARATIVE STUDIES

1. "Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and

Husser1.(with Supplement 1979) 3
2. Husserl's and Peirce's Phenomenologies: Coincidence or Interaction
(with three Supplements 1979) 27
3. Husserl's Phenomenology and Sartre's Existentialism 51
4. Husserl and Pfänder on the Phenomenological Reduction (with
Supplement 1979) 62
5. "Linguistic Phenomenology": John L. Austin and Alexander
Pfänder 83

PART II: HISTORICAL EXPLORATIONS

6. Amiel's "New Phenomenology" 93

7. What William J ames Knew ab out Edmund Husserl: On the Credibility
ofPitkin's Testimony (with Supplement 1979) 105
8. Brentano's Husserl Image 119
9. On the Significance of the Correspondence between Brentano and
Husserl 125
10. Husserl in England: Facts and Lessons 144
11. On the Misfortunes of Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Artic1e
"Phenomenology" 162
12. Preface to W. R Boyce Gibson's Freiburg Diary 1928 166
 viii

13. Husserl's Approach to Phenomenology for Americans: A Letter and its

Sequel 173
14. A Review of Wolfgang Köhler's The Place 01 Value in a World 01
Facts 193
15. The Puzzle of Wittgenstein' s Phänomenologie (1929 - ?) (with
Supplement 1979) 202
Appendix: Supplement 1980 to "Husserl in England" 229
Index of N ames 235
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Permissions for reprinting parts ofthe items making up this volume have been given generously by
the following copyright holders:
American Philosophical Quarterly, "The Puzzle of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Phänomenologie
(1929- ?)."
GeraldDuckworth& Co. Ltd., "'Intention' and 'Intentionality' in the Scholastics, Brentano and
Husserl."
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JBSP), "Is the Reduction Necessary For
Phenomenolügy? Husserl's and Pfänder's Replies"; "Husserl in England: Facts and Lessons";
"On the Misfortunes of Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article 'Phenomenology' ";
"Preface to W. R. Boyce Gibson's Freiburg Diary 1928."
Martinus Nijhoff Puhlishers B. V., "Husserl's Approach to Phenomenology für Americans: A
Letter and its Sequel";"The Lost Portrait of Edmund Husserl by Ida and Franz Brentano."
Northwestern University Press, "What William James Knew about Edmund Husserl";
" 'Linguistic Phenomenology': John L. Austin and Alexander Pfänder."
University ofBuffalo, "Husserl's and Peirce's Phenomenologies"; "Review ofWolfgang Köhler,
The Place of Value in a World of Facts."
Walter de Gruyter, "Amiel's 'New Phenomenology'."
Grazer Philosophische Studien, "The Significance of the Correspondence between Franz
Brentano and Edmund Husserl."
 PREFACE

This is an unashamed collection of studies grown, but not planned before-

hand, whose belated unity sterns from an unconscious pattern ofwhich I was
not aware at the time ofwriting. I call it "unashamed" not only because I have
made no effort to patch up this collection by completely new pieces, but also
because there seems to me nothing shamefully wrong about following up some
loose ends left dangling from my main study of the Phenomenological
Movement which I had to cut off from the body of my account in order to
preserve its unity and proportion.
This disc1aimer does not mean that there is no connection among the pieces
he re assembled. They belong together, while not requiring consecutive
reading, as attempts to establish common ground 1lnd lines of communication
between the Phenomenological Movement and related enterprises in philo-
sophy. They are not put together arbitrarily, but because ofintrinsic affinities
to phenomenology. This does not mean an attempt to blur its edges. But since
they are growing edges, any boundaries cannot be drawn sharply without
interfering with the phenomena. Nevertheless, in the end the figure of the
Phenomenological Movement should stand out more distinctIy as the text
against its surrounding context, ofwhich these studies are to provide some ofthe
comparative and historical background. This is why I gave to this collection
the titIe "The Context ofthe Phenomenological Movement" in contrast to the
central "text" as contained in my historical introduction to this movement. In
this sense this collection is a companion volume to The Phenomenological
Movement, especially in its revised third edition, meant to enrich it without
diverting from it.
Finally I hope that this collection will reinforce the case for one of my
favorite historical theses: that the Phenomenological Movement proper is
actually a set ofwaves superimposed upon a much vaster anti-reductionist and
anti-constructionist groundswell that began in the nineteenth century.
Hardly any of the components of the collection have remained unchanged
compared with their original versions. For he re too the subject and even more
my knowledge of it have kept growing. All the components have been checked,
an operation in which I had in the end the invaluable aid of Karl Schuhmann,
who also helped me with the proofreading. In fact, the most important tool in
 xii

updating my texts was Karl Schuhmann's Husserl-Chronik (The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff, 1977). In some cases there have been substantial additions,
especially in the last essay on Wittgenstein's phenomenology. In such cases I
have tried to put the changes into special Supplements, partly in order to
facilitate easy identification of new information and insights.
I also want to express my special thanks to the editors of the series
"Phaenomenologica," who aga in offered their hospitality to my work.

The New Pattern

The components of this collection fall roughly into two groups: (1) contem-
porary paralleis and (2) historical explorations inside phenomenology. What
they have in common is the intent to remove blinkers from the narrow
provincialist perspective on the Phenomenological Movement in its often far
from splendid isolation and from its preoccupation with its own latest phase.
In this spirit Part I deals largely with relations between central figures in
phenomenology and those in other philosophies, where I found a special need
for historical exploration. Husserl figures in the first four essays against the
background of other earlier philosophies ofintentionality, the native American
phenomenology of Peirce and Sartre's existentialism. The comparison with
Pfänder is concerned with an internal confrontation, but one whose bearing
affects also the relation to the outside world in its puzzlement ab out the
reduction. Pfänder figures even more prominently in the subsequent
comparison with the "linguistic phenomenology" of lohn L. Austin.
As the common denominator for the "Historical Explorations" ofPart II, I
can suggest merely the lure of dark corners in my historical knowledge which
had called for elucidation, mostly in connection with special occasions
explained in each case. Again, Husserl is not the only target of these
explorations. The best possible vindication ofthese studies I can suggest is the
additional light they can provide in helping the figure of phenomenology to
stand out more sharply against the ground of its origins. The case of
Wittgenstein's phenomenology as it now emerges may help to promote more
sympathetic mutual understanding without syncretism. Here I am much
indebted to several Wittgenstein scholars for interest and help.

The Components

Some remarks about the circumstances of each ofthe pieces may be helpful for
their full appraisal.
1. The comparative studies ofthe first part open with a study I had written in
German before leaving the Continent. " 'Intention' and 'Intentionality' in the
Scholastics, Bentano and Husserl" was prepared in an atmosphere where
 xiii

Husserl's conception ofintentionality was widely considered a mere loan from

the Scholastics and his phenomenology a new form, if not a corruption, of
Scholasticism. My primary goal was to show the originality ofboth Brentano' s
and Husserl's transformations ofthe undeniable Scholastic stimulus and at the
same time the complexity ofthe historical issues involved. But Iwanted to do
more than terminological history. I also wanted to prepare the ground for a
terminological reform which would overcome the resulting confusion by going
back to the original phenomena - and I still do. As far as I know, the survival of
this overambitious enterprise is due to the unexpected interest taken by
Roderick M. Chisholm, who listed the German title in his English biblio-
graphies on intentionality. In a Supplement I comment on some of Ausonio
Marras' criticisms of my views, although they refer mostly to my later
condensed statement in The Phenomenological Movement.
2. The essay on "Husserl's and Peirce's Phenomenologies" was the res.ult
of an invitation by the program committee ofthe Peirce Society in 1955. At
that time I knew much too little about Peirce and was struck by the paralleis as
weIl as by the differences I encountered, but also by the significance of the
issue for the relation between Peirce and William James. As the Supplements
will show, more details are now available, though they do not yet call for a
rewriting of the entire articl.e.
3. The piece on "Husserl's Phenomenology and Sartre's Existentialism"
was part of a symposium on Phenomenology and Existentialism at the
Meeting ofthe Western Division of the American Philosophical Association
at Madison, Wisconsin, in 1959. Here Iwanted to draw the line between
phenomenology and existentialism as sharply as possible, at a time when
even in thl( States a thoughtless confusion of the two movements, separately
originated but converging, was particularly widespread. In the printed version
lieft out the two initial paragraphs as no longer timely after the centennial of
Husserl' s birth in 1959 and suppressed the concluding pun as unnecessary and
inappropriate, which became a target of my fellow-symposiast and friend
Maurice Natanson; see J. J. Kockelmans (ed.) Phenomenology, New York:
Doubleday-Anchor, 1967, p. 347.
4. The essay on the Phenomenological Reduction in Husserl and Pfänder
was a first attempt to alert the Anglo-American friends of phenomenology to
my attempt to revive interest in Pfänder's alternative to Husserl's radical
phenomenology. I had made this attempt first at the International Conference
on "The Munich Phenomenology" on the occasion of the centennial of
Pfänder's birth in Munich where some ofthe Pfänder tradition was still alive. I
therefore began the German version of my paper (to be published in
Pfänder-Studien) with Pfänder's conception ofthe phenomenological re duc-
tion before comparing it with Husserl's. But when the same year I had an
occasion to present an English version ofthis paper at the Dublin Conference
 xiv

"European Philosophy Today," I reversed this order in view ofthe fact that in
Britain only a first acquaintance with Husserl could be assumed and that the
best way to introduce the practically unknown Pfänder was to show first the
impasse in the final stage ofHusserl' s reduction as a background for introducing
Pfänder's alternative. But except for this reversal in the order ofpresentation
the two versions are substantially the same. My main point was to show
Pfänder's radical phenomenology as maintaining Husserl's epoche but
omitting his transcendental reduction with its presuppositions, thus salvaging
the best of Husserl's radicalism.
5. The paper on "Linguistic Phenomenology" tried to take advantage of a
special occasion in the Ibero-American world at the XIIlth International
Congress of Philosophy of 1963 in Mexico City, where Pfänder's work was
comparatively weIl known in Spanish translation. Iwanted to show how
Pfänder's emphasis on the need of initial clarification of meanig prior to
phenomenology proper fits in with the admittedly much more explicit emphasis
on" linguistic" analysis in J ohn L. Austin' s "linguistic phenomenology." This
attempt has now been backed strikingly by Paul Ricoeur's plea for Pfänder's
hints about the need of a study ofthe language ofthe will in a paper he gave at
the Conference on the M unich Phenomenology on' Phenomenology ofWilling
and Ordinary Language Approach,' in 1971. .
6. The second part of these Studies is devoted to more specific historical
topics. My interest in Amiel and his phenomenology was a side-effect of
Walter Biemel's invitation to help hirn with the re-publication of Husserl's
Tagebuchnotizen of 1906 and 1907 in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, which contained a puzzling isolated reference to Amiel. Winthrop
Bell's surprised response to Husserl's interest in Amiel aroused my curiosity,
with very little immediate success as far as the reference was concerned. It was
only when I began to explore Amiel for his own sake that the really fascinating
information about his "new phenomenology," certainly unknown to Husserl,
emerged. The findings are quite preliminary, but were at least an encourage-
ment for my own research on the experiential phenomenology of the self.
7. F or the article on J ames and Husserl, undertaken in view of Aron
Gurwitsch's interest in the parallel between their study of consciousness, I
would not claim for it more than the interest in a piece of historical detective
work which to my mind establishes James's innocence of antiphenomeno-
logism and the importance of correspondences like Walter Pitkin's as more
trustworthy than his autobiography.
8. The piece on Brentano's Husserl image also makes no phenomenological
claim. Its real interest is to explore such perspectives on Husserl as Brentano's
in a case where pictorial material was available.
9. The paper on the correspondence between Brentano and Husserl was
prepared at the invitation of the Brentano Foundation, read in part at the
 xv

Brentano Conference in Graz in September 1977 and published first in the

Grazer Philosophische Studien vol. 5. My main point was to explore in
greater detail than I could in the Phenomenological Movement the context for
the sampies I had used in my discussion of the Brentano-Husserl relation. I
also wanted to make this correspondence a test case for the importanceof such
exchanges as sources for understanding the philosophical dialogue between
major thinkers.
10. "Husserl in England: Facts and Lessons," written for the first issue ofthe
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology is the result of my
protracted search for the early history of phenomenology in a country where its
fortunes have been rather uneven. I hoped that my findings could provide some
lessons at a point when its chances seemed to be surprisingly improved. The
most important evidence turned up when I had already submitted my article
and Karl Schuhmann drew my attention to the Freiburg Diary ofW. R. Boyce
Glbson, which had just arrived at the Louvain Archives. Partly for the sake of
the story lIeft this evidence, mostly about the Cambridge phase ofHusserl's
visit, in the original Postscript. Further details might still emerge from a more
thorough examination of the Husserl correspondence, especially the family
correspondence.2
11. The related but still incomplete story of Husserl's invitation to write the
Encyclopaedia Britannica article "Phenomenology" for its 13th edition was
the result of my shock after comparing the English article with the German
original published by Walter Biemel in Husserliana IX, revealing that the text
was anything but a "free translation" by an expert. When Richard Palmer
volunteered to provide a new translation ofthe entire text for theJournal ofthe
British Society for Phenomenology, I agreed to use the occasion for putting
together the remaining scraps of the story still available, largely as a warning
against the continued use of the truncated Husserl text.
12. My interest in the Boyce Gibson Diary of 1928 was not spontaneous. At
the time I still harbored a prejudice against hirn on the basis ofhis problematic
translation ofHusserl's Ideen. The find ofthe diary revealed a very different
picture and a philosopher worth knowing for his own sake. Besides, to my
knowledge, none of the closer witnesses with inside knowledge has supplied
anything comparable about this phase of Freiburg philosophy.
13. The stimulus for exploring the Husserl-Welch correspondence was again
completely accidental, beginning with a piece of information about a nine-page
letter by Husserl in the files ofthe University of Southern California picked up
at the Mexico Congress of 1963. It turned out that Husserl saw in his
correspondent an important American philosopher capable of helping his
favorite American student Dorion Cairns. It included an interesting self-
appraisal of Husserl's own earlier work in 1933 and a directive of how he
 xvi

thought an American student should go about studying the latest phase of his
phenomenology.
14. The review ofWolfgang Köhler's William James lectures of 1934 goes
back to my first American years at Swarthmore College, where Köhler hadjust
published their book edition under the title The Place 0/ Value in a World 0/
Facts. For me it was a special occasion for studying the place ofphenomeno-
logy in Gestalt psychology, which Köhler and his associates had stressed
especially after their transplantation to the United States.
15. The study of Wittgenstein's Phänomenologie was a result of my casual
reading in his first Cambridge book with its surprising use ofphenomenological
terminology. Since at the same time Paul Ricoeur and others were interested in
pointing out paralleis between the two Austrian thinkers, the exploration of
this puzzling episode in Wittgenstein's development seemed worth starting.
Since the publication of my article in theAmerican Philosophical Quarterly in
1968, a good deal of additional information about Wittgenstein's stake in his
peculiar phenomenology has emerged, which I first hoped to contain within the
framework of a Supplement. But the latest evidence in the shape of a developed
chapter on Phenomenology in the still unpublished Big Typescript (# 213) has
shown me that what is really needed is a complete rewriting of this article.
However, this plan is not yet practicable. I therefore have to leave it at giving
simply a preview ofthe significance ofthis central text in a way which allows a
first hypothesis about the significance of phenomenology for Wittgenstein's
entire development. Even this hypothesis, as far as it can be confirmed or
refuted, will not enable us to solve all the puzzles I raised, for instance the one
about the origins ofhis conception prior to his return to England in 1929. But it
should make it possible to assess more definitely the place of Wittgenstein's
phenomenology in relation to the Phenomenological Movement in general.

NOTES

I See Paul Ricoeur, "Phänomenologie des Wollens und Ordinary Language Approach," Die
Münchener Phänomenologie, The Hague: 1975, pp. 105-124.
2The need far this precaution has just been demonstrated strikingly by the appearance of
Husserl's communications to Winthrop Bell, which made the addition of a last-minute
supplement (see Appendix, p. 229) imperative.
 PART I

COMPARATIVE STUDIES
 1. "INTENTION" AND "INTENTIONALITY" IN THE
SCHOLASTICS, BRENTANO AND HUSSERO

PREF ACE, 1969

This essay originally appeared in vol. 5 (1936), ofthe journal Philosophische

Hefte, edited by Maximilian Beck, first in Berlin and finaBy in Prague. The
inaccessibility ofthis journal, which ceased publication after the Nazi invasion
of Czechoslovakia, and the fact that, to my astonishment, there is still
considerable interest in this incidental essay, explains this reprint in almost
unaltered form. In the Postscript a new paragraph is identified and attention is
called to the fact that this study needs expanding and updating in several
places. The seemingly new title (" 'Intention' und 'Intentionalität' in der
Scholastik, bei Brentano und Husserl") which replaces the earlier one ("Der
Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl")
merely signifies areturn to my original choice.

1. INTRODUCTION

The attempt at a more thorough investigation of what is designated by the

expressions "intention" and "intentional" in present-day philosophy needs no
special justification at the present stage of philosophy. Brentano and Husserl
discovered the strategie role of these phenomena within aB mental life, and
brought it to the fore. N evertheless, one can hardly claim that the subject and
its context have been sufficiently explored. In several respects more clarity is
needed. In many cases urtexamined or insufficiently examined preconceptions
and anticipations are obstructions to the real understanding ofthe situation. In
part these harken back to conscious or unconscious historie al recollections by
which one is guided or, rather, misguided, in the study ofthe phenomena. It is
the main purpose ofthis essay to render them harmless and at the same time to
work out more clearly the systematic problems that stand behind the historical
development.
Not everything, however, that goes by the name "intention" will be dealt
with, but only extra-practical intention. "Intention" is commonly understood
 4

in the sense of an intention to do something, or a purpose. That is the original

practica I meaning of the term and it has been preserved in ordinary language.
This meaning will not be diseussed here. By eontrast, the extra-praetieal is
seeondary; it has been limited to aeademic philosophy, and is demonstrably
derived from the Seholastics of the Middle Ages.
One might be tempted to replace the artificial expression "extra-practical"
by the term "theoretical." Actually it does deal, particularly in the Middle
Ages, predominantly with theoretical entities. The new meaning, however,
also encompasses decidedly atheoretical phenomena such as acts ofjoy about
something or aets oflove for something. Even in the praetieal aet ofwilling we
encounter, in addition to the praetical intention - i. e., the intention to do
something - the mere directedness toward the willed object, which is a
common eharaeteristie ofboth this praetieal aet and extra-praetical acts. Thus
it may be advisable in this eontext to designate non-praetieal intention by
"extra-praetical" for the time being.
So far hardly any attention seems to have been devoted to the obvious ques-
tion whether there is a genus intention that includes both praetieal and extra-
practical intention, i. e., whether the common name" intention" designates one
common referent, or whether it is merely applied equivocally to two totally
different things. Thomas Aquinas, when he defined the nature ofthe inten tio as
a striving toward, an aiming at something else, something beyond the aet, was
still only thinking of the practical intention, the actus voluntatis. 2
In any ease, systematie decision on the question is possible only if, prior
thereto, extra-practical and practical intention, as weIl as the area between the
two - for they may be widely separated by a large number of intermediate
phenomena - have been thoroughly investigated.
At times the extra-practical meaning ofthe term has fallen completely into
oblivion. Only since Brentano and Husserl has it once again assumed an
extremely important role in the theory of acts and meanings, in logic and
ontology, psychology and phenomenology. Brentano himselfpointed out the
connection with the Scholastics. Yet neither Brentano nor others have
undertaken more specifie studies ofthis connection. We know very little about
the origin and the history ofthe meaning ofthe extra-praetical intention. For
the most part, people have been satisfied with the assertion of terminologie al
agreement. No attempt has been made to investigate in greater detail the
question of the basic relationship between the Scholastic and the modern
eoneeptions of extra-practieal intention. So far, the relationship has been
characterised most aecurately by Maximilian Beek (toward the end of his
eommenton an essay by Oskar Kraus in Philosophische Hefte, vol. 1, p. 133).
At any rate, opinions on the subject are at present diametrically opposed.
Some people believe that the modern theoretical intention is something merely
taken over from the Scholastics, which is ineontestably true as to the mere
 5

term; some regard Brentano, and some regard Husserl, as the discoverer of
intentionality. In the present context it is impossible to give a complete history
of the problems of intention; not only would this be a very ambitious task, but
the necessary material has not yet been made sufficiently accessible. All I shall
attempt here is to juxtapose the main types ofthe old and new extra-practical
intention and to bring out the most important differences between them.
In this attempt the two terms "intention" and "intentional" (intentionality)
will be dealt with separately, despite the fact that in some places this
differentiation is difficult to maintain. However, the differences between the
referents ofthese terms are much more essential than the grammatical form of
the words would suggest. This has been overlooked previously. I shall begin
with the investigation of the history of "intention."

2. EXTRA-PRACTICAL INTENTIO IN THE SCHOLASTICS

Throughout ancient philosophy until the beginning of the High Scholastic

period, "intentio" simply had the practical meaning of "striving toward,"
"intent to do something," "exertion." The first passages where the expression
has thus far been detected with a divergent, theoretical meaning are the
translations of Arabic philosophers from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
especially the translations of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) by Dominicus Gundis-
salinus and J ohannes Hispanus in Toledo. 3 In order fully to understand the
meaning and the motives for these translations, one would need to explore
Arabic philosophy to an extent not possible for me. There, "intentio" seems to
correspond principally to the word "ma 'na," which denotes sense, meaning,
idea, concept, matter. 4 The Latin expression seems to be just as ambiguous.
But throughout intention is understood as something which is the object of an
act, never as something act-like or mental ("intentio sumitur pro eo quod
intenditur," Metaphysica IX, 8). Furthermore, the intentions are always
cognitive constructs, intentiones intellectae, i.e. something that the cognising
subject grasps in the sense-given objects ("Id, quod apprehendit anima de
sensibili," De Anima, in Opera, Venet, 1518f. 4a-5a, Pars I c. 5). The whole
of the area so designated becomes clear through the distinction, so important
later on, between intentiones primae and intentiones secundae; Avicenna
(Metaphysica 1, 2), too, speaks in the most important passage, of intentio
prima andsecundo intellecta. By primae intentiones the objects ofknowledge
themselves are meant, while intentiones secundae refers to the so-called
intentiones logicae such as the universal, genus, species, differentia, and, in
general, the logical concepts or terms which are predicated on the known thing
or refer to it. 5 Very often Avicenna used intentio merely in the sense of the
meaning of a word.
 6

In this way extra-practical intention was explicitly introduced into medieval

philosophy and became one of the foundations of High Scholasticism. A
detailed description of the stages of this process is here neither possible nor
indicated. In specific cases the history of meanings is tangled; the interpreta-
tions change considerably. lntentio represents, indeed, one of the most
problematic terms in Scholasticism. All I shall attempt here is to exhibit, by
means of a few cross-sections, the structural character and the pi ace of extra-
practical intention in this philosophy.
Thomas Aquinas is particularly suited to such an attempt. Simonin has
already done some very creditable preliminary work on his concept of
intentionality.6 Thomas, too, is familiar with the broad meaning of "extra-
practical intention" prevalent in A vicenna, for example in his commentary on
the "Sentences." Mostly, however, we encounter a narrower meaning, in
which the intention is distinguished from the known object, the res, which
elsewhere was regarded as the intentio prima. lntentiones are, then, the
Iikenesses, similitudines or even imagines 7 absorbed in the soul that represent
the res or make it present again. Furthermore, he uses species orforma rerum
as almost synonymous with intentio. 8 Thus intentiones are here first and
foremost imprints of things, cognitive images in the human mind which
terminate the (sensory or intelligible) cognition and at whose production this
knowledge aims. They are, thus, the means for grasping the objects to be
known, not the known objects themselves. It is c\ear, therefore, that this
intentio is very c\osely bound up with the Thomistic theory ofknowledge, the
so-called species theory.
In addition there is aseries of subspecies of this extra-practical intentio,
which, however, are only fully comprehensible and meaningful within the
context of the whole Thomistic conception of knowledge. The one most
sei dom spoken of is an intentio sensibilis (or intentio formae sensibilis ):9 it
coincides with the species sensibilis, the form ofthe perceptual object which is
received into the mi nd without the materia, in the case of sense perception.
More often we encounter the intentio intelligibilis, which is identical with that
species intelligibilis which corresponds in the intellectus to the species
sensibilis. Still a third kind of intentio is mentioned in the Summa Contra
Gentiles, the intentio intellecta.1° It is the final cognitive image (terminus) in
which the knowledge ends, which the intellect actively forms from the
passively receivedspecies intelligibilis ("id quod intellectus in se ipso concipit
de re intellecta"). This intentio intellecta, too, is a likeness, a similitudo or
imago. In this respect we would certainly be justified in c\aiming a c\ose
relationship between extra-practical intention in St Thomas and the copy
theory of knowledge. This does not mean, however, that this copy has to be
fully intuitable by the senses. This is shown, for example, by the fact that the
intentio intellecta is also designated as verbum interius, meaning inner word
 7

or eoneept, and is presented as the produet of an abstraetion. 11 In a more

formal ontologie al sense Thomas also frequently speaks of intentiones
logicae. They eoincide materially with the earlier intentiones secundae, the
basic logical eoneepts, whieh include, above all, the Aristotelian eategories.
lntentio logicalis is, indeed, a basic term in Seholastie logie.
As is weil known, the Thomistic theory of knowledge did not dominate the
entire period of the Middle Ages. Partieularly in later Seholastieism,
eompletely novel eoneeptions of knowledge developed alongside the older
ones. In many ways. however, one has the impression that the whole doetrine
ofextra-praetical intention, including the distinetion betweenprima as weH as
the secunda intentio, had become somewhat of an embarrassment. They really
did not know what to do with it any more, especially after the doetrine of
speeies inereasingly began to be displaeed by terministie eoneeptions.
Sometimes it almost seems as if intentio means the same as "content," or
"objeet of thought" or" presentation," or" eoneept" in a very vague sense to be
found so frequently today (as, for example, in intentio generis, an expression
which is virtually synonymous with "genus"). Thus it is not surprising that the
term intentio in its extra-praetical meaning was not earried over (like so many
other Seholastie terms) into modern philosophy.
For a preliminary, though still rather simplified, picture ofthe variety ofthe
eompeting theories on extra-praetieal intentio at thattime, one had best turn to
the 23rdDistinctio in the first book ofthe" Sentences" by Peter Aureol. If one
tries to group these theories, the one which is particularl~ new is that of the
extra-praetical intentio as an act, i.e. as an actus rationis (actus intellectus).
This eonception appears for the first time in Duns Seotus, though his coneept
of extra-praetical intentio wavers a good deal. In general, he upholds the
tradition al doetrine of the intentio prima as res intellecta and the intentio
secunda as the object of logic proper;12 at times he simply takes over the
Aristotelian-Thomistie species doetrine of knowledge. 13 He is thus somewhat
ineonsistent when he develops the traditional doetrine and then, abruptly, at
the end of the "Questions," designates the diseursive aet of inference as an
intentio secunda, which, as actus rationis, or intellectus, leads to the primae
intentiones. 14 Such a coneeption would be more understandable with the
Thomist Hervaeus Natalis, who only partially aecepted the aet theory. For
hirn, intentio is first and foremost everything that is found in the subjeet that
represents the objeet and that leads to it. N aturally the actus intellectus, too, is
one ofthese entities which represent the objeet. 15 While disregarding some less
important advoeates ofthis conception, who, for the most part, depend chiefly
on Scotus, we must pay some attention to William of Ockham. He, too,
however, is ineonsistent;just after he has eharaeterised the res realiterexistens
as an intentio prima, he designates, at the end ofthis same Quodlibet, the res
as weil as the intentio secunda as mere actus intelligendi, indeed even as
 8

animae passiones. 16 The basis for this conception is characteristic; it is

arrived at merely on the basis of the Principle of Parsimony.17 What is
noteworthy is the clarity with which Scholastics such as Giles of Rome,
(Aegidius Romanus)18 or Peter Aureol 19 opposed such psychologistic con-
ceptions, especially of the objects of logic (or the secundae intentiones), by
pointing out their non-mental nature.
Others interpret the extra-practical intention as a relation. This interpre-
tation, too, originated in incipient form in Duns Scotus, e.g. when he, at one
point, presented the intentio secunda as the relation ofthat which is predicable
to that of which it can be predicated. 20 The main advocate of this theory is
Hervaeus Natalis. Yet in his ca se, too, the intentio is not so much a genuine
relation as a relational property in the object known. It does not denote a
relation between the known and the knowing, but rather a characteristic on the
side of the known (but by no means on that of knowing!) in relation to
knowing. 21 The ens intellectum here seems to be almostidentical with the fully
known object,22 and is then designated by intentionalitas. The possession, the
having, of such respectus rationis is also characterised as a habitudo rei
in tellectae. 23
Finally I should mention the conception of Peter Aureol hirnself, who
discussed all ofthe previously mentioned conceptions ofintentio. For hirn it is
a me re conceptus mentis, namely one which, originating from the objects, is
formed only by means of an act of intellect. Yet, in the last analysis, he believes
that this conceptus should include as an indistinguishable part the conceptio
passiva ofthe object and the conceived object itself, which only increases the
difficulties of the intentio doctrine. 24
Characteristic of the conceptions of extra-practical intention at the end of
the Scholastic period are the definitions of concepts in the Lexicon of
Goclenius, a Marburg disciple of Petrus Ramus at the beginning of the
seventeenth century. At first he talks about an intention in the proper sense
(intentio formalis) as actus mentis quo tendit in obiectum. Only in the loose
sense does the intentio also designate the obiectum in quod actus mentis
tendit, the so-called intentio obiectiva. In this sense the actus mentis is always
a cognition, an actus intellectus quo obiectum suum percipit (quo obiectum
cognoscimus) and correspondingly, the intentio obiectiva is always the object
of a cognition Ud quod per actum cognoscitur.)
Thus the picture of extra-practical intentio that the late Scholastics give us is
highly complex. Nevertheless, the great diversity ofthe medieval conceptions
stays within certain bounds, which ac counts for their relative unity compared
with the modem conception. Here is one common unifying feature: regardless
ofthe differences between the late Scholastic and the High Scholastic versions
of intention, whether as an objective entity (object, relation or concept) or as an
act, it was always closely associated with knowledge.
 9

Furthermore, it should be mentioned that this cognitive meaning ofthe term

"intention" in no way remained restricted to philosophy; it seems to have been
used effectively even in languages other than Latin. There is no doubt that
Dante is still wholly under the influence of Scholastic philosophy when he
writes about the intenzione which is drawn out of things by the power of
conceptualisation (apprensiva) and which is incorporated by the soul ("tragge
intenzione et dentro voi spiega," Purgatorio Canto XVIII. Vers 22f.). It is
interesting to note that it was only at that time that the Latin word intendere
took on the new meaning ofthe Italian intendere and the French entendre, in
the sense of understanding. 25 The Scholastic intentio in the sense of a
cognitive image may have played a role in the appearance ofthis peculiar new
meaning ofthe Latin intendere as weIl as in the new development ofthe Italian
and French meanings.

3. INTENTION IN HUSSERL

What is the situation with regard to the meaning of the term "intention" in
contemporary philosophy? Bearing in mind the distinction between "inten-
tion" and "intentionality," it should be made clear that F ranz Brentano did not
revive the independent term "intention," at least not in those of his writings
published up to 1936. As 1 will point out, he spoke only of intentional objects
and intentional relations. Presumably someone who knew the Scholastics as
weIl as Brentano did had a reason for avoiding the expression intentio, which
was all too reminiscent of the various theories of knowledge connected with
this term, and, in particular, of the Thomistic species doctrine.
Thus the actual term "intention" first re-emerges, as far as 1 can see, in
Edmund Husserl. It is not very easy to determine clearly his conception ofthe
essence of intention. At times we must go beyond Husserl's own statements,
since he hirnself offers no final account of the question. What follows is an
attempt to work out an exegesis of what is essential in the Husserlian
conception by way of a somewhat free and extrapolating approach.
It is best to start from the fact that the Husserlian intention appears in two
different places - in meaningful signs (words) and in very specific kinds of
experiences; the subclasses of these intentions are disregarded here as
inessential for my purpose.

3. i. The Verbal-intention (Wortintentioni6

This intention is by no means identical with the word itself. However, it has the
closest relationship with what is designated as the meaning of a word, insofar
as this is not understood as the object meant. The intention, like the meaning, is
 10

something that belongs to thc word, it is something that is directed from the
word to an object. Metaphorically, one could speak ofthe verbal intention as a
beam or an arrow shooting out from the word toward the object. Wh at is behind
the image of such an intentional beam is the assumption that a peculiar non-
real ostensive pointer issues from the word to an object, and that one has to
follow it if one wants to understand the word one has heard. The verbal-
intention is, thus, the non-real pointer beam emanating from the the word (as
from a sign post).27 Of course this be am is not an independcnt cntity; it is
attached to the word from which it emanatcs, tied to it as its source of radiation.
Such a phenomenon is attributed to it, bestowed upon it; on the basis of such an
assigned intention pointing toward a thing, the word "has" the meaning ofthis
thing as a property, yet it does not "have" the intention itself, the intentional
beam, for this beam cannot form a property. Meaning is, accordingly, the
property a word has ofpossessing, not as a property per se but as a kind ofideal
external accessory, an intentional be am which emanates from it and points to a
definite object.

3.2. The Experientiallntention (Erlebnisintention?8

Husserl calls experiences that possess this sort of intention, acts or intentional
experiences. Occasionally even such acts themselves are called "inten-
tions."29 Strictly speaking, this is still an improper phrase, apa rs pro toto. Acts
have the "essential character" (Wesenscharakter), the "peculiarity of inten-
tion, the relation to an object through representation or an analogous mode."
Intention, thus, is something pertaining to an act, not the act itself. So
perceiving or wanting are not intentions in themselves, but they include
intentions directed toward the object of perception, toward the target meant.
The essence ofthis experiential intention, however, is ne ver clearly delimited
by a definition in Husser!. Yet from the context it be comes clear that for hirn
intention is the "character" of an act, its peculiarity by virtue ofwhich it relates
to, is directed toward, or aims at an object. Intention is like thc central thread
woven into every act, aiming at the object belonging to each act. Intention is,
therefore, adependent component of an act, adependent part thereof.
One might suppose that there are also independent acts of intending in addi-
tion to those mentioned thus far. Intention in this sense is often identified with
the act ofmeaning( meinen). The German expression meinen itselfhas a variety
of meanings: the most common one being "to beJieve". Yet when it simply
refers to the pointing toward something, to the making something an object ("I
mean this one, no other") then it must be noted that such a meinen makes
possible sense only in connection with other acts. Furthermore, such an
explicit meinen cannot be traced in acts ofperceiving, feeling or wanting; the
 11

most common and at the same time most important acts include no explicit
independent meaning intentions (Meinungsinlenlionen). Thus the meaning
of Husserl's original act-intention is that of a peculiar function of pointing at
something. There is reason to place special emphasis on this specific function
because more recently Husserl30 himself describes this function of the
intention as a process of constituting, of constructing, the objects, even as a
productive creation which, by the way, brings extra-practical and practical
intention into immediate proximity again. The question may remain undecided
to what extent a demonstration of such functions is possible. At any rate, they
are not distinctive functions necessary for the essence of general act intentions.
What, then, is the relation between verbal intention and experiential
intention? Certainly it is not a case of an equivocation if both are called
"intentions." A common feature ofboth is, above all, the fact that the carrier of
the intention (word or act) points to an object as weIl as the fact that these
intentions are dependent upon their carriers. To be sure, the difference in
carriers is not the only difference between verbal-intention and act-intention.
Going beyond Husserl's treatment ofthe question, one will also have to note
differences in the structure of the intentions themselves. Thus the verbal-
intention is an artificially assigned attribute ofthe word, its connection with the
word is non-real (ideell), resulting from the act of attribution, while experien-
tial intention, being mental directedness independent of such acts of attribu-
tion, has areal existence in the act itself. Connected with this is the further
difference that verbal intentions are located, as it were, outside ofthe real body
of sound, thus forming a kind of non-real (ideell) appurtenance, whereas act-
intentions are parts embedded in the acts themselves. These differences,
however, do not exclude the possibility that the "pointing beams" ofwords as
weIl as acts constitute a common, basic characteristic ofHusserl' s two types of
intention.

4. A COMPARISON BETWEEN INTENTION IN THE SCHOLASTICS

AND IN HUSSERL

What, then, is the relation between intention in Husserl and intention in the
medieval Scholastics? Let us first briefly point out the main differences in
parallel columns:

(1) Extra-practical intention in the (1) In Husserl the verbal intention is a

Scholastics is a self-contained entity, dependent entity, an accidens. Only
and is, in this sense, an independent acts of a mere intentional meinen
entity, regardless ofwhether we mean would be relatively independent; but
 12

a mere likeness of a thing, a thing, or even they must be distinguished from

an intellectual act; the only case
where this differs is where we inter-
pret intentionalitas as a relational
property (habitudo).
(2) The Scholastics have extra-
practical intention only in cognitive
acts.
(3) We encounter the term "inten-
tion" in the Scholastics only in the
field of logic and in epistemology.
(4) In the High Scholastics the
doctrine of intentio usually occurs in
dose connection with the species
doctrine ofknowledge, a special form
of the copy theory.
(5) Even in the conception ofintentio
as act, the element of directedness
toward the object is not elaborated at
all or is not elaborated as such; the
conception of relational property
regards it at best as a relation of the
object to the act.
intellectual acts in general.
(2) In Husserl, it also occurs in non-
cognitive acts, e.g. in representational
acts or believing, and particularly in
emotional and practical acts (for
example, delight at something or
striving for something).
(3) Husserl uses it throughout the
entire realm of philosophy, especi-
ally, also, in general psychology,
phenomenology and philosophy of
language.
(4) Husserl's use of the term is not
based upon any special theory of
knowledge.
(5) In Husserl's conception the
essential element of verbal and
experiential intentions is the pointing
relatedness of the word and the act to
the object.

The only thing the Scholastics and Husserl might have in common with regard
to intention is, perhaps, the connection with mental acts in general. But this
connection is too general to provide the foundation for an essential relationship
in structure. At any rate, on the basis ofthe findings above, we cannot speak of
a common Scholastic and phenomenological concept of extra-practical
intention.
1fthis is true, then we arejustified in asking why Husserl re-introduced the
Scholastic term at all. The answer can be given only in the light ofthe history of
the expression" intentional." Historically speaking, as I want to re-emphasise,
both terms have been used in a closely parallel fashion, and it is only for
systematic reasons that I considered it appropriate to loosen up their tight
linkage.
 13

5. THE INTENTIONAL IN THE SCHOLASTICS

Obviously the term "intentional," too, goes back to the Scholastics. To my

knowledge its first occurrence has not yet been traced, yet it is already used by
Thomas Aquinas. He contrasts the esse intentionale, characteristic of every
likeness, every similitudo in the transmitting medium (e.g. the similitudo
co loris in aere, the likeness of colourin the air) to the esse reale ofthe original
(theesse coloris inpariete, the being of colour on the wall); in a similarfashion
the expressions secundum intentionem or intentionaliter and secundum esse
or realiter are contrasted; the expression esse in intentione is also used. Thus
"intentional," in this context, means a certain mode of existence, the
characteristic irreal kind of being attributed to likenesses, the extra-practical
as weIl as to the practical intentions, the goals of an intention to do something
as opposed to the being of real objects. 31 Esse intentionale, therefore, does not
simply mean the same as "to be an intentio" which is sometimes called
intentionalitas, but rather "to have an existence of the sort that the intentio
has."
The late Scholastics formulated the conception of intentional existence even
more radically: esse intentionale now becomes an existence that depends
solelyon the act, even on the act of will of the subject. A typical example is
Durandus de S. Porciano's differentiation between an esse intentionale in a
primary sense and the esse reale. The former he attributes to those objects
which owe their existence solely to an act of the intellect (non sunt nisi per
operationem intellectus); among them he lists genus, species, and;in general,
the logicae in tentiones , but he (like Thomas) does not include the image
present in the medium, which is in this sense real. In a secondary sense he uses
"intentional" for everything that possesses a weak, inferior kind of existence
(esse debile) insofar as it has not yet reached the full development of its essence
(quia deficit a perjectione propriae speciei) as, for example, the light and the
species coloris in the conveying medium. 32 This secondary meaning, however,
gradually recedes into the background and the conception of the intentional
existence as a subjective existence dependent upon the act takes precedence. 33
We should bear in mind that according to this Scholastic conception of the
esse intentionale, certainly not every intentio forms an ens intentionale with
an esse intentionale. Thus the intentio prima, in its most commonly accepted
meaning as direct object of knowledge, is not simply intentional; in Ockham,
for example, the intentio prima was characterised almost as res realiter
existens. 34

6. BRENTANO'S INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE

Among modern philosophers it was indeed Brentano who resumed the use of
 14

the term "intentional," and, in so doing he referred explicitly to the Scholastic

usage of the term. But his students and commentators in particular have paid
too little attention to the context in which it was introduced. In general it should
be stressed that in the works ofBrentano which have been published so far (and
these are the only ones which can be used as references here) the term
intentional is very seldom used.
Brentano re-introduces the term in Psychology from an Empirical Stand-
point, and he does this in connection with the attempt at a more exact
differentiation between mental and physical phenomena. This fact by itself
shows that this is a matter of general psychology and no longer, as before, a
matter of epistemology and logic.
Furthermore, it is striking that the word "intentional" in Brentano's
Psychology is always used as a direct or indirect attribute of "object." In
Brentano every mental phenomenon (such as presentation, judgement, love)
is characterised by that which, in his opinion, "the Scholastics of the Middle
Ages called the intentional (or even mental) inexistence of an object, and wh at
we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a conte nt (which
is not to be understood as meaning something real), or immanent objectivity.
Every [mental phenomenon] includes something as object within itself....
This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phe-
nomena." These can be defined as "those phenomena which contain an object
intentionally within themselves."35
It is of no concern here just to what extent such a conception of mental acts
per se, and not just of cognition, is a Scholastic or Thomistic one. One thing is
clear, however: in Brentano the term "intentional" is intimately connected
with a conception of the experiential structure according to which all objects to
which an experience relates are at the same time contained in this experience,
they exist within it. The term "intentional (mental) inexistence" expresses this
immanence in the mens especially clearly; it seems to denote an embed-
dedness in the sense of a Scholastic or, in particular, a Thomistic intentio.
In this sense such "intentional" objects obviously do not exist outside the
mens. This conception originates mainly in critical realism which Brentano,
too, advocated, and which regards physical phenomena such as colours from
the outset as something subjective. This critical realism is certainly no copy
theory of knowledge; nevertheless a relation exists insofar as it leads to a
doubling of the extern al object in the consciousness in the form of a
phenomenal correlate of the real object. In Brentano, the word "intentional"
is thus synonymous with "immanent" and stands in contrast to "transcen-
dent," and "intentional object" is synonymous with "immanent object."
Without the underlying conceptions of immanence and transcendence,
Brentano's theory of the intentional object, or, more precisely, of the
intentional inexistence of the object, loses its foundation.
 15

This becomes even more apparent from Brentano's later objections to this
terminology. In a footnote in the 1911 edition,36 he objects only to the
misunderstanding that the expression "intentional inexistence" denotes an
intention to do something and the pursuit of a goal. "In view ofthis I might have
done better to avoid it altogether. Instead of the term 'intentional' the
Scholastics very frequentIy used the expression 'objective'.37 This has to do
with the fact that something is an object for the mentally active subject, and, as
such, is present in some manner in his consciousness .... " Here too, therefore,
the intentional is nothing but that which is present, immanent, in conscious-
ness, as opposed to that which actually exists. More importantly, Brentano, at
this point, is very close to giving up the expression "intentional" in order to
throw the mental immanence of mental phenomena into even bolder relief. In
an appendix of 1911, the term completely disappears. Here he only speaks of
the "mental reference to something as object.,,38
According to Oskar Kraus,39 however, Brentano later completely gave up
the doctrine ofimmanent objectivity, ofthe mental inexistence ofthe objects.
He maintains that only the reference to something as object remained for
Brentano as characteristic of mental phenomena. Even then, however, it is
significant that in connection with this the expression "intentional," too,
completely disappears. 40 F or Brentano it was and remained closely connected
with the doctrine of the act-immanent objects; mental inexistence, not the
reference to something as object, constituted for hirn the essence ofintention-
ality.
This realisation does not conflict with the claim that at the same time
Brentano was the first to point out the essential relatedness of the mental
phenomena to objects. The only thing that is open to dispute is whether he
characterised specifically this side of the mentallife by the expression" inten-
tional." What he hirnself regarded as being equivalent to" intentional (or even
mental) inexistence of an object," namely, on the one hand, reference to a
content, direction toward a (non-real) object, and, on the other hand,
immanent objectivity, are two very different things. Objects toward which I
direct mys elf do not by any means have to exist immanently. Even if both
things always went together, they would still have to be distinguished
conceptually. It seems that Brentano was not sufficiently aware of this
difference when he combined the two phenomena under the heading "inten-
tional inexistence." That the word "intentional," in particular, is connected
not with the conception of the reference to an object, but with the idea of
immanence is shown clearly by the remark about the adjectives "intentional
(also even mental)" (inexistence) in which their meaning in the sense of
immanence within the mind is once again expressed. 41
Thus "intentional" for Brentano refers to the property of an object which is
immanent in consciousness in a way analogous to that in which the species are
 16

immanent in the Thomistic-Aristotelian theory of knowledge, with which

Brentano had concerned himself a good deal. 42 He thus occupies astrange
position on the dividing line between the medieval and the modern conception.
On the one hand, his use ofthe term "intentional" is highly Scholastic; on the
other hand, the concept of mental reference, which does not yet receive the
designation "intentional," is modern.
This does happen, however, in two places in the very important lecture of
1889, On the Origin ojOur Knowledge ojRight and Wrong. 43 Here Brentano
speaks of an "intentional relation to something which may not be actual but
which is presented as an object." Yet there is no mention of intentional
phenomena. The intentional relation is also described as a "subjective
attitude" ("subjectives Verhalten"), and thus not as a relation in the usual
sense between two equal poles, but rather as something which Brentano later
described as "relation-like" ("relativlieh"). An act, not an object, therefore, is
"intentional." But in this case, too, it is made clear that that to which the act
refers is primarily "inwardly objective," Le. "immanent" or "intentionally
inexistent" in the sense of the Psychology of 1874.
Finally, Brentano also uses the expression "intentional" to denote the
merely phenomenal as distinguished from the real. Thus he talks about
mental phenomena such as knowledge, joy, and longing as having real
existence in addition to their intentional existence, while physical phenomena
such as colours, sounds, warmth have only phenomenal and intentional
being. 44
Ir one were to und erstand "intentional" here in the sense of "immanent,"
intentional and real existence would be mutually exclusive; "immanent
objectivity" should then mean mere objectivity in the Scholastic sense, Le. a
lack of real existence.

7. THE INTENTIONAL IN HUSSERL

On the basis of this evidence it no longer seems to me to be doubtful that the

modern meaning of the term "intentional," and not just that of the term
"intention," is first arrived at in Husserl. Husserl was the first to separate the
concept of intentionality from the notion of immanent inexistence and
interpreted it, or, speaking more precisely, re-interpreted it, as relatedness to,
direction toward, the object.
This comes out with greatest clarity in Husserl's discussion of Brentano's
doctrine of mental phenomena in his fifth Logical Investigation ("On
Intentional Experiences and their 'Contents' "). There he wams, in particular,
oftwo misunderstandings to which Brentano's exposition could give rise. The
 17

first one - the possibility of construing the objective relatedness of experiences

as a real relation between the ego and the object known - is of minor
importance. What is more dangerous, according to Husserl, is the misunder-
standing implicit in expressions such as "immanent objectivity," "intentional
or mental inexistence," "the object's being contained in consciousness"; this
amounts to the view that the object is thought of as included in the experience
as in a box. Here an essential difference between Husserl's and Brentano's
conceptions ofthe intentional comes to light. For Husserl the intentionalobject
is never immanent, but transcendent in a sense yet to be shown. What is
"immanent," an expression Husserl still wanted to avoid in the Logical
Investigations (see Logical Investigations, vol. 2, Investigation V, sect. 11),
for instance real (reell) data of sensation, "appearances," are precisely not
intentional.
In addition, further striking peculiarities ofHusserlian intentionality appear.
First, it should be noted that Husserl speaks not only, as Brentano did, of
intentional objects but, above all, of intentional experiences or data. No one
before Husserl had done this.
In order exactly to comprehend the actual sense of the adjective "inten-
tional" in Husserl, one must again become somewhat specific. This will also
require a more exact elaboration of some points that Husserlleft in need of
clarification.
For Husserl, intention~l experiences are in the foreground. "The qualifying
adjective 'intentional' names the common 'essential character' of certain
classes of experiences, which relate to objects. ,,45 To this extent "intentional"
means nothing but the property of an experience to possess an intention in the
previously discussed sense of the term, a directedness toward an object.
"Intentional" in this sense is synonymous with "having an intention or
containing it."
Husserl often speaks, too, of intentional relation as a characteristic of acts,
in the same sense in which Brentano spoke of a relation of mental to physical
phenomena. Yet the question arises whether a relation can really be the bearer
of intentionality in the strict sense. There is certainly a particular relation
between an act and the object toward which it is directed: one member of the
relation, the act, is directed intentionally (through an "intention") toward the
other member, the object. The relation itself, however, is not directed toward
the object. Thus the relation can at best be "intentional" in a derivative sense
inasmuch as it depends on the intentionality ofthe act, or rather, is contained
in the act.
Other bearers of intentionality can be linguistic expressions. Husserl,
indeed, attributes intentional meaning to words with an intention toward
objects.
 18

With acts as weil as with words, "intentional" thus means "having an

intention," "tending toward an object," and to this extent, "intending." The
situation changes when we now move on toobjects as bearers ofintentionality.
Here the predicate "intentional" means, first of aB, the same as "being
intended,"46 "being the object of an intention," "being the goal at wh ich one
aims." Thus the opposite ofthe intentional is the not-intended, that which is
not aimed at: in this sense, for example, one's own mentallife is, normally, not
intentional. In principle, every object can be intentional in this way, can
become the object of an intention - regardless of whether the object is
immanent or transcendent (in the sense ofbeing beyond the limits ofthe given,
and, to this extent, not given), real or unreal.
Besides this, the expression "intentional" as applied to objects has a yet
narrower, more specific meaning for Husserl. According to it, "intentional"
refers to everything that lies beyond the realm of experiences and their
"components," but which is still actually meant or intended by the acts as
"correlates." Here "intentional" is contrasted to "reell," the latter meaning
contained in experience as a constituent part, as an independent piece or a
dependent element;47 the data of sensation are supposed to be included here
as well. 48 The intentional in this sense lies, therefore, essentially outside ofthe
experiences, and is in this respect "transcendent. ,,49 In I deas, Husserl
introduced the term "noematic" for "intentional" in the above sense, and the
term "noetic" for" reell." This terminology, however, is based on a conception
of the structure of consciousness, which, insofar as it presupposes the
existence of sense-data, cannot be regarded as certain and binding. In this
doctrine of the data of sensation, a vestige of the old species doctrine remains,
according to which only correlates of objects, not objects themselves, can
appear in consciousness itself.
Finally, one finds in Husserl a third meaning ofthe expression "intentional"
with respect to objects, one which corresponds almost completely to that ofthe
Scholastics. It means the mode of being of such objects which only exist
thanks to consciousness, as opposed to the mode of being of reality. Husserl,
then, often speaks of "merely intentional" objects. If one starts out, however,
from the new meaning of"intention" as mere directedness toward an object,
the retention of such a terminology does seem rather unfortunate. F or such
directedness can in no way constitute an object or maintain it in existence. On
the contrary, the completed constitution of an object is presupposed before an
act can direct itself toward it; one simply cannot direct oneself toward
something which is not yet constituted. Thus Husserl's terminology leads to a
confusion of intention as directedness and intention in the sense of constituting
an object, a confusion which, especially in Husserl, had unfortunate con-
sequences; for he construed the intentionality of the object more and more in
the sense of being constituted by functioning intentions.
 19

8. A COMPARISON OF HUSSERLIAN AND EARLIER INTENTIONS

I shall now compare the Husserlian concept of intentionality, on ce again in a

summary fashion, with that of his predecessors.
The last mentioned meaning of"intentional" in contrast to "reell" indeed
has its origin in Scholastic philosophy and is carried over almost unchanged
into modern philosophy.
The situation is different with the conceptions mentioned before. Diametri-
cally opposed to the Scholastic conception50 is, in particular, the meaning of
"intentional" as differentiated from the "reell" which has no basis in
Scholastic philosophy nor in Brentano. Brentano's immanent intentional
object provides a link only insofar as Husserl is concerned with the same entity
and designates it as intentional, yet he conceives it in an alte red sense, no
longer in that of immanence, but of a peculiar transcendence to the "reell"
content of consciousness.
"Intentional" in the sense of "intended" occurs, in the strict sense, first in
Husserl. This meaning is completely absent from Scholastic philosophy. It is
true that we encounter in Brentano a directedness toward an object, which thus
becomes the target of this directedness; however, this object is not yet called
intentional; in Brentano this term remains connected with the idea of
immanence. Husserl's conception of intentionality is free from this idea of
immanence, but is characterised by the element of intendedness.
A meaning of " intentional" which we find exclusively in Husserl and which
he uses most frequently is the one of an intending or meaning directedness
(intendierend-meinenden Gerichtetheit) in the experience toward the object.
Thus the main result of our historical comparison can be stated as follows:
both with regard to the meaning of the term "intention" and to that of the
derivative term "intentional", very considerable differences remain. It may
very well be that the modern conception is historically connected to the
medieval one, yet at the final state of development the differences in meaning
have become so far-reaching that all that remains for a portion of the
phenomena is a sameness of label, and for the corresponding terms mere
equivocation of meanings. Here, as in all cases, terminologie al agreements
between medieval and modern, between Scholastic and phenomenological
philosophy, must be treated with extreme caution, in the interests ofboth, and
in the interest ofthe subject-matter itself. This is even more true in those cases
where, on the basis of such agreement, it is claimed that there have been
influences and that ideas have been taken over from the one to the other.

9. SYSTEMA TIC CONCLUDING REMARKS

The main goal of the present essay has now been reached. All that was
 20

intended here was to discuss the relationship between the medieval and the
modern conceptions, to show their differences and their similarities in a
historical context. Systematic problems were investigated and clarified only to
the extent necessary for an understanding of the history. Nevertheless, the
systematic interest served as a kind of guide for the questions posed. It
seems, therefore, appropriate to add a few systematic supplementary remarks
and conclusions.
The present essay has not dealt with a number of questions which would
have to be taken up in a systematic investigation ofintentional structures. To
point out only one: the relationship between intention and consciousness
which, not without reason, has hardly been mentioned so far. We can by no
means assert from the very start that they are identical, as little as that the
mental and the conscious are identical. We should not underestimate how
important it is to clarify these questions. It is also extremely important,
particularly from the epistemological point ofview, to clarify the relationship
between that which is intended and that which is given, whose identity, too,
must not simply be assumed.
On the basis ofthe preceding resuits, a ceitain terminological reform would
seem to be indicated. The term "intention" was certainly meaningful and
historically justified as a me ans of pointing out an extremely important and
thus far alm ost overlooked area of phenomena. But today when the complexity
of the respective structures has been revealed and when, in many cases,
equivocations have intruded, the foreign word has degenerated into a
dangerous catchword because it is often used rather haphazardly; therefore, a
simplifying adaptation ofthe terminology to the new situation would certainly
be desirable.
Yet, as far as possible, the coining of new technical terms should be avoided.
In any case preference should be given to expressions close to the subject-
matter. In many cases the German word meinen is quite suitable; yet, for
reasons indicated above (p. 10), this is not always the case. I would
recommend that the intentional act be designated as "object-directed"
(gegenstandsgerichtei) and the intentionally intended object as "act-meant."
For in view ofthe problematic nature ofthe structure in question, it would be
premature to worry over the substitution of another term for "intentional" in
the sense in which it is opposed to "reell"; possible formulations would be
"act-transcendent" (aktjenseitig) or "experience-transcendent" (erlebnis-
jenseitig). Für the merely intentional object as contras ted with the real object,
the term "act-dependent" or "experience-dependent" would seem appro-
priate. For "intention" itself, meaning a pointing from the word or act to the
object, a term such as "object-directed" or "object-aiming reference" will
usually suffice.
Such terminological revisions, however, do not affect the importance ofthe
 21

subject-matter. It remains Brentano's indisputable achievement to have

revealed that the mental refers to an object. One may doubt whether this
phenomenon is a suitable means for distinguishing the area of psychology or
the area of phenomenology from other areas. Yet this does not change the fact
that object-directed acts are of fundamental importance, and not only for the
comprehension of the mental as such. If we start from the study of inorganic
and merely organically living nature, it is an enormous leap, something
fundamentally new, to have a being that is not confined within itself, that can go
beyond itself and can have something else as an object, that can refer and can
be directed toward something else, and this not only in a real-causal
manner, but also in a peculiarly non-real, mental manner. Here something
utterly new enters the world. Dead nature rises above its self-containment and
reaches out beyond itself. This signifies a turning point in the cosmic order.
Such a phenomenon is important enough to constitute a basic theme not only
in psychology but in the philosophy of life, metaphysics and philosophical
anthropology as weIl. This is true even if consciousness or object-directed acts
are already present in subhuman living beings, above all in the higher animals.
This would not exclude their decisive role in the human structure. But their
importance is altered and enhanced in the human being since he has to a certain
extent the ability freely to control these object-directed acts. Such a structure,
furthermore, has its own, inherent value and dignity worthy of further
investigation. Finally, one can gain here basic ethical insights. Is itpermissible
that a being whose essence and value reach their full development only when it
rises above itself should remain confined within itself, within its natural
biological confines and plant-like rootedness? Is it not rather destined to start
out from its specific station and reach beyond itselfby utilising what nature has
granted it? A thoughtful answer to these questions, which each person must
work out and live for himself, will also, more than ever, determine the fate of
our humanity and our civilisation.

NOTES

'Translated from the German by Linda L. McAIister and Margarete Schinde. "The present
translation is based on a reprinted version of the German original which appeared in Studia
Philosophica, vol. 29 (1970), pp. 189-216. However, Professor Spiegelberg, who, together
with Professor Donald Sievert, also ofWashington University, checked our drafts, wrote to us
that after more than thirty-five years he found it difficult to stick to the fonnulations of his
original text. His corrections were, therefore, not always based on disagreements with our
translations, but sometimes constituted modifications of the text translated." [L.L.M. and
M.S.].
2 Summa Theologica, 1, 2q, 12a, 1c. Raymundus LuIlus, who offers a comprehensive fonnula
("Intentio est operatio inteIIectus et voluntatis, quae se movet ad dandum complementum
desideratae et inteIIectae rei") in his De Prima et Secunda intentione (Opera VI), considers
only practical intention in the remaining text, especially because this work has a purely ethical
 22

character; thus the continuation ofthe definition reads, "et intentio est actus naturalis appetitus,
qui requirit perfectionem quae iIIi naturaliter convenit."
3Ueberweg-Geyer, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 2, 11th ed. (1928), p. 343.
4 Another relevant expression besides M a 'na is M aqsad especially in combinations such as Qsad
Tani (Le. secunda intentio).(Averroes, Compendio de Metafisica, Madrid, 1919, p. 800) and
maqsad alkalam (aim of speech); I am indebted for the reference to the late Max Meyerhof in
Cairo.
5 The distinction between prima and secunda intentio in Arabic philosophy, as I can on!y
hypothesise, has to do with the doctrine ofprimary and secondary substances in Aristot!e. The
secundae intentiones, like secondary substances, have on!y a derivative and, to that extent,
secondary being. This is expressed most c1early by A verroes, who says of the secundae
intentiones (or intelligibilia), "quorum esse est in intellectu tantum" (Metaphysica, I, 1, Venet,
1550f., 169b59).
6 R.D. Simonin, "La notion d' 'intention' dans l'oeuvre de Saint Thomas d' Aquin", Revue des
sciences philosophiques et thiologiques, vol. 19 (1930), pp. 445, sqq.
7 Summa Contra Gentiles IV, 11, "Est autem ... ".
8 This becomes particularly evident by combining the passages I, 58, and VI, 11, in the Summa
Contra Gentiles.
9 Summa Theologica 1, q. 78, a. 4 corp.
10 In the Summa Theologica (1, q. 85 a 1 ad 4) only the intentio intelligibilis or species
intelligibilis appears.
11 Summa Contra Gentiles IV, 11. On the doctrine of the verbum interius see also Summa
Theologica, I, q. 27 a 1 corp.
12 Super !ib. I Posteriorum 1. 46 "Item ... ".
13 Prant!, Geschichte der Logik, vol. 3, sect. XIX, nos 107 and 109.
14" ••• triplex est operatio intellectus. Una est intelligentia simplicium; alia est compositio vel
divisio.... Tertia est operatio discursiva a praemissis ad conc1usiones, at ille discursus est
intentio secunda et est actus rationis per quem ducimur in cognitionem primarum intentionum et
aliarum scientiarum" (Super lib. I, Post, q. 46).
15 "Uno modo dicitur intentio ex parte ipsius intelligentis omne illud quod per modum alicuius
repraesentationis ducit intellectum in cognitionem alicuius rei, sive sit species intelligibilis sive
actus intellectus sive conceptus mentis" (Prant!, vol. 3, sect. 19, no. 396).
16 Quodlibeta, IV, 19.
17 "Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora ... ergo praeter actum intelligendi non
oportetponere aliquid aliud" (Prant!, vol. 3, sect. 19, n. 768).
18 "Logica non est de actibus sed est de intentionibus et conceptibus qui formantur per huiusmodi
actus .... Dialectica ergo, quae proprie rationalis est, magis erit de huiusmodi conceptibus
quam de ipsis actibus' ibid., vol. 3, no. 371).
19 "Logica non coniungit actum intellectus actui intellectus sed conceptus secundarios con-
ceptibus primis,... ; ergo manifestum est, quod secunda et prima intentio non sunt actus
intelligendi sed obiectivus conceptus' (Prant!, vol. 3, n. 705).
20". . . intentio secunda quae est quaedam re!atio rationis in praedicabili ad illud de quo est
praedicabile ... " (Prant!, vol. 3, sect. 19, no. 106).
21 " ... qui quidem respectus non tenet se ex parte actus intelligendi vel ex parte scientiae in ordine
ad rem intellectarn sed magis e converso, respectu rationis, tenens se ex parte rei intellectae in
ordine ad intellectum ipsum" (according to Peter Aureol in Prant!, no. 701).
n"Prima intentio ... non est aliud quam esse intellectum". Peter Aureol, in 1, Sent., dist. 23,
art. 1.
23 " Alio modo dicitur intentio, quod se tenet ex parte rei intellectae et hoc modo dicitur intentio
res ipsa quae inteIligitur inquantum in ipsam tenditur sicut in quoddam cognitum per actum
inteIligendi, et intentio sie dicta formaliter et in abstracto dicit ... terminationem quae est
quaedam habitudo rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi ... Prima intentio concretive et
materialiter dicit illud quod intelligitur ... Intentio, prout se tenet ex parte rei intellectus,
dupliciter potest accipi seil. in abstracto ipsa intentionalitas et in concreto pro eo cui ista
intentionalitas convenit" (Prant!, n. 396).
 23

24"Intentionalitas (or intentio: note 532) est ipsemet conceptus obiectivus per intellectum
formatus claudens indistinguibiliter conceptionem passivam et rem quae concipitur per ipsam,
et idem est dicta intentio quod conceptus" (Prant!, n. 539).
25 The first example ofthis meaning is, according to Ducange-Henschel, Glossarium mediae et
infimae latinitatis, sub voce intendere, in the Vita of St Catherine ofthe fourteenth century:
Prophetarum cum discretione intendenda.
26 Cp. especially Logical Investigations, vol. 2, no. 1; English edition trans. J.N. Findlay, pp.
269-336.
27 R. Ingarden speaks here of an "intentional direction factor" (Richtungsfaktor) in Das
literarische Kunstwerk (Halle, 1931), pp. 61 ff.
28 Cp. especially Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay, vol. 2, no. 5, esp. § 18; pp. 533-
659. esp. pp. 580-1.
29 Not taken into consideration here are the equivocations that Husserl hirns elf distinguished, as
weIl as intention in the narrower sense, i.e. the act of the non intuitive or empty aiming at an
object which corresponds to the intuitive experience that fulfils it.
30 As in Formale und transzendentale Logik (Halle, 1929), see esp. p. 183 (Wesen der
Intentionalität als konstituierende Leistung) and p. 216 and E. Fink, Die phänomenolo-
gische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik (1934); "Studien zur
Phänomenologie 1930-1939," Phaenomenologica, val. 21 (1966). p. 143.
31 Brentano's historical remark in his Psychology concerning Thomas Aquinas, to the effect
that not only what is thought of is intentional in the thinker, but also that the object of love is in
the lover and the thing desired in the desirer, turns out to be correct for the esse intentionale (as
distinguished from the intentio itself).
32 In Sent. I, dist. 23, art. I (ed. Romae, 1595, val. I, p. 530): "Esse intentionale" is comparable
to the "esse.-übiectivum tantum et ficticium seu apparens" and is differentiated from the "esse
reale et fixum extra verorum [probably: rerum] naturam, absque omni apprehensione," "per
quod patet quod esse intentionale non est aliud quam visio aut apparitio obiective. " "Illud quod
non est existens in rerum natura nec habet esse fixum extra secundum quod huiusmodi, illud
inquam est quid intentionale" (Prant!, p. 592, notes 530 and 532).
33" Scholastici ens intentionale appellant ens quod sola conceptione et consideratione inest, seu
ens quod est intra animam per notiones, cui opponitur reale quod reperitur extra animae
notiones" (Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum).
34 Likewise his folIower Armandus de Bellovisu: "Ipsa ergo res intellecta materialiter et in
concreto dicitur intentive sive res intellecta sive ens reale ut homo, lapis et huiusmodi" (Pranti,
vol. 3, sect. 19, note 631).
35 Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 2nd ed. Oskar Kraus (1925), Book II, chapter 1,
sect. 5. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, English edition ed. Linda L. McAlister
(London and New York, 1973).
36 2nd ed., vol. 2, p. 8; English ed., p. 180.
37 So Durandus de S. Porciano speaks of an "esse in intellectu obiective" oftruth as opposed to
"esse in intellectu subiective," as it belongs to the species or actus intelligendi (Prant!, note
564).
38 2nd ed. vol. 2, pp. 133ff.; English ed., pp. 271ff.
39 2nd ed. vol. 1, p. 269, no. 11; English ed., p. 89; and Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano (Munich,
1919), pp. 23f.
40 This becomes particular clear in the Appendix mentioned above: "Mental Reference as
Distinguished from Relation in the Strict Sense."
41 2nd ed., vol. 1, p. 124; English ed., p. 88n. "They [the Scholastics] also use the expression 'to
exist as an object (objectively) in something,' which, if we wanted to use it at the present time,
would be understood, on the contrary, as a designation of areal existence outside the mind. At
least this is what is suggested by the expression 'to exist immanently as an object,' which is
occasionally used in a similar sense, and in which the term 'immanent' should obviously rule out
the misunderstanding which is to be feared."
42 Nicolai Hartmann follows hirn in this, unconsciously to be sure, in his Metaphysics of
Knowledge. For hirn, the intentional object is "wholly and completely immanent" and
represents, as such, the transcendent-real object (see esp. 2nd ed., p. 105ff.).
 24

43 English edition ed. Roderick M. Chisholm (London and New York, 1969), pp. 14, 16.
44 Psychologie, 2nd ed., vol. 1, p. 129.
45 Logical Investigations, vol. 2, Inv. 5, sect. 13.
46 Occasionally Husserl himself differentiates between intentional, which can be used both for
meaning and object, and intended, which can only be used for the object (see Logical
Investigations, vol. 2, Inv. I, sect. 30).
47 /deas - General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (1913), trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson,
sect. 88.
48 Ideas, sect. 98.
49 Ideas, sect. 61.
50 This becomes quite clear when we look back to the above-cited passage from Armandus de
Bellovisu (note 35), who used "intentional" primarily to denote whatis immanent, and only in a
secondary sense did he use it to denote the known object of intention.

POSTSCRIPT,1969

(1) The only essential addition in the reprint ofthis essay of 1936 is on p. 16.
I deal here with Brentano's use ofthe expression "intentional relation" in The
Origin o/Our Knowledge 0/ Right and Wrong which I had overlooked when
the original essay was written.
(2) In the light ofnew material, which had not been available to me before,
concerning the role of "intentional" and "intentionality" in the Scholastics,
sections 2 and 5, in particular, need to be supplemented, although they are by
no means outdated. F or additional material on the role of intentio in Ockham
and Albert of Saxony, see I.M. Bochenski, A History o/Formal Logic (Notre
Dame University Press, 1961), pp. 155ff. On the origin ofthe differentiation
between prima and secunda intentio see ibid., p. 154. Compare, further
William and Martha Kneale, The Development ofLogic (Oxford, 1962), pp.
195,229ff.
(3) Husserl's last publications and the posthumous works published in the
Husserliana edition would call for considerable expansion of sections 3 and 7.
Yet I do not believe that this would lead to any essential changes in my
interpretations. For a preliminary enlargement upon my ac count I refer the
reader to the pertinent sections in my book The Phenomenological Move-
ment, A Historical Introduction (The Hague, 1969), pp. 39ff, 117ff.

