Hutchcroft Colonial Masters

Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local
Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913

Author(s): Paul D. Hutchcroft
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 2 (May, 2000), pp. 277-306
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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Colonial Masters,National
Politicos,and ProvincialLords:
CentralAuthorityand Local
Autonomyin the American
Philippines,1900-1913
PAUL D. HUTCHCROFT
W HEN THE UNITED STATES EMBARKED ON A CAMPAIGN of overseascolonial

conquest a century ago, it was for some Americans an unquestionably righteous
venture in political tutelage. "[Godi has made [the English-speaking and Teutonic
peoples] adept in governmentthat we may administergovernmentamong savage and
senile peoples," proclaimed Indiana Senator Albert J. Beveridge. "And of all our race
He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the
regenerationof the world" (Snyder 1962). The largestand most importantU.S. colony
was of course the Philippines, where a campaign of militaryconquest began in 1898
and continued into the early years of the new century.The conquest involved intense
fighting,brutal torture,forced resettlement,and horrificmassacres-and was at the
same time combined with determined effortsto conciliate important elements of
Filipino society through a process of "benevolent assimilation." By July 4, 1901, a
civil governmentwas established with President William McKinley's instructionsto
promote "the happiness, peace, and prosperityof the people of the Philippine Islands
... [conforming] to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the
fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of
just and effectivegovernment" (Salamanca 1984, 32),
What kind of state was this to be? To answer this question, one must pay
particular attention to the Taft era, 1900-13, when American colonials-building on
the residual architectureof the previous Spanish colonial state and responding to a
Paul D. Hutchcroftis AssistantProfessorof Political Scienceat the Universityof Wis-

consin-Madison.
Foroffering commentsthatcontributed to theideas in thisarticle,I am especiallygrateful
to Michael Cullinane,as well as to BenedictAnderson,Mark Beissinger,Donald Emmerson,
Edna LabraHutchcroft, David Leheny,Resil Mojares,Crawford Young, participantsin a 1996
roundtableof the Asian InstituteofManagement(in Manila), participantsin a 1997 panel of
the AssociationofAsian Studies(in Chicago),and anonymousreadersof TheJournalofAsian
Studies.Valuable researchassistancewas providedby GwendolynBevis and StevenHong. All
errors,of course,are mine alone.
ofAsian Studies59, no. 2 (May 2000):277-306.

TheJournal
C) 2000 by the AssociationforAsian Studies,Inc.
277

278 PAUL D. HUTCHCROFT
revolutionary challenge-establishedthefoundations ofthemodernPhilippinepolity.

During these years,the expedientstrategiesand political ideals of U.S. officials
encouragedveryclose tieswithFilipinoelites,and theresultinginteractions produced
a statequite distinctivein theannalsofcolonialism.This is especiallyapparentwhen
one examinesrelationsbetweencapital and countryside.Both administrative and
politicalstructureswerein mostimportant respectsverydecentralized,and provincial
powerholders came to enjoya greatdeal of influenceoverall levelsof governance-
fromlocal bodies up to the executiveagenciesin Manila. The thoroughpenetration
of the bureaucracyby extensivesystemsof patronage,moreover,further promoted
local autonomyat the expenseofcentralauthority.
Clearerunderstanding of this decisiveperiodof stateformationis of particular
relevancetoday,as a sweepingprogramof decentralization has been initiatedpartly
in responseto common-but flawed-perceptionsthat the Philippine polity is
historically"overcentralized."One public administration study,forexample,asserts
that "our colonial historyleftan indeliblestamp of centralismthat contemporary
forceshavesustained."'These sentiments are echoedby keypolicymakers,including
a recentinteriorsecretarywho condemnedthe way in which "imperialManila"
historicallyexerciseda "strangleholdon local governments.' '2 The logical means of
rightingthe wrongs of the past, in this analysis,is a far-reaching programof

devolution-and the Philippines has indeed, in the 1990s, undertakenwhat is
probablytheworld'smostambitioussuch initiative(Blair 1996, 18).
My firstmajorobjectiveis to challengeimportantassumptionsunderlyingthis
effort by reexaminingthe originsand territorial characterof the modernPhilippine
state.As this articlewill demonstrate, a distinctiveAmericancolonial heritagehas
fostereda complexweb of central-localties in whichManila can seem to be at once
overlordand lordedover.One keyaspectofpostwarcentral-local relationshas indeed
been centralized:eventhemosttrifling ofadministrative decisionsmustbe approved
in Manila, and manylocal and provincialauthoritieschafeat restrictions on their
autonomy.At the same time,Manila has long displayeda notablyweak capacityfor
sustained administrativesupervisionof provincial and local officials.National
politicians,moreover, mustcommonlyrelyheavilyon local power(and thebrokering
of arrangements with local bosses and theirprivatearmies)in orderto succeed in
electoral contests. Sorting out the longstandingcomplexityof how territorial
dimensionsof administrative structuresinteractwith those of political structures
providesmanyvaluablelessonsforcurrentefforts at reform.3
My secondmajorobjectiveis to demonstrate how carefulexaminationoftheTaft
era offersmanyinsightsforcomparativeinquiryinto stateformation, colonialstate
'Ocampo and Panganiban1985, 2. This assertionof a "centralist"historyis a common

argumentin postwaranalysisofPhilippinepublicadministration. See also RomaniandThomas
1954, 119-22; variousselectionsin Abueva and de Guzman 1969, 415-75; de Guzman,
Reforma,and Panganiban1988, 208-12; and Tapales 1993, 8.
2Alunan 1995, 49. This officialsimultaneouslyboasted of how "local power elites are
being dismantledto level thepoliticalplayingfield"throughhis department's effortsto con-
ofprivatearmies.If Manila is reallyimperial,one mightask,how did local
fiscatethe firearms
elitescome to exerciseso muchpower?
3Because theirfocusis indeed upon administrative structures, scholarsofpublic admin-
istrationtend to concentratefarmore attentionon formalstructuresof authoritythan on
informalnetworksofpower.While theymaywell be awareof the importanceofthelatter,it
is rarelyincorporated formalistic
into theiranalysis.For a critiqueof public administration's
tendencies,and a discussionof the interactionbetweenauthorityand power,see Hutchcroft,
forthcoming.

AUTONOMY IN THE AMERICAN PHILIPPINES, 1900-1913 279
formation, and central-localrelations.In particular,thisanalysisfocusesattentionon

issues of compromise,ideology, and the historicaltiming of the creation of
administrative and representationalstructures-eachof whichplays a major role in
both influencing the characterof a nationalstateand shapingthe mannerin which
centralstatesand local forcesrelateto one another.
The followingsection introducesa frameworkfor analyzing the territorial
dimensionsofadministrative and politicalstructures. In thesecondand coreportion
ofthearticle,I use thisframework to analyzethecharacter ofrelationsbetweenManila
and the provinces4as theyevolved throughoutthe course of the Taft era, when
recurrent tensionsbetweencentralauthority and local autonomywerelargelyresolved
in favorof provincialelites who were empoweredin new and importantways by
Americanstructuresof governance.Within these structures,the quest for self-
government becamenearlysynonymous with the quest forlocal autonomiy, national
legislativeauthority,and patronageopportunities.The thirdsection verybriefly
surveyshow the initial courseof state formationin the Taft yearsis essentialfor
understanding thegeneralweaknessofcentralauthority in thePhilippinesthroughout
the remainderof the colonialera and into the secondhalfof the twentiethcentury.
In the conclusion,I returnto my two majorobjectivesby summarizinghow clearer
understanding ofthisbasicperiodofstateformation is criticalto anyeffort
to reshape
the politytoday,and reviewinghow issuesof compromise,ideology,and historical
sequencehelp to explainthe unusualcharacterof the Americancolonialstatein the
Philippines.
AssessingTerritorialDimensions of Politics and

Administration5
Over time, Michael Mann emphasizesin a discussionthat draws heavilyon

Weber,themodernstatehas come to "[embodylcentrality, in thesensethatpolitical
relationsradiateto and froma center,to covera . . . territorially demarcatedarea
overwhichit exercises. .. somedegreeofauthoritative, bindingrulemaking,backed
up by some organizedphysicalforce"(Mann 1993, 55). As therecentworkofJames
Scotthighlights,theveryformation ofa modernstatedependsin manyfundamental
waysuponitscapacityto make"legible"the"chaotic,disorderly, constantly
changing
societybeneathit" (Scott1998, 2, 82). The degreeto whicha stateembodiescentrality
and makeslegible its society,however,differs a greatdeal fromone case to another.
In attemptingto analyzethisvariation,I beginbydistinguishing twocommonly
noted aspects of centralizationand decentralization:that which exists in the
administrativerealmofcivilianand militarybureaucracies and thatwhichexistsin the
politicalrealmof legislatures,elections,politicalparties,patronagesystems,and the
4Myfocus,throughout, will be on the lowlandChristianprovincesin whichthe bulk of

thepopulationresided.Fromthebeginning,Americancolonialsestablisheddistinctstructures
forthegovernanceof the "non-Christian tribes"of theMountainProvincein northern Luzon
and the Muslim regionsof Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.On these areas, see Finin
(1991) and Abinales(1997). For a veryinsightfulcomparisonofa military-dominated process
of state formationin Mindanao and a civilian-dominated processof state formationin the
"Christianized"regionsof the archipelago,see Abinales 1999.
5Thisdiscussiondrawsand builds upon a framework developedin moredetail in Hutch-
croft,forthcoming.

like.6For heuristicpurposes,theserealmscan initiallybe conceivedas two distinct

continua,each definingrelativelymore centralizedor decentralizedpolities. After
providingthisconceptualfoundation, it is possibleto proceedto examinethecomplex
interplaythatexistsbetweenthe two spheres.
Scholarsof state formationhave devoted considerableattentionto historical
strategiesofadministrativecentralization(see, e.g., Weber 1978, 1042-43; Tilly 1992,
100, 114), and have demonstrated how prefectoralism was the singlemosteffective
historicalstrategyof centralizingrulers.In this system,"the nationalgovernment
dividesthe countryinto areasand places a prefectin chargeofeach." Feslerexplains
thattheprefect"represents thewholegovernment, and all specializedfieldagentsin
the area are underhis supervision"(1968, 374); "he is a 'littleking' " (1962, 120).
While theprefectoral systemis mostcloselyassociatedwiththeNapoleonicreforms,
it latercame to be thedominantmode ofadministration in colonialsettings,and has
more recentlybeen foundin many postcolonialauthoritarian settings.It is most
effectivein accomplishingsuch basic tasksas the impositionand maintenanceoflaw
and orderand the extractionof revenueand resources(Callaghy1984, 106).
Whetheror not prefectoral systemsare adopted,thereare a rangeof otherways
bywhichmodernstatesmayseekto imposetheiradministrative authority throughout
theterritory. A centralbureau,commonlytheInteriorMinistry, oftenclaimsa leading
positionamong othernationalagenciesby virtueof its jurisdictionoverlower-level
governmental unitsthroughoutthe country.When appointments are made forlocal
posts, a centralizingstate commonlyfavorspersonswho do not have (and are not
likelyto acquire)close ties to theirarea of responsibility.7 To ensuretheirloyaltyto
thecenter,theymaybe chosenfromotherregionsand/orinculcatedintoa bureaucratic
elite cultureverydistinctfromthesocietalgroupstheyare to govern.A centralizing
statewill also commonlytryto rotatepersonnelon a regularbasis,and attemptto do
so at the firsthintthatan officialis seekingto build a local fiefdom. In addition,a
centralizingstate will seek to provide regularand extensivesupervisionof local
governments, and ensurein particularthatanythinghavingto do with revenueand
coercivecapacityis carefullycontrolledbyofficials loyalto thecapital.Finally,national
agenciesmayrequirelocal officials to obtainpermissionfora rangeoftasksperformed
at thesubnationallevel,and insiston overturning or reversing therulingsand actions
ofwhichit does not approve.
At the otherend of the continuumlie the diversephenomenaof administrative
This may resultmerelyfromthe de factolack of integration-or
decentralization.
disintegration-ofa polity. Weber's analysisof patrimonialismprovidesvaluable
descriptions ofsomeofthemostcommonwaysin whichpolitiescan quite effectively
be carvedup by thepersonalinterests ofthosewho stafftheadministrative apparatus,
as when elites are able to monopolizecontrolover local government positionsand
"extendthe authoritywhich theyalreadyexerciseovertheirown dependentsto all
inhabitantsofa given region"(Ertman1997, 8). Most threatening ofall to a central
ruler,logicallyenough,is the combinationof both militaryand economicpowerin
thehandsofa singledistrictofficial; particularly in outlyingareas,suchindependence
becomesincreasingly probableand can oftenbe passedon fromone generationto the
'While my focus is on the administrative and political spheres,I fullyrecognizethat

examinationof anypolityrequiresprudentattentionto how botheconomicand sociocultural
ties also exertpowerfulcentripetaland centrifugal
pressuresthatoftenvarygreatlyovertime.
7Throughoutthisarticle,forthe sake of simplicity,the use of the term"local" is meant
to signifymunicipal,provincial,and regionallevelsofgovernment.

next."[Tihe patrimonialrulercannotalwaysdare to destroytheseautonomouslocal

patrimonialpowers,"writesWeber; in attemptingto do so, the ruler"musthavean
administrative organizationof his own whichcan replacethem."In general,fearof
resistanceand lack of an alternative apparatusled centralrulersto compromisewith
theselocal lords(Weber 1978, 1040, 1044, 1051, 1055, 1058).
In othercases,administrative decentralization comesabout as partof a planned,
de jure strategy.Here, scholarsof modernpublic administration have developed
typologiesthat include the widely used distinctionbetweendeconcentration and
devolution(the lattera more extensivetransfer of decision-makingauthorityand
responsibility to local governmentunits). Combiningthe variouselementsof the
analysisabove, one can say that towardthe centralizedside of the continuumlie
prefectoral systems;towardthedecentralized side ofthecontinuumlie administrative
systemsthatexhibithigh levels of "local patrimonialism" and/orsystemsin which
high levelsof authority and responsibility have been devolvedto the local level.
While the administrative continuumrestson well-developedliteratures in state
formationand public administration,its companion continuum of political
centralizationand decentralization requiresexaminationof fourbroad issues relatedto
bothlocal and nationalpolitics.As with the administrative continuum,judgements
on thecharacter ofa givenpolityrequirecarefulattentionto itshistoricalspecificities.
First,it is importantto examinewhetherlocal executivesareappointed bythecenter or
electedbypopularvote.Officialsappointedby the centerhave far less potentialto
representlocal intereststhan thoseelected by popularvote. In each case, however,
otherpolitical dynamicscan serveto counterthesegeneralizations.An appointed
officialable to controlsignificant electoraland/orcoerciveresources, forexample,will
haveconsiderable bargainingpowervis-a-visthecenter;conversely, an electedofficial's
tendenciesto supportlocal interestsmaybe neutralizedby thecentralizinginfluence
of his or herpoliticalparty.
Second,on a moreinformal a concentration
level,is there ofsocioeconomic and/or coercive
powerin localpatrons and bosses,and how do thesepowerholders affectthecharacterof
ostensibly democraticinstitutions? In particular,to whatextentdo localpowerholders
influencetheelectionof nationallegislators, governors, mayors,and local legislators?
The greatertheconcentration oflocal power,themoredifficult it will be forthecenter
to imposeits will on the localitiesand regions.Weber,it will be recalled,expected
the combinationof economicand coerciveroles in single individualsto promotea
tendencytowarddecentralization.
Third,movingon to thenationallevel,is there a legislaturewithsignificant decision-
makingauthority? Quite obviously,a politythatconcentrates authoritysolelyin the
executiveis farmorecentralized,politically,thanone in whichauthorityis shared
betweentheexecutiveand legislators.While thiscriterion does notinherently address
territorialdimensions of authority,the potential for representationof diverse
territorialinterestsis certainlyheightenedbytheexistenceofa functioning legislature.
For reasonsexplainedelsewhere,the Americanpresidentialsystemas well as single-
memberdistrictplurality(or "firstpast the post") electoralsystemsgenerallyoffer
more potential for the legislative representationof local interests than do
parliamentarysystems and proportional-representation electoral systems (see
Hutchcroft forthcoming).
Fourth,to whatextent are administrative structures insulatedfrompartypatronage?
Wherepartypatronageand spoils effectively permeateadministrative structures, the
characterof central-localties may be significantly different thanwhat one findsin
settingswitha strong"constituency forbureaucratic autonomy"(Shefter1994, 28).