SUPPLEMENT 1979

The present reprinting of my translated German article gives me the

opportunity to respond to its successor in Linda McAlister's collection, the
article on "Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality" by
Ausonio Marras. Much as I appreciate his interest in my position, his
criticisms are directed primarily not at my article of 1936 but at the few
 25
incidental remarks on the subject I put into my account of Brentano in The
Phenomenologica't Movement (Chapter I, section 7, p. 40), where Husserl's
position was not yet taken up and the significance of the difference between
"intention" and "intentionality," so important in the case of Brentano, not
resumed. Marras' impressive scholarship in contesting my views focusses
mostly on two points: (1) "that the idea of reference to an object is not
incompatible with the scholastic idea of inexistence, but in fact constitutive of
that very idea," (2) "that the doctrine ofintentional existence does not commit
scholastic thought to some form of immanentistic epistemology," as Marras
thinks I simply assurne. Thus Marras is mainly concemed with a correction of
my picture of Scholasticism and especially of the Thomistic conception of
intentionality, which was for me only the starting point for my argument. On
this point I gladly yield to his superior leaming. However, as to my
interpretation of Thomas Aquinas' view on "intentional inexistence" I would
like to point out that I never asserted the incompatibility of the belief in the
immanent existence ofthe "intentio" with that of a reference to an object. I
only meant to distinguish between them. In my view they are combined in
Brentano's case, hence compatible though not necessarily connected.
It is true that in my condensed attempt to characterize Thomas Aquinas'
conception of "intentio" - which does not occur in Brentano - I had con-
centrated too narrowly on his use of the words "similitudo" and "imago"
implying that they are" self-contained entities" and, in this sense, independent
of the things which they resemble, like pictures or films. In this character-
ization I did not pay sufficient attention to the essential relation of such
likenesses to that to which they are like. But I am still wondering whether this
relationship can be identified with the reference and directedness that is
characteristic of Brentano's "psychic phenomena," i.e., acts of persons, not
static relations among concepts and things. In contrast to the uses of the term
"intentio" in some later scholastics, Thomas' "extra-practical" intention
seems to me a static relationship, not an ongoing process. *
As to Marras' second fear that I assurne the Scholastic doctrine of
intentional in existence commits it to some immanentism or subjectivism, I
hope I can reassure hirn that no such thing was and is on my mind. I am well
aware that the critical realism advocated by Thomist epistemology can be
defended on other grounds and can break out of the "iron ring" of ideas that

* On one minor point I cannot yet concede Marras' criticism; namely, that I am certainly mistaken
in saying that phrases like "intentional inexistence" have no standing among the genuine
Scholastics as I said, incidentally merely in the footnote on p. 40 of The Phenomenological
Movement. Actually in referring me to passages in Thomas' commentaries on Aristotle, Marras
hirnself in his translation of "esse intentionale" openly inserts in brackets the crucial syllable
"in" ("intentional [in] existence"). "Esse intentionale" which I discuss in aseparate section of
my article is primarily opposed to "esse reale" and does not imply the connotation of
"being within."
 26

imprisons a Lockian representationalism by causal reasoning. It is another

question how such a causal inference can be justified.
On this occasion I would like to draw attention to an equivocation in the
present puzzling debate on the state of intentionality, ofwhich I myselfhave
become fully aware only recently after reading abrief entry in the latest
Enciclopedia Filosofica (1972) on "intentional inexistence" by G.
Sentinello. It points out that the original meaning of this term was that of
existence within something else, which can be found in Aristotle and the
Scholastics and presumably also in the earlier Brentano. By contrast in most
contemporary discussion inexistence is understood as non-existence illustra-
ted especially by the paradigm ofthe unicom. This poses some very different
problems from those of immanence.
I hope I have now made it sufficiently clear that I consider my historical
discussions in this article as merely a first raid into a minefield. I am happily
surprised that the re cent studies by Klaus Hedwig still find it useful as a basis
for further research. I should like to refer the interested reader particularly to
his articles in the field in Etudes philosophiques, 1978, pp. 259-72 on "La
discussion sur l'origine de l'intentionnalite husserlienne", and the Grazer
Philosophische Studien 5 (1978) pp. 67-82 on "Der scholastische Kontext
des Intentionalen bei Brentano."
 2. HUSSERL'S AND PEIRCE'S PHENOMENOLOGIES:
COINCIDENCE OR INTERACTION'

Until the late thirties, phenomenology in today's sense of the term was for
American philosophy a "foreign affair." To this generalization there is only
one possible exception: the phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce. 2 True,
the mere absence of the word from the works of other American philosophers
does not prove the absence of the thing so designated. Thus the psychology of
William J ames and the philosophy of George Santayana contain many
phenomenological ingredients without the trademark. On the other hand, the
mere presence ofthe name "phenomenology" in Peirce's writings constitutes
no guarantee that it meant the same thing to hirn as it did to Edmund Husser!.
The principal objective ofthe present paper is therefore to determine whether
and to what extent there is common ground between Peirce's and Husserl's
ideas, and whether this ground is sufficient to speak of their phenomenology in
the singular. 3 In so far as such common ground emerges, I shall also discuss the
possibility of mutual influences.
My point of departure will be the following remarkable coincidence: In 1901
the second volume ofHusserl's Logische Untersuchungen appeared under the
title of Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, a
book in which Husserl used the word "Phänomenologie" prominently for the
first time. The following year, 1902, seems to be the earliest certain date for
Peirce's use of the term "phenomenology" as a label for a branch of his new
c1assification of the sciences and of philosophy in particular. 4 Yet, while
Husserl not only continued using it, but even made it the officiallabel of his
philosophy, Peirce, as will be shown in a later section, abandoned the term
after about two years, to replace it by several neologisms, among which
"phaneroscopy" is the one best known. What was behind this striking though
temporary terminological parallel?
In trying to answer this question I shall begin with Husserl' s phenomenology
and then in this light discuss comparable features ofPeirce's phenomenology.
One minor reason for beginning with Husserl is that his use of the term
"phenomenology" apparently precedes Peirce's by at least one year. A more
important one is that it will facilitate the subsequent comparison.
 28

I. THE NUCLEUS OF HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

It would be foolhardy to attempt here a full presentation of Husserl's

phenomenology, let alone of that of other phenomenologists. Besides,
Husserl's conception of phenomenology was a growing and changing one, and
this is not the place to trace its development. Instead I shall try (1) to point out
the germinal idea of Husserl's phenomenology as it had developed when
Peirce was formulating his own conception of phenomenology, and (2) to
indicate the later direction which it was to take.
When Husserl first adopted the term "phenomenology" in 1900 in a foot-
note close to the end of the first volume of his l~ogische Untersuchungen,
which contained his celebrated refutation of psychologism in logic, he was
hardly aware of a revolutionary philosophical or terminological innovation.
He simply was using a term then frcely in use among various philosophical and
scientific thinkers. These ranged all the way from the Hegelians to positivists
like Ernst Mach, with whose use of the term in physics Husserl was
demonstrably familiar. N evertheless, the wording of this footnote was
significant. F or, after onee more rejecting the "psychologistic" claims of an
empirical psychology to supply the foundations for a pure logic, Husserl
contrasted it with a "descriptive Phänomenologie of inner experience which
forms the foundation of empirical psychology and, in a very different sense, at
the same time of the critique of knowledge." This formulation 5 was the one
which Husserl tried to develop and to exemplify in the decisive second volume
of the Logische Untersuchungen, published in 1901.
The introduction to this volume contained the first systematic attempt to
clarify the scope and character of such a pre-psychology and pre-episte-
mology, as one might call it. Among the main characteristics of this new
strange science of experience were (a) its pu rify, (b) its rej7ective character,
and (c) its analytic approach based on the pattern of so-called intentionality.
(a) Purity actually meant two things: Negatively, it signified independence
of empirical facts; for phenomenology "makes not the slightest assertion about
existence," even though most of its material may come from experience. Thus
it was to study perception in its ideal structure, regardless ofwhether such ideal
perception had ever occurred in psychological observation. Positively, purity
meant exclusive concern for the general essen ces of the experiences in
question; far phenomenology concentrated on their essential properties, while
disregarding their accidental modifications in individual cases. Thus it had no
interest in mere individual case studies of perception.
(b) Rej7ectiveness implied that phenomenology turned its attention to the
way in which phenomena, for instance percepts, were given to our intuitive
experience (Anschauung). It studied particularly the varying aspects under
 29

which these phenomena may present themselves, and the various degrees of
clarity with which they were given.
(c) Intentional analysis implied that phenomenology analyzed and de-
scribed the phenomena in terms of their intentional structure, that is, paying
equal attention to the intending act, e.g., the perceiving, and to the intended
content, e.g., the perceived. As is now commonly recognized, it was Husserl's
teacher, Franz Brentano, who had first drawn attention to the phenomenon of
intentional reference. But he had used it only to distinguish between
psychology and the physical sciences. Husserl made it the basis for a
methodical analysis of all phenomena of consciousness in which the parallel
structures ofthe intending acts and the intended contents were studied in their'
reciprocal relationships.
In theLogische Untersuchungen Husserl had applied this reflective analysis
of consciousness in its pure structures only to the foundations of logic and
mathematics. But du ring the first decade ofthe new century, he came to extend
it to an ever widening range of phenomena, until he finally formulated the
program of phenomenology as that of the universal foundation of science and
of every philosophy that aspired to be a rigorous science (strenge
Wissenschaft).
Up to 1905/6, Husserl's phenomenology was epistemologically neutral,
although his doctrine of essences showed a decided tendency toward a
Platonic realism. The subsequent development of his phenomenological
idealism occurs in aperiod when Peirce had already stopped using the name
"phenomenology." Nevertheless the general direction of Husserl's pheno-
menology should at least be indicated, if only for the sake of the record, which
continues to be marred by the seemingly ineradicable legend of Husserl's
epistemological realism. In 1907, in his Göttingen lectures on the Idee der
Phänomenologie, Husserl, under the influence ofDescartes' method of doubt,
introduced for the first time his method of "reduction" or bracketing, wh ich
demanded the suspension of all belief in the existence ofthe world of our naive
experience. In due course this led to the development of a phenomenological
idealism, which became manifest first in the Ideen of 1913 and assumed even
more radical form later on. While Husserl himselfincreasingly insisted on the
fundamental importance ofthis step, not 1et mentioned as such in the Logische
Untersuchungen, I shall refrain from discussing this highly technical and
controversial subject in this context. Yet it is important to realize that Husserl
now conceived of phenomenology as a study inaccessible to the "naive" or
"natural" approach. According to this later interpretation it required a
fundamental change of attitude, which was to give access to an entirely new
dimension in the world of everyday experience. It is hardly necessary to point
out that this later Neo-Cartesian approach would have been utterly unac-
ceptable to Peirce, the avowed anti-Cartesian.
 30

2. PEIRCE'S PHENOMENOLOGY AS SEEN FROM HUSSERL'S PERSPECTIVE

I shall not dweIl upon the fundamental importance which the later Peirce
attached to his new discipline of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. 6 N or shall I
attempt to d uplicate accounts of Peirce's phenomenology wh ich can be found
in the comprehensive studies of such Peirce scholars as James Feibleman,
Manley Thompson and Thomas A. Goudge, all based on the texts published in
the Collected Papers, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Instead I
want to utilize a statement on phenomenology contained in one of Peirce's
letters to William J ames, of which only a small part has been printed in Ralph
Barton Perry's selection from the J ames-Peirce correspondence. 7 The back-
ground for this statement is briefly as follows: In an earlier letter, dated June 8,
1903, Peirce had tried vainly to convince James ofthe necessity ofhis new
phenomenology as outlined in his first two Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism -
those lectures which had elicited J ames' well-known remark about "flashes of
brilliant light relieved against Cymmerian darkness;" in fact, it seems that it
was precisely Peirce's doctrine of the phenomenological categories, i.e.,
firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which James had found so dark. s Now, in
a second letter, dated October 3,1904, in replying to the reprint of James'
essay "Does consciousness exist? ," Peirce tries to prove to J ames that his
phenomenology is really what J ames hirnself was propounding under the new
title of radical empiricism. 9 So he writes:

As 1 understand you, then, the proposition you are arguing is a proposition in what I called
phenomenology, that is just the analysis ofwhat kind of constituents there are in our thoughts and
lives (whether these be valid or invalid being quite aside from the question). It is a branch of
philosophy 1 am most deeply interested in and which 1 have worked upon almost as much as 1 have
upon logic. (Here the letter shows an insert: It has nothing to do with psychology.) ... Perhaps the
most important aspect ofthe series of papers ofwhich the one you sent me is the first, will prove to
be that phenomenology is one science and psychology a very different one .... Phenomenology
has no right to appeal to logic, except to deductive logic. On the contrary, logic must be founded on
phenomenology. Psychology, you may say, observes the same facts as phenomenology does. No.
H does not observe the same facts. It looks upon the same world and the same world that the
astronomer looks at but what it observes in that world is different. Psychology of all sciences
stands most in need of the discoveries of the logician, which he makes by the aid of the
phenomenologist.

There is hardly one sentence in this statement with which Husserl could not
have fully agreed. What would have had Husserl's particular approval is the
disregard for the question ofvalidity or invalidity, the emphasis on the radical
difference between phenomenology and psychology, the affirmation that
phenomenology is a science, a point particularly important to Husserl, and as
such the foundation not only of philosophy, but even of logic. N or would this
exhaust the list of possible agreements.
But behind the agreements of this programmatic facade of Peirce's
 31

phenomenology there remain considerable differences. Of these I shall select

merely those most relevant to the proposed comparison.

2.1. The Phenomenology of Categories

The conception of Peirce's phenomenology had grown out of his pervading

interest in a system of categories for the entire universe of knowledge. It
"simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon and discerns its ubiquitous
elements, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, together perhaps with other
series of categories" (5. 121). As such it was to exclude only "the universal
and necessary laws of the relations of Phenomena to Ends," which Peirce
reserved for Normative Science, and the consideration of the "Reality of
Phenomena," v/hieh he left to Metaphysics (5. 121). Thus, Peirce's pheno-
menology was primarily motivated by his intent to find a system of categories
for all the ranges ofbeing as such, an intent congenial primarily to Aristotle's
science of being qua being, i.e., his metaphysics in the sense of ontology.
There is no direct parallel to this objective in Husserl's phenomenology,
whose primary concern was epistemological. While Peirce's interest in
ontological categories may not be incompatible with Husserl's philosophiz-
ing - some of it is reflected in the "formal ontology" of his Pure Logic - his
phenomenology shows no partieular interest in the search for and discovery of
a system of categories nor any parallel to Peirce's triadic pattern.

2.2. The Nature of Firstness

The basic category in Peirce's phenomenology is Firstness. However, though

pivotal to the whole scheme, it is far from easy to und erstand, since it is
actually "the most elusive" of the categories. 10 Firstnesses, according to
Peirce's chief characterization, consist in "Qualities" or "Qualities of
Feeling." Without discussing ambiguities ofthis term, one had best consider
its denotation whieh, while of "myriad-fold variety" includes such items as
redness, an odor, "one infinite dead ache," and nobleness (5.44). Thus
Firstnesses seem to coincide chiefly with what are usually called "data,"
although not only with sense data.
It would appear that in the beginning Peirce himself was far from sure that
anything like a systematic study ofthese qualities in their chance-like flux was
possible. Thus, in his Guess at the Riddle (1890) he wrote:

Firstness precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be
articulately thought; assert it, and it has already lost its innocence; for assertion always implies the
denial of something else .... Remember that every description of it must be false to it. (1.357)

Considering such a nearly Heraclitean, or even Cratylean, picture it is not

 32

surprising that Peirce never gave any systematic development of his pheno-
menological program, a fact wh ich is actually the major obstacle to a fuIl-scale
comparison between the two phenomenologies. Husserl, much as he realized
that in this area precise mathematical description was essentially impos-
sible,11 was never that pessimistic as to the chances of phenomenolo-
gical description. And while he never arrived at a final formulation of his
phenomenology, he left at least an impressive array of concrete systematic
studies.
N evertheless, it would seem that even Peirce had become more hopeful as to
the chances of a scientific study of Firstness by the time he had adopted the
term "phenomenology" for his science of categories. Thus, when he advanced
the program ofphenomenology as a science in his Lectures on Pragmatism of
1903, he merely stressed the need for the student ofphenomenology - in the
letter to J ames of October 3, 1904, he called hirn actually the "phenomeno-
logist" - to develop the following three qualities:

(1) Seeing what stares one in the face, just as it presents itself, unreplaced by any interpretation,
unsophisticated by any allowance for this or that modifying circumstance;
(2) resolute discrimination, which fastens itselflike a bulldog upon the particular features that we
are studying;
(3) the generalizing power of the mathematician who produces the abstract formula that
comprehends the very essence of the feature under examination purified from all admixture of
extraneous and irrelevant accompaniments. (C.P. 5.42).

I can think of few, if any, passages in Husserl's writings in which the primary
requirements of the phenomenological approach are stated with equal
impressiveness.
But even at this stage there remained certain basic ambiguities in Peirce's
conception of Firstness which make a full-scale comparison with equivalents
in Husserl's phenomenology next to impossible. Thus, as far as I can make out,
Peirce's Firstness occurs as a result oftwo basically incompatible procedures.
According to the one, represented in the quotations above, it makes its first
appearance once we assurne a merely passive, receptive attitude and abstain
from all tampe ring with the phenomena. 12 According to other passages,
however, it would seem that Firstness is given as a result of an operation called
"prescission," a type of abstraction without which it is impossible to even
distinguish between the various categories (4.235). In fact, in such contexts
Firstness is even called "the most abstract of the categories," an "abstract
potentiality," and "a pure abstraction" (1.551); also, in his "New List of
Categories" (1867) Peirce explicitly contested the view that qualities are
"given in the impression." Thus there may weIl have been a shift in Peirce's
views about the proper approach to Firstness. N evertheless, he seems to have
 33

held at all times that "separation from all conception of reference to anything
else" was characteristic of all Firstness.
Does Husserl's conception of phenomena have any equivalent of Peirce's
Firstness? True, Husserl has an elaborate theory of abstractions, in which
there is also room for the isolation or" prescission" ofvarious features in them.
But he indicates no preference for qualities as having a privileged status over
other types of properties such as quantity or even of substance. In fact, from
Husserl's original viewpoint there seems to be no reason for assigning priority
to any particular aspect of phenomena. If at all, such priority pertains to the
phenomenon as a structured and interrelated whole, which, for Husserl as weil
as for the gestaltists, is characterized primarily by the character ofunity in the
context of a horizon, or world.
There is, to be sure, in Husser!' s analysis of phenomena an element, later on
designated as the "hyletic datum," which one might feel tempted to relate to
Peirce's Firstness. But this raw material for fully constituted phenomena is so
closely linked up with Husserl's whole conception of knowledge as an
"intentional" process that there is little sense in correlating it with Peirce's
thought without discussing at the same time this very conception, for which,
as will be shown, there is no clear equivalent in Peirce.

2.3. Secondness and Thirdness

There is in Husserl's scheme no exact equivalent of Secondness, as !ittle as

there was one ofFirstness. Secondness, characterized by Peirce as "the most
prominent" ofthe three categories, is to hirn an "experience," which "comes
out most fully in the shock of re action between ego and non-ego," in the
"double consciousness of effort and resistance.,,13 Its primary character,
according to Peirce, is "struggle" (5.45). It has also a "predominant" pI ace
in the idea of reality (1.325).
Husserl reserves no peculiar status for the phenomena of interaction
between ego and non-ego and for" struggle" in particular. The closest to it one
might discover is the peculiar treatment he accords to the character of
existence in connection with the operation of phenomenological reduction, or
bracketing. For it implies that existence is presented in a way quite different
from essence, which does not call, nor even allow for, a parallel operation. In
passing it might be mentioned, however, that Max Scheler's conception of
reality as revealed in the experience ofresistance comes very close to Peirce's
conception of Secondness.
Peirce's Thirdness, wh ich, no differently from Firstness, defies any brash
attempt at adefinition, may be said, nevertheless, to consist in a connecting
bond mediating between the other two categories. Its prime examples for
 34

Peirce are signs, meanings and generaliaws. Husserl, again, has no compara-
ble status for these phenomena either. It seems legitimate, however, to suggest
that his theory of intentionality, at least insofar as it deals with the structure of
signs, would find its proper place under Peirce's Thirdness.

2.4. The Non-reflective Nature of Peirce's Phenomenology

Peirce's main injunction to the phenomenologist is to look at what is "before

our minds," at "what stares one in the face." It is therefore not surprising that
his findings consist primarily of such qualities as colors, rarely, if ever, of items
like cönsciousness or acts such as seeing or hearing, but never ofthe "mind"
itself, an entity of rather uncertain status in Peirce's whole philosophizing.
Only introspection could possibly reveal it, and such introspection is for Peirce
a matter of inference (5.462, 5.244 ff.), hence not accessible to
phenomenology.
From Husserl's point of view, such an approach can at best develop a
phenomenology of the intended contents straight ahead (geradeaus), a
phenomenology such as was developed particularly by some ofHusserl's early
students und er the name of Gegenstands-phänomenologie, but never a
phenomenology of our acts and of the structure of our consciousness. By
contrast, Husserl wants us to focus as much on what is within as on wh at is
ahead. In fact, reflection on the acts of our consciousness is for Husserl the
decisive step, though only the first step, in the development of a phenomeno-
logical psychology. In Peirce's perspective there is no room for such a
psychology. Actually, he seems sceptical of, if not downright ho stile to, all
existing psychology. Against the background of such "antipsychologism,"
Husserl's attitude appears to be equally removed from a "peculiar"phobia of
logic in James and a similar phobia ofpsychology in Peirce. What Husserl's
phenomenology tries to establish is, among other things, a deeper link between
logic and psychology, while defending the autonomy of each.

2.5. The Absence of Intentionality from Peirce's Phenomenology

Closely related to the preceding point is wh at makes up probably the most

basic difference between Peirce's and Husserl's phenomenologies: the
absence in Peirce of what Husserl called "intentionality."
Apparently, when Peirce speaks ofFirstnesses as "qualities offeeling," he
never distinguishes between the quality feIt and the feeling ofthis quality. Thus
it is not surprising that he lists among his Firstnesses the color ofmagenta side
by side with the quality of emotion upon contemplating a fine mathematical
demonstration, the quality of the feeling of love, etc. (1.304). In fact, in his
"Objective Logic" (6.221) Peirce goes so far as to say that "a quality is a
 35

consciousness" and speakssubsequently of a "quale-consciousness," which

he illustrates by sense-data such as redness. Here Peirce simply shares the
monistic conception of phenomena, which can also be found in Ernst Mach
and in the radical empiricism of the later William J ames.
By contrast, Husserl's conception of consciousness is fundamentally "bi-
polar" (a term which seems to me more expressive than Perry's ambiguous
"dualistic"). This allows Husserl not only to distinguish between acts and
contents but also to pay special attention to the varying subjective appearances
of the identical objective contents. It also yields a much more differentiated
structure of the field of phenomena compared with Peirce's phenomenon of
Firstness, which consists simply in a sequence of "seemings," without any
structural depth or referentiallinks. It is only Secondness and Thirdness that
would seem to open up the possibility of phenomena comparable with
Husserl's intentional identical referents.
Thus, seen from Husserl's perspective, Peirce covers at best half of the
world of phenomena, namely the objective or intended pole of our conscious-
ness. The other half, the subjective or intending pole of it, remains outside its
scope. 14
The fact that Peirce's phenomenology does not include Husserl's inten-
tionality of consciousness as the basic structure in the field of phenomena does
not prevent that at least some of it is paralleled in a more limited area of
Peirce's phenomenology, notably in his theory of Thirdness, inasmuch as it
deals with the nature ofsigns. Forthe relationship between the "repraesenta-
men," the "object" and the "interpretant" is clearly based on some kind of
reference from the sign to the object, although Peirce does not give any further
description of this relationship except by words like "representation" or
"signifying." Now Husserl too shows a considerable interest in the theory of
signs. In fact, the second volume ofhis Logische Untersuchungen begins with
a studyofsymbolism (Ausdruck und Bedeutung). It is here, in connection with
bis discussion of the structure of signs, that he introduces for the first time his
doctrine of intentionality. Only in later parts of his work does he take up the
intentionality of conscious acts, which also provides indirectly the foundation
for the intentionality of signs. It is thus the first and more limited study which
comes closest to Peirce' s theory of signs as an outstanding case of Thirdness.

2.6. Peirce's "Firstness" and "Secondness" as Particulars, not Universals

Phenomenology in Husserl's sense is a study of the general essence of

phenomena. Particulars may be used as stepping stones for insights into these
general essences. But, at least for Husserl, there can be no phenomenology of
particulars.
How far are the basic categories of Peirce's phenomenology either partic-
 36

ulars or universals? In describing Firstnesses as qualities of feeling Peirce

never makes their status plain in terms of this disjunction. All he requests is the
disregard of the question of reality and of connections with other phenomena.
However, the fact that universals appear only under the heading of Thirdness
indicates that neither Firstnesses nor Secondnesses have reached the level
of universality. As to Secondness, Peirce, in denying that it can ever be
conceived, asserts explicitly its essential individuality.15

2.7. Induction as the Method 0/ Peirce's Phenomenology

The preceding section does not mean to imply that Peirce's phenomenology
exhausts itself in a description of particular phenomena. For Peirce states
clearly that the task of his phenomenology is to find the universal qualities of
the "phenomena" by way of inductive generalization. It is, however, this very
generalization which again marks an important difference from Husserl's
methodofdetermining the properties ofhis "phenomena." For here Husserl
appeals to his peculiar intuition of essences (Wesensschau). It would be
beyond the scope ofthis account to give a fuH explanation ofwhat this method
involves. But it certainly differs from a mere collecting generalization. For,
while based on a study of examples, real and imaginary, it tries to grasp their
essential character and properties in a special and unique way, very much in
the manner ofwhat W. E. Johnson in later years described under the name of
intuitive induction. There is no indication that Peirce's phenomenological
generalization involved a similar operation.

2.8. Different Estimates of Mathematics

Particularly in his criticisms of Hegel' s phenomenology, Peirce, deploring his

neglect of mathematics, claimed for this study the status of the fundamental
science, more fundamental even than phenomenology. Despite Husserl's own
indifference, if not hostility, to Hegel, this fact would also mark a sharp
dividing line between Peirce and Husserl, although Husserl can certainly not
be charged with a neglect of mathematics. But whereas Peirce never seems to
have questioned mathematics and never seems to have been disturbed by the
so-called crisis in the foundations of mathematics, as other philosophical
mathematicians have been, these very difficulties were at the root ofHusserl's
whole turn to philosophy and ultimately to phenomenology. To hirn pheno-
menology was designed to supply not only an ultimate philosophical founda-
tion for logic but also for a mathesis universalis ofwhich mathematics proper
was to be only apart. Mathematics was therefore to hirn anything but a pre-
philosophical self-sufficient discipline. Here Husserl shares the view, pro-
posed most effectivley in Russell's and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica,
 37

about the derivative character of mathematics. Actually, according to

Goudge's interpretation, even Peirce originally took this position.1 6 I shall
refrain from discussing the reasons for Peirce's reversal and for his ensuing
classification ofthe sciences in the order mathematics-phenomenology-Iogic.

2.9. The "Ethics" of Phenomenological Terminology

Finally, there are some aspects in the comparative histories of the term
"phenomenology" in Husserl and in Peirce which throw revealing light on the
different spirit of the two enterprises.
Husserl never seems to have given explicit thought to the question of the
principles, let alone, the ethics, of philosophical terminology. Nor does he
seem to have been guided even unconsciously by any definite policy in
adopting and modifying pre-existing philosophical terms. Thus, when he took
over the term "phenomenology" in 1900, which was then widely and loosely
used in Germany, he seems to have feIt no hesitation in assigning to it a new
and more specific meaning. At that time, and even more so later on, he simply
implied that he had the right to change the tradition al meanings in accordance
with his own evolving and deepening conception of phenomenology - a fact
which has been responsible for a good deal of confusion without and even
within the so-called Phenomenological Movement.
In contrast, Peirce's scrupulous ethics ofterminology not only forbade hirn
to adopt terms which had been in use for different designata, but induced hirn to
abandon them when they were being misused by others. Thus, quoting once
more from the letterto James ofOctober 3, 1904, Peirce, aftertakingJames to
task for his use ofthe term "pure experience," and recommending to hirn again
his choice "phenomenology" stated:

It is downright bad morals so to misuse words, for it prevents philosophy from becoming a science
... it is an indispensable requisite of science that it should have a recognized technical vocabulary
composed of words so unattractive that loose thinkers are not tempted to use them, and a
recognized and legitimated way of making up new words freely when a new conception is
introduced, and that it is vital for science that he who introduces a new conception should be
held to have a duty imposed upon hirn to invent a sufficiently disagreeable series of words to
express it. I wish you would reflect seriously upon the moral aspect of terminologyP

It is well known how this stringent ethics made Peirce, when "finding his
bantling 'pragmatism' wrongly promoted" (to wit, by J ames and Schiller)

... kissed his child good-by and relinquished it to its higher destiny; while, to serve the precise
purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word
pragmaticism which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers. (C.P. 5.414)

Apparently it has not yet been realized that the very same principles
responsible for this terminologie al purge were also effective in both Peirce's
 38

original choice of the term "phenomenology" and its later abandonment and
replacement.
It was probably in the early years of the new century that Peirce, having
developed his conception of a science of categories in the nineties, also began
looking for an appropriate label for it. 18 About the same time he came to think
that his triadic pattern of categories was so similar to Hegel's scheme that he
called his own philosophy a "variety ofHegelianism" (5.38) and a "resuscita-
tion of Hegel, though in astrange costume" (1.42) - this despite-the fact that
he confessed to his original antipathy and even to his feeling of repulsion
toward Hegel. 19 Thus it may weil have been this new interest in Hegel which
gave hirn the idea that Hegel's term "phenomenology" could be used without
undue violence for the common doctrine of categories, although the equivalent
of what Peirce interprets as Hegel's categories actually occurs in Hegel's
Encyc/opedia oi/he Philosophical Sciences (Part I), rather than in the
Phenomenology oi/he Spirit. 2o In adopting it, he was probably guided more
by the literal meaning of the term "phenomenology", as "a description or
history of phenomena" (see, for instance, the Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia VI (1891), p. 4441), than by Hegel's much more restricted use in
the third part ofthe Enzyklopädie, translated by Wallace two years later in a
separate volume (Hegel's Philosophy ol Mind).21
There are a number of concrete evidences for Peirce's acute interest in
Hegel just during these years. The invitation which he extended to Josiah
Royce to spend the summer of 1902 with hirn in Milford is one of them. 22 An
even more concrete expression ofhis intensified stake in Hegel can be found in
two reviews of books on Hegel for the Nation. Of these, the one on J. B.
Baillie's The Origin and Signijicance ol Hegel's Logic, published on
November 12, 1902 (vol. 75, p. 390), contains one ofthe peaks ofPeirce's
Hegelianism, even at that clearly not without reservations:

Hegel is a vast intellect. The properly prepared student cannot but feel that the me re
contemplation ofthe problems he presents is good. But the student of Hegelianism tends too much
toward subjectivism, and is apt to break the natural power of penetrating fallacy, which is common
to all men except students of logic, especially of the German stripe.

The second review, that of J. G. Hibben's book on Hegel's Logic published

on May 21,1903 (vol. 76,419-2,420), reveals a much severer judgment on
Hegel. Thus, he states that the Logik "now condemns itself," being "anti-
evolutionary," and "anti-progressive," because, as he says, "it represents
thought as attaining perfect fulfilment." More pertinent to the subject of
phenomt:nology is the following passage:

It is evident enough that all Hegel's categories properly belong to his third grand division, the
Begriff, What, far example, could be more monstrous than to call such a conception as that of
 39

being a primitive one, or, indeed, what more absurd than to say that the immediate is abstract? We
might instance a dozen of such self-refutations. That the Hegelians should have allowed the
obviously unsuccessful development ofthe doctrine of Wesen to stand all these years uncorrected,
is a striking instance ofthe mental fossilization that results from their method of study. A powerful
and original study ofwhat the true Hegelian doctrine of Wesen should be according to our present
Iights might breathe some reallife into a modified Hegelianism if anything could have any effcct.

At the same time, in his Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism (March to May

1903) Peirce attacked Hegel's doctrine of Wesen specifically for not having
properly distinguished between essence and existence, acharge whieh might
weH be based on Part I, Section 9 of Hegel's Enzyklopädie, where Existenz
figures prominently in the discussion of Wesen. Thus Hegel, according to
Peirce, dealt only with "what actually forces itself on the mind," which makes
his phenomenology "pragmatoidal" (5.37). Furthermore, Hegel's catalogue
of special categories as descriptions of phases of evolution is to Peirce "utterly
wrong" (5.37). FinaIly, he calls Hegel's phenomenology a "pitifully club-
footed affair since it does not take account of pure mathematics" (5.40).
Soon after his return from Harvard in a letter to William James of June 8,
1903, Peirce refers to Hegel' s "monstrous blunders" in his interpretation of
Thirdness. 23
1t is therefore not surprising that in his letterto WilliamJames ofOctober 3,
1904, Peirce intimated that Hegel's Phänomenologie was "somewhat dif-
ferent"; and that he was in fact willing to acknowledge Hegel's prior claim to
the term:
"I am not sure that Hegel ought not to have named the enterprise after his
attempt." A little farther on the letter, after charging J ames with misusing the
term "pure experience," he states by way of an afterthought, added between
the lines, why he feels he has to get rid of the first part of the term
"phenomenology":
"My 'phenomenon',jor whieh I must invent a new word, is very near your
'pure experience' but not quite, since I do not exclude time and also speak of
only one phenomenon."
Nine days after this letter, Peirce teIls Lady Welby in his long epistle of
October 12, 1904, which deals chiefly with the theory of signs, ofthe need of a
study, named "ideoscopy," which is to consist in "describing and classifying
the ideas that belong to ordinary experience or that naturaHy arise in
connection with ordinary life, without regard to their being valid or invalid or
to their psychology." He adds that the word "phenomenology" is used in a
different sense. Ofthis new terminological creation the second part "-scopy,"
had already been sanctioned previously by Peirce when his classification ofthe
sciences in 1902 had adopted the division into "coenoscopic" and "idiosco-
pie" (sie) ontology and divided the sciences into mathematies, philosophy, and
idioscopy (1.183). But the new ideoseopy, dealing with all sorts ofideas, has
 40

clearly nothing to do with this idioscopy, since the latter "embraces all the
special sciences, which are principally occupied with the accumulation of new
facts" (1.184). What Peirce seems to have liked in his new coinage is the
ending "-scopy," interpreted as "looking at," not as "observation of facts."
This dates the abandonment of the term "phenomenology" as having
occurred between the two letters, although Peirce used it at least once more in
the Monist of 1906 (vol. 16), where he referred in passing to "students of
phenomenology." (5.610)
The final replacement of "phenomenology" by "phaneroscopy" occurs in
two paragraphs written for "Logic viewed as Semiotics, Introduction Number
2, Phaneroscopy" (1.286-287), which the editors date as "c. 1904." I submit
that the first possible date for the second change is after the letter to Lady
Welby of October 12, 1904, the last possible one the Adirondacks lectures of
1905, from which 1.284 is taken. Thus far no explicit statement has come to
light explaining the quick abandonment ofthe transitional term "ideoscopy,"
which occurs only in the letterto Lady Welby. Quite apart from the misleading
similarity of" ideoscopy" and "idioscopy," Peirce' s main reason was probably
that the word "idea" proved unsuited to his purposes, since, in the way it had
been used by the British philosophers, it was too narrow and too loaded, as
he put it, with "a psychological connotation which I am careful to exclude"
(1.285). This conjecture is confirmed by Peirce's entry in the Century
Dictionary under the heading "phaneron.,,24
The new term "phaneron," of which Peirce freely uses the plural form
"phanerons," in contrast to his merely singular use of "phenomenon," is
defined as "the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to
the mind, quite regardless ofwhether it corresponds to any real thing or not"
(1.284); which is of course identical in substance with his earlier descriptions
ofthe "phenomenon." Actually, the literal meaningofthe Greek term suggests
more than a mere "phenomenon" (which merely appears), namely something
that reveals itself in its real nature; what Peirce means is described much better
by the English word "seemings" or appearances.
Was "phaneroscopy" Peirce's last and final terminological choice? This
might be inferred from the fact that the pertinent manuscripts were inscribed
with the name, or with the Greek abbreviation "phan"; see, e.g., the draft for
an unpublished paper in the Monist, written in 1905 (1.306-311; 4.6-10;
4.539 nl; 4.553 nl). Another manuscript, dated c. 1905, bears the title
"Phaneroscopy or the Natural History of Concepts" (1.332-336). Also, on
November 20-22, 1906, Peirce presented to the National Academy of
Sciences a communication on "Phaneroscopy, or Natural History of Signs,
Relations, Categories etc.... " (Report ofthe National Academy ofSeien ces ,
for the year 1906, p. 18). After this entry the chronological bibliography of
 41

Peirce's writings by Arthur W. Burks lists no further item related to the whole
field.
There exists, however, one piece of evidence which may suggest some
continued indecision in Peirce's mind on this score. It consists, oddly enough,
of his contributions to the two new volumes of the Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia of 1909. The significance of this evidence would clearly depend
upon the date, or dates, oftheir submission to the Editor, which theoretically
could have occurred at any time between the first edition of 1891 and the
appearance of the supplementary volumes in 1909, although circumstantial
evidence would make the time after 1904 more likely for most of them.
According to Miss Mary Mackey ofHarvard College Library, the interleaving
next to the entry "phenomenology" in Peirce's own annotated set of the
Century Dictionary, now at the Houghton Library, shows a disappointing
blank.
The most puzzling fact about these contributions is that, while there is an
entry under "phaneron" (p. 990), referring specifically to Peirce as the user of
this term (now defined somewhat differently as "whatever is in any sense
present to the mind, whatever its cognitive value may be, and whether it be
objectified or not"), there is none under "phaneroscopy." On the other hand,
there occurs an entirely new entry entitled "phenoscopy" (p. 991), which is
even signed conspicuously by the name of C. S. Peirce in italies. This last
neologism is defined as "that study which observes, generalizes and analyzes
the elements that are always or very often present in, or along with, whatever is
before the mind in any way as percept, image, experience, thought, habit,
hypothesis, etc." Despite minor variations the identity with the definiens of
"phaneroscopy" is obvious.
Besides, on the very same page, there appear lengthy additions to the brief
entry "phenomenology" of the original volume, presumably at least in part
prepared by Peirce. They consist oftwo more meanings, namely Kant' s, taken
from Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, and Hegel's,
now clearly based on his Phänomenologie des Geistes. These are followed by
five further distinctions in small print. The first of these reads "Cenopythago-
rean phenomenology," described as "universal phenomenology as it is under-
stood by those who recognize the categories offirstness, secondness, and third-
ness. "25 The fifth, (which follows the distinctions of phenomenology of
conscience, clearly referring to Eduard von Hartmann, phenomenology of
mind, probably meaning Sir William Hamilton's conception, and phenomeno-
logy of spirit, obviously in Hegel's sense) is called "Universal Phenomeno-
logy" and characterized as "the observation, analysis, and generalization of
those kinds of elements that are present in the universal phenomenon"; a cross
 42

reference to the article "phenomenon" gives the following characterization of

the "universal phenomenon": "that which is in any way before the mind (as by
perception, imagination, conception, emotion, desire, etc.) considered only in
its most general characters." A comparison between the characterization of
Universal Phenomenology and that of "phenoscopy" indicates that for all
practical purposes the two enterprises are identical. Nor would it seem that
"Cenopythagorean phenomenology" would differ from it except by its
commitment to Peirce's doctrine of the three categories.
Thus, barring further evidence concerning the history of these entries, the
provisional conclusion would seem to be that Peirce's terminological con-
science was never quite at ease, even after he had coined the term "phanero-
scopy," and that he was tending toward "phenoscopy" as the simplest and
most original solution, without abandoning alternatives like "Cenopytha-
gorean" and "Universal Phenomenology." The latter would also have
protected his conception sufficiently from confusion with the Hegelian
version, which seems to have been his main worry after his final rejection of
Hegel's philosophy.

3. COINCIDENCE OR INTERACTION

In summary, the main characteristics which distinguish Peirce's phenomeno-

logy from Husserl's are the following:
(1) Peirce's preponderant interest in the discovery of categories;
(2) his conception of Firstness as quality of feeling;
(3) the non-reflective nature of his phenomenology;
(4) the absence of the intentional pattern ("intentionality") from his pheno-
menological accounts;
(5) the status of Firstness and Secondness as particulars;
(6) the use of inductive generalization in phenomenology;
(7) the priority of mathematics to phenomenology; and
(8) the different principles governing the adoption and modification of the
phenomenological terminology.
These differences appear to be important enough to demand the use of the
plural in referring to Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies rather than the
singular.
N evertheless, apart from the temporary terminological parallel, there
remain such basic agreements as:
(I) the program of a fresh approach by way of intuitive inspection and
description to the immediately given, an approach free from preconceived
theories;
(2) the deliberate disregard, in so doing, of questions of reality or unreality;
 43

(3) the insistence upon the radical differences between phenomenology and
psychology;
(4) the claim that such a phenomenology would be a rigorous science, basic
not only for philosophy but even for logic. These agreements seem to
justify the reference to the two phenomenologies by the common noun.
Under these circumstances it seems natural enough to ask whether these
agreements represent mere coincidences, comparable to the conjunction in the
course oftwo planets at their point of nearest approach, or whether there could
have been one-sided or mutual influences.
An answer to this question makes it necessary first to establish how far
Husserl and Peirce were even aware of one another and oftheir philosophical
ideas.
As far as Husserl, Peirce's junior by twenty years, is concerned, there is
certainly no reference to Peirce in his published writings. All one can assurne is
that Husserl had come across Peirce's name when his eye passed over the
famous page of credit to Peirce in William J ames' Pragmatism, a book which,
however, greatly disappointed Husserl, in contrast to his enthusiasm for the
Principles of Psychology. There is also in the Husserl Archives in Louvain a
letter to Husserl by Charles Hartshorne, written in October 1928, in which he
reported his work on the edition of the Collected Papers and mentioned
Peirce's phenomenology, actually suggesting the possibility of an influence
from Husserl's side. However, when Dorion Cairns talked with Husserl three
years later, Husserl apparently did not even recognize Peirce's name. 26
There is, to be sure, a very different story in the case ofMax Scheler. True,
even Scheler knew of Peirce only through James' Pragmatism. But in this
extended discussion of pragmatism, on which he had been working since 1910,
it was Peirce who served as .its main representative. In fact, he took
pragmatism ofthe Peircean variety so much more seriously than Husserl that,
in his book on epistemology and sociology27 he devoted a lengthy chapter to an
examination of its claims. Also, while rejecting pragmatism as philosophically
erroneous, he defended the right of Peircean pragmatism as a correct
interpretation and account of our primary relation to the world and likewise of
the nature of positive science. Scheler's interest in Peirce (whose name he
misspells consistently as Pierce) rather than in J ames would seem to be
another example of Scheler's uncanny flair for what was philosophically
significant, long before others had discovered it.
As to Peirce' s knowledge of Husserl there is at least one piece of concrete
evidence. In the course of a critique of the German logicians, which,
interestingly enough, the editors found in his manuscript on "Phaneroscopy"
of 1906, Peirce named as a representative example "the distinguished
Husser!." However, what Husserl was supposed to exemplify was in Peirce's
 44

eyes anything but a distinguished and commendable tendency. F or the context

reads:

How many writers of our generation (if I must call names, in order to direct the reader to further
acquaintance with a generally described character-let it be in this case the distinguishedHusserl),
after underscored protestations that their dis course shall be of logic exclusively and not by any
me ans of psychology (almost alliogicians protest that on file), forthwith become intent upon those
elements ofthe process ofthinking which seem to be special to a mind like that ofthe human race,
as wefind it, to too great a neglect ofthose elements which must belong as much to any one as to
any other mode of embodying the same thought. (4.7)

On the one hand, one might well wonder what gave Peirce such a
surprisingly high estimate of Husserl. No English-speaking philosophical
magazine had taken note of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen. 28 Of other
American philosophers only W. E. Hocking and Walter Pitkin had made his
acquaintance in Germany at that time. Unfortunately there seems to be no way
of determining whether Peirce had owned and had worked through a copy of
the Logische Untersuchungen. But even if he did not, there is at least the
possibility that he used the copy owned by the Johns Hopkins Library since
May 2, 1905.
On the other hand, Peirce's picture ofHusserl's enterprise was clearly based
on a grave misunderstanding. Certainly Husserl never showed the slightest
interest in a study of the "thinking of the human race as we find it." What
probably explains Peirce' s impression was the typical surprise of those who,
after reading Husserl's attack on psychologism in the first volume of the
Logische Untersuchungen, expected from the second volume the develop-
ment of a pure logic purged of all psychological infiltration. Instead they found
themselves confronted with studies which, under the heading of"phenomeno-
logy," culminated in a discussion ofthe acts in which the logical entities and
laws were given, a discussion which Husserl in the first edition had even
mistakenly called descriptive psychology. Despite Husserl's determined
attempt to distinguish this phenomenology from a psychology in the current
sense, the impression of a relapse into psychologism was widespread, even in
Germany. This disappointment may well have prevented Peirce from reading
on and finding, for instance, an important support for his "Scotist realism"
which he might otherwise have discovered in Husserl's second study of the
new volume ("Ueber die ideale Einheit der Spezies"). In any case, Peirce's
re action suggests that he was anything but sympathetic to the new kind of
phenomenology which Husserl was about to develop, and simply considered it
another type of psychology. This can also be gathered indirectly from the fact
that Husserl's phenomenology is not listed in the extended article on
"phenomenology" in the New Volume of the Century Dictionary of 1909.
Summing up, we may therefore say, that Husserl knew practically nothing
 45

about Peirce, and that Peirce knew about Husserl only the wrong things, at
least in so far as Husserl's phenomenology was concerned. 29 Thus I see no
alternative to burying all wishful historical hypotheses about early interaction,
let alone cooperation, between the European and the American branches of
phenomenology. All that one might suspect - and that without concrete
evidence - is that the acquaintance with Husserl's misinterpreted phenomeno-
logy confirmed Peirce in his decision to abandon the term "phenomenology"
and to replace it by some new less ambiguous term. But it was chiefly Hegel
who was on his mind, both when he adopted and when he dropped the
phenomenological label.
Does this mean that the rapprochement between Husserl and Peirce was
only a temporary affair, a "conjunction," ended perhaps less by Peirce's
terminological innovation than by Husserl's shift toward phenomenological
idealism? As far as the terminological aspect is concerned, the simultaneous
choice ofthe label" phenomenology" was clearly not more than a coincidence.
There was as little connection between these choices as there was between
Hegel, Peirce's source, and Brentano, a possible inspiration for Husserl's
adoption, with whom Peirce does not seem to ha ve been acquainted at all. And
there can be no question that Brentano was deadly opposed to Hegel and to all
his works. The same holds true for Husserl, though in his later idealistic period
he made some friendlier gestures toward the Post-Kantian Idealists
collectively.
N evertheless, there may be more than such a superficial coincidence when it
comes to the designata behind the labels. Despite the deep-seated differences,
there are enough paralleis between Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies to
justify the question about a common root for them both. This root can only be
found in the very nature ofthe problems with which both Peirce and Husserl
struggled. Both were originally mathematicians dedicated to the cause of
establishing philosophy as a rigorous science. And both sought its foundation
in a renewed and enriched approach to the phenomena given in experience.
Thus one might look at Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies as two
independent historical paralleis. Their value is that oftwo experiments set up
by the history of philosophy and serving as mutual controls for one another.
Their outcome is all the more sjgnificant, and it does credit to both thinkers.
Thus what Peirce wrote about his own relationship to Hegel could be said even
more appropriately about his agreements with Husserl:

There was no influence upon me from Hegel unless it was of so occult a kind as to entirely escape
my ken; and ifthere was such an occult influence, itstrikes me as about as good an argument for the
essential truth of the doctrine, as in the coincidence that Hegel and I arrived in quite independent
ways substantially to the same ·result. (5.38).
 46

NOTES

1 Read in part at the Meeting of the Peirce Society at Goucher College, December 28, 1954,
published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 17 (1957), pp. 164-85.
2 Even in this case it should be remembered at the outset that, prior to the appearance ofvol. I of
the edition of the Collected Papers, Peirce's phenomenology was practically unknown. Even
the term "phenomenology" did not occur in auy ofhis published articles and can be found only
in such places as his four-page Syllabus o/Certain Topics o/Logic (Boston, Alfred Mudge &
Son, 1903), an outline printed specifically for his Lowell Institute lectures of 1903, and in
scattered and unidentified entries in the New Volumes of the Century Dictionary and
Cyc/opedia of 1909. Peirce's manuscripts dealing with this field were apparently inscribed
"phaneroscopy," not "phenomenology." In view of the prominent place given to the term
"phenomenology" in the Collected Papers, it seems worth pointing out that, of the two editors,
Charles Hartshorne, before beginning work on the edition, had studied under Edmund Husserl
at the University ofFreiburg in 1923-1925 and that Paul Weiss had likewise been in Freiburg
between 1929 and 1930.
3 To my knowledge no confrontation between these two 'phenomenologies has as yet been
undertaken, except for one suggestive page in an article by Marvin Farber on "Descriptive
Philosophy and the Nature of Human Existence," in Philosophie Thought in France and the
United States (University of Buffalo Publications, 1950), pp. 420-1.
4 "Minute Logic" (1902) in Collected Papers 2.120. That "the term phenomenology appears in
none ofthe writings ofthe Collected Papers before the Minute Logic of1902" is also the opinion
of Manley Thompson J r. in The Pragmaric Philosophy 0/ c. S. Peirce (The University of
Chicago Press, 1953), p. 157. Thomas A. Goudge, in The Thought o/c, S, Peirce (University
ofToronto Press, 1950), merely mentions the year 1900 as a terminus postquem, butwithout
giving evidence that it appeared prior to 1902 (p. 76). David Savan's statement that Peirce
suggested the existence of a "positive science of Phenomenology" for the first time in the early
90's ("On the Origins of Peirce's Phenomenology" in Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H.
Young, editors, Studies in the Philosophy 0/ Charles Sanders Peirce, Harvard University
Press, 1952, p. 185) does not mean to imply that even the term "phenomenology" occurs in
Peirce at such an early date, as Savan assures me in arecent letter.
S In the second edition of 1913 it was slightly amended: "phenomenology understood as the pure
theory of conscious acts."
6 This is confirmed by the following communication, which I owe to Professor C. I. Lewis, the
first curator ofthe Peirce papers: "As I remember it, Peirce's Phaneroscopy was one ofthe few
larger pie ces ofhis manuscripts which were all together and not represented by several different
and unfinished drafts."
7 The Thought and Character 0/ William James (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1935), vol. 11,
chap. LXXVI. I wish to thank the Library of Harvard U niversity for the permission to include
the quotations from the original letters.
8 Letter of June 3, 1903, in The Thought and Character 0/ William James, 11, 427.
9 To be sure this label appeared for the first time in the article" A World ofPure Experience" in
the issue of the Journal 0/ Philosophy, Psych%gy and Scientljic Method of September 29;
apparently Peirce had not yet seen it when he composed his letter of October 3.
10 Isabel Stearns, "Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness," in Studies in the Philosophy 0/
Char/es Sanders Peirce (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 199. See also Ernest
Nagel, "Guesses at the Riddle" in Journal o/Philosophy XXX (1933), pp. 366 ff.
11 Ideen zu einer reinen PhCmomenologie, § 73.
12See also Collected Papers, 1.357: "What the world was toAdam on the day he opened his eyes
to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious ofhis own existence .... "
13 L-etterto William James ofJune 8, 1903, published in R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character
0/ William James, vol. II, p. 429.
14 Peirce's phenomenology resembles in this respect the conception advanced in 1905 by Carl
 47

Stumpf, who preceded Husserl as student of Franz Brentano. See his "Zur Einteilung der
Wissenschaften" in Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin,
1906.
15 "To conceive it is to generalize it; and to generalize it is to miss altogether the hereness and
nowness which is its essence." Letter to William James of June 8,1903 in R. B. Perry, The
Thought and Charae/er of William James. Vol. II, p. 429.
16 The Thoughl ofC, S. Peirce, p. 57.
17 See also Collected Papers (5. 413), and Nation 76 (1903), 498.
18 This hypothesis would also fit in with Peirce's simultaneous ambitious attempts to develop a
"natural classification ofthe sciences," including the philosophical sciences and mathematics,
about which he reported to the Secretary ofthe Philosophical Society, S. P. Langley, in a letter
of May 6, 1902 (Philip P. Wiener, "The Peirce-Langley Correspondence" in Proeeedings of
the American Philosophical Societ)', 91 (1947), p. 211).
19 See, for example, Letter to Lady Welby of October 12, 1904 in C, S. Peirce's Letters 10 Lady
Welby, edited by Irwin C. Lieb (New Haven, Whitlocks, Inc., 1953), p. 8; Collected Papers
4.2.
20 See, especially 5.43. Circumstantial evidence makes it seem very unlikely that Peirce ever
studied Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes, especially since the first English translation by J.
B. Baillie did not appear until191 O. His knowledge of Hegel's Logik and specifically ofhis list
of the categories seems to have been based on William Wallace's translation of Part I of
the Enzyklopädie, which appeared under the title The Logic of Hegel in 1892, rather than on
the Wissenschaji der Logik. This mayaiso be inferred from the Iistofthe Hegelian "categories"
as given in Peirce's article "Category" in the New Volumes of the Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia (1909), a list which differs slightly from the one in Hegel's larger work.
21 The close association between phenomenology and the doctrine of categories in Peirce's mind,
which is so surprising to one familiar only with the German original, would seem to be
explainable on the basis ofPeirce's use ofWallace's translation ofPart I. For here Wallace used
the word "category" to render not only the German "Kategorie" but also Hegel's much more
general expression Denkbestimmung (see his Prolegomena 10 Hege/'s Philosophy (Oxford,
1894), p. 227), which results in a rather suggestive juxtaposition of the two terms in a fairly
important passage of the translation (p. 58 f.), where Hegel refers back to the more
comprehensive conception of his earlier phenomenology.
22 "You and I could pitch into the logical problems, and I am sure I could make it weil spent time to
you, while with all you should teach me ofHegel etc., I am equally sure it would tremendously
benefit my own work." (Letter of May 28,1902, published in James Harry Cotton, Royce on
the Human Self (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 301).
23 "The third stage" (ofHegel's thought) "is very close indeed to Thirdness, which is substantially
Hegel's Begriff. Hegel, of course, blunders monstrously, as we shall all be seen to do, but to my
mi nd the one fatal disease of his philosophy is that, seeing that the Begriff in a sense implies
Secondness and Firstness, he failed to see that nevertheless they are elements of the
phenomenon not to be aufgehoben, but as real and able to stand their ground as the Begriff
itself." (This passage is omitted from R. B. Perry's publication of the letter.)
24" A term proposed by C. S. Peirce in order to avoid loading 'phenomenon,"thought,' 'idea,' etc.
with multiple meanings."
25 An entry under "Cenopythagorean" identifies this kind ofNeo-pythagoreanism as "pertaining
to a modem doctrine which resembles Pythagoreanism in accepting universal categories that are
related to and are named after numbers." A manuscript using the same adjective, entitled
"Reflections upon Pluralistic Pragmatism and upon Cenopythagorean Pragmaticism," dated as
c. 1906, is referred to in Collected Papers 5.555-5.563; see also 2.87
26 Private communication.
27 "Der philosophische Pragmatismus" inDie Wissensformen und die Gesellschaji (Leipzig, Der
Neue Geist, 1926), 259-323.
28 See Supplement 1.
29 See Supplement 2.
 48
SUPPLEMENT 1
Re footnote 28 on p. 47:

An exception ofwhich I learned only afterthe first edition ofThe Phenomeno-

Iogical Movement had appeared in 1960 is Josiah Royce. In his 1901
Presidential Address to the American Psychology Association in Chicago
on" Recent Logical Inquiries and Their Psychological Bearings" (Psychologi-
cal Review IX (1902), 113-33) he mentioned Husserl's Logische Unter-
suchungen in a remarkably perceptive long sentence, which includes Husserl' s
new phrase "phenomenological analysis ofthe thinking process as taking the
place of psychology." In view of Peric'e's interest in and connections with
Royce this could be indeed an important source for Peirce's knowledge ofthe
"distinguished Husserl" in the early years of the century. It could also be
responsible for the (misleading) mention of Husserl's name as the last in a
string ofthe "German school oflogicians, meaning such writers as Christoph
Sigwart, Wundt, Schuppe, Benno Erdmann, Julius Bergmann, Glogau,
Husserl etc." ... who" make truth, which is a matter offact, to be a matter of
the way of thinking or even of linguistic expression." (Review of J ohn Dewey' s
Studies in Logical Theory in the Nation, 15 September 1904, 2; 9-20;
Collected Papers VIII, 146.)

SUPPLEMENT 2
Re footnote 29 on p. 47:

My conclusion about the lack ofinterconnection between Peirce and Husserl

has now to be modified in the light of new evidence not available to me when
I wrote the original paper. I owe to Professor Max Fisch the information that
Peirce's reprint collection, now at Harvard, includes reprints of Husserl's
article "Folgerungskalkül und Inhaltslogik" of 1891 and of his review of
E. Schröder, Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik ofthe same yearwith
the rubber stamp imprint "Oberreicht vom Verfasser." These pieces refer
repeatedly to Peirce as one of Schröder's predecessors to whom Schröder
hirnself had given high praise. However, Husserl's references do not make it
c1ear how far he had made a direct study of Peirce' s original artic1es. Accord-
ing to Karl Schuhmann, there are some indiciations in Ms. K I 38, wh ich
need further checking.
Another significant piece of evidence is that, as Karl Schuhmann informed
me, Husserl's library, now in the Husserl Archives at Louvain, inc1udes a copy
of Peirce's Studies in Logic of 1883 with the inscription "With the respect
of C. S. Peirce." But there does not seem to be any information as to which
gift took precedence, much as I suspect that the younger Husserl initiated
the exchange.
 49
In any case, in the early nineties the two mathematicians Peirce and E. G.
H usserl (who dropped his middle initial only in the Logische Untersuchungen
of 1900) were sufficiently aware of each other to exchange publications. But it
seems more than doubtful that they kept abreast of one another's later philo-
sophical developments. Hence the new information hardly affects my point,
namely that there was no one-sided or two-sided interaction between their new
phenomenologies.

SUPPLEMENT 3

A letter by Peirce to W. T. Harris of May 1, 1868, published by Wall ace

Netherby in The Personalist 43 (1962), p. 30, suggests to me that it was
Harris, who, perhaps by a quotation from Hegers Phänomenologie des
Geistes, first drew Peirce's attention to "phenomenology". For in his reply to
Harris's preceding letter, which unfortunately does not seem to have survived,
since it cannot be found among the Peirce papers at Houghton Library, as the
Curator ofManuscripts, Mr. Rodney G. Dennis, in a letter ofMarch 19, 1979,
kindly established for me, Peirce wrote as follows:
I am glad you find my doctrine accordant with Hegel, because it shows you think it has some
merit. ... I am very glad to learn that the Phänomenologie is to be translated.
Actually Harris put the first of Peirce's three contributions to the second
volume of his Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1868) "Questions con-
cerning certain F aculties claimed for Man" immediately after the first
instalment of H. C. Brokmeyer's and his own translation from Hegers
Phenomenology ofthe Spirit in number 2 (pp. 103 ff.). And in his "Preface"
to the entire volume he listed Peirce's contributions to the "Philosophy of
the Spirit" under" A. Psychology" even as no. 1 ahead of the selections from
Hegers "Phenomenology of the Spirit" (p. IV).
No wonder that in acknowledging his receipt ofthis issue on June 11, 1868,
Peirce remarked: "I am most pleased at your giving us the Phänomenologie."
And, obviously referring to the fact that this translation had omitted the
Introduction of the work, he added "I fear the readers will not be pleased to
have the Introduction to Philosophy crowded out by my lucubrations."
Harris's remark and even more his juxtaposition of Hegel's text from the
beginning ofthe translated Phenomenology ofthe Spirit and ofPeirce's article
must have made a lasting impression on the early Peirce. But it may be admitted
that it took Peirce more than thirty years, i.e., untill902, until he came out
with his own phenomenology, in which he gave Hegel ample credit. The only
additional text known to me which may have had a supplementary influence on
Peirce's interest in Hegel's Phenomenology was Harris's main work Hegel's
 50

Logic. A Book on the Genesis ofthe Categories ofthe Mind (1890), which
deals mostly with Hegers Phenomenology. This emphasis on the pheno-
menological roots of Heger s "categories" may very weil have revived and
reinforced Peirce's interest in Hegel as his predecessor in his own pheno-
menology of categories.
 3. HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND
SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALISM J

In the public eye even today phenomenology is mostly identified with the name
of Edmund Husserl and existentialism with that of Jean-Paul Sartre. It
therefore still makes good sense to use their versions as entrance wedges for a
first understanding of the relations between the two movements. I propose to
do so by first bringing out some historical facts about their actual connections
or lack ofthem and then to discuss their essential relations in a more systematic
fashion.
This program presupposes some preliminary agreements ab out the Protean
terms "phenomenology" and "existentialism." To make them sufficiently
precise will require cutting off some marginal types. In this context there will
be no room to justify the eliminations. So I shall have to be rather dogmatic,
keeping my reasons in reserve.
In the case of phenomenology it would be improper to advocate here a wider
conception which would include more than Husserl's version ofphenomeno-
logy, as I have tried to do elsewhere. J Not only out of respect for Husserl, but
for the purpose of sharpening the issue, it seems fitting to consider here
phenomenology in its most rigorous form. To be sure, even then one has to
take account of the development of Husserl's conception from a merely
descriptive to transcendental phenomenology. Yet for the sake ofthe present
confrontation it seems defensible to condense the most important constants of
his phenomenology into the following minimum list of propositions:
1. Phenomenology is a rigorous science in the sense of a coherent system of
propositions; it goes beyond positive science by aiming at absolute
certainty for its foundations and at freedom from presuppositions that have
not passed phenomenological scrutiny.
2. Its subject-matter is the general essences of the phenomena of conscious-
ness; among these phenomena, the phenomenologist distinguishes between
the intending acts and the intended objects in strict correlation; he pays
special attention to the modes of appearance in wh ich the intended referents
present themselves; he does not impose any limitations as to the content of
these phenomena.
3. Phenomenology is based on the intuitive inspection and faithful description
of the phenomena within the context of the world of our lived experience
 52
(Lebenswelt), anxious to avoid reductionist oversimplifications and over-
complications by preconceived theoretical patterns.
4. In order to secure the fuHest possible range ofphenomena and at the same
time doubt-proof foundations it uses a special method ofreductions which
suspends the beliefs associated with our naive or natural attitude and shared
even by science; it also traces back the phenomena to the constituting acts
in a pure subject, wh ich itself proves to be irreducible.
5. Its ultimate objective is the examination and justification of all our beliefs,
both ordinary and scientific, by the test of intuitive verification.
To perform the same kind of surgery on the much more amorphous body of
beliefs and attitudes that go by the name of existentialism may appear as an
even more foolhardy enterprise. In attempting it one does weIl to remember
that self-confessed existentialism does not date earlier than 1944 when Sartre,
having already published his major philosophical works, took the word
"existentialism" out of the hands of his ho stile critics and applied it
retroactively to his own writings and to those ofhis predecessors. Any attempt
to define such a sprawling phenomenon has to make incisions which may seem
arbitrary. I submit, however, that there is something like a hard core of present-
day existentialism based on affinities in interest and approach. It includes not
only the self-confessed phenomenological existentialists such as Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty but also Gabriel Marcel, however repentant as to the term
"Christian existentialism," and such unrepentant existentialists as Nicolai
Berdyaev or Nicolo Abbagnano. Besides, according to their major concerns
and themes, Jaspers' deliberately nonphenomenological elucidation of exis-
tence and Heidegger' s phenomenological analytics of existence are inseparable
from fuH-fledged existentialism, their vigorous protests notwithstanding. Even
if their own objectives were different and ulterior, the existentialism of the
forties would never have been possible without their pioneering.
Sartre has attempted to condense the cloudy essence of these existentialisms
into the neat though mystifying formula that in existentialism "existence
precedes essence." But this formula has been repudiated, with good reasons,
by everyone but himself. For the present purposes it may be more helpful to
match the preceding propositions about phenomenology with a similar set
that is meant to apply to hard-core existentialism only:
1. Existentialism, unlike phenomenology, does not aspire to be scientific,
though it is not essentially anti-scientific or even anti-systematic. System-
atic structures and absolute certainty are simply none of its primary
objectives.
2. Its subject-matter is human existence or "human reality," not conscious-
ness, as in phenomenology. It studies existence in its involvement in a
situation within a world. Consciousness, however, reflective as weIl as pre-
reflective, is part of the encompassing structure of existence.
 53
3. Existentialism is not restricted to any particular method; Kierkegaard's
existential dialectics and Jaspers' elucidation of existence have historical
priority over phenomenological existentialism.
4. Phenomenological existentialism goes beyond the phenomenological de-
scription of phenomena by a special kind of interpretation, the so-called
hermeneutic method, wh ich aspires to decipher their meaning for existence.
Phenomenological reduction as practiced by Husserl, if it is mentioned at
all, is rejected; so is Husserl's concern for transcendental subjectivity as the
absolute foundation of all being.
5. The ultimate objective of existentialism is not theoreticaljustification, but
the awakening to a special way öflife, usually called "authentic existence."
We are now in a position to approach the question of the historical relations
betweim the two movements. Husserl hirns elf during his lifetime faced only the
predecessors of self-declared existentialism: Karl Jaspers' Existenzphilo-
sophie and Martin Heidegger's existential analysis ofhumanDasein. Jaspers,
although he had used phenomenological description in his psychopathology,
had rejected phenomenology at the very outset of his independent philoso-
phizing because of its claims to scientific rigor. Heidegger, however, publish-
ing his magnum opus Sein und Zeit in Husserl's yearbook for philosophy and
phenomenological research, gave every indication of adhering to the pheno-
menological method, although he claimed at the same time the right to develop
it further and, implicitly at least, to omit some of it. Such a tacit omission was,
for instance, that of Husserl's cherished phenomenological reduction.
Three years later Husserl' s only printed pronouncement about Exis-
tenzphilosophie appeared, notably in a Postscript to his Ideen, at the very end
ofthe last volume ofhis yearbook. It came two years after Heidegger had been
appointed successor to his chair at the University ofFreiburg, an appointment
which, as a matter of fact, had resulted from Husserl' s own recommendation.
Although this pronouncement did not mention either Jaspers or Heidegger by
name, it left no doubt about the identity ofhis targets. It rejected summarily the
actual or suspected charges against Husserl's own philosophizing. It also
declaredExistenzphilosophie a relapse into the deadly sins of anthropologism
and psychologism, hence not acceptable even as a specimen of genuine
philosophy. Other expressions, such as lectures, letters, and especially
marginal comments to his readings in Heidegger, left no doubt ab out the fact
that Husserl saw especially in Heidegger's analytics of existence a corruption
of the phenomenological enterprise. These indictments led soon to a cooling
off and a final ceasing of the once cordial relations between Husserl and his
erstwhile assistant. From then until much later on Heidegger practically
stopped using the term "phenomenology" in his own philosophizing. As a
result, phenomenology and the philosophy of existence remained two comple-
tely separate movements, as far as Germany was concerned.
 54

However, it would be mistaken to infer from this that Husserl had no

appreciation for the questions raised by the philosophers of existence. Even
the Postscript to the Ideen, while rejecting the charges that phenomenology
was unable to cope with the problems of"so-called 'existence,' " implied that
such problems do exist. What Husserl objected to was merely the claim to
priority of the existential analytics over his own transcendental phenomeno-
logy, which Heidegger had implied. It is therefore not surprising to find
Husserl hirnself in his last decade repeatedly resorting to existential phraseo-
logy.3 How far the conception ofthe Lebenswelt (the world of our immediate
life experience), which plays such an important part in Husserl' s last work, can
be traced to indirect stimulation by Heidegger's conception of Dasein as
being-in-the-world need not be decided here. Hence there is no reason to deny
the possibility of an existential philosophy within the framework ofHusserl's
phenomenology. There are even indications that Husserl hirnself conceived of
his transcendental phenomenology as a distinctive existential possibility, and
that in particular the transcendental reduction included for hirn a liberating
conversion of human existence.
By contrast the French philosophers never seem to have questioned the
identity of phenomenology and existentialism. One even wonders whether,
when in the early thirties Sartre took up the study of phenomenology and
existential philosophy, he was at all aware of the seriousness of the break
between Husserl and Heidegger. Part ofthe explanation for this oversight may
be the fact that Heidegger impressed the young Frenchmen interested in
German philosophy much more than Husserl, and that in his writings
Heidegger, ostensibly Husserl's appointed heir, gave no clear indication of
serious friction between hirn and the master.
However, mere factual statements about the historical connection between
phenomenology and existentialism, pertinent though they may be, cannot
resolve the problem oftheir essential relation. What is required is a systematic
consideration of the following questions:
1. Are the two movements compatible?
2. ]f compatible, are they necessarily connected?
3. If not necessarily connected, have they at least an affinity?
4. Can today's phenomenological existentialism be considered sound phe-
nomenology?
1. With regard to the first question I maintain: phenomenology and
existentialism are compatible in principle. The opposite view may be argued
on grounds like the following:
a. Phenomenology is outspokenly rationalistic; existential philosophy is
opposed to all forms ofrationalism. Now it is true that Husserl's phenomeno-
logy professes rationalism in the sense of a concerted effort to justify all human
claims by rational evidence, although he opposes the uncritical rationalism of
 55

pure apriori metaphysics. But this does not mean that phenomenology rejects
insights based on non-theoretical, notably on emotive experience. On the other
hand, it is a fateful error to identify existentialism with the advocacy of
"irrational man." Existentialism does stress the practical partofhuman nature
as expressed in choice and commitment. But "thought," though not logical
thought in the technical sense, is an essential feature of Heidegger's philo-
sophizing, and Sartre stresses the Cartesian cogito to the extent of seeing in the
emotions primarily magie attempts to evade our situation, instead offacing it
rationally.
b. It is also argued that phenomenology "brackets" aIl questions of
existence, hence that it is essentially a philosophy of detachment in contrast to
existentialism's philosophy of commitment (engagement). But it is a mis-
understanding of the phenomenological reduction to think that bracketing our
beliefs in the existence of the phenomena eliminates the phenomenon of
human existence. This misunderstanding is based on an unfortunate equivoca-
tion in the meaning of the word "existence." F or the existence-character in the
phenomena which we bracket is something quite different from Existenz or
Dasein as the structure of being-in-the-world, which is found only in human
beings. As far as the latter is concerned, bracketing may weIl affect the beliejin
the reality of the world and even of the human being who is in such a world. But
even this does not mean that being-in-the-world and its believed reality is
totally ignored. It may be described qua phenomenon like any other reduced
phenomenon. One may consider Husserl's treatment of this phenomenon as
inadequate. It mayaiso be true that the phenomenologist' s detachment implies
a temporary retreat from the involvement and active participation in concrete
existence. But this does not mean total neglect of the phenomena of existence.
Nor must it be overlooked that the immanent residuum of consciousness which
survives the ordeal of the phenomenological reduction has the character of
absolute existence - an existence that can certainly riyal in poignancy the
existence which the existentialists attribute to the human being incarnated in
the world.
c. FinaIly, it is alleged that phenomenology deals with universal essences,
whereas existentialism is concerned with the concrete single individual.
However, even though it is correct that Husserl's phenomenology is restricted
to universal essences, it is an oversimplification to say that existentialism deals
only with concrete individuals. Even existentialism describes its findings in
universal terms and claims that its universal statements are valid for more than
one single individual. Heidegger's much quoted pronouncement that "the
essence of Dasein is existence" ascribes to human existence an essence. How
else could this statement about an essence be substantiated except by an
essential insight, a Wesenseinsicht in the phenomenological sense?
2. If then phenomenology and existentialism are compatible, are they
 56

dependent upon one another? My answer to this question is an unqualified

"no."
That existentialism does not depend on phenomenology can be shown by the
obvious examples of Kierkegaard and Jaspers. Quite apart from Jaspers' own
disclaimers, the methods which they applied differ basically from those used
by Husserl and even by Heidegger.
That phenomenology too does not depend on existentialism seems equally
obvious. Yet it has been held that phenomenology entails existentialism as an
essential, if not a necessary, consequence. At least implicitly this is asserted by
Gilbert Varet,4 and he is followed in this point by Wilfred Desan in his
Harvard dissertation. 5 However, these assertions are based on grave miscon-
ceptions ofGerman phenomenology. It is therefore more serious that so keen
an expert as Alphonse de Waelhens tries to show an essential trend from
Husserl's phenomenology to existentialism. 6 De Waelhens bases his case on
the fact that the emphasis in phenomenology on the importance of perspectives
necessitated a consideration of the concrete existences that occupy these
perspectives. But this does not seem to me compelling. Thus in the analogous
case of Einstein ' s theory of relativity the need of considering the standpoint of
the observer did not require a study ofthe observer's personality. And even a
consideration of the concrete existence of the subject at the source of a
perspective does notjustify the abandonment ofthe phenomenological attitude
of suspension of belief. I can therefore see no valid reason for asserting a
logical necessity in the historical procession from Husserlian phenomenology
to Heideggerian or Sartrian existentialism.
This denial has important consequences. It cuts the ground from under
Varet's and Desan's case against phenomenology based on the failure of
existentialism in Sartre's supposed tragic finale. Since Sartre's existentialism
is not the necessary consequent of phenomenology, denying this consequent
does not affect the right of the antecedent, phenomenology.
Besides, it must not be overlookedthat Husserl's phenomenology inspired a
considerable number of phenomenological enterprises other than existen-
tialism. Specifically I have in mind the so-called "Original" Phenomenological
Movement, as represented by Alexander PHinder, Moritz Geiger and Roman
Ingarden. The descriptive investigation of psychological, logical, ethical,
esthetic, and religious phenomena constitutes at least equally legitimate
expressions of original phenomenology. And there seems to be good reason to
stress that what has been achieved in these areas does not reflect too un-
favorably on Husserl's pioneering enterprise.
3. While phenomenology and existentialism are essentially independent
enterprises, have they at least enough affinity for fruitful cooperation? This
question I shall answer affirmatively.
This answer hardly needs much substantiation. While phenomenology as
 57

such has no preference for the phenomena ofhuman existence, it stands to gain
in significance by turning its powers to a field of such vital interest. On the other
hand, the pre-phenomenological insights of existentialism by means of
Kierkegaard's dialectics and Jaspers' non-objectifying elucidation of exis-
tence have been provocative, but highly elusive. Once existentialism comes to
grips with the epistemological problem, which it will not be able to shrug off
indefinitely, it has little hope of support from the more empirical and
positivist philosophies or psychologies. Hs best chance is an approach which
stresses and develops the faithful description ofthe phenomena as they present
themselves, regardless of whether they fit into the framework of our more
traditional methodologies. Besides, if for the existentialist, as Kierkegaard
puts it, "subjectivity is the truth," a phenomenology aimed at finding the
source of all consciousness in subjectivity is at least a congenial approach. Yet,
before existentialism can expect substantial benefit from invoking the aid of
phenomenology, it will have to accept it in its own right and undergo its
discipline, instead of trying to convert it into its handmaiden.
4. How far then can today's existentialism be considered phenomeno-
logically sound? Here, I am afraid, I have to make grave reservations.
Phenomenology has never been foolproof. But some of the fooling that has
invoked its name need not be laid at its doorsteps. I do not want to deny that the
phenomenological existentialists have made suggestive and at times even
striking contributions to the fund of phenomenological insights. But most of
these have to be gone over more cautiously and more critically. Thus, I submit
that such brilliant pieces as Sartre's phenomenology of the social gaze are
vitiated by a selective emphasis on isolated aspects of a roore comprehensive
phenomenon, by inadequate description, and by a hasty interpretation which
ignores alternative meanings that would have deserved consideration.
However, instead of taking such sweeping exceptions I would like to present
a concrete example from the very beginning of Sartre's phenomenological
career which can at the same time demonstrate Husserl's still unsurpassed
descriptive powers. I have in mind his discussion of the ego or the "I."
There is something strange about the relative lack of interest in the "ego" in
a philosophy which professes its prime concern in personal existence. This is
true particularly of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. Sartre, a vigorous
advocate of Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, went even farther. In his
first major article, "The Transcendence of the Ego,,,7 published in 1936, he
launched a frontal attack on Husserl's doctrine ofthe pure ego. In so doing he
tried to show that this ego was not, as Husserl had maintained, the immanent
source of all consciousness, but its transcendent and constituted object.
This is not the place to discuss the considerable merits and the weaknesses
of Sartre's first "sketch of a phenomenological description" and its ulterior
objectives. I shall focus merely on the reasoning which made Sartre repudiate
 58

one ofHusserl's central tenets. For it throws light on Sartre's entire approach
to phenomenology.
Sartre's primary objection to Husserl's pure ego is its superfluousness for
the description of consciousness. Should such an argument carry any weight in
matters of phenomenological description? It smacks more of Occam's razor,
which may have its place in keeping down the number of explanatory
hypotheses, but certainly not in describing the phenomena.
Phenomenologically more significant is Sartre's attempt to show that the
"I" is not part of our ordinary unreflective consciousness: thus, to him, we are
not aware ofthe "I" in reading a book or listening to a paper, but only when we
reflect upon Qur reading or listening. Whence he infers thatit is reflective
consciousness which constitutes the "I" or "me" as transcendent to the
immanent stream of consciousness.
Is this sound phenomenology? In what sense may reflection be said to
constitute the object on which it reflects? This raises, of course, the whole
question ofthe meaning of constitution in Husserl's phenomenology. But there
is certainly no good reason for assuming apriori that reflection brings its object
into being rather than that it merely uncovers or discovers it. In fact, when it
comes to other acts of consciousness, inc1uding Sartre's original pre-reflective
consciousness, Sartre himse1f seems to think that reflection simply illumines,
but does not bring about a consciousness which has been there all the time in
pre-reflective twilight, as it were. What is more, there seems to be very good
evidence for thinking that the "constitution" of the ego in reflection consists
simply in its emergence from the background of consciousness rather than in its
formation on its outskirts. What is constituted is its phenomenal character, not
its being.
I conc1ude that Sartre's critique of Husserl's conception of the ego is
anything but convincing, and particularly that its phenomenological basis is
inadequate. 8
How, then, does Sartre's pseudo-phenomenology ofthe ego compare with
Husserl's research on the subject? Sartre was well aware of the fact that
Husserl's views on the ego had changed between the first edition of his
Logische Untersuchungen of 1901 and the Ideen of 1913. But he took it for
granted that this change was a change for the worse and meant nothing but
Husserl's return to the transcendental ego of Kant or rather the Neokantians.
What Sartre and other critics ofHusserl's shift seem to discount is the fact that
when, in a footnote to the second edition of his Logische Untersuchungen, he
frankly admitted this reversal, he stated: "Since then (i.e., my earlier failure to
discover the ego) I have learned to find it, or more precisely, I have learned not
to be diverted from the pure grasp of the given by the excesses of the
metaphysics of the ego,,9; and in his Ideen he dec1ared that he had found his
earlier scepticism with regard to the ego untenable. IO I suggest that Husserl's
 59

explanation ofthe reasons for his shift should be taken seriously. There must
have been phenomenological evidence behind his seeming about-face. In fact,
some ofthis evidence has become available through the publication ofvol. II of
the Ideen, edited by Marly Biemel. ll F or it contains the chapter on the pure
ego which Husserl had promised in the first volume. It deserves the closest
attention ofthose who think they can dispose ofthe pure ego as a remnant from
the pre-phenomenological past. Specifically, Husserl's phenomenology ofthe
ego makes the foIlowing points:
I. It is of the essence of the pure ego that it can be seized firsthand (originäre
Selbsterjassung) by wh at Husserl calls self-perception (Selbstwahrneh-
mung) (§ 23). It is neither capable nor in need of a special constitution
( § 26). It forms an immanent phenomenon which does not present itselfby
different perspectives (Abschattungen ).
2. This original perception ofthe selfis subject to reflective modifications, for
instance by recall. In these reflective modifications the identity of the
persistent ego is given with self-evidence. Only its modes of appearance
differ. Reflective modifications presuppose original perception to which
they refer back in their very structure.
Nevertheless, Husserl denied that this intuitively self-given ego has any
similarity with a Cartesian substance, much as he subscribed to the indubi-
tableness of Descartes' "ego cogito." To hirn, the ego cannot occur in
abstraction from his acts, just as little as the acts can be given in abstraction
from the ego. Both are dependent on each other. But this does not affect their
distinctness.
The chapter on the pure ego makes other important points. Thus it
distinguishes between the pure ego as the focus of all our experiences and the
empirical or "real" human ego with its factual properties, its character, its
aptitudes, etc. Like Sartre, Husserl treats the latter ego as a "transcendent
object" constituted by the transcendental consciousness with its focal ego.
All this does not mean that Husserl' s phenomenology ofthe ego had reached
its final form. Husserl saw weIl enough that, since the pure ego lives in
immanent time, it is affected by the problems of constitution which are posed
by the consciousness of inner time. Moreover, it cannot and must not be
overlooked that, during Husserl's last period, in wh ich he collaborated closely
with Eugen Fink, his doctrine of the ego proliferated into a bewildering
multiplicity of at least three egos. 12 This proliferation may weIl have been the
cause forthe increasing scepticism even among Husserl's close followers, and
finally for Sartre's drastic cure. But this scepticism sacriticed the solid co re
along with the questionable outer shells.
This is not the place to pursue further the problems of Husserl's phenom-
enology of the ego. I introduced it merely as an instance of a case where
Husserl's patient search may be shown to be more penetrating than, and still
 60

unsurpassed by, the more spectacular assertions of the existentialists who

supposedly use his method. Besides, I do not mean to suggest that Husserl's
claims concerning the direct perception ofthe ego and concerning the reflective
modifications ofthis act are to be taken as final. Nor should it be overlooked
that Husserl withheld the volume oftheldeen with the chapter on the pure ego
during his lifetime. All his findings will have to be examined, re-examined, and
developed. But in the meantime it remains a remarkable fact that Husserl, after
his initial scepticism, came out with such definitive and positive suggestions for
a phenomenology ofthe ego. Moreover, I submit that Husserl's defense ofthe
ego as the center of our conscious existence may be cl os er to the original
existential conception of Kierkegaard, with his insistence on inwardness and
subjectivity as truth, than Sartre's denial ofthe pure ego and his ejection ofthe
empirical ego into the outside transcendent world. Sartre's attrack on the pure
ego, which he replaces by a stream of impersonal consciousness, actually
volatilizes existence. By denying it a center and the dimension of inwardness
he deprives it at the same time of its existential weight.
Existentialism may be on the trail of more vital, more fruitful insights than
pure phenomenology. But it has still to leam a few lessons from the older
phenomenology, particularly from Husserl. One of these is the injunction
which I heard hirn address to an informal group of students when he criticized
Max Scheler's much more rapid but not equally solid production: "One needs
bright ideas, but one must not publish them." Another lesson is his insistence
on the need ofmaking sure ofthe epistemological groundwork: "One must not
consider oneself too good to work on the foundations." It is such lessons,
lessons of philosophical solidness, integrity, and humility, which both
phenomenologists and existentialists still have to leam or to relearn.