In Italy, Putnam explains,patronagepractices"allowed local elites and national

deputiesto bargainforlocal interests againstnationaldirectivesin returnforelectoral
and parliamentary support.Politicalchannelsto thecenterweremoreimportant than
administrative channels"(1993, 19). Patronage-basedAmericanpoliticalpartiesin
thelate nineteenth centurysimilarlypromotedthe"broaddispersionofparticularistic
benefits downwardto thelocalitiesat a timein whichsocialinteractions and economic
conflictswere becomingincreasinglynationalin scope" (Skowronek1982, 39). In
short,democraticpoliticalsystemswith a strongelementof patronagemayprovide
importantinformal avenuesforthepromotionoflocal interests, and at thesametime
undercutthe supervisory capacityof the center.
This raisescausal issues thatare of particularimportanceto the analysisbelow.
In MartinShefter's insightful analysis,thehistoricaltimingofthecreationofmodern
bureaucraciesand the emergenceof mass political participationis essential in
determining therelativestrength ofa "constituency forbureaucratic autonomy"versus
a "constituency forpatronage."To statehis nuancedargumentin thesimplestterms,
if the formationof a "constituencyfor bureaucraticautonomy"has precededthe
mobilizationof a masselectorate(as in Germany),partieswill be unlikelyto control
the administrative structures throughspoils and patronage;if the timingis reversed
(as in Italy),patronage-ridden administrative structuresaretheprobableresult(1994,
21-60).
Using thisframework, one can examinetheparticularfeatures ofa givenpolitical
systemand determineitsplacementon a continuumofrelatively morecentralizedvs.
relativelymore decentralized.In generalterms,however,one can expect a highly
centralizedpoliticalsystemto be one in whichone findssomeextensivecombination
of the followingfeatures:(1) local and regionalofficials are appointedby the center;
(2) thereare no local bosses to challengethe authorityof the center;(3) decision-
making authorityat the capital is concentratedin the executive(or, if thereis a
nationallegislature,it has littlerealsay);and (4) bureaucraciesarewell insulatedfrom
systemsofpatronage.Conversely, one can expectthata highlydecentralized political
systemwill have a significant combinationof the opposingfeatures.
Conceivingof two separatecontinuaof centralization vs. decentralization-one
fortheadministrative sphereand one forthepoliticalsphere-is a valuableheuristic
exercise,and I havehighlightedabovethemajorfactorsthatroughlydetermine where
a given politymight be placed on each continua.8The next step is to apply this
analysisto the earlyAmericancolonial state in the Philippines,and examinethe
complexinterplay ofadministration and politicswithinthisdistinctive polity.In the
course of this examination,I will explain the historicalgenesis of the generally
decentralized administrative and politicalstructuresof the modernPhilippinestate.
The TaftEra, 1900-1913: The Originsofthe

ModernPhilippineState
The keyfigurein theconstruction ofAmericancolonialrulewas William Howard
Taft,who firstarrivedin thePhilippinesin 1900 and servedas thefirst
Civil Governor
"It is importantto emphasizethat this framework does notattemptto resolvewhat are

sure to be oftenverydifficultproblemsof determiningpreciselywhereon the (politicalor
administrative)continuaa givenpolityshouldbe placed. As withtheconceptsofstateauton-
omyand statecapacity(Skocpol 1985), thesetwocontinuahelp to charttheconceptualterrain
but do not proposemethodsfordefinitemeasurement.Othersare welcometo attemptsuch
precision,but mysuspicionis thatB. C. Smithwas correctin assertingthatthemeasurement
of decentralization
(and, one should add, centralization)"cannotbe a preciseexercise;rough
judgementswill have to be made" (1980, 139).

from1901 to 1903. On returning to theUnitedStates,he proceededto becomeU.S.

Secretary of War from1904 to 1909 (thus "America'sde factocolonial secretary")
and thenPresidentoftheUnitedStatesfrom1909 to 1913.9At thetimeofhis arrival
in the Philippines in mid-1900, a widespread Filipino guerrilla struggle for
independencewas unitingmuchofthepopulationand tyingdownsome 72,000 U.S.
troops (Golay 1998, 93); steady reportsof atrocities,meanwhile,fanned anti-
imperialistsentimentat home. Out of a combinationof expediencyand ideals, the
blueprintsfora new colonialstateweredrawn.
I will firstbriefly
surveyimportantlegaciesoftheSpanishcolonialstate,and then
examineboththeexpedientstrategiesand politicalidealsofearlyAmericancolonials.
The followingthreesubsectionsexaminemajorperiodsoftheTaftera(1900-3, 1903-
6, and 1906-13), afterwhichI providemorein-depthanalysisof the era as a whole.
The Spanish Heritage

To begin, it is importantto recall that the state constructedthroughthe
interactionof U.S. colonialsand a collaboratingPhilippineelite in the firstdecades
ofthetwentieth centurybothbuiltuponand respondedto socioeconomic andpolitical
patternsofdevelopmentin theSpanishcolonialera.The firstsystematic investigation
of the Americansinto Philippinepolitical conditions,conductedby the Schurman
Commissionin 1899, foundmuch about thispreviousregimethatdemandedto be
reformed.One of the commission'smajor targetswas what theyperceivedas the
excessivecentralizationof the Spanish colonial state. While centralgovernment
intervention in local affairs"is foreignto Americanpractice,"they noted, it "is
fundamental to thewholepoliticallifeand thoughtoftheFilipinos."Decentralization,
theydeclared,was "one ofthecryingneeds"ofthearchipelago(Report ofthePhilippine
Commission [hereafterRPCJ 1900 1:70).
This commonAmericananalysisof the territorial dimensionsof the Spanish
colonialstatehas manyproblemsworthyofbriefreview.Thereweremeansbywhich
Manila intervened in local government to be sure,not the least of whichwas
affairs,
theabilityto makeappointmentsto provincialposts.But one mustalso notethat-
throughoutthe Spanishera-the governmentbased in Manila was so understaffed
thatit had to relyheavilyupon ecclesiasticalpersonnelin orderto extendits reach
throughout thearchipelago.JoseRizal's latenineteenth-century novelsvividlyportray
theenormouslocal powerexercisedby somefriarsin theircommunities-inpatterns
initiallyestablishedsome threecenturiesearlier.Friarsnot only exerciseda large
degreeof influenceoverlocal government but wereoftenoutsidethe control
affairs,
ofcentralsupervision byeithersecularorecclesiasticalauthorities(Corpuz1957, 118-
22; Stanley 1974, 10-11). Provincial governors,moreover,"establishednearly
autonomousfiefdoms" outsideManila's reach(just as Governors-General in Manila
were highlyautonomousfromtheirsuperiorsin Acapulco and Madrid) (Steinberg
1994, 57-58). Despite the creationof a largerstate structureand the spread of
universalreligion-both commonlyassociatedwith breakingdown local identities
and promotinglong-distancetrade (Young 1976, 30-33)-the Spanish period
initiallypromoteda strengthening of local identitiesand a curtailingof many
elementsof internaltrade.As PeterStanleyconcludes,"the tumult[ujousimpactof
9Paredes1989b, 46. Althoughfarfromthearchipelagoin theselateryears,Taft'sattention

to Philippineaffairsremainedkeen. As a laterGovernor-General (CameronForbes,1909-13)
notedin his journal,the Philippineswas "Mr. Taft'sfavoritehobby"(Paredes 1989b, 47).