NOTES

J Abridged version of"Husserl's Phenomenology and Existentialism" published first inJournal

of Philosophy 57 (1960), 762-74.
2 The Phenomellologica! Movement: A Historical 1l1troduction (Phaenomenologica 6), The
Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.
3 Thus his last publication, the introduction to transcendental phenomenology, The Crisis of/he
European Sciences al1d Transcendental Phenomeno!ogy, speaks of the crisis of European
"Existenz" which has arisen from the loss of meaning brought on by modern positivistic
science, of the "existential contlict" (existenzieller Widerspruch) which this entails for the
contemporary philosopher committed to the cause of scientific rigor, and ofthe responsibility of
philosophers, as agents ofhumanity, wh ich determines their "existential being" (Husserliana,
vo!. VI, pp. 10, 15 ff.; trans!. by David Carr pp. 12, 16ff. See also the Vienna lecture 00935
about the possibility of extending phenomenology to the problem of" so-called existence" (VI,
346, trans!. p. 298). How deeply, if not "existentially," Husserl hirnself was involved in his
philosophie enterprise can be seen from some of his private diary notes ("Persönliche
Aufzeichnungen," published by Walter Biemel in Philosoph)' and Phenomenological Re-
search, vo!. XVI (1956), pp. 293 fI).
 61

4L'Ontologie de Sartre, Paris, 1947.

5 The Tragic Finale, Cambrldge, 1954.
6 "Les constants de I'existentialisme," Revue internationale de philosophie, vol. 9 (1949), pp.
255-269.
7"La transcendance de I'ego, Esquisse d'une description phenomenologique," Recherehes
philosophiques, vol. VI (1936), pp. 85-123. English translation, with the misleading subtitle
"An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness," by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick
(New York, Noonday Press, 1957).
Bit seems worth mentioning that in L 'Etre et le neant (Part 111, Chapter I, iii, pp. 290 f.) Sartre
modified his position, not to be sure as far as the "transcendence ofthe ego" is concemed, since
he continues to consider Husserl's ego as a useless and nefarious (ne/aste) hypothesis. But he no
longer asserts that the stream of consciousness is impersonal. Instead he ascribes to it the
character of"ipseity," 'without however making it sufficiently clear what this quality involves.
9Logische Untersuchungen, 2nd edition (Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1913), vol. 11, 1, p. 361.
loIdeen I (Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1913), § 57 footnote. English translation by W. R. Boyce
Gibson, p. 173. For a thorough examination ofthis transition see now Eduard Marbach, Das
Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
11 Husserliana, vol. IV (1952), Zweiter Abschnitt, Erstes Kapitel: Das reine Ich.
12Eugen Fink, "Die phanomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen
Kritik," Kantstudien, vol. 38 (1933), 381 ff.
4. HUSSERL AND PFÄNDER ON THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL
REDUCTION 1

1. INTRODUCTORY: THE ISSUE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

By speaking ofthe reduction in the singular I do not want to imply that the term
"reduction" as used in phenomenological philosophy has only one referent. It
has little, if anything, to do with what we mean ordinarily when we speak of
reduction outside philosophy and of the fallacy of reductionism in general
philosophy. But even phenomenologists, quite apart from the founder of the
Phenomenological Movement, Edmund Husserl, speak of reduction in at least
two senses: (1) the so-called "eidetic reduction," leading from particulars to
universal essences (eide), a sense shared by those phenomenologists who
subscribed to the platform at the head ofthe first volume ofHusserl'slahrbuch
fÜ'r Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung which in 1913 specified
intuition (Anschauung) and the essential insight (Wesenseinsichten ) based on
it as the common ground of all phenomenology, and (2) the more specific-
and controversial- sense of reduction which Husserl called the "phenomen-
ological" or "transcendental reduction," for hirn its fundamental form, in fact,
the entrance gate to pure phenomenology or phenomenology proper. The
question which I am raising here is whether the reduction in this latter sense is
really indispensable for phenomenology or whether a phenomenology is
possible and perhaps even actual without this radical procedure.
For all those even moderately acquainted with Husserl's thought there will
be no question about his own answer concerning the indispensability of the
reduction, at least as far as pure phenomenology was concerned, for instance in
his lectures on Die Idee der Phänomenologie in 1907, although it was not until
1913 that his affirmative answer appeared in print through his Ideen zu einer
reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.
The case is different with Pfänder, his major associate in Munich after their
first meeting in 1904 and his chief co-editor of the phenomenological yearbook
until about 1925. At first sight it could seem - and this is certainly what
Husserl hirnself believed - that Pfänder took no interest in his phenomeno-
logical reduction. Thus in Pfänder' s writings published during his lifetime,
even in his Logik öf 1921, the only place where he discussed the meaning of
phenomenology explicitly, there is no mention of the reduction. This would
 63

imply that in Pfänder' s view the phenomenological reduction is indeed no

important part of phenomenology and hence expendable. Much as the possi-
bility of such a denial has to be considered for its own sake, the plain fact is that
Pfänder hirnself did not ignore or repudiate Husserl's reduction indiscrimi-
nately. This fact now emerges from his unpublished philosophical papers,
which have been published posthumously in German. 2 In these texts an
operation very much akin to Husserl's reduction plays a major role. If I say
"akin to" I would like to make it clear at once that Pfänder's conception ofthe
reduction does not coincide with Husseri's, since it includes only its first part.
In fact, Pfander even omits the word "reduction" and uses merely Husserl's
Greek term epoche, by which he means a suspension ofbelief or judgment. But
Pfänder does not subscribe to Husseri' s additional operation ofleading back to
the origins ofthe world in the consciousness ofthe phenomenological subject.
In other words, Pfänder accepts the epoche, but rejects the transcendental
reduction.
Today the issue of the place of the phenomenological reduction in
phenomenology is of crucial importance for the fate ofthe Phenomenological
Movement, especially in the worid outside its country of origin. Since its
beginnings the reduction has been a stumbling block to many insiders and
outsiders and certainly an embarrassment to its interpreters. The founder
hirnself took an increasingly uncompromising stand on its necessity for doing
genuine phenomenology and for understanding it. On the other hand, there are
those who have tacitly or openly refused to accept his terms. To mention only a
few conspicuous examples of such refusals: (1) In England J. N. Findlay
has voiced his lack of comprehension for the reduction; to hirn the pre-
reductive phenomenology of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen of 1900-
1901 represents its climactic achievement, of which he prepared the first
translation. 3 (2) Jose Ortega y Gasset, one ofthe main supporters ofpheno-
menology in the Spanish world and such disciples of his as Julian Marias
consider the reduction as a distortion of the "executive character", the most
important feature of direct consciousness.4 (3) Heidegger observed complete
silence on the phenomenological reduction in his major writings, a silen ce all
the more conspicuous under the circumstances ofhis personal and geographi-
cal c10seness to Husserlin the twenties and most telling when in his (second)
draft for Husseri's Encyclopaedia Britannica artic1e "Phenomenology" he
simply ignoreä it.5 In fact, it is not easy to assemble a list ofHusserl's followers
who accepted the reduction explicity and without qualifications, as can be seen
best in the case of Merleau-Ponty, who stated that the great lesson of the
reduction was the impossibility of completing it.6

2. THE ORIGINS OF HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION

A full understanding ofHusserl's growing insistence on the crucial importance

 64

ofthe reduction far his phenomenology would require tracing its development
from its very beginnings. Apart from other considerations which would make
such an approach inadvisable in the present context, such a his tory cannot yet
be written. It would require a painstaking search for all the major occurrences
of the term and its equivalents in the contexts of Husserl's published and
unpublished writings. Indications are that the change-over 1'rom the tradition al
philosophical sense ofthe term "reduction" with its pejorative connotation 01'
oversimpli1'ication (the "nothing but" fallacy) to a more honorific and literal
sense, i.e., the "leading back to" from an advanced to a mare basic starting
ground happened almost imperceptibly and without Husserl's pointing it out. 7
However, the important fact for the history of the Phenomenologica!
Movement was that, although Husserl tried, unsuccessfully at that, to launch
the early vers ions ofthe new reduction in his Göttingen lectures since 1906, it
was not until the publication ofhis Ideen in thelahrbuch of 1913 that this
conception reached the wider public and even most of his co-editors, and
caused at once bewilderment, i1' not downright rejection. Here, in the second 01'
the four sections of Book I, Husserl introduced alm ost abruptly a new
"fundamental meditation" leading 1'rom wh at he now called the "natural
attitude" to the "phenomenological attitude," to be achieved by a new
operation, called interchangeably the "phenomenological" or "transcenden-
tal" reduction or the epoche. s,9 He characterized this act in more or less
figurative language as suspension, bracketing, inhibition, putting out of action,
turning off or abstention from the "general thesis," i.e., the belief in the
existence of the natural world as it accompanied the natural attitude. The
result of this new operation was to be the isolation of a region of pure
consciousness whose being could be considered as absolute or beyond possible
doubt, analogously to Descartes' ego cogito, only that Husser!, on the basis of
his theary of intentionality, added to this formula the cogitata qua cogz'tata,
i.e., the intentional objects.
One ofthe odd features ofthis first presentation ofthe reduction was that it
did not offer any clear reason why such a violent change of our natural attitude
was to be required. All that Husserl claimed in the beginning was that it was a
matter of our complete freedom to carry out such an act of intellectual ascesis.
But especially for those used to the happy freedom, if not licentiousness, of the
early phenomenological method, this sudden epistemological rigour appeared
anything but inviting.
Clearly, far Husserl himself the phenomenological reduction meant much
more than a sudden inspiration and a discovery of a new human power. It was
to open up the possibility for a new interpretation of our relation to the world.
Specifically it was to give access to what he called the Ursprünge (origins) of
our world in our consciousness from the Leistungen (achievements) of our
constituting acts. But the mere description of reduction in the Ideen did very
 65

little to show the actual procedure in unearthing these constituting acts. More
and more it became clear that the mere suspension ofbeliefwas insufficient to
bring about such discoveries. Thus Husserl began to talk not only of a
"reduction of ... " but also used the phrase "reduction to ... " notably a
reduction to (auf) subjectivity, or even more explicitly to the origins of the
world in subjectivity. This clearly involved a special search, an effort to track
down the way in which the phenomena were supposed to originate in our
consciousness. Such a constitutive phenomenology involved an epistemologi-
cal and even metaphysical position which after 1922 he called openly
"phenomenological idealism."
The burden which this objective put upon the phenomenological reduction
was clearly an enormous one. It is therefore not surprising that Husserl not
only attached increasing importance to this operation, but also struggled to the
end ofhis life to clarify and develop it. The sad fact is that in spite of all these
efforts he never succeeded in doing so and especially in explaining it to others
in a final form. In the following section I shall try to convey a first idea of the
complexities and difficulties as they unfolded in the period after the publication
of the Ideen.

3. THE UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF HUSSERL'S

PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION

3.1. The Theory 0/ Reduction (1924)

When, after abandoning plans for the publication of the two partially
completed additional volumes ofthe Ideen, Husserl, now in Freiburg, tried to
give a more systematic and radical account of his transcer.dental phenomeno-
10gy - first outlined in his four lectures at the U niversity of London in 1922 -
he devoted a whole semester of lectures to the theory of reduction, published
as Part 11 of his Erste Philosophie (Husserliana VIII). But while this text
contains a major effort to provide new approaches to the reduction, it adds
little, if anything, to its further clarification, especially concerning ways in
which the origin ofthe phenomena from subjectivity can be demonstrated and
convincing proof for an idealistic conclusion be supplied.

3.2. Psychological and Transcendental Reductiol1

Around 1925 Husserl's phenomenological reduction began to proliferate into

such a variety of operations that some of his students thought there were as
many as six to eight types of them, an impression which, in a letter to Roman
Ingarden, Husserl himself called an excessive "systematization." 10 However,
 66

his article on "Phenomenology" written in 1927 for the Encyclopaedia

Britannica, prepared in 1924 by discussions in Erste Philosophie
(Husserliana VIll, pp. 139-145) clearly separated a "psychological
phenomenological reduction," needed for the development of a pure psycho-
logy based on intentionality and free from all naturalistic admixtures, and
a "transcendental phenomenological reduction," which would reduce even
the pure psychological phenomena to those of pure transcendental conscious-
ness. Yet it did not become clear whether this meant completely different kinds
of reduction or merely an extension of the psychological reduction to a more
basic level. However, the distinction itselfwas apparently permanent, since it
can be found also in the Cartesian Meditations of 1929 andin the drafts forthe
Crisis of 1935.

3.3. The Distinction of Epoche and Reduction

An even more important distinction, at least in the context of this article,

emerges in connection with Husserl's preparations for the Cartesian Medi-
tations in 1929; namely a distinction between the referents of the terms
"epoche" and "reduction," thus far used interchangeably. It finds its clearest
expression in the syllabus (Husserliana I, p. 189) where Husserl speaks ofthe
epoche as "universal abstention from experiential belief and the ensuing shift
of attention (die nunfolgende Blickwendung ) to the experiencing life," called
subsequently "transcendental- phenomenological epoch(!"ll and "tran-
scendental-phenomenological reduction" respectively. This formulation is
slightly toned down in the text ofthe Paris lectures themselves in a sentence to
the effect that "by means ofthe phenomenological epoche the natural human
'I' is reduced (reduziert sich)" to the transcendental 'I' which explains "the
talk of the phenomenological reduction" (pp. 10-11). The distinction is
weakened even further in the actual Cartesian Meditations (p. 61), where
Husserl says that "the transcendental epoche insofar as it leads back to it [the
transcendental ground (Seinsboden)1 is called (he isst) transcendental-
phenomenological reduction," implying that the two are again identical.
But the distinction returns in much more explicit form in Part III of the
Crisis ofthe European Sciences, both in Divisions IIIA and IHB. In Part lIlA
the title of § 41 reads "The genuine transcendental epoche makes possible
(ermöglicht) the reduction." The genuine epoche, as distinguished from its
partial and temporary predecessors practised in our everyday professionallife,
is characterized as the total inhibition of the performance of all RctS of belief,
i.e., ofthe so-called general thesis which accompanies our daily living. Thus
far all seems to be clear and in ac cord with Husserl's account ofthe epoche in
the Ideen.
What is much less clear is the operations that are to follow on the foundation
 67
ofthis enabling epoche. It would seem that their primary or ultimate purpose is
to show, by leading us back to the origin ofthe world in subjectivity, how the
phenomena are constituted by and in the transcendental subject. However,
the few pages that follow the characterization of the new epoche are never
specific enough to bear out such a claim. In § 42 Husserl seems to be groping
for a way to fulfi1 it by raising a whole series ofunanswered questions as to how
to obtain a "transcendental experience" of this achievement. Apparently the
epoche has led us merely to the entrance gate of the new realm of the
"mothers," as Husserl, referring once more to one ofhis favourite passages in
Goethe's Faust(Faust's mystifying and awe-inspiring trip to the keepers ofthe
keys to the mystery of existence), calls the place for such knowledge of the
origin oftranscendental knowledge. Thus the performance ofthe epoche does
not yet seem to have opened the way to transcendental subjectivity, although it
constitutes its prerequisite.
I t is therefore not surprising that in § 43 Husserl starts on an apparently fresh
track which begins directly from our naturallife in the world. Here he mentions
the "Epoche bzw. (sic) Reduktion" only in passing and then takes us to the
first full-scale ac counts of the life world. There is no further mention of
reductive operations in the subsequent discussions ofthe apriori correlation
between the things in the life world and the subjective modes in which they are
given, an account of which seems to contain merely a static, not a genetic
correlation of the "noetic" and the "noematic" levels of consciousness. Only
in a final footnote on page 169 does Husserl mention again that the discovery
in 1898 ofthis correlation in the Logische Untersuchungen led by necessity to
the phenomenological reduction to absolute transcendental subjectivity as
developed inIdeen I, where it clearly has not yet been stated adequately. Thus
the new reduction, as distinguished from the epoche, receives no further
clarification, and there is no indication how it can reveal the achievements of
constitutive consciousness.
However, the distinction between epoche and reduction recurs in Krisis III
B, i.e., the division in which Husserl tried to lead the reader by the road, taken
first in his article on "Phenomenology" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica and
again in the Prague 1ectures of November 1935, from psychology into
transcendental phenomenology. Here, where at first the terms "epoche" and
"reduction" seem to be interchangeable, they appear, beginning with VI, 249
1. 39, in conjunction, connected by an "and," suggesting two different
operations. In fact, in a special paragraph immediately after this passage (VI,
247, 11.3-16) Husserl attempted to clarify the relation between the two terms
explicitly (although he stated that it was obvious [selbstverständlich] in the
light of the preceding discussions) in the following way (VI, 247, 1. 7-16):
"In pure, Le., in the true sense descriptive psychology epoche is the means
for making experienceable and thematizable in their specific purity those
 68

subjects which in our natural mundane life are experienced and experience
themselves as standing in intentional real relations to mundanely real objects.
Thus for the absolutely non-involved spectator they become 'phenomena' in
a peculiarly novel sense - and this transformation (Umstellung)12 is called
here the phenomenological-psychological reduction."
Now, while the attempt to distinguish between epoche and reduction is clear
enough, the clarification offered in this paragraph will not do. It differs
considerably from the one implied in III A, where the epoche seemed to be the
necessary ("enabling") condition for the reduction leading to the "mothers,"
whereas here the epoche seems to be the me ans leading directly to the
reduction and thus apparently is its sufficient condition. The fact that the new
distinction refers only to the field of psychology and speaks only of the
phenomenological-psychological reduction, not the transcendental pheno-
menological reduction, makes the distinction incomplete, but could probably
be mended by a suitable extension. However, characterizing the epoche simply
as a means for converting mundane subjects into phenomena describes merely
its function but fails to mention a special act which accounts for this
achievement. This is even more true ofthe characterization ofthe reduction as
Umstellung wh ich, quite apart from the ambiguity of this term, seems to refer
to a becoming, not to an operation by the phenomenologists, as all the preced-
ing and following occurrences of this term suggest.
In the text following this episodic paragraph, the two terms seem to be used
interchangeably, but are also repeatedly given in conjunction and connected by
an "and." Besides, Husserl also attempts to distinguish several "steps"
(Stufen) in both the epoche and the reduction, e.g., the "first" or "behaviour-
istic" one (VI, 251), the phenomenological-psychological one, and the
universal and radical epoche and/or reduction. No wonder that in one ofthe
most revealing paragraphs (VI, 253, 33-254, 17) Husserl refers the reader to
future publications for"transparency" (Durchsichtigkeit) and clarity through
concrete investigations, and to the continuation ofIII B, which does not follow,
one more fact proving the incompleteness ofthis section. No wonder also that
in a note attached to a manuscript from K III 6, now published as "Beilage
XX" (VI, 555) Husserl refers to the need of changing (Umarbeitung) the
account of the "epoche in two steps" which he had already "turned in." This
part of the text was eventually called back from the editor of Philosophia in
Belgrade (see Karl Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1977, p. 478).
Thus, while the final stage in Husserl's attempt to clarify his conception of
the phenomenological reduction yielded at least two forms of it and also
several steps ofthe two, he himselfwas not satisfield with this formulation. In
view of this fact, it can hardly be claimed that he succeeded in supplying a
student of transcendental phenomenology with a clear directive for ente ring it
 69
through the narrow gate of the phenomenological reduction. Hence it is not
surprising that Husserl refused to release this new distinction for publication,
not even the one in the Pariser Vorlesungen and the Cartesian Meditations,
whose German version remained unpublished during Husserl's lifetime.

3.4. Eugen Fink's First Interpretation 0/ the Reduction

Eugen Fink in his momentous article of 1933 in the Kantstudien I3 in which,

according to Husserl's preface, there is "not one sentence with which I cannot
fuIly identify, which I cannot acknowledge as my own conviction" offers the
foIlowing characterization of the phenomenological reduction in thesis form:

Primarily the phenomenological reduction is not a method of mere turning off (Ausschaltung) but
one of leading back (Zurückleitung). By way of the most extreme radicalism of self-reflection it
leads the philosophizing subject through himself back to the transcendental doxic life ( Glaubens-
leben ) which is concealed by his self-apperception as a human being whose correlative of what is
supposedly valid (Geltungskorrelat) "is" the world. To put it differently, it is the method of
uncovering and laying open (Freilegung) of epistemic themes (Thematik) that is in principle non-
worldly: the dimension ofthe origin ofthe world. (Ibid., p. 134.) My translation; see also R. O.
Elveton, The Phenomenology of Husserl. Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1970.

This formulation makes it plain that Husserl's own accountin theIdeen had
been merely preliminary. The new differentiation can make Husserl's claims
for the reduction at least comprehensible, if not convincing.
However, Fink's article makes much more stringent demands on the
outsider and especiaIly on those brought up in the spirit of a rigorous science
free of unexamined presuppositions. For he begins his exposition of the
reduction with the foIlowing warning:

Any discussion of the phenomenological reduction, however sketchy, faces the practically
inescapable (ausweglos) difficulty of having to talk about it as of a cognitive operation which is
always possible and lies within the horizon of our human possibilities, whereas actually it is by no
means a possibility of our human existence. Hence the unfamiliarity with (Unbekanntheit) the
phenomenological reduction is not merely factual, but is an unfamiliarity with its very possibility
(p. 110). . .. This means in turn: The true theory of reduction cannot be placed right at its
beginning (p. 111). What it calls for is that one surrender himself fully to the cognitive movement
of the basic phenomenological method and, in performing it, transcend the description that started
in the natural attitude. Hence it is wrong to treat the reduction here needed as something that can
be reported in a way intelligible to all and as an intellectual technique specifiable as to its
procedures, running along the natural psychic tracks which any scientifically educated person
could carry out immediately after proper instruction.

One may weIl ask: what has become here of the ideal of a rigorous science of
philosophy with its claim to self-evident rationality shareable on the basis of
rational communication in intersubjectivity, of Platonic justification and
Cartesian clarity? How can one reasonably expect such a blind leap into a
reduction whose real sense cannot be explained beforehand, let alone be
 70

justified as necessary, and for which no clear instructions can be formulated?

How does such a leap differ from the one demanded by blind faith as a
prerequisite for understanding (credo ut intelligam)?

3.5. Fink's Final Critique of the Reduction

The problem has not diminished since Husserl's death. Meaning and
justification of phenomenological reduction provided one of the major topics
for the important Husserl Colloquium at Royaumont in 1957. 14 Here Eugen
Fink hirnself, in briefly listing the "operative" but not explicitly clarified and
examined basic concepts of Husserl's phenomenology, inc1uded among them
the epoche and commented on the lack of clarity and on the indefiniteness
(Unbestimmtheit) ofthe concepts now distinguished, of epoche and reduction
(p. 333). The difference between the natural and the new transcendental
meaning of epoche, according to Fink overlooked by Husserl, is now a
symptom of the "operative obscurity" (Verschattung) at the centre of
Husserl's philosophy. Whatever this late concession ofHusserl's most trusted
interpreter of his last phenomenology may prove, it adds to the difficulty of
understanding Husserl's basic step into transcendental phenomenology - and
makes it even more forbidding.

3.6. H. L. Van Breda's Position

In the discussion of Fink's paper H. L. Van Breda stated,

I can see the ambiguity of the different meanings of the expression epoche. To me it is the
consequence ofthe undoubtedly preliminary inadequacy of our interpretations ofthe Husserlian
doctrine as weIl as of its intrinsic ambiguity.

In his own paper about the phenomenological reduction Van Breda started out
with the thesis that for Husserl it provided access to the genuine philosophical
level. Yetin his answerto Roman Ingarden's remarks on its ambiguity (p. 330,
2) he stated in conclusion:

The ambiguity of the deep sense of the reduction will remain unaffected, I believe, even by the
study of the entirety of the unpublished material. All that remains to be done for us is therefore to
clarify its meaning by interpreting Husserl's extant texts. (p. 332.)

This c1early means that for the time being the access to reductive phenomeno-
logy is a precarious enterprise for any outsider. What are the chances, to say
nothing of the right, of expecting hirn to make such an attempt?
The result ofHusserl's struggle to develop and to explain his conception of
the phenomenological reduction may be summarized as folIows:
 71

I. The reduction is a highly complex operation, including at least two

distinctive steps:
(a) The epochlor suspension ofbeliefin the existence ofthe natural world;
(b) the leading back of the suspended world phenomena to their origin in
conscious subjectivity, on the assumption that
(i) all phenomena have origins and
(ii) these origins lie in conscious subjectivity.
2. This reduction can be applied to different levels of phenomena. For
instance, it can be applied to the natural world, the scientific world, the life
world, the intersubjective world, etc. In particular the psychological
phenomenological reduction affects only the psychic world, the transcen-
dental reduction also the purified psychological phenomena. No complete
census of these reductions is possible.
3. While it is relatively simple to describe the first step of the reduction,
Husserl did not succeed in giving a sufficiently clear idea of the way back
from the phenomena to their origins in subjectivity and particularly to the
discovery ofthe "hidden achievements" ofthis subjectivity in constituting
the phenomena.
In short, Husserl did not make the phenomenological reduction generally
accessible and available. Under these circumstances his increasing insistence
on the indispensability ofthe reduction as the narrow gate into the kindgdom of
true phenomenology is more than forbidding. The more he insisted on it, the
more he piled up difficulties for its understanding and practice. No wonder
Husserl hirns elf wrote to Roman Ingarden on November 23rd, 1932: "The
hardest thing in all philosophy is the phenomenological reduction, to penetrate
it with philosophical understanding and to practise it.,,15, 16

4. PFÄNDER'S ALTERNATIVE TO ABANDONING THE

PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION

Under such circumstances the most obvious solution ofthe problem may well
be to completely abandon Husserl's reductive phenomenology as a lost cause.
The safest course would then be areturn to the type of phenomenology that
preceded Husserl's radical enterprise, i.e. to the position which once united the
early phenomenologists at the stage of the foundation of the Jahrbuch.
However, I am not yet ready for such a counsel of despair. I believe that
Husserl's original idea of looking for a method that would put philosophy on
new and more solid foundations through a radical approach was basically
sound. His mistake was that in his passionate eagerness to develop such a
foolproof method he was carried away into making exaggerated claims for it,
 72

notably in the form of his phenomenological idealism. Husserl was right in

see king for a protective device against the extravagances to which an uncritical
phenomenology of simply rushing to the things and their essences and
describing them could give rise. This in itself is enough reason not to return to
an uncritical phenomenology ofthe type ofwhich non-Husserlian phenomeno-
logy contains some unfortunate examples. As an example for a critical and
cautious adoption of the c\earer and safer parts of Husserl's reductive
phenomenology, I would now like to introduce the conception of another
radical phenomenologist, that of Alexander Pfänder.
This is not the place for telling the whole and eventually tragic story of the
relations between Husserl and Pfänder, his first and oldest associate, oftheir
initial co-operation, and their final estrangement. 17 Suffice it to point out that
Pfänder, the leading student ofTheodor Lipps after writing a Phänomenologie
des Wollens as early as 1900,joined forces with Husserl, after meeting hirn first
in 1904 in Munich and spending a momentous summer vacation with hirn in
Seefeld, Tirol in 1905. Thus, until 1925, Husserl clearly and publicly pointed
to Pfänder as his foremost collaborator and as the most solid workman in
phenomenology.18 Like all Husserl's early associates, Pfänder was taken by
surprise when in 1913 Husserl publicly announced the epoche as the
foundation of the new phenomenology. It is also true that in his publications
Pfänder did not commit hirns elf to adopting the Husserlian reduction.
Apparently this was one reason why Husserl came to think that Pfänder had
dismissed the reduction and the constitutive phenomenology that he had built
upon it. Part ofHusserl's error was due to the fact that he was not aware ofthe
role of the reduction in Pfänder' s lectures and manuscripts in preparation for a
book-size systematic "introduction to philosophy and phenomenology." For
here Pfänder incorporated important features ofHusserl's reduction - and that
even under the Husserlian name of epoche Nevertheless, it remains true that
there are basic diferences between their conceptions of this operation. These
differences shall now be presented.

5. PFÄNDER'S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTALISM

Unfortunately, as has happened only too often in the his tory of the Pheno-
menological Movement, there has been hardly any public or even private
discussion between its diverging trends about the divisive issues, especially the
phenomenological reduction. In fact, during his lifetime Pfänder published
very littIe about phenomenology as such, and referred to Husserl only in his
Logik in connection with his refutation of psychologism. This does not mean
that he failed to read and examine carefully Husserl's publications, as Husserl
believed. This can be demonstrated from the detailed excerpts and notes found
 73

among his papers, especially those related to special Husserl seminars which
Pfänder offered repeatedly.
Perhaps the most explicit comment in these notes is contained at the end of
Pfander's excerpts from Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, which he, like
everyone else at the time, could read only in the French translation that
appeared du ring Husserl's lifetime. 19 Pfiinder's comment on this text reads in
translation:
"I. Nowhere does it really say clearly what is meant by 'transcendental.'
11. The transcendental experience is misdescribed."
The first criticism is perhaps less significant since it applies only to the
Cartesian Meditations. However, it explains why Pfander himselfneverused
transcendental terminology. The second objection is more serious. "Tran-
scendental experience" occurs especially in Husserl's second Meditation
about the opening up (Freilegung) ofthe transcendental field of experience.
Short of further clues, it seems likely that Pfänder's objection concerned
especially Husserl' s constitutional analyses. However, the transcendental
reduction does not figure in Pfander' s critique, which is not surprising in view
ofthe fact that there is not much discussion ofthe reduction in the Meditations.
Pfänder's most explicit critique of Husserl's reduction can be found in his
review of a book on Husserl's phenomenological idealism by Theodor Celms,
one ofHusserl's Latvian students in Freiburg, in a leading German reviewing
journa1. 20
The book had pointed out a dangerous ambiguity in Husserl's terminology
of the phenomenological reduction, inasmuch as it did not distinguish
between "reflection upon" and "reduction to." Besides, as Pfänder restated
Celms in his highly favourable review, Husserl's idealism did not only
abandon his original suspension of belief in the existence of what is
transcendent to consciousness, but is based on the prejudgment that there can
be no being by itself (an sich), but only being for consciousness, nothing
beyond it. As Celms saw it, Husserl's main arguments for his view were
completely inadequate and could not satisfy the standards ofrigorous science.
Among Pfänder's unpublished notes (A IV 4) there is also a more direct
criticism of the phenomenological reduction found on a special sheet among
his preparations for his book Introduction to Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logy. This criticism followed a few remarks about critical realism, which,
according to Pfänder, is based on untenable assumptions. Then he states:
Even the so-called phenomenological reduction starts from the presupposition that, for instance,
the extemal world is ultimately a mere unity of valid beliefs (Geltungseinheit). But it fails to
establish first what precisely is meant by the extemal world and then to investigate what goes on
when the belief in it finds contirmation 'or fulfilment; specitically, whether or not the fulfilling
experiences are also merely intentional, the having of me re contents in consciousness. 21
 74
Thus, in Pfänder' s eyes, the phenomenological reduction is burdened with
illegitimate presuppositions and hence not sufficiently radical. Yet this critique
of Husserl' s reduction does not affect the phenomenological reduction itself
but merely the presuppositions which Husserl had implied and never
questioned. W ould it not be possible to free it from this burden? Any answer to
this question would be premature before Pfander's conception ofthe reduction,
or rather of the epoche, is presented in its proper context.

6. PFÄNDER'S CONCEPTION OF THE "EPOCHE"

Significantly in Pfänder' s own version of the phenomenological method the

term "reduction" never occurs; his criticism of Husserl's reduction should
make this sufficiently understandable. But all the more does Pfänder make use
ofthe even more Husserlian term epoche, which he uses interchangeably with
such German expressions as Urteilsenthaltung (abstention fromjudgment) or
Glaubensenthaltung (abstention from belief). But what precisely does
Pfänder und erstand by this epoche? There can be practically no doubt that he
had taken overthe term as a result ofhis study ofHusserl's Ideen, since it does
not seem to occur in his own lecture notes prior to its appearance. These
lecture notes show Pfänder's epoche in the proper context. Thus in the
introductory section of his Einleitung in die Philosophie und Phänomeno-
logie we find a section " A First Look at Phenomenology" wh ich focusses on
the epoche or abstention from judgment as "leaving in abeyance" (dahin-
gestellt sein lassen) of what we believe in the following four areas:
I. reality in its various domains;
II. truth of specific knowledge;
III. knowledge of one's own body;
IV. the existence of one' s own soul.
Presumably this is not a systematic catalogue but merely a selection of areas
where the epoche is particularly important.
In the main body ofthe text in each of its chapters the epoche is applied to the
major topics of philosophy. The account of this operation does not vary
substantially. There is repeated emphasis on the fact that the epoche implies
abstention from decisions about the reality of what is in our consciousness.
Phenomenology must not rely on knowledge obtained from extraneous
sources. In this sense it must be free of aIl presuppositions and take up its place
at the very beginning of all knowledge. In his Ethik Pfänder also points out
that the epoche does not amount to serious doubt but is merely a method-
ological device. 11 must not interfere with the preservation of what is meant
exactly as it is meant. 22
Except for this specific instruction Pfänder agreed with Husserl's de-
 7S

scription ofthe epoche especially in theIdeen ( § 31 and 32). True, he avoided

most ofHusserl's metaphorical terms such as Einklammerung (bracketing).
But his own favourite equivalent,Urteilsenthaltung (abstention from judge-
ment), also occurs in the Ideen, e.g. § 55. However, Pfander omitted and
actually rejected Husserl's reduction to subjectivity, which went beyond the
epoche. Only in so far as an tinbiased examination of the phenomena should
reveal their actual dependence upon consciousness - the kind of dependence
that Ingarden had demonstrated for the literary work of art and Pfilnder himself
acknowledged für mathematical objects - would Pfänder accept the claims of
Husserl's transcendental reduction.

7. THE ROLE OF THE EPOCHE IN PFÄNDER'S AND

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

While there is little difference in Pf"änder's and Husserl's conception of the

epoche, its role in their actual methods differs considerably. Husserl's pure
phenomenology begins with the epoche. In Pfänder' s philosophy the epoche, in
spite of its central importance, forms only the second of the three steps of his
method. In fact, Pfänder frequently states that the first two steps are merely
preparatory to phenomenology proper, whose concluding and culminating
task is the definitive grasp of what is authentically given in perception.
To understand this intermediary position of Pfänder's epoche requires an
adequate familiarity with the other two steps, the preceding one of M einungs-
klärung or Sinnklärung ( clarification of meaning or sense) and the subsequent
one which Pfander usually called Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung or
eigentliche Phänomenologie (phenomenology of perception or phenomeno-
logy proper).
Clarification of meaning, as Pfänder conceived of it, aims primarily at
removing all Begriffsfälscherei (falsification of concepts) and Umdeuterei
(distortion of meanings) by means of a new radical interpretation of senseP
It consists negatively in the elimination of aU philosophical misinterpre-
tations, for instance in the case of causality, by the distortion of our
original conception through Hume's idea of regular succession, which fails
to account for what we really mean by "causal efficacy" (wirken). Posi-
tively it consists in the fearless exploration of this meaning as experienced
in our everyday living when we speak of causes and effects. Even though
pfänder's "clarification of meaning" is not tied to the interpretations of
everyday or ordinary language, it offers a striking parallel to what the later
Wittgenstein initiated and John L. Austin, who almost labelled this enterprise
as "linguistic phenomenology," developed much more painstakingly.24
Husserl's phenomenology, though often starting from linguistic considerations
and distinguishing the ambiguous meanings of the fundamental philosophical '
 76

terms at least in appendiees, as in the Logische Untersuchungen, and

developing a phenomenology of language in his later philosophy, has nothing
comparable to offer. It could well be that Pfänder's emphasis on and
formulation of this preparatory step of phenomenology was stimulated by the
observation ofHusserl's misinterpretations of ordinary meanings in the Ideen
and elsewhere.
The role ofPfänder's epoche, whieh follows the clarification ofmeaning, is
spelled out most clearly in the sentence: "The Urteilsenthaltung is to
prevent premature assertions of knowledge."25 A specific example men-
tioned in the Introduction to Philosophy and Phenomenology is the psycho-
physieal theory of perception. 26 The epoche is therefore clearly a protective
measure, designed to prevent easy-going credulity which might result from
mere clarification of meaning. Gilbert Ryle speaks of the Fido-"Fido"
principle whieh makes us identify the existence of a proper name with that of
the pet so named; and, more gene rally, the semanticists warn us against the
fallacy of inferring from words to things. Pfänder's epoche is an explicit
insurance against this risk. Apparently he did not install it as aseparate step in
his method until the later twenties. As such it differs from Husserl's epoche as
introduced in the Ideen. There it was conceived not merely as a new form of
Descartes' purgative doubt but as the key to the kingdom of absolute
consciousness and to the constitutive achievements of transcendental con-
sciousness. Pfänder's epoche serves a more modest purpose. It is to free us
merely from the gullibility with regard to words and meanings which might
arise from the dogma that ordinary language is always right, and to prepare the
way for a fresh exploration of the phenomena whieh supposedly correspond to
what is meant.
Only after these two steps are we prepared for Pfänder's phenomenology
proper, the unbiased examination through perception ofwhat we really mean
after the belief in its validity has been temporarily suspended. This is not the
place to show in detail what is involved in Pfänder's phenomenology of
perception, clearly the decisive phase ofhis method. But it is essential to point
out that not every form of perception is suited to a valid verification of what we
mean, but only a scrutinizing critical perception, as distinguished from various
types of superficial or merely scanning perception. Its purpose is to give access
to the authentie phenomena as distinguished from mere appearances, or to
establish that nothing corresponds to what we meant. It is obvious that this
conception is not only compatible with Husserl's but indebted to it, especially
in view ofPfänder's utilization ofHusserlian terms, for instance in characteriz-
ing what is authentieally perceived as leibhaftig gegeben (presented bodily or
in person). Also, PIänder's conception of verification clearly corresponds to
Husserl's conception of intuitive fulfilment (Anschauung) of our merely
 77

conceptual intentions. But Pfänder again avoided such technical terminology

in order to stay c10ser to everyday language.
It is noteworthy that Pfänder's phenomenology of perception inc1udes a
reflection on our acts of perceiving and pays special attention to the question of
how these acts are related to the phenomena, whether producing them or
merely receiving them. This assignment indicates the proper place for a
constitutive phenomenology, whose full development in Husserl's later sense
is indeed missing from Pfänder's phenomenology.
Thus on the whole Pfänder's triadic phenomenological method is not in
conflict with Husserl's seemingly dyadic one, which starts with the epoche,
however enriched - and complicated. Also, it must not go unmentioned that
later on Husserl preceded the transcendental epoche with the exploration of
the life world and that the static constitution in his phenomenology was later
supplemented by a genetic constitution. The real difference between Husserl
and Pfänder lies in the different role ofthe epoche: Pfänder's epoche involved
merely the attitude of temporary neutrality concerning existence; a final
decision can be expected as a result of fresh phenomenology of perception. By
contrast Husserl's epoche amounts to a permanent step and commits us to a
new interpretation of reality as a result ofhis constitutive investigations carried
out on the basis of the epoche.
What then is the upshot ofPfänder' s adoption ofHusserl' s epoche? Even for
Pfänder the reduction in its epochistic form was an essential and necessary
part of a critical phenomenology. But this reduction did not inc1ude the
subsequent phases of Husserl's version, Le., the transcendental reduction to
subjectivity. Without going so far as to say that these phases were incompat-
ible with the phenomenological approach, Pfänder saw in them a theory not yet
supported by phenomenological evidence. In short, for Pfänder's critical
phenomenology, the epochistic reduction was indispensable; but the tran-
scendental reduction was anything but necessary and in fact misleading. 27

8. A FINAL PERSPECTIVE: PHENOMENOLOGICAL EPOCHE AND

EXISTENTIALIST COMMITMENT

Does this result justify a general answer to the initial question: Is the
phenomenological reduction necessary for phenomenology? Obviously it
does only for two leading members of the Phenomenological Movement,
Husserl and Pfänder. Without taking a similar look at the other protagonists of
the Movement, no definitive conc1usion can be reached. But it cannot be
denied that as a matter of fact Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger developed
phenomenological philosophies without using the reduction in Husserl's or
 78

Pfänder's sense. Occasional references in Scheler to the reduction mean

different operations and certainly do not approach the conception and role
assigned to it by the two "radieal" phenomenologists.
Besides, any factual statement about the opinions and practiees of the
phenomenologists thus far would be inconclusive with regard to the essential
indispensability of the reduction. A general ans wer can be based only on the
merits of the case as presented by those who have explored the problem in
depth. I submit that the case for the need of an epochistie reduction in a critieal
phenomenology has been made by Pfänder, though perhaps not explicitly
enough. As far as the more far-reaching form ofthe reduction urged by Husserl
is concerned, such a case has not yet been presented convincingly, and the
evidence thus far makes it more than doubtful that it ever will be.
This result may not be very exciting. Let me therefore in conclusion make a
very different plea for it. I might as weIl call it an ethical or existential plea.
Our natural, everyday attitude toward the world and its reality is that we
simply take them for granted. What right do we have to receive such a grant?
By this I do not mean merely an epistemologie al right based on the strength of
the reasons for believing in our" rightness." I have in mind our moral claim to
this taking for granted, to being right, especially being born right i. e., occupying
the "right" perspective. Perhaps one of Albert Schweitzer's little noted but
most valid insights was his sudden realization that he must not take as a matter
of course (selbstverständlich) his social good fortune, health and intellectual
gifts, and that they put hirn in debt toward his less fortunate fellow-beings. 28
Inasmuch as even truth, or rather its possession, is something whieh we have
no right to receive unearned we may be under a moral obligation never to take
"things," including the privilege of knowledge, for granted.
In the wake of the existentialist approach a certain glorification of
engagement and commitment as the proper and unquestioned ethieal attitudes
for authentie existence has sprung up and is nearly taken for granted. But in a
world where the claims to our unconditional allegiance to supposed authorities
become more and more dubious, and where conscientious objection has
become a much more valid stance than unconditional obedience, we may weIl
wonder whether disengagement and non-commitment are not equally valid as
engagement and commitment. In fact, our primary obligation may be precisely
to detach ourselves, to examine critically, and not to take things, including
authorities and truth claims, for granted. There is in this sense an ethical case
for the epoche of detachment as our prime obligation. All the more valid will be
the eventual attachment or commitment, once we have conscientiously tested
the case for it. This case should never be argued apart from the equally valid,
and in fact primary, case for the epoche, for a detachment whieh takes nothing
for granted before we have earned our right by the apprentieeship of epochistie
doubt.
 79

Radical phenomenology in the sense of Husserl's and Pfänder's epoche

(not: reduction) is not only the counterpart to existentialist commitment: there
is a moral case for it as a corrective for our smug acquiescence with a world to
which we have no obvious claim, and which has no obvious claim upon uso

EPILOGUE: "RADICALISM" IN HUSSERL AND PFÄNDER

In stressing the common "radicalism" of Husserl's and Pfänder's phenomeno-

logies I did not want to minimize the differences between their conceptions of
it. In order to appraise it properly one has to pay careful attention to the
concrete uses of this over-used prestige word. Husserl's increasing fondnesE
does not always go with a precise conception of its meaning. In Pfänder' s case
even the use of this term needs some documentation since it does not figure
prominently in his earlier writings. But it can be traced specifically in his final
Philosophie auf philnomenologischer Grundlage. Notably the adjective
"radical" is used in such combinations as "radical thinking through"
(Durchdenken) (op. eit. p. 23), the "radical cognitive drive" (p. 36, 40),
the need for "radical criticism" (p.43), and, most pertinent, the "radical
epoche" (p. 56 and its conspicuous place on the manuscript page reproduced
opposite p. 11).
Of course, the common use of such a term is no proof that it meant the same
for both. Indeed, there are indications that it did not, especially not in the way
they applied it. In fact, insideand outside philosophy "radicai" and "radi-
calism" are to some people prestige-laden, and to others repelling labels, whose
popularity or unpopularity stands in inverse proportion to their connotative
clarity. Actually neither in Husserl's nor in Pfänder's case are they defined
explicitly.29
All the more reason is there to point out in conclusion the common ground
and the differences in Husserl's and Pfänder's radicalisms. Both wanted to go
"to the roots," as the literat sense ofthe Latin word suggests. This means that
in philosophy they wanted to take nothing for granted and insisted on tracking
down all assumptions to their foundations in direct experience. Hence the
slogans "freedom from presupposition" and "to the things"; hence also the
radical epoche or suspension of belief.
Pfänder abides by the verdict of the direct evidence to the extent that what
appears to be given in person (selbst leibhaftig gegeben) must be accepted as
actually real. Husserl is not yet satisfied with this verdict until the phenomena
are "reduced" to their "origins in transcendental subjectivity." However, at
this point the ways part. For to Pfänder the idea that all the phenomena
originate in transcendental subjectivity is apresupposition that cannot be
taken for granted. It needs explicit statement and critical examination. Why
 80

could the phenomena not have their origin equally weIl in "objectivity," or in a
combination ofboth, or even have no" origin" at all? In this sense Husserl was
not radical enough for Pfänder. To hirn to be radical did not mean to take a
transcendental turn, much as he saw in consciousness the essential starting
point for phenomenological investigation.
THus Husserl's conception of radicalism is ultimately ontological in the
sense that it searehes for the ontie "origins" or "roots" from whieh all
phenomena spring. By contrast, Pfänder's coneeption is methodologieal,
inasmuch as his nidiealism refers to the unlimited examination of all
ontologie al eommitments including the one to the origin of all phenomena in
transcendental subjectivity. It has to begin with radical clarification of
meanings, go on to the radical suspension of all beliefs and terminate with the
radical investigation of the given.
But these substantial differenees do not affeet the eommon principle that
phenomenology must not stop short of going to the limits of critical
examination. This entails the epochistie suspension of all naive beliefs until
direct evidence is produced. In this sense both Husserl's and Pfänder's
phenomenologies were eommitted to the phenomenological reduction.

NOTES

1 From J oumal oJthe Britis h Society Jor Phenomenology 4 (1973), 3-15, published first under
the title "Is the Reduction Necessary for Phenomenology? Husserl's and Pfänder's Replies."
The text has been enlarged at the end by an Epilogue and several notes have been added.
2 Schriften aus dem Nachlass. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1975.
3 See his preface to his Gifford Lectures The Discipline oJthe Cave (London: George Unwin
Ltd., 1966, p. 15): "I neither practise nor wholly understand the epoche or suspense of
conviction, of which Husserl wrote so much."
4 See The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, p. 613).
5 A seeming exception is the Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, his Marburg lectures of
1927, where, however, the term reduction serves an entirely new, admittedly un-Husserlian
function.
6 Phenomenology oJ Perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945): Introduction.
7 See, e.g., the different uses ofthe term "reduction" in the second oftheLogical Investigations,
compared with the sixth investigation, especially in the second edition, the manuscripts of 1904
and the SeeJelder Reflexionen of 1905, published in the Beilagen of Husserliana X, and the
second lecture ofthe Idee der Phänomenologie of 1907 (Husserliana 11). They make it clear
that Husserl's first objective was "epistemological," involving the restriction to the indubitably
certain by a retreat from all "transcendent" claims to the merely immanent or "reell," a term
which Husserl at the time identified with the "phenomenological," incidentally the first new
sense ofthe term "phenomenology," still retained in the second edition of chapter I ofthe fifth
investigation of 1913.
8 Husserl may have picked up this term from his study ofthe Greek Sceptics in the two-volume
work of 1904 by Raoul Richter (see The Phenomenological Movement, p. 134 note) although he
otherwise rejected scepticism as practically identical with relativism. Even more likely seems to
me that his main source was the Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus (1905) by Albert
Goedeckemeyer, his Göttingen colleague at the time.
 81

9For the first occurrence ofthis term in the lectures of 1906/07, see E. Marbach, Das Problem
des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, p. 32.
lOBriefe an Roman Ingarden (Phaenomenologica 25), letter of December 10, 1925, p. 35.
11 A similardistinction can be found in Husserliana XV, p. 74, which theeditor, Iso Kern, dates as
"probably 1930." Even before, in a text of January 1924 (A IV 2/11 a), Kar! Schuhmann found
a footnote with the following telling sentences: "To carry out the Epoche is not yet reduction.
Hence I proceed in this manner that after the Epoche I direct my glance to the correlation"
[presumably of noesis and noema]. My translation.
12David Carr in his translation (The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 244) renders Umstellung
by" reorientation." But, while this would be a more idiomatic equivalent, I submit that it cannot
cover the "becoming 'phenomena' " that the reduction is to consist of here.
13 Die Stellung der Phänomenologie in der gegenwärtigen Kritik: see also in Studien zur
Phänomenologie 1930-1939. pp. 119-145. Around the same time Fink prepared the text of a
sixth Cartesian Meditation on "Die transzendentale Methodenlehre" - which he kindly let me
see in Freiburg in 1953 - in which he distinguished two fundamental parts ofthe phenomenolo-
gical reduction, the epoche and the phenomenological reduction proper (das eigentliche
Reduzieren). .
14Cahiers de Royaumont 111 (L'oeuvre et la pensee d'Edmond Husserl), "Editions de Minuit".
lS"Das Schwerste in der Philosophie überhaupt ist die phänomenologische Reduktion, sie mit
Verständnis zu durchdringen und zu üben." Husserl, E., Briefe an Roman Ingarden. The
HaE;ue: Nijhoff, 1968, p. 74.
16See Supplement, p. 82.
17 This story has been told in considerable detail by Karl Schuhmann, Husserl über Pfänder, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973; see also my "Neues Licht auf die Beziehungen zwischen
Husser! und Pfänder," Tüdschrift voor Filosofie 26 (1974), pp. 565-573.
18 On February 11, 1922, Husserl wrote to Paul Natorp in Marburg about Pfänder as folIows:
Toward you I have to be frank and must therefore say that I consider Pfänder not only a
thoroughly solid (grundsolider) worker, but also a radically philosophical personality. For a
long time his start from Lipps has blocked his access to the transcendental problems, but in his,
in my opinion, original manner ofworking out everything for himselfhe has progressed further
and further, and not in vain his lectures exert a profound influence, in spite of his plain
(nüchtern) style .... Pfänder is rieh in phenomenological insights, which he has picked up
independently, and of which the greater part has not yet been published.
19 Pfänderiana A VIII.
20 Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls. Acta Universitatis Latviensis XIX (1925),
249-441; review in Deutsche Literaturzeitung 1929, pp. 2048-2050. There is a strong
possibility that Celms's distinction between reflection (identified with epocM) and reduction
acted as a stimulus on Husserl, who on the whole responded favourably to this study by his
fOrIller student (personal communication).
21 Here one may have to add the following phrase: "or rather experiences in which beingpresents
itself authentically" (selbst leibhaftig).
22 Ethik in kurzer Darstellung, edited by Peter Schwankl, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag,
1973, p. 54.
23See especially the "Grundgedanken" in Pfander's philosophie auf phänomenologischer
Grundlage, a fragment from the elaboration ofhis introductory lectures for a book which he was
unable to complete. An integration ofthe fragments with the surviving lecture notes is my edition
München: Wilhelm Fink, 1973, p. 26.
24"Linguistic Phenomenology: John L. Austin and Alexander Pfänder," published in the
Proceedings of the 13th International Congress of Philosophy and reprinted below. Apparently
that Pfänder, in stressing the need of apreparatory c1arification of meaning, thought of a
linguistic analysis. Thus in a note written on April 7, 1928 (Pfänderiana A III 2), he pointed
out that in order to find something in phenomenological perception, one has to know first what
one is see king. And this is what one means by words, which are by no me ans arbitrary. "One
has always taken these words in certain meanings and successfully communicated with other
 82

people. Whoever believes to mean something other than this ordinary meaning ought to first
make sure ofthis meaning ... with the same conseientiousness whieh he would apply ifhe were
to speak under oath .... " Onee he has established this meaning, he should proeeed to making
phenomenologieal investigations through pereeption about the phenomena as meant.
25 Ethik, p.116.
26 Philosophie, pp. 58-59.
27 Pfänder's restrieted use of the reduetion seems to parallel its use in epistemology by Roman
Ingarden. See..Guido Küng on "Roman Ingarden: Ontological Phenomenology" in the third
revised edition of my The Phenomenological Movement, Section IV, F.
28 "Good Fortune Obligates: Albert Sehweitzer's Seeond Ethical Prineiple." Ethics 85 (1976),
227-234.
29 Perhaps the first philosopher to make extensive use of the label was William J ames with his
"radical empiricism." It seems not altogether impossible that this had a eertain influence on
Husserl, who had received a eopy of James' erucial article of 1904 on "A World of Pure
Experienee" as a present from the author. It is less likely that the so-called "philosophieal
radicals," i.e., the utilitarians in the wake of Jeremy Bentham had anything to do with James's
"radiealism."

SUPPLEMENT 1979

In ending with this sceptical conclusion I should mention that now at least the
following three new interpretations have to be considered:
1. Antonio Aguirre, Genetische Phänomenologie und Reduktion, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
2. Karl Schuhmann, Die Fundamentalbetrachtung der Phänomenologie,
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, pp. 90-103; Husserl über Pfänder,
pp. 177-183;
3. Elisabeth Ströker, "Das Problem der Epoche in der Philosophie Edmund
Husserls," Analecta Husserliana 1(1971), p. 170-185. But at this point
I have to suspend judgment on how far these new solutions can meet the
problem as I have tried to present it. An adequate discussion would
deserve and require a much fuller treatment.
 5. "LINGUISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY": JOHN L. AUSTIN
AND ALEXANDER PFÄNDER!

It has become almost a diebe thatAnglo-Ameriean and Continental European

(ineluding Ibero-Ameriean) philosophy are separated by a gulf, widest at the
English Channel. Such eliebes and the underlying metaphors'of gulfs, curtains,
and blocks can become dangerous once we become resigned to them. 2 But
blocks can be crushed, curtains can be raised, and gulfs can be bridged. My
preference is for trying to build bridges.
It seems to me that the Spanish-American world offers an unusually good
setting for building another such bridge. For, probably thanks to Ortega y
Gasset, Spanish philosophy has been particularly hospitable not only to
phenomenologists and existential philosophers adopted in France and Italy,
such as Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger, but also to theless renowned Munich
phenomenologist Alexander Pfänder, whose Phenomenology 01 Willing and
Logic were translated into Spanish in the early thirties.
Even more pertinent, his Logic, the translation of whieh has gone through
several editions, has been put to productive use in Mexico in the philosophy of
law of Eduardo Garda Mäynez. Thus in Mexieo the choiee of Pfänder's
phenomenology as one of the abutments of the new bridge needs no lengthy
justification.
The other abutment will be more familiar, especially among Anglo-
Ameriean philosophers. Although John L. Austin was not the only leading
figure among the Oxford analysts, re cent publications from his posthumous
papers and lectures reveal the gravity of his untimely loss, not only to British
philosophy but to the philosophie al world at large.
These circumstances do not yet entitle me to link the name of the English
analyst with that of the much older Munich phenomenologist. Indeed it is
highly unlikely that either one knew of the other even by name. The sole
justification for mentioning them in one breath is the unconscious convergence
oftheir ideas. In fact, as far as Pfänder was concemed, this convergence can be
shown only on the basis of posthumous materia1 3
N evertheless, I believe I can show that Austin' s type of analysis was moving
beyond me re linguistie analysis toward a supplementary study of the
phenomena whieh was elose to an explicit phenomenology. From the other
side Pfänder, who did not formulate his conception of phenomenology until
 84

late in his career, realized that phenomenology proper presupposes a

conc,~ptual analysis under the name of "clarification of meaning (Sinnklä-
rung)," to be guided largely by what we mean by the terms of our ordinary
language. It is not my contention that the completion of Austin' sand Pfänder' s
enterprises would have resulted in a dovetailing bridge. Between the ap-
proaches oftwo philosophers so different in background and development there
remain basic differences which I do not want to gloss over. But I believe that
here are two forms of analytic philosophy and phenomenology which are not
only congenial but which, fully developed, could complement one another.
In order to show this incipient convergence I shall first trace the trend toward
phenomenology in Austin. The most explicit expression of this trend can be
found in his Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society in 1957,4 which
contained the following paragraph:

In view ofthe prevalence ofthe slogan" ordinary language" and of such names as "linguistic" or
." analytic" philosophy or "the analysis oflanguage," one thing needs special emphasis in order to
counter misunderstandings. When we examine what we should say when, what words we should
use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or "meanings," whatever they
may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness
of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena. F or this
reason I think it mi~ht be better to use, for this way of doing philosophy, some less misleading
name than those given above - for instance, "linguistic phenomenology," only that is rather a
mouthful (p. 8).