Spanishconquestwas followednot by centuriesof exposureand exploitationbut by

two hundredyearsofdeliberate, plannedisolation"(Stanley1974, 14, 10, quotationat
10, emphasisadded).
Even whentherewas a dramaticopeningofthePhilippinesto worldagricultural
marketsbeginning in the late eighteenthcentury,the particularcharacterof
agricultural commercializationstrengthenedlocal power of another sort, as
increasinglypowerfullanded elites (generallyof mestizoheritage)emergedin the
provinces(McCoy 1982, 8; Larkin1982). Althoughtherewereindeedefforts to reduce
the role of the priestand standardizelocal government administration in the latter
yearsof the Spanishregime(as in the Maura Law of 1893), such reforms had yetto
be implementedin mostareasby the close of Spanishrule(Stanley1974, 38). With
an economic base outside the controlof the centralgovernmentin Manila, the
circumstances wereripe forthishighlydispersedgroupof prosperouslocal elitesto
obtain political power as well. Both by forceof circumstancesand ideological
inclination,as we shall see, the arrival of the Americansprovided countless
opportunities forthiselite to do so.
A Fusion of Expediency and Ideals

Anxiousto win over both a cosmopolitanilustrado(educated)elite as well as a
broadergroupof local "caciques" thathad-particularlyin thevicinityofManila-
given strongsupportto the revolutionary effort,Taft and his associatesnot only
drafted administrativereformsthat envisaged the creation of strong local
governments,but also made longer-termplans for the conveningof a national
representativeassembly(the promiseof which was formalizedin the Organic Act
passedby theU.S. Congressin 1902). Taftprivately consideredtheeducatedmestizos
"difficultpersonsout of whom to make an honestgovernment,"but needed the
cooperationof preciselythisgroup in orderto pacifythe archipelago(Stanley1974,
66-67). As part of the bargainof "benevolentassimilation,"therefore, the United
States began to providegreatlyexpandedopportunitiesforpoliticalpowerto elites
that had alreadydevelopeda strongeconomic base throughoutmajor regionsin the
latterdecadesoftheSpanishera.10The strength ofanti-imperialistopinionat home-
amplyrepresented in Congress,whichplayed a major role in determiningcolonial
policy-providedfurther impetusforensuringthatTaft'soverarching initialobjective
was to end thewar (Golay 1998, 75, 99). If only"our countrymen who are decrying
and hindering"Americaneffortscould see the programof "offering these people
completelocal autonomy,"suggestedone Taftaide, perhapstheiroppositionmight
be quelled (Williams 1913, 182)."
Expediencyalone,however,does not explainthemannerin whichU.S. colonials
crafteda new Philippinestate; distinctivelyAmericannotionsof governancealso
played a major role. Perhapsthe clearestexpositionof ideologicalpreceptsguiding
the new colonial mastercan be foundin the April 1900 instructions writtenby
Secretaryof War Elihu Root (on behalfof PresidentMcKinley)to Taft'sPhilippine
"0Whereas previouslysuchopportunitieswereconfinedto themunicipallevel(as examined

in May 1989), theAmericanregimesteadilygave elitesa strongroleat all levelsofgovernment
quite localized
(municipal,provincial,and national).In the process,as we shall see, formerly
elitesforgeddeep and enduringlinkagesamong themselves-firstat theprovincialand later
at the nationallevel.
"1Foran overviewofvariouswaysin whichexpediencyguidedTaft'sstatecraft, seeAlfonso
1968. See also Yabes 1967, 20, 22.

Commission(Salamanca1984, 31-32, 237-45). Root initiallytriedtopreparehimself

forthetaskby studyingtheBritishcolonialexperience, but soonconcludedthat"the
precedentsof othercountrieswere less importantthan the legal rightsand moral
traditionsof his own" (Stanley1974, 60). Althoughthe United Stateshad come to
enjoy "completesovereignty"over the Philippines,Root nevertheless emphasized
"thatthereare certainthingstheUnited StatesGovernmentcouldn'tdo" becauseof
the inherentlimitationson government embodiedin theBill of Rights.Therewere,
of course,manyaspectsof the Bill of Rightsoftendenied to Filipinos-particularly
in the course of the protractedPhilippine-American War; Root's own racism,
moreover, led him to considertheFilipinos"littleadvancedfrompuresavagery"and
thusnotyetworthyofgovernment basedon popularconsent(quotedin Stanley1974,
60-61). But even while rightscould be restrictedand democracydelayed, it is
importantto emphasize that Americanofficialsbegan the task of colonial state
formation witha strongbeliefin necessarylimitationson governmental authority. In
addition,Root mandatedtherapidestablishment ofmunicipalgovernments "subject
to theleastdegreeofsupervisionand control. .. consistentwiththemaintenance of
forfavoringlocal unitsin "the
law, order,and loyalty,"and set out clearinstructions
distribution ofpowersamongthe governments" (Salamanca1984, 239, 241).
In both these aspects,Root was of coursedrawingon importantelementsof
Americanpolitical thought.Observersof the United States have long noted the
relativehistoricalabsenceofa powerful,clearlydemarcated,and centralizedstate;in
de Tocqueville'swords,"societygovernsitselfforitself.. . so feebleand so restricted
is the shareleftto the administration" (1953 [18351 I, 57). The typicalAmerican,
argues Huntington, "is so fundamentallyanti-governmentthat he identifies
government withrestrictions
on government.... Confronted withtheneedto design
a politicalsystemwhichwill maximizepowerand authority, he has no readyanswer.
His generalformulais thatgovernments shouldbe based on freeand fairelections"
(1968, 7). In his analysisof the nineteenth-century "state of courtsand parties,"
Skowronekobservesthatthe "broaddiffusion ofpoweramong the localitieswas the
organizationalfeature... most clearly responsiblefor the distinctivesense of
statelessness"(Skowronek1982, 24, 23).
Colonialstateformation in the Philippinesbegan just as theAmericanstatewas
in the midst of a period of extensivereform,and "new national administrative
institutionsfirstemergedfreefromthe clutchesof partydomination,directcourt
supervision,and localisticorientations"(Skowronek1982, 15). In the Philippines,
however,themajorbuildersof the colonialstatewere,by the standardsof theirday,
conservatives ratherthan reformers or progressives(May 1984, xviii; see also Golay
1998, 63). Therewas indeed a "new Americanstate" emergingat home,and there
wereelementsof thatstatethatmade theirway to the Philippines(most notably,as
we shall see, the attemptto introducea professionalcivil service).Nevertheless,it
was in manywaysan olderversionofthatstatethatU.S. colonialsendedup implanting
in thePhilippines.12 Emergingfroma systemin whichcourtsand partiesstillplayed
12Indeed,one can observethat just as Britainbequeathedan "antique polity" upon its

formerAmericancolonyprior to experiencinga high degree of state centralizationin the
seventeenth century(Huntington1968, 93-139, at 135), so toodid theUnitedStatesbequeath
elementsofthe"earlyAmericanstate"upon thePhilippinespreciselyat a timein whichmajor
reformof thatstatewas being accomplishedat home (Skowronek1982, 23). Abinales(1999)
discussesthecoexistencein theAmericanPhilippinesof(1) Jacksoniantraditionsof"machine
politics" and (2) more recentantimachineProgressivereforms(such as effortsto createa
professionalcivil service),and demonstrateshow patternsof machine politics eventually
emergeddominanteven in "specialprovinces"oftheCordilleraand Mindanaothathad earlier
been governedby the military(and thusrelativelyinsulatedfromsuch patterns).