On the strength of this statement one might weIl suspect that at this point
Austin feIt actually closer to phenomenology than to "linguistics." Even the
fact that in the new hybrid phrase "linguistic phenomenology" "phenomeno-
logy" and not "linguistics" is the noun might indicate this. Also, the text makes
it plain that the study of linguistics is to serve as a me ans to "sharpen our
perception ofthe phenomena." That this is his ultimate objective was spelled
out even more fully when Austin answered H. L. Van Breda's questions at the
Colloque de Royaumont as folIows:

We use the multiplicity of expressions which the richness of our language furnishes us in order
to direct our attention to the multiplicity and the richness of our experiences. Language serves us
as interpreter for observing the living facts which constitute our experience, which, without it, we
would tend to overlook .... The diversity of expressions which we can apply attracts our attention
to the extraordinary complexity ofthe situations on which we are called upon to speak. This means
that language iIIumines for us the complexity of life. [My translation]5

However, this does not yet mean that Austin's "phenomenology" deals
directly with the phenomena rather than with the express ions that lead to them.
In fact, even at Royaumont Austin's answer seems to have sidestepped Van
Breda's double question: "To what degree do we make use of criteria which are
not strictly linguistic? In what measure do we study phenomena which are not
 85

strictly phenomena oflanguage when we go beyond the point at which we have

arrived thus far?" No extra-linguistic criteria are explicitly mentioned or
excluded. The only avenue to the phenomena considered seems to be that
through language.
Thus, all that can be asserted on the basis of the crucial paragraph in the
Presidential Address is that Austin contemplated a change in name for his
analysis of language in view of its ultimate objective. No direct study of the
phenomena is as yet at stake. In particular, there is no evidence thatAustin was
interested in phenomenology in a technical and especially in the Continental
sense of the term. His aversion to the "mouthful" of as clumsy a hybrid as
"linguistic phenomenology" may therefore reflect more than the new Oxford
purism, namely, a shying away from suspicious allies, especially those using
technical jargon Iike the Continental phenomenologists.
However, the decisive question is whether Austin's way of doing philosophy
has genuine affinity with wh at phenomenologists do. Stuart Hampshire in his
memorial for Austin6 distinguishes between a stronger and a weaker thesis
implied in Austin's way of doing philosophy. The stronger is to the effect that
"for every distinction ofword and idiom that we find in common speech, there
is a reason to be found, if we look far enough, to explain why this distinction
exists" (p. iii). Language, as Wittgenstein had put it, is always "in order as it
is," and if we only study it painstakingly enough, it will yield all the relevant
information about the world in all its intricacy. Austin's posthumously
published lectures on Sense and Sensibilia provide one ofthe best examples of
this procedure. The weaker thesis, as Hampshire states it, merely implies that
"we must first have the facts, and all the facts (of the existing distinctions
marked in common speech) accurately stated, be fore we erect a theory upon
the basis of them" (p. vi). Austin maintained that the neglect of this prime
prerequisite was at the root ofthe "scandal" that philosophy has remained so
inconclusive. However, the inventory thus to be collected would supply merely
the "indispensable preliminary to any philosophical advance" (p. ix). This
clearly suggests that it would have to be followed up by the study ofthe facts.
Austin's explicit reflections about his own method, especially those in his
Presidential Address, seem to me to keep much closer to the weaker thesis.
This becomes clearest from his discussion ofthe alleged "snag" for Iinguistic
philosophy called the "crux ofthe last word," about which Austin has this to
say:

Certainly ardinary language has na claim ta be the last ward. if there is such a thing.... In
principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upan and superseded. Only
remember, it is the first ward. 7

This may suggest that already the second word of philosophy is no longer
Iinguistic analysis. In any case, the last word would belong to a study of the
 86

phenomena to which the linguistic express ions refer. In fact, it would seem that
the study ofthe phenomena would have to enter in at least two ways: first, in the
sense of the phenomena as they are viewed by ordinary language; second, in
the sense of the phenomena as they emerge from a fresh examination of the
facts, either by science or by some other direct approach, such as phenomeno-
logy in the continental sense. In the light of this second exploration ordinary
language and its picture of the phenomena may prove to be inadequate and
even wrong.
But while this phenomenological extension oflinguistic analysis was clearly
foreshadowed by Austin's announcements, he hirns elf did not undertake it.
Thus his "plea for excuses," one of the most brilliant demonstrations of his
linguistic perceptiveness, did not yet advance beyond a painstaking review of
the language of excuses.
Now for the corresponding picture of Pfänder's phenomenology and its
stake in linguistic analysis:
It must be realized that, in spite of Pfänder's key role in the growth of the
original Phenomenological Movement and especially of its Munich branch, he
was rather slow in formulating his theoretical conception of phenomenology,
and particularly in stating it in print. His early use of the term, actually even
before Husserl, in his Phänomenologie des Wo lIens of 1900, contains not
much more than a descriptive psychology, and even his much more developed
"Psychologie der Gesinnungen" in the first and third volumes of Husserl:s
Jahrbuch of 1913 and 1916 is mainly another example ofsuch a phenomeno-
logical psychology with special emphasis on the need for determining the
essential structure of the empirical facts. In his Logik of 1921, the develop-
me nt ofHusserl's original program of a pure logic freed from psychologism, he
is surprisingly cautious in answering the question of what phenomenology
really is:

To state briefly and yet intelligibly what phenomenology is and is striving for today is arequest
coming from many quarters, but at the moment it is hardly possible to fulfill it. All that can be done
is to give some hints as to the subject and the task of phenomenology and to characterize the
position of logic in relation to the science so characterized. 8

This statement is followed by a half-page which characterizes phenomenology

as the viewing of the world from the perspective of the subject, the attempt to
study the ideas and beliefs ofthis subject by describing its intentional or meant
objects as weIl as its intentional or meaning acts, and furthermore the modes of
givenness ofthese objects and the modes ofthese acts. Since pure logic as itis
studied in the Logik is not found to be dependent on such a phenomenology,
this text contains no further discussion or illustration of this conception.
Pfänder had no chance to state his fully-developed conception of pheno-
menology in print, a conception wh ich differed considerably from Husserl's
 87

parallel conceptions. All the more important is it to point out that it was
Pfänder's definite plan to round up his work with the publication not only of an
Ethics but also of an Introduction to Philosophy; the latter was at the same
time to serve as an introduction to his mature phenomenology, for whieh he
also used the phrase, the "Munich phenomenology," clearly in order to
distinguish it from Husserl's Freiburg phenomenology. In fact, the course of
lectures which was to be the foundation for that book and whieh PfäIider
offered sixteen times during his years ofteaching, eventually went by the title
of" Introduction to Philosophy and Phenomenology." But his worseningheart
ailment prevented hirn from carrying out his plan beyond several fragments.
Thus the only authentie source for a reconstruction of this phenomenology is
his carefullecture notes, whieh, however, do not form a continuous text, but
consist only of key sentences. Yet they are sufficient for a clear idea of his
conception and its projected development. In collaboration with Dr. Eberhard
Ave-Lallemant I have prepared a coherent text of this Philosophy on
Phenomenological Foundation which integrates the completed fragments
with the lecture notes. 9 On this basis it is now possible to give a general idea of
this phenomenologieal philosophy and particularly of those of its features
which parallel Austin's linguistic phenomenology.
The basie pattern ofPfänder's final synthesis consists in the successive re-
examination ofthe major substantive issues of systematic philosophy concern-
ing first the real world in its inanimate, animate, psychic, social, and cultural
divisions and in its religious implications, the ideal world ofmathematical and
logieal entities, the phenomena of value and those of ideal requirements. In
each case Pfänder first discusses non-phenomenological approaches to the
issues such as empiricism, rationalism, and Kantian critical philosophy and
their failures before introducing phenomenology as the remaining alternative.
The major reason of the earlier failures was the misrepresentations and
misinterpretations of the original phenomena to which the other approaches
had to resort. Any attempt to do justice to these phenomena has to start with
the removal of these distortions and the return to the original phenomena and
issues.
In introducing phenomenology as the way leading to the authentie phe-
nomena Pfänder became increasingly aware of the need for restoring the sense
of the problems by the following three stages:
(1) clarification ofmeaning (Sinnklärung ), aiming at the elucidation ofwhat
we really mean;
(2) epoche, a term taken over from Husserl, implying for Pfänder simply the
neutralizing suspension of belief in the existence of what is meant, thus
blocking the tendency to infer the existence ofthe referents from the fact
of our referring to them;
(3) phenomenology of perception, i.e., perceptual verification of our clari-
 88

fied and neutralized meanings, sometimes also called "phenomenology

proper," with the goal of determining whether our meanings are verified
by the phenomena to which they refer.
Here I shall not discuss this three-step method, its merits and limitations, in
detail. I shall focus merely on the first step, the clarification of meaning, as the
possible equivalent of" linguistic phenomenology." As a typical example of it I
shall use the analysis of "what is meant by a material object (Körper)." Here
Pfander first points out negatively that what we mean is not one sense datum or
an aggregate of many sense data, not a concept, and not something unknown
behind the sense data. Then he determines positively that what is really meant
is an extended space-filling continuous substratum. The same procedure is
followed with regard to the meaning of its properties (Eigenschaften) and to
the ways in which we mean these properties as related to the material thing.
T 0 what extent can such a clarification of meaning be considered linguistic
analysis? Certainly Pfander did not speak explicitly about analyzing ward
meanings. Nor did he use inverted commas or mention language as such. The
emphasis is clearly on identifying and describing the referents of our thinking
and speaking. On the other hand, the formulation "What is meant by ... ?"
which occurs over and over again in Pfänder's text makes it plain that this
analysis takes its departure from the word as it is commonly used. In fact, since
Pfänder often asks "What do we mean?" there can be little doubt that his
primary goal is to make sure of the ordinary meaning of these terms by
establishing the referents at wh ich they ordinarily point. Now the above
example, the first in Pfänder's text, does not show detailed study of, or special
interest in, the nuances and shadings of ordinary language. However, when
Pfänder criticizes the poverty of the current theories of value, he collects
carefully the variety of appraising predicates in everyday use, such as the
German equivalents of "pretty" (hübsch), "dainty" (niedlich), "delicate"
(zierlich), "nice" (nett), etc. Pfänder is well aware of the fact that ordinary
language is the depository of a wealth of meaning all too easily overlooked and
that it should be consulted first and foremost.
In fact, there is even more specific evidence that Pfänder thought of the need
for ordinary language analysis in preparation for phenomenological investiga-
tion. Thus, in a note, dated April 7, 1928 (Pfaenderiana III A 2), he pointed
out that in phenomenology one first had to know what one is see king. And this
is what one means by words, which are by no means arbitrary. "One has
always taken these words in certain senses and successfully communicated [by
them] with other people. Whoever believes that he means something different
than this ordinary meaning ought first to make sure of this (ordinary)
meaning... with the same conscientiousness that he would apply if he were to
speak under oath."
Pfänder's clarification ofmeaning was not an exact counterpart of Austin's
 89

linguistic analysis. It lacks the meticulousness of his procedures and reports.

But it clearly acknowledges the need for such analysis in the case ofthe major
philosophical problems. It emphasizes less than Austin the linguistic expres-
sions and uses them merely as springboards for exploring our meanings, which
need not always be expressed in words. This may have the advantage that such
an analysis is not dependent on the peculiarities of any particular language at a
particular stage of its historical development. F or this can easily become one
of the pitfalls of a linguistic analysis which depends on one specific language
such as the King's English.
Besides, Pfänder's second step, the suspension of belief, should immunize
his analysis ofmeanings from the dangers ofthe well-known semantic fallacy
of inferring from the word to the existence ofthe thing, which Austin's "strong
thesis" might easily promote. Austin himself was certainly on his guard against
this dang er. lt seems worth pointing out that in leaning over backward from it,
he came very close to the phenomenological epochi. lO The real test for the
entire method could come, of course, only with the third step of phenomenology
proper or phenomenology of perception. It involved a fresh start by a direct
approach to the phenomena, about which much more would have to be said,
but which clearIy is not matched in Austin's actual procedure.
What, then, is the ups hot ofthis seemingly far-fetched confrontation oftwo
historically unrelated philosophers? I submit that in the case of Austin there is
concrete evidence that, quite apart from his coining and nearly adopting the
phrase "linguistic phenomenology," he was headed beyond mere linguistic
analysis toward an examination of the phenomena to which language refers.
But he seems to have considered linguistic analysis the indispensable
preparation for it, and does not seem to have envisaged a direct approach to the
phenomena as a feasible alternative.
Pfänder did add an extension to his phenomenology, namely, apreparatory
or propaedeutic phase of analysis of meanings, including linguistic meanings,
to precede phenomenology, which was his primary concern. True, wh at we
find even in his unpublished texts cannot compare with the subtlety of
Austin's analyses. Also, it is not clear how far Pfänder considered analysis of
meanings an indispensable step for phenomenology. But he clearly implied
that in the area of the major philosophical problems which had undergone the
distorting influence of pre-phenomenological philosophies a semantic and
linguistic purge was the proper preparation for a fresh start.
I maintain, then, that in the case of Austin and Pfänder an.alysis and
phenomenology converged, linguistic analysis pointing beyond itselfto a study
ofthe phenomena, phenomenology discovering the usefulness of apreparatory
study of ordinary meanings. This does not mean that the two complementary
extensions of these philosophies can be put together and riveted into asolid
bridge. But it suggests at least that developments from both sides properly
 90

correlated can be used for working cooperatively on the same problems from
different directions. This is in fact wh at I would like to suggest in conclusion: in
certain areas of philosophy, particularly those which have already come under
the cultivation of ordinary language, a two-pronged approach is not only
possible, it promises mutual stimulation and verification. Linguistic analysis
can sharpen our eyes for shades in the phenomena for which our individual
phenomenological eyes are not yet sufficiently sensitized. Phenomenology can
clear the ground for the verification ofthe distinctions of ordinary language and
at the same time make room for its orderly development beyond its present
stage. There is no need for an either-or. Analysis as weB as phenomenology
stands to benefit from a both-and.

NOTES

I Reprinted from Alexander Pfander, Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation, pp. 86-92.
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestem University Press, 1967.
2 Among those who have resigned prematurely I suspect the editor ofthe Colloque de Royaumont
on La Philosophie analytique (Paris, 1962), Leslie Beck, whose Avant-Propos expresses
serious doubt about the success of this particular dialogue. His own evidence is hardly that
discouraging. Thus he teils us that "when Merleau-Ponty asked 'Isn't our program the same?'
the firm and clean-cut answer (of Gilbert Ryle) was 'I hope not.' " But if one looks up the main
textthe only place where this answer occurs is in reply to Merleau-Ponty's question ofwhether
Ryle in his studies was always "in strict accord with the program outlined at the beginning ofthe
century by Russell and refined by Wittgenstein and some others" (p. 98). Austin, who took a
leading part in the discussion, was perhaps even more conciliatory than Ryle, at least as shown
in the published text of the Proceedings.
3 Philosophie aufphänomenologischer Grundlage. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973.
4"A Plea for Excuses," Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Sodety, LVII (1957),1-30; also in
Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1961), p. 130.
5 La Philosophie analytique, p. 333. Stanley Cavell in "Austin at Criticism" (Philosophical
Review LXXIV, 1965) reprinted in Must We Mean What We Say (New York: Scribner's,
1969, p. 99), believes that in spite of his hesitation Austin did not retract this label.
Unfortunately my inquiries with other students of Austin have not yet yielded clear information
on this point.
6 "In Memoriam J. L. Austin 1911-1960," Proceedings oftheAristotelian Society, LX (1960),
i-xiv.
7 Jbid., LVII (1957),11; Philosophical Papers, p. 132.
8 Logik (Halle, 1921), p. 33. For a translation of the Introduction see A. Pfänder, Phenom-
enology of Willing and Motivation, Northwestem University Press, 1967.
9 Philosophie auf phänomenologischer Grundlage. Zusammengestellt und eingeleitet von
Herbert Spiegelberg. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973.
10 See his Presidential Address, Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Sodety, LXII (1957),11 n.5:
"And forget for once and for a while, that other curious question, 'Is it true? May we?' "
 PART II

HISTORICAL EXPLORATIONS
 6. AMIEL'S "NEW PHENOMENOLOGY"\

To the memory 01 Winthrop Bell, Jean Hering,

and William Ernest Hocking

I. INTRODUCTORY

In Edmund Husserl's confidential diary published by Walter Biemel there

occurs under the date of September 25, 1906 the following isolated reference
to the name Amiel:

Hold yourself ready for the great purpose and be prepared.

Cf. AmieI and the many beautiful words of Carlyle. 2

In the absence of any other allusions to Henri-Frederic Amiel in Husserl's

published writings it has probably become impossible3 to establish what
Husserl knew of AmieI, how he had come to know of hirn, and what, beyond
the apparent emotional inspiration, he derived from hirn. No copy of Amiel's
works could be found in Husserl's library, now at Louvain, which however
cannot any longer be considered as co~plete. The date 1906 permits his
knowing the only German translation of Amiel'sJournal intime published in
1905.4 As to Amiel's philosophical influence on Husserl, the available
evidence allows at best the hypothesis that some of Amiel's ideas may have
had a subsidiary and corroborative meaning for Husserl. The main justifica-
tion for the present study is the interest which Amiel's ideas on phenomeno-
logy hold in their own right.
I first became aware of this independent interest when Winthrop Bell, one of
Husserl's Göttingen students, in response to a reprint of Husserl's diary
Aujzeichnungen,5 expressed his pleased amazement at the fact that Husserl,
the philosopher of "rigorous science," should have attached so much
importance to as profound and complex a personality as Amiel. This fact is
indeed remarkable, considering the general neglect of Amiel during this period,
particularly in Germany.6 It was actually Bell's remark which sent me to the
text of the Journal intime, but not yet in the idea of finding anything
 94

particularly phenomenological in this amazing labyrinth. Only after I had run

into the main evidence which I shall introduce presently did I become aware
that another Husserl student of the Göttingen period, leaD Hering, in his
characteristic ingenuity had preceded his trailblazing chapter on "Pheno-
menology in France"7 by the foIlowing motto, taken from Amiel's Journal:

For me philosophy is a way of seeing things, a mode ofperceiving reality. lt does not create nature,
man, or God, but it finds them and attempts to understand them. Philosophy is the ideal
reconstruction öf consciousness in which consciousness understands itself along with all that it
contains.
November 17,1852 8

But Hering gives no further explanation for this quotation and no information
about Amiel's role in the history of phenomenology and particularly ofFrench
phenomenology, except for abrief comparison with Gabriel M arcel, favoring
the latter. Specifically, he does not mention the fact that the very term
"phenomenology" occurs in an entry oftheJournal only a few pages after the
quoted passage, namelyon February 5, 1853. 9 As to myself, it was not until,
lured on by Amiel's striking introspective observations, I had worked my way
through the published parts of his posthumous journal and some of his scant
publications during his lifetime that I discovered several more explicit
references to "phenomenology." Finally they made me think that he re
something quite basic had escaped Amiel's interpreters and critics, who had
been interested chiefly in his personal case history. I believe that this original
motifin Amiel's thought, unsystematic though it be, deserves to be presented
and discussed, not so much for the sake of priority claims or influences, but for
its intrinsic merits and particularly for the sake of Amiel's insights into the
nature of the self.
It goes without saying that any student of Amiei' s thought, particularly of an
idea which does not seem to have impressed his previous editors Edmond
Scherer, Bernard Bouvier, and Leon Bopp has to be aware ofthe incomplete-
ness ofhis material. As long as not more than perhaps one tenth ofthe 16,900
pages of the original journal are available in print, it may weIl be that a good
many more references to phenomenology are hidden in the unpublished
manuscripts. Subject to the revision which Leon Bopp's new complete edition
will require when finished lO I shaIl merely try to caIl attention to Amiel's
conception of phenomenology as far as it is revealed in the published parts of
his papers. I shall do so by first presenting the main evidence concerning his
use of the term "phenomenology," its meaning, and the method which it
implies far hirn. I shall then try to give an idea of what is easily his most specific
and original contribution to such a phenomenology, his phenomenology ofthe
self (moi).
 95

2. AMIEL'S GENERAL CONCEPTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY

At first sight it may seem preposterous to claim for Amiei, this most
unsystematie and aphoristie thinker, anything as ambitious as the creation of a
new phenomenology. Indeed, as in the case of so many of his ambitions,
Amiel's rambling and repetitious contemplations, however entrancing and
inspiring, faB painfully in achieving anything like a coherent structure. Yet the
ambition cannot be denied, considering one ofhis last entries, writtenjust three
months before his death:
(1) "It seems to me that what remains from all my studies is a new
phenomenology of the spirit, the intuition of universal meta-
morphosis."ll
This passage is not an isolated one, but has antecedents, ofwhieh I succeeded
in tracing the following five, beginning 28 years earlier.
(2) In an entry ofFebruary 5,1853 Amiel speaks ofthe need for a new
"basis for a psychology and an ethics": "in short, a new phenomeno-
logy, more complete and more moral, where the soul as a whole
be comes spirit. Man reproducing the world, surrounding hirnself with
a nature which is the objectivation of his spiritual nature, rewarding
and punishing hirns elf; the things being the divine nature; the nature of
the perfect spirit being understood only in proportion to our own
perfection; intuition as areward for inner purity; science (objective)
coming at the end of goodness (subjective). - This is perhaps the topic
for my summer course.,,12 .
(3) Reflecting about the premature end of these contemplations on that
particular morning Amiel ends with the remark: "The most appro-
priate hours for phenomenology are those which precede dawn.,,13
(4) Thirteenyears later, two morereferences occur. On January 21, 1866,
after describing an experience in which everything seemed unreal to
hirn "including my own individuality," Amiel remarks: "Here I find
myself back in full phenomenology."14
(5) Probably from the same period sterns an undated reflection whieh
Scherer attached to the Journal for 1866. Here Amiel, in referring
. back to his preceding characterization of his own self, concludes:
"This phenomenology ofmyselfis like the magie lantern ofmy destiny
and at the same time like a window opening on the mystery of the
world.,,15
(6) On December 8, 1869 AmieI, in deploring the lack of critical delicacy
among the vulgar intelligences who do not understand the nature and
the laws ofthe human spirit, adds: "Phenomenology is a closed book
for the pachyderms who live on the surface of the soul.,,16
 96

Then, in 1881, twelve years later, follows the climactic passage with which I
started this collection of the major explicit references.
Now the mere use of the label "phenomenology" proves of course little, if
anything, about the substance and the originality of Amiel's conception. One
may therefore suspect a loan, however free, from Hegel's conception of
phenomenology. And it is true that Amiei, who was particularly at horne and in
sympathy with German philosophy and letters, knew and mentioned Hegel's
Phenomenology oi {he Spirit. Thus, in an entry of AprilS, 1864, he
characterizes the thought of a much more effective and popularfriend ofhis,
Victor Cherbuliez, as reminding hirn ofHegel by his Olympian detachment. 17
But precisely this reference to Hegel' s Phenomenology makes it clear that and
how much Amiel wanted to keep his own "new" phenomenology apart from
that of his famous predecessor, at least to the extent that his was to be a much
more personal phenomenology, without capital letters.
But then, what is the positive content of this new phenomenology?
Obviously the six quotations above cannot give an adequate idea of what
Amiel had in mind. And, while the contexts which I omitted supply a good deal
of additional light, Amiel' s style of thought and the characteristically
unfinished type of his meditations prevent a precise and systematic restate-
ment ofhis project and its development. N evertheless, apart from the concrete
illustration which will follow in the next seetion, Amiel offers some greatIy
illuminating reflections on the method which he claims to be using. They show
in any case that more was involved than the new use of an old label.
Here is, for instance a direction which precedes the quotation under (5):

To have a faithful portrait, one must convert succession into simultaneity, forsake plurality for
unity, and ascend from the changing phenomena to the essence .... Hence also to show whatever
it may be of my past, of my journal, or of myself does no good to one who has not the poetic
intuition and does not reconstruct me in my totality with and (even) in conflict with the material
which I entrust to him. 18

Thus far, one might think that the "simultaneous, unitary essence" thus to
be intuited is merely a particular, individual item. However, the following later
characterizations of the procedure go far beyond this stage:

Everything becomes transparent to me. I see the types, the meres,19 the ground of(all) beings, the
sense of things.
My natural tendency is to convert everything into thought. All the personal events, all particular
experiences are for me pretexts for meditation, facts to be generalized into laws, realities to be
reduced to ideas. This metamorphosis is cerebral work, philosophical work, operation of
consciousness, which is amental alembic. Our life is nothing but a document for interpretation,
matter to be spiritualized, a sequence offleeting phenomena to be transformed into a microcosmic
scheme. Such at least is the life of the thinker. It depersonalizes itself every day: if he consents to
feel and to act, it is only in order to understand better; if he wills, it is in order to know the will. He
considers hirnself a laboratory of phenomena and does not demand from life anything for hirnself
but vision .... What distinguishes hirn is alienation (desappropriation). Although it is sweet for
 97

hirn to be loved, and although he does not know anything equally sweet, this event still seems to
hirn merely the occasion [i.e., instance] of the phenomenon rather than its destination [i.e.,
objective]. He does not even believe that his body is his; he feels the vital commotion (tourbillon )
pass within hirn which he is granted temporarily in order to let hirn perceive the cosmic
disturbances. He is merely thinking subject, he keeps nothing but the form ofthings, he does not
attribute to himselfthe material possession of anything. This is the disposition which makes hirn
immune (incomprehensible) to anything that means enjoyment, domination, acquisition. In fact,
he is fluid like a phantom. which one can see weil, but which one cannot seize, because its solidity
and opaqueness are (merely) apparent. The alienation makes hiin insubstantial (inane) and
empty; he resembles a man in the way in which the Manes of Achilles or the shade of Creusa
resembled living beings without having died. I am a retumer from the grave (revenant). I dream,
standing upright and fully awake. The others appear to me as dreams, and I appear as a dream to
others. This is half-way the condition of a visionary. Without sickness and suffering I could even
doubt whether I am fully alive. The apparitions ofthe resurrected Christ do not overly surprise me,
for that form of existence, excepted from gravity and floating between corporality and spirit, is
alm ost familiar to me. 20

Similar accounts may be found in the entries for July 12, 1876, June 20, 1878,
and F ebruary 18, 1881, where Amiel is also fond of calling the individual
thinker a mere "sampie" (&hantillon) ofthe type. 21
Little as these often highly figurative and telescoped self-interpretations of
Amiel's method may achieve as philosophical ac counts of his own practice,
they contain enough clues for identifying some ofthe more original features in
his conception and method. The following is an attempt to speIl these out in
more contemporary terms:
1. Phenomenology aims at grasping not only individual essences but also
general essences, types, and even ideal laws.
2. Essences are to be grasped by a peculiar type of meditation related to
"poetic intuition" on the basis of concrete phenomena (phenomimes). Even
such terms as "generalization" and "reduction" figure in this connection. But
it is fairly clear that the generalization here mentioned is not based on complete
induction by simple enumeration.
3. It would seem that Amiel's method affects the "reality" of the
phenomena by "reduction." Even the phenomenological contemplator him-
self seems to be losing the weight of his everyday existence when he treats
hirnself as a "laboratory" and assurnes a new, dream-like existence.
4. While this method would seem applicable also to other phenomena,
Amiel hirnself speaks of it only in connection with the study of his own self as
the focus of his interest
5. Phenomenology shows man as "reproducing the world, surrounding
himselfwith a nature which is the objectivation ofhis spiritual nature" (see (2)
above). While this conception has clearly a metaphysical ring, it indicates that
Amiel thought of phenomenology as capable of showing concretely the
"constitution" of the world within the phenomenological contemplator;
I shaIlleave it to the reader already initiated into some ofthe peculiarities of
contemporary phenomenology to evaluate these features in terms especially of
 98
Husserlian phenomenology. Vaguenesses and differences notwithstanding,
the points distinguished above seem to be striking anticipations of Husserl's
(1) eidetic phenomenology, (2) idealizing abstraction (ideation, Wesens-
schau ), (3) "phenomenological" or "transcendental" reduction to "pure
phenomena," (4) the "egological" emphasis in Husserl's later phenomeno-
logy, and (5) constitutive phenomenology.
Before leaving Amiei' s phenomenological method I should like to relate it to
his "psychology," to which he refers repeatedly. Now in the statement under
(2) above Amiel implies that his new phenomenology would offer a basis for
both objective psychology and ethics, since it is the subjective base in which
the foundation for all objective science has to be laid. But this isolated
statement is hardly sufficient proof that Amiel distinguishes consistently
between phenomenology and psychology. Very often he calls hirnself a
psychologist and even calls psychology his most constant preference (mon
gout le plus constant).22 According to some passages,23 psychology in the
sense there characterized would seem to coincide with phenomenology,
especially since self-study is again described as a means for obtaining insights
about the whole species, Presumably Amiel had at this time no clear
conception of psychology as a science and conceived of it as a universal
collection of observations about human nature, one's own nature as weIl as
that of other people, Phenomenology, as far as he distinguished it from
psychology, was hardly more than a division within this wider field.

3. AMIEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SELF

Amiel's prime fascination was clearly with his own self. Some of it was
doubtless the result of a merely personal problem: Amiel suffered tragically
from an inability, reminiscent of aboulia, to live up to his own ambitions and to
the high expectations of others. His all too despondent self-analysis only added
further torture to his plight. Yet even in analysing his merely personal
predicament he often comes up with striking insights of wider scope, And in
any case much of Amiel's preoccupation with his own selfhas a much deeper
foundation: a constant amazement and curiosity (un etonnement et une
curiosite constante) concerning the mystery of the self.24 The fresh insights
which spring from this amazement probably constitute his main and least
exhausted originality and his potential significance for a phenomenology
today. On the following pages I shall make a first attempt to indicate some of
his most characteristic views about the nature of the self.
When in 1854 Amiel published the little volume of poems and thoughts
entitled Grains de mit, he climaxed the poetic section with a somewhat exalted
piece called "The Eternal Proteus." Its theme, introduced by a long litany of
 99
rhyming epithets, is the soul (I'time). But this soul, as any reader of Amiel who
knows hirn from the Journal will recognize at once, is identical with the self
(moi). In what is perhaps his most concentrated statement of the "phenomeno-
logy ofmyself', the reflexion of 1866 published by Scherer, we find the same
emphasis on the Protean nature of the self in the following form:

I feel mys elf as a chameleon, a kaleidoscope, a Proteus: changeable and capable of polarization in
every direction; fluid, virtual, and therefore latent even when manifested, and ab se nt even in
presentation. I am an observer, so to speak, ofthe molecular whirlwind which is called individual
Iife; I have the perception and the consciousness of incessant metamorphosis, of that irresistible
movement of existence which is going on within me. I feel the flight, the renewal, the modification
of all the particles ofmy being, all the drops ofmy river, all the radiations ofmy unique force. 25

The Protean character: this is probably the central characteristic of Amiel's

self. In its fluidity it is potentially everything. It does not coincide with any
particular actual condition in wh ich it happens to be at any particular moment,
but is capable ofmetamorphosis into any other. This is why Amiel also called
it "omnipossible" or "omnimodal" (omn imode). 26 Thus, while his self has no
essential or permanent form, it acquires its temporary forms by a characteristic
"metamorphosis." Amiel returns to this theme aga in and again, usually with
exultation, but at times also in despair, e.g., when his own lack of adefinite
character, as he experiences it, disconcerts him. 27 Yet on the whole the
capacity for unlimited metamorphosis means for hirn the major manifestation
of his essential and cherished freedom,28 so much that he claims for his own
personality only a "minimum of individuality."29
It is not surprising that under these circumstances Amiel considers his
distinguishing individualities and circumstances as merely accidental:

I am a perpetually new-born being, who does not succeed in becoming solidified in a definitive
form. I am a spirit not married to his body, a fatherland, a prejudice, a vocation, a sex, a genre. Am
I at least sure of.being a man, a European, a tell urian? It seems to me so easy to be something else
that this choice appears to be arbitrary. I could not take seriously a completely fortuitous structure
whose value is purely relative ... 30.

This does not mean that Amiel considers it impossible to describe the self in
more positive terms. He is particularly fond of calling it a monad, and in so
doing refers explicitly to Leibniz:

It is Leibniz' theory which appeals to me most, because it opens up infinity in duration, in

multiplicity, and in evolution. A mönad, being virtually the uni verse, does not have too much ofthe
infinity oftime in order to develop the infinite which it carries within. Only it would be necessary to
admit external actions and influences; it would also be necessary for it to be a mobile quantity,
growing between zero and infinity without ever being complete or ever being nothing, since the
monad cannot be absolutely passive nor entirely free. 31

Amie1 also speaks of the self as the "last sanctuary of intimate conscious-
 100

ness," ofits "atomic point-likeness' (ponctualite d'atome), which allows it to

free itself of"space, time, matter, temptations, distraction, and escape from his
organs, his own life.'m He also leaves no doubt that this self coincides with his
central consciousness (conscience centrale), the axis of all the trimmed-off
branches, the "support" of all mutilatians:

Soon I have nothing left but that, naked thought. Death reduces us to the mathematical point; the
destruction which precedes it pushes us back by concentric circles, narrower and narrower,
toward the last and unconquerable asylum. Isavor with anticipation this zero in which all the
forms and all the modes are extinguished. 33

Much earlier, in Grains de mit, Amiel had said under the heading "The
Captivity of the Spirit":

The thinking of thinking and the consciousness of consciousness, this is where the critical faculty
of the philosopher must terminate (CLXVIII).

It would therefore be an overstatement to assert that for Amiel the Protean

self is completely without a nature, much as his concrete nature at any given
moment is merely transitory and largely a matter of choice. Amiel himself
expresses this paradox clearly, without resolving it, in the following manner:

Man is nothing except what he becomes, a profound truth; but he also does not become anything
but what he is, an even more profound truth. What are you? A problem of predestination, ofbirth,
of freedom: the abyss. And yet, one must plunge into it, and I have plunged into it. .. 34.

The unique situation of the self with regard to its Protean roles involves for
Amiel the capacity to perform certain peculiar acts which have not been
described before, and which he calls mostly "deplication" and "reimplica-
tion," the one expanding the Protean amoeba ofthe self indefinitely, the other
contracting it to its pointlike minimum. 3)
"Deplication" is described most fully in one of the aphoristic seetions of
Grains de mil under the heading "The Centrifugal Force" (CXLII):

If the spirit is essentially mobile and, so to speak, fluid, and if the spiritual Iife is subject to a
continual movement of rotation like the planet, its prototype, I can explain to myself the almost
irresistible tendency of consciousness to disperse itself. Except at the single central point, except
in its completely point-Iike condensation at the very axis of its Iife, consciousness tends
perpetually to become estranged from itself, to lose itself in the outer world, to evaporate in the
peripheral sphere. Carried away, as it were, by its centrifugal force, its dispersion is proportional
to the radius of its activity.36

But even here Amiel adds at ance:

Reduced to its status of mathematical point it (consciousness) offers a minimum of grip to the
destructive force. The more it increases its volume, the more it is in danger. The contraction of
ingathering (receuillement), the return to the inner atom, to the monad, is therefore the law of
 101

personal conservation. Whereas cohesion is a guarantee of life, dispersion is a symptom of death.

Well then, what thrusts man outside himself? The life ofthe sens es. What concentrates him most?
Prayer. Between the two lies thought, centrifugal by its curiosity, centripetal by meditation.

Obviously, it is the centripetal power of the mind which is much more

essential to Amiel than the centrifugal one. Actually he discusses it in the
following manner in an earlier aphorism ofGrains de mit underthe heading" A
Power of the Mind" (LVI):

There is a faculty which very few people know and wh ich almost nobody puts into practice: I shall
ca!! it the faculty of"reimplication." To be able to simplify oneself gradually and without limits; to
be able to re live truly the vanished forms of consciousness and existence; for instance, to slip out of
the skin of one's epoch and to resuscitate one's own ancestor; better to detach oneselffrom one's
individuality to the degree offeeling oneselfpositively another being; even better, to get ridofone's
actual organization by forgetting and extinguishing bit by bit one's various senses and entering by a
kind of miraculous re absorption into the psychological condition preceding sight and hearing; even
more, to redescend within that wrapping to the elementary condition of animal and even of plant -
even more profoundly by an increasing simplification to reduce oneselfto the condition of germ, of
point of latent existence; i.e., to free oneself of space, time, body, and life by plunging oneself
again, circle after circle, to the darknesses of one's primitive being, by feeling again by indefinite
metamorphoses the emotion of one's own genesis, and by condensing oneself until one's limbs
become merely virtual: a faculty precious and (only) too rare, supreme privilege ofintelligence,
spiritual youth at our discretion.

Clearly, this ac count ofthe new faculty of"reimplication," sometimes also

called interiorisation,37 is overcondensed. It seems to cover a whole series of
distinguishable acts, and needs considerable development. Nevertheless,
something in this account betrays more than Amiel's excitement over the
discovery of apower which he considers essential to his own existence. Here is
a phenomenon within the self which invites further exploration and
c1arification.
To be sure, Amiel does not always side with reimplication against
deplication. In some places he intimates that both are essential to hirnself as
weil as to any self, like diastole and systole. The expansion ofthe selfbeyond
its actual boundaries by deplication and the return to its innermost core by
reimplication are part of the liberation of the self from its actual imprisonment.
Such are some of the ingredients of Amiel's phenomenology of the self. It
would be foolhardy to try to press them into anything like a rigid mold.
Actually, and perhaps essentially, Amiel's thought does not lend itselfto such
a Procrustean procedure. It is seminal rather than fruit-like. As such it should
be utilized, neither accepted uncritically nor rejected off-hand. It needs, but
also deserves, developing, comparing, and, last but not least, testing.
Thus, some of Amiel's phenomenology of the self invites comparison with
the thesis of Sartrian existentialism according to which man has no definite
pregiven nature, but creates it as a result of his existential acts. Amiel's
Protean self also seems to start from zero. But closer inspection and a study of
 102

the real objectives will soon reveal that Amiel's concern is quite different from
the activist involvement ofthe existentialists, which in Sartre's case often goes
so far as to reject the "inner life" as an inauthentic escape. Amiel's concern
was the preservation and the deepening of the self as the comerstone of any
kind of genuine existence.
In this respect too Amiel's enterprise is much more congenial to Husserl's
undertaking of grounding knowledge on the pure ego as the ultimate foundation
of all reality. But here again Amiel's concern is much more personal, more
immediate: it is man in his concreteness, not the pure theoretical subject,
whom he wants to help, if not to save. Yet this concern too may explain why
Husserl found Amiel such an inspiration, particularly at a stage of his
development when he conceded the ego the status of a genuine intuition, after
having first denied it. 38
The phenomenology ofthe self remains to this day unfinished business. But
Amiel deserves to be remembered as one of its initiators. So does his entire
conception of a new phenomenology. Such remembrance would be the most
fitting fulfillment of Amiel's last hope "that my labors, my experiences, and
my meditations may not be entirely lost and can serve others, even if they do
not make my name survive ... 39

POSTSCRIPT 1966

Since this article was submitted for publication in 1963, I happened to come
across what I believe is the clue to Husserl' s puzzling interest in Amiel. It
consists of a letter by the late William Ernest Hocking to Husserl, written
from Andover Semtnary on October 29, 1904, about a year after Hocking's
return from a study year in Germany, where, during two months in Göttingen,
he had formed a lasting attachment to Husserl, expressed, among other things,
in sixteen letters and postcards now deposited in the Husserl Archives in
Louvain. In the three-page letterjust mentioned Hocking, after telling Husserl
about his problem of getting started on the writing of his first book, quotes the
following sentences from Amiel's journal entry of March 25, 1851,40 clearly
taken from the English translation by Mrs. Humphry Ward (1885):

Show what is in thee! It is no longer a question of promising - thou must perform. Art thou ready?
Give an ac count. Give an account of thy years, thy leisure, thy strength, thy studies, thy talents,
and thy works.

In view of the fact that this is alm ost the only passage in the mostly so
disheartened self-analysis of Amiel which strikes a more activistic note, it
seems to me practically certain that it was Hocking's letter which armed
Husserl with Ihis moral tonic for his "crisis" beginning in 1905. This suspicion
 103

is reinforced bya postcript in the margin ofHusserl's reply of August 10, 1905:
Wer ist (I'erzeihen Sie meine Unbildung) der trejjliche Amie!? (Who is -
pardon my ignorance - the worthy AmieI'?). Since Hocking's response of
September 17, 1905 fails to answer this question, the Iikelihood of Husserl's
having followed up the matter by himselfbefore the diary entry of September
25, 1906 looks even more remote.

NOTES

I From Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 49 (1967), 201-14.

2 "Persönliche Aufzeichnungen," Philosophy and Phenomenological Researlfl XVI
(1956),300.
l See now the Postscript 1966 for the solution of the puzzle.
4 Tagebücher. Deutsch von Dr. Rosa Schapire. München und Leipzig, R. Piper & Co., 1905.
5 "Persifnliche Aufzeichnungen," /bid., p. 294f.
"Ernst Merriam-Genast, Amiel im Spiegel der europaisehen Kritik 1881-1931, Marburg
(Lahn) 1931, especially p. 165f.; Hedwig Hilz, Amii!lllnd die Deutschen, Münster 1930,
p.6lff.
7 Marvin Farber, ed., Philosophie Thought in France and Ihe Uniled States. Buffalo 1950.
p.67.
H Henri-Frederic Amiei, Fragments d'un journal intime, ed. Bernard Bouvier, Paris, Editions
Stock. 1949, p. 81.
9 For another unexplained reference, see 1. M. Bochenski, Die zeitgenossischen Denkmethoden,
München. Lehnen Verlag, 1959, p. 22.
10 Tt is a matter of profound regret that according to a letter I received from Monsieur Bopp this
edition, after three volumes, has come to a halt.
11 February 4, 1881. ed. Bouvier, p. 504.
12 Bouvier, p. 83.
13/bid.
14 Bouvier, p. 188.
15 Scherer I, 235 (Henri-Fn!deric Amiei, Fragments d'un journal intime. Geneve 1884).
16 Bouvier, p. 250.
17 Bouvier, p. 171.
18 Scherer I, 234.
19 An allusion to a celebrated passage in the second part ofGoethc's Fa list (lines 621 ff), repeated
in other parts of the JOllmal, and, incidentally, quite often in Husserl's writings.
20 September 9, 1880; Bouvier, p. 484f.
21 Bouvier, pp. 371, 423f., 507.
22 August 20, 1860; Bouvier, p. 139.
23E. g., September 9, 1850(B., p. 50); August 20, 1869(B., p. 243); May 31,1876 (B., p. 370);
July 8, 1880 (B., p. 477).
24 April 23, 1871 (B., p. 282); February 3, 1862 (B., p. 153).
25 Scherer I, 234f.
26 August 31, 1856 (B., p. I J 5); May 31, 1880 (B., p. 46).
27 September 4, 1873 (B., p. 325).
28 July 26, 1857 (B .. p. 122f).
29 August 14. 1869 (B., p. 243).
30 July 3, 1874 (B., p. 342); also May 2, 1877 (B., p. 398).
31 April 23, 1871 (B., p. 283).
32 September 27,1871 (B., p. 74).
33 July 12, 1876 (B.; p. 371).
34 May ll, 1853 (B., p. 87).
 104

oj Ahout these possibilities see also the article by Georges Poulet, "La Reverie tournoyante d'
Amiei," Les Temps Modernes XVII (1961) pp. I-51. based largely on unpublished material.
36 For another reference to this "expansion" see also the entry to the Journal of May 11, 1853
(B., p. 86).
37 February 3,1862 (B., p. 153).
38 See my The Phenomenological Movement. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, Second edition,
1965, p. 140f.
39 Bouvier, p. 21.
40 Apparently an error of the English translation; in Scherer and Bouvier the date is March
26, 1851.
 7.
WHAT WILLIAM JAMES KNEW ABOUT
EDMUND HUSSERL:
ON THE CREDIBILITY OF PITKIN'S TESTIMONYl

WHAT IS BELIEVED ABOUT JAMES'S VIEWS OF HUSSERL

Thanks to the pioneer essays of Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz, to the later
books of Johannes Linschoten, Bruce Wilshire, and John Wild, and to other
articles, recently listed and analyzed most helpfully by James M. Edie,2 the
paralleIs between James's and Husserl's original insights no Ion ger have to be
pointed out. Moreover, James's place in Husserl's field of consciousness, his
admiration for and his debt to J ames, as attested most movingly in his private
diary for September 25,1906, have been sufficiently recorded. 3 Thus it has
been all the more a matter of regret, if not embarrassment, to phenomenolo-
gists, beginning with Husserl hirnself, that J ames did not reciprocate these
sentiments. Instead, the general belief is that J ames had a low opinion of
Husserl's work. The main evidence is, as Edie puts it in his article (p. 488), that
"it was J ames hirnself who advised a great eastern publishing house in
America against publishing a translation of the Logische Untersuchungen."
Husserl's own disappointment about J ames's rejection was so deep that he
talked about it spontaneously to several ofhis Anglo-American visitors. Ralph
Barton Perry, the major authority on J ames, recorded in his diary after a visit to
Husserl in Freiburg on June 21, 1930 (and graciously copied for me):
"[Husserl] says William James advised publishers against the translation
(Pitkin's) of his Logische Untersuchungen - and Husserl evidently feIt badly
because he was so great an admirer of William J ames.,,4 Incidentally, Perry
did not seem to remember any statements by J ames about H usserl, favorable
or unfavorable, when I had occasion to ask hirn about this in 1954.
There is perhaps even more telling evidence of the depth of Husserl's
disappointment when he heard about James's part in the rejection through
WaIter Pitkin's letter to hirn of August 20 from Munich. This letter must have
failed to reach Husserl in Göttingen, which he hadleft, on August 13,1905, for
his momentous vacation in Seefeld, Tirol, stopping on his way in Munich to see
Theodor Lipps. But Pitkin's letter was apparently forwarded to Seefeld; for,
according to a later letter of Pitkin's to Husserl- the letter of October 5 from
N ew York - Husserl again stopped over in Munich on the way back from
 106

Seefeld and went to Pitkin' s address in Schwabing, only to discover that Pitkin
had already left for Columbia University, where he had been offered a
lectureship. It seems more than likely that Husserl's impromptu call was an
attempt to find out, not only about the state ofthe translation, but also as much
as possible about the reasons for James's rejection.
I am afraid that in my historical introduction to phenomenology5 I myself
did not sufficiently question the bases for Husserl' s belief in J ames' s hostility.
Now I believe I can undo part ofthe damage by proving that our worries were,
to say the least, premature and exaggerated. 1fJames knew anything about
Husserl, and even if he advised Houghton Mifflin against publishing
Pitkin 's translation, he did so in ignorance ofHusserl's new phenomenology.
My attempt will consist in a reconstruction of William J ames' s phenomenal
field of consciousness with regard to Husserl. I have to admit that this attempt
has a very narrow base. To me this is another illustration ofthe need to salvage
what we still can of the perishing memory of a memorable episode in the
his tory of philosophy.

THE SOURCES FOR A REAPPRAISAL

Walter B. Pitkin's Autobiography

The only published evidence about James's supposed dirn view ofHusserl's
work occurs in a short paragraph of the autobiography by Walter Boughton
Pitkin (1878-1953), who is now mostly remembered for his best seIler, Life
Begins at Forty (1932), but who was also lecturer in philosophy and
psychology (1905-9) and professor of journalism (1913-43) at Columbia
University. The crucial sentence in On My Own (1944) occurs in a context
which is so revealing that I would like to quoteit here with the surrounding
paragraphs:

I had the idea of a career as a translator of German books. I enjoyed translating atthe time. I had
read scores of novels and serious works then popular. Perhaps I might make as much as $2,000 a
year at the work. No harm feeling out the situation.
The first man I approached was Edmund Husserl. A year before he had been more than friendly
when I went to Göttingen just to talk with hirn about his new "Logische Untersuchungen," a
monumental work in two volumes, which marked an important turn in logical analysis. Husserl
was more than appreciative. He kept me in his horne for a long time and put in part of every day
explaining to me various problems in his new logic. His ability as a teacher was amazing. He put
everything so clearly and repeated the key propositions at such well timed intervals that, even ifl
had not been keenly interested, I could not have failed to understand his philosophy.
Yes, he would be delighted to have me translate his book. So I, big idiot, plunged at the task. I
 107

sent hirn chapters for reading and corrections. I finished the task and se nt it to a N ew Y ork
publisher, with a formal letter from Husserl hirnself.
In a few weeks, back came the MS. with a dull note stating that the publishers had referred the
matter to William James, who had said that nobody in America would be interested in a new and
strange German work on logic. Sorry.
Next I tackled Georg Simmel, the Berlin sociologist. I had taken every course he had offered. I
knew his outlook and his special vocabulary. He authorized me to translate his latest book. Again I
rushed in where angels fear to tread. I finished only half ofthe volume this time, before sending it to
New York. That was lucky, for back came the copy. No Americans were interested in German
sociology. Sorry.
While plowing through these heavy tasks oftranslating I had struck out along another line. I was
not seeking a job. I merely wanted to publish various matters I had been working over. . . . 6

Now this somewhat breezy ac count of the whole episode, written nearly
forty years after it happened, leaves James's part in it far from clear. What did
the publisher's "referral" ofthe matter imply? Had he sent Pitkin's manuscript
to J ames? Did J ames in his answer (oral, or in writing?) say anything about
Husserl and about the Logische Untersuchungen? Or did he speak only about
"a new and strange German work on logic" in general terms? And did he
merely give an estimate of the foreseeable interest in such a work on the
American book market? Surely, on the basis of one such sentence alone it is far
from certain that J ames was judging Husserl rather than the American sales
prospects.
The safest way for resolving all these uncertainties would be to consult the
archives of the possible publishers. In 1954 I myself tried the Macmillan
Company, which simply replied that any pertinent correspondence would
have been destroyed long ago, and then Houghton Mifflin, where I learned that
"most of our early correspondence with important figures has been deposited
at the Houghton Library." However, a letter, for which I am indebted to Mr.
Rodney G. Dennis, curator of manuscripts in the Houghton Library of
Harvard University, informs me that "there is no mention of Husserl in
William James's correspondence with Houghton Mifflin." He also established
that the Houghton Library" does not have Husserl' s works or any offprints by
hirn from William James's library."
1 also inquired of the Walter B. Pitkin estate about other documents when I
finally began my search, one year after Pitkin's death in 1953; and from his
widow, Mrs. Katherine B. Pitkin, I received the following kind reply: "I very
much doubt ifthere exist now any J ames or Husserlletters to my husband. And
I think that finally, when he could not find a publisher for his Husserl
translation, he threw it away."
Thus the only hope that remained was the collection ofthe Husserl Archives
in Louvain. And here indeed was the evidence of the Pitkin-Husserl
correspondence, which, thanks to Professor Van Breda, I have now been able
 108

to examine more carefully than I could when I was preparing my book The
Phenomenological Movemenl.

The Pitkin-Husserl Correspondence

To be sure, only one side ofthis correspondence has survived, namely, seven
letters by Pitkin to Husserl, all written in 1905 and dated February 8 and 13
from Berlin, March 23 and April 9 from Florence, April 27 from Rome,
August 20 from Munich, and October 5 from New York.7 All are hand-written
in German, usually on short pages. I shall give, first, abrief description of each
letter, with emphasis on the pertinent information about the translation project:
1. Pitkin in three short pages on February 8 asks Husserl's permission to
translate the Logische Untersuchungen, claiming intensive study ofthe work,
adding arguments for its timeliness, mentioning especially the confusions
(Wirrsale) produced by the so-called "humanistic" trend in philosophy, and
introducing hirnself as an American student of psychology and logic.
2. Pitkin's three-page letter ofFebruary 13 refers to Husserl's reply ofthe
day before, in which Husserl seems to have specified certain conditions, which
Pitkin is ready to accept. Husserl also seems to have pointed out the difficulties
ofthe task, which Pitkin now acknowledges. Husserl must also have offered his
help and invited Pitkin to visit his lectures on the theory of judgment
(Urteilstheorie ) during the coming semester. Pitkin's answer is noncommittal,
but he announces his visit for the first week in March and also that he will come
to stay in the fall "until the completion of the translation." It also appears that
Husserl told Pitkin about his own plan to revise the original text before the
translation. Pitkin then asks for Husserl's consent to his contactingpublishers,
such as Macmillan and Company.
3. On March 23 Pitkin writes on two pages from Florence. He and his wife
must have carried out the plan of visiting Husserl in Göttingen be fore going to
Italy. This becomes clear, not only from later expressions of the hope for a
repeat visit (Wiedersehen), but from the fuller account in On My Own. The
letter reports, first, a response to Pitkin's inquiries (he had apparently
approached several publishers), this one probably from Harper and Brothers-
a name which Husserl entered at the top of the page, presumably after
receiving Pitkin's next letter, where it occurs. Harper's ans wer was almost
completely negative, but it made Pitkin decide that "a complete translation of
at least the first volume was indispensable for negotiations" and that he should
make a "provisional" (prol'isorische) translation as early as possible, it being
understood, of course, that, after contract, "you would subject the entire work
to a revision [Revision]" - a proposal about which he invited Husserl's
opinion. Pitkin also mentions that his planned visit to Franz Brentano had not
yet taken place. (This plan was clearly the result of a suggestion by Husserl,
 109

whose contact with his old teacher had been revived by Brentano's letter of
October, 1904; Husserl hirnself eventually visited Brentano in Florence in
1907.)
4. On April 9 Pitkin again sends two pages from Florence. They make it
clear that Husserl had written hirn, telling hirn chiefly about his visit with
Dilthey in Berlin, in whose seminar Pitkin had found out about the Logische
Untersuchungen the preceding semester. But he starts by telling Husserl that
he has by now almost completed (ziemlichjertig) the translation of 110 pages
of Volume I, which would mean the end of the sixth chapter, or half-way
through the rrolegomena. He announces his departure for Rome by April 15
and supplies an address to which Husserl could occasionally send "Cor-
rekturen" - presumably the intended changes about which he may have told
Pitkin at Göttingen. He also indicates that he has some questions about the
meaning of certain sentences but hopes that these "difficulties" will resolve
themselves with continued study. Finally he mentions a letter from Houghton
Mifflin, "the greatest firm with us," containing an explicit request for the
translation manuscript of Volume I.
5. On April 27 Pitkin writes three long pages on the stationery ofthe Fifth
International Congress ofPsychology in Rome, without implying the receipt of
any reply from Husserl to his letter of April 9. Written on the third day ofthe
Congress, the letter consists almost completely of an attempt to brief Husserl
about the interest in, but also the misunderstanding of, the Logische
Untersuchungen which he had encountered at the Congress. Among those
who chiefly talked about Husserl in two afternoon sessions, which he had
attended, he mentions several followers of Alexius Meinong, especially Alois
Höfler. Only in the end does he mention the fact that for the past eight days he
has not been able to do any translating but that he hopes to be able to complete
Volume I after three more weeks.
6. Not until August 20 is there another letter, this time a three-page one
from Munich, where, judging from his address contained in the Proceedings of
the Rome Congress, the Pitkins had settled; perhaps they had gone there for the
summer semester, beginning in May, as is suggested by remarks on the
lectures of Lipps in the autobiography. This letter was apparently not
preceded by one from Husserl. Pitkin apologizes for not having written before,
giving as the major reason for his silence the fact that the publisher had
repeatedly postponed adefinite reply. Also, Pitkin hirnself had been so
burdened with work that he had not had enough time for the negotiations. But
now the one publisher upon whom he had set his hopes had definitely declined,
"for the reason that according to all indications one thousand copies of the
translation could not be sold. In this opinion he is also supported by James"
(underlined). He would bring out a smaller edition only if someone would
advance the costs of production, "which is of course impossible." Pitkin then
 110

expresses his own disappointment in view of the fact that he had already
advanced far into the second volume, and he expresses regret about the hours
that Husserl had lost. Pitkin also refers to reports (Berichte) which Husserl had
loaned him and which he was returning, presumably including the one about
German writings on logic from the Archiv fiir systematische Philosophie of
1904, which contained amendments of his formulations in the first edition of
the Logische Untersuchungen, such as his abandonment of the definition of
phenomenology as "descriptive psychology."
7. October 5, 1905, is the date of Pitkin's last letter, this one three pages
long, written on the stationery of the Department of Philosophy and
Psychology of Columbia University. It begins with a reference to Husserl's
unsuccessful attempt to visit him at his Munich address. Whether Pitkin had
heard about this visit through his Munich landlords or through a letter
from Husserl himself is not stated. Pitkin first explains that he had not come to
Gottingen as planned because he had accepted the unexpected offer of a
position at Columbia. He then tries to explain the background for the reprints
of some of his own short articles which Mrs. Pitkin had sent to Husser!. He
reports about his teaching assignment, especially in logic and philosophy of
science, and expresses the hope for a course with advanced students in the
second semester, where he would discuss Volume II of the Logische
Untersuchungen. Finally, he teils Husserl that he will now have better access
to publishers. And he thinks that he can awaken interest in the work, especially
since he has discovered much interest in Bolzano; and he remarks that the new
"absolutistic" logic and the "immanenter Realismus" in the making (Pitkin
was one of the "Six Realists") will sooner or later prepare the way for
Husserl's book.
Compared with the account in the autobiography, On My Own, the letters
show some agreements and some discrepancies.
(a) That Pitkin had gone to Göttingen "a year before" he approached
Husserl about the translation, Le., in 1904, "just to talk with him about his new
Logische Untersuchungen" seems most improbable in the light ofPitkin's first
letter, which does not mention any earlier contacts.
(b) The statement "I sent him chapters for reading and corrections"
certainly does notjibe with the letters, which suggest that, in order to satisfy the
request ofHoughton Mifflin, Pitkin did only a "provisional" translation ofthe
first volume and told Husserl that he would not send it to him for revision until
after acceptance.
( c) "I finished the task" holds true only for Volume I, and there is no way of
telling how far Pitkin had advanced into Volume 11 be fore he abandoned this
job.
(d) That he had sent it to a New York publisher (Macmillan or Harper)
rather than to Houghton Mifflin in Boston is at least an error.
 111

(e) That he had added a "formal letter from Husserl himself' is certainly
not borne out by Pitkin's letters.
However, the statement that "after a few weeks back came the MS. with a
dull note stating that the publishers had referred the matter to William J ames,"
who had said "that nobody in America would be interested in a new and
strange German work on logic," is at least compatible with the one brief
sentence in the letter of August 20 stating that the pubIisher was supported in
his estimate that one thousand copies ofthe translation could not be sold on the
book market. But the letters mention no other reasons and contain no specific
reference to Husserl and his book. This, of course, is something which Pitkin
may have feIt he should keep from Husserl.
The letters reveal quite a few additional facts. The translation ofVolume I,
which Pitkin, if his estimate in the Rome letter was correct, might have
completed by May 18, was merely a provisional one, not examined by
Husserl. It might have reached Boston by the end ofMay. Even though Pitkin
states that the publisher postponed the decision repeatedly, the letter of August
20 indicates that the final "No" came a good deal earlier. At least this is
suggested by the autobiography (" a few weeks" after Pitkin had submitted the
manuscript). In fact, this must have been the case if, before leaving Gerrnany at
the beginning of September and abandoning the Logische Untersuchungen,
Pitkin also translated half of George Simmel's "latest book" - which could
only have been his Philosophie des Geldes (1900) of 585 pages - not to
mention the fact that, "while plowing through these heavy tasks of trans-
lating," he had prepared articles for philosophical and psychologicaljournals
in England and the United States. Whateverthe chances of such a superhuman
program for the months between May and the beginning of September might
have been, Pitkin certainly could not have completed the translation ofVolume
II of the Logische Untersuchungen beforestarting on Simmel.
But even if the story as it emerges from the letters is more credible than the
account given in the autobiography, a puzzle remains concerning James's
adviceagainst the publication of Pitkin's translation. For the only sentence
about J ames' s role in the drama occurs in a short paragraph of the letter of
August 20, which I shall insert in the original German:

Endlich aber hat der einzige Verleger, auf dessen Entschluss ich grosse Hoffnung gesetzt habe,
das Unternehmen endgültig abgelehnt und zwar aus dem Grunde dass allem Voraussehen nach
1000 Exemplare der Übersetzung nicht zu verkaufen wären. In dieser Meinung ist er auch von
J ames unterstützt.
("Finally, the only publisher for whose decision I had great hopes has turned down the
undertaking for good, and this for the reason that 1000 copies of the translation could not be sold.
In this opinion he has the support of James.")

This account again leaves J ames' s role in the story far from cIear. All it does
 112

say is that J ames supported the publisher's estimate about the prospective
sales. But the basis in James's mind for this support now remains completely
obscure. Wh at kind of question had the publisher asked J ames? Had he sent
hirn the translation or given hirn any specific information about the author of
the original? The only extant direct evidence thus leaves it more than doubtful
that James's "support" was based on any opinion about Husserl hirns elf or
about his work.
From this point onward the attempt to reconstruct the basis for J ames's
response to Houghton Mifflin' s inquiry has to become somewhat hypothetical.
First of all, what are the chances of his having seen Pitkin's provisional
translation of Volume I (Prolegomena), assuming that Pitkin had sent it to
Houghton Mifflin? The answer presupposes a minimum of information about
James's whereabouts du ring the crucial period. We know that James went to
Europe in March, 1905, spending several weeks in Italy and Greece. From
April 25 to April 30 he attended the Fifth International Congress of
Psychology in Rome, subsequently stopping in a variety of places, such as
Orvieto, Siena, Paris, and London, before returning to Boston on J une 11. But
by June 29 he left for Chicago, where he was to give a "round" oflectures in the
summer school ofthe University ofChicago. Then he spent apparently all of
July in the Adirondacks, again lecturing, not to return to Boston until August
29. 8 Thus, unless Houghton Mifflin sent hirn the Pitkin manuscript somewhere
else, which seems highly unlikely, June 11 to June 29 was the only time he
could have examined it at Cambridge with some leisure. Actually this seems
also a time when, according to the Pitkin correspondence, the manuscript
could have been in Boston. But what are the chances of J ames's having given it
a thorough examination? Unless James had special reasons for paying closer
attention to it, he probably restricted hirnself to the rough estimate of the
market outlook for such a translation. Certainly he did not take time for a
written reply.
But now, for the most important circumstance: Even if James laid eyes on
Pitkin's translation, he could have seen only the "Prolegomena to a Pure
Logic," in which, in the first edition, the word Phänomenologie occurs only
once, at the end of a long foonote to Chapter X, where Husserl promises
clarification in the second volume. In other words, from the Prolegomena
James could have learned only about Husserl the antipsychologist and
advocate of a new pure logic, but not about Husserl the phenomenologist in the
making.

Gther Possible Sources for James 's Knowledge about Husserl

The International Congress of Psychology in Rome

There was one more occasion when J ames could have picked up information
 113

about Husserl, possibly from Pitkin hirnself. For both James and Pitkin
attended the Fifth International Congress of Psychology from April 25 to
April 30, 1905, in Rome. In fact, the two were the only American members
present. J ames reported about the congress in two letters of April 25 and
April 30 to his wife. 9 Pitkin did so in his letter of April 27 to Husserl. But
neither mentions the other, which in Pitkin's case may weIl indicate that he did
not meet J ames until after the date of the letter. However, in his autobiography
Pitkin has a lot more to say about his attendance at what he there calls the
"International Congress ofPhilosophy (or something like that)" in 1903 (sie!),
mentioning at least two occasions at which both he and J am es were present: an
official reception at the end ofthe last day in the Villa Borghese, and a private
meeting with some Italian "Futurists," i.e., Italian Pragmatists, who wor-
shiped J ames. Both occasions were also mentioned in J ames' s second letter to
his wife, but in a much more appreciative tone than Pitkin's derisive accounts;
and James says nothing ofPitkin's presence. FinaIly, Pitkin hirnself does not
mention any personal talks with J ames, which would have allowed hirn, the
young beginner, to talk spontaneously about Husserl and his own translation
project. Yet this possibility cannot be ruled out.
As far as J ames is concerned, one also has to be aware of his preoccupa-
tions during the Congress. Immediately after his arrival, the program
committee had persuaded hirn to prepare an address for the general meeting on
the last day, for which occasion J ames chose to give an abridged version of his
article of 1904, "Does Consciousness Exist?", in French under the title "La
Notion de conscience," a feat in which he apparently took a good deal of
pride. According to the second letter to his wife, he worked on this paper for
most ofthe third and fourth days ofthe Congress. This would have left hirn only
the first two days for attending any ofthe meetings. Yet the proceedings ofthe
Congress, published later during the year,1O do not show that he took any
active part in the discussions. However, even on the very first day there were
two events which could have made hirn aware ofHusserl's advent in Europe.
Theodor Lipps (whom J ames in his letter to his wife of April 25 had mentioned
as not coming) delivered the keynote address to the first general session, "Die
Wege der Psychologie," in which he, though once attacked by Husserl as a
prime example of Psychologismus, now proclaimed "Dass, um das Schhlg-
wort des Tages zu gebrauchen, aller 'Psychologismus' völlig überwunden
werde, dies ist wohl die wichtigste Forderung, die an die heutige Psychologie
gestellt werden muss" ("the most important demand to be made on today's
psychology is, to use one of today' s slogans, that it must completely overcome
all psychologism,,).11
Then, in the afternoon ofthe same day, Alois Häfler ofPrague read a paper,
"Sind wir Psychologisten?" Here, in defending hirnself against Husserl's
charge, Höfler mentioned in the very first paragraph the new pejorative sense
 114

ofthis term and illustrated it in a special footnote by a reference to Husserl's

Logische Untersuchungen, quoting the title of the third chapter in the
Prolegomena.
However, the most important occasion - and the one which J ames cannot
have missed - was the discussion ofhis own contribution on the last day, when
Lipps, according to the Italian minutes,12 referred to James's position as
"psychologistic," saying: "The whole trend of the new German philosophy
opposes itself to psychologism, which begins with Berkeley and Hume, and
which J ames represents." In his letter to his wife, J ames states that, with one
exception (Claparede), the critics had completely missed his point. His own
conciliatory answer, published in the Proceedings, did not answer Lipps
specifically. But the charge of psychologism must at least have puzzled him.
What did it mean, and who was this Husserl who led the charge against it?

Possible Informants about Husserl in America

In 1905 the name of Husserl was not entirely unknown on the American
continent. The earliest and most remarkable case ofreal familiarity with both
volumes of the Logische Untersuchungen is that of Josiah Royce, who
discussed them in his presidential address at the meeting of the American
Psychological Association in Chicago in January, 1902, shrewdly and
critically, but without mentioning phenomenology.13 What would have been
the chance of J ames' s presence and of subsequent communication between the
two on that occasion? The answer is, "Practically none," since James was
already preparing for his departure for his Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh.
There was C. S. Peirce, who, to be sure, referred to "the distinguished
Husserl" in 1906 as one of the German logicians for whom he did not care. 14
Could J ames have conferred with Peirce, at that time mostly confined to his
retreat in Milford, Pennsylvania?
Finally, there is the possibility that James heard ab out Husserl through the
reports of one of the Harvard traveling fellows and first admirers of Husserl,
William Emest Hocking, who had studied in Göttingen in 1903 and knew the
Logische Untersuchungen wel1. 15 But again, how much weight would James
have attached to such areport? Besides, there was Hugo Münsterberg, the
German psychologist-philosopher, who since 1892 had taught at Harvard. It
seems highly doubtful that he was much aware of Husserl's rising fame in
Germany. In fact, there is one piece of telling counterevidence: As Hocking
tells us about the answer to his study report for his committee, consisting of
Royce, J ames, and Münsterberg: "I received from Professor Mlinsterberg,
then chairman, a rather sharp note to the effect that the Department 'did not grant
Fellowships in order that students might seclude themselves in provincial
universities.' ,,16 The fact that, later on, Münsterberg had a friendly cor-
 115

respondence with Husserl does not conflict with the evidence that in 1905 he
had no appreciation for hirn. Anyway, as a possible source for James's
knowledge about German philosophers, Münsterberg is unlikely because of
the growing estrangement between the two at this time.
Finally, a much more pervading factor in James's possible re action to
Husserl's logical work has to be considered, namely, James's mounting
rebellion against logic. In contrast to Royce and Peirce, J ames had never been
interested in logic. Peirce, especially in his letters, had often taken hirn to task
for this defect. According to Perry, this resentment against logic, which he calls
one of James's "morbid traits," grew in his last decade, reaching a climax in
1908 in his Hibbert Lectures on "The Pluralistic Universe," where he
"solemnly and publicly renounced logic."17
In this light, what kind of echo could one expect from J ames to a new
German work on "pure logic," especially in the light of what he had just heard
in Rome about the attack oflogicians like Husserl on psychology and Lipps's
charge of psychologism against hirnself? Whatever sources of information
were atJames's disposal at the time ofHoughton Mifflin's inquiry, none could
have made hirn believe that Husserl was a logician comparable with Lotze or
Sigwart, whose texts had already been published in English translation.

CONCLUSIONS

What all the available evidence, direct and indirect, adds up to seems to be the
following:
1. J ames "supported" Houghton Mifflin' s pessimistic prognosis about the
possible sales of Pitkin's translation of the Logische Untersuchungen. But
such support may not have amounted to more than seconding a preconceived
negative judgment by the inquiring publisher.
2. As tothe basis forthis "support," there is no solid proofthat James knew
anything of or about Husserl at all. It could have been based on a general
opinion about German logic.
3. There is a possibility that James saw, but hardly read, Pitkin's
"provisional" draft ofthe translation ofVolume I. 1fthis is the case, Husserl's
suspicion, as expressed to Cairns in 1931, thatJames was putoffby Husserl's
antipsychologism makes good sense. But even the state of the provisional
translation could have contributed to his negative verdict.
4. J ames could have heard in Rome and from some of his Harvard
colleagues about Husserl and his Logische Untersuchungen. Butnone ofthese
sources could have convinced hirn that here was the work of a major
philosopher in the making.
5. In no case could James have known anything about Husserl's pheno-
 116

menology. At best he could have considered hirn an opponent of psychologism

and a proponent of a new type of "pure logic."
In words taken from Gurwitsch's analysis of the field of consciousness: If
Husserl figured at all in J ames's field, which is by no means established, he was
certainly ne ver a "thematic object" in it. At one time, when James was
consulted about the chances ofPitkin's translation, Husserl might have been in
the "thematic field." But otherwise he never emerged from the "marginal
field." And the only side or part of Husserl which could have appeared here
dimly was the early Husserl groping his way toward the phenomenology which
was taking shape in the second volume ofthe Logische Untersuchungen. But
J ames could not possibly have known this volume, either direct1y or in Pitkin' s
translation. There is of course no way of telling whether J ames would have
changed his possible estimate ifhe had had a chance to see it or if as I suggested
earlier, he could have consulted his friend Carl Stumpf, whose name apeared
in the dedication but need not have appeared in Pitkin's draft. Certainly
Husserl's style, even in Volume H, might not have appealed to James, the
pragmatist and antilogician of 1905. But this, too, would be mere hypothetical
guesswork. Considering the salvaged evidence and OUf remaining ignorance,
there is no good reason for embarrassment about.J ames' s alleged contempt far
Husserl's phenomenology.

NOTES

1 From Life-World and Consciousness. Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, edited by Lester E.
Embree, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 407-22.
2 "William James and Phenomenology," Review of Metaphysics, XXIII (1970), 481-527,
esp. 484, n. 8.
3 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XVI (1956), 294-95; reprinted in The
Phenomenological Movement (The Hague, 1960), p. 114.
4 For similar expressions see the Freiburgdiary ofW. R. Boyce Gibson (publishedin theJournal
ofthe British Societyfor Phenomenology, II [1971], 68) underthe date July 14, 1928: "Pitkin
translated the Prolegomena oftheLogische Untersuchungen, but the publisher before agreeing
fmally consulted WilliamJ ames, and William J ames warned hirn off." See also Dorion Cairns's
records of "Conversations with Husser! and Fink" under the date February 13, 1931: "The
prospective publisher of the Logische Untersuchungen was advised by William James not
to publish. Husserl thinks that J ames saw only the Prolegomena, and that its Antipsychologismus
was very unsympathetic to James." There is also evidence that Husserl was so impressed by
Pitkin's interest that, as Dr. Schuhmann of the Husserl Archives in Louvain informs me, he
drafted and presumably sent a letter to his publisher, Max Niemeyer Verlag, during the Easter
vacation of 1905, i.e., even before Pitkin had left Berlin to visit hirn on the way to Italy. This
draft, contained in MS A VI II/15b, teils Niemeyer of Pitkin's request and adds: "I am very
pleased about this, since thus far the English periodicals have reacted so little."
5 The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 111 ff.
6 Chapter 5, "What Next?," p. 319; quoted with the permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.
7 Kar! Schuhmann identified one draft of Husser!'s lost letters to Pitkin ofFebruary 12, 1905, in
MS F I 9 (see Journal ofthe British Society for Phenomenology 3 (1972), p. 65).
8 These dates are taken from Gay Wilson Allen, William James (New York, 1967), pp. 443 ff.
 117

9 The letters 01 William James, ed. Henry James (Boston, 1920), pp. 225-27.
10 Atti dei V Congresso Internazionale de Psichologia (Rome, 1905).
11 Ibid., p. 57.
12Ibid., p. 155.
13 The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 740 f.
14 "Husserl's and Peirce's Phenomenologies: Coincidence or Interaction?" Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, XVII (1956),164-85; esp. 183.
15 "From the Early Days oftheLogische Untersuchungen." Edmund Husser11859-1959 (The
Hague, 1959), pp. 1-11.
/6 Ibid, p. 5.
17 The Thought and Character 01 William James (Boston, 1935), II, 690 f.

SUPPLEMENT 1979

Only aft,er the publication of my earlier artic1e when I revisited the Houghton
Library at Harvard in 1972, did I come across the following letter to Pitkin in
the business correspondence of Houghton Mifflin for 1905 (vol. 53, 1905,
p. 146; quoted with permission of the company):

14 March 1905
Mr. W. Pitkin
Berlin, Germany
Dear Sir:
We thank you for kindly calling our attention to your proposed English version
of Professor Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen. Without in the least
questioning the intrinsic excellence of the work, we are still in doubt of being
able to discover a good field for it in this country. Ifit should be practicable for
you to let us see your translation when it is finished, we would be pleased to
have you do so, but we do not feel prepared to decide our course in advance.
Yours very truly

(Signed) Houghton

No other letter to Pitkin seems to have survived and, in view ofthe extensive,
weIl bound and indexed correspondence volume, it seems unlikely that any
comparable piece was written. Also, no letter of Pitkin to the firm seems to
have been kept.
The document above throws remarkable new light even on the correspond-
ence between Pitkin and Husser!. Contrary to Pitkin's letter to Husserl of
Apri19, in which he reported to Husserl about an explicit request for a
translation of volume I, the actualletter voices grave doubts about the whole
project and certainly contains no such request. It only expresses willingness to
 118

look at the translation when it is completed, a condition which Pitkin never

fulfilled. This alone could explain the fact that Houghton Miffiin turned down
the proposal by a reply of which no record has survived. Did the firm simply
return Pitkin's draft with a rejection slip (assuming that it ever received the
manuscript!)?
But what aboutJames's role in this exchange? His name does not occur in the
one surviving document from the publisher's file. Under these circumstances I
now doubt very much that it ever figured in the negotiations between Pitkin and
Houghton Miffiin. Even Pitkin's sentence "In dieser Meinung wird er auch
von J ames unterstützt" no longer proves to me that J ames ever expressed his
view about Pitkin's project directly to Houghton Miffiin. In this case the
possibility ofthe subject having come up during Pitkin's encounter with James
in Rome, not ruled out on p. 113, acquires a certain plausibility. F or it would be
not unnatural to ass urne that J ames inquired at least in passing about the
present occupations and projects of his young American fellow countryman
and even that Pitkin showed hirn the original Houghton letter of March 14
in Rome. And it would also not be unlikely that J ames warned hirn paternally
against wasting his time on as hopeless an enterprise as the translation of a two-
volume German book on logic. In fact, could it be that this warning dampened
Pitkin's eagerness to go through with the much tougher task of translating
volume 2? In any case Pitkin's sentence in his letter to Husserl need not
indicate James's direct support for Houghton Miffiin's estimate, butmerely an
independent confirrnation ofthe publisher's scepticism as expressed to Pitkin
directly on March 14 and remembered by Pitkin when in August he had to
break to Husserl the bad news, having already launched into new and different
projects.
What all this amounts to is that even at the actual time of Pitkin's and
Husserl's contacts Pitkin had injected J ames's name in a way which was bound
to give Husserl an entirely wrong picture of James's role in the translation
affair, i.e., that J ames had deliberately blocked Husserl's way to the American
public. J ames warned nobody but possibly Pitkin hirnself about Husserl on the
basis of the few things Pitkin could have told hirn about his own work at the
time, and ofthe few echoes ofHusserl's work which James could have picked
up at the Rome Congress implying Husserl's hostility to James's "psycho-
logisrn." If anything, James wanted to protect Pitkin, but not to stop Husserl.
 8. BRENTANO'S HUSSERL IMAGE l

BRENT ANO'S HUSSERL PORTRAIT AND HIS

EARLY PERSPECTIVE ON HUSSERL

In his "Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano,,2 Husserl inserted the following

sentences about Brentano's versatility:

In St. Gilgen beteiligte er sich gerne an den Porträtbildern seiner Frau, die eine tüchtige Malerin
war, hineinbessernd, oder ihre Bilder im Werden ganz übernehmend: aber freilich musste sie
dann wieder nachhelfen und manches wieder gut machen. So hat er mich im Jahre. 1886
gemeinsam mit seiner Frau gemalt: "ein liebenswürdiges Bild," wie Robert Vischer,3 der
feinsinnige Kunsthistoriker, urteilte.

Subsequently Brentano gave this portrait to the young Husserls as an

engagement present. On December 29, 1886, Husserl referred to it in a letter
as folIows:

Sie haben meiner Braut durch das grosse Geschenk, welches Sie ihr mit meinem Portrait gemacht
haben, eine unbeschreibliche Freude bereitet! Jeder ihrer letzten Briefe brachte mir hiervon
erneute Kunde. Sie findet das Bild prächtig, trefflich, lebensvoll, von der gehörigen Stellung und
Beleuchtung, geradezu zum Sprechen ähnlich. Ja sie gesteht mir, dass sie mit dem Wechsel und
der Auswahl der Stellungen und Beleuchtungen schier die ganze freie Zeit verspiele und
verträume. Kurz sie ist sowohl von dem Werke als auch von dem Künstler, der die Sendung
überdies mit so liebenswürdigen Zeilen begleitet, ganz begeistert. So sind meine Erwartungen
noch übertroffen worden.

After their wedding the Husserls displayed the portrait prominently in their
horne. For some time before her marriage Husserl's daughter Elly kept it on a
wall in herroom in Freiburg. Whenin 1939, after Edmund Husserl's death, his
papers and books were transferred to Louvain, the portrait was put into a van
with Mrs. Husserl's personal belongings, which were to be shipped to the
United States. On September 16, 1940, this van with the portrait was
destroyed by fire in the harbor of Antwerp as a resuIt of an aIIied air raid. 4
When in April, 1966 I had occasion to ask Mrs. Rosenberg about this
portrait, she was kind enough to send me a little snapshot of hers, showing her
room in the Freiburg apartment with the portrait at an angle on one ofthe walls
(Plate I). I took this snapshot to Mr. Herbert Weitmann ofthe Photographie
9. -
_._
~.
Plate H. Photographie Enlargement Plate III. A Contemporary Photo. Plate IV. The Projection Retouched.
and Projection.
 122

Services ofWashington University, St. Louis, who turned it over to two ofhis
assistants, Messrs. Bayard Fitzgerald and lohn Oytman. They managed to
enlarge the picture on the wall in the snapshot sufficiently to yield an
expressive face and also to spread out the picture in a way which neutralized
the perspective distortion. Even so, the reproduction was blurred by many
distracting reflections and left many areas ambiguous (Plate II). Miss Marilyn
Roth, an art student at Webster College, toned down these reflections by
retouching. At this stage Mrs. Rosenberg also sent me from her collection
copies of two contemporary photos of young Husserl as a student. (See
Plate III for the later one.) On this basis and in an attempt to take account of
written comments by Mrs. Rosenberg, Miss Roth also tried to resolve some of
the remaining ambiguities (Plate IV).
Obviously the result is at best an approximation. The only qualifiedjudge,
Mrs. Rosenberg, points out that the reproduction does not show the blond,
curly hair and the blue eyes ofthe original. She also feels that the narrow steep
head ofthe final version has something deadly serious about it compared with
the friendliness and naturalness of the original as she remembers it.
Thus the final photo is at best a doubtful copy of a copy of a painting that
represented an original through the eyes oftwo gifted amateurs. The only hope
is that this reconstruction is still better than the nothing oftotal destruction left
by the Antwerp bomb.
However, the real value of this reconstruction seems to me neither
iconographic nor aesthetic. Subsequent tradition and the comments of the
editors ofBrentano's works have often given the impression that Brentano had
a very dubious opinion of his erstwhile student Husser!. Much of this can be
discredited by a study oftheir extant correspondence. The portrait, however,
unique not only as a portrait painted by a philosopher but as that of a pupil by
his teacher, teIls an additional part ofthe story. Brentano had singled out this
particular student as worthy of a special portrait. With all its imperfections, the
reconstruction can show that in 1886 Brentano had seen in Husserl's eyes a
spark, if, not yet, the spark of genius. As Mrs. Rosenberg, to whom I am so
deeply indebted for her help in this iconographic venture, put it to me, the
portrait throws a certain light on the relation between the two philosophers, and
it is a bright and warm light.

BRENT ANO'S LATER PERSPECTIVE ON HUSSERL

It is often believed that in his later years Brentano took a rather dirn view of
Husserl's philosophical achievements and in particular ofhis phenomenology.
And it is certainly true that at least in two letters to Hugo Bergmann of
 123

September 6, 1907 and March 27, 1908 5 Brentano expressed hirnselfnot only
in puzzled but rather unfavorable terms about Husserl's philosophizing, even
after Husserl had visited hirn in Florence in an attempt to explain his new
views to his former teacher.
The entire relation between the always revered master and the emancipated
pupil would require a full-scale study, in which their voluminous correspon-
dence between 1891 and 1916 would have to be a center piece. Some of it
certainly deserves publication. 6
But it is perhaps even more important to inquire into the basis for Brentano' s
low opinion of Husserl's work. In the Bergmann letters Brentano hirnself
mentioned specifically Emil Utitz as the source ofhis information. Indications
are that almost all his evidence about Husserl was based on similar oral
reports.
But there is even more conclusive proof for the fact that Brentano never
made a study of any of Husserl's publications. Even when he recommended
Husserl to Carl Stumpffor possible" Habilitation" in Halle (October 18, 1886)
Brentano pointed out that he had not seen any of his written work.
Husserl had sent Brentano copies ofhis Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891)
with its printed dedication and of the first volume of his Logische Unter-
suchungen (1900) and other reprints with handwritten inscriptions. According
to Professor Chisholm, to whom I am indebted for this and other pertinent
information, none of these shows any markings in the text.
The most telling case is actually the one ofthe Philosophie der Arithmetik.
Some time in 1891 (the letter has no specific date) Brentano wrote Husserl a
brief but warm acknowledgment, but added that he would have to postpone
reading the book. Then in 1904, as shown in a letter of October 7, Brentano
rediscovered the volume, and, in the beliefthat he had not yet acknowledged
the dedication, sent hirn his apologies and renewed thanks. But even then he
did not take a look inside. F or the pages of the book, now in the Brentano
Archives at Brown University under Professor Chisholm's direction, are still
uncut. However, this fact must be seen in the light of Brentano's inability to
read such a work after his unsuccessful operation for cataract in 1903.
As forthe Logische Untersuchungen there is Brentano's own testimony in a
letter to Oskar Kraus of September 28, 1904 thai he had "not seen the two fat
volumes ofhis (Husserl's) Logische Untersuchungen ," which had impressed
so many of his own friends, especially in Munich.
Under these circumstances it seems safe to assert that Brentano's later
verdict on Husserl as a philosopher was not based on direct acquaintance with
the texts of his writings. There is also a good deal of evidence that his
secondary sources of information were not always unbiased. 7
 124

NOTES

I Published as "The Lost Portrait of Edmund Husserl by Ida and Franz Brentano" in
Philomathes. Studies and Essays ill Ihe Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, pp. 341-45.
2 Appendix II to Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano (München: C. H. Beck, 1919), p. 162 .
.1 Husserl erroneously put in the name of Robert's father Thcodor, as Mrs. Elly Husserl
Rosenberg informcd me.
4 See H. L. Van Breda, "Le Sauvetage de l'h6ritage husserlien ct la fondation des Archives
Husserl," Husserl et la pensee moderne. Phaenomenologica II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1959), p. 39. The refcrcnce to (WO such portraits in the text secms to be bascd on a
misunderstanding.
j "Briefe Franz Brentanos," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research VII (1946), pp. 86 f.,

93f.
6 Thus far only two ofBrentano's letters to HusserL without the corresponding letters by Husserl
or any information about them, have been published by Oskar Kraus in Wahrheit und Evidenz
(Leipzig. 1930), pp. 153-61; English translation in the edition by Roderick M. Chisholm
(London, 1966), 135 ff. For other sampies see my 7'he Phenomenological Movemenl (The
Hague, 1965), pp. 89f. and Grazer philosophische Studien VI (]978), pp. 1-12.
7 See especially Oskar Kraus in Wahrheit und Evidenz. pp. XXIX-XXXIII ("Psychologism
and Phenomenologism") and the headline ofp. 153 (" ... on the Basic Mistakes in a so-called
'Phenomenology' ").
 9. ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN BRENTANO AND HUSSERO

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 2

The immediate purpose of this paper is the examination of a correspondence

between two major philosophers which thus far has hardly been noticed,
largely because it was practically inaccessible. I believe that it will add to our
knowledge of both Brentano and Husserl and especially of their relationship.
My own interest in this exchange goes back to my initial research on the
beginnings of the Phenomenological Movement, where I found letters and
exchanges one of the most important tools for my historical reconstructions.
The Brentano-Husserl correspondence was no exception.
But there was more to it than I could utilize at the time, especially as far as
philosophical issues were concerned. I therefore had the feeling of a remaining
responsibility for a more thorough analysis of the texts. The invitation to the
Brentano symposium in Graz in 1977 gave me at last the necessary incentive
to return to this unfinished business and make an attempt to discharge an
unpaid debt to the one who had entrusted me with the means to do it, lohn
C. M. Brentano, Franz Brentano's devoted son, whose unstinted help I
enjoyed in my enterprises.
Beyond this immediate interest I see also a wider significance to such a
study. I have been intrigued by the significance of all philosophical correspon-
dence as an approach for watching a delayed and considered philosophical
dialog in the making. There have been classical cases of such dialogs. The
present example is hardly one of these. Nevertheless it may be indirectly
illuminating as a case study of an imperfect form, if not a failure.

2. ON THE BACKGROUND FOR THE CORRESPONDENCE

Although I do not think that in this paper there is need to assemble the entire
antecedents of this correspondence, a selection from them may be helpful.
In particular it seems relevant to mention that the correspondence was
preceded by Husserl's four semesters ofstudy from 1884-86 at the University
of Vienna, during which the young Ph.D. in mathematics, just returned from
 126

post-doctoral work in Berlin with Karl Weierstrass, had attended all of

Brentano's lecture courses and taken part in his seminars. At the end of the
fourth semester Brentano had invited Husserl to spend three months of his
summer vacation with hirn in St. Gilgen (Salzkammergut), clearly a sign ofhis
special interest in and appreciation ofthis promising ex-mathematician, which
he may not have extended to many of his earlier students. At the end of it he
recommended Husserl at his request to his older student Carl Stumpf in Halle
with a view to possible "habilitation." It was at this stage that the correspon-
dence began, with Husserl's acknowledgment of the Brentanos' engagement
present for Husserl's bride in the shape of an oil portrait of Husserl which
Brentano' s wife Ida, with her husband' s assistance, had painted at St. Gilgen. 3

3. THE FACTS ABOUT THE CORRESPONDENCE

In 1929 Oskar Kraus, in a footnote to his brief autobiography mentioning

Brentano's correspondence listed the one with Husserl along with those with
Marty, Stumpf, Schell, Ehrenfels, and hirnself as containing "valuable
information."4 Husserl in his Recollections of Brentano reported only little
correspondence and of little consequence between them. 5 When I inquired
about it in 1953 at the Husserl Archives I was told that it was missing and that
it was presumably one of the correspondences placed, along with similarly
important letters, into a drawer ofHusserl's desk which was destroyed by the
allied fire bombing of the harbor of Antwerp in 1940. It was therefore a most
happy surprise when lohn C. M. Brentano told me that he believed he had a
complete set of his father' s correspondence with Husserl and that he would be
glad to put copies at the Husserl Archives' and my disposal. The gaps in this set
are apparently minor. On the other hand, it contained such items as the
publisher's announcement of Husserl's Jahrbuch für Philosophie und
phänomenologische Forschung, probably sent to Brentano by Husserl which
I had not seen elsewhere and could use as an illustration in my The
Phenomenological Movement.
In the Appendix I am adding abrief survey of the extant pie ces of this
correspondence according to dates, page numbers and main topics. Ofthe 32
pieces 20 were written by Brentano and only 12 by Husser!. However,
Brentano's communications are usually much shorter, often only postcards,
and penned on smaller stationery in large letters. Several of the remaining
pieces contain references to missing items. Thus Husserl's very first letter of
December 29, 1886 mentions "every one of your preceding letters," which
presumably also me ans that Husserl too had sent missing replies. This
could also be gathered from Husserl's reference in his Recollections to an
absent letter in which he had asked Brentano to accept the dedication of his
 127

Philosophie der Arithmetik and to Brentano's reply warning hirn not to call the
wrath of his teacher's foes upon his head. 6 Husserl added that Brentano had
not thanked hirn for the actual dedication until fourteen years later. This
suggests that Husserl had never received Brentano's incompletely dated note
of thanks of 1891; I now suspect that it never went into themail and was
forgotten by Brentano bims elf. Other gaps can be inferred in 1892, in 1893,
1898 and 1916 as indicated in the survey. Karl Schuhmann found at least two
drafts of Husserl's four letters in the nineties. Thus the numbers of the
communications actually exchanged exceeded those listed in the survey
slightly to about 40 pieces. In view ofthis fact Husserl's own minimizing ofthis
correspondence sounds exaggerated. However, it is not the size but the content
ofthis correspondence which matters. I shall therefore attempt to appraise first
the biographical importance of these letters and then their philosophical
substance.

4. PERSONAL SIGNIFICANCE

Not many of the communications add much to the chronology of Brentano's

and Husserl's lives, even if at times they confirm information from other
sources. 7 However, in the case ofBrentano I found his references to his,reading
difficulties by 1904 and to the effects ofhis unsuccessful cataract operation of
1903 revealing. Moreover what he wrote to Husserl about his courseof 1893
on contemporary philosophies and his plans in 1893 for books on Psycho-
gnosie and Dasein Gottes is probably noteworthy. In tbis regard much more
can be gathered from Husserl's letters, especially about his difficult start in
Halle, about the problems ofhis academic position in Göttingen, and about his
lectures and literary plans at the time. Finally the choice of the second name
(Franziska) for the Huserls' first-born daughter Elisabeth in honor ofBrentano
announced in the letter of December 29, 1892, tells something about his
veneration for hirn during those years.
Much more meaningful seems to me what this correspondence reveals about
the personal relations between the correspondents, their mutual perspectives
of each other and their sentiments. Here even more important than the number
of pieces exchanged is the time span over which they extend, Le., from
Husserl's first letter in 1886 to Brentano's last dictation of 1916, shortly
before his death, as a sign of a lasting loyalty and even friendship over more
than thirty years, in spite of minor lapses and misunderstandings. But more
meaningful is the tone of many of these pieces. Here the perspective is of
course very different for teacher and student. Brentano' sinterest and liking for
the eager young Ph.D. in mathematics of 1882 was dear enough from his
invitation to St. Gilgen. But it also speaks from the form ofhis letters and cards.
 128

Thus, after first addressing Husserl as "Lieber Herr Dr." Brentano after 1893
uses almost consistently "Lieber Freund," without however changing over to
the intimate "Du." But more important are the expressions of almost paternal
concern, comfort, encouragement and advice that permeate many of these
pieces, especially during Husserl's continuing professional tribulations. Most
touching is Brentano's repeated attempt to reassure Husserl ofhis unchanged
sympathy and friendship even after Husserl had announced his emancipation
from his master's teachings. This did not diminish Brentano's interest in
finding out ab out and understanding his student' s new development and trying
to show hirn the errors ofhis ways. But even when this approach had failed, he
invited hirn to Florence for direct discussion - which proved to be another
failure. Yet the correspondence continued, without Brentano giving up hope
and certainly without personal estrangement.
Brentano's continued benevolence and sympathy with the Husserls has to
be seen also in the context of his reservations about Husserl's philosophical
competence and achievement. In this respect even his recommendation to Carl
Stumpf in 1886 had been non-committal. And, without having read any of
Husserl's major writings thoroughly, especially after his blindness, Brentano
found hirn in this correspondence and in conversation neither cIear nor
persuasive. In fact, he complained to Husserl directly abouthis vagueness. But
he did not question the seriousness of his efforts and the sincerity of his
affirmations ofloyalty, even in the touchy issue of"psychologism," where he
thought Husserl had included Brentano among its advocates. It was certainly
not easy for hirn to put up with one of his earlier students who failed to take
account of his own later teachings, especially of his "linguistic turn" and his
battle against "fictitious entities."
Is it possible to understand Brentano's ambivalent feelings of attraction to
and frustration with a personality as different as Husserl? They were probably
complex and variable. Husserl's initial enthusiasm and openness at the start
were certainly important factors. So may have been Husserl's conversion to
Protestant Christianity at the time. At one point Brentano's neglect to
acknowledge in time the dedication of Husserl's first book may have added a
certain sense of guilt and recognition for Husserl's magnanimity. His
professional struggles and personal misfortunes became additional reasons for
special sympathy. In any case Brentano's friendship for Husserl was more
than a form and went far beyond their diminishing philosophical ties.
Husserl in his letters almost never went so far as to address his former
teacher as "friend" (exception: 1905); in general he continued using the
title "Professor" or, less formally, "Lehrer" (teacher). But he never failed to
precede these nouns by the adjectives "verehrt" (revered) or "hochverehrt"
(highly revered). This may seem to be to some extent a matter ofconvention.
Yet in Husserl's case it also was a genuine expression ofthe almost excessive
 129

veneration and gratitude which he kept feeling for the teacher who had once
awakened hirn to the cause of scientific philosophy. However, this pervading
attitude, which even Brentano acknowledged as genuine, conflicted with
Husserl's craving for intellectual independence. Brentano was to hirn not the
authority figure, as he was to his later students. Husserl could not resolve this
inner conflict, alternating between extravagant expressions of devotion and
abrupt declarations of independence and unspecified departures. And while at
times Husserl feIt hurt by Brentano's implication that he was overly concerned
about academic advancement and by his charge of vagueness, he did not let
this interfere with his personal loyalty and admiration.
Thus wh at the correspondence reveals about the personal relations between
Brentano and Husserl is by no me ans simple. It was inevitably a delicate
relationship. But underlying all the tensions was a sentiment ofmutual respect
which prevented a final break. This speaks perhaps most movingly from the
last decade of this correspondence. Husserl's gratitude for his start with
Brentano made hirn look up to hirn as a model, if not as his guide. And Brentano
saw in his erstwhile student a serious seeker, even though one who had gone
astray, and a lovable personality.

5. PHILOSOPHY IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

Only a few letters take up philosophical matters, aIthough most of them

contain interesting information about the philosophical activities of their
authors. But only on three occasions were specific philosophical issues raised
and pursued to some extent, the first at Husserl's initiative, the two others at
Brentano's. I shall introduce them in chronological order.

5.1. Euclidean Geometry

Toward the end ofhis letter ofDecember 29, 1892 Husserl, then a lecturer at
Halle, teIls Brentano that lately he had been occupied with problems of
philosophy of geometry, an occupation which makes good sense after Husserl
had published his first book on philosophy of arithmetic and nearly completed
its second volume in 1892, aIthough no other record of this occupation has
survived. "Some things which be fore seemed to me secure have now become
very dubious. F ormerly I believed that a continuum8 in which any two points
can be connected by one straight line is eo ipso characterized as plane
(Euclidean). This is probably not correct.... In short, the parallel axiom is at
fault ifehlt)." Husserl also announces that his view about "the Riemann-
HelmhoItz theories of space has changed," in which, in spite of defects, he
finds a valuable core, although he is not satisfied with their psychological and
 130

logical analyses, which lack clarity. His own approach would be deeper and at
the same time smoother and easier, and he holds out the possibility of a sketch
if Brentano should be interested. In any case Husserl would be grateful to
Brentano for the communication of views divergent from his own.
For these Husserl did not have to wait long. Already on January 3, 1893
Brentano came to the defense of Husserl's earlier position, "which has also
been always my own .... It would be refuted only if one could conceive of a
two-dimensional continuum which met the specification and were still plane.
And certainly you have not been able to constnict such a one." Then he
proceeds to give a formal proof ofthe parallel axiom illustrated by a diagram. 9
Brentano also refused to accept HelmhoItz' theory of space, objecting chiefly
to his self-contradictory terminology. "How can one forgive hirn that he calls
space curved, but characterizes the line which follows the curvature straight
because it is the shortest between two points?" Strangely, no answer to this
letter has survived. 1O

5.2. Husserl's Two Logics

The longest exchange between Brentano and Husserl lasted from 1904 to
1906. The occasion was that on October 7, 1904, after an interruption offour
years, Brentano had sent Husserl a short letter when it had come to his
attention (" kam es mir zur Kenntnis") that in 1891 Husserl had dedicated his
Philosophie der Arithmetik vol. I to hirn ("Meinem Lehrer Franz Brentano in
inniger Dankbarkeit"). (So Brentano had forgotten that he had at least drafted
an acknowledgment.) This letter was received enthusiastically by Husserl,
who, in reaffirming his debt to his teacher, also pointed out that he had moved
beyond his philosophy. This remark led Brentano in his reply ofOctober 21 to
make the following request:

I would be very grateful to you if you would point out to me a single important point in which you
believe to have departed from me and gone beyond me. My eyes do not permit me much reading.
And you know how many a duty lies upon me for the completion of my own work.

More than two months later, in his 12 page letter of January 3, 1905, Husserl
tried to fulfil this request by offering a sequence ofthoughts (Gedankenreihe)
from his Logische Untersuchungen. "Of course it cannot be more than a
sketch (Andeutung) which might easily be exposed to misunderstanding."
What Husserl actually did on about seven handwritten pages in his small,
mostly Gothic script was to outline some basic ideas of the first shorter
volume, the Prolegomena to a Pure Logic, with its "struggle against
psychologism, i.e., an overestimate ofpsychology, very damaging in my view,
as the alleged fundamental discipline for all philosophy and consequently also
 131

for the new logic and critique of knowledge." (This formulation must have
struck Brentano as a major challenge to his entire philosophical program. )
However, the second volume ofthis work with its Investigations Concerning
Phenomenology and Theory 0/Knowledge is mentioned only at the very end
as unfinished business. Here Husserl speaks of "very comprehensive and
painstaking (mühselige) phenomenological investigations" to complement the
logical studies, a hint which could hardly have meant much to Brentano. The
sketch of the Prolegomena beg ins with the distinction between two types of
logic: (1) logic as a technology (Kunst/ehre) and (2) logic as a theoretical
discipline, i.e., formal or pure logic. According to Husserl the former is partly
based on psychology. But its more essential basis is pure logic. Pure logic itself,
which also includes pure mathematics, is entirely independent ofpsychology.
The neglect of this distinction is blamed for psychologistic empiricism,
relativism and anthropologism (here not characterized and refuted). Husserl
also mentions his rejection of a logic based on the principle of economy of
thought advocated by such positivists as Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius.
Then he tries to convey an idea ofthe main content ofhis new theoreticallogic,
in which he had been aided especially by Bolzano. Thus the theme of pure
logic, not that of phenomenology, appeared to Husserl as his main departure
from Brentano and the best way to introduce hirn to his innovations.
Brentano's answer, written six days later on January 9, does not directly
reject Husserl's exposition and even expresses some agreements, for instance
with his inclusion of pure mathematics into logic. What he criticizes alm ost
exclusively is Husserl's distinction between two types of logic. To Brentano
even pure logic with its law of contradiction is based on certain psychological
impossibilities of thinking. But he denies that these inabilities are of such a kind
as to endanger the validity and truth oflogic and mathematics. In particular he
sees no need for accepting the theory of truths-in-themselves advocated by
Bolzano. Finally a long postscript dealing with mathematics argues that it
includes psychic operations and takes account of economy of thought.
Husserl's reply ofMarch 27 first expresses happy surprise at the remaining
common ground regarding pure mathematics as logic and the rejection of
"anthropologism." But then the nine-page letter defends and develops the idea
of a logic which eliminates everything "empirical and psychological" and
confines itself to apriori propositions and theories essentially connected, a
logic wh~ch would include modern arithmetized mathematics. It contains
nothing based on "matters of fact" and deals only with non-empirical
essences. Here, Husserl makes a special point of stating that his Prolegomena
were not directed against Brentano and his students. Finally he dissociates
hirns elf from Bolzano's "propositions-in-themselves" as metaphysical enti-
ties. Bolzano had ignored "epistemology and phenomenology ofknowledge,"
 132

which Husserl considered essential. This is, incidentally, the only place in this
correspondence where Husserl uses the noun "phenomenology," but again
without further explanation.
Brentano' sanswer to this most developed plea for pure logic is contained in
a dictation, ofwhich only an incomplete text of April 30 has survived; I doubt
that it was ever completed and sent off to Husserl, since he never acknow-
ledged it. Here Brentano does not deny the possibility of collecting all truths
evident from concepts (Wahrheiten, soweit sie aus Begriffen einleuchten). But
he doubts that they can be put together in a special science. He also states that a
merely theoretical science without practical significance would be pointless,
especially if not matched by empirical facts. Even the greatest mathematicians
like Franz Klein did not treat mathematics as an end in itself.
Brentano's next letter to Husserl of August 1, 1906, which was certainly
received, is dated more than a year later. Beginning with congratulations on
Husserl's promotion to a full chair in Göttingen, Brentano continued:

Unfortunately, after the somewhat vague communications of your letters rather than a sharply
formulated proposition in which you would have expressed a substantial (wesentliche) innovation,
I could not form an opinion of how much and what great things can be expected from your lively
efforts.

Then he states that he has no doubt that "immediate experiences" can be

obtained only in the domain of the psychic phenomena, in fact of one single
psychic being. "Today as little as ever do I believe in the apriori fictions which
Kant has bestowed on philosophy. Nevertheless you will know that I differ
from the empiricists who want to found the law of contradiction on simple
enumeration." This meant obviously the final rejection of Husserl's apriori
pure logic, much in the spirit of Brentano's new "reisrn."
Husserl's acknowledgment ofBrentano's congratulations of August 22 also
contains the following sentences:

I regret that you found my written communications about some scientific points vague which I
believed I shoulc1 stress. I had made a great effort to be precise.

Then he announces his plan for a little text "in which I want to outline with the
greatest clarity and precision possible to me the methodological ideas for a
non-psychological, though not antipsychological critique ofknowledge and the
will. To be sure, I believe that the solution of the questions of epistemological
origin is neither in the area of natural science nor of psychological ex-
perience. The 'immediate experiences' and other acts of knowledge which
function in epistemological research are, to be sure, objectively speaking my
acts, mine, i.e., ofthis psychic individual. But my existence, the existence of
this individual and the existence of my acts as acts of areal psychic individual
 133

remain necessarily in abeyance. They are epistemologically as problematic as

the existence ofthe physical individuals and their physical states. In both cases
the meaning of' existence' is equally questionable and can only be c1eared up
by epistemological research."
My impression is that here, in taking up Brentano's ideas about "immediate
experiences" and trying to reassure him that he too believes in individual
experience as the ultimate foundation of all knowledge, Husserl also wanted to
introduce him to his phenomenological interpretation of it, without using the
label. For Husserl's immediate experience, while individual, leaves its
existence as well as existence in general in suspense until it can be explored
"epistemologically". This sounds very much like the phenomenological
epoche, which Husserl was developing over these years. In other words,
Husserl now tried to suggest that Brentano's psychology was very c10se to his
own new pure phenomenology. But he certainly did not make this explicit
enough, especially not for Brentano. Anyway, Husserl did not suggest further
correspondence on this point Instead he expressed the hope for further
c1arification during another personal visit to Brentano' s summer home in
Schönbühl.
To this suggestion Brentano, in a letter of August 27, responded with a
definite invitation to Florence for the following spring. But he also stated:

What you touch upon by way ofscientific questions points undoubtedly to substantial differences
.... But I am not completely clear either about your general standpoint or about any ofyour
specific theses. And this was the meaning of the complaint in my letter. My eyes are weakened. A
few years ago I had to undergo an operation which, in the view ofthe physicians, has protected me
permanently against complete blindness; but at first it has damaged my vision even more. F or this
reason the inspection of your extensive work has become more difficult for me. I have to
economize. This is why I asked for the mention of a particularly precise thesis. I had hoped to
obtain from it a more general estimate. As the saying goes, one can know the lion from his claw (ex
ungue teonem).

At this point I would like to pause in my account for a first appraisal ofthis
most sustained philosophical exchange between Brentano and Husserl. At
first sight its outcome may appear as an unmitigated failure for both
correspondents: Brentano, whose desire for an understanding of Husserl's
innovations had started the exchange, broke it off after the first round,
apparently not sending offhis draft for a reply to Husserl' s second letter, which
in retrospect he called too vague; Husserl, who feIt he could not do any better in
writing merely expressing the hope for another direct talk to discuss the issues
face to face.
But does the dissatisfaction of the correspondents prove that nothing was
accomplished? Even without final agreement, the positions of the partners
stand out more sharply than before, and each of them may have developed his
own position not only to his own satisfaction but for the benefit oflater outside
 134

readers. To some extent this seems to me the case in this part of the
correspondence. Husserl's letter of January 3, 1905 contains an unusually
succinct restatement of his Prolegomena, his second of March 27 contrasts
sharply pure" apriori" logic with empirical science. Brentano, in conceding
the elose connection between mathematics and logic, stressed their practical
aspects and introduced his "reisrn" with its rejection of apriori "fictions."
But such belated consolations cannot undo the disappointment of the
participants. To understand it one might resort to a rather simple, all too
simple, explanation: Brentano's lack of directknowledge ofHusserl's writings.
In the beginning, i.e., after the appearance of Husserl's first book, the
Philosophy 0/ Arithmetic, dedicated to Brentano, he only took superficial
notice of it, prevented by the various diversions and dislocations ofhis life after
abandoning his teaching in Vienna. And when he rediscovered the book in
1904, it was too late for hirn to read it after his unsuccessful cataract surgery in
1903, as shown also by the fact that the pages ofthe dedication copy, now in
the possession of Roderick Chisholm, have remained uncut. So Brentano's
knowledge of Husserl's writings remained almost completely indirect and
confined at best to tiresome sampling. Hence his request to Husserl to supply
hirn with a shortcut to one ofhis basic new ideas. Could Brentano at least read
Husserl's letters easily? Even this does not seem to me obvious, considering
not only the length ofHusserl' s most important letters butthe fact that his small
script may not have been easy to decipher for Brentano's remaining vision.
But while not irrelevant, as Brentano's own explanation ofhis request in his
letter of August 1906 and the end of the exchange suggests, this was hardly the
whole story. First, one might question Husserl's strategy in his attempt to fulfil
Brentano's request. Why did he not submit one or more brieftheses, perhaps in
the manner of Brentano' s famous habilitation theses, instead of substituting a
brief summary of his Prolegomena, which, without fuller explanation, could
hardly tell Brentano where Husserl had departed and gone beyond hirn?
However, this substitution could have been explained. For it was true that, in
contrast to the Philosophy 0/Arithmetic, in which Husserl had put Brentano' s
psychological analyses to an only partially successful test, the Logical
Investigations meant a new departure .. But the abridged tale of the
Prolegomena with its loose ends leading to the second volume in which
Husserl had made such impressive and transforming use of Brentano's
conception of intentionality, could hardly capture and retain Brentano's
interest and win his understanding. So he was completely absorbed by
Husserl's distinction ofthe two types oflogic. In defending in his second letter
even more in detail his distinction between pure logic and logic as a
psychology-based art, Husserl also seems to have been little aware of the
change in Brentano' s position, which just around this time had led hirn to his
"reism" and the abandonment of all "fictitious entities" in a way that made all
references to apriori essences for Brentano particularly objectionable.
 135

There seems to be little point in speculating whether and how Brentano, in

responding to Husserl's first letter, could have conducted a more pointed
interrogation about his vaguenesses in view of the fact that he apparently had
no access to the Prolegomena, although Husserl had sent hirn a copy with a
handwritten dedication in 1900. In any case, Brentano, though explicitly
acquitted by Husserl of "psychologism," was very weH aware that his own
"empirical psychology" as the new foundation of all philosophy was not
immune against Husserl's anti-empiricism. Had Husserl given Brentano a
clearer idea of his own phenomenological "empiricism" as the ultimate
foundation of pure logic, this could at least have narrowed the gap.
But such explanations far the undeniable failure of this most sustained
philosophical exchange between the two friends cannot undo it. Ultimately the
conditions for a written dialog between the two philosophers were unfavor-
able from the start. Their personalities, their style ofthinking and writing were
too different.
Anyway, this was not the end of their personal contacts and even of their
philosophical dialog. The next phase was Husserl's visit to Florence in March
1907, where the two Husserls were the house-guests of the Brentanos for
several days. Apparently the reunion was cordial and enjoyable personally.
But, as far as it involved philosophical conversations, little, if anything, was
achieved. In his Recollections of 1918 Husserl intimates that the discussion
consisted largely in a sequence of monologues. In Brentano's overwhelming
presence he had "feIt again like a timid beginner.... I rather listened than
spoke myself." But at one point Brentano had wanted to listen and "had me
explain to hirn the meaning of the phenomenological way of research and my
former struggle against psychologism, without interrupting me with objec-
tions." But "no agreement was reached.'", All the same, this seems to have
been the first occasion for Husserl to give Brentano at his own request an
explicit account of his new phenomenology.
Brentano's retrospective view in a letter to Hugo Bergmann of March 27,
1907, probably written soon afterwards, suggests even more of a philosophical
failure, though not an unmitigated one. Social and scenic attractions had
"prevented an exhaustive discussion. Nevertheless I was exposed to some
grotesque statements. In view of the wish Husserl seems to have of taking
account of a critical word, a more detailed discussion could perhaps make hirn
abandon them. Time may remedy thiS.,,'2

5.3. "Positive and Negative Presentations" in Brentano's Psychology

One more topic of philosophical discussion between Brentano and Husserl is

indicated in Brentano' s letter of J anuary 16, 1908, when he wrote: "As to
myself the encounter with you in Florence has been stimulating. I even
attempted to carry through the hypothesis of positive and negative presenting
 136

(Vorstellen) and piled up everything that could help to recommend it. But
eventually I had to content mys elf with conceding merely negative ideas, as
does Leibniz in his Nouveaux Essais."
I suspect that this issue is related to Brentano's classification of psychic
phenomena, according to which presentations (in contrast to judgments and
phenomena oflove and hate), do not have positive and negative qualities. Such
qualities would certainly be dimensions of all of Husserl' s acts in the sense of
modes of intentional consciousness.
Did Husserl actually raise this question during the Florence conversations?
Again there is no ans wer in the subsequent correspondence. But at least
Brentano gave Husserl belated credit for having stimulated his own thought in
this matter. Also, his letter proves that in his mind Florence did not mean the
end of philosophical communication.

6. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BRENTANO-HUSSERL CORRESPONDENCE

.What, then, is the significance of this correspondence as a source of

information about Brentano, Husserl and their personal and philosophical
relations? It contains some pieces of biographical material, and also throws
light on the personal relations and attitudes of the two philosophers. Its
philosophical yield is clearly more problematic, especially as far as a
clarification of issues is concerned. But even the dissents and misunderstand-
ings of important philosophers are not without interest.
W ould this justify pu blication ofthe correspondence in its entirety or at least
of selected letters, in the way Oskar Kraus did it already in the case of two of
the Brentano pieces? The main case for it would have to be made on the basis
of the historical importance of the two correspondents and their historical
relationship. Certainly this correspondence should be made generally
accessible.
How important are philosophers' correspondences? The answer will clearly
vary and depend on the role of letters in the development of their thoughts and
in using them for a delayed dialog with others. There are extreme cases of
philosophers such as Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg known almost
exclusively through his correspondence with Wilhelm Dilthey. At the other
end are philosophers like Whitehead, who seems to have used letters only for
practical matters. In between are the cases ofDescartes, Kant and especially
Leibniz, where at least some of their most important ideas are to be found in
their letters. Where does Brentano fit into this spectrum? Quite a few of his
letters have been included in the edition ofhis posthumous wark. One might at
least suspect that, as his blindness made sustained work on books practically
impossible for hirn and he had to dictate his ideas in sm aller instalments, even
 137

correspondence assumed an increased importance in his production. This is

also largely the case for the later Husserl in his increasing isolation. In fact the
volume of his personal correspondence grew toward the end of his life. Thus I
feel no right to make general recommendations. I can only express the hope
that the examination of and chronological cataloging of this material be not
postponed too long. Certainly no serious personal and philosophical bio-
graphy will be possible before this has been done. But I have one specific plea:
that at least both sides ofthe Brentano-Husserl correspondence dealing with
Husserl's conception of pure logic be released soon as a corrective for the
present unbalance of Oskar Kraus' publication in Wahrheit und Evidenz of
merely two of Brentano's replies to Husserl without presenting Husserl's
preceding letters or at least reporting about them. I believe this would not only
be a matter of historical fairness, but that it would add to our picture of
Brentano's position. In making this plea, I do not want to deny the legitimacy
and appropriateness of selecting merely some ofBrentano'sletters insofar as
they add to an understanding ofhis conception of"The True and the Evident"
in the posthumous volume with this title. 13

7. BRENTANO AS A HUSSERL TEACHER. HUSSERL AS A

BRENTANO-STUDENT

In conclusion I would like to raise one more historical question. Roderick

Chisholm, in accepting my topic even before I had time to investigate it, wrote
me in the end: "I am viewing Husserl as being a student ofBrentano rather than
viewing Brentano as a teacher ofHusserl." This was clearly meant as a partial
paradox. How can being someone's student vary in total or partial indepen-
dence ofhis being the teacher? One solution may be that the words "student"
and "teacher" are he re used in different senses. Thus, in Gilbert Ryle's terms,
"studying" would almost always be a task ortry-it word: one may study badly,
but even so one is studying, regardless of one's success or achievement. In this
sense Husserl was certainly a student ofBrentano's. But the case ofthe word
"teaching" is not equally clear. In one sense even teaching is a try-it or task
word. E yen the most unsuccessful teacher" teaches" as long as he is surrounded
by students, although he does not "teach them anything." But what does
teaching mean in the last phrase? I submit that there is a second sense of the
word "teaching" in which it means more than having students but conveying
something to them. In this sense "teaching" is an achievement or get-it word.
Teaching means to put something across, not merely to try to do so. In the case
of Brentano the question is: How much did he succeed in not only te ac hing
Husserl but in teaching hirn something, i.e., the substance ofhis philosophy? I
suspect this is wh at Chisholm means to question.
 138

However, I believe that more is at stake than the semantics of the words
"student" and "teacher." What is involved is the relation between their
referents. And in the case of a social relation between a concrete student and
his teacher this presupposes a study ofthe ways in which each appears to the
other, i.e., a phenomenology of the student and teacher perspectives.
Considering the variety of these actual and possible relations and their
common essential structures, this would be an enormous task. The specific
example of Brentano and Husserl may at least show how this relationship
would have to be approached phenomenologically, i.e., from the side of the
different perspectives of the two main partners. How did they see each other?
What did they even know ab out one another? For example, was Brentano
aware that Husserl had put his conception of the intentional relationship
between the psychic acts and their contents into the center of his phenomeno-
logy of consciousness? On the other hand, how far was H usserl aware of the
fact that Brentano had changed his basic philosophy when in 1904 he rejected
"irrealia" as fictitious entities? In other words, neither one saw the other as he
appeared to himself at the time. This discrepancy was probably also one ofthe
deeper roots of their misunderstandings. But there is certainly no chance of
establishing the amount of agreement or discrepancy between their images of
one another.
Nevertheless, allowing for this lasting uncertainty, we can try to determine
the student-teacher relation between them, as seen in their differing
perspectives.
1. How did Brentano see Husserl as his student? In the beginning he was
apparently impressed by this serious full-fledged mathematician converted to
philosophy, and saw in him an eager student of his own oral and written
teachings. As such he recommended him to Carl Stumpf at Husserl's request,
without committing himself as to his achievements. And he never seems to
have doubted Husserl's continued interest in his own philosophy as far as he
knew about it. But apparently he doubted increasingly Husserl's clarity and
competence as an independent philosopher.
But how far did Brentano consider himself as Husserl's teacher? There is of
course the impersonal sense of teaching in which the lecturer to a large class,
especially on the Continent, broadcasts his teachings to an anonymous and
mostly passive audience with which he has no personal contact. But
Brentano's relationship with Husserl soon developed into much more. Thus he
took a personal interest in this student, climaxing first in the invitation to join
him in his summer vacation in 1886. And then began the correspondence, in
which Brentano also responded to Husserl's questions and finally made an
effort to find out about and criticize his self-declared innovations. All this
shows that Brentano, even though he did not supervise Husserl's written work,
especially not another doctoral dissertation, showed more than the usual
 139

teacher's concern in one ofhis less faithful students. To this extent I maintain
that not only did Brentano consider Husserl a serious student of his teachings
but also tried to te ach hirn informally by personal advice and discussion. He
may have been unsuccessful as a teacher in the achievement-sense, but he was
certainly much involved in the task-sense of teaching.
11. In what sense did Husserl see hirnself as Brentano's student? In what sense
was and remained Brentano to hirn his teacher? Husserl hirnself in his
Recollections puts it most succinctly in the following sentences:

At the start his enthusiastic student, I never ceased to worship hirn highly as a teacher. But it was
not granted to me to remain a member of his sChOOJ. 14

This formulation implies that at some point Husserl ceased to consider hirnself
Brentano's student, especially in the sense of being a school member,
presumably after the publication ofthe Philosophy 0/Arithmetic. But he still
looked up to Brentano as his teacher, though hardly in the sense that he still
accepted his teachings. Now Brentano was to hirn the stimulator of his own
independent thought and the source of some of the persistent impulses in his
thought, but no longer his final authority. Was he then in his own eyes more of a
student of Brentano than Brentano was his teacher?
Certainly Husserl continued to study Brentano's writings even in his later
years, though now in a much more critical spirit than at his enthusiastic start.
Correspondingly, Brentano was no longer his teacher any more than any other
thinker. Now the only real "teacher" was the direct evidence ofthe Sachen,
the phenomena in his new sense. Thus one might say that to Husserl the
teacher Brentano became less and less important compared with his own
study, and "worship" took the pi ace of acceptance. Philosophically, his bond
with Brentano was now that of a historical debt.
Thus Brentano's and Husserl's perspectives oftheir teacher-student relat-
ionship did not match. F or Brentano Husserl was the eager but wayward
student whom he could not teach. F or Husserl Brentano was the indispensable
teacher who had supplied hirn with the tools for his own emancipation toward a
more radical start. The human problems of this emancipation are reflected in
their correspondence. But it also shows movingly how some of their personal
friendship survived their philosophical separation.

NOTES

I Prom Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978), 95-116.

2 I am greatly indebted to Kar! Schuhmann for his support and criticism.
3 See Chapter 8 "Brentano's Husser! Image", pp. 119-124.
4 Oskar Kraus in his contribution toPhilosophie in Selbstdarstellungen, ed. Raymund Schmidt,
voJ. 7 (1929) p. 10.
 140

5 Anhang to OskarKraus, Franz Brentano (1919) p. 163; English translation in ThePhilosophy

oj Franz Brentano, ed. Linda L. McAlister. London: Duckworth 1976, p. 53.
(, Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano, loc. eil., p. 163; trans!. p. 53.
7 Karl Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, p. 499.
8The term "continuum" in this context is significant. Husserl's first datable manuseript page
(K I 50/47) ofJune 28, 1886 hence written soon after the beginning ofhis three months summer
vacation with the Brentanos at St. Gilgen and additional pages deal with "homogene und
inhomogene Continua" (Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, pp. 16, 17). Brentano's life-Iong
interest in the problem ofthe continuum based on Aristotle's Physics is documented particularly
in his Philusophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum, herausgegeben und
eingeleitet von Stephan Körner und R. M. Chisholm. Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1976. According
to Husserl's "Recollections ofBrentano" (Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentanu, p. 159; tr. p. 49; also
Husserl-Chronik p. 14) his lectures on "Elementary Logic" in the winter semester 1884/85
dealt in particular detail with the descriptive psychology ofthe continua (p. 157). It seems more
than likely that this was also one of the topics of Brentano's and Husserl's St. Gilgen
conversations, all the more since, according to Brentano's letter of introduction to Carl Stumpf
ofOctober 16, 1886, he knew that Husserl was working on a habilitation thesis dealing with the
problem of continuity, which may very weIl have been inspired by Brentano.
9 I shall not enter into this proof, which apparently does not escape circularity. Brentano offered
an even briefer proof of the parallel axiom in the Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum,
Zeit und Kontinuum, loc. cit., p. 48.
10 Such a response could have been planned in connection with the missing, but acknowledged
birth announcement ofHusserl's son Gerhart on December 22, 1893. In fact, Karl Schuhmann
found the draft oftwo long paragraphs, addressed to Brentano, written probably in the beginning
of 1894 (K I 7 nIl b) in which Husserl raises a new "metaphysical question" concerned with a
"simple and certain" proof of the law of causation based on ccrtain properties of continua,
especially in movements.
II Recollection oj Franz Brentano, loc. eil., p. 165, trans!. p. 54.
12 "Briefe Franz Brentanos an Hugo Bergmann," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
6 (1946),93.
13 Oskar Kraus, the first editor of the Brentano papers, in his singular devotion to his teacher was
understandibly perturbed by the fact that his older, less faithful students Carl Stumpf, Alexius
Meinong and Edmund Husserl increasingly overshadowed their former master without taking
account of his later teachings. In passionately advocating Brentano's new views he became at
times so preoccupied with this historical injustice that his picture of their relationships,
especially that with Husserl, became unbalanced. I would like to counterbalance some ofthis
slant, especially in view of the fact that new English translations of Kraus's editions and
introductions may otherwise perpetuate his perspectivc. His bias and its dangers bewme
apparent especially in the following places: (1) In Kraus' edition of the Psychologie vom
empirischen Standpunkt of 1924 his editorial preface (fortunately moved to the Appendix in
the English translation) focusses immediatelyon the relation of this Psychologie to Husserl's
Phänomenologie and Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie. Also five editorial footnotes to
Brentano's text deal exclusively with Husserl's supposed misunderstandings and errors. What
should be realized is that Brentano hirnself refers to Husserl only once in an appendix to the
second edition ofthe second Book on Psychologismus, expressing his agreement with Husserl's
position. (2) In Wahrheit und Evidenz the second subsection deals with Psychologismus und
Phänomenologismus. "Phänomenologismus" is not defined, but seems to be identified by
Kraus with anti-psychologism. His Anhang, entitled "On the General Validity ofTruth and the
Basic Mistakes in a So-called Phenomenology," consists exclusively 01' Brentano's answer to
Husserl's letter of January 3, 1906 and the draft of his answer to Husserl's subsequent letter.
But, as shown above, neither Husserl's nor Brentano's letters on this occasion dealt with
phenomenology. (3) Kraus entered into the original of Brentano's lectures on "Deskriptive
Psychologie oder beschreibende Phänomenologie" of 1888/89 (a course Husserl could not
have attended) on the first page in ink the words "irreführend. Husserl dadurch verwirrt."
14 Recollections ojFranz Brentano, loc. eil., p. 164; trans!. p. 53. Apparently the emancipation
 141
was gradual, beginning with Husserl's triallecture before the Philosophy Faculty at Halle on
July 6, 1887 (Husserl-Chronik, p. 20). Actually Kar! Schuhmann sees signs of a Brentano-
crisis in Husser! between 1893 and 1895.

APPENDIX

SURVEY OF THE EXTANT CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN

FRANZ BRENTANO AND EDMUND HUSSERL

DATE AUTHOR PAGES MAIN TOPICS

1. 12/29/86 Husserl 8 Thanks for the Husser! portrait by the Brentanos. Carl
letter Stumpfs help in Halle. Work on fundamental concepts of
arithmetie and higher analysis. Use of notes from
Brentano's leetures on Old and New Logie.
2. 4/27/91 Brentano Thanks for Abhandlung. (Folgerungskalkül): "newand
posteard strange."
3. ?/?/91 Brentano 2 Thanksfordedieation of Erstlings werk (Philos. derArith-
metik ) only imperfeetly sampled. Progress of own psy-
ehognostie investigations. (Probably never mailed.)
4. 10/21/91 Husserl pe. Thanks for leeture (Ursprung sittl. Erk.) Visit to Stumpf
in Munich.
5. 1/21/92 Brentano 2 Sending photo. Mention ofleeture on "Das Schlechte als
Gegenstand literarischer Darstellung."
6. 12/29/92 Husserl 5 Thanks for Brentano's eongratulation on birth of daughter
Elisabeth Franzisk& Carola (missing). About work on
philosophie-geometrie problems.
7. 3/1/93 Brentano 8 Answer to geometrie questions. Plans for publieation of
"Psyehognosie" and "Dasein Gottes."
8. 12/26/93 Brentano 2 Congratulations on birth of son Gerhart. On his leetures
about "Zeitbewegende Fragen" aiming at replaeing posi-
tivism, monism, and dualism by something "infinitely
eontrasting. "
9. ?/?/93 Brentano 2 Thanking for sympathy in letter (missing) with his effort
on Austrian marital law, referring to five artieles in the
Neue Freie Presse.
9a. ?/?/94 Husser! draft Two paragraphs on a proof of the law of eausation
10. 1/7/96 Brentano pe. From Rome. Study of marital law in Austria.
lOa. 1/?/98 Husserl draft Congratulations on Brentano's 60th birthday (A I 13/7b).
11. 2/5/98 Brentano 2 Thanks. Mentions visit by an unnamed student of Anton
Marty.
12. 7/28/00 Brentano pe. Thanks for "scientifie gift" (probably Logische Unter-
suchungen, Prolegomena).
13. 10/7/04 Brentano 4 Rediscovery of the dedication of Philosophie der Arith-
metik. Wishes for transfer from Halle to Göttingen.
 142

14. 10/11 Husserl 4 Joy at Brentano's letter. Own work problems.

& 15/04
15. 10/21/04 Brentano 8 Reassuring Husserl ab out his departures [rom Brentano's
position. Invitation to identify a single important point.
16.* 1/3/05 Husserl 12 Defending his suspeeted aeademie ambitions. Aeeount of
a "series of thoughts" from the Prolegomena.
17. 1/9/05 Brentano 25 Doubts ab out Husserl's distinetion between pure logie
and logie as art. On Evidenz. PS: More on interpretation
of mathematies.
18.* 3/27/05 Husserl 5 Mention of his use of Brentano's Vienna lectures on
deseriptive psyehology of phantasy and time in his own
leetures. Defense of the independenee of pure logic and
mathematies from logic as an art.
19. 3/30/05 Brentano 3 (apparently not eompleted and sent off). On possibility of
(diet) of a pure logie and its uselessncss.
20. 8/1/06 Brentano Congratulations on Husserl's promotion. Complaint
ab out "somewhat vague eommunieations" instead of a
"sharply formulated proposition." "Psyehologism" and
empirieism.
21. 8/22/06 Husserl 4 Thanks for eongratulation. Regrets about the impression
of" vagueness." Plan of a new precise text. Wish to visit
Brentano at Schönbühl.
22. 7/6/06 Brentano 4 Invitation to Florence. About doubtlcss essential dif-
ferenees betwecn their positions.
23. 4/5/07 Husserl 3 Thanks far Flarenee hospitality. Memaries oflistening to
Brentano' s philosophie al ideas.
24. 5/6/07 Husserl 4 Thanks for Brentano's Ul1lersuchungen zur Sinnespsy-
chologie. Preoccupation with own course "Hauptstücke
zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis."
25. 5/9/07 Brentano 6 Invitation to eritieize his new findings, in which the
psychognostie interest is prevalent.
26. 1/13/08 Husserl 3 Congratulations on Brentano's 70th birthday. His
impulses transmitted. No completion of his own work in
sight.
27. 1/16/08 Brentano 5 Thanks. An example ofthe stimulation through Husserl's
Florenee visit: the hypothesis of negative as weil as
positive presentations.
2R. 11/17/11 Brentano 3 Announeement of gift of three small pie ces on Aristotle.
(dict) On "psychologism," as newly introduccd by Husserl but
not applied to Brentano.
29. 11/22/11 Husserl 6 Surprise at the revision of a main seetion of the Psrcho-
logie, in addition to the Aristotle work. Regrets that no
complete seeond edition. Attempt to clarify the meaning
of "psyehologism" as not applying to Brentano.
30. 12/31/13 Husserl pc. New Year's wishes.

* These two letters by Husserl have been published in Grazer Philosophische Studien 6 (1978),
pp. 1-12.
 143

31. 4/6/16 Brentano I Condolenee on the death in action of Husserl's younger

(diet) son Wolfgang.
32. 4/30/16 Brentano I Answer to Husserl's letter about Wolfgang's death
(diet) (missing). Wishes for the move from Göttingen to
Freiburg.
 10. HUSSERL IN ENGLAND: FACTS AND LESSONS 1

The following essay, which accompanied the publication ofthe syllabus forthe
four lectures on "Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological Philo-
sophy" which Edmund Husserl delivered at the University of London in
June 1922,2 is chiefly an attempt to salvage an episode in the history of
phenomenology which is rapidly becoming inaccessible. Some of its most
important parts are in all probability past recovery. The special reason for this
attempt is the present revival of interest in phenomenology in England. This
remarkable, if not amazing, comeback makes it doubly important to leam
some of the facts about its largely-forgotten past record.
As far as I can tell, the living memory of Husserl's London lectures has
practically disappeared. In my inquiries since about 1954 I have been unable
to find anyone with the exception ofMrs. G. E. Moore who remembered as
much as the fact ofthese lectures. There is no record ofthem in the files ofthe
University of London except for an entry in the "University of Landon
Gazette" for 7th June, 1922, announcing the forthcoming four lectures;3 the
only references to them I have come across in the literature occurs in C. K.
Ogden and I. A. Richards' The Meaning of Meaning of 1923,4 and in a
"Survey of Recent Philosophical and Theological Literature" by George
Dawes Hicks. 5 The only other printed evidence is Husserl' s own mention ofthe
lectures in his Preface of 1930 to the English edition of W. Boyce Gibson's
translation of his "Ideen" (p. 22) where he referred to them as a less mature
form of the Paris lectures of 1929, later expanded into the "Cartesian
Meditations ."
Is there any explanation for this ne ar-total eclipse? Does ithold any lessons?
Before it makes sense to attempt an answer to these questions, the extant facts
of the case have to be assembled.

1. THE INVITATION FOR THE LONDON LECTURES

Neither in the Husserl Archives in Lauvain nor in those ofthe University of

Landon is there any re cord of the invitation to these lectures, apparently the
first extended to a German philosopher after W orld War 1. The only terminus
 145

ad quem I can find is in Husserl's letter to Roman Ingarden ofDecember 24th, [1]
1921:

Denken Sie, die Londoner Universität hat mich officiell eingeladen, dort 4 Vorlesungen zu
halten. Ich habe angenommen, wohl Ende April oder Ende Juni. Ich werde bei Prof Hicks in
Cambridge logieren. [Imagine, the University ofLondon has invited me officially to deliver there
four lectures. I have accepted, probably for end of April or end of lune. I shall stay with Professor
Hicks in Cambridge.]6

This passage and other circumstantial evidence makes it highly probable

that it was George Dawes Hicks (1862-1944), professor of philosophy at the
Unversity of London, though residing in Cambridge, who was the moving
spirit behind this invitation. There are no indications that any other British
philosophers familiar with Husserl's work had anything to do with it. Thus
Bernard Bosanquet,7 who at the time had retired to the vicinity ofLondon, and
died in 1923, was already failing in health. 8 As far as Bertrand Russen is
concerned, much as he was interested in Husserl, at least up to the time ofhis
letter to Husserl in 1920,9 there is little likelihood that, in his detachment from
British universities at the time, he would have taken much interest in such an
invitation.
What could have been the basis for Hicks' interest and initiative? Again, no
personal documents about Hicks' relations with Husserl priorto the invitation
have survived. In fact an ofHicks' papers, which after his death in 1941 were .
turned over to the University ofLondon, were apparently lost during the war. 10
And the Husserl Archives in Louvain contain nothing but a copy of a three-
page typed letter by Husserl to Hicks of March 15th, 1930, referring to a
preceding letter by Hicks, presumably on the occasion ofHusserl's seventieth
birthday in 1929. However, Husserl' s library proves Hicks' interest in Husserl
in the form of gift copies of several of Hicks' books, one of them being his
Leipzig dissertation of 1887 in German, and a whole carton with twelve
reprints of articles, some ofthem dating back to 1910, at least one ofthem with
signs of Husserl's reading in the form of notations.
In the light of Hicks' own philosophy, and in particular his self-confessed
"critical realism," one may wen wonder about the reasons for his special
interest in Husser!. From his book publications it would appear that his
primary interest, as that of so many of other British philosophers of the early
century, beginning with Bertrand Russell, was in Alexius Meinong. Husserl is
quoted only incidentally and only with references to his Logische Unter-
suchungen. This is true even ofHicks' book on Berkeley of 1932, ofwhich he
sent a copy to Husser!. He certainly could not have been very sympathetic with
Husserl's increasing turn toward idealism, which had not yet been explicit in
his pre-war publications.
However, there is some revealing evidence about Hicks' initial appraisal of
 146

Husserl in his unique semi-annual "Surveys of Recent Philosophical and

Theological Literature," which appeared in the "Hibbert Journal" from 1910
until his death in 1941. Here he mentioned Husserl for the first time in 1911
(X, 476)as a contributorto the first volume ofthe new journal "Logos" forhis
"very able and exhaustive treatment of 'Philosophie als strenge Wissen-
schaft'." In 1913 (XII, 198ff.), the survey begins with a five-page
review ofthe first volume ofHusserl's "Jahrbuch," preceded by the sentence:
"Beyond question the most fruitful contributions to philosophical research in
recent years have come from Alexius Meinong, in Graz, and Edmund Husserl,
in Goettingen." Husserl's initial contribution, the "Ideen," is called "extre-
mely elaborate and significant" and "a masterly piece of analysis."
Under these circumstances the most plausible explanation for the invitation
would seem to be the following: Since the days of his Hibbert scholarship to
and doctorate from the University of Leipzig, Hicks was keenly interested in
German philosophy. He also seems to have had a unique command of the
German language, as evidenced not only by his dissertation but by his German
contribution on English philosophy to the 1928 edition of Ueberweg's
Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. V.1t is therefore not surprising that as soon as
possible after the war he took the initiative in restoring academic relations with
German philosophy by inviting its outstanding representative. His first choice
might have been Meinong. But after his death in 1917 Husserl was the obvious
candidate. And the University ofLondon seemed to be particularly suited to
take the lead in issuing such an invitation, which, according to Boyce Gibson's
diary (May 20, 1929) was sent by the Vice-Chancellor of the University.
From various correspondence with Paul N atorp, Hermann Weyl, Dietrich
Mahnke, Max Scheler and Darkow (Husserl-Chronik, pp. 258-259) it is now
known that Husserl worked intensivelyon the preparation of these lectures
from at least February until May. Thus he prepared a complete text for four
lectures which was to be "ready for printing" to be translated by an American
friend, perhaps Winthrop Bell (letter to Mahnke of March 26, 1922; mss
F 11 3/lOa; F 11 7/70b; M 11 3b/20). He also prepared a complete syllabus,
which, however, especially in its later parts, does not always contain full
sentences but merely key words and phrases.
There is no evidence that before his departure he briefed hirnself about the
philosophical situation in England. This is perhaps reflected in an episode [2]
about which I learned from Martin Heidegger in 1953. When seeing the
Husserls off at the Freiburg railway station, Heidegger, in answer to some
briefing Husserl had given hirn about his plans, asked somewhatjokingly" Und
wie, Herr Geheimrat, steht es mit der Geschichte?" (And what about history?)
Whereupon Husserl replied, looking hirn straight in the eye: "Die habe ich
vergessen." In reading the text ofthe London lectures one may indeed wonder
 147

about the scarcity ofhistorical references, especially in the Syllabus, and, most
significant, the omission of the names of any British philosophers. The best
explanation may well be that what mattered to Husserl on this occasion was
the first systematic development ofhis own new "system" (Husserl-Chronik,
p.257).

2. THE VISIT

The exact length ofthe Husserls' stay in England can no longer be ascertained. [3]
It lasted probably for two weeks from June 2 to June 15. Husserl's letter to
Dawes Hicks of 1930 makes it likely that the Husserls carried out the plan,
mentioned in the letter to Ingarden of December, 1921, of accepting Hicks'
hospitality at 9, Cranmer Road, Cambridge, about which he reminisced later
as folIows:

Mit niemand habe ich über die Grundgedanken dieser Schr(ft (Le., the Meditations
Cartesiennes which he had sent to Hieks) so anregende Gespräche gepflogen wie mit Ihnen - an
den unvergessenen schönen Abenden amfireplace in Ihrem Studierzimmer. [With no one did I
engage in such stimulating eonversations about the fundamental ideas of this text (i.e., the
Cartesian Meditations) as with you - on those unforgotten niee evenings in front ofthe fireplace
in your study.]

Probably Husserl conducted most of his philosophical conversations in

Cambridge with Hicks. F or in the letter, declining a second invitation by [4]
Hicks, he mentioned that "die vielen interessanten Persönlichkeiten, die ich
da (i.e., in Oxford) träfe, blieben mir bei meiner Unfähigkeit, mich englisch
zu verständigen doch unzugänglich." [The many interesting personalities
which I would meet there (i.e., in Oxford on the occasion ofthe International
Congress of Philosophy of 1930) would remain inaccessible to me in view of
my inability to communicatein English.] Apparently, Mrs. Husserl was much
more at home in English.
Presumably Husserl commuted by train from Cambridge to London for the [5]
four afternoon lectures on June 6th, 8th, 9th and 12th, accompanied by Hicks.
For the last lecture they were joined by G. E. Moore, who was to chair it.
According to Dorothy Moore (Mrs. G. E. Moore), "my husband had some
talk with him,"]] but, as she told me later in conversation, she did not know of
what nature. N or did she remember any pronounced re action of G. E. Moore to
the lectures. Similar conversations could have taken place with J ames Ward,
the chairman of the second lecture, who had once studied under Lotze in
Goettingen and might have been particularly sympathetic to Husser!' s idealistic
leanings as expressed in the lectures. 12 There is no reference to the third
 148

chairman, Wild on Carr, of King's College, London, chiefly known as an

expositor of Bergson and Croce, whose idealism may have provided some
points of contact.
About the actual delivery of the London lectures in University College,
Gower Street, there is again only indirect information. C. K. Ogden and [6]
I. A. Richards, or more specifically, Ogden, since Professor Richards told me
he was not present, mentions a "Iarge English audience." It is more than
unlikely that there was any subsequent discussion. However, on the last day
(June 12th), Husserl also took part in a session of the Aristotelian Society
under Dawes Hicks' chairmanship, and, according to the Proceedings of
1921-22, led offthe discussion of a paper by T. M. Greenwood on "Geometry
and Reality."13
Husserl's daughter, Mrs. Elli Rosenberg, remembers hearing from her
parents about an official reception at the German Embassy in London, one of [7]
them attended by Viscount Haldane, the statesman philosopher, a Germano-
phile in politics and folIower of Hegel in philosophy.
On the whole, Husserl seems to have been weil pleased with the visit itself
and especially with his election on 11 th December as a Corresponding
Member of the Aristotelian Society soon after his return to Freiburg. 14 [8]
Thus the immediate echo to the lectures, as it came back to Husserl, was
clearly positive and encouraging. Hicks hirnself referred to the lectures
specifically in his first Survey for 1922 in the Hibbert Journal, expressing the
hope for an early publication in English. 15 One might even suspect that the
request for an article on phenomenology for the 1929 edition of the
Encyclopaedia Britannica was an after-effect ofthe London lectures. But in
this case, too, no correspondence about the background ofthis ill-fated 16 piece
has survived, either at the Husserl Archives or in the files of the Encyclo-
paedia Britannica.
However, Husserl's letter to Hicks in 1930 clearly shows that Husserl was
aware of the fact that the immediate effect of the London lectures did not last.
In particular, he was clearly disappojnted, if not hurt, by the fact that the
preparatory committee for the International Congress ofPhilosophy in Oxford
in 1930, in contrast to the preceding congress at Harvard in 1926, had ignored
hirn, let alone invited hirn for a major lecture.
In fact, there had been negative reactions from the very start. The most
conspicuous one can be found in Ogden and Richards' The Meaning of
Meaning, which expressed presumably the views of British analytical
philosophy of the time. Here Husserl, introduced as a representative of the
"Terminological" method of attack on the problem of meaning, figures in
Appendix Das the first ofsix "Modems" illustrating "strange and conflicting
... languages which the most distinguished thinkers have thought fit to adopt in
their attempts to deal with Signs, Symbols, Thoughts and Things" (p. 269).
 149

The authors begin their documentation with a reference to the London

lectures, quoting five sentences from the "explanatory Syllabus in which he
(Husserl), or his official translator, endeavoured to indicate both his method [9]
and his vocabulary," after which they switch to an account ofHusserl's earlier
work by Joseph Geyser, whom they call a "disciple": in the case ofthis highly
critical neo-scholastic certainly a misleading label. There is actually no
connection between this account and the senten ces from the London lectures,
which, in themselves and quoted out of context, can hardly make sense to any
readers. In any case, the great influence of Ogden and Richards' work is likely
to have scared away the British public not only from the London lectures but
from Husserl' phenomenology in general.
But even more telling than this attempt at ridicule was probably the complete
oblivion of the London lectures. Thus in the discussions of phenomenology
which continued in the 1930s, for instance in the symposium of the
Aristotelian Society of 1932, the London lectures were never mentioned. N or
were they in the first review ofPhilosophy in Germany by Helen Knight in the
Journal 01 Philosophical Studies of 1927, where Husserl's Logische Unter-
suchungen and the Ideen provided the first exhibit of German philosophy
since the beginning of the century.
How far did the lectures meet Hicks' own expectations beyond the fact that
he called them "remarkable" in his Survey? Again, there is no explicit
information, especially since none of his letters to Husserl have been
preserved. Husserl had sent Hicks copies of his Formale und Transzend-
entale Logik and of the French Meditations Cartesiennes, with personal
dedications, which can still be found in the Library of the University of
London, to which Hicks bequeathed all his books. But Hicks' own works after
the London lectures, of which he sent Husserl at least the one on Berkeley,
mention Husserl only incidentally in connection with the familiar topics of
universals and of intentionality. But there seems to be no further reference to
the London lectures. Brentano and Meinong continue to be his major
continental authorities.
One must, of course, realise that Hicks' own philosophical development
took in a sense exactly the opposite course from Husserl's. In fact he entitled
his contribution to Muirhead's Contemporary British Philosophy (vol. H,
1925) "From IdeaIism to ReaIism." Coming from the position of German
Idealism, which he had studied not only in Oxford but during his five years in
Leipzig with Wundt and Heinze, devoted to Kantian philosophy, he had in
1917 reached the position of"Critical Realism,"17 which he tried to develop
further in such later books as Critical Realism (1937). Thus one can well
imagine that Husserl's progressive turn toward idealism in the London
lectures, even though the term does not occur in the Syllabus, as it did in the
actuallectures, did not appeal to Hicks particularly. Perhaps this was one of
 150

the topics discussed between the two in front of the fireplace at 9, Cranmer
Road. All the same, the personal relations between the two remained
unaffected by Hicks' possible philosophical disappointment as can be
gathered from Hicks' second invitation to Husserl in 1929, which he declined
in his letter of 1930.
But signs of Hicks' reservations toward, if not disenchantment with,
Husserl's later work can be culled from Hicks' later references to Husserl in his
Hibbert Surveys after 1922. Thus in his Survey of 1927, on the occasion of
commenting on Marvin Farber's Phenomenology as a Method and as a
Philosophical Discipline, Hicks voiced doubts about the possibility of
presenting Husserl's ideas in English. 18 In 1929 Hicks also reviewed briefly
Heidegger' s edition of" some extremely valuable lectures of Husserl deliver-
ed in Goettingen many years aga on the 'Phänomenologie des inneren
Zeitbewusstseins' ," published in the HusserlJahrbuch of 1928 (vol. 28, p. 165).
In 1931 he discussed W. R. Boyce Gibson's translation ofHusserl'sIdeen"
"indeed a formidable task": "It is to be hoped that, as a result ofhis labours, the
leading conceptions of a mode ofthought, now so influential in Germany, will
become better known than they are at present to students of philosophy in this
country. Ofthe value and interest ofthe mode ofthought in question there can
be no doubt (vol. 30, p. 167)." There is, however, no reference to either the
Formale und Transzendentale Logik of 1929 or theMeditations Cartr!siennes
(1931), both personal gifts from Husserl to Hicks, in the following surveys. But
in the Survey for 1936 (vol. 35, p. 451), when discussing the new international
Philosophia, Hicks singled out Husserl's first instalment of the Krisis as
"beyond question the most important contribution to the volume." The 1938
Survey (vol. 37, p. 156) begins with a two-page obituary ofHusserl, including
major events ofhis biography, but strangely omitting reference to the London
lectures.
What should also not go unmentioned is that in December, 1940, Hicks
"co-operated" actively in the founding ofthe International Phenomenological
Society and, at the time of his death, was a member of the Advisory
Committee,19 as the only British philosopher to have served in this capacity.
To this extent his interest in a wider phenomenology remained undiminished.
What then was Husserl's own retrospective appraisal of the London
lectures? According to RudolfBoehm2o he apparently thought for a short while
of publication, but then enlarged them into a "system of philosophy in the
sense of phenomenology and in the form of' meditations on first philosophy'."
But this was only the beginning of further transformations which led to the
Paris lectures and the Cartesian Meditations. Even in his letter of 1930 to
Hicks, Husserl stated that he had found it necessary to execute concretely
(konkrete Durchführung) the fundamental ideas ofthe London lectures, that
 151

he had deepened them in the Paris lectures, and that he was to enlarge them
further in the German edition of the Cartesian Meditations.
Perhaps even more revealing was what Husserl told Dorion Cairns in a
conversation on August 28th, 1931.21 Here, in response to one of Cairns'
remarks about the problem ofthe right beginning in phenomenology, Husserl
commented on the fact that this point had made hirn dubious about his own
attempts of giving introductions. A first attempt, destined not only to introduce
other people to phenomenology but also to provide hirnself with guide lines,
had been the series of lectures he had given in London. A later attempt had
been the Paris lectures, and a stilliater one the German text ofthe Cartesian
Meditations. So Husserl admitted that in London he was actually pursuing a
double purpose, namely to introduce phenomenology to his (British) audience
and at the same time to provide guidance for hirns elf. How far were the two
purposes compatible?
Also, on September 1st he confessed that "for years he had been under the
illusion that it would be a comparatively simple matter to write a 'popular'
introduction, but that in reality all his attempts throughout the last ten years,
attempts which had resulted in the London and Paris lectures and the French rIO]
Meditations, had been without satisfactory results."
Husserl's dissatisfaction with his own achievement is, of course, nothing
new. And in many ways it does hirn credit. But in this particular case it has
special significance. For it poses the question not only of an introduction to
phenomenology in general, but of the proper introduction for a British
audience.