thatTaftexplicitlyset out to make the "modern

a dominantrole,it is notsurprising
lawyer-politician"
(ratherthan the "medieval-religioustype" of Spanishtimes) the
dominantfigurein Philippinesociety(quoted in Steinberget al. 1987, 277).
The Impulse Toward Devolution, 1900-1903
Through a combinationof expediencyand ideals, therefore, Taft and other

architectsof Americancolonial rule demonstrateda stronginclinationto grant
substantialauthorityto local officialsthroughoutmost of the archipelagoand thus
replicatethe spiritof local self-rulepracticedat home (Cullinane 1971, 18). With
fond referenceto New England, Taft proclaimed"town government"to be "the
practicalway of buildingup a generalgovernment" (May 1984, 41).
The PhilippineCommissionenjoyedbroadauthority in crafting newpolicies.The
ultimategoal was to educatethe Filipinosin thewaysofrepresentative government,
but Tafthimselfexpectedit to be "at leasta generation" -and perhapsthree-before
the Philippineswould be preparedforself-government (May 1984, 14-15). The
Commission,composedoffiveAmericans,was initiallygivenlegislativepowers;after
the establishment of civil governmentin July 1901 it enjoyedboth legislativeand
executivepowers.Soon thereafter, its rankswereaugmentedby the appointmentof
threemembersof the Taft-supported, pro-American,and primarilyManila-based
PartidoFederal(Cullinane1989, 82, 89-90; Golay 1998, 76-77).
In the midst of continuingconflict,the Americanmilitarygovernmenthad
alreadybegunto hold municipalelections-firstgrantingwide rightsofsuffrage and
laterlimitingthefranchise. Evenifmunicipalities had littlerealauthority (May 1984,
44-45), this earlyrelianceupon an electoralprocesscan be said to reflectdistinctly
Americannotionsofhow to constructa state.Afterits formation in late 1900, Taft's
in for
PhilippineCommissionquicklyput place thelegal framework moresystematic
organizationof local governments(building on the units and boundariesalready
establishedin Spanishtimes).In themunicipalities, a sharplycircumscribed electorate
was given the rightto elect president(mayor),vice-president, council. The
a and
presidentappointeda municipaltreasurer and secretary, and the council was given
considerablelatitudeforplanningprojectsand appropriating townfunds.Provinces
wereto be governedby a three-member a
board,headedby governor (indirectly elected
in
by municipalofficials his province) and also comprising a treasurerand supervisor
(of public works)appointedby Manila. The provincialgovernments were charged
with three major functions:collectionof taxes (by the offce of the treasurer),
construction and maintenanceof local infrastructure (by the officeof thesupervisor),
and supervisionof municipalgovernments (by both the governorand the treasurer)
(Cullinane1971, 19-21; Hayden1942, 266). Bothlevelsoflocalgovernment received
an allocationofinsular(central)revenues,and reliedas well on a poll tax(thecedula),
an unpopularand generallyunproductive tax on land,and variousothersourcessuch
as licensesand fees(Golay 1998, 114, 117; Hayden 1942, 273; Luton 1971, 143).
In providingfortheelectionofprovincialgovernors, theAmericanssignificantly
expandedthe politicalarena in which Philippineelites could vie forpower.Under
the Spanish,provincialgovernors(exclusivelySpaniards)were centrallyappointed,
and electionsallowed only at the municipal level. The revolutionary Philippine
Republic,establishedin 1898, had a moreextensivesystemofelectedmunicipaland
but its influencewas short-lived.Beginningwith the electionof
provincialofficials,
governorsin 1902, theredevelopednew and moreextensivetypesof intraprovincial

linkagesamong variousmunicipalitiesthatsoon emergedas provincewidepolitical

factions.In the comingyears,as the Americanprojectof "self-government" moved
beyondmunicipalitiesand provincesto the creationofan Assemblyin Manila, these
provincialfactionswereto becomea majorbuildingblock of national-level political
maneuvering (Cullinane 1989, 227, 255, 513-14).
Nearlyall municipalofficials wereFilipino,as wereroughlythree-quarters oftop
provincial officers.In seeking to maintain "firm control over the provincial
governments," however,theCommissionreserved thepostsofprovincialtreasurer
and
supervisorforAmericans(Cullinane 1971, 19-20, 45, 47, quotationat 19). The
treasurer was to be the majorfigureoverseeingbothprovincialand municipalaffairs
on behalfoftheinsulargovernment. In Manila,theExecutiveBureauwas established
bothas the clearinghouse forthe executivebranchas a wholeand as the majorbody
overseeinglocal units of government.As such, its top official-the Executive
Secretary-came to be "recognizedthroughoutthe Archipelagoas one of the
outstandingmembersofgovernment." Even iftheExecutiveBureauhad a dominant
role in dealing with the provinces,it is also importantto note that it was not the
onlyagencyto enjoyan extensivenetworkoffieldoffices: thebureausofconstabulary,
education,land,forests, mines,and postsalso had theirowndirectdealingswiththeir
provincialunits (Hayden 1942, 275; Barrows1914, 17). As such, the Executive
Bureauwas farlowerin staturethanthepowerfulinteriorministriesassociatedwith
prefectoral systems(whereone centralagencytendsto monopolizethedealingsofthe
centralstatewithlowertiersofauthority).
The ExecutiveBureaulookedoverall legislationcomingout ofprovincialbodies
(some 20,000 to 30,000 statutesper year) and examinedas well the titles and
occasionallythe substanceof municipalacts. The goal was to detectand disallow
illegal acts and "deliberateabuse of authority,"but, as Cullinanepoints out, this
methodofsupervision bycorrespondence had littleimpacteitheron thewayin which
the legislationwas implementedor on the behaviorof theofficials involved(Hayden
1942, quotationat 272; Cullinane1971, 23, 26). This approachwas veryformalistic,
implicitlyassuminga strongcorrelationbetweenwrittenstatutesand the actual
behaviorof local officials.Anotherelementof long-distancesupervisionincluded
requirements thatlocal officialsobtaincentralapprovalforbudgets,loans,and certain
governmental tasks(Hayden 1942, 273). Finally,as analyzedin greaterdetailbelow,
the ExecutiveBureau investigatedchargesof wrongdoingagainstlocal officials and
recommended a rangeofsanctionsforthosefoundguilty.In orderto promotehonest
and efficient government at all levels,theCommissionenacteda Civil ServiceAct in
1901. Taft expectedthe law to save the colony from"the most markedevil of
Americanpolitics,the spoils system,"and the Commissiondeclaredthat "without
this law American government in these islands is . .. foredoomed to humiliating
failure"(Hayden 1942, 91).
At the same time thatTaft was seekingto promoteconsiderableautonomyat
local levelsand soundadministration throughoutthecolony,he was also determined
to assistin the formationand expansionofa favoredpoliticalparty,theFederalistas.
Politicalpartyformation is a not a normalactivityformostcolonialmasters,but in
the PhilippinesTaft consideredit an importantelementof his largerproject of
"politicaleducation."He supportedtheFederalistas veryopenly,notonlygivingthem
a privilegedpositionon the colony'spremiergovernmental bodybut also providing
ample opportunities forthemto transcendtheirthinelite Manila politicalbase and
begin to build a largerfollowingthroughoutthe provinces.Most importantly, the
Federalistaswere given a powerfulrole in makingappointmentsto key provincial

offices(a privilege formerlyenjoyed primarilyby American militaryofficers)