3. THE SYLLABUS OF THE LONDON LECTURES IN

BRITISH PERSPECTIVE

What kind of a response might one expect from a typical English listener to
Husserl's cycle? In order to answer this question one must try to put oneself
into the place of a listener generally interested in German philosophy, but not
yet briefed ab out any of its recent developments.
From this perspective one might assurne that the title, with its promise of an
introduction to a new method and to a philosophy based on it, had aroused his
interest, together with the fact that the announcement listed such leading
British philosophers as James Ward and G. E. Moore from Cambridge
University, in addition to Wildon Carr and Dawes Hicks from the University
ofLondon as chairmen ofthe four lectures. Even the topics announced for each
one of the four lectures, beginning with "The Aims of Phenomenological
Philosophy" may weIl have sounded attractive. Also, for those not sufficiently
sure of their command of German there was the reassuring promise of an
 152

English syllabus as a listening guide. In fact, one may weIl suspect that for a
good part of the audience this syllabus provided the major basis for
understanding what went on during the German reading. It might, therefore,
be weIl to reflect first independently on how this syllabus must have struck the
typicallistener. In trying to reconstruct his reaction I am referring to the text of
the syllabus as published in the Journal 01 the British Society lor
Phenomenology.
The very first sentences must have startled the audience. What are "the
fundamental considerations" to which Husserl he re refers and from which the
phenomenological method is supposed to have arisen? And what is the point of
an unspecified "radical change of the attitude of natural experience and
knowledge" which it promises? This is supposed to "open out" a "peculiar
realm of given entities" of which Descartes' "ego cogito" is mentioned as
the prime example. Is this Cartesianism all over again? Then, this new
realm is identified with "transcendental phenomenological subjectivity as
immediate phenomenological self-experience," an experience which is not
supposed to be psychological experience. Why "transcendental," a term at
once associated in England with Kantian philosophy? Why"subjectivity"?
And what does "phenomenological" mean in this context? N ext, the reader is
told that this makes possible an apriori science extracted purely from concrete
phenomenological intuition. All these claims must have struck the unprepared
audience as extremely puzzling and certainly thus far as mere assertions.
The second paragraph can only have added to this puzzlement by speaking
of the transformation of the originally "egological" phenomenology into a
"transcendental sociological phenomenology" -incidentally a term which
Husserl never seems to have used elsewhere. Equally strange must have
sounded the next claim, namely that a systematically consistent development
of phenomenology would lead necessarily to an all-comprehensive logic
concerned with the correlates "knowing-act," "knowledge-significance," and
"knowledge-objectivity." Wh at weird conception of logic does this imply?
And what does it mean that this transcendental phenomenology realises the
idea of a "first philosophy"? Is this anything like Aristotle's metaphysics or
Descartes'? Supposedly it contains in itself "the systematically-arranged
totality of all possible apriori sciences, the principles of construction for the
apriori forms of all the sciences of realities for all possible worlds." Since when
is it to be taken for granted that all sciences have such apriori principles?
In a second section of the first lecture we are supposed to learn about the
Cartesian way to the ego cogito and the method of phenomenological
reduction. It begins with mere key phrases hinting at the connection of this
approach with the Platonic Tradition in philosophy. They are followed by such
claims as: "The necessary form of the philosophical beginning" is a
"meditation on the '1'," and "The ultimate basis of all philosophy must
 153

be ... a basis of 'apodietie experienee'." Whatever this apodietieity may

mean, ean this make sense for an English listener?
In the syllabus for the seeond leeture on "The Realm ofPhenomenologieal
Experienee" we may expeet to enter the realm of phenomenologieal philo-
sophy proper, as distinguished from its method. It should present us with the
field eovered by a phenomenologieal philosophy. Here the syllabus, even with
its fragmentary phrases interrupted by a few full sentenees, ean eonvey a little
more about eonerete topies for the new seienee clustered around the ego
eogito. Pereeption, reeolleetion, Einfühlung, ete., are listed among many
related topies. In a seeond seetion the question of the possibility of an
egological scienee is raised and the neeessity of"reduetion" to the" absolutely
given" postulated, resulting in transeendental phenomenology as the mother of
all apriori seienees. Here the reader may at least hope that the variety and
novelty of some of these topies will be elueidated by the aetual leeture.
The syllabus for the third leeture promises to throw light on what
transeendental phenomenology ean establish about the possibility of know-
ledge, scienee, and the objeetive world. It is this leeture whieh announees
Husserl's peeuliar brand ofidealism and his monadology. First diffieulties are
hinted at, but not explained. The phenomenology of a puzzling "primordial"
eonseiousness of time seems to ofTer a solution. The systematie divisions of
phenomenology are sketehed as sub-divisions of intentionality. All this
remains programmatic. It ean hardly mean mueh to the uninitiated. Questions
of traditional epistemology are mentioned, leading to the thesis that they are all
transeendental phenomenologieal questions. This thesis is followed imme-
diately by the startling claim that it is I who assign the signifieanee of opinion,
knowledge, proof, ete. This general phenomenology is to be developed into
eonstitutive phenomenologies of our knowledge of nature, ete. But what
"eonstitutive" means in this eontext does not beeome clear.
Next, we are told that subjeetivity or "monadologism" is the neeessary
eonsequenee ofthe phenomenologieal attitude, and that any objeetivity is what
it is only through "intentional meaning." Subjeetivity is even ealled the only
genuine "substanee." All other being is merely an "ideal pole." Clearly these
claims come closest to the actual assertion of an ego-eentred idealism. But
where is its demonstration? In the following sections we are told that this does
not mean solipsism, and that the alter ego is guaranteed by Einfühlung into the
other's body, which suddenly appears. This position is now ealled "phen-
omenologieal monadology."
The promise of the last leeture is that of a conerete logic and of a conerete
aim (in contrast to the "general aim" of the first lecture?) for a phenomenol-
ogieal philosophy. Supposedly this lecture talks only about logic, but, as it
turns out, it also deals with all the other scienees. After being told again about
the claims of transcendental phenomenology as absolutely justified, we learn
 154

that such disciplines as mathematics are naively dogmatic. These sciences are
said to be contained in phenomenology. This, we are told, is the realisation of
the original and genuine idea oflogic in the Platonic sense. "Historicallogic,"
too, is called dogmatic. The exploration of its necessary requirements is
claimed to lead to transcendental phenomenology.
Next, transcendental monadism is said to make "essence requirements" of
the individual monads and of the condition of compossible monads, now called
a "metaphysical inquiry." Here we have clearly arrived in the Leibnizian
world. The topics of teleology, the world, its history and the problem of God
are added. But the bases for these abrupt claims remain unexplained. From
he re we are referred back to the world of non-a priori facts. These in turn are
supposed to lead to the knowledge of possibilities as their presupposition. The
ideal goal for the future is an absolute theory of monads. And a single universal
science on a single universal foundation is to take the place of independent
sciences, which is none other than transcendental phenomenology.
How many English readers will have followed Husserl to this climax? There
is, of course, a good chance that those who could keep up with Husserl's
German delivery ofthe lectures were able to make better sense ofthe syllabus
than by simply reading it. And here one would like to know whether and how
far the actuallectures followed the text ofthe syllabus and ofhis typed text, how
far Husserl simplified or complicated it, how far he improvised, etc. The
following section will make at least a preliminary study of the relation between
the syllabus and the typed text of the lectures.

4. THE GERMAN TEXT OF THE LECTURES

Thus far the text of the lectures has not yet been published. My subsequent
observations are based on a first examination of the transcript of the text, as
typed out by Ludwig Landgrebe, Husserl's assistant at the time. On the basis of
this examination I have come to the definite conclusion that Husserl had
composed the syllabus before writing out the lectures and that he used it as an
outline in preparing them. Specific evidence for this conclusion can be found at
the very start (M II 3 b, p. 2 of the typescript), where Husserl refers his
listeners to the succinct theses of the syllabus in their hands as something
which he does not want to duplicate in the lecture, hence in a sense as the basic
aid for the understanding ofthe lecture itself. Later, in the third lecture (p. 64),
Husserl refers to a thesis to be found in the syllabus as something which he has
now demonstrated in the lecture, namely, that all questions ofphilosophy are
either transcendental-phenomenological or non-sensical.
In contrast to the syllabus in its often peremptory and sketchy style, the
lectures develop a continuous argument. Thus in the first two lectures Husserl
 155

makes a painstaking case for the new transcendental approach, supported by

suggestive examples which, as far as I can tell, do not occur in other texts. In
many regards these first two lectures strike me as much more persuasive than
the first Cartesian Meditations.
On the whole the text of the lectures follows the order of topics outlined in
the syllabus. But there are also significant departures. One interesting case at
the very beginning of the first lecture is that Husserl does not resume the
strange expression "transcendental sociological (transzendental-soziolo-
gische) phenomenology" (a phrase picked up in Ogden and Richards'
ridiculing quotations) for a phenomenology which is to take the place of a
merely "egological phenomenology," something which he later will call
"intersubjective phenomenology."
Also, while in the syllabus Husserl stopped short of calling his own position
"idealism," the lectures themselves contain the term "transcendental ideal-
ism" as a new alternative to "transcendental philosophy" (p. 74), in which
Husserl sees an unclear pre-stage (Vorstufe) ofits authentic form. Then, at the
beginning of the last lecture, Husserl designates this position in retrospect as
"phenomenological idealism" (p. 68), as contras ted to traditional transcen-
dental idealism. 22 In view ofthe fact pointed out by RudolfBoehm that Husserl
did not use this term in any of his publications prior to the Formale und
Transzendentale Logik of 1929, this may well have been the first occasion
when he launched this phrase in public. The fact that this happened in London
under the very chairmanship of G. E. Moore, whose "Refutation ofIdealism"
had marked the turn from British idealism to realism, represented astrange
historical irony, which made Husserl's message appear even more anachro-
nistic in twentieth century England.
Another significant feature of the lectures is Husserl' s outspoken plan of a
scientific metaphysics based on phenomenology, capable of revealing the
meaning of the world through a "phenomenological monadology."
Even the full text ofthe lectures does not contain a single reference to British
philosophers. Plato and Descartes are named as the chief inspirers ( of the new
approach). Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant are mentioned near the end. On one
occasion (p. 96) in referring to the recent revolution in mathematics and
physics, Husserl introduces the names ofEinstein, Brouwer and Weyl, but not
those of Russell and Whitehead, of whom H usserl was demonstrably aware.
Clearly these lectures did not make any attempt to play up to his British
audience. One cannot help wondering how these omissions affected his
listeners, and in particular the initiator of the lectures, G. Dawes Hicks.
How far in planning and developing this series did Husserl think of his
prospective listeners as a British audience? The answer seems clear enough.
Actually the omission of all references to British philosophy is not only
unfortunate but strange indeed considering the fact that Husserl was not only
 156

familiar with British philosophy from Locke to Mill, but recommended the
British empiricist philosophers as one of the best, if not the best, approach to
transcendental phenomenology,23 calling for instance Hume "almost the first
phenomenologist."24 Besides, his Britannica article uses the "phenomeno-
logical psychology" ofLocke and the British empiricists as stepping stones for
showing the need for transcendental phenomenology.
The truth, as it now emerges, seems to be that Husserl did not think ofthese
lectures as an introduction für a British public. In fact, as it turns out, he soon r11]
forgot about his audience completely and thought ofthe text chiefly as a guide
for hirnself, a .new way out of the mazes of his own thought.
Perhaps the clearest confirrnation of this interpretation can be found in a
postcard which Husserl wrote less than three months after the lectures on
September 1st, 1922 to one of his former Goettingen students, the later
Socialist Prussian Minister of Education, Adolf Grimme:

Dieses Jahr war eine Zeit grosser Besinnungen. Ich durchdachte noch ein letztes Mal die
principiellen Grundgedanken und Grundlinien der Phänomenologie. Demgemäss wählte ich
auch das Themo für meine Londoner Vorträge (Phänomenologische Methode und phänomeno-
logische Philosophie), die schön ausfielen, aber ziemlich schwierig waren. [This year was a time
of great meditations. For a last time I thought through the basic principles and guide lines of
phenomenology. Accordingly I chose the theme for my London conferences (Phenomenological
Method and Phenomenological Philosophy) which turned out beautifully, but were rather
difficult.]

"Demgemäss" (accordingly): so Husserl's own problems were the decisive r12]

factor in the choice of his approach to the London assignment; "Ziemlich
schwierig" (rather difficuIt): so he knew in retrospect how he had taxed his
audience, not only in the Syllabus, but in the lectures themselves. Let us
remember that Husserl presupposed on the part of his audience:
1. the recognition of the need of a radical change of the "natural attitude";
2. the acceptance ofDescartes' cogito, inc1uding the ego as a safe basis for all
philosophy;
3. a clear idea of what is meant by the term "transcendental," apart from
what it may mean to those familiar with Kantian philosophy;
4. the acceptance of "subjectivity," as a legitimate basis of philosophy;
5. some idea of what is meant by egology and wh at it could possibly include;
6. an understanding ofhis new idea oflogic, which is clearly no longerthe pure
logic of his Logische Untersuchungen;
7. the distinction between knowing-act, knowledge-significance and
knowledge-objectivity, a distinction never explored in the text.

5. SOME LESSONS

Considerable caution must be exercised in any attempt to draw lessons from

 157

the mitigated failure of Husserl's first presentation of phenomenology to the

English world: too little is known ab out the background of the lectures for
indulging in fault-finding and hindsight about "might-have-beens." But even
so, on the basis ofthe preceding analysis ofwhat one could now imagine as the
probable reaction ofthe original British audience curious to find out about and
sympathetic to renewed cultural and philosophical relations with German
philosophy, it makes some sense to reflect on the London episode, if only in the
interest of doing a better job in the situation oftoday, which is in many ways so
much more favourable-ultimately still as a result of Husserl's pioneering.
The first lesson from the London lectures one might be tempted to draw is
simply: How not to do it. But that would be grossly unfair. There was nothing
wrong in the idea ofthe lecture cycle. The title could hardly have been framed
better to arouse intelligent interest. Even the subtitles for the four lectures,
though not always clearly related to the general title, made fairly clear sense.
The real problems began with the syllabus, in itself a good idea, possibly
suggested by Hicks, since the whole device of a syllabus is practically
unknown on the Continent. What, then, can be learned from this first exposure
of a British public to phenomenology or rather phenomenology to British
reactions?
First of all, I want to make it plain that, after studying the main texts I would
consider It not only superfluous but fatuous and pedantic to speil out in detail
what Husserl could have done differently in his lectures. After all, it is now
perfectly clear that Husserl was not so much interested in helping a specifically
British audience, but in working out a general introduction into his evolving
"system" of transcendental phenomenology, something he had not yet tried
before on this scale. As far as the lectures are concerned, all I would like to
suggest is that some of the damage of the first attempt to import phenomeno-
logy into the English-speaking world could still be repaired by the belated
publication of some of the authentie texts in responsible translations. What I
have in mi nd is specificaIly:
1. the full text of the London lectures from the German original.
2. the complete text of the original Encyclopaedia Britannica article. 25
In the case of both texts, the printing of the German original and the
translation on facing pages may be particularly valuable and feasible. But what
should be even more helpful is the publication ofDavid Carr's translation of
Husserl's last work, incomplete though it remained, the Krisis der europäi-
schen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie by the North-
western University Press. In fact Husserl hirnself in his last conversation with [13]
Alfred Schutz "repeatedly designated this series of essays as the summary and
crowning achievement of his life work. "26 It is, therefore, not suprising that in
one of his last letters to Dorion Carins (August 20th, 1936) he put the
importance of an early translation of this work even ahead of that of Formal
 158

and Transcendental Logic and Cartesian Meditations, on which Cairns was

working at the time.
However, there is now new and definite reason for us who believe that
phenomenology, and Husserl's phenomenology in particular, have something
to offer to the Anglo-American world, to reflect on how to present them more
effectively and how to avoid some ofthe mistakes ofthe pioneer days. What I
intend to offer here is not a specific list of recommendations and recipes but
guidelines together with one basic query.
As to such guidelines all one really needs is to put oneself in the position of
readers and/or listeners having been exposed to nothing except the mystifying
and all but attractive label "phenomenology," and approaching it with the
suspicion that all there is behind it is another Germanic system a la Hege!.
Further, one ought to be aware that this public has been exposed to two
generations of analytic philosophy, and that the only Continental philosophers
that have made sense to it thus far are logical positivists and Ludwig
Wittgenstein. Besides, this new analytic way of doing philosophy with its
prolific production has been largely self-sufficient to the extent that there is no
longer any need for continental imports, and that such imports have often been
considered as a necessary nuisance, necessary only for the sake of cultural
politics rather than in order to learn anything from it. What this calls for is a
patient attempt to take ac count of this situation and to discover possible points
of contact and openings where a philosophy such as phenomenology can offer
real help. It also calls for areturn to the common roots of both traditions,
especially those which are still alive in the guest country. In the case of Anglo-
American philosophy this was and is definitely no longer German idealism.
Instead, the obvious common background is the tradition ofBritish empiricism
from Locke to Mill, in which Husserl had grown up philosophically. At times
an attempt to begin such introductory work at the level ofone's audience may
involve simplifications which, in the eyes ofpurists, may look like betrayals. I
believe that this risk, much as one has to be on one's guard against it, is worth
taking. F or I have every confidence that, once the ice of distrust is broken, the
pure doctrine, insofar as it is sound, will prevail on its own strength.
But in order to meet these requirements, an even more basic adjustment of
attitude is required: we have to realise more fully than before that we have no
right to ass urne that others owe us the extraordinary effort it takes to study a
philosophy like phenomenology in its present state on our own and Husserl's
terms. Among the flood of competing philosophies of our day, national and
international, it is by no means obvious that phenomenology has any special
claims. To assurne this means not only self-righteous arrogance but a type of
provincialism. We mayas weIl admit that, had it not been for the accident of
our birth and his tory, we probably would not have arrived at this philosophy, at
least not as early as we did. This calls for a special effort and for a genuine
 159

sensitivity for the difficulties and needs of one's audience. What I am pleading
for is the attitude of epistemic humility withaut relativism, which never
presupposes that one is right, and even less that one has a right to be right. If
one is right, and thinks one can demonstrate it, one has to earn this right by
patiently and empathically considering and understanding the case for
alternative positions, which through no merit of our own we happen not to
occupy.

NOTES

1From the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 1, No. 1, January 1970,
pp. 3-15.
2 Published in the same issue ofthis Journal, pp. 16-23.
3Letter by J. T. Richnell, B.A., F.L. A., Goldsmith Librarian ofthe University ofLondon Library
ofMay 30,1968.
4 C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (Tenth Edition), p. 269.
5 Hibbert Journal XXII (1922),182; see below note 14.
6 Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden. The Hague,Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, p.24.
1See my The Phenomenological Movement. The Hague, Nijhoff, 1969, p. 624.
8See Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet. Oxford 1924, p. 145.
9 Recent evidence from the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University in the form ofhis
letters to his brother Frank of June 3,10 and July 1, 1918 show that he had promised G. F.
Stout a review of the Logische Untersuchungen for Mind, which never materialized; this
explains Mind's apparent neglect of this work.
10 Letter of August 26, 1968, from the Librarian, Miss J. L. Randall-Cutler.
II Personal letter of April 5, 1968.
·12 For a late confirmation of this possibility see the Postscript.
13 Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society for 1921-22, p. 228.
14 Letter ofDecember 14, 1922: "In England fand ich wärmste Aufnahme, nachträglich hat mich
die Arist. Soc. z. Corresp. Mitglied gemacht." (In England I found a very warm reception;
subsequently the Aristotelian Society has made me a corresponding member). Edmund
Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, p. 25.
15" Last June Professor Edmund Husserl delivered, on the invitation ofthe University ofLondon,
at University College a remarkable series of lectures on 'Phänomenologische Methode und
Phänomenologische Philosophie'; and these lectures will, it is hoped, be published in English at
no distant date." (XXII, 182).
16 1 call it "iII-fated" in view ofthe fact that the fourth and last version of Husserl's German draft,
now published in Husserliana IX (pp. 277-301) was not only telescoped by the translator but
also paraphrased to such an extent that the original is hardly recognizable and at times distorted.
17See. e.g., W. G. DeBurgh, "George Dawes Hicks" in Proceedings ofthe British Academy
XVII (1941), p. 415.
18" It is far from being an easy task, for Husserl and his followers have introduced a whole galaxy of
new technical terms, for many ofwhich it is well-nigh hopeless to lookfor English equivalents."
(vol. 27, p. 166).
19 See the obituary by John Wild in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 11
(1942),266-7.
20 Husserliana VII, p. xxii. See also Briefe an Roman Ingarden, p. 26. .
21 See Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff,
1976, p. 27.
22 Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), p. 26.
23 See my "Perspektivenwandel" in Edmund HusserI1859-1959, p. 58.
 160

24 About Husserl's strong sympathy for and interest in English and American philosophy, see also
the diary note by Ralph Barton Perry quoted in Husserl-Chronik, p. 363.
25 Now available in the translation by Richard Palmer in JBSP 2 (1971), 77-90.
26 Collected Papers I (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 119.

POSTSCRIPT (AUGUST, 1969)

The possibility of conversations between Husserl and J ames Ward during

Husserl's Cambridge visit mentioned on p. 147 can now be considered an
established fact. Thanks to Karl Schuhmann of the Husserl Archives in
Louvain, to whom I am indebted for much additional information and help, I
learned about a diary by W. R. Boyce Gibson, kept during his Freiburg visit in
1928. A copy ofthis diary has just been turned over to the Archives by his son,
A. Boyce Gibson, from which he has kindly allowed me to quote. The most
important passage occurs in an entry of June 15th, 1928, based clearly on
Husserl's information "over the punchbowl"; presumably at a reception in his
horne:

Husserl had a fine time at Cambridge at Hicks' house, and had greatly enjoyed the evening chats by
the fire, leather arm-chairs and smoke. He had met Ward there and, by accident, Stout, who was
examining at Cambridge.

Another entry (October 19th) states:

Husserl met Broad and Stout at Cambridge. They were external examiners there. Couldn't get on
with Stout, as Stout couldn't speak German. Had to do everything through an interpreter. Took to [14]
Moore. Moore admired the Logische Untersuchungen, but couldn't swallow Ideen.

Even allowing for the indirectness of this information and the time lag
between 1922 and 1928, the names ofthe British philosophers in this account
can hardly be questioned.
As to J ames Ward, the H usserllibrary, now in Louvain, contains a copy of
his Naturalism and Agnosticism with Husserl's entry "Geschenk des
Verfassers, Cambridge, Juni, 1922." His Psychological Principles, likewise
there, show a pencil note "Geschenk von G. Dawes Hicks, Cambridge, 1922,
Juni."
The contact with Stout could have been particularly meaningful in view of
Stout's interest in Brentano, ofwhich Husserl was aware, but also in Meinong
and Husserl hirnself. Husserl owned Stout's Analytical Psychology of 1896,
but only in a second hand copy. His in ability to communicate with Stout could
have been intensified by Stout's being "terribly deaf"; see C. D. Broad inMind
41 (1945),285. This has just been confirmed by a long letterfor which I am
indebted to his son, A. K. Stout. He also supplied ample correspondential
 161

evidence for Stout's continued high regard for Husserl such as sending one of
his students to Husserl in 1933 for special tutoring.
In the case of C. D. Broad the Husserllibrary has two interesting items: his
Perception, physics and Reality (1914) with a personal dedication, and,
perhaps even more revealing, Part 11 (only) ofW. E. Johnson'sLogic (1922)
with the inscription "To Prof. Husserl with kind regards from C.D.B." Could it
be that this gift was related to the striking parallel between Johnson's
conception of"intutive induction" in Chapter VIII and Husserl' s Wesensschau
("ideating abstraction")? A letter card by C. D. Broad of April 27th, 1937,
also in the Husserl Archives, acknowledges the receipt of a reprint ofHusserl's
"Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften" (Philosophia I), "which I
have been reading with much interest."
The information about G. E. Moore's admiration for the Logische
Untersuchungen and rejection of the Ideen, is at best puzzling. Personally I
find it hard to reconcile it with the factthat, when in 1937 I had several contacts
with Moore while attending his Cambridge lectures and had introduced myself
as a student ofphenomenology, Moore never responded to this cue. Nor did
Broad. And, unfortunately, no one referred me to the stillliving crown witness
of the story of this article, G. Dawes Hicks.
 11. ON THE MISFORTUNES OF HUSSERL'S
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ARTICLE
"PHENOMENOLOGy"j

Husserl's article "Phenomenology" for the Enclyclopaedia Britannica (or

rather the semblance of it which survived the translation from his German
original into English) appeared in its Fourteenth Edition of 1929, to remain
there in subsequent editions until 1955, when it was replaced for some ten
years by a new article written by Professor J. N. Findlay.
About the original invitation to Husserl to contribute such an article very
little is known today. No correspondence has survived in the HusserlArchives
at Louvain or in those oftheBritannica. One might suspect some connection
with Husserl's four lectures at the University of London in 1922.2 But the
interval seems suspiciously long, especially since Husserl does not seem to
have started writing until 1927.
The preparation of Husserl's German text went through the probably
unmatched number of four surviving drafts. Their history has been traced in
some detail by the editor of three of them, Walter Bieme1, for volume IX
(1962) of Husserliana, where they appeared as supplementary texts to
Husserl's lectures on "Phenomenological Psychology" of 1925. 3 The reason
for this unusual amount of care was apparently not so much the challenge ofthe
assignment as the chance for ajoint production with Martin Heidegger, at that
time still in Marburg, a hope which, however, completely miscarried, as
Husserl hirnself put it in retrospect in a letter on J anuary 2, 1931, to Alexander
Pfänder. For nothing of Heidegger's draft for version II was absorbed in the
final text. 4 A detailed study of the four vers ions would be of considerable
interest in itself, but is irrelevant to this occasion, since only one such version
seems to have been used by the translator.
U ntil1962 only the English text, printed in the Britannica itself, was known,
which was republished in 1960 in an anthology by Roderick M. Chisholm,5
where, however, one revealing correction was made based on "information by
Professor H. L. Van Breda" in the last sentence: the replacement of
"phenomenalists" (as the addressees ofphenomenology) by "phenomenolo-
gists," although the word "phenomenalist" actually occurs in the original of
Christopher V. Salmon's "translation" (M III 1, III 1,2).6
Biemel in his preface characterized this translation as "very free"
 163

(Husserliana IX, p. XV). However, I must confess that when I personally

began to compare the four vers ions of the German original with the English
text (which had always puzzled me), I found myselfunable to decide which one
could have possibly served as the model for the eventual product. However, it
is more than likely that Salmon worked from the "fourth and last version"
(HusserUana IX, pp. 277-301); at any rate this is what Biemel assurnes
(p. 592). In fact Husserl's remaining original copy states on the outside ofthe
folder: "The bracketings are mere indications for abridgments proposed in
order to make it possible to keep within the prescribed narrow space of the
English article (Salmon)."
The spatial restriction, of which Husserl seems to have been insufficiently
aware in composing his German text, may well have been the major
explanation for what happened to the article. About the scope of this
restriction we now have at least indirect information through a Freiburg diary
kept by W. R. Boyce Gibson, known to readers ofHusserl chiefly through his
translation of the 1deas. F or on November 19, when H usserllent Boyce Gibson
the manuscript of the original, he also told hirn that Salmon had to reduce it
from 7,000 (German) to 4,000 (English) words, a telescoping which,
considering the ratio of words, in German and English, meant cutting the
article at least in half.? But even this next to impossible assignment is no full
explanation for what happened between the German original and the English
translation. To trace this in detail would be an interesting task, but not in the
present context. However, what must at least be mentioned is the fact that the
fifteen sub-headings of the German text dropped out completely in the
translation and that even Part 111, entitled "Transcendental Phenomenology
and Philosophy", disappeared, although Part 11 ("Transcendental Pheno-
menology") now shows a single sub-heading toward the end, entitled,
"Phenomenology, the Universal Science." In Part I ("Phenomenological
Psychology") there was also one new sub-heading halfway through, "Pheno-
menological-psychological and Eidetic Reductions." The text itself contains
formulations which cannot be tracked down to the original, among them such
amazing statements as that the goal of phenomenological psychology is
"comprehending the being of the soul." Perhaps the worst case is the füllowing
new sentence: "The 'I' and the 'we', which we apprehend, presuppose a hidden
'I' and 'we' to whom they are 'present'." This sentence is reprinted in italics in
Realism and. the Background oi Phenomenology and repeated in the
"Editor's Introduction" (p. 21) by Chis holm, who, however, was notrespon-
sible for this change. Besides, the "transcendental" is characterized as "that
most general, subjectivity, which makes the world and its 'souls' and confirms
them." There is no basis in the original for these interpretive substitutions.
A particularly dangerous departure from Husserl's original occurs in
Salmon' s rendering ofhis definition of phenomenology at the very beginning of
 164
\'

the ahicle, as revealed by a comparison of the new translation with the

following start in the Britannica version:

Phenomenology denotes a new, descriptive, philosophical method, which, since the concluding
years ofthe last century, has established (I) an apriori psychological discipline, able to provide
the only secure basis on which a strong empirical psychology can be built, and (2) a universal
philosophy, which can supply an organum for the methodical revision of all the sciences.

I merely want to point out that this "translation" reverses the order of
phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological psychology; that it
implies that the new apriori psychology has been already "established" since
before 1900; that the new method has also established a "universal philo-
sophy," i.e., presumably an aIl-comprehensive system, and not only "the tool
for a rigorously scientific philosophy"; that it supplies also a tool for the
"methodical revision of all the sciences," not only "makes possible a
methodical reform."
One may sympathize with the plight of the space-pressed would-be
translator, especially in the later sections of the text. But one might at least
have hoped for some indication that the author of this text was no longer
"E.Hu." as the signature under the article still implied, but rather that the
reader was confronted with free and at times wild paraphrases of Husserl's
own text. However, this may weIl have been impossible under the editorial
rules of the Britannica.
Nothing seems to be known about the aftermath ofthe publication. Whether
Husserl himself saw the published article, either in a complete set of the
Britannica or in a reprint, is no longer ascertainable. All that can now be found
in the Husserl Archives is the dedicated personal copy of Salmon's typescript
without reading marks.
There are, however, some strange pie ces ofnegative evidence for Husserl's
final response. When at the end of his "Author's Preface to the English
Edition" ofhisldeas Husserl suggested additional readings, he failed to list the
Encyclopaedia article, his only other published text in English, on which he
had spent so much time and labour foul" years before. Only W. R. Boyce
Gibson mentioned this article in his own "Translator' s Preface" in introducing
C. V. Salmon, its translator, as his helper. Nor am I familiar with any other
mention of this article in Husserl's later writings, letters (except the one to
Pfänder) and conversations, including those with Dorion Cairns. Clearly,
Husserl did not consider the final result of his effort a success.
Unfortunately he had ample reasons. But now, thanks to the labours of
Prof. Richard E. Palmer, Husserl can at last speak to the Anglo-American
readers he had in mind without the Procrustean restrictions of space-conscious
word counters and paraphrasers. At least in this piece, in contrast to the
London lectures, Husserl did refer to the British empiricists as pacemakers for
 165

transcendental phenomenology. It remains to be seen whether the unabridged

and faithfully rendered article can now speak to the condition ofhis readers. It
is certainly the concisest introduction to phenomenology he ever prepared and
the one on which he worked hardest. It is also the first piece he wrote for
publication in the Anglo-American world through its most respected reference
work.

NOTES

IFromJournal ofthe British Societyfor Phenomenology 2 (1971), 74-76.

2 See" Husserl in England: Facts and Lessons," chapter 10.
3 See Biemel's "Einleitung des Herausgebers" to this volume, p. XV; also "Husserl'sEncyc1o-
paedia Britannica Artikel und Heidegger's Anmerkungen dazu," Tüdschrift voor Philosophie
XII (1950) pp. 246-280, and my The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 279-281.
For other information see Roman Ingarden's report in Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman
Ingarden (Phaenomenologica 25), The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, p. 153ff. Ingarden,
whom Husserl asked to criticize the third or fourth version, seems to have made merely technical
suggestions.
4 There is now a translation of this version under the title "Martin Heidegger, The Idea of
Phenomenology" by John N. Deely and Joseph A. Novak in The New Scholasticism XLIV
(1970), 325-344.
5Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, Glencoe, 111., 1960, pp. 118-128.
6 Salmon, M.A. Oxon, Ph.D. Freiburg, died in 1960 and could no longer be contacted about this
and related matters. For other information about hirn and his relations to Husserl see my Notes
to W. R. Boyce Gibson, "From Husserl to Heidegger. Excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary by
W. R. Boyce Gibson," published in the Journal ofthe British Society for Phenomenology 2
(1971),58-83.
7"From Husserl to Heidegger," ibid., p. 71.
 12. PREFACE TO W. R. BOYCE GIBSON'S
FREIBURG DIARY 1928 1

To most students of phenomenology William Ralph Boyce Gibson

(1869-1935) will be known only as the translator ofEdmund Husserl's Ideen
zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I
(1913) under the title, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology
(1931). This pioneer feat, however imperfect, undertaken by an accomplished
British philosopher in his own right, has a remarkable history worth knowing
for its own sake. 2 Probably the decisive phase occurred in Freiburg in 1928,
where Boyce Gibson spent more than a semester of his sabbatical year from
the University ofMelbourne, Australia. This timing made hirn a witness ofthe
transition from Husserl to Heidegger as the occupants of the most important
phenomenological chair in German Philosophy. How unique a witness he was
can now be shown on the basis of his Freiburg diary.

ON THE TEXT

The diary has come to the fore only recently when his sons, Professors
A. Boyce Gibson (University ofMelbourne) and Quentin Gibson(Australian
National University) turned over extensive excerpts from this private docu-
ment in transcript to the Husserl Archives in Louvain. I am personally
indebted to them for sending me not only another copy but lending me
a photocopy of the original, after Professor H. L. Van Breda of the Husserl
Archives had asked me through Dr. Mays to undertake an edition far
the JBSP. Bur I am even more in their debt for the prompt help they gave
me during the actual work on this text: Professor A. Boyce Gibson chiefly
far background information about his father, which it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, for me to collect without his assistance, Professor
Quentin Gibson for his careful check on my transcription, which was based in
part on his own, and for his comments. Their permission for the publication,
approval of my selections and concrete suggestions make me feel that this
should almost be considered ajoint edition. I can only claim credit for most of
the explanatory notes not identified as theirs and for this introduction.
The original of this diary consists of handwritten notes jotted down on the
 167

pages of a desk diary for the year 1926 with one sm all page per day. The
pertinent entries begin on April 30 and end with the double sheet for
Oetober 16 and 17. However, the aetual dates ofthe entries soon emancipate
themselves from those given at the top of each page, ending with one for
November 16. While for many days there are no entries, reports for others
eover several pages.
The distinctive handwriting is on the whole clearly legible, even to outsiders.
Only in very few pi aces doubts remain about the reading of certain words.
Question marks within brackets follow such words in this edition. In most
cases, Mrs. Ruth Jackson, my indefatigable critical typist, found the solution.
Professor Quentin Gibson solved the remaining uncertainties.
One's first impression may weil be that these notes were meant only for the
writer himself as aids to his memory. This is certainly true for many items here
omitted. However, not only have these memos been prepared with unusual
care, but they also increasingly give me the impression that the writer meant
them to be intelligible to others, even where he did not write in eomplete
sentenees. The fact that they are intelligible and, what is more, intensely
interesting, justifies their publication.
According to Professor Quentin Gibson, his extract "comprised the major
part of the entries made in Freiburg. The only omissions are of incidental
personal items, some accounts of diseussions other than philosophical- in
particular those with Professor (Hermann) Kantorowicz (professor of juris-
prudence) and his friends and with Frau Husserl on English and on Russian
literature, and brief aceounts of discussions with Professor Jonas Cohn
(professor ofphilosophy and pedagogics) (information about recent German
philosophical writings)." I omitted also the section about a revisit to Jena at the
end of the summer semester, some general observations about German
universities at the time, including Husserl's comments on them. Not included
are also several second-hand stories by witnesses who are elearly uninformed
or gossiping. The criterion for inclusion in this seleetion was the interest each
entry has for a better understanding ofthe state ofphenomenology in Freiburg
in 1928.

ON THE DIARIST: THE BACKGROUND FOR THE DIARY

A fuller understanding of Boyce Gibson's Freiburg diary and his stake in

phenomenology requires some knowledge ofhis biography. A good deal ab out
it can be found in an obituary artiele by W. A. Merrylees, one ofhis colleagues
at the University of Melbourne. 3
The following items seem to be relevant for Boyce Gibson's comparatively
late, but very intense, interest in Husserl: After his Oxford graduation in
 168

mathematics he had discovered philosophy and began pursuing it on the

Continent, first in Jena, where, in 1893, he studied under RudolfEucken and
Otto Liebmann. His interest in Eucken's Personal Idealism led not only to
another visit to Jena in 1906, after he had completed his philosophical studies
in Glasgow and started teaching in various British universities, but to the
preparation ofthe first book on RudolfEucken (RudolfEucken's Philosophy
01 Life), who gave hirn active support in writing it. This does not mean that
Boyce Gibson was an uncritical admirer of Eucken. Some of his criticisms,
such as Eucken's defective treatment of psychology and his distrust of
intellectualism, may even explain why he kept looking for congenial philoso-
phies outside Eucken's Lebensanschauung. In the meantime he translated,
together with his wife Lucy, three ofEucken's works. His deep attachment to
Eucken is also attested by the fact that in 1928 he paid a special visit to Jena,
staying at the Eucken house, visiting Eucken's widow and his successors,
about which he jotted down some ten pages of" Reminiscences" in his Diary.
Also, Eucken is often remembered during the meetings with the Husserls.
Now it is weIl attested that Eucken had a high regard for Husserl at least as
earlyas 1911. The Husserl Archives still have some six letters which Eucken
wrote to Husserl in connection with his attempt to have hirn appointed as his
successor in Jena, an attempt which failed only for financial reasons. So it is
not unlikely that Boyce Gibson heard ab out Husserl from Eucken although, in
the absence of any remaining correspondence between the two, at least not in
the hands of the Gibson family, this cannot be established.
According to Merrylees' biography, Boyce Gibson's "interest in, but
dissatisfaction with, the Phenomenology of Husserl," to which he "devoted a
large part of the last fifteen years of his life," must have begun around 1920,
when he had been in Australia for eight years. There is no particular
explanation for this date. However, Professor A. Boyce Gibson, who does not
remember his father talking about Husserl up to 1920, when he left Australia,
thinks that he "followed German developments in philosophy c1osely ... and
kept scanning the German horizon as a matter of course." In that case
Husserl's rise could have escaped hirn as little as it did G. Dawes Hicks when
he invited Husserl to London and Cambridge in 1922. 4 lncidentally, as
Professor A. Boyce Gibson informs me, they knew each other very weil.
This interest found its first public expression in a paper "The Problem of
Real and Ideal in the Phenomenology of Husserl," first delivered before the
Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy in Melbourne in
1923. 5 It throws a good deal of light on Boyce Gibson' s initial concern and
stake in Husserl, his later visit to Freiburg, and his plan to translate the Ideen.
It also accounts for some ofthe questions Boyce Gibson raised and explored in
Freiburg and in particular in his conversations with Husser!.
The paper itself, after commending the phenomenological School, as
 169

represented by Husserl's Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische

Forschung, to British philosophers and scientists, focuses on one particular
problem, less characteristic for Husserl's position at the time when his new
idealism had not yet been stated explicitly than for Boyce Gibson' s concern in
Personal Idealism. What bothered hirn was that phenomenology as a science
of essences seemed to be indifferent to the real and to the ultimate reality studied
by metaphysics. Yet Gibson feIt that Husserl's pure consciousness or ego was,
in fact, a metaphysical entity. Pure consciousness in its absoluteness cannot be
studied exhaustively as an ideal essence alone, but only when we accept it as a
realm ofbasic, existential fact, to be unravelled by metaphysics, with as much
help from phenomenology as it can offer. This concern finds expression in the
Freiburg conversations of May 20, June 15, July 14, 24, and Gctober 27,
where Heidegger's new metaphysics enters.
Closely related to this concern is Boyce Gibson's initial Freiburg disap-
pointment at finding Husserl at the time so adamant in his insistence on the
need for rigorous science, expressed in his rejection of a philosophical Welt-
und Lebensanschauung in the style of Rudolf Eucken. This concern is
reflected in the conversations of May 20 and J une 15, where Gibson tried to
push Husserl toward a less rigid position.
The paper also tries to show the possibilities of phenomenology in the
direction of a theological union of ideal essence and reality in a theology of
consciousness, a suggestion taken up in the conversation of June 25.
Finally, the paper refers to Gibson's "point of greatest difficulty," Husserl's
criterion of Evidenz through intuition of essences: "My own view is that this
phenomenological criterion is flagrantly and inexplicably dogmatic." This
objection comes up in the conversations with Husserl and Levinas of June 25,
July 14, and November 15, without any satisfactory resolution to Boyce
Gibson, whose epistemological position was much more empirical.
All the way through his paper Boyce Gibson expressed the hope that the
missing volumes II and III of the Ideen would bring the resolution of some of
his difficulties and especially speIl out Husserl's new metaphysics. Thus
Husserl's announcement on July 24 that these volumes were no longer likely to
appear at all must have been a severe disappointment to Boyce Gibson. For
presumably the hope to find out more about these volumes was one of the
purposes of his Freiburg semester.
The final paragraph ofthe paper throws a first light on a secondary objective
of the visit; the possible translation of the entire work by Boyce Gibson
hirns elf, the experienced Eucken translator:

Meanwhile let us hope that someone will have the requisite courage, insight, leisure, and
familiarity with the niceties of philosophical speech to translate this great thinker into readable
English. It would be something really worth doing.
 170

Apparently it took Boyce Gibson five more years and two months of his
Freiburg stay before he feit ready to take on his own assignment by asking for
Husserl's permission.
About the actual visit to Freiburg not much more can now be established
than what transpires from the diary itself. However, Professor Quentin
Gibson, who accompanied his parents as a schoolboy, informs me that, in
accordance with the Australian academic calendar, his father had taken the
whole year 1928 as a sabbatical, spending two months in Italy, a few weeks in
England in the summer and one month in Paris in the autumn. The
approximately six months in Freiburg were the central part of the European
year.
As to later contacts between Boyce Gibson and Husserl, eight letters by
Husserl to Boyce Gibson between December 24,1928 and lune 3,1935 are
now in the Husserl-Archives (see Husserl-Chronik, p. 499). The first letter
reveals that Boyce Gibson had sent to Husserl on November 19 a highly
appreciative farewell message. It contains an acknowledgment of Boyce
Gibson's book on logic, and mentions a second letter from Boyce Gibson,
which had alarmed Husserl because of an apparent hitch in the translation
project, perhaps in connection with the problem of finding a publisher. But
apparently Boyce Gibson went ahead with the task anyhow. To be sure, in
December 1930 Husserl had not yet heard about the production ofthe book,
and therefore told Boyce Gibson that he would have to publish the Nachwort,
the German equivalent to his Preface to the translation, in the Jahrbuch for
1930. Anyway, the translation itself was published by Allen and Unwin
(London) and Macmillan (New York) in 1931.
What was Boyce Gibson's final response to phenomenology? The only
indication in print can be found in one of his last essays on "What is
Philosophy?" which he had read in Melboume, 1933,6 where he distinguished
two types of philosophy, "the philosophy which aims at a life-view or world
view, as the expression goes," and the other which "eschews poetry and has
affinities with science and indeed seeks to outdo science in rigour and
precision." Then he states:

The Phenomenology ofHusseri and his followers aims at this thoroughgoing rigour, and it regards
the speculative world-views and Iife-views as amateurish, subjective, unphilosophical. We need
not be so extreme. The logical and the phenomenological foundations of philosophy are certainly
most important, but so are its contacts with life and conduct, and the rigidity required by one may
be deadening to the other. Let us then accept this twofold conception of philosophy as inwardly
related to poetry and religion, on the one hand, and to science and mathematics on the other ...
(p.94).

So Boyce Gibson never abandoned Eucken for Husserl. Husserl only

complemented Eucken in Boyce Gibson's personal synthesis.
 171

ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIARY

Why is this personal diary jotted into an old calendarworth not only preserving
but publishing today? After all, it presents the perspective of German events by
a foreign observer unfamiliar with the scene at a time when there were many
better prepared observers around, some of them still alive.
To begin with, the very fact that the diary is written by an outside observer,
rather than by a local German participant, gives it a special value. That this
observer was British and by academic background and seniority an unusually
qualified one, makes it particularly relevant to an English readership. The only
comparable witness, the much younger Christopher Salmon, apparently left
no comparable record. The only similar one, the American Dorion Caims' s
record of his conversations with Husserl and Eugen Fink, st.ems with one
exception of 1926 from the years 1931 and 1932, when Husserl was already in
retirement. 7
But this diary is unique even from a more general standpoint. Thus far no
comparable first-hand account from German or other sources has come to the
surface, particularly not for the year 1928 with its fateful transition from
Husserl's to Heidegger's Freiburg. True, Boyce Gibson did not and could not
know the inside story with its tragic implications, especially for Husserl. This
does not diminish the value of an ac count of how the transition looked in the
perspective of an unbiased outside witness.
The primary interest of the diary attaches, of course, to Boyce Gibson's
perspective ofHusserl, in whom he was principally interested. The picture ofhis
personality as it appeared to Boyce Gibson at this time, both as a teacher and
as a human being is certainly a remarkable tribute. But even more important is
the information he elicited from Husserl, especially on matters of Anglo-
American interest, such as his views on David Hume and on his visit to
England.
But the diary also throws interesting light on the Heidegger of 1928, his first
impact upon retuming to Freiburg and his relations to Husserl at the time.
Clearly, notwithstanding some initial amusement about Heidegger's
appearance, Boyce Gibson was impressed by his teaching, although he knew
hirn then only by reputation, including Husserl's recommendations. While
Boyce Gibson was not yet aware ofthe developing rift soon after Heidegger's
arrival, one may wonder in retrospect whether Heidegger's reticence at the
farewell party ofNovember 15 had not struck hirn as peculiar. In connection
with Boyce Gibson's interest in Heidegger's metaphysicalleanings, it seems
worth pointing out that he could not yet have heard his inaugural lecture on
"What is Metaphysics?" delivered on July 24, 1929, which, incidentally, did
not contain a single word about Husserl's phenomenology.
 172

Users ofthe Boyce Gibson translation of Husserl's Ideen will be interested

to find out more about its history and particularly ab out its beginnings after
July 20. In particluar, the diary makes it possible to watch the translator
grappling with such problems as how to render technical Husserlian terms like
reell and real (not distinguished in the English version) and Konstituierung
(October 29 and November 12). Oskar Becker, rather than Husserl himself,
seems to have been Boyce Gibson' s German adviser in these matters.
Finally, the diary reveals the diarist himself as a philosophical personality
in his own right, open-minded, curious, generous, perceptive, not uncritical,
and not without a sense ofhumour. 8 Personally, I can testify that he grew on me
as a human being and as a thinker as I became more familiar not only with this
diary, but with other pieces of his philosophical writing. This, too, adds to the
value of the diary with its unique reflection of a crucial episode in western
philosophy. Its thorough exploration and understanding will not be possible for
some time to come. But Boyce Gibson's diary will be an indispensable piece of
evidence for a reconstruction of the full story.

NOTES

I From the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 2, No. 1, J anuary, 1971,
pp. 58-62.
2 See Karl Schuhmann, Reine Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 163-192, and Husserliana UI!2, pp. 627-651 ("Aus dem
Gibson-Konvolut").
3 "William Ralph Boyce Gibson." The Austratasian Journal ofPsychology and Philosophy
XIII (1935), 85-92.
4 See "Husserl in England," eh. 10 above.
5 Mind XXXIV (1925),pp. 311-327.
6 The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy XI (1933),88-98.
7 Conversations with Husserl and Fink, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
8 It should not go unmentioned that, as Professor Quentin Gibson writes me, his father was "hit
hard" when in the thirties the Euckenbund sent hirn Nazi propaganda materials, to the extent
that he severed all his earlier connections with it.
 13. HUSSERL'S APPROACH TO PHENOMENOLOGY FOR
AMERICANS: A LETTER AND ITS SEQUEU

HUSSERL'S EXCHANGE WITH E. PARL WELCH

The two letters here published were discovered around 1963 by Professor
Margaret Van de Pitte of the U niversity of Alberta at Edmonton, at that time a
graduate student at the University of Southern California, "in a cardboard
folder stacked on a shelf with a few others not related to phenomenology" at
the School of Philosophy of the University. I am greatly indebted to her for
having drawn my attention to this exchange between E. ParI Welch and
Edmund HusserI and for additional helpful inquiries. However, her efforts to
find out why the forgotten letters had landed and remained there were
unsuccessful. One can only surmise that Welch, who at the time was a Ph.D.
candidate at the School, had taken them there and never reclaimed them. The
two letters were preceded by a separate page with the title "Letter concerning
phenomenology by Edmund Husserl in Answer to a Communication by
E. ParI Welch."
Welch's letter, which he, through his son, Professor Cyril Welch ofMount
Alison University, has kindly permitted me to publish together with Husseri's
reply, is printed first, since it throws important light on the content and
arrangement of HusserI's reply.
But my main gratitude goes to Professor Gerhart HusserI who gave me
permission to publish his father's letter.

THE BACKGROUND FOR HUSSERL'S LETTER

Before presenting Welch's letter of inquiry and Husserl's response one might
do weil to explore the possible reasons for the interest in phenomenology at the
California School of Philosophy reflected in Welch's inquiry. One likely
hypothesis would be the affinity between the personaIistic philosophy of its
Director, Ralph T. Flewelling, and the variety of personalism which he seems
to have suspected in phenomenology, especially in the "ethical personalism"
ofMax Scheler. This is borne out by the topic ofW elch' s dissertation on "Max
Scheler's Philosophy of Religion. A Study in Phenomenology" and parti-
 174

cularly by its preface. This affinity is of course much less clear in the case of
Husserl. But Scheler's tributes to Husserl as the fountainhead ofphenomeno-
logy were all the more reason to explore Husserl's philosophy.
Welch, whose doctoral committee included Flewelling, had, according to
his letter, written to Husserl before in 1932, receiving" one or two" letters in
reply. But since none ofthis preceding correspondence seems to have survived,
one can only suspect that it was related to an earlier phase of Welch's thesis
project. Welch's new letter ofMay 9,1933 was clearly an attempt to secure
more specific aid for his Scheler dissertation, though he did not mention his
name, which at this time Husserl would certainly not have appreciated.
Why would Husserl write a nine-page letter to a young American Ph.D.
candidate, which, according to its date line kept him occupied for four days
(June 17-21)? Among the possible explanations the following seem to me
singly or cumulatively plausible:
1. Welch introduced himself as "on the staff of the School of Philosophy."
Actually he seems to have been merely a research fellow for 1933-1934,
whose name does not figure in the university catalogue. To an uninformed
European such an introduction could only mean that the writer was at least a
"Privatdozent" and as such a "colleague" ("Kollege" as Husserl addresses
him) far beyond the level of a Ph.D. candidate. From Welch's statement that he
was writing a book on the "philosophy of religion of the phenomenological
school," Husserl could hardly gather that this was merely the dissertation on
Max Scheler, which Welch was to submit in 1934.
2. Some ofthe questions raised in Welch's letter made Husserl particularly
aware ofthe problem ofthe proper introduction to the latest, most radical form
of his philosophy.
3. Husserl was particularly anxious to warn Americans about wrong
approaches through misleading introductions and his own earlier works, even
those translated, and to point out the only possible right way through his latest,
largely untranslated writings.
4. Husserl thought of this occasion as an opportunity to promote the
academic fortunes of his student-friend Dorion Cairns, in whom he saw the
future of American phenomenology, as the end ofthe letter and its postscript
amply show.

THE TEXT OF THE LETTERS

(a) Letter 01 Welch to Husserl

May 9, 1933
Los Angeles, Calif.
Dear Prof. Husserl:
You will probably have forgotten that you honored me with one or two letters
 175

in the year 1932, but you may pardon a student of philosophy profoundly inter-
ested in you and your work ifhe ventures to address you once again. I am now
on the faculty of the School of Philosophy he re at the University of Southern
California. Being a thorough-going convert to your movement, and writing a
book on the philosophy of religion of the phenomenological school, I find
myself in need of your aid on one or two important matters.
I am devoting an entire seetion to you and your thought in the way of
introducing the reader to the general standpoint ofPhenomenology. Because of
the extreme importance of your thought I am very anxious to present a
thorough and adequate description ofthe philosophy ofPhenomenology to the
English-reading public. That is the reason I am taking the liberty of enlisting
your assistance. There has been but one book devoted to your school, that of
Marvin Farber's "Phenomenology as a Method and as a Philosophical
Discipline." Although this little work is good, it is by no means adequate or
comprehensive. I myself am undertaking the task of supplying the need for a
more comprehensive work. Unquestionably Phenomenology has areal and
much-needed message for American and English philosophy. Therefore, any
help you may be willing to render me will conduce greatly to the enlightenment
of our philosophers.
First of all, do you conceive your system as organically connected with any
philosophie predecessors? Do you feel it to be absolutely new and unique, or
do you believe yourselfto have drawn material from some ofthe great men and
their movements, e.g., Plato, Plotinus, and Descartes? Ifnot, how would you
define your attitude towards these, and in particular towards Plato's view of
essences?
Secondly, how do you deal with the problem of error? I have read your
"LU" and the "Ideen," but do not seem to be able to discover just how you
would solve this problem. Can there be such a thing as error in the intuition of
essences, or in the selection ofthe essences to be intuited? If so, how are we to
know when we err? What standard is one to employ? Ifyou have dealt with this
problem somewhere, and I have missed it, could you give me the reference?
Thirdly, can you tell me under whom you studied? When do you feel you
emancipated yourself from the influence of your teachers?
I believe you will realize the importance of this book to English and
American thought. I want to deal with these questions in order to avoid undue
criticism ofyour system. I will print only what you give me permission to print,
and shall, of course, gratefully acknowledge your assistance in the Preface.
Believe me
Very respectfully and sincerely yours
E. Pari Welch
 176

(b) Letter 01 Husserl to Welch (German Original)

Freiburg, den 17/21. VI. 1933

Sehr geehrter Herr College!

(1) In der Unruhe dieser Zeit mit der Revolutionierung unseres gesamten
deutschen Volkes und seines Lebens konnte ich Ihren freundlichen Brief nicht
sogleich beantworten.
(2) Es freut mich natürlich sehr, dass meine philosophischen Bestrebungen,
die in einer stetigen inneren Entwicklung durch mehr als vier Jahrzehnte zu
einer prinzipiell neuartigen philosophischen Methode und damit zu einer völlig
neuartigen Philosophie selbst geführt haben, auch in Amerika ein tätiges
Interesse erregen. Indessen eben die Neuartigkeit gegenüber aller philoso-
phischen Tradition macht ihre ausserordentlich schwere Zugänglichkeit aus.
Es ist eine harte Zumutung für den in der Philosophiegeschichte Stehenden
und in ihren Traditionen Erzogenen, diese ganz und gar" einzuklammern" und
von ihren Denkweisen durchaus keinen Gebrauch zu machen; und damit auch
keinen Gebrauch zu machen von ihren nie radikal herausgestellten Voraus-
setzungen, den selbstverständlichsten Selbstverständlichkeiten der Welter-
fahrung und des auf sie zufÜckbezogenen logischen (wissenschaftlichen)
Denkens. Anderseits muss doch von der Tradition und der natürlichen vor-
wissenschaftlichen Erfahrung aus (in der jedermann vor der Phänomenologie
steht) ein Motivationsweg beschritten werden, der zu der revolutionären
"phänomenologischen Reduktion" emporleitet, und es gehört eine ungewöhn-
liche Konsequenz und Denkenergie dazu, festzubleiben, nicht wieder in die
traditionalen Denkweisen zurückzufallen, sich des Neuen wirklich zu bemäch-
tigen, ohne es durch solche allzu versucherischen Rückfälle zu verfälschen.
Dass jemand mein akademischer Schüler war oder unter dem Einfluss meiner
Schriften Philosoph geworden ist, besagt daher noch lange nicht, dass er zum
wirklichen Verständnis des inneren Sinnes meiner, der originellen Phäno-
menologie und ihrer Methode durchgedrungeI}. ist, und in die von mir
eröffneten neuen Problemhorizonte, denen die Zukunft gehört (wie ich völlig
sicher geworden bin), hineinforscht. Das gilt von fast allen Schülern der
Göttinger und der ersten Freiburger Zeit, auch von so berühmten Männern
wie Max Scheler und Heidegger, in deren Philosophien ich nur sehr geistvolle
Rückfälle in die alten philosophischen N aivitäten sehe. Auch meinen nahen
Freund Jean Hering-Strassburg muss ich hier nennen mit Beziehung auf das
Sie jedenfalls besonders interessierende Werk "Phenomenologie et philoso-
phie religieuse" (Strassburg 1925). Natürlich gilt das auch von Herrn Farber,
dessen philosophische Erziehung ich mir während seiner Freiburger Studienja
hauptsächlich angelegen sein liess. Es war aber nicht in meinem Sinn, dass er
 177

sich allzu früh an eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologie wagte. Dazu war er
noch lange nicht reif genug. Es dürfte aus dieser Situation sich ergeben, dass
Sie fehlgehen würden, wenn Sie sich auf irgend eine der literarischen Darstel-
lungen meiner Phänomenologie stützen. (auch nicht auf die neueste von
Levinas "La theorie de l'intuition dans la Phenomenologie de Husserl,"
F. Alkan, 1930, welcher meine Phänomenologie mit der Heideggerischen auf
eine Ebene bringt und damit ihres eigentlichen Sinnes beraubt). Es wird keine
andere Möglichkeit geben als die, meine eigenen, begreiflicher Weise sehr
schwierigen Schriften zu studieren. Hier sind nun für das Verständnis einer
Philosophie, die im fortgehenden Werden und selbstbesinnlichem Klären
entstand, am allerwichtigsten die der spätesten und reifsten Periode: die
gleichzeitig entstandenen Schriften "Formale und transzendentale Logik"
(1929, separat und im "Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische
Forschung" Bd. X), sowie die nur in französischer Übersetzung erschienenen
"Meditations Cartesiennes" (Armand Colin, Paris, 1931). Wichtig ist auch
das "Nachwort" zur englischen Übersetzung meiner "Ideen" (am Besten die
ein wenig erweiterte deutsche Veröffentlichung im" Jahrbuch ... " Bd. XI., die
auch separat zu haben ist.)2
(3) Nun wird Ihnen schon, was ich bisher schrieb, lieber Herr College, fatal
klingen, da Ihr Thema eine Einheit der phänomenologischen Bewegung, also
so etwas wie eine einheitliche Philosophie dieses Namens voraussetzt,
während ich das leugne, nachdem ich lange genug gewartet habe, dass meinen
früheren Schülern aufgrund meiner den "Logischen Untersuchungen" nach-
folgenden Schriften die Augen aufgehen würden über das, was als eine völlig
neuartige und völlig radikale Philosophie im Werden war und ist. So kann man
z.B. von der Religionsphilosophie Schelers (oder Stavenhagens, oder
J. Herings) sprechen, aber mit Phänomenologie in meinem Sinne hat sie nichts
zu tun. Denn diese eröffnet mit der phänomenologischen Reduktion eine
prinzipiell neuartige Erfahrung, die nicht Welterfahrung ist, und stellt uns
damit direkt auf den absoluten Boden, den der "transcendentalen Subjekti-
vität." Dafür blieb leider die "phänomenologische Bewegung" blind. Fast alle
Darstellungen und kritischen Äusserungen von diesen Seiten über die
Reduktion sind so sinnverkehrend, dass ich Sie nur warnen kann. Es liegt im
Radikalismus der phänomenologischen Reform, dass sie vom Urboden der
neuartigen "transcendentalen Erfahrung" aus und in Gestalt einer systemati-
schen Analytik der Seinssinn konstituierenden transcendentalen Intentio-
nalität aufzuzeigen unternimmt, wie und in welchen Stufen in dieser die Welt
ihren Sinn und ihre Seins geltung gewinnt. Die philosophischen Probleme
erschliessen sich mit ihrem echten Sinn als transcendental-phänomenolo-
gisehe in einer wesensmässigen systematischen Stufenfolge. Es zeigt sich
dabei, dass die religiös-ethischen Probleme solche der höchsten Stufe sind.
(Sie sind also als wissenschaftliche nicht so billig zu haben, wie es
 178

der im Grunde naive Ontologismus Schelers meinte.) Eben darum schwieg ich
mich in meinen Schriften über religionsphilosophische Probleme aus. Doch
sind in ihnen und den kommenden Publikationen schon die Wege vorgebahnt,
um zu ihnen hinzuarbeiten und die echten religions-philosophischen Probleme
zu formulieren.
(4) Zum Teil liegt die Antwort auf Ihre formulierten Fragen schon im
Vorstehenden. Ad 1. Meine Philosophie, bitte ich Sie, nicht ein" System" zu
nennen. Denn es ist gerade ihr Absehen, alle "Systeme für immer un-
möglich zu machen. Sie will strenge Wissenschaft sein, die in unendli-
chem Progress systematisch ihre Probleme, Methoden und Theorien
erarbeitet. Was meine Vorgänger anbelangt, so habe ich in einem gewissen
Sinne viele, ja alle grossen Philosophen der Geschichte, so fern alle, auch die
ich nie studierte, mindestens mittelbar auf meine Phänomenologie, wie auf
jede Philosophie der Gegenwart eingewirkt haben. Aber seitdem ich im
Zuendedenken des misslungenen, (weil nicht in rücksichtsloser Konsequenz
durchgeführten) Versuchs der Cartesianischen Meditationen, eine absolut
vorurteilslose Wissenschafts begründung zustande zu bringen, die phäno-
menologische Reduktion erreicht hatte, gab es für mich keine Philosophen,
von denen ich irgendwelche Ergebnisse hatte übernehmen können. Es gab
seitdem für mich nichts, und durfte auch nichts geben, das ich mir nicht auf
dem neuen Wege erarbeitet hätte. Und selbst Vorvermutungen müssten sich
auf ihm selbst als Arbeitshorizonte vorzeichnen und konnten nur dann als
Leitung für die wirklich erledigende Arbeit zugelassen werden.
(5)3 Meine ganze Entwicklung ist durch den Ausgang von F. Brentano
(meinem akademischen Lehrer) bestimmt- von dessen Psychologie, die zum
Grundcharakter des Psychischen die "Intentionalität" rechnete. Aber in der
Vertiefung in die Correlation zwischen den log. Idealitäten und ihren
intentionalen Correlaten (Log. Unt. Bd. II) gestaltete sich mir der Sinn einer
intentionalen Psychologie und ihrer analytischen Methode völlig um. Erst
nach den L.U. hob sich jedoch der radicale philosophische Unterschied
zwischen einer intentionalen Psychologie als positiver Wissenschaft und der
transz. Phänomenologie ab.
(6) Welche Rolle mein "Platonismus," mein energisches Eintreten fUr eine
universale Ontologie, also fur die Erarbeitung von Wesenseinsichten (für
das echte Apriori) in allen Erkenntnissphären, in meiner Entwicklung hatte
und welche neue Bedeutung er in der gereiften transcendentalen Phänome-
nologie gewinnt, darüber wird Sie am Besten meine "Formale und trans-
cendentale Logik" (insbesondere ihr H. Teil) aufklären, obschon darin nur die
"formale Ontologie" in Frage ist. Dank schulde ich für diesen "Platonismus"
dem bekannten Kapitel in Lotze's Logik, wie sehr seine Erkenntnistheorie
und Metaphysik mich stets abstiess. Plotin habe ich nie gelesen, auch die
gros sen Idealisten nach Kant habe ich nur in Bruchstücken kennen
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gelernt, also nie eingehend studiert. Jetzt erst, nachdem die Phänome-
nologie aufgrund meiner Lebensarbeit den sicheren Gang wirklicher Wissen-
schaft gewonnen hat, (allerdings der grässte Teil meiner konkreten Unter-
suchungen harrt noch der Veröffentlichung), habe ich ein grosses Interesse
auch für sie als meine "Vorgänger." Denn nun kann ich sie als solche
verstehen, nämlich von meiner Phänomenologie aus und auf sie hin. Im
Grunde bin ich zu einem guten Teile Autodidakt. Aber es gibt eben, scheint
mir, Wenden der Wissenschaft, in denen es auf Autodidakten ankommt als
solchen, die nicht der Versuchung der Gelehrsamkeit unterliegen, Gedanken
der Tradition fortzubilden anstatt in deren eigene dunkle Tiefen, in ihre naiven
Voraussetzungen usw. selbstdenkend einzudringen. Im Übrigen habe ich vor
meinen philosophischen Studien ungefähr sieben Jahre ausschliesslich und
berufsmässig Mathematik und exakte Naturwissenschaft studiert und sicher-
lich von dem Geiste des Radikalismus der Weierstrass'schen Vorlesungen
Einfluss erfahren.
(7) Ad 2. Das Problem des Irrtums ist auf der ersten Stufe der Phänome-
nologie beschlossen in der Lehre von der "Modalisierbarkeit" aller Akte. D.h.
es tritt aufin der Erforschung des konstitutiven Aufbaus der Welt im Hinblick
auf die sich immer neu in Intention und Erfüllung vorzeichnende und
bewährende Einstimmigkeit des Seinssinnes: eine Einstimmigkeit durch
Einbrüche der "Modalisierungen" und durch immer neue "Korrekturen"
hindurch. In der höheren Stufe der Phänomenologie wird der Irrtum in eins mit
den Fragen des ethischen Lebens, des Lebens in echter oder unechter
Menschlichkeit, in letztlicher Befriedigung oder Unseligkeit, (einer indivi-
duellen und sozialen Harmonie und Disharmonie) von N euem zum Problem.
Es handelt sich um die allumfassende Problematik, die auch unter dem Titel
der universalen Teleologie angesprochen werden kann. Anders ausgedrückt
sind es die Probleme der Totalität, der transcendentalen Möglichkeit einer
seienden offenen, unendlichen transcendentalen Intersubjektivität, darin be-
schlossen der Möglichkeit "wahrer Selbsterhaltung" einer jeden, einzelnen
und sozialen, Subjektivität im unendlichen Zusammenhang. Die Probleme der
"universellen Harmonie," aber auch die der echten "Humanität" gewinnen
also als phänomenologische Probleme ihren absoluten, auf die transcen-
dentale Subjektivität bezogenen Sinn. So ist der oberste Abschluss für die
Problematik der phänomenologischen Philosophie die Frage nach dem
"Prinzip" der in ihren universalen Strukturen konkret erschlossenen Te-
leologie. Demnach ist das oberste "Konstitutionsproblem" die Frage nach
dem Sein des "Überseienden," eben dieses Prinzips, das eine in sich
zusammenstimmende Totalität der transcendentalen Intersubjektivität mit der
durch sie konstituierten Welt existenzmöglich macht, weshalb man es auch
platonisch als Idee des Guten bezeichnen könnte. (Natürlich darf aber hier
"'Idee" nicht Eidos besagen.) Mit all dem aber bewegt man sich innerhalb der
 180

Problematik und der Methodik einer Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft,

der allein radikalen und im höchsten Sinne strengen. Obwohl die oberste Stufe
in ihrem allgemeinen Problemsinn sich schon streng vorgezeichnet hat, ist es
noch weit bis zur geforderten theoretischen Durchführung in konkret ausge-
arbeiteten wissenschaftlichen Theorien. Die Phänomenologie ist aber jeden-
falls da, als wirkliche Arbeit in lebendigem Werden.
(8) Unter den ganz Vereinzelten, die in den tiefsten Sinn meiner Phäno-
menologie eingedrungen sind, ist übrigens ein glänzend begabter und
sehr ernster Amerikaner, Herr Dorion Cairns, der die Energie und Konse-
quenz hatte, nicht abzulassen, bis er zum wirklichen Verständnis gekommen
war. Er hat soeben in Harvard seinen Doktor gemacht und zwar aufgrund
eines Entwurfes zu einer Einleitung in die Phänomenologie. Er besitzt
zweifellos die dazu erforderliche Reife. Er war schon vor einer grösseren Reihe
von Jahren für zwei Jahre bei mir in Freiburg und neuerdings bis letzten
Weihnachten wiederum fast ebensolange. Er wird gerne bereit sein, Sie bei
allen Verständnisschwierigkeiten zu beraten, falls Sie es wünschen. Ich würde
es Ihnen sehr empfehlen. Seine Adresse ist: Dr. Dorion Cairns, 14 Remington
Str., Cambridge Mass., USA.
Es kommt mir soeben in Erinnerung, dass mein Freund Cairns für seinen
letzten Studienaufenthalt in Freiburg und Harvard den ganzen Rest seines
Vermögens aufgebraucht hat und somit auf eine Anstellung angewiesen ist. Ist
vielleicht in Los Angeles ein Platz für ihn? Könnte er dort als Philosoph
wirken? Er ist eine in jeder Hinsicht erfreuliche Persönlichkeit, abgesehen
von seinem ungewöhnlichen philosophischen Können, das eine bedeutende
philosophische Zukunft sicher erscheinen lässt.
Mit dem Ausdruck vorzuglicher Hochachtung
Ihr sehr ergebener
E. Husserl

(c) Letter 0/ Husserl to Welch (Translation)

Dear Colleague,
(1) In the midst ofthe unrest ofthis time with its revolutionizing of our entire
German nation and its life, I was unable to answer your kind letter at once.
(2) I am of course very glad that my philosophie al endeavors arouse interest
even in America; endeavors which in the course of a constant inner evolution
through more than four decades have led to a fundamentally novel philosophi-
cal method and thereby to a completely novel philosophy. However, precisely
this novelty, compared with all the philosophical tradition, results in the extra-
ordinary difficulties in its accessibility. It is a hard imposition on those having
their pI ace within the history of philosophy and educated in its traditions to
"bracket" it entirely and not to make any use of it; and hence also not to make
 181

any use of its presuppositions which have never been radically isolated, of the
most obvious obviousnesses of the experience of the world and of the logical
(scientific) thinking based upon it. On the other hand, it is necessary to make a
(well-)motivated approach, stafting from the tradition and the natural pre-
scientific experience (in wh ich everyone lives before phenomenology), which
leads upward to the revolutionary phenomenological reduction. And it takes
unusual consistency and energy ofthought to remain firm and not to fall back
into the tradition al ways of thinking, to really take hold of the new, without
falsifying it by such all too tempting relapses. The fact that someone was my
academic student or has become a philosopher under the influence of my
writings does not therefore mean by far that he has penetrated to areal
understanding of the inner meaning of my, the original phenomenology and its
method and does research into the new horizons of problems which I have
opened up, to which the future belongs (of which I have become completely
certain). This is true of almost all the students of the Göttingen and the first
Freiburg period, even of such famous men as Max Scheler and Heidegger, in
whose philosophies I see merely ingenious relapses into the old philosophical
naivetes. I have to refer in this context even to my close friend Jean Hering-
Strassburg with regard to the work "Phenomenologie et philosophie religi-
euse" ( Strasbourg 1925), which is certainly of interest to you. Of course this is
also true of Mr. Farber, whose philosophical education during his Freiburg
studies was my special concern. But it was not in my mind that he would risk all
too early an introduction into phenomenology. For this he was by far not yet
mature enough. From this situation it would seem to follow that you would go
astray if you rush at any of the literary accounts of my phenomenology (not
even at the latest by Levinas "La theorie de l'intuition dans la pheno-
menologie de Husserl" F. Alcan, 1930, who puts my phenomenology
on the same plane with that of Heidegger and thus deprives it of its proper
meaning). There will be no alternative to studying my own writings, which are
understandably very difficult. Here, for an understanding of a philosophy
.which arose in continuous development and reflective clarification the most
important writings are those of the latest and most mature period, Le., the
simultaneously developed texts Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929,
separately and in Jahrbuch vol. X) as weIl as the Meditations cartesiennes,
which have appeared only in French translation. Also important is the
Postscript to the English translation ofmy Ideen (its best form is the slightly
enlarged German publication in Jahrbuch, vol. XI, which is also available
separately).4
(3) However, [I realize], my dear colleague, that even what I have written
you thus far, will sound discouraging to you, since your topic presupposes the
unity of the Phenomenological Movement, hence something like a unified
philosophy ofthis name, whereas I deny its existence, after having waited long
 182

enough for the possibility that as a result ofmy writings following theLogische
Untersuchungen the eyes of my former students would be opened up for what
was and still is in the making as a completely radical philosophy. Thus, for
instance, one can speak of the philosophy of religion of Scheler (or of
Stavenhagen or Jean Hering), but it has nothing to do with phenomenology in
my sense. For by way ofthe phenomenological reduction this phenomenology
opens up a fundamentally novel experience which is not mundane experience
and thus puts us directly on absolute ground, that of "transcendental
subjectivity." Unfortunately, the "Phenomenological Movement" remained
blind to this. Almost all the accounts and critical expressions from these
corners about the reduction distort its sense so much that I can only warn you.
It is part of the radicalism of the phenomenological reform that it undertakes to
demonstrate how and in what stages in this analytics the world acquires its
sense and its validity of being, as seen from the ultimate ground of
"transcendental experience" and in the form of a systematic analytics of the
transcendental intentionality which constitutes the sense of being. The
philosophical problems disclose themselves in their genuine meaning as
transcendental-phenomenological ones in an essential systematic series of
steps. On these occasions it becomes manifest that the religious-ethical
problems are problems of the highest level. (Consequently they cannot be
obtained as cheaply as Scheler's basically naive ontologism believed.) This is
precisely the reason why in my writings I kept silent about the problems of
philosophy of religion. However, in these and in my forthcoming publications
the roads are cleared in order to work one's way toward them and to formulate
the genuine problems of philosophy of religion.
(4) In part the answer to your formulated questions is contained in the
preceding.
As to question 1: May I ask you not to call my philosophy a "system." F or it
is precisely its objective to make all "systems" impossible once and for all. It
wants to be rigorous science, which in an infinite progression works its way
systematically toward its problems, methods and theories. As far as my
predecessors are concerned, I have in a sense many ofthem, even those whom
I never studied, have had at least an indirect effect on my phenomenology, as
they have had on every philosophy of the present. However, since the time
that, in thinking through the failure (since not carried through in ruthless
consistency) of the attempt of the Cartesian Meditations to achieve a
foundation for science free of all prejudice, I had reached the phenomeno-
logical reduction, there were no philosophers left for me from whom I could
have taken over any results. Since then there was nothing for me, nor by right
could there be anything, that I have not achieved for mys elf by the new
approach. And in this way even presuppositions had to outline themselves
[merely] as horizons for work and could be admitted merely as directives for
really decisive work.
 183

(5) lHandwritten insertion1 My entire development is determined by the

stimulation of Franz Brentano (my academic teacher) - by his psychology
which inciuded as a fundamental character of the psychic "intentionality."
However, in penetrating deeply into the correlation between the logical
idealities and their intentional correlates (Logische Untersuchungen, vol. II),
the sense of an intentional psychology and of its method became for me
completely transformed. However, only after the Logical Investigations the
radical philosophical difference between an intentional psychology as a
positive science and transcendental phenomenology revealed itself.
(6) Wh at role had my "Platonism," my vigorous plea for a universal
ontology, hence for the achievement of essential insights (for the genuine a
priori) in all spheres of knowledge, in my development, and what new
significance does it acquire in the mature transcendental phenomenology?
About this point my Formal and Transcendental Logic (especially its second
part) will enlighten you, although here merely "formal ontology" is under
discussion. I am indebted for this "Platonism" to the well-known chapter in
Lotze' s Logic, no matter how much I was always repelled by his epistemology
and metaphysics. I never read Plotinus; even the great Idealists after Kant I
have come to know only through fragments, hence I have never studied them
intensively. Not until now, since, on the basis of my life work, phenomenology
has reached the safe course of areal science (to be sure, the large part of my
concvete investigations is still awaiting publication), I have great interest even
for them as my "predecessors." For now I can understand them as such (i.e.,
from the standpoint of my phenomenology and as tending toward it). Basically
I am a self-taught person. However, it seems to me that there are turning points
of science where everything depends upon self-taught men as the ones who are
not subject to the temptation of scholarship to cultivate ideas of the tradition
instead of penetrating by their own thinking into its own dark depths, into its
naive presuppositions etc. Besides, prior to my philosophical studies, for about
seven years, I pursued exciusively and professionally the study of mathematics
and exact science, and certainly underwent influences from the spirit of
radicalism of Weierstrass' leetures.
(7) As to question 2. The problem of error is inciuded, on the first level of
phenomenology, in the doetrine ofthe "possible modalization" of all aets. This
means that it occurs in the investigation of the constitutive formation of the
world with a view to the eoneordanee ofthe meaning ofbeing foreshadowing
and validating itself in intention and fulfillment: a eoneordanee through
eollapses of its modalizations and through ever new "eorreetions." On the
higher level of phenomenology error, together with questions of ethicallife, of
the li fe in genuine or spurious humanity, in ultimate satisfaetion and
unhappiness (of an individual and social harmony and disharmony) becomes
onee more a problem. This is a matter of an all-eomprehensive set of problems
which ean also be designated by the title ofuniversal teleology. Put differently,
 184

these are the problems of totality, of the transcendental possibility of an

existing, open, infinite transcendental intersubjectivity, and, included in it, the
possibility of "true self-preservation" of any single and social subjectivity in
infinite connection. The problems of "universal harmony," but also those of
genuine humanity acquire, as phenomenologieal problems, their absolute
meaning related to transcendental subjectivity. Thus the supreme terminus for
the problems of phenomenologieal philosophy is the question of the
"principle" ofteleology disclosed concretely in its universal structures. Hence
the supreme "problem of constitution" is the question ofthe being of"what is
beyond being," i.e., precisely of this principle which makes possible in its
existence a totality of transcendental intersubjectivity concordant in itself,
together with the world constituted by it, whieh is why one could also designate
it Platonically as the 1dea of the Good. (But of course "1dea" must here not
mean the same asEidos.) Butwith all this one moves within the setofproblems
and methods of a philosophy as a rigorous science, the only radieal and in the
highest sense rigorous science. Although the topmost level has already been
strietly outlined in the general sense of the problem, it is still a long way to the
postulated theoretieal development in concretely worked out scientific
theories. But in any case, phenomenology exists, as real work in living
development.
(8) 1ncidentally, among the very rare ones who have penetrated into the
deepest sense of my phenomenology is a splendidly gifted and very serious
Ameriean, Mr. Dorion Cairns, who had the energy and persistence not to
desist until he had arrived at real understanding. He just has taken his Ph.D. at
Harvard, actually on the basis of a draft for an introduction to phenomenology.
Without a doubt he has the required maturity for this undertaking. A
considerable number of years ago he was with me in Freiburg for two years,
and recently untillast Christmas again for almost the same length oftime. He
will be glad to give you advice in all difficulties of understanding. I would
recommend it to you very much.
I just remember that my friend Cairns has used up the entire rest of his
fortune for his last study stay at Freiburg and Harvard and is thus dependent on
an appointment. 1s there perhaps an opening for hirn in Los Angeles? Could he
there be active as a philosopher? He is a personality enjoyable in every regard,
quite apart from his unusual philosophie al ability.
E. Husserl

SOME COMMENTS ON HUSSERL'S LETTER

The following remarks are to give the readers of the Husserlletter aids for
better understanding than the addressee seems to have achieved. I shall begin
 185

by commenting on each of the paragraphs in succession, before attempting a

final appraisal of the letter in the context of Husserl's development.
1. The initial brief paragraph intimates that the preceding five months since
Hitler had come to power had not been easy ones on Husserl, the "non-
Aryan," even though as an emeritus he was not directly affected by the first
phase ofthe "revolution." The wording ofthe paragraph suggests that Husserl,
who had not yet stopped identifying with the German nation, being still a
naturalized German citizen, though a native Austrian, counted with the
possibility that the letter might be read by a censor.
2. The second paragraph is remarkable for the stringency of the demands
Husserl makes on anyone who wants to understand his mature philosophy,
including the demand to perform a phenomenological reduction by which the
whole tradition of philosophy had to be "bracketed." Accordingly he
characterizes this reduction as a revolution not yet understood as such by any
of the available introductions to phenomenology, for which he gives specific
examples. As the only proper approach to this most radical form of his
phenomenology he mentions some of his own, at the time still mostly
untranslated, writings, omitting the English translation of his Ideen of 1913 by
W. R. Boyce Gibson, published two years earlier (1931) except for his own
Preface, here called aNachwort, and even his article on "Phenomenology" in
the 1929 edition oftheEncyclopaedia Britannica, "translated" and cut down
from 7000 to 4000 words by Christopher Salmon. 5
3. In the third paragraph Husserl dissociates himself demonstratively from
the Phenomenological Movement, to which Welch had alluded, and especially
from Max Scheler, actually Welch's primary interest. Husserl makes it clear
that until then he had entertained hopes that his erstwhile followers wouldjoin
his final "revolution," but that they had actually never understood it and
especially had failed to see that it led to a new kind of transcendental
experience which could show how intentionality "constituted" the world, i.e.,
its "meaning" and "validity," and he intimates that this is true even for
phenomenology of religion, of which Husserl tries to give Welch some taste
later in the letter.
The remaining parts of the letter seems to follow Welch' s two main questions
as leads. His third question, that on Husserl's teachers and his emancipation
from them, is answered to some extent implicitly when he takes up his
predecessors, notably Plato and Descartes.
4. In the fourth paragraph one ofthe striking things is Husserl's emphatic
denial of having developed a system and his claim that he wants to abolish all
such systems once and for all. Actually this almost Nietzschean rejection of
the will to a system is something that Husserl did not always maintain. Prom
statements in some of his letters and fragments now found in his unpublished
 186

manuscripts it appears that Husserl cherished the plan of condensing his final
insights into something he hirnself called a system. 6 Nevertheless, it remains
true that he had no intention ofrivalling any ofthe great systems such as those
of Aristotle or Hegel, and that he denied any substantial loans from them,
claiming that he had reached their conclusions independently by his own
method.
5. The hand-written paragraph-Iength marginal insertion about Franz
Brentano, about whom Welch had not inquired, is interesting proof that
Husserl did not want hirn to be forgotten, although he hirnself had developed
his master's "empirical psychology" into a psychology of intentionality and
finally into transcendental phenomenology.
6. The sixth paragraph takes up Plato's significance for Husserl's philoso-
phy. Here Husserl makes it plain that in his latest phase Platonism has become
subordinated to a transcendentalism for which even PI atonie essences are
constituted in consciousness. He also admits openly that he had not made an
intensive study ofpost-Kantian idealism, although he had lectured about it. I
am not familiar with other texts in which Husserl caIIs hirnself self-taught
("Autodidakt"), as he does in this letter. This is actually correct in the sense
that he had never taken an academic degree in philosophy. It is interesting that
in the letter Husserl connects his own radicalism with the lectures of his
mathematical teacher Karl Weierstrass, see Husserl-Chronik, p. 7.
7. The seventh paragraph tries to answer Welch's question about the
problem of error. Apparently this paragraph attracted the special attention of
the addressee, since translations of single words are pencilled on top of several
German words, not aII of them correct ones. Husserl's attempt to account for
error in terms of "modalizations" of acts clearly does not treat the traditional
problem under its usual name. The expression Modalisierbarkeit (possible
modalization) does not seem to occur in Husserl' s published writings up to that
time. However, it can be related to the discussions of modalities ofbelief in the
Ideen (par. 100ff.), which also mention the possibility ofthe transformations
ofbeliefs. Presumably error, though not itself a mode ofbelief, is to be explained
as the correlate of our changing modes ofbelief, revealing itselfwhen, e.g., our
belief in the Ptolemean system has changed into dis belief. However, it is not
surprising that this account could not make much sense to the uninitiated.
What might have been more helpful is what Husserl suggests by referring to the
consonance between intention and fulfiIIment and the coIIapses (Einbrüche)
and emendations (Korrekturen) in our constitution of the world. In other
words, error occurs in our experience wherever a crisis develops in the normal
fulfillments of our intentions and when the lack of fulfillment is followed
by a correction, thus revealing our having been in error. However,
at this point Husserl turns at once to the situation as it unfolds on
higher levels of our experience, including that of religious knowledge,
 187

perhaps thinking of Welch's primary interest in philosophy of religion.

The injection of the term "teleology," which in Husserl's last phase is
closely connected with the conception of a divine goal (telos) of all
transcendental acts, seems to suggest that error can occur even in areas other
than elementary theoretical knowledge whenever a comprehensive totality is
at stake. But at this point Husserl seems to have been carried away toward
sketching a theory of the principle that stands behind such a teleology,
something even above Being, which he finally identifies with the Platonic idea
of the Good. There is other evidence in Husserl' s last thought suggesting that
Husserl's idea of God was that of an ultimate telos of all transcendentallife.
But even at this stage he maintains the ideal of phenomenology as a rigorous
science, while admitting that at the level of religious consciousness it is still in a
rather rudimentary stage.
8. The last paragraph, the recommendation of Dorion Cairns as the
American authority on phenomenology with the "needed maturity" to
interpret Husserl's own thought implies that others mentioned in Welch's
letter do not have it. Was this introduction of Cairns merely an after-thought?
This would seem to be a suitable interpretation for the subsequent handwritten
postscript, which seems to mean that on re-reading Husserl found the
concluding paragraph of the letter itself not yet strong enough. The referral to a
live interpreter is certainly weil motivated by the preceding paragraph which is
anything but easy to understand for a beginner and admits the unfinished
conditions ofHusserl's own thought. In this sense this recommendation comes
as a kind of personal climax to the letter. Whether this means that the whole
letter was' written with the purpose of making Cairns the official interpreter of
phenomenology can no longer be established, but it seems highly likely that
Husserl would not have written this letter if it had not given hirn a chance to
make a plea for his favorite American student.

ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HUSSERL'S LETTER

In trying to assess the importance of this letter in the context of Husserl's

development one must distinguish between his own perspective and the
"objective" pi ace of the letter in relation to his philosophical work.
"Subjectively" one might wonder why no copy of this unusually lengthy
letter häs survived in the files ofHusserl's correspondence as taken over by the
Louvain Archives, which comprise not only lettersfrom others to Husserl but
copies of his own letters to others which he seems to have considered
important. But the very fact that the letter to Welch was typed, presumably by
Eugen Fink, at a time when he continued writing most ofhis letters by hand,
seems significant. So is, in addition to its length, the fact that according to the
 188

date line the incubation time for this letter extended over four days. Here was a
carefully considered attempt to give directions to an American scholar writing
from a new center of philosophy. This challenge gave Husserl a chance of
thinking through the wh oIe problem ofhow to introduce others to the maturest
stage of his radieal phenomenology, to survey critically the existing intro-
ductory literature and to develop some of his own ideas, not only about the
problem of error but about his religious teleology.
But what about the objective significance ofthe letter apart from Husserl's
own perspective? What light does it throw on Husserl's philosophy in general
or at least on a specific phase in its development? Here one ought to bear in
mind that this was the time when Husserl had practically abandoned work on
the German version of his Cartesian Meditations after having turned them
over to Eugen Fink; in this context it is not without interest that in
recommending this work to Welch, Husserl mentions merely the French
translation, and no longer holds out the prospect of an improved German
version. On the other hand the plan ofthe last work, the Crisis ofthe European
Sciences, which was to grow out ofthe Vienna and Prague lectures of1935 had
not yet been conceived. So Husserl was looking for new and better ways of
introducing the public to his transcendental phenomenology. That this new
phenomenology represented a radieal revolution, not yet sufficiently expressed
in his own earlier work was a conviction which Husserl has rarely, if ever,
expressed as sharply as in this letter. I am familiar with only one other occasion
during the same year, when he warned a student of G. F. Stout, visiting in
Freiburg, not only against approaching phenomenology via the history of
philosophy but even against his own earlier work. This may well have been the
period when he conceived of the radicalism, first announced in his 1922
Lectures at the University ofLondon, as an entirely new type ofphilosophy,
whose first literary expression was the Formal and Transcendental Logic of
1929.
My first impression after seeing this letter was that it might weU be
considered Husserl's "Epistle to the Americans." But on second thought I
have come to realize that this would be misleading. As a letter for Americans it
certainly does not make any attempt to show the relevance ofphenomenology
for American philosophers, which Husserl might weil have done in view of his
admiration for William J ames as a pioneer of phenomenological seeing and
describing. Husserl is simply speaking to a foreign scholar, realizing his
difficulty in ente ring into radieal phenomenology and offering hirn as the only
alternative to the study ofuntranslated text the help of a proven expert, Dorion
Cairns.
Thus the message of this letter is reaily addressed to all those who want to
enter Husserl's "most mature" philosophy directly. This was a problem with
whieh Husserl struggled increasingly as he came to realize that in his
 189

radicalism he had left behind the entire Phenomenological Movement and had
maneuvered hirnself into a position of nearly solipsistic isolation. Husserl's
letter to Welch clearly reflects this realization. It also shows that for Husserl
his last period, beginning apparently with the London Lectures of 1922,
involved a drastic change in his philosophical development, to which a new
approach was indicated. Yet in 1933 all he could suggest was the study ofhis
publications since 1929 with no apparent hope that the German version ofthe
Cartesian Meditations would solve the problem. This makes it even more
understandable that he was looking for a completely new approach, which did
not develop until1935 with the Vienna and Prague lectures. In this regard the
letter to Welch shows Husserl at the half-way mark. He announces the radical
novelty ofhis final phenomenology. But he is still in search of a new road that
cou1d make it more accessib1e to newcomers, if not to oldtimers. Obvious1y
there could be no royal road to this phenomenology. But the letter to Welch
proves that Husserl had not yet given up hope that there was a way, and that
such devoted students as Cairns could show it.

A SEQUEL TO HUSSERL'S LETTER

Husserl's correspondence, now in the Archives at Louvain, includes abrief

note by E. Parl Welch dated J uly 20, 1933 acknowledging the receipt of the
June letter and thanking hirn for recommending Dorion Cairns, combined with
arequest for permission "to publish some parts ofyour letter, particularly that
on the problem of error." On August 31 Husserl answered this request in a
briefletter to which I was given access by Professor Cyril Welch, the son ofthe
addressee, in which Husserl, without directly refusing such a permission,
advised Welch strongly against such use, mentioning bad experiences he had
had on earlier occasions ("Ich meine, dass Sie vorldufig mit dem literarischen
Gebrauch meines Briefes warten sollten"). This instruction explains to some
extent why Welch did not mention this letter at all, neither in his unpublished
University of Southern California dissertation of 1934 nor in his later
publications on Husser1. 7 Only in two footnotes ofthe typewritten dissertation
did he seem to be referring to it ("in a private letter to the writer") as the source
ofhis information for Husserl's repudiation of Scheler (p. 68) and ofhis own
view that Husser1 chose "to remain vague to the point of irritation when
questioned upon the matter of error" (p. 339). Otherwise there is no indication
that either in his dissertation, submitted almost a year after the date of the
letter, or in his laterwork, Welch made any use ofHusserl's substantive advice
in the June letter. Anyway, he never referred to Husserl's "latest and maturest
work," which Husserl had urged hirn to consult in preference to his earlier
ones. Instead Welch's ac count of Husserlian phenomenology is based
 190

exclusively on the Logische Untersuchungen, the Ideen, and on the Encyclo-

paedia Britannica article, along with Marvin Farber's first Husserl book of
1928. Also, according to personal information from Dorion Cairns, Welch
had never turned to hirn for further help and advice, as Husserl had suggested.
Less than two months after Husserl's August letter, i.e., on October 28, the
Director ofthe School ofPhilosophy at the U niversity of Southern California,
Ralph T. Flewelling, sent an official letter to Husserl on Department
stationery, which, according to Husserl's letter to Dorion Cairns of
November 15, was received only a few days later. Starting with the remark
that "we in America have been greatly interested in your work in phenomeno-
logy," and describing the philosophical and climatic merits of California,
Flewelling closed his letter with this paragraph:

We are wondering ifyou could be induced to come to us on a permanent, apart-time, or even a

one-year's visiting basis in order to see how you might like it.

I have been unable to discover any documentary explanation for this

amazing invitation to the 74-year-old Husserl, five years after his official
retirement. Of course, by October 1933 the true nature ofthe Nazi revolution,
to which Husserl had alluded cautiously at the very start ofhis June letter, had
become sufficiently manifest to make the idea of emigration attractive to all
those of "non-Aryan" descent. Thus Flewelling, in his attempt to win such
distinguished European scholars as Wild on Carr (known to Husserl as one 6f
the four chairmen of his lecture at the University of London in 1922) and
F. C. S. Schiller, both mentioned in the letter of invitation, may well have
thought that he re was another chance of adding the name of an outstanding
European philosopher to the roster of his new School of Philosophy.8
But why did Flewelling single out Husserl among all the potential German
philosophers already arriving as refugees in the States, who were in need of
asylum? There is no longer enough information available for adefinite answer.
But there is sufficient evidence to suggest a plausible, if no longer verifiable,
hypothesis. Could it have been a mere coincidence that so soon after Husserl's
last letter to Welch the School with which he was affiliated issued an invitation
to its author? Why was it that Husserl's June letter was found in a special folder
with a covering sheet among the papers of the School of Philosophy and not
returned to Welch? Why did he turn over his precious letter to Flewelling
without asking for its return? Could the main reason have been Husserl's plea
for Dorion Cairns as a candidate for a possible opening at the School? And
could this plea have turned Flewelling's attention from the recommended
novice to the source of the recommendation, Husserl hirns elf? However,
apparently Welch hirnselfwas not aware ofFlewelling's use ofhis letter, since
his obituary article on "Edmund Husserl: An Appraisal" in the Persona/ist
 191

(vol. 21, 1940, pp. 159-168) contains no mention ofthe 1933 invitation to the
Schoo1 of Phi10sophy, which pub1ished Flewelling's journal.
Husserl' s reply to the invitation does not seem to have survived, either at the
School of Philosophy or in the Husser1 Archives. Eut we know a good deal
about his reactions and about the very serious thought he gave to the possibility
of an asy1um in the States. The main source for this knowledge is his
correspondence with Dorion Cairns, whom he informed about the invitation in
a letter ofNovember 15. Here he declared at once that, while he feIt tempted to
go for one year, he would not consider doing so without Cairns as his assistant
and Eugen Fink as his collaborator(who, however, did not particu1arly like the
idea, as Husser1 added). So Husser1 asked Cairns for an immediate response
about his readiness to join hirn. A letter by Mrs. Husserl of November 29
mentioned the fact that Husserl had sent a first reply to Flewelling inquiring
among other things particularly about the possibility of a teaching assistant in
view ofhis difficulty of expressing hirnself in English. On December 9 Husserl
hirnself told Cairns that he had made his simultaneous appointment a pre-
condition (Grundbedingung) for his acceptance. On January 28, 1934
Mrs. Husserl reported to Cairns that there was .still no decision as to the
assistantship question. Flewelling had written on J anuary 13: "The most
difficult question for us would be to take on Dr. Cairns, as we have no notion
how much we would have to pay hirn." But Mrs. Husserl added that any other
solution would be "out of the question" and Cairns' s assistantship a conditio
sine qua non.
Cairns's own response to Husserl's original announcement in a letter of
January 17 made it plain that he would have been ready to go, although at the
time he was even more interested in the possibility of a lectureship at the N ew
School of Social Research, where Husserl had recommended hirn very
strongly to Max Wertheimer (see his letter ofDecembe: 12 and Cairns' reply
of January 12, 1934).
On May 18, Husserl began his letter to Cairns by telling hirn that the
negotiations with Los Angeles had failed. As his chief explanation he named
not his age,9 but the fact that his one basic condition, that of an appointment of
Cairns as his aide, had not been met, largely because of lack of funds.
Nevertheless, Husserl added that once this obstacle should disappear,
negotiations could be resumed in the following year.
All this makes it clear that Dorion Cairns was the key figure in the story of
Husserl's invitation to the United States. His place in Husserl's June letter to
Welch may have precipitated Flewelling's invitation. And when it came, the
failure of a collateral invitation to Cairns was a major reason for Husserl's
final "no."
Husserl in America - this possibility was by no means an idle dream. lO But
in view ofthe short span offour more years he was to live, one may weIl wonder
 192

whether the move to America would have been a wise one, allowing him to
work as much or more than he actually did despite the worsening conditions
around him. Certainly it would have given Americans better access to him and
stimulated interest in his work considerably. In any case, it seems worth
recording that Husserl himself seriously considered such a move. The story of
this possibility, beginning with the Welch letter, should also not be forgotten in
view of its message to all students of his later philosophy in the N ew W orld. It
also serves as another reminder ofDorion Cairns' key role in the introduction
of Husserl's thought to America.

NOTES

1 Published as "Husserl's Way Into Phenomenology for Americans: A Letter and its Sequel"
from F. Kersten and R. Zanereds., Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 168-91.
2 [Husserl's footnote:] Lesenswert sind die [in] den letzten Jahrgängen der Deutschen Literatur-
zeitung erschienenen eingehenden Rezensionen dieser 3 Schriften von A. Gurwitsch und
F. [Alfred] SchUtz.
3 Handwritten insertion in margin of letter.
4[Husserl's footnote:] Also worth reading are the detailed reviews of these writings by
A. Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz, which appeared in the latest volumes of the Deutsche
Literaturzeitung.
5For possible reasons see Chapter 11, "On the Misfortunes of Husserl's Encyclopaedia
Britannica Article 'Phenomenology'."
6 See Husserliana XV, pp. XXXIV-XLI.
7Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology (The University of California Press, 1939) and The
Philosophy oJ Edmund Husserl (Columbia University Press, 1941).
8 See The Forest Qf Yggdrasil: The Autobiography oJ Ralph T. Flewelling, edited by
W. H. W. Werkmeister and Wilbur Long. University of California Press, 1962, pp. xvii, 113.
9He did so in a letter to AdolfGrimme of April 25, 1934, also mentioning the demands of his
works (Husserl-Chronik, p. 446).
10 Actually Husserl's ashes came to the States, when after the war Mrs. Husserl, who had kept
them with her, joined her daughter Elisabeth Husserl Rosenberg, to whom I am indebted for
this information, in Arlington, Massachusetts. Only five years later could they be deposited
in Mrs. Husserl's grave in Günterstal near Freiburg.
 14. A REVIEW OF WOLF GANG KÖHLER'S
THE PLACE OF VALUE IN A WORLD OF FACTS'

Wolfgang Köhler's two latest books deserve the attention of phenomenologists

for several reasons. Relations between Gestalt psychology and phenomeno--
logy have always been friendly, ifnot very weIl developed. As far as they have
met on psychological ground, the two schools have worked along parallellines
and largely with concordant results. Christian von Ehrenfels' "Gestaltqua-
litäten" had their equivalent in Edmund Husserl's "figurale Momente" or
"Einheitsmomente."2 Gestalt psychology proper, fighting both against
behaviorism and against a prejudiced introspectionism, which attempted to
reduce all phenomena to pure sensory elements, has energetically upheld the
part ofunadulterated immediate experience. 3 By the use ofphenomenology in
the sense of descriptive psychology, as it had been developed in psychology
long before phenomenology as a philosophical movement had been started,
Gestalt psychology has investigated a large group of hitherto neglected
phenomena, notably those designated by the term" Gestalt." But in addition to
that, by stressing the part of" insight" in mental processes, it has come elose to
the phenomenological concept of insight into essences (" Wesens einsicht")
and has moreover demonstrated its significance for actual thinking and for
other psychological problems.
Yet, there has been little explicit contact between the two groups. It may be
that the anti-psychologism of Husserl's "Prolegomena" to the Logische
Untersuchungen had an unduly deterrent effect. Anyhow, from the side of
Gestalt psychologists there had been, until recently, only occasional and
passing references to phenomenology4 and only rather qualified approval of its
systematic principles. From within the phenomenological camp, studies ofthe
relations between Gestalt theory and phenomenology have been offered only
in A. Gurwitsch's dissertation on "Phänomenologie der Thematik und des
reinen Ich.,,5
Köhler's book on The Place ofValue in a World ofFacts, an elaboration of
the William James Lectures which the author gave at Harvard University in
1934, is noteworthy among other things both for the explicit discussion of
phenomenology as a philosophical movement, and for concrete phenomenolo-
gical contributions. Dynamics in Psychology, an enlarged version ofthe Page-
 194

Barbour Lectures delivered at the University ofVirginia in 1938, also contains

a few pertinent passages.
The first ofthe two books, however, is much more ambitious. Jn its ultimate
scope it is a study in natural philosophy. As such it undertakes to determine the
locus and the significance of value in the universe. It starts with an eloquent
imaginary indictment of science by a layman who argues that science, since it
has done away with value ("Wertfreiheit"), is unable to deal with the vital
issues of value in life. It is only capable of handling facts, and the facts of
science seem to occur indifferently without any regard for values. It is against
this conception of science and the resulting anti-intellectualism nowadays so
rampant in Europe that the rest ofthe book is directed. Köhler realizes that the
"crisis of science" has its deepest root in its unwillingness and its in ability to do
justice to values. 6 So his first concern is to make sure of the phenomena of
value. The second chapter on "Theories of Value" sets out to show that the
phenomenon which Köhler calls "requiredness" cannot possibly be denied
nor reduced to a mere indifferent natural fact. In the third chapter, "An
Analysis of Requiredness," Köhler undertakes to elucidate the structure of
this phenomenon. But he is not satisfied with the result of such phenomeno-
logical analysis. For in his view the world does not consist of phenomena
alone. Epistemologically he advocates a critical realism that, at least for
practical purposes, involves a sharp dualism between a phenomenal and a
physical world. Value, he pleads, has a place even in this transphenomenal
sphere. The basis for this hypothesis is supplied by the principle of isomor-
phism, according to which there is a certain resemblance between the
phenomenal and the physical world in their essential macroscopic structures.
Such an isomorphism would also have to obtain in the relations between
perceptual phenomena and the physical correlates in the cortex. Eventually,
this principle is also applicable to the phenomenon ofrequiredness. Especially
in the field of memory Köhler believes that he has definite evidence for
requiredness as residing and operative even in the physical traces: It is, as he
calls it, "amphibian" in cases such as that of successive comparison (where a
relation is judged with regard to a first term which is no longer present in our
consciousness), or in attempts to recall a forgotten name (where our tentative
solutions are judged to be right or wrong by some valuing agent behind the
phenomena). It is true that a cautious discussion ofthe facts of organic fitness
yields no conclusive argument in favor ofvalue as a special operative principle
in the field ofbiology. It would seem that ifrequiredness has any place among
the events of organic nature it must coincide with some known feature of the
physical world. In fact the correlates of phenomenal requiredness are
eventually identified as specific forces and fields offorces in Faraday's sense.
It is obvious that such a parallelism between phenomenal demands and
 195

physical selective tendencies (411) extends the domain ofvalue by linking it up

with the realities of the physical world.
This is not the pI ace to discuss the far-reaching implications of such a theory,
which is advanced throughout in the spirit of a carefully weighed hypothesis
that avoids any dogmatic claims to a "monistic" solution. Köhler's familiarity
with the facts and theories of the natural sciences enables hirn to support his
theory by vast and colorful evidence. This familiarity is equalled only by his
keen interest in the phenomenological aspect of the problems. Methodolo-
gically this combination is perhaps most characteristic of the book. On the
whole, he avoids successfully the obvious danger of being carried away by
either of these interests.
The present review proposes to examine merely the phenomenological
aspects of the book. There are some explicit statements expressing Köhler' s
attitude towards phenomenology in general. He looks upon it chiefly as a
method (105), consisting in "looking at things themselves," as expressed in the
celebrated watchword "Back to the things" (46), and directed against
empiricist misinterpretations of phenomena as mere results of habit and
learning as weIl as against evolutionary errors identifying the nature of
phenomena with their origin. Phenomenological description, the core of this
method, has to make sure of the nature and the properties of things be fore
explaining them (70). For "no explanation can change a phenomenon or its
location" (71). Köhler defends phenomenology against the "phobia" of
introspectionism, i.e., the distortion of our direct experience by the dogma that
such experience is an aggregate of primitive sensory elements plus indirectly
attached meanings which the psychologist has to discard (47). He finds,
however, some justification in the criticism that Husserl has no clear criterion
for the separation of genuine phenomenological material and hypothetical
additions. Thus Husserl wants us even to "discard" as a "foreign ingredient
brought in by naturaIistic habits... any conviction about existence and
occurrence." (lncidentally, it is not quite safe to say that Husserl's pheno-
menological reduction wants to discard existential beliefs; it wants only to
suspend them and remains interested in investigating them as phenomena.)
Husserl's evidence for excluding these convictions from the pure phenomenon
appears questionable. Nevertheless in Köhler's view too phenomenology has
to precede any attempt at explanation. Both positivism and behaviorism skip
this stage which really should be the basis of a consistent positivism. His final
expression of qualified adherence should be noted - and heeded:
"For our purposes phenomenology is not to be restricted to the realm of
logic and timeless entities. If, furthermore, some exponents of phenomenology
tend, by their work, to make us believe that their occupation is necessarily
sterile, this is their fault, not that of the procedure as such. Even more
 196

important, the very vaguest speculation has sometimes found a shelter under
the roof ofphenomenology. With such aberrations we cannot wish to have any
connection" (68).
Köhler's own phenomenological analyses are mostly given in chapter I1 and
III, which form the basis for the transphenomenological part of the book.
These chapters are chiefly concerned with the phenomenology of value or,
more gene rally, of requiredness, a term introduced by Max Wertheimer.7 It
is meant to include "logic" as weH as values in the narrower sense of the
word (37).
Köhler begins with a discussion of a few outstanding theories ofthis value-
phenomenon. Plato's account is rejected as actually eliminating value from the
real world and confining it to aseparate realm of its own without clarifying the
essence of the phenomenon under consideration. Kant, who did admit
"values" among the facts, nevertheless thought that their locus was in the
structure of the human mind; and he failed to account for the concrete forms
that requiredness assumes. Naturalism, being unable to account for such a
phenomenon, tried to get rid of its last remains with notoriously disastrous
results, not only for our civilization but for science itself. It was, in Köhler's
view, Husserl's lasting merit that he reinstated the "intrinsic requiredness" of
logic as something more than a mere fact. In an admittedly simplifying
statement of Husserl's most relevant insights special stress is laid on their
timeless ideal nature as represented by such truths as "Purpie is a visual
quality which as such has its place between red and blue." Against this
modernized Platonism Köhler raises two objections. The time-indifference of
these truths would not preclude their occurrence in the world offacts unless the
meaning of the term fact is unduly restricted. And, secondly, ideal truth has
immediate bearing upon the world offacts as exemplified by the technician's
caIculations: Truth is in this sense "amphibian" (54).
Incidentally, it might be pointed out that Husserl's position in this matter is
not quite unambiguous. To be sure he is not an outspoken representative of an
"amphibian" Aristotelianism. Certainly, "eidos" and individual, though in
strict correlation, belong in general to two different spheres. However, when
Husserl traces the intuition of these "eide" back to the process of ideating
abstraction, by which we extricate species from individuals ("heraus-
schauen"), one must suspect that they were already somehow inside the
individuals.
There follows a discussion of various psychologistic attempts to explain
away autonomous intrinsic requiredness. Köhler demonstrates their inade-
quacy by confronting them with very telling counter-examples which fulfil the
conditions of the psychologistic accounts while failing to result in
requiredness.
Chapter III, which gives the actual analysis of requiredness, is of more
 197

direct phenomenological significance. It begins with a discussion of Ralph

B. Perry's subjectivistic reduction of value to interest and of his biological
interpretation of interest itself, a theory which appears to be incapable of doing
justice to the phenomena. Areal phenomenological analysis in Köhler's sense,
which penetrates the "cover of everyday staleness," shows interest to possess
the peculiar structure of a dynamic Gestalt-organization with a vector directed
from a selfto an object as its target. At first sight this might seem to be nothing
but the familiar structure of intentionality, as developed by Husserl, with its
"ego cogito cogitata mea." Köhler's view, however, goes beyond Husserl
inasmuch as in such a context the vector is characterized as a property of the
organized system, and the ensuing value-qualities as dependent properties
(83,85). However, once this structure has been revealed, there appears to be
no reason why such a vector should issue only from the valuing subject, as the
subjectivistic theory of requiredness assumes. Besides, this subjectivistic
account certainly does not agree with the plain man's convictions about value,
which Köhler hirnself espouses, for instance the value-convictions as repre-
sented in love or political hatred. Demands and the accompanying values may
just as weIl issue from the object, though there are definitely cases where value
appears as the resuIt of our interest. Accordingly Perry's attempt to explain
away objective values as mere "tertiary qualities" projected by the self into the
object and Iiable to yield to a proper effort of our attention, is found to be a case
of objectionable introspectionism (80 f.); phenomenology precludes any such
explanation by unconscious projection (80). The GestaIt-structure of
requiredness also admits of situations where the demanding vector does not
start from the selfbut from other people who expect us to behave in a certain
way. And finally there is requiredness within objective contexts as exempIified
by that occurring between the notes of a melody. To explain aIl the vectors
which phenomenally issue from objects by pathetic fallacies is simply a
falsification of the phenomena.
The analysis of requiredness is further developed in the ninth chapter on
"Facts and Forces" (336 ff.). This presentation, being more concise and no
longer complicated by the parallel discussion of the interest-theory seems,
from a systematic point of view, to deserve preference. According to it,
requiredness occurs only within a context of other data; it is adependent
characteristic; it has a transcendent reference from one datum to others in the
context; it shows demanding character either as acceptance or as rejection; and
it sometimes assurnes a "correctionist" attitude (this last feature reminds one
to a certain extent ofNicolai Hartmann's "aktuales Sollen"). In view ofthe
lack of adequate analyses of the inner structure of phenomena such as
oughtness (Sollen) even in phenomenological literature, these ac counts of
requiredness include definite phenomenological progress.
Admittedly this phenomenological analysis of requiredness and value is a
 198

simplified outline, which draws no more distinctions than necessary for the
following studies in natural philosophy. If, as here, these limitations are
explicitly stated, such a procedure is perfectly legitimate. Yet, in some cases, a
more detailed analysis might have affected even the transphenomenal results.
Thus by subsuming value under the term requiredness, simple value-
predicates receive an overcomplicated structure. Aesthetic or ethical value-
qualities in themselves do not imply any requiredness, although they might
entail it. N or would it be plausible that they form the dependent characteristics
of a requirement-system. And such value may inhere in any real object; in fact
it occurs primarily here and is not relegated to any ideal realm of values, the
connection of which with reality appeared to be so problematical.
The situation is certainly different in the case of requiredness as it occurs in
the ideal laws of logic which in their essential structure are definitely
segregated from reality. Here the problem does arise as to how far such ideal
entities can communicate with reality. For instance, once such ideallaws are
established and investigated, the question oftheir significance for real thinking
will arise. And a psychology ofthinking will certainly have to consider how it is
possible that ideal entities can direct real thought. The investigations of
Gestalt psychologists have even supplied definite evidence that in this respect
right thinking shows a different structure from wrong thinking, and that in the
case of insight time-indifferent logical relationships determine largely, if not
exclusively, the course of our thinking. 8 This position no longer involves a
psychologistic conception of logic but could rather be called a logistic
interpretation of psychological data. So long as it is the psychologists
themselves who requisition logic for this service, there is no reason to object to
such "trespassing."
A similar situation arises from the fact that Köhler, to this extent still
conforming to the subjectivistic account, includes the phenomenon of interest
within the scope ofrequiredness, and that sometimes little distinction is drawn
between demands (demanding vectors) and requiredness (which, strict1y
speaking, could be only the result of such demands). Whereas it is com-
paratively plausible that interests, valuations, or demands have an isomorphie
equivalent in selective forces within the cortex, such an equivalence would still
have to be substantiated for value, oughtness, or the ideallaws oflogic to which
they refer.
Furthermore, certain differences among the various types of requiredness
seem to be somewhat underrated. In cases where we try to remember a name
and the one we find is judged as "right" or "wrong" from somewhere behind
the phenomena, or in attempts at successive comparison between something
absent and something present we are faced with a requiredness which is only a
function of our arbitrary interest in certain data. In other words such
 199

requiredness is dependent upon a subjective requiredness, i.e., a requiredness

the vector ofwhich issues from the subject. The words "right" and "wrong" as
used in such cases of reaching or missing an arbitrarily proposed goal have a
meaning entirely different from the case where we apply them to logical
conclusions in relation to their premises or to acts of charity or truthfulness;
their requiredness seems to be independent of any subjective interests. It might
be comparatively easy to conceive of an isomorphie equivalent to requiredness
as conditioned by subjective interests. But the situation would be at least much
more complicated in the case of purely objective requiredness whether
directed from the object to the subject or confined to the relations of objects
among themselves. In such cases further buttressing would be necessary in
order to substantiate and to strengthen the isomorphistic theory of require-
ment. Still whatever the isomorphie place ofvlaue and objective requirement
in the physical world may be, this does not affect their incontestable place in
the phenomenal world and their undeniable influence upon our real life.
Another section of the book which deserves the special attention of
phenomenologists is Köhler's transition from the phenomenal to the physical
world, which forms the basis of his dualistic critical realism. F or unless the
physical world is completely denied, as the phenomenalists would have it, even
the phenomenologist will have to admit that the scientific world ofthe physicist
looks rather different from the phenomenal one. Köhler takes great pains to
justify this step "beyond phenomenology" (chapter IV) by pointing to
"transcendent references" in the phenomena themselves. And he emphasizes
that in our inferences to such a physical world we are confined to the building
materials and models supplied by the phenomenal world (143). This point is
made particularly weH in a discussion of Eddington's theory of pointer-
readings. Köhler mentions as transcendent references which like bridges rest
on one side on the phenomenal world while their other end remains in the dark
beyond, the case of our recaH ofthings to which we have temporarily no access,
although we do know that they exist beyond our phenomenal range, and later
the case ofthe influence ofthe absent term in successive comparison (273). In
these particular cases the indications are that the transcendent entiües are
memory-traces in our brain-tissue (123).
Certainly such examples prove the existence of entities beyond the horizon
of our actual phenomena. Yet this does not imply that these entities are
ultimately and in principle beyond all possible experience and that they can
never become actual phenomena, especially since, according to Köhler, even
the physical constructs are built from phenomenal material. The physical
world may be ever so remote from our phenomenal data: the dualistic separa-
tion of phenomenal and transphenomenal worlds can hardly be upheld as final.
There is evidence to believe that Köhler would not claim this either. Even from
the examples of the book, the division looks more like a fluctuating and
 200
temporary border line based either on the limitations of our momentarily
occurring field of perception or recall or on our limited human possibilities of
obtaining direct access to certain types of objects.
Elsewhere Köhler offers a very ingenious answer to the phenomenalistic
puzzle of how it is that we perceive objects as something outside our bodies
(126 ff.). Even the dualistic critical realist can account for this fact, once he
distinguishes clearly between our phenomenal body and our physical
organism. The argumentation is a development ofKöhler' s earlier discussions
of this point.
Another feature of interest to phenomenologists is Köhler's phenomenolo-
gical vindication ofthe concept offorce, which was to serve as the isomorphie
correlate of requiredness. Although no exhaustive analysis is given, a number
of essential characteristics are enumerated (342), and the concept of objective
force is effectively defended against the charge of anthropomorphism (388).9
Dynamics in Psychology is a purely psychological study of a more technical
character. Its main interest is directed toward the transphenomenological
field. It reports some remarkable experimental results on the structure,
organization and dynamics of visual perception and discusses their signifi-
cance in the biological context of isomorphism. F araday' s concept of fields of
force is found to throw new light on the situation, since perceptual organization
shows dynamical features of a structure simiJar to that of electric currents.
There can be little doubt as to the existence of such field-action in the brain-
tissue.
Some methodologie al considerations in the first chapter, "The W ays of
Psychology," are not without phenomenological interest. Köhler starts out by
raising the question of how it is that psychology cannot riyal the other natural
sciences in the impressiveness of its results. His answer is that psychology as
distinguished from physics for example, cannot discover any totally
unknown facts. All its real discoveries concern "facts of functional relation-
ships" between phenomena which as such are known to everybody. A
large and important section of these relationships are hidden and can be
discovered only by inductive, i.e., by indirect procedures. On the other hand
these hidden relationships may contribute to an understanding ofhow and why
our various experiences originate (3 ff.). For instance, the discovery of certain
hidden relationships might make it intelligible why even reasonable pre-
ferences and aversions are changed by satiation (38).
The kind ofunderstanding which the author has in mind here is explanation
by scientific theory as illustrated by physical examples (119 ff.), in the case of
retention and recall, for instance, in terms ofthe dynamics ofmemory-traces.
No teleological intelligibility is envisaged. In cases where there is no obvious
coherence among our phenomenal data and where for reasons of principle
some kind of connection must still be assumed, even the phenomenologist must
 201

allow for inductive theories ofthe physicallinks among the brain-correlates of

our phenomena. Such explanation by inductively established hidden relation-
ships certainly me ans an important addition to our knowledge.
Köhler himself points out that among our phenomena there are also directly
observable intelligible relationships which are indispensable in our investi-
gation of the hidden relationships. Thus the application of such concepts as
causal relationship could not be justitied except on phenomenological
grounds (38); and Köhler affirms that we often do experience one event
growing out of another, not merely following it (37). Even the term
"functional dependence" would not make any sense unless a corresponding
phenomenon had been experienced somewhere (38).
Thus it appears that in Köhler' s view, despite the lack of spectacular results,
phenomenological psychology forms the basis of transphenomenological
psychology with its more striking achievements. One might add that to throw
the fulllight of phenomenological analysis and description upon phenomena is
often more important than to discover facts which are hidden somewhere
beyond our present range of phenomena. The significant thing brought out with
such gratifying explicitness in the two books remains the fact that psychology
and in particular the inductive psychology of hidden functional relationships
will have to resort to phenomenological intuition as the ultimate foundation for
and justification of whatever hypothetical constructions it might have to
introduce.

NOTES

1 From Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (1941), 377-86.

2 Logische Untersuchungen, 2nd ed., Halle, 1913, vol. 11, 1, p. 234.
3 Cf. Wolfgang Köhler, Gestalt Psychology, 3rd ed. New York, 1929, chapters I-III.
4 Cf. e.g., Kurt Koftka, Principles o/Gestalt Psychology, New York, 1935, pp. 73, 570 f.
5 Psychologische Forschung, vol. XII (1929), pp. 279 ff. For a fuller account see my
Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry. Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1972, pp. 67-82.
6 The parallel with the beginning ofHusserl's Crisis o/the European Sciences of 1936 is striking.
7 "Some Problems in the Theory of Ethics" (Social Research, vol. 11, 1935, pp. 353 ff.). The
term does not seem to have any definite equivalent in the preceding German literature; it would
have to be rendered by "sachliche Gefordertheit."
8 Cf. e.g., Koftka, Principles 0/ Gestalt Psychology, pp. 570 f., 614.
9 For a similar attempt by the phenomenological method see The Phenomenological Movement,
Chapter XV.
 15. THE PUZZLE OF WITTGENSTEIN'S
PHANoMENOLOGIE (1929-?)!

The puzzle about Ludwig Wittgenstein's phenomenology which I would like to

discuss is on the face of it merely historical. It concems one of the most recent
publications from his posthumous papers, his Philosophische Bemerkungen. 2
The source of this puzzle is that here for the first time the term Phänomeno-
logie appears plainly and repeatedly in Wittgenstein's own published writings.
What is the meaning and importance of this fact, which does not yet seem to
have attracted attention?3 Since it is too late to consult Wittgenstein himself, it
has become impossible to answer this question with finality. But this
melancholy fact is no good reason for shirking the issue.
I should first explain why this point seems so remarkable and puzzling to me
personally. When the first edition of my historical introduction to the
Phenomenological Movement appeared in 1960,4 I was under the definite
impression that Wittgenstein had no interest whatsoever in phenomenology
and probably shared the low estimate of it held by his friend Moritz Schlick in
his writings. Al1 the same, certain passages in the Philosophical Investiga-
tions had given me the impression ofunconscious rapprochements between the
later Wittgenstein and phenomenology. Then, in 1963, I came across Rush
Rhees's article on Alexander Maslow's Introduction to the "Tractatus'':; in
which, in discussing Maslow's positivistic interpretation, he mentioned
casually the fact that in 1929 Wittgenstein had discussed the idea of a
phenomenologicallanguage and postulated a purely phenomenological theory
of colors; that, however, he had abandoned the idea of a phenomenological
language a few months after he had suggested it, but had "for a time" continued
to speak of a " 'phenomenology' as concemed with the gramm ars or the
possibilities of the various sensory fields." Now the Philosophische Bemer-
kungen brings unexpectedly rich confirmation ofthese hints. Unfortunately,
this new evidence may be still incomplete, since there is more unpublished
material from this period about which I have been unable to obtain sufficient
information thus far.
N ow what is the puzzle about this new evidence? Actually it poses a host of
such puzzles. The following are the ones which impress me as particularly
significant or at least intriguing:
1. What did Wittgenstein really mean by Phänomenologie?
 203

2. When did he adopt it? For what reasons? What were his relations to the
Phenomenological Movement of the time?
3. How far did he abandon this Phänomenologie? When? For what
reasons?
4. What was its role in Wittgenstein's development?
5. What is its philosophical merit?
6. What is its significance for other phenomenologists?
Some ofthese questions can probably never be answered. Some require full
access to Wittgenstein's and others' extant papers and correspondences.
All ofthem presuppose a much fuller knowledge ofWittgenstein's philosophy
than I can muster. This is why I approach the subject with considerable
diffidence. At least I shall try to lean over backwards in an attempt not to over-
estimate the available evidence and not to jump to unwarranted reconstructive
conclusions. But the subject seems to me important enough to justify even an
intruder's questions and to urge those in a better position to take over from
here. For this is not merely achallenge for historical detectives. It is an
opportunity for opening some new windows and for dialogues between
Wittgensteinians and phenomenologists in search of common ground and
meaningful dissents.

I. THE TEXTUAL FACTS AND THE PUZZLE OF MEANING

As far as I have been able to make out, the words Phänomenologie and
phänomenologische appear at least twelve times in the text of the Philo- [1]
sophische Bemerkungen6 (the noun fourtimes, the adjective eight times). Four
of these references occur in Chap. I (ffi 1 and 4), two in Chap. VI
(both in § 57), one in Chap. VII (§ 75), two in Chap. XX ( ~ 213 and 217),
one in Chap. XXI (§218), and two in Chap. XXII (~224 and 230). This
means that the pertinent passages appear throughout·the text, with a slight
clustering at the very beginning and again toward the end. So Wittgenstein's
phenomenology is clearly a pervading theme of the book, not merely an
incidental side issue.
However, none of these twelve passages contains an explicit definition or
discussion of the meaning of the terms. Thus the only way to determine their
connotation is to approach it by starting from their denotations, i.e., by
watching their use in the contexts of their occurrence.
Here I shall not attempt to carry out such a comparative analysis in detail.
Specifically I shall not quote all the pertinent passages and translate them in
full. Instead I shall simply report my main findings and illustrate them by brief
excerpts. However, the main texts with my translations can be found in the
Appendix below.
 204
U nfortunately, my comparisons of the texts do not support the conclusion
that Wittgenstein had arrived at a clear and unified conception of his
Phänomenologie. Rather I seem to perceive two different, though related
conceptions. A relatively simple and clear one emerges from most of the
passages in which the adjective phänomenologisch is used; for instance, in the
ones where Wittgenstein refers to "phenomenological investigation of sense
impressions" ( § 224), to their "phenomenological description" ( § 230), to a
"phenomenological language" used in the description of immediate
experience (ffi 1, 213), to "phenomenological geometry," as opposed to
physical geometry for picturing visual space, and to" phenomenological color
theory" in contrast to physicalistic, physiological, and psychological color theory
( § 218). In all these cases the modifYing adjective seems to characterize distinctive
approaches to the phenomena of direct experience. Phenomenology in this
sense would then be a certain kind of study of the phenomena as given in
experience. This study may be distinguished from other approaches ·in the
following manner:

(1) Its task is to describe, not to explain.

(2) 1t differs from physics, which deals with explanatory laws ofhypothetical entities, such as
light waves. [Note here that Wittgenstein did not consider the possibility of a phenomeno-
logical physics in the style of Ernst Mach. For his own phenomenology is to be "pure"
(§ 218), i.e., free from all ingredients from the natural sciences.]
(3) It differs likewise from physiology, which concentrates on sense organs and nerve
processes.
(4) It even differs from psychology insofar as the latter is an aposteriori science using
experiments, e.g., in the study of afterimages, whereas phenomenology is an apriori
study, exemplified by its study of the color octahedron. ( § 1)
(5) Its goal is to grasp and describe the essential features or the essence (Wesen) of the
experience. (§ §l, 57)

In connection with the descriptive function of this phenomenology, it is

important to clarify Wittgenstein's conception ofphenomenologicallanguage,
which is at first sight confusing and certainly not sufficiently developed. F or on
the one hand Wittgenstein teils us "Now phenomenological language or
'primary language,' as I have called it, does not stand be fore me as a goal: now I
no longer consider it necessary" ( § 1). This formulation implies that prior to
PB, Wittgenstein had entertained the ambitious project of a much more
comprehensive language for phenomenological purposes. In fact, in one ofthe
conversations in Vienna reported by Friedrich Waismann,7 Wittgenstein
referred explicitly to his earlier belief in a primary language (Primärsprache )
which can express "what we really know, i.e., the phenomena." But only a few
lines later in PB (§ 1) he states: "a realization of what is essential to our
language and what is unessential for description ... amounts to the construct-
ion of a phenomenologicallanguage." These sentences suggest that we have
to distinguish between a primary and a secondary phenomenologicallanguage:
 205

the primary one pursuing the project, now declared dispensable, of describing
experience in all its complexity without any selection, the other based on the
essentials of our language. It is this second (constructed) language which
allows us to grasp the "essence" ofthe described, apparently one ofthe major
goals of Wittgenstein's descriptive phenomenology.
His other conception ofphenomenology seems to emerge from two passages
in wh ich the noun "phenomenology" is used in a more than incidental fashion
(!§land4):

Phenomenology statfls merely what is possible. . . . It would be the gramm ar for the description of
those facts upon which physics erects its theories .... ( § 1) ... Isn't the theory ofharmony at least
in part phenomenology, hence grammar? (§4)

Clearly this phenomenology is no longer in direct touch with the actual

phenomena, but at best with the possibility of such phenomena. But its real
function is that of a "grammar." Wittgenstein's conception of"grammar" is
known to be one ofthe most crucial and at the same time enigmatic concepts of
his later philosophy. But here the important point is that it deals with
descriptions, not with what is described ( § 1). Its function is to supply the
framework which can be used in the description of concrete facts, much as the
theory of harmony does for music and the theory ofcolor for chromatic data.
Now, such a "grammar for description" is clearly no longer dealing directly
with phenomena, as did the first type of phenomenology. In this sense it would
be a metaphenomenology rather than a phenomenology.
Wittgenstein's first conception ofphenomenology is not particularly new.1t
is certainly in line with the conception of a descriptive science which can be
found repeatedly long before Husserl's phenomenology. However, Witt-
genstein's insistence on purity in the sense offreedom from scientific theories
is not equally frequent and is worth stressing. Even more remarkable is the
interest in grasping essences. At this point one may indeed begin to think of
possible relations to the phenomenology ofthe Phenomenological Movement.
However, Wittgenstein's second conception, that of a gramm ar for phe-
nomenological descriptions, strikes me as completely original. I can think only
of one comparable precedent: that of C. S. Peirce's "phenomenology" or
"phaneroscopy," conceived as a system of the categories of firstness,
secondness, and thirdness. But it seems highly unlikely that at the time
Wittgenstein would have had any inkling of this part of Peirce' s philosophy,
which became known only since 1931 through the edition ofPeirce's Collected
Papers. 8

2. THE PUZZLE OF THE ORIGIN OF WITTGENSTEIN'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Before discussing the origins ofWittgenstein's Phänomenologie in PB, I would

 206
like to give some general information about the book itself. It is important to
realize that in spite of its seemingly casual title Bemerkungen (remarks) - a title
which explicitly or implicitly applies to all ofWittgenstein's publications since
the Traetatus - and in contrast to such works as the Remarks on the
Foundations ofMathema ties (1956) this book was planned for publication. In
fact, after completing it and turning it over to G. E. Moore toward the end of
1930, Wittgenstein composed a remarkable preface for it which shows how
much this text meant for hirn as a sampie of a very new and untimely kind of
philosophy. A motto from St. Augustine attached to the manuscript alluding to
the difficulties of the journey also testifies to Wittgenstein's belief in the
importance of this work at the time of its conception.
Already the mere size ofthis book is impressive. For even after deducting
Rush Rhees' s 35 pages of summarizing preview at the start and the 29 pages of
Friedrich Waismann's notes about conversations with Wittgenstein from this
period, the remaining 281 pages exceed the number of pages of each of his
other works, even the Philosophieall nvestigations (although this is probably
not true of the number of words).
One of the unusual features of Rhees's edition is that it consists of a
completely German text without the accustomed facing translation, and that
even the editor's note at the end of the book, published by the British firm of
Basil Blackwell, is completely in German. I wonder why. In any case for some
timethis makes the present work inacessible to Anglo-American admirers of
Wittgenstein who are unfamiliar with ordinary German, until G. E. M.
Anscombe's forthcoming translation9 is available. f21
The editor's notes on the last two pages inform us that the book is based on
entries in notebooks which Wittgenstein kept from F ebruary 1929, i.e., almost
immediately after the beginning of his second residence in Cambridge
(according to G. E. Moore in January) until July 1930. However, the
subsequent typescript contained a new arrangement of those notes which
Wittgenstein selected for the book, apparently in the order now published.
However, since according to the editor (p. 347) Wittgenstein did not divide the
book into chapters, number the entries, and make a table of contents, it may be
assumed that Rhees is responsible not only for the initial summary, but for all
the divisions of the present text.
In its published form the book is divided into twenty-two "chapters" and
subdivided into sub-sections of varying length, which are numbered con-
secutively throughout the volume. No titles are assigned to the chapters. I
would describe Chaps. I to VII as dealing roughly with general problems of
philosophy and language, Chaps. VIII-IX with problems of color, Chaps.
X-XIX with such problems of mathematics as number and infinity, Chaps.
XXI-XXII as again with questions of color, and the last chapter with the
subject ofhypotheses. In other words, I cannot find a clear logical structure in
 207

the book, even after its editorial organization. But, after all, where can such
structure be found in Wittgenstein's other writings since the Tractatus?
It also seems pertinent to mention briefly the antecedents ofthis work with a
view to determining the pi ace of the new phenomenology in relation to
Wittgenstein's earlier writings. It hardly has to be pointed out that the
Tractatus, finished in 1918 and published in 1922, contains no references,
explicit or implicit, to phenomenology. While it seems possible to find some
illuminating paralleis to Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen,1O indications
are that Wittgenstein hirns elf had no interest in them. 11
Wittgenstein's return to philosophy around 1926, after its seeming liquida-
tion in the Tractatus, brought hirn in contact with the Vienna Circle and,
apparently even more momentous, with the protagonist of intuitionist mathe-
matics, L. E. l. Brouwer. But there is no evidence that this meant an exposure
to phenomenology. Immediately after Wittgenstein's arrival in Cambridge, he
launched into prolific writing. It is more than likely that his first completed
piece was the paper, "Some Remarks on Logical Form," which was printed in
the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Societi 2 ahead of its lune Meeting,
where, however, Wittgenstein discarded it in favor of a different piece on
infinity, possibly based on what can now be found in PB, Chap. XV. Again this
paper did not mention phenomenology explicitly. But it did contain some very
telling anticipations of it. On the face of it, the paper shows Wittgenstein in
search of a system of atomic propositions which cannot be derived from
ordinary language. In order to obtain it, he now postulated a new language or
symbolism which has to be based on the

inspecting of the phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying to understand logical
multiplicity. That is to say, we can only arrive at a correct analysis by, what might be called, the
logical analysis of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain sense aposteriori, and not by
conjecturing about apriori possibilities. (P. 163)

This means that it is the phenomena - a term which Wittgenstein uses he re for
the first time prominently - rather than ordinary language which have to teach
us about the structure of atomic propositions. The "logicai" analysis ofthese
phenomena is to suppIy us with the

forms of space and time and with the manifold of spatial and temporal objects, with colors and
sounds and their gradations, continuous transitions and combinations in various proportions, all of
which we cannot seize by our ordinary means of expression. (P. 165)

At the end of the article we are told again that rules for atomic propositions
cannot be Iaid down,

until we have actually reached the ultimate analysis ofthe phenomena in question. This, as we all
know, has not yet been achieved. (P. 171)
 208

What else is missing here but the actual name "phenomenology?"

About Wittgenstein's other amazing output during this period a list in front
of B. F. McGuiness' German edition of Waismann's notes about the
Wittgenstein conversations with the Vienna Circle of 1929 and 1930 gives
some tantalizing information. I 3 It refers to five major items preceding the B lue
Book of 1933, three ofthem containing material from ten manuscript volumes,
namely the PB, a set of extracts from the same (770 pages oftypescript), and a
new text, the Philosophische Grammatik of 1932 (768 typewritten pages) 13]
plus a text, Grundlagen der Mathematik, apparently repeating the last 240
pages ofthe Grammar. Thus far I have been unable to obtain any information
about the question of whether they contain any further references to and
discussion of Phänomenologie. However, the title Grammatik reminds
immediately of one of the characterizations of Phänomenologie in PB ( §3 1
and 7; see latter part of Sect. 1 above).
Another important event during this period was Wittgenstein's Christmas
visit back in Vienna, during which Waismann recorded six conversations at
Moritz Schlick's home. 14 As the editor teIls us in his preface,

Wittgenstein had to report results ofhis work in Cambridge .... But before the end ofthe vacations
he had obviously finished the interpretation of the ideas he had already formulated; for then one
finds quite frequently remarks. questions and debates with Schlick and Waismann as weil as
unprepared discussions of Wittgenstein about ideas of Husserl, Heidegger, and Weyl.

Now Waismann's report about the third meeting on December 25, 1929,
clearly still as part of Wittgenstein's report, contains a section of nine lines
under the heading "Physik und Phänomenologie," where Phänomenologie,
in contrast to physics, which merely records regularities, deals with what is
possible, Le., with meaning, not with truth and falsehood. While the editor teIls
us specificaIly to use Waismann's account with the greatest caution, it goes [4]
together very weIl with the passages in PB. Wh at it also shows clearly is that
Wittgenstein made a special point of including Phänomenologie among the
findings of his Cambridge year. Later on, just before the end of the same
conversation, Waismann heads a subsection by the title " Anti-Husserl." It is
introduced by a question from Schlick, in which he inquires about Witt-
genstein's answer to "a philosopher who thinks that the statements of
phenomenology are synthetic judgments apriori" (p. 671). Wittgenstein' s
answer is apparently the only place on record where he refers to Husserl by
name. But it is by no means clear that he rejected Husserl on the basis of direct
knowledge or rather on the strength ofthe picture he received from Schlick's
question, which may weIl have been the result of Schlick' s surprise at suddenly
hearing Wittgenstein talk Phänomenologie and state his own stake in the
issue. For Schlick was engaged in a running battle with Husserl in his
Erkenntnislehre, foilowed by his later article "Gibt es ein materiales A
 209

Priori?"15 In any case, it would seem that Wittgenstein was noncommittal

about the relation of his own Phänomenologie to Husserl's. He merely
rejected a particular doctrine of it as presented by Schlick.
Immediately after his return to Cambridge in January 1930 Wittgenstein
began his Cambridge lectures, about which G. E. Moore gave a selective
account from the very beginning to 1933. 16 This account does not contain the
term nor the conception of phenomenology, although it does show Witt-
genstein's struggle with the idea of a philosophical grammar. "Pheno-
menology" does not figure either in the B lue Book (1933) or the Brown Book
(1935), nor does it occur in the undated slips of Zettel, most of which,
according to the editors, go back to 1941-1948.'7 This may therefore be the
proper point for stopping my factual account of the early fortunes of
Wittgenstein's phenomenology.
I shall now turn to possible reasons for its introduction and first consider
reasons for the adoption ofthe conception and then ofthe term. Any attempt to
understand a particular development in Wittgenstein's thought in the laie
twenties has to take account of the major change after the Tractatus: the
gradual abandonment of logical atomism. In his chapter describing this
process George Pitcher18 distinguishes five specific points, two ofwhich seem
to me particularly pertinent to the development of the new phenomenology:
1. Analysis no longer leads to atomic facts, but can lead to "things":
This is borne out by the fact that the Aristotelian Society paper of 1929 (SR)
no longer mentions "facts" as the proper objects of analysis. Instead it uses the
term "phenomenon," absent from the Tractatus (except for an incidental and
irrelevant use in 6.423). The same seems to apply to PB.
2. The belief in simple atoms is abandoned: This is apparently not yet the
case in SR. For here the search for the "terms" ofthe atomic propositions is
assigned to theory of knowledge. This search is caIIed "very difficultand
Philosophy has hardly yet begun to tackle it." It has to be done on an a
posteriori basis.
In PB the solution of this task is declared unnecessary, at least if it is
undertaken by the "primary" phenomenological language. But Wittgenstein is
still hopeful that a new "phenomenological language" can meet the needs of a
description of the data in their complexity. Thus it would seem that
phenomenology is destined to provide the missing foundation for logical
atomism. Seen in this light this would of course only be a holding action for the
philosophy ofthe Tractatus as such to be overtaken by the "new philosophy"
after the break of 1933. But it does not yet mean that phenomenology will share
the fate of logical atomism.
However, these facts do not yet explain why Wittgenstein adopted the term
"phenomenology." To put the matter in the most paradoxical form: Why
would Wittgenstein, just returned to Cambridge from the Continent. imme-
 210

diately talk, or at least write, "phenomenology," a term which he may never

have used while still in Vienna and which would hardly win hirn a sympathetic
hearing in England? For at best it would have been identified with Husserl's
phenomenology, which in the twenties had aroused a certain interest in the
wake of his London lectures of 1922 and his article on "Phenomenology" in
the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1929. Could this have been a holdover from
his Austrian past?
There is no evidence for his having talked phenomenology in Vienna before
1929. Even so, one might suspect that he had picked up the term and some of
its connotations before crossing the Channel. Now what are the chances ofhis
having been in touch with phenomenology in Austria? During the years when
he belonged to the periphery of the Vienna Circle, Husserl, the native
Austrian, had few, if any, followers in Vienna, and the Brentano atmosphere
had evaporated, although phenomenology was part ofthe general atmosphere
everywhere in Germany and Austria at the time. The only member of the
Vienna Circle who also had a live interest in Husserl's phenomenology was
Felix Kaufmann. But there is no evidence for, and little likelihood of, any
direct connections between hirn and Wittgenstein. 19 Also, Wittgenstein [5]
could hardly have absorbed phenomenology from his closer friends Moritz
Schlick and Friedrich Waismann. Of these Schlick was violently opposed to
Husserl, criticizing phenomenology in several of his writings and in fact
comparing Husserl unfavorably with Wittgenstein. 20 But this would scarcely
account for Wittgenstein's adoption ofphenomenological terminology on the
other side of the Channel, although it would account for at least some
acquaintance with the subject.
A more likely explanation for Wittgenstein's positive attitude toward
phenomenology would be his knowledge ofRudolf Carnap' s conception of it in
his Der Logische Aufbau der Welt of 1928. In fact, indirectly such
an explanation could lead back to Husserl hirnself. For, according to
information for which I am indebted to Herbert Feigl, Carnap, during
his stay in Buchenbach near Freiburg from ,about 1922 to 1925, attended
Husserl's seminars from summer semester 1924 to summer semester
1925 (Husserl-Chronik, p. 281), although he does not seem to have been
greatly impressed by its content but merely by the deep personal commitment
ofHusserl's philosophizing. More important are the traces ofCarnap's study
of Husserl's works in the Logische Aufbau itself, which contains five
references to Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen and to the Ideen, none of
them critical. Actually Carnap wrote the first version of his book in
Buchenbach between 1922 and 1925" However, Carnap' s own conception of
phenomenology, as indicated in five other pI aces of the text (pp. 67, 93, 106,
150, 152), is by no means identical with Husserl's. Its main function is to
analyze our Erlebnisse (experiences). Other topics mentioned by Carnap are
 211

qualities, values, and cultural knowledge. In some pI aces the term phenomeno-
logy is used interchangeably with Gegenstandstheorie (theory of objects),
probably in Meinong's sense, in others with psychology. But since Camap
expressly rejects the psychological interpretation (Psychologisierung) of
values, one gathers that he too was opposed to psychologism.
Now even Camap's conception ofphenomenology does not coincide with
Wittgenstein's in PB. Both stress analysis of phenomena. But at least the
examples mentioned by Camap outnumber Wittgenstein's considerably.
Also, at the time Camap seemed to be much less concemed with problems of
phenomenological description than was Wittgenstein. N evertheless, Witt-
genstein's conception comes much closer to Camap's than to the much more
sophisticated one of Husserl, especially in the late twenties. In suggesting the
possibility of a connection between Camap's and Wittgenstein's conceptions
ofphenomenology one must, however, be aware ofthe fact that, according to
Camap's account in his autobiography,21 their personal relations were rather
tenuous, if not strained.
But even more important is a general proviso which one should attach to any
speculations about possible influences on a thinker ofWittgenstein's cast. Not
only in general is "influence" a very complex affair, presupposing receptive-
ness on the part of the recipient: In the case of a Wittgenstein it could hardly
ever amount to more than a stimulant and a trigger for his own thinking. The
most I would therefore dare hypothesize is that some of the talk and writing
about phenomenology that was in the air when Wittgenstein left Vienna drifted
into his thinking, and that he picked it up when he was faced with the task of
presenting his ideas to a new audience, possibly more receptive for the new
label. What underlies such a possible "influence" is the fact that thinkers as
independent as Husserl, Camap, and Wittgenstein, all looking for deeper
foundations of their logical studies, converged independently on the need of a
fuller study of the phenomena. Actually, such parallelism would mean a much
more valuable confirmation of the validity of their investigations than causal
inter action.