(Cullinane 1989, 90, 93-96).
At a point in historywhen most colonial powers were building powerful
bureaucraciesin the capital and relyingon prefectoral systemsto centralizecontrol
overthe countryside, therefore,the Americancolonialgovernmentin Manila began
the taskofstateformation witha pronouncedemphasison local autonomyand party
patronage.There were indeedprovisionsforcentraladministrative supervision,but
at the same timelocal interestswereable to attainpoliticalofficeamid expectations
of gainingan ever-widening role in governmental affairs.In a settingin whichde
factodecentralization was alreadyfaradvanced(as landed elites held swayin many
localities),Taftpromotedthe devolutionofa considerabledegreeofdecision-making
authority to (1) electedlocal officials
and councilsand (2) indirectly
electedprovincial
governors.At the same time,a Manila-basedpartystrugglingto expandits political
base to thecountryside was givenamplepatronageopportunities, and therebyable to
influencethe characterof local administration. In termsof expediency,thisstrategy
of building a state throughcompromisewith establishedprovinciallords was
remarkably successfulin enablingU.S. colonialsto defeatthePhilippinestrugglefor
independence.13 As an effortto duplicateNew England-styletowngovernment in a
distinctlycontrastingsocioeconomicmilieu, however,the strategywas quickly
revealedto be a monumentalfailure.
FrustratedSupervision, 1903-1906
Despite theirinitialintentions,Americancolonialofficialssoon foundthat the
goal of local autonomyquite oftenconflicted withthegoal ofseekingto ensurethat
government was doingitsjob well (buildingroadsand ports,providinglaw and order,
dispensinggood justice,fightingdisease,and the like). There werealso increasing
concerns-as voicedbyTafthimselfin 1902-over "caciqueism"and "feudalrelations
of dependence"in the countryside; the previousSpanishregimewas also blamedfor
failing to provide sufficient"examples of fidelityto public interest . . . to create a
properstandardofpublicduty"(Owen 1971, 5; Cullinane1971, 18). Manymunicipal
councilswereappropriating fundsto theirown salaries,leavingroadsuntendedand
teachersunpaid."The truthis," Taftacknowledged,"thatthemunicipalgovernments
havenotbeenas satisfactory in theiroperationsas could be wished"(RPC 1903 1:83).
Beginningin 1903, concernoverinefficiency and corruptionin local governance
led to an increasingtendencyto tryto supervisefromthecenter.Severalexamplesare
instructive.Municipal treasurersbecame civil serviceappointments,selectedand
deputizedbyan Americanprovincialtreasurer who nowhad theauthority to examine
municipalbooks. The provincialboard was empoweredto annul acts of municipal
councils deemed illegal, and the generalsupervisory and disciplinaryauthorityof
provincialofficialsoverthe municipalitieswas given new emphasis(e.g., governors
werenow specifically instructedto inspectmunicipalitiesonce everysix months,and
giventheauthority to makeon-the-spot suspensionsofmisbehavingofficials). In 1905
and 1906, the ExecutiveBureau took chargeof the activitiesofprovincialtreasurers
(formerlysupervisedby the Insular Treasurer),a new corps of districtauditors
operatingout of Manila was chargedwith looking over the books of provincial
13OnofreD. Corpuzspeaksofthe " 'co-optation'ofnationalism":as theFilipinoelitewas

"co-optedintothecolonialregime,"therewas a "moderationofFilipinonationalism"(Corpuz
1965, 65-66). See also Yabes's analysisof "dilutednationalism"(1967, 23-25).

treasurers,majorresponsibility forbothpublic worksand public healthwas removed

fromthe localitiesand vestedwith centralbureausin Manila, and the Bureau of
InternalRevenuetookmorecontroloverthecontroversial processofland assessment
(Cullinane1971, 21-23, 66; RPC 1906 1:97, 105; Hayden 1942, 266, 270; Barrows
1914, 17; Luton 1971, 130-31). Therewas also a 1903 reform to tryto improvethe
much-denigrated municipalpolice,who were"oftenused as thepersonalservantsof
the municipalpresidentes"(RPC 1903 1:84-85).
Despite theseefforts to centralize,however,keybureausin Manila oftenlacked
the capacityto superviseeffectively. One major constraintwas the weaknessof the
bureaucracy createdby the Americans.As Andersonexplains,"unlikeall the other
moderncolonialregimesin twentieth centurySoutheastAsia,whichoperatedthrough
huge, autocratic,white-runbureaucracies, the Americanauthoritiesin Manila ...
createdonlya minimalcivil serviceand quicklyturnedovermostof its component
positions to the natives" (1988, 11). There were weak incentivesfor attracting
qualifiedAmericansto join thecolonialservice,exacerbatedby uncertainties overthe
longevityof Americanrule (Corpuz 1957, 179-80). These problemsled Executive
Bureau SecretaryArthurW. Fergussonto concludethat Americanswere somehow
differentcreaturesfromtheirEuropeancounterparts, who weretrainedin thecolonial
serviceand "contentto live and die 'East of Suez' " (RPC 1905 1:104).14 Fergusson
evenfoundit difficult to findcompetentAmericansforthemostcriticalpost,thatof
provincialtreasurer (Cullinane1971, 31). The instability ofthebureaucracy involved
both Americanand Filipino employees;withinthe ExecutiveBureau-the premier
agencytaskedwithsupervising provincialand local government-therewerein 1906
onlysevenemployees(out of a total of 156) who had servedsince its foundationin
1901 (RPC 1906 1:98). If centralrulersare to succeedin theirstruggleagainstlocal
patrimoniallords,Weber observed,theymustdevelopand controlan administrative
structurecapable of replacingthem.Concernedoverabuses of governmental power
in the countryside, the United Statessoughtto increasecentralsupervisionand thus
improvethe qualityof local government.It soon becameapparentthattheylacked
the administrative capacityto do so.
These tentativeefforts at administrative centralizationwereaccompanied,in the
political realm,by the rapid and substantialprovincialization of the nationalelite.
The PartidoFederalthatTaftinitiallynurtured had by 1905 losthis activesupport-
and thuslosttheirhold on provincialappointments. "Increasingly,"explainsMichael
Cullinane,"thepoliticalforcesin theprovinceswereplayingtheirowngamesto gain
access to patronageand political influence"(1989, 240). In 1905, Taft put out
instructions forcolonialofficialsto look to provincialgovernorsfora new group of
Filipinoleadersin orderto "strengthen yourhold on theentirearchipelago"(Paredes
1989b, 53-60, quotationat 60). Some did so with great skill, and in the process
promotedboth theirown careersand the careersof the provincialeliteswhomthey
elevatedto the nationalstage(Cullinane 1989, 413-29).
In the firstnationalconventionofprovincialgovernors, held in Manila in 1906,
two politiciansin particularemergedas dominantfigures:Sergio Osmeniaof Cebu
(electedpresidingofficer) and Manuel Quezon ofTayabas,each ofwhomhad emerged
throughclose ties to rising American officials.As the new colonial authority
consolidatedits controloverthearchipelago,bothofthesebuddinglawyershad been
quick to discernthatthepathto powerlay in thepoliticalsphere-not in thejudicial
and bureaucraticsphereas duringSpanishtimes(Cullinane 1989, 228, 515). These
14Fora usefulanalysisof Americancolonials'comparativeassumptions,see Adas 1998.

two "lawyer-politicians"continuedto dominatenationalpoliticsforseveraldecades

to come,and provedmasterful in usingtherhetoric ofAmericandemocracy and subtle
understandingsof American institutionssimultaneouslyto consolidate their
provincialbases of power and build a nationwidenetworkamong otherprovincial
powerholders(Cullinane 1989, 384-90; 1971, 25). From 1906 on, the national
politicalleadershipwas thoroughly provincialin both its originsand its base.
Shared Authority:The Commission and the Assembly,

1906-1913
Amid thesemajorchanges,Americancolonialscontinuedto followthroughwith
ongoingplans to turnoverincreasinglevelsof politicalauthorityto Filipinoelites.
Upon therecommendation ofthegovernors, theCommissionin 1906 madetwomajor
changesin thecompositionoftheprovincialgovernment: governors wereto be elected
directly(insteadof indirectly)by the voters,and one of the two membersof the
provincialboardformerly appointedby the centerwas to be replacedby an elected
Priorto the reform,
official.15 therehad oftenbeen considerabletensionbetweenthe
governorand the two appointedAmericanson the provincialboard,with the latter
frequentlypressuringthe formerto investigatemunicipalofficials(on whom the
governordependedforvotes!)formisconductand othercharges(Cullinane1971, 21;
see also Hayden 1942, 270). Afterthereform, a majorityofprovincialboardmembers
became both elected officialsand Filipino, and-according to the Philippine
Commission-provincialleadersnow "realizethattheyareon trial... to provetheir
capacityfor local self-government." They furtherreportedthat frictionbetween
governors and treasurers"has entirelydisappeared"(RPC 1907 1:44). Whetheror not
these assertionsare true, it is clear that the attempt to reduce frictionled to
considerableadvancementin the decentralization of thepoliticalsystem.
Provincialtreasurerscontinuedto be centrally appointed,but eachyearmoreand
more posts were assumed by Filipinos instead of Americans(reachingnearly40
percentof the total by 1913) (Cullinane 1971, 48). To the extentthat appointed
officialsremainedloyalto Manila ratherthancultivatingties to thelocalityin which
theywere assigned,nationalityneed not be a definingissue in examiningcentral-
local relations;the criticalfactoris thatofficialsfeelthemselvesto be distinctfrom
the societalgroupstheyare to govern-as when a strongespritde corps emerges
withinthe bureaucracy.But it became increasingly apparent(forreasonsdiscussed
further below)thatthebureaucracy constructedbytheAmericanswas neverto become
well demarcatedfromthe societyit was supposed to serve-or frompatronage
structures on thevergeof majorexpansionin influenceand scope.
These provincialreforms wereveryimportantin reshapingManila's ties to the
provinces,butan evenmoretransformative changecameat thenationallevel,in 1907,
when the American-dominated Philippine Commissionbegan to share legislative
powerwitha FilipinoAssemblyelectedby a highlycircumscribed electorate.16The
leadershipthatemergedin the 1907 electionsconfirmed the shifttowardprovincial
"5Thishad originallybeen the provincialsupervisor,and later(after1905) the superin-

tendentof schools(Cullinane 1971, 22).
16ThisAssemblyhad been plannedsince 1902, and was to "be establishedtwo yearsafter
thepublicationoftheCensusprovidedthattherewas completepeacecertified bytheGovernor
General.... The census was published in 1905" (Kalaw 1926, 308). The Assemblywas
electedbya franchisecomposedofroughly3 percentoftheentirepopulation(Salamanca1984,
56).

powerthathad becomeevidenttwo yearsearlier.SergioOsmeniawas electedSpeaker

of the new Assembly,and Manuel Quezon namedmajorityfloorleader(Golay 1998,
139). Together,thesetwoyoungand highlyskilledpoliticianswerethemajorfigures
in the newlyformedNacionalistaParty,a purportedly proindependence partywhich
was to dominatePhilippinepoliticsformuchofthenextfourdecades.Togetherwith
othersof similarbackground,theyrepresented a qualitativelynew typeof national
politician.Unlike the earliergroup of Manila-basedpoliticianswho had become
"solelydependenton Americanpatronage,"the new Nacionalistaleadershipenjoyed
"a morepermanentpoliticalbase upon which to collaborateand competewith the
colonialauthorities."Unlike manyotherprovincial-based politicos,as well, theyhad
also been quick to see thatit was possibleto combinea provincial base withaccessto
nationalpower(Cullinane1989, 389-90, 513-14, quotationsat 514).
Secretaryof War Taft came to witnessthe openingof the Assembly,and at a
banquetgave his blessingsto the leadershipchangeby declaringOsmeniato be "the
secondman in the PhilippineGovernment"(Kalaw 1926, 315). Behind the scenes,
the Commissionhad been workingfuriously to pass a rangeof bills in the finaldays
beforeit gave up its exclusivecontroloverthe legislativeprocess.Manyofthesehad
a centralizingintent:grantingauthorityto the ExecutiveSecretaryto regulatethe
salariesof provincialemployees,enabling provincialboards to reviewthe acts of
municipal councils, restrictingmunicipal councils' rights to impose taxes, and
tighteningrestrictions on ownershipoffirearms. The Commission'slast-minuterush
to legislateproducedbitterfeelingsin thenewAssembly(Golay 1998, 125-26), and
therewere soon a host of lower-houseproposalsthat soughtto move policy in the
oppositedirection.A largenumberofbills soughtto decreasesupervisonand increase
the powersand resourcesof local government, fulfillingearliercampaignpromises
(May 1984, 60-61, 189-92; Golay 1998, 139). The Nacionalista'sfoundingprinciple
of "immediateindependence"was set aside immediately, and was not to be a matter
thatOsmefiaand Quezon pursuedwithanysincerity. As a publiclyproclaimedgoal,
however,this slogan was an effective vote-getter-andhad the additionalutilityof
forcingconcessionsfromthe Americansthat advancedthe new nationalpoliticos'
ultimate objective: "self-government or political autonomyunder colonial rule"
(Salamanca1984, 147-52; Cullinane1989, 498-99, 517-18, quotationat 518).17
The civilservicelaw was an earlytargetin thiseffort to promotea greaterdegree
of "self-government." In 1908, one successfulmeasurereestablishedthe controlof
municipalcouncilsovermunicipaltreasurers (since 1903, thispost had been subject
to appointmentby the provincialtreasurer,who was in turn appointed by the
ExecutiveBureau).This measureremovedone ofthemostimportantlocal postsfrom
civil serviceprotectionand transformed it into an explicitlypolitical post. The
AmericanDirectorofCivil Servicewas veryvocalin opposition,chargingthatit "will
practicallydestroythe open competitiveprinciple."The treasurerwould become
beholdento thecouncilsratherthanto the center;becausetheoccupantsofthispost
would be judged accordingto political ratherthan bureaucraticcriteria,moreover,
the overall quality of local governancewould likely sink even lower. The new
17AsSalamancaconcludes,Osmefiaand Quezon "did not reallydesireimmediateinde-

pendence,or even want to have a date fixedforthe futurerecognitionof Philippineindepen-
dence. What theywantedwas forthe United Statesto make an authoritative declarationthat
it would ultimatelyrecognizePhilippineindependence,and accompanythisdeclarationwith
thegrantofmoresubstantialpowersto a Philippinegovernment composedalmostentirelyof
Filipinos"(1984, 152).