3. THE PUZZLE OF THE VANISHING OF WITTGENSTEIN'S

PHENOMENOLOGY

When did phenomenology disappear from Wittgenstein' s writing and thought?

How far did it vanish at all? As far as the term is concemed, all that can be said
at this time is that it does not occur in Wittgenstein's published writings,
beginning with theBlue Book. Also, Rhees, in his article in The Philosophical
Review of 1963, in stating that Wittgenstein spoke of phenomenology "for a
time" even after he had abandoned "phenomenological language after a few
 212

months," implied that he ceased to do so later (p. 218). Until the bulk ofthe
manuscripts between 1929 and 1933 becomes generally accessible, the date of
the Blue Book is the terminus ad quem. [6]
However, what is much more significant than the question ofterminology is
that of the underlying conception. How far did Wittgenstein abandon it at all? I
find this by no me ans easy to decide. Here I shall simply state the case for
maintaining the survival of Wittgenstein's phenomenology even without the
label. However, I shall refrain from giving a detailed exegesis ofthe texts which
could suport this thesis. The following seem to me the main reasons on which it
could be based:

(1) Wittgenstein continued to refer to phenomena and to the need of watching them [7]
(schauen) as an essential part of his later investigations. This is particularly true of his
studies in philosophical psychology (e.g., on thinking, reading, etc.).
(2) He continued to think of his enterprise as merely descriplive (e.g., Blue Book, p. 18;
Brown'Book, p. 125; Philosophical Investigations, pp. 109, 124).
(3) Even in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein showed continued interest in
determining the essence ( Wesen) of the phenomena. This implies the exploration of what
is essentia\1y possible, impossible, or necessary in the phenomena, not only how we speak
about them. Perhaps the most significant evidence in this context is the enigmatic
aphorism: "The essence is expressed by grammar." (PI §371) For it also implies the
connection with the enterprise which in PB was the equivalent of phenomenology: the
gramm ar of our descriptive language, of sounds, and of colors. In making this point, I
hasten to add that the whole concept of essence in Wittgenstein' s philosophy is in need of a
thorough study. While his essences often seem to be merely "nominal," he seems to me
anything but an easygoing nominalist - nor is H usserl a Platonic realist!

The final decision seems to me to depend on the answer to the question: How
far is Wittgenstein's conception of a philosophicalgrammar not only the heir
ofhis phenomenology but its identical continuation? Now this central concept
in Wittgenstein' s later philosophy is certainly anything but clear and simple. 22
After the failure of so many of his students, beginning with G. E. Moore, I
certainly shall not claim that I understand it any better. The major difficulty, as
I see it, is that it is never quite clear whether Wittgenstein's philosophical
grammar is a grammar oflanguage or a gramm ar of phenomena. Even as far as
the former is concerned, Wittgenstein stresses the question ofthe rules for the
use of words, rather than merely those for their forms (morphology) and
arrangement (syntax) as in traditional grammar, thus widening the meaning of
the term to include semantics or semasiology. But in talking of a grammar of
harmonies, colors, other sense qualities, and of space, he is advocating a
completely new and personal conception. Now, insofar as this second
grammar is a systematic study of the phenomena and not only one ofthe words
referring to them, it would indeed take over the role of the phenomenology of
PB. And ifthis is the case, then it could certainly be argued that Wittgenstein
never abandoned phenomenology, but merely ceased to call it by this name
rather than by a more conventional one, i.e., grammar.
 213

This still leaves us with the puzzle about Wittgenstein's reasons for
abandoning the term Phänomenologie. As a general explanation I can only
suggest Wittgenstein's sustained effort to avoid technicaljargon, increased in
his later philosophy by his aversion to reliance upon constructed ideal
languages - including "phenomenological language" - rather than ordinary
language. In this respect his dropping of the term "phenomenology" would
parallel Heidegger's since Sein und Zeit, when he began to turn away from all
such technical expressions. 23
However, there is at least one more specific clue which, subject to further
checking, may lead to apartial explanation. In January 1930, one year after his
arrival in Cambridge, Wittgenstein began his lecturing. Among his listeners
from the very start was G. E. Moore, whose account ofthese lectures in Mind
(1950) gave a very informative, though by no means uncritical, idea of what
went on. Now it appears that at the very beginning of the first lectures
Wittgenstein took up the topic of"rules of grammar," a discussion which, as
Moore teils us, "puzzled rne extremely."24 The account of Wittgenstein's
treatment of this subject (on p. 271) makes it perfectly clear that what
Wittgenstein was talking about was precisely what in PB he had called
Phänomenologie, namely "the arrangement of colors in the color octa-
hedron," which was "really apart of grammar, not of psychology." Moore
added that he was so upset about Wittgenstein' s departure from the ordinary
sense of the phrase "rules of grammar" that he wrote "a short paper about
ihis." He also intimated that Wittgenstein later became doubtful about this
point and referred to his own use as his "jargon."
This makes me wonder whether Wittgenstein, in presenting his ideas, ever
went so far as to inject the additional "jargon" of phenomenology from his
simultaneous preparations for PB. Kar! Britton, to be sure in describing the
situation in Wittgenstein's seminar one year later, teils us:

We feit that Wittgenstein addressed hirnself chiefly to Moore, although Moore seldom intervened
and often seemed to be very disapproving. Sometimes the lecturer appealed to hirn, but my
recollection is thatMoore's replies were usuallyvery discouragingindeed. At all events we had the
impression that a kind of dialogue was going on between Moore and Wittgenstein even when
Moore was least obviously being "brought in.,,25

Under these circumstances I would like to couch my hypothesis about the

disappearance of the term "phenomenology" in the form of a question: Could
it be the case that Moore's re action to Wittgenstein's use of the word
"grammar" and to other departures from ordinary language discouraged hirn
so much that he refrained from introducing the additional solecism of
"phenomenology" into his lectures? The test of this hypothesis could be in
Moore's "short paper," if it still survives, or more conclusively in the "six
volumes" of" very full notes" which, as Moore teils uS,he "scribbled" in his [8]
 214

notebooks. Of course the term still survived in the German text of PB which,
according to Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein lcft with Moore "probably toward the
end of 1930." One wonders wh ether Moore ever read and discussed the
typescript with Wittgenstein before tuming it over to the editors of Witt-
genstein's posthumous writings after his death in 1951. All the same,
Wittgenstein must have come to the conclusion that the use of phenomeno-
logical terminology would be of little help in presenting his philosophy in
Cambridge, as he may have thought at first.
How far did the disappearance of the name Phänomenologie mean that
Wittgenstein lost interest in the ideas of others who continued to use it? Here 1
would like simply to add a remarkable piece of information which 1 owe to
Professor G. H. von Wright, who in answering some of my questions
concluded with the following paragraph:

Perhaps it is of some interest to mention here that Wittgenstein in the last year ofhis life did much
work on a problem-complex which had always greatly interested hirn, viz. colour-concepts. He
was at the time reading Goethe's Farbenlehre, and we had discussions on it and on his own
problems and views. He then often used to say that what he was doing was of a kind some
philosophers call "phenomenology." But he did not hirnselfwant to call it by that name - and I
think I can partly see why. His attitude is connected, I believe, with the stress he wanted to lay on
language in his philosophical inquiries. For this reason, incidentally, Wittgenstein's use ofthe
term "grammar" (or "logical grammar") should be of great interest to phenomenologists.

It is indeed. It also shows that Wittgenstein did not turn his back on
"phenomenology" and not even on the "phenomenologists."

4. THE PUZZLE OF THE "PHENOMENOLOGICAL" INTERLUDE

A much deeper and more difficult historical puzzle concems the role of the
phenomenological interlude in Wittgenstein's development. Assuming that
the real break between Wittgenstein (I) and Wittgenstein (11) lies around
1933, just before the Blue Book as for instance von Wright asserts, one might
share his estimate that the PB and a good deal of its content "represent a
transitional stage" from the Tractatus to a "radically new philosophy," during
which he was" fighting his way out of the Tractatus. " But this does not excuse
one from studying this transition in detail and spotting the appearance of the
really new ideas along with the merely temporary innovations.
Personally 1 have not yet come to any conclusions about the role ofthe new
phenomenology in preparing the way to Wittgenstein (11). This has to be done
by the seasoned Wittgenstein specialists. All 1 am prepared to suggest is what 1
aiready implied in my hypothesis about the origins of this conception: (1) that
the new attention to the phenomena at the base of atomic facts not onIy
we.akened the hold ofthe older conception, but it also prepared a way to the less
 215

formal investigations ofthe later philosophy, Le., not only to the new attitude
toward "ordinary language" but also to the phenomena which it reflects;
(2) that phenomenology also made Wittgenstein give special attention to the
need for overcoming the complexity of these phenomena by studying the
essentials of language and the "grammar" of the phenomena.
It is true that in the process Wittgenstein changed his view of phenomeno-
logicallanguage and even abandoned all reference to it and to phenomenology
as such. Nevertheless they may have been essential stones on the way to his
final philosophy.
I would therefore not go so far as to suggest that the sheer bulk of new
material, published and unpublished, from this period calls for the insertion of
a new stage in the periodization of Wittgenstein's philosophizing. The
evidence is still too incomplete for proposing such a drastic revision. Also, the
new period seems to have been too short and Wittgenstein' s own later estimate
of it too negative in order to call it more than an interlude. But it seems safe to
maintain that Wittgenstein's phenomenology was an important, if not
essential, station on his road from logical atomism to the philosophical
gramm ar of the Philosophiea/ Investigations. At least for this reason it will
des erve intensive study once the evidence is fully accessible.

5. TOWARD AN APPRAISAL OF WITTGENSTEIN'S

PHENOMENOLOGY

It is also still too early to give more than a tentative and conditional evaluation
ofwhat is thus far known about Wittgenstein's phenomenology. Nevertheless,
even at this stage some of the merits and possible demerits of his conception
can be stated, if only in the spirit ofwaiting for evidence which may support or
refute a hypothesis.
I must confess that, as far as intrinsic value is concerned, I find it difficult to
become very enthusiastic about the shape ofWittgenstein' s phenomenology as
it has come down to us in PB. Quite apart from the aphoristic style which this
book shares with all his writings after the Tra eta tus , his conception of
phenomenology as it emerges from PB is anything but clear. And even after
adding to it the whole range ofthe philosophical gramm ar as it developed in his
subsequent writings, there remain so many dark and ambiguous corners that I
hesitate to claim for it more than the merit of a seminal idea which Wittgenstein
himself could not unfold.
Of course even more serious would be downright contradictions in the text.
Ofthese at least one near-contradiction is disturbing and suggests the need for
much fuller development: that in his conception of a phenomenological
language. A similar near-contradiction is that, while the Aristotelian Society
 216

paper (SR) characterizes the analysis of the phenomena as aposteriori,

according to PB phenomenology is to be apriori.
But this does not stand in the way of paying tribute to some important
insights in PB. Among these I would nominate:

(1) There is need for going to the phenomena as the basis for any logico-philosophical treatise.
(2) Essences are indispensable for the description of the phenomena in their complexity.
(3) Pure descriptive phenomenology free of hypotheses from physics, physiology, and
empirical psychology is the necessary prerequisite for explanatory science.
(4) A" grammar" of the phenomena caUs for the systematic study of the structural
relationships among them, as exemplified in the relations among colors.

6. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WITTGENSTEIN'S PHENOMENOLOGY

FOR OTHER PHENOMENOLOGISTS

My qualified plea for the intrinsic value of Wittgenstein's phenomenology

does not exclude the possibility of larger extrinsic merits in relation to the
general philosophical situation. Of these I am particularly interested in its
value for the phenomenologists in today's sense. Here too I shall lean over
backward in the attempt not to claim too much.
In recent years there have been several attempts to point out similarities
between Wittgenstein' sand Husserl' s philosophizing, most important perhaps
those by Mikel Dufrenne 26 and Paul Ricoeur,27 who try to show specific
paralleis between Wittgenstein's course from the Tractatus to the Philoso-
phicallnvestigations and Husserl's from the Logische Untersuchungen to
Krisis. Such comparisons have at least the value of providing historical control
experiments. Some authors have even gone so far as to call Wittgenstein's
philosophy "phenomenology" (Thomas N. Munson, S.J.), on the basis that
Wittgenstein's philosophy wanted to be merely descriptive, to the exclusion of
all explanation. 28 This is of course only a very modest conception of
phenomenology, which makes Husserl's phenomenology stand out as a much
more developed, ifnot superior form. The new evidence here assembled allows
for much more specific comparisons.
However, any attempt to compare the full record of the Phenomenological
Movement with Wittgenstein's brilliant aphorisms in PB could hardly result in
any claims to their superiority. But this verdict would have to be amended as
soon as one includes the achievements ofWittgenstein's philosophy after PB.
Nevertheless, there remain vast stretches of phenomenological studies on
which Wittgenstein does not seem to touch. I have in mind such areas as the
modes of appearance, and the constitution of our phenomena, let alone
Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, with its reductions, its idealism,
and its monadology.
 217

The real value ofthe new light on Wittgenstein's phenomenology seems to me

more peripheral, but nevertheless substantial. I realize that a good deal ofwhat
I have presented may be suspected as just another attempt at philosophical
fraternizing with a philosophy very different in origin, spirit, and development.
I certainly am aware of the danger of glossing over relevant differences.
Nevertheless, in the present case I would plead a special value for the kind of
historical detective work in which I may seem to have been indulging.
Today's explosion of scientitic knowledge has an equivalent even in
philosophy. The quantitative expansion of studies has led to an over-
production which makes it more and more impossible to keep abreast ofwhat is
going on in otherquarters ofthe philosophical community, especially in other
languages. The almost inevitable re action to this situation has been a
narrowing down of one's philosophical horizon and a self-incapsulation of
philosophical schools and movements which almost amounts to a new
provincialism. Too ~any philosophies have become windowless monads. But
their isolation is anything but splendid. What is more, the shrinking world of
our atomic age can no longer afford it.
Under these circumstances the duty to maintain interphilosophical com-
munication is comparable to that of maintaining international and intercultural
relations. Such efforts can at times become superficial and strained. It is
therefore doubly welcome if unexpectedly windows open up in another
philosophy which allows us to establish new common interests. The appear-
ance of Phänomenologie in the very framework ofWittgenstein's philosophy
seems to me such a new window. I should like to open it further in the hope that
it will prepare more meaningful exchanges and common pursuits.

NOTES

1 From American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1968), 244-56.

21930. Ed. by Rush Rhees (Oxford, Basil BIackweII, 1964).
3 Thus far the facts of the case seem to have attracted Iittie attention. Gershon Weiler, The
Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. 43 (1965), pp. 4 I 2-4 I 6 does not say anything about
them. Eric Stenius in his review ofthe book in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 16 (1966),
pp. 37 1-372, merely remarks briefly that Wittgenstein' s use ofthe word "phenomenological" in
connection with his discussion of "phenomenologicallanguage" is vague. Stuart Hampshire
makes no mention ofthe fact in New Statesman, vol. 71 (1966), pp. 163-164. And Norman
Maleolm, in his review article in The Philosophical Review, vol. 74 (1967), pp. 220-229,
simply Iists "phenomenologicallanguage contrasted with physicallanguage" as the fourth of
some twenty topics taken up in the book, without discussing it
4The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960; 2nd ed., 1965).
5 The Tractatus: Seeds ofSome Misunderstandings." The Philosophical Review, vol. 72 (1963),
pp. 213-220; also The Phenomenological Movement, op. eit., p. 761 ff.
6 Abbreviated as PB hereafter.
7 Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis. Gespriiche aufgezeichnet von Friedrich
Waismann, ed. by B. F. McGuinness (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1967), p. 45.
8See my "HusserI's and Peirce's Phenomenologies," pp. 27-50 above.
 218

9 Announced in Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy, ed. by K. T. Fann (New
York, DelI Publishing Company, 1967), p. 405.
JOSee Max Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Ithaca,
Comell University Press. 1964), p. 131.
11 Professor J. N. Findlay told me in conversation that when in 1939 he mentioned Husserl's
Logische Untersuchungen to Wittgenstein, he expressed some astonishment that he was still
interested in this old text.
12Vol. 9 (1929), pp. 162-171, abbreviated hereafter as SR.
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, p. 10.
14Ibid., p. 19.
15 Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, 1st ed. (1918), pp. 119-124; 2nd ed. (1925), pp. 127-131.
Gesammelte Aufsätze (1938), pp. 20-30; English("Is There aFactuaIAPriori?") inReadings
in Philosophical Analysis, ed. by H. Feigl and W. Sellars (New York, 1949), pp. 277-285.
16 "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33," Mind, vol. 63 (1954), pp. 289-316, and vol. 67
(1955), pp. 1-27; also in Philosophical Papers (1959), pp. 247-318.
17 Zettel, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Berkeley, University of Califomia
Press, 1967), p. iv.
18 The Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Englewoods Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964), Chap. 6, "The
Rejection of Logical Atomism."
19 As far as Wittgenstein is concemed, the only reference to Kaufmann occurs at the end of the
reportofthe Waismann conversation ofJanuary 2, 1930 (Waismann, op. eit., p. 84), in the form
of a rejection (Ablehnung) of one ofKaufmann's views about number, which was published only
later in the year in Kaufmann's Das Unendliche in der Mathematik und seine Ausschaltung.
However, in this book Kaufmann refers repeatedly to the Tractatus, which he calls highly
important (hochbedeutsam) (p. 26 n.).
20See The Phenomenological Movement, op. eit., p. 762.
21 In The Philosophy of Rudolj Carnap, ed. by Paul Schilpp (La Salle, Open Court, 1963),
pp. 25 ff.
22See, e.g., John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (New York, Basic Books, revised
edition, 1967), p.433.
23Se The Phenomenological Movement, op. eit., pp. 291, 747.
24See now Philosophical Papers (New York, 1962), p. 26L.
25 Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy, op. eil., p. 56.
26"Wittgenstein et Husserl," Jalons (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 188-207.
27"Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language" in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. by
E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (Baitimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 207-
217. Gerd Brand even goes so far as to call hirn the phenomenologist par excellence in Die
grundlegenden Texte von L. Wittgenstein, Suhrkamp, 1975.
28 "Wittgenstein's Phenomenology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 20
(1959), pp. 37-50.

APPENDIX

The excerpts from the German original of the Philosophische Bemerkungen

are reprinted with the permission of Basil Blackwell, Publishers. The
translations are my own.

A. Phänomenologie

( I ) Die Physik unterscheidet sich von der (1) Physics differs from phenomenology
Phänomenologie dadurch, dass sie Gesetze by its aim of establishing laws. Phenomenology
 219
feststellen will. Die Phänomenologie stellt nur
die Möglichkeiten fest. Dann wäre alsl01 die
Phänomenologie die Grammatik der Beschrei-
bung derjenigen Tatsachen, auf denen die
Physik ihre Theorien abfbaut.
Erklären ist mehr als Beschreiben. Aber jede
Erklärung enthalt eine Beschreibung.
Der Farbenraum wird z.B. beiltil(fig dar-
gestellt durch das Oktaeder, mit den reinen
F arben an den Eckpunkten, und diese Darstel-
lung ist eine grammatische, keine psycho-
logische. Zu sagen, dass unter den und den
Umständen - etwa - ein rotes Nachbild
sichtbar wird, ist dagegen Psychologie (das
kann sein, oder auch nicht, das andere ist a
priori; das eine kann durch Experimente fest-
gestellt werden, das andere nicht).
( ~ I, p. 51 f)
(2) Ist nicht die Harmonielehre wenig-
stens teilweise Phänomenologie, also Gram-
matik? (§4, p. 53)
(3) Alle unsere Redeformen sind aus der
normalen physikalischen Sprache hergenom-
men und in der Erkenntnistheorie oder
Phänomonologie nicht zu gebrauchen, ohne
schiefe Lichter auf den Gegenstand zu werfen.
(§57,p.88)
(4) Die blosse Redensart, "ich nehme x
wahr," ist schon aus der physikalischen Aus-
drucksweise genommen und x soll hier ein
physikalischer Gegenstand - z. B. ein Körper-
sein. Es ist schon falsch, diese Redeweise in
der Phänomenologie zu verwenden, wo dann x
ein Datum bedeuten muss. Denn nun kann
auch" ich" und" nehme wahr" nicht den Sinn
haben wie oben. Ibid.
B. "Phenomenological investigation"
Die Gefahr, die darin liegt, Dinge einfacher
sehen zu wollen, als sie in Wirklichkeit sind,
wird heute oft sehr überschätzt. Diese Gefahr
besteht aber tatsächlich im höchsten Grade in
der phänomenologischen Untersuchung der
Sinneseindrücke. Diese werden immer fur viel
einfacher gehalten, als sie sind. ( § 224, p. 281)
C. "Phenomenological description"
Die Beschreibung der Phänomene mittels
der Hypothese der Körperwelt ist unumgäng-
establishes merely possibilities. Thu~ pheno-
menology would be the grammar for the de-
scription of those facts upon which physics
erects its theories.
Explaining is more than describing. But every
explanation contains a description.
F or instance, the color space is represented
parenlhelically through the octahedron, with
the pure colors in the corner points, and this
representation is a grammatical, not a psycho-
logical one. By contrast, to say that under such
and such conditions a red afterimage becomes
visible is psychology (this may or may not
occur, but the other is apriori; the one can be
established by experiments, the other cannot).
(2) Isn't the theory of harmony at least in
part phenomenology, hence grammar?
(3) All our forms of speaking have been
taken from the usual language of physics and
cannot be used in theory of knowledge or
phenomenology without casting distorting
lights upon the subject.
( 4) The very form of expression "I perceivex"
has been taken over from the phraseology of
physics, and 'x' is to stand here for an object of
physics - e.g., a body. Itis already amistake to
apply this way of speaking in phenomenology,
where 'x' must then mean a datum. For now
even 'I' and "perceive" cannot have the same
meaning as above.
The danger which lies in wanting to see
things as simpler than they are in reality is
nowadays often much overestimated. How-
ever, this danger does indeed exist in the
highest degree in the phenomenological
investigation of the sense impressions. These
are always considered to be much simpler than
theyare.
The description ofthe phenomena by means
of the hypothesis of a corporeal world is
 220
lieh durch ihre Einfachheit, verglichen mit der
unfassbar komplizierten phänomenologischen
Beschreibung. Wenn ich verschiedene zer-
streute Stücke einer Kreislinie sehe, so ist ihre
genaue direkte Beschreibung vielleicht unmög-
lich, aber die Angabe, dass es Stücke eines
Kreises sind, den ich aus nicht weiter unter-
suchten Gründen nicht ganz sehe - ist einfach.
(§230, p. 286)
D. "Phenomenological Language"
(1) Die phänomenologische Sprache oder
"primäre Sprache," wie ich sie nannte,
schwebt mir jetzt nicht als Ziel vor; ich halte sie
jetzt nicht mehr für nötig. Alles, was möglich
und nötig ist, ist das Wesentliche unserer
Sprache von ihrem Unwesentlichen zu
sondern.
D. h., wenn man quasi die Klasse der Spra-
chen beschreibt, die ihren Zweck erfüllen,
dann hat man damit ihr Wesentliches gezeigt
und damit die unmittelbare Erfahrung unmit-
telbar dargestellt.
Jedesmal, wenn ieh sage, die und die Dar-
stellung könnte man auch durch diese andere
ersetzen, machen wir einen Schritt weiter zu
dem Ziele, das Wesen des Dargestellten zu
erfassen. (§ I, p. 51)
(2) Eine Erkenntnis dessen, was unserer
Sprache wesentlich und was ihr zur Darstel-
lung unwesentlich ist, eine Erkenntnis, welche
Teile unserer Sprache leerlaufende Räder sind,
kommt auf die Konstruktion einer phänomeno-
logischen Sprache hinaus. (lbid.)
(3) Wenn nun die phänomenologische
Sprache den Gesichtsraum und was in ihm
vorgeht von allem anderen isoliert, was macht
sie mit der Zeit? Ist die Zeit der "visuellen"
Phänomene die Zeit unserer gewöhnlichen
physikalischen Ausdrucksweise? ( § 224,
p. 103)
(4) Eines der klarsten Beispiele der Ver-
wechslung zwischen physikalischer und
phänomenologischer Sprache ist das Bild, wel-
ches Mach von seinem Gesichtsfeld entworfen
hat, und worin die sogenannte Verschwom-
menheit der Gebilde gegen den Rand des
Gesichtsfeldes durch eine Verschwommenheit
(in ganz anderem Sinne) der Zeichnung
wiedergegeben wurde, Nein, ein sichtbares
Bild des Gesichtsbildes kann man nicht
machen. (§213, p. 267)
unavoidable because of its simplicity, com-
pared with the inconceivably complicated phe-
nomenological description. When I see dif-
ferent scattered pieces of a circular line, a
precise direct description is perhaps impos-
sible, but the information that these are the
pieces of a circle which for reasons not further
examined I do not see completely - is simple.
(1) As of now, phenomenologicallanguage
or "primary language," as I have called it, does
not appeal to me as a goal; now I no longer
consider it necessary. All that is possible and
necessary is to separate what is essential to ou r
language from its unessentials.
That is to say: if one describes, as it were, the
dass of languages which satisfy their purpose,
then one has shown what is essential to them
and thus presented immediate experience
immediately.
Each time I say that this or that presentation
could also be replaced by this different one, we
take another step toward the goal of seizing the
essence of what is presented.
(2) A realization ofwhat is essential to our
language and what is essential for presentation,
a realization of what parts of our language are
idling wheels, amounts to the construction of a
phenomenological language.
(3) Now if phenomenologieal language
isolates visual space and what occurs in it from
everything else, what does it do with time? Is
the time of"visual" phenomena the time of our
usual physicalist way of speaking?
(4) One of the dearest instances of the
confusion between physicalist and pheno-
menological language is the picture which
Mach* drew ofhis visual field, and in which he
rendered the so-called blurredness ofthe struc-
tures near the edge of the visual field by
blurredness (in a very different sense) of the
drawing. No, you cannot draw a picture ofthe
visual picture.
*Analysis of Sensations, eh. I.
 221

E. "Phenomenological geometry"

... man könnte auch sagen: Sie [d.h. eine
euklidische Zeichenebene] soll genau so stark
zittern, dass wir es noch nicht merken, dann ist
ihre physikalische Geometrie ein Bild unserer
phänomenologischen. (§ 217, p. 271).
One could also say: the Euclidean plane in
our drawing must tremble just strongly enough
for us not to notice it; then physical geometry is
a picture of our phenomenological geometry.

F. "Phenomenological color theory"

Es scheint einfache Farben zu geben.
Einfach als psychologische Erscheinungen.
Was ich brauche, ist eine psychologische oder
vielmehr phänomenologische Farbenlehre,
keine physikalische und ebensowenig eine
physiologische.
Und zwar muss es eine rein phänomeno-
logische Farbenlehre sein, in der nur von
wirklich Wahrnehmbarem die Rede ist und
keine hypothetischen Gegenstände - Wellen,
Zellen etc. - vorkommen. (§ 218, p. 273)
There seem to be simple colors. They are
simple qua psychological phenomena. What I
need is a psychological or rather a phenomeno-
logical color theory, not a physicalistic one,
and just as little a physiological one.
More specifically, it must be apure pheno-
menological color theory, in which only what is
actually perceivable is under discussion, and
no hypothetical objects - waves, cells, etc.-
figure.

***
The following passage is quoted from Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis. Gespräche
aufgezeichnet von Friedrich Waismann, aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von B. F. McGuinness
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1967), p. 63.

Physik und Phänomenologie Physics and Phenomenology

Die Physik will Regelmässigkeiten feststel-
len; sie geht nicht auf das, was möglich ist.
Darum gibt die Physik, auch wenn sie voll-
ständig entwickelt ist, keine Beschreibung der
Struktur der phänomenologischen Sachver-
halte. In der Phänomenologie handelt es sich
immer um die Möglichkeit, d.h. um den Sinn,
nicht um Wahrheit und Falschheit. Die Physik
hebt gleichsam aus dem Kontinuum gewisse
Stellen heraus und verwendet diese zu einer
gesetzmässigen Reihe. Um das andere küm-
mert sie sich nicht.
Physics wants to establish regularities; it
does not look for what is possible.
This is the reason why physics, even when it
is completely developed, does not offer a
description of the phenomenological states of
affairs. Phenomenology always deals only with
possibility, i. e., with the meaning, not with
truth and falsehood. Physics focuses, as it
were, on certain points in the continuum and
uses these for constructing a lawlike series. It
does not care about anything else.

SUPPLEMENT 1979

Since this article was published in the American Philosophical Quarterly

(vol. V, 1968,244-256), there has been a major change in the accessibility of
the sources for further exploration of the "puzzles." Wittgenstein's original
papers deposited in Oxford, Vienna and Helsinki are now available on
28 microfilms ofwhich enlargements in bound volumes can be studied in the
 222
Olin Library at Cornell University. However, the use of the manuscript
materials presupposes familiarity with Wittgenstein' s handwriting, not always
easy to decipher even for native Germans, especially since not infrequently the
writing has faded. Also, short to indexes the usefulness ofthese texts is limited.
Anothermajor aidis the appearance ofa special article by G. H. von Wrighton
"The Wittgenstein Papers" in thePhilosophical Review 75 (1969),483-503.
The present Supplement to the original article can do no more than to
indicate how these new aids and other information that has come to my
attention can throw additional light on the questions I had raised. But the major
puzzles are still unsolved. Their challenge remains, and I can only hope that
others in a better position than I will take it up.
I shall divide this supplement into two sections. The first will contain
specific emendations of statements in my article geared to the text by numbers
in the margin, the second section will try to give a first idea of what new
information can be found in the microfilms of the unpublished materials.

Emendations

[1] The new evidence after sampling of the microfilms, especially from the
manuscripts preceding the typescripts and the final printed version ofPB,
may weIl double the number of such passages.
[2] An English translation ofthe book by Raymond Hargreaves and Roger
White appeared in New York, Barnes & Noble, 1975.
[3] The Philosophische Grammatik is now available in an edition by Rush
Rhees (BlackweIl, 1968); an English translation by Anthony Kenny
appeared atthe University ofCalifornia Press in 1974. This textcontains
the terms "Phänomenologisches" and "Nicht-phänomenologisches"
only once (p. 215). Also, there are only incidental discussions of the
meaning of "grammar," chiefly in Part I, pp. 184-192.
[4] It now turns out that the formulation reported by Waismann in his reports
agrees almost verbatim with the one at the beginning of Wittgenstein's
manuscript notebook for PB which was not included in the final version.
[5] There is a possibility that the papers of Felix Kaufmann, housed at
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, will yield some
pertinent information.
[6] Any hope that such evidence will still emerge has now practically to be
abandoned in the light of G.R. von Wright's information that
"Wittgenstein on his last visit to Vienna, from Christmas 1949 to March
1950, ordered a great many papers, belonging to all his periods of work,
to be burned" (loc. eil., p. 484). Thus the gap in his papers between 1918
and 1929 will probably never be closed.
 223

[7] This statement may have to be qualified in the light of such passages as
Philosophical Investigations #383, where Wittgenstein denies the
intention of analyzing phenomena rather than "their concept and hence
the use of the word." Certainly Wittgenstein's conception of pheno-
menon and its role in various phases ofhis philosophy is in need of further
study.
[8] What I called the conclusive test of my hypothesis through an inspection
of G. E. Moore's "scribbled notes" from Wittgenstein's Cambridge
lectures was now possible thanks to Professor Casimir Lewy in Cam-
bridge, who not only showed me kindly the original ofMoore's notebooks
but put a xerox copy of the crucial page at my disposal and gave me
permission to quote from it. It occurs in vol. I, p. 15, and contains the
following information about Wittgenstein's third Cambridge lecture:

Colours are imagined [as] placed on an octahedron.

[Here follows a rough pencil sketch of an octahedron in perspective.]

This is really a part of grammar, not of psychology....

Logic, Psychology, and Phenomenology.
"People under these circumstances have red after-images" is psychology.
But
"There is such a colour as a greenish-blue," is phenomenology or grammar.
In grammar some things are arbitrary, some not.
The whole system of rules is not arbitrary.
Euclidean Geometry is also apart of grammar.

So I was wrong in surmising that Wittgenstein would not inject the term
"Phenomenology" into his lectures. He did and did so conspicuously enough
for G. E. Moore to take it down twice.

New Evidence and Tasks

Meanwhile I had a first chance to examine the microfilms ofthe Wittgenstein

papers, whose enlargements greatly facilitate further research. My definite
impression is that a more intensive study of these materials would throw
further light on the "puzzles" ofWittgenstein's phenomenology and would be
also worth while for its own sake. This impression is based on a sampling ofthe
following texts:
(1) Manuscripts Band I-VII (vols. 7-13); von Wright 105, 106, 107, 108.
(2) Typescript 1929-1930 (vol. 42); von Wright 208.*
(3) Manuscripts 172-176.
* According toa letter from Professor von Wright the typescript mentioned in Rush Rhees's
Anmerkung to PB, p. 347, which Wittgenstein handed to G. E. Moore" probably toward the end
of 1930" and on which the printed version of PB seems to be based was #209, not #208. But
 224

The following sampies of new evidence are all contained in the manuscripts
from which the typescripts were selected, since they supply a much fuller
picture of the genesis of Wittgenstein's thought.
l. Almost the first topic taken up in the manuscript Band I (von Wright
#105) ofthe Philosophische Bemerkungen, probably written soon after the
last carrying a date (9.2.29), is "Phänomenologie" (pp. 3-4). It contains the
passages published under Al. But these are preceded by a much longer series
of remarks discussing the relation of physics to the wahre Phdnomenologie
which are otherwise alm ost identical with what Wittgenstein told the Schlick
group at the end of the passage quoted above from the Waismann conversa-
tions. There are also completely new remarks such as the one that just as
sentences make up (bilden) physics, thus "grammar makes up Phänomeno-
logie (or however one cares to name it)." (My translation.)
2. Volume 11 of the Philosophische Bemerkungen (Von Wright # 106,
RollI of Cornell microfilms) begins with a discussion of "phenomenological
language" of which the latter half has been printed in PB # 74 and # 75. It
includes the statement that in spite of all possible objections there can be a
phenomenological language, and that ordinary language is to some extent
phenomenological, though it does not allow for aseparation of sensory fields
as does phenomenological language.
3. Perhaps the most intriguing novelty Iran across occurs in volume VII
"Bemerkungen zur Philosophie" (Von Wright # 111 RollI), where Wittgen-
stein raises as "the most important question" that of an essential difference
( Wesensunterschied) between "logical" and" phenomenological grammar,"*
which seems to coincide with the difference between essential and unessential
grammar. What seems remarkable ab out this distinction is (I) that here the
adjective "phenomenological" is used to qualify the noun "grammar," and (2)
that this implies the possibility of a non-phenomenological grammar. Thus at
this point Wittgenstein did not simply identify phenomenology with grammar.
4. In 1977 G. E. M. Anscombe published Wittgenstein'sBemerkungen
uber die Farben (Remarks on Colour) based on three manuscripts written

#209 is now listed as "missing." The two texts certainly differ considerably at the very
beginning, although in both of them phenomenology figures close to the start. #209 was.
probably the "bulky typescript" which Wittgenstein had taken to Bertrand Russell before
May 5, 1930 (who forwarded it to Moore on May 8), and on which Russell reported to the
Council of Trinity College on the same date, entitled, Philosophische Bemerkungen (see
Bertrand RusselI, Autobiography 1914-1944 [Boston: Little Brown, 1968] pp. 297-301).
Photostats of # 209 could have been the basis for the Rush Rhees edition.
* Some light on this distinction is thrown by the paragraph on top ofp. 215 ofthePhilosophische
Grammatik. Such a grammaris to contain a "chapter" on color, where the use of color words is
laid down, in contrast to what is to be said about the "logical constants" like "and," "or," ete.
 225

during the last months ofhis life early in 1951. They reflect his work on color
concepts and his study of Goethe's Farbenlehre mentioned in Professor Von
Wright's letter (see p. 214). In two ofthese manuscripts(pp. 9 # 53 and49 #
248) the following identical sentence appears: "Es gibu zwar keine Phano-
menologie, wohl aber phanomenologische Probleme." [True, there is no
phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems.]
There is no obvious connection between this isolated sentence and the
preceding and following observations about color in either manuscript.
In the second Manuscript, #3 (p. 15) raises the question "What kind of a
sentence is that, that the admixture ofwhite removes the coloredness from the
color." In answering it Wittgenstein not only denies that this can be a
"proposition of physics" but adds: "Hier ist die Versuchung sehr gross, an eine
Phanomenologie, ein Mittelding zwischen Wissenschaft und Logik zu
glauben." [Here the temptation to believe in a phenomenology, something
midway between science and logic, is very great.] But clearly Wittgenstein did
not yield to this temptation.
Enigmatic though the sentence about the non-existence of a phenomenology
and the existence of phenomenological problems may be, it establishes at least
the fact that the subject of phenomenology had not been completely dropped at
the stage of the Philosophical Investigations. But it still has to be clarified
what he meant at the time by the phenomenology whose existence he denied
and the phenomenological problems whose persistence he affirmed. As to the
latter, one may assume that most of the open questions raised in the Remarks
on Color are phenomenological problems. Did he then understand by
phenomenology a doctrine in the style of Goethe' s Farbenlehre consisting of a
"phänomenologische Analyse," which in Wittgenstein's view (Il, # 16 p. 16)
was Goethe's objective, a phenomenology which is conceptual analysis
(BegrijJsanalyse) rather than physics?
In any case it would appear that to the end Wittgenstein acknowledged that
there was place for a study halfway between physics and logic and that there
was a temptation to call it phenomenology, only that he denied that it could be
more than a collection of problems apparently insoluble, but suitable for
"remarks. "
5. The latest and for this study most revolutionizing text came to my
attention as the result of my encounter with Dr. Michael N edo, the editor of the
new critical edition of Wittgenstein's works, at the Second International
Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, Austria in 1977. On that occasion, in
connection with a discussion group on Wittgenstein and Phenomenology, he
told me about the "chapter" entitled "Phänomenologie" in Wittgenstein's
Final Version of the Big Typescript of 1933 (# 213), still unpublished,
consisting of 49 typewritten pages now contained in volume 89 ofthe Cornell
 226

enlargement (Microfilm Roll 21). A first idea of the subject matters included
under this title may be obtained from Wittgenstein' s own Table ofContents, in
which this "Phänomenologie" forms the 13th of15 subdivisions. It is preceded
by one entitled simply "Philosophie" and followed by one with the title
"Idealismus etc." The seven sub-sections ofthe "Phänomenologie" section go
by the following titles (in my translation):
94. Phenomenology is Grammar (p. 437)
95. Is it Possible to Penetrate more Deeply into the Properties of Visual
Space? (p. 443)
96. Visual Space in Contrast to Euclidean Space (p. 446)
97. The Seeing Subject and Visual Space (p. 462)
98. Visual Space Compared With an Image (Plane Image) (p. 465)
99. The Smallest Visible Objects (p. 469)
100. Colors and Color Mixtures (p. 473)
I shall not attempt to report about the contents ofthe actual text, before it has
been released. Anyway, the subtitles make it plain that the chapter begins with
a characterization, though without definition, of phenomenology as dealing
with the rules for a language that describes the phenomena of our experience;
even the color-octahedron and musical theory of harmony are in this sense
phenomenology or grammar. Next Wittgenstein deals in considerable detail
with the grammar of our language ofvisual space in contrast to the Euclidean
space of geometry. Finally he discusses most extensively the phenomena of
color and color mixtures. While here too he claims that he is ultimately only
concerned with the gramm ar of the phenomenological language used in the
description ofthe phenomena, the actual investigations increasingly deal only
with the phenomena of shape and color and their laws.
Even this most extensive and explicit treatment of Phänomenologie is
anything but systematic and comprehensive. Nevertheless, it is the peak of
Wittgenstein's occupation with the subject. This means that my original
article, in which I had assumed that that references to Phanomenologie in the
Philosophische Bemerkungen were the high water mark, if not the end of his
temporary conception will have to be re-focussed. But any such rewriting ofthe
entire article had better be postponed until the new text is fully accessible and
all other relevant texts assembled and analyzed, which presupposes a
systematic index of subjects to the published and unpublished writings. In the
meantime the new text from the Big Typescript supplies at least a much fuller
denotation for Wittgenstein's concept of Phanomenologie.
6. One possible explanation for the origin of the concept of Phäno-
menologie in Wittgenstein's writings was suggested to me by Rush Rhees in a
letter of 1979, according to which the most Jikely source for it was Ludwig
 227

Boltzmann. This possibility is now even more appealing since in aremark of

1931 in his Vermischte Bemerkungen edited by G. H. von Wright in 1977
(Suhrkamp Verlag) Wittgenstein lists the men who influenced him most,
headed by the name ofBoltzmann, followed by Hertz (who also had developed
a (mathematical) phenomenology), Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus,
Loos, Weininger, Spengler, and Sraffa in that order (p. 43). The difficulty for
such a hypothesis is that Wittgenstein's Phänomenologie is opposed to
physics, physiology and psychology, whereas Boltzmann's is apparently a
subdivision ofphysics (see my The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 9-10).
Thus, even if Wittgenstein's familiarity with the terms should go back to
Boltzmann, he used it for sOinething quite different from what his possible
inspirer had in mind.
7. While I still see no early chance. if any, of dissolving the remaining
"puzzles" about Wittgenstein's Phänomenologie which I had raised, I am
now ready to offer the following working hypothesis* about the stages in the
development of his conception:
I. A first form of phenomenology developed after Wittgenstein had
abandoned logical atomism and had conceived the idea of an ultimate analysis
of the phenomena to be described with all their details by a "primary"
phenomenologicallanguage. It was probably developed during his last years in
Austria and sketched in the notebooks from this period which were bumed by
his instruction. Remnants of this conception can be found in "Some Remarks
on Logical From" of 1929.
11. The second phase of his phenomenology as expressed first in the
Philosophische Bemerkungen of 1929/30 and, in greater detail in the Big
Typescript of 1933. Here "phenomenologicallanguage" is no longer merely
primary but "secondary" in the sense that it describes the phenomena of our
experience in terms of a selective ordinary language. The main characteristic
of this phenomenology is that it is neither physics nor psychology.
IH. Beginning with the Blue Book the term phenomenology, already
identified before as grammar, is completely replaced by the grammar of
ordinary language. One might easily think that this meant the end of
phenomenology.
IV. That this is not the case becomes clear in the last stage of Wittgen-
stein's philosophizing. Here, in retuming to the phenomena of color, which

* In venturing thus far I would Iike to pay tribute to a preceding ingenious hypothesis, based not
only on my collection but on Wittgenstein's Blue Book, offered by Don Ihde in Phenomeno-
logical Perspectives, edited by Philip J. Bossert(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975) pp. 47-
61 under the title "Wittgenstein's 'Phenomenological Reduction.' " Its main point is that
Wittgenstein was influenced by a generalized phenomenological method which provided in part
ij basis for the turn to ordinary language. But at the same time the peculiar use of a
"phenomenological reduction takes a turn inverse to Husserl and towards the isolation and
description of linguistic phenomena over a phenomenology of experience" (p. 48).
 228

had occupied hirn since the Notebooks of 1914-1916, he points out again that
there is a set of phenomena covered neither by science nor by 10gic which has to
be studied in its own right. The fact that Wittgenstein was no longer prepared to
call this study Phänomenologie is perhaps less important than that he sees
here a vast area ofphenomena that have to be acknowledged as problems even
if they should prove to be insoluble.
Such a working hypothesis about the stages in the origin and development of
Wittgenstein's interest in a peculiar phenomenology will have to be verified
much more fully in the light of the text of his papers once they are fully
organized and edited. In the meantime the fact that not only the term "pheno-
menology" but also a characteristic set of problems designated by it had a
persistent place in Wittgenstein's thought seems to be worth recording and
exploring for its own sake. Indications are that it represents another variety of
thought thai belongs to the pattern of the Phenomenological Movement in the
wider sense.
 APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENT 1980 TO "HUSSERL IN ENGLAND"

This Supplement, written after the reprinting ofthe original article was already
at the galley stage, is the result of an odd repetition ofthe circumstances which
necessitated the Postscript 1969 after the unexpected arrival of the Freiburg
Diary 1928 by W. R Boyce Gibson at the Husserl Archives in Louvain in
1969. 1 Only this time, the information that, thanks to the efforts of Professor
Cyril Welch of Mount Allison University, became available to me is even
more authentie and of greater significance than the Diary for supplementing
and correcting the story of Husserl's visit to England, for it comes from the
letters of Edmund Husserl and his wife Malvine.
Winthrop Bell, the Canadian addressee of these 23 letters and postcards
from 1919 to 1925, was one of Husserl's earliest Anglo-American students
(after William Ernest Hocking who had spent only two months in Göttingen in
1902). Bell had come to Husserl after a year's graduate study at Harvard and
then at Cambridge, England - a fact which mayaIso explain Husserl's hope
to enlist hirn as his" mentor" and assistant during his visit to England in 1922.
Bell had left Cambridge for health reasons to go to Leipzig, where he first
learned about Husserl. So he transferred to Göttingen, where he stayed on
from 1911 to 1914. There he had just completed his German Ph.D. thesis, at
Husserl's urging on "Eine kritische Untersuchung der Erkenntnistheorie
von J osiah Royce"2 when W orld War I broke out, leading to Bell' s internment
in Ruhleben near Berlin. After his return as a civilian to America, he taught
philosophy first at Toronto, then at Harvard. But then he had to take charge of
the family enterprise (fisheries) in Chester, Nova Scotia. Having obtained his
address through the Harvard Alumni Office I took up correspondence with
hirn in 1955 and learned on that occasion, in addition to fascinating other
information about his years with Husserl, that he had some letters from
Husserl. But he did not offer to send them or copies ofthem to me at the time.
After his death his papers were transferred to Mount Allison University, his
undergraduate college. But at that time the letters were not yet included. It
came therefore as a happy surprise to me when Cyril Welch wrote me in
October 1980 that Husserl's letters to Bell were finally accessible, and that he
could even send me xerox co pies of the 23 pieces that had been turned over to
the University Library Archives on September 8, 1980.
 230

Even than I had no good reason to expect that these letters would prove of
major importance in view ofwhat Bell had written me in November 3, 1955:

I still have sorne letters frorn Husserl frorn the 1920s, but with little philosophical significance in
thern, I fear. And what there is of that kind would be rather rneaningless without letters I had
written to hirn. Of those I have no copies. I learned to use the typewriter only quite late in life
(unfortunately), so rny letters to hirn were handwritten and no copies were kept. And I could not
today recall what I wrote.

Under these circumstances it is unfortunate that the originals ofBell's letters

have not survived at the Husserl Archives in Louvain. Chances are that they
belonged to the ones that were destroyed in a storehouse at Antwerp as a result
of an allied air raid in 1940.3 But a good deal ofBell's letters can be inferred
from the Husserls' replies. Also, Husserl' spart of this correspondence is
clearly the one most important in the present context.
All I can do at this stage is to describe in the following pages the new
information on the Husserls' visit to England by gearing it to the relevant
passages in my earlier account through numbers in the margins. I believe that
this will also be the most effective way to show how much this correspondence
has enriched and corrected the earlier picture. Besides, I do not think that the
entire story should be rewritten before it is certain that no further information
will be forthcoming from other sources.

THE NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE HUSSERLS' LETTERS AND

POSTCARDS TO BELL

[1] As early as December 7, 1921, when, in a postcard beginning with the sentence
"There are signs and wonders," Husserl announced to Bell the invitation by
the University of London, his "first thought" concemed the possibility of
Bell' s joining hirn in London as his" wise mentor" and helper. He added to this
news the "big request" that Bell translate the four lectures he was to give for the
printer and likewise a brief syllabus for the university news paper. Then he
asked for advice whether he should look into F. H. Bradley' s major works and
for information about philosophers in London, for instance Hicks? Bosanquet?
Finally he announced at once his theme : "Phenomenological Method and
Phenomenological Philosophy." The fact that Husserl had thought imme-
diately for Bell as his assistant for the English undertaking explains why his
messages to hirn are the best source for the still missing information about the
visit. A second postcard, written on December 19, acknowledging a preceding
Christmas note from Bell, states that Husserl, who had accepted Hicks's
invitation for April, had realized this early date would interfere with Bell' s
 231

teaching at Toronto and ofTers to postpone his London commitment until June
if this would help.
[2] Husserl's preparations for the English lectures appear now in an entirely new
light from what I thought before seeing his pieces to Bell. The postcard of
January 22, 1922 shows hirn studying English contemporary philosophers
apparently suggested spontaneously by Bell. As Karl Schuhmann has
established, Bell also sent hirn the following books: Lord Haldane, The
Reign oJRelativity, London, 1921 (Husserl Library at the Louvain Archives.
BA 662), William Sorley, Moral Va lu es and the Idea oJGod, Cambridge,
1918 (BA 1608) and probably others. Yet these names and that of Wildon
Carr,4 to which Husserl responds, are hardly representative of London and
Cambridge philosophy at the time. Husserl himselfinquires about Shadworth
Hodgson5 and again about F. H. Bradley, whom he had read and liked during
his years at the University ofHalle (1887-1901). Another item ofinterest is
that, in preparation for the visit, Husserl took English lessons which would
enable hirn to follow at least slow English conversations and discussions.
However, judging from later remarks, the results were limited.
On J anuary 28, 1922 Husserl acknowledged the receipt of a work by
R A. F. Hoernle (1880-1943), an Idealist friend of the ailing Bernard
Bosanquet, of South African descent, whom Husserl was to meet later on the
occasion of the lectures, calling it sehr hübsch (very nice). This was Hoernl6' s
first book, the Studies in Metaphysics (1920) (BA 797). According to Karl
Schuhmann, HusserlinanMS(ofFebruary 19,1922) underBI38 creditsthis
book with having seen that thus far metaphysics had always tried to reduce
"Being" to one kind ofbeing. Incidentally, Hoernle had published "A Plea for
a Phenomenology ofMeaning" in the Proceedings oJ the Aristotelian Society
XXII (1921),71-89, discussing Meinong and Husserl on pp. 80-86.
In a postcard ofMay 10, 1922, Husserl announced the receipt of other books
which he had read "with much enjoyment". They may weIl have included
Bell's own copy ofBradley'sAppearance and Reality (BA 187). I agree with
Karl Schuhmann that Bell's selection may have contributed to Husserl's
impression that Idealism was still dominant in England and even encouraged
him to present phenomenology as a form of idealism. But at the same time he
stated to Bell that he had not ordered any more books ("although I would be
very eager for Whitehead's writings"6), since he would not have the time to
read them before his arrival in London. The same would be the case with the
writings of Samuel Alexander. Although most of these readings dealt with
British Idealist authors, Husserl was most anxious to meet others like James
Ward and G. E. Moore (December 6, 1921) in Cambridge.
[3] The exact length of the Husserls' stay in England can now be determined
from his postcard of J anuary 10, 1922 and Malvine's letter from Cambridge of
June 11. They arrived in Cambridge on the Saturday before Pentecost (June
 232
3), and returned to Freiburg on Saturday June 20. Thus the entire visit did not
exceed two weeks.
[4] Husserl's extensive retrospect on the visit to Cambridge and London of
December 13 contains a remarkably complete record of his philosophical
contacts during this briefvisit G. Dawes Hicks was of course the central figure
during the entire period. He sees in hirn the only Englishman who realizes that
phenomenology is not only literature for the day ofthe "usual philosophical
and international style" but a "serious enterprise in which one can and
eventually must invest one's life." But Husserl also remarks that Hicks is a
philosophical personality whose "irrational" life circumstances had used up
his powers rather "irrationally." (Once, in connection with Hicks's insistence
on early publication of the London lectures in English he even states: "The old
gentleman takes hirnself a little tragic.") He met several times with the "fine"
J ames Ward, chairman ofthe second London lecture, who was the only one to
call on the Husserls and invited them twice to tea, in addition to beinga
dinner guest at Hicks's with G. E. Moore, and who took hirn once to dinner at
Trinity College, where at high table he introduced Husserl to McTaggart, "the
stout Hegelian," who withdrew promptly after dinner. For an evening party
G. F. Stout appeared, "a magnificent short little man, who was manifestly
pleased to see me, and C. D. Broad, a lively, apparently gifted young man your
age." Then there was G. E. Moore, the chairman ofthe last London lecture,
"very keen and interesting, but I ne ver saw hirn again" - a fact which suggests
that the occasion took place after the London lecture of June 11. W. E.
Johnson, the logician was unable to come, and Sorley refused to see a German
after having lost a son in the war. In London Husserl was surprised not to be
met by the Vice-Chancellor who had invited hirn, but only by the Provost in
charge of technical arrangements perfunctorily. He talked briefly with
Haldane, Hoernle, who" speaks German well," with [A.] Wolf(University of
London) whom he considered philosophically innocent( ahnungslos) and like-
wise Ernest Belford Bax, a non-university philosopher with German idealist
leanings.7
Bertrand Russell, for whom Husserl had expressed his "veneration" largely
because of his opposition to the war, for instance in a letter to Bosanquet, to
which both he and Russell himselfhad responded (August 20, 1920), was one
ofthose he missed in London (" he is just married and one assurnes that he is on
a trip"). Also Whitehead, then still at the Imperial College in Kensington,
"was invisible to me." No wonder that Husserl summed up the balance ofhis
English encounters in the sentence: "Thus I did not get to know those in whom
I was particularly interested."
Incidentally, Mrs. Husserl, in her letter of June 11 from Cambridge
remarked: "All of them (Ward, Moore, Stout, etc.) and even Hicks speak
German poorly. That is a pity."
 233

[5 J Husserl commented particularly on the strenuousness of cornmuting between

Cambridge and London, which took two hours and twenty minutes.
[6] As to the delivery of the lectures Husserl hirns elf mentions "70-100"
listeners, mostly older students. Also present were Hoernle, with whom he had
a short talk, and a University of London lecturer, "Miss Oakfort," clearly a
misspelling for (Hilda D.) Oakeley, author of an article on Nicolai Hartmann
in Mind (1931). There was" demonstrative warmth at the first reception (hand
clapping)" - unaccustomed for German university lecturers - and "great-
est attention." Mrs. Husserl, on June 11, i.e., still be fore the last lecture on the
following day, wrote:

On the whole, one had the impression that very much depends on the English edition of the
lectures. For hardly anyone knows enough German in order to understand Gerrnan lectures
completely.

[7] There is no mention of an additional invitation to the German Embassy.

Lord Haldane figures only as tal king for a quarter of an hour with Husserl on
the way to another lecture by an Austrian historian, which he had to chair.
[8] No plan of an invitation to Oxford is mentioned. But Husserl was asked to
address the Cambridge Moral Science Club (22. I.1922), an invitation which
he declined.
[9] Malvine Husserl's letter from Cambridge makes it clear that the translator
of the Syllabus was Hicks hirnself, who had urged it from the very start.
H usserl' s initial attempt to involve Bell to undertake it (letter ofDecember 7,
1921; see also letter to Dietrich Mahnke of March 26, 1922, mentioned in
K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, p. 259) had clearly not worked out. Husserl
turned in the German text in installments to Hicks and had particular trouble
with the texts for lectures 3 and 4 (May 10, 1922). From the very start Hicks
had urged the publication of an English translation of the lectures through the
Cambridge University Press. Hence Husserl's immediate attempt to win Bell
as his translator. Whether Bell accepted is not clear from Husserl' s subsequent
letters. At any rate Husserl asked hirn through a letter of Mrs. Husserl from
Cambridge whether he could examine the manuscript within a few weeks with
a view to possible improvements before a translation. What prevented the
execution ofthe translation plan was clearly Husserl's difficulty in finalizing
the text after his return to Freiburg, first because of his exhaustion and then
because of plans for a new semester course of an Introduction to Philosophy
into which he wanted to incorporate the London lectures. He finally
abandoned the whole plan in 1923.8
[10] On December 13, 1922 Husserl writes to Bell:

F or the fourth time I am lecturing here in Freiburg" Introduction to Philosophy" and for the third
 234

time in a completely new form. This is the most difficult lecture for me - and, to tell the truth, I
have been working on the systematic sequence ofthoughts which I am now converting into lecture
form for more than a year - it is the same which was presented in London in compressed form.

[11] Already in preparing the lectures (January 28, 1922) and especially in his
retrospect, Husserl doubts the appropriateness and effectiveness of the
lectures. Thus on May lOhe wrote to Bell: "I have laid out the whole thing
too grandly.... Insanely (unsinniger Weise) 1 have made the new basic
conception of philosophy (from the idea of phenomenology as first philosophy)
the theme of my lectures." And on September 30 in explaining why he could
not go through the manuscript of the London lectures and prepare them for the
printer he wrote: "I found that it (the text) was too compressed and difficult."
[12] This interpretation of his ultimate objective in the London lectures is
confirmed by the way he explains his project to Bell on May 10, 1922: "This
winter 1 have thought through anew the basic (prinzipiell) foundation of
phenomenology and its differentiation (Verzweigung) down to the system of
ontologies and parallel constitutive disciplines."
[13] For David Carr's English translation see now The Crisis 01 European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1970.
[14] Husserl's characterization of his encounter with G. F. Stout in the letter of
December 13, 1922 sounds much more positive than what he told W. R
Boyce Gibson in 1928 (see above p. 160).

NOTES

ISee this volume -p. 160.

2The Phenomenological Movement, vol. I, Ch. 111, Excursus "Husserl and Josiah Royce."
3H.L. Van Breda, "Le Sauvetage de l'heritage husserlien et la fondation des Archives-Husserl,"
Husserl et la pensee moderne. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, p. 39.
4Husserl's library contains Carr's A Theory of Monads, 1920 (BA 237) with the dedication
"To Professor Edmund Husserl with best regards. 16 June 1922. H. Wildon Carr," hence
c1early a present for Husserl after the end of the London lectures.
5 About Husserl's interest in Hodgson see Stuart Spicker, "Shadworth Hodgson's Reduction as
an Anticipationof H usserl's Phenomenological Psychology," Journal ofthe British Society For
Phenomenology II, 2 (1971), 57-73, and Karl Schuhmann "Husserl and Hodgson: Some
Historical Remarks," Ibid. III (1972) 63-65.
6Husserl's library inc1udes Whitehead's The Principle of Relativity with Applications to
Physical Science 1922 (BA 1862).
7Bax's book The Real, the Rational and the Alogical, 1920, is in Husserrs library (BA 107).
8See letterto Roman Ingarden of August 31,1923 and RudolfBoehm in his editorial preface to
Husserliana VII, p. XXII.
 INDEX OF NAMES

No index of subjects has been added, since no special need for it is anticipated
in this book, in which the subjects are of secondary importance and easily
traceable with the help of the headings and subheadings of each essay.

Abbagnano, Nicola 52 Boehm, Rudolf, 150, 155, 159, 234

Aegidius Romanus see Giles of Rome Boltzmann, Ludwig 227
Aguirre, Antonio 82 Bolzano, Bemhard 11 0, 131
Albert of Saxony 24 Bopp, Leon 94, 103
Alexander, Samuel231 Bosanquet, Bemard 145, 230-232
Allen, Gay Wilson 116 Bosanquet, Helen 159
Amiei, Henri-Frederic XIV, 93-104 Bossert, Philip l. 227
Anscombe, G.E.M. 206, 218, 224 Bouvier, Bemard 94, 104
Aquinas, Thomas 4,6,7,13,23,25 Boyce Gibson, A. 160, 166, 168
Aristotle 22, 26, 31,140,152,186 Boyce Gibson, W.R. XV, 24, 61,116,144,146,
Armandus de Bellovisu 23, 24 150,160,163,164,166-172,185,229,234
Augustine 206 Bradley, Francis H. 230, 231
Austin, lohn L. XII, XIV, 75, 83-90 Brand, Gerd 218
Ave-Lallemant, Eberhard 87 Brentano, Franz XII-XV, 3-26, 29, 45, 47,
Avenarius, Richard 131 108,119-124, 125-143,149,160,178,183,
Averroes 22 186
Avicenna 5, 6 Brentano, Ida 126
Brentano, lohn C.M. 125, 126
Baillie, lames B. 38, 47 Britton, Kar! 21 3
Bax, Emest Belford 232, 234 Broad, C.D. 160, 161,232
Beck, Leslie 90 Brokmeyer, H.C. 49
Beck, Maximilian 3, 4 Brouwer, L.E.J. 155, 207
Becker, Oskar 172 Burks, Arthur 41
Bell, Winthrop XIV, XVI, 93,146,229-234
Bentham, J eremy 82 Caims, Dorion XV, 43,115,116,151,157-
Berdyaev, Nicolai 52 159,164,171,174,180,184,187-192
Bergmann, Hugo 122,123,135 Carlyle, Thomas 93
Bergmann, lulius 48 Camap, Rudolf 210,211
Bergson, Henri 148 Carr, David 60, 81, 157,234
Berkeley, George 114 Carr, H. Wild on 148, 151, 190,231,234
Biemel, Marly 59 Cavell, Stanley 90
Biemel, Walter XIV, XV, 60, 93, 162, 163, Celms, Theodor 73, 81
165 Cherbuliez, Victor 96
Black, Max 218 Chis holm, Roderick M. XIII, 24, 123, 124,
Bochenski, I.M. 24, 103 134, 137, 140, 162, 163
 236

Claparede, Edouard 114 Glogau, Gustav 48

Cotton, James Harry 47 Goclenius, Rudolf 8, 23
Cohn, Jonas 167 Goedeckemeyer, Albert 80
Croce, Benedetto 148 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 67, 103,214,
225
Dante Alighieri 9 Goudge, Thomas 30,37,46
Darkow, Flora 146 Greenwood, T.M. 148
DeBurgh, W.G. 159 Grimme, Adolf 156, 192
Deely, John N. 165 Gurwitsch, Aron XIV, 105, 116, 192, 193
Dennis, Rodney G. 49, 107
Desan, Wilfred 56 Haldane, R Viscount 148,231-233
Descartes, Rene 29, 59, 64, 76, 136, 152, Hamilton, Sir William 41
155,175,185 Hampshire, Stuart 85, 217
De Waelhens, Alphonse 56 Hargreaves, Raymond 222
Dewey, John 48 Harris, W. T. 49
Dilthey, Wilhelm 109, 136 Hartmann, Eduard von 41
Dominicus Gundissalinus 5 Hartmann, Nicolai 23, 197,233
Dufrenne, Mikel216 Hartshorne, Charles 30, 43, 46
Duns Scotus 7, 8 Hedwig, Klaus 26
Durandus de S. Porciano 13, 23 Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm 36,38,39,
41,42,45,47,49,50,96, 148, 158, 186
Eddington, Arthur 199 Heidegger, Martin 52-57, 63, 77, 83, 146,
Edie, James M. 105 150,162,164,166,169,171,176,177,
Ehrenfels, Christi an von 126, 193 181,213
Einstein, Albert 56, 155 Heinze, Max 149
Elveton, RO. 69 Heimholtz, Hermann 130
Embree, Lester E. 116 Hering, Jean 93, 94,176,177,181,182
Erdmann, Benno 48 Hertz, Heinrich 227
Eucken, Rudolf 168-170 Hervaeus Natalis 7, 8
Hibben, J.G. 38
Fann, K.T. 218 Hicks, G. Dawes 144-151, 155, 157, 160,
Faraday, Michael 194 161, 168, 230, 232, 233
Farber, Marvin46, 103, 150, 175, 176, 181, Hilz, Hedwig 103
190 Hocking, W.E. 44, 93, 102, 103, 114,229
Feibleman, James 30 Hodgson, Shadworth 231, 234
Feigl, Herbert 210,218 Höfler, Alois 109, 113
Findlay, J.N. 23, 63, 77, 162,218 Hoernle, RA.F. 231-233
Fink, Eugen 23, 59, 61, 69, 70, 81, 171, Hume, David 75,103,114,156,171
187, 188, 191 Husserl, Edmund passim
Fisch, Max 48 Husserl, Gerhart 140, 141, 173
Fitzgerald, Bayard 122 Husserl, Malvine 119, 147, 167, 191, 192,
Flewelling, Ralph T. 173, 174, 190, 191 229, 231, 233
Frege, Gottlob 227 Husserl, Wolfgang 143
Ibn Sina see Avicenna
Garcia Maynez, Eduardo 83 Ihde, Don 227
Geiger, Mortiz 56 Ingarden, Roman 23,56,65,70,71,75,81,
Geyser, Josef 149 82, 145, 147, 165,234
Gibson, Quentin 166,167,170,172
Giles of Rome 8 Jackson, Ruth 167
 237

James, Henry 117 MarceI, Gabriel 52, 94

James, WilliamXIII, XIV, 27, 30, 32, 34, 35, Marias, J ulian 63
37,39,43,46,47,82, 105-118, 188 Malcolm, Norman 217
Jaspers, Karl 52, 53, 56, 57 Marras, Ausonio XIII, 24, 25
Johannes Hispanus 5 Marty, Anton 126, 141
Johnson, W.E. 36, 161,232 Maslow, Alexander 202
Mays, Wolfe 166
Kant, Immanuel 41, 58, 87, 132, 136, 152, McAlister, Linda L. 21, 23, 24, 140
155,178,183,196 McGuinness, B.F. 208, 217, 221
Kantorowicz, Hermann 167 MeTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis 232
Kaufmann, Felix 210, 218, 222 Meinong, Alexius 109, 140, 145, 146, 149,
Kenny, Anthony 222 160,211, 231
Kern, Iso 81 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 52, 63, 80, 90
Kersten, Fred 192 Merriam-Genast, Ernst 103
Kierkegaard, Sören 53, 56, 57, 60 Merrylees, W.A. 167, 168
Kirkpatrick, Robert 61 Meyerhof, Max 22
Klein, Franz 132 Mill, John Stuart 156, 158
Kneale, Martha 24 Moore, Dorothy 144, 147
Kneale, William 24 Moore, G.E. 147, 151, 155, 160, 161,206,
Knight, Helen 149 209,212-214,223,231,232
Kockelmans, Joseph XIII Muirhead, J.H. 149
Koflka. Kurt 201 Munson, Thomas N. 216
Köhler, Wolfgang XVI, 193-201 Münsterberg, Hugo 114, 115
Körner, Stephan 140
Kraus, Kar! 227 Nagel, Ernest 46
Kraus, Oskar 4, 15,23, 123, 124, 126, 136, N atanson, Maurice XIII
137, 139, 140 Natorp, Paul 81, 146
Küng, Guido 82 Nedo, Michael 225
Landgrebe, Ludwig 154 Netherby, Wallace 49
Langley, S.P. 47 Novak, Joseph A. 165
Lee, E.N. 218
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 99, 136, 155 Oakeley, Hilda O. 233
Levinas, Emmanuel 177, 181 Ockham, William of7, 13,24
Lewis, C.I. 46 Ogden, C.K. 144, 148, 149, 155, 159
Lewy, Casimir 223 Ortega y Gasset, Jose 63, 83
Lieb, Irwin C. 47 Oytman, John 122
Liebmann, Otto 168
Linschoten, Johannes 105 PaJmer, Richard E. XV, 160, 164
Lipps, Theodor 72,81, 105, 109, 113-115 Passmore, John 218
Locke, John 156, 158 Peirce, Charles Sanders XII, XIII, 27-50,
Long, Wilbur 192 114, 115,205
Loos, Adolf 227 Perry, Ralph Barton 30, 35, 46, 47, 105,
Lotze, Hermann 115, 147, 178, 183 160, 197
Peter Aureol 7, 8, 22
Mach, Ernst 28,35, 131,204,220 Petrus Ramus 8
Mackey, Mary 41 Pflinder, Alexander XII-XIV, 56, 62-82, 83-
Mahnke, Dietrich 146, 233 90, 162, 164
Mandelbaum, Maurice 218 Pitkin, Katherine B. 107, 110
Marbach, Eduard 61, 81 Pitkin, Walter B. XIV, 44, 105-118
 238

Pitcher, George 209 SentineIIo, G. 26

Plato 155,175,185,186,196 Sievert, Donald 21
Plotinus 175, 178, 183 Sigwart, Christoph 48, 115
Poulet, Georges 104 Simmel, Georg 107, 111
Prant!, Kar! von 22, 23 Simonin, H.D. 22
Sorley, William 231,232
RandalJ..-Cut!er, J.L. 159 Spengler, Oswald 227
Raymundus Lullus 21 Spicker, Stuart 234
Rhees, Rush 202, 206, 211, 214, 217 222- Spinoza, B. de 155
224,226 Sraffa, Piero 227
Richards, I. A. 144, 148, 149, 155, 159 Stavenhagen, Kurt 177, 182
Richnell, J.T. 159 Stearns, Isabel 46
Richter, Raoul 80 Stenius, Eric 217
Ricoeur, Paul XIV, XVI, 216 Stout, A.K. 160
Rosenberg, Elisabeth Husser!119, 122, 124, Stout, G.F. 159-161, 188,232,234
127, 141, 148, 192 Ströker, Elisabeth 82
Roth, Marylin 122 Stumpf, Carl 47, 116, 123, 126, 128, 138,
Royce, Josiah 38, 48, 114, 115, 229, 234 140, 141
Russell, Bertrand 36, 90, 145, 155, 224,
227,232 Thomas Aquinas see Aquinas
RusseU, Frank 159 Thompson, Manley 30, 46
Ryle, Gilbert 76, 90, 137
Utitz, Emil 123

Salmon, ChristopherV. 162-165, 171, 185 Van Breda, H.L. 70, 84, 107, 124, 162, 166,
Santayana, George 27 234
Sartre, Jean-Paul XII, XIII, 51-61, 102 Van de Pitte, Margaret 173
Savan, David 46 Varet, Gilbert 56
Schapire, Rosa 103 Vischer, Robert 119, 124
Schättle, Margarete 21
Scheler, Max 33, 43, 47,60,77,78,83,146, Waismann, Friedrich 204, 206, 208, 210,
173,174,176,177,181,182,185,189 218,222,224
ScheU, Hermann 126 WaIIace, William 38, 47
Scherer, Edmond 94, 95, 99, 103, 104 Ward, Humphrey 102
Schiller, F.C.S. 37, 190 Ward, James 147, 151, 160, 231, 232
Schilpp, Paul218 Weierstrass, Kar! 126, 179, 183, 186
Schlick, Moritz 202, 208, 210, 224 Weiler, Gershon 217
Schmidt, Raymund 139 Weininger, Otto 227
Schopenhauer, Arthur 227 Weiss, Paul 30,46
Schröder, Ernst 48 Weitmann, Herbert 119
Schuhmann, KarlXI, XII, XV,48, 68, 81, 82, Welby, Victoria 39, 40, 47
116, 127, 139-141, 160, 172,231,233,234 Welch, Cyril 173, 189,229
Schuppe, Wilhelm 48 Welch, E. P. XV, 173-192
Schutz, Alfred 105,157, 192 Werkmeister, W.H.W. 192
Schwankl, Peter 81 Wertheimer, Max 191, 196
Schweitzer, Albert 78, 82 Weyl, Herrnann 146, 155
Sellars, Wilfred 218 White, Roger, 222
 239

Whitehead, A.N. 36, 136, 155,231, 232, 234 Wright, Georg Hendrik von 214, 218, 222-
Wiener, Philip P. 46, 47 225, 227
Wild, lohn 105, 159 Wundt, Wilhelm 48, 149
Williams, Forrest 61
Wilshire, Bruce 105 Yorck von Wartenburg, Paul136
Wittgenstein, Ludwig XII, XVI, 75, 85, 90, Young, Frederic H. 46
158, 202-228
Wolf, A. 232 Zaner, Richard 192