Assemblyalso frequently actedupon requestsforexemptionsofspecifichiringsfrom

the Civil ServiceAct, and in 1908 triedto downgradethe statusand independence
oftheBureauofCivil Service(Hayden 1942, 92-93). The latterproposalwas defeated
by the PhilippineCommission(now the upperhouse of theLegislature). 18
Otherproposedmeasureshad thepotentialto affect central-localrelationsin more

indirectbut nonethelesssignificantways.These includedefforts to reducetaxesand
provide extensionsforpaymentsof the land tax (in an extractivesystemalready
strugglingto generate revenuesfrom the landed class), increase control over
governmental appropriations,promoteFilipinizationof the bureaucracy and cabinet
posts,and supplantthe Commissionwith an electiveSenate.Osmeniapushed fora
"quasi-parliamentary" systemof government, in orderthat Nacionalistalegislators
could simultaneously takecontrolofcabinetposts;althoughthisidea was rejectedby
Taft in Washington,one additional Filipino member was brought on to the
Commissionin 1909 (RafaelPalma, a close Osmefiaassociate),and forthe firsttime
a Filipinocommissioner was givena cabinetpost. When battlesoverappropriations
threatened to shutdownthegovernment, TaftconvincedtheU.S. Congressto amend
the 1902 Organic Act to ensure that the previous year's budget would be
automaticallyrenewedin the eventthatthe PhilippineLegislaturefailedto approve
a new appropriations bill.
Overall, the opening of the AssemblypresentedAmericancolonials with far
greaterconstraints on determiningcolonialpolicy;by 1913, only29 percentof the
Commission'smeasureswerepassed by the Assembly.The provincial-elites-turned-
national-politicoselectedto theAssemblyveryskillfully utilizedtheirnewauthority,
and consistently workedboth to consolidatetheirpowerat the nationallevel and
extendtheirautonomyat thelocal level. Even ifOsmefia'seffort to claim a chunkof
executivepower was not to succeed until the followingdecade, the Nacionalista
leadership soon learned the art of "seizing power ... by burrowing from within"
(May 1984, 60-67; Golay 1998, 139-59, quotationat 144).
In sum,Americancolonialrulefurther reinforced thedecentralizednaturein the
Philippinesby concentrating farless on the creationofa centralbureaucracy thanon
the introductionof representative institutions.As the framework outlined above
suggests,thecreationofa nationallegislatureexpandsopportunities fortheexpression
of local interests,19as does the permeationof administrative structuresby systemsof
patronageand spoils. The representative institutionsenabled local caciques to
consolidatetheirhold on thenationalstate,and fostered thecreationofwhatBenedict
Andersonhas called "a solid,visible'nationaloligarchy.'" UnderSpanishrule,these
elitesenjoyedmunicipalpower,but therewas no largerpoliticalarenaforfostering
regularinteractionwith othermunicipalelites. Thanks to Americanrepresentative
institutions,municipal elites firstcoalesced into provincial factions,and soon
181tis not knownwhythe Commissionapprovedthe bill removingcentralcontrolover

municipaltreasurers. But as the subsequentGovernor-General (CameronForbes)remarkedin
his diaryin 1909, theCommissionagreedto some "verypernicious. .. but popular"measures
in order"to keep theAssemblyin the frameof mind ofapprovingour measures"(May 1984,
62). Cullinane points out that Forbes was also keen on showingTaft that he had strong
influencewiththe new Filipinoleadershiphe had helpedto cultivate,and regularlyconferred
withOsmefiaand Quezon to tradelegislativefavors(1989, 499). This earlyharmony, however,
soon deteriorated (May 1984, 62-70).
19This is particularly
truewhen,as was the case in the AmericanPhilippines,legislators
are electedthrougha single-member districtpluralityelectoralsystemand expected(in what
was developingto be a presidentialsystem)to representthe interestsof theirdistricts.

thereafter
leadingprobinsiyano
politiciansenjoyeda new arenaof power-and social
interaction-inManila:
Theymightdislikeoneanother,buttheywentto thesamereceptions, attended the
samechurches,livedin thesameresidential
areas,shoppedin thesamefashionable
had affairs
streets, witheachother'swives,and arranged marriages
betweeneach
children.
other's Theywereforthefirsttimeforming a self-conscious
rulingclass.
(Anderson 1988, 11,emphasisin original)
While reformswere reshapingpolitical structuresat all levels of government,

certainlongstandingproblemsremainedunresolved.Amongthemostpersistent was
that of the municipal police, who continued to be widely perceived as the
"muchachos"of local mayors.As the Constabularycommanderreportedin 1905,
"municipalpolice organizationas a whole is worsethanuseless"(RPC 1905 111:32).
Despite earliertentativeattemptsat reform, supervisionby outsideauthoritieswas
sporadicat best.In 1912, theConstabulary was giventheauthority to govern,inspect,
and discipline all municipal police forces(RPC 1912, 147). Nonetheless,they
remained"a joke and a scandal" throughoutthe Americanperiod (Hayden 1942,
291).
ThroughouttheTaftyears,a largenumberofchargesofmisconduct(e.g., neglect
of duty,abuse of authority, malversation,extortion,bribery,falsearrest,"bad habits
and immorality," and gambling)werebroughtagainstlocal officials. It was the task
of the ExecutiveBureau's Law Division to investigatethese chargesand suggest
sanctionsthat could then be imposed by the GovernorGeneral (ranging from
reprimandto removalfromoffice).Some typesofofficials, it seems,weremorelikely
to be punishedthan others."[Flor obvious reasons,"explainedExecutiveSecretary
Fergussonin 1906, "the Governmenthas acted on the theorythatFilipinoofficials
ought not to be as yetand theyhave not been held up to the standardsrequiredof
Americans."In 1902 and 1903, seventeenAmericans(fifteen ofwhomworkedat the
provinciallevel) were caughtwith theirhands in the till and sent to prison.Quite
significantly,fiveof thesewereprovincialtreasurers, entrustedbyManila
theofficials
with the criticaltask of watchingover the conditionof municipaland provincial
finances(Cullinane 1971, 39, 56-57, 59, quotationat 39).
Therewas a notablereluctance,on theotherhand,to removeFilipinoofficials at
the provinciallevel. Between 1903 and 1911, a total of only fourgovernors,six
prosecutingattorneys, and twentyofficialsof lowerrankwereremovedfroma total
of some thirty-four provinces.When it came to governors,in particular,both Taft
and one of his successorsadmitteda hesitancyto removethemfromoffice:not only
weretheyprominent individualsin thecolony,but theExecutiveBureaureliedheavily
upon them forsupervisionof the municipalities.Among Filipino officialsof the
roughly600-1000 municipalities(the numberfluctuatedovertime),a totalof over
2300 cases were investigatedand nearly1500 penaltiesassessedbetween1903 and
1913. In the yearsforwhichmoreprecisedata are available(1904-6, 1909-13), a
total of 733 personswere removedfromoffice-including128 presidentsand 16
municipaltreasurers.
Political considerations played a regularrole in this processof administrative
supervision.Chargesagainstofficials wereto be channeledthroughprovincialboards;
not surprisingly, thosethatinvolvedpoliticalrivalswerepursuedwith vigorwhile
thoseinvolvingallies werenot.Sometimesgovernorsused theirpowersofsuspension
and failedto informthe ExecutiveBureau; when Manila did at timesget directly
involvedby sendingin investigators fromtheLaw Division,it was nearlyimpossible

to judge charges,countercharges, or the reliabilityof witnesseswithouta thorough

understanding of the local powerstructure.20
Nonetheless,a large numberof cases wereexaminedeach yearby eitherinsular
or provincialauthorities.The effectiveness of thesepenaltiesforpromotingcentral
governmentinterestsis impossibleto assess;as Cullinaneobserves,we do not know
whethertheytended"to makethe nextofficialmorededicatedto thepublic good or
merelymoresubtle in his activitiesand morewaryof the supervisory authorities."
But as Taftexplicitlyacknowledgedin 1908, officials feltmorepressurefromManila
thanfromthe (narrowelite) electorate-and previouspunishmenthad no obviously
negativeimpacton officials'subsequentsuccessat the polls. At least 40 percentof
the membersof the new Assemblyhad receivedsome sortof sanctionwhile serving
as local officials,and severalhad facedcourtconvictionsand removalsfromoffice
(Cullinane1971, 27-29, 36-37, 54-55, 59, 64, 70, quotationat 29).
The Taft Era in Retrospect

By 1903, whenTaftleftManila forhigherofficein Washington,it was already
clear thathis strategyof conciliatingPhilippineelites had been highlyeffective in
enablingthe Americancolonialsto defeatthe Philippinestruggleforindependence.
By 1913, as Taftwas leavingthe White House and a new era was to unfoldin the
Philippines,one can also observethatAmerica'sleadingcolonialmasterhadsucceeded
entirelyin his goals of promotinglocal autonomyand makingthe "modernlawyer-
politician"the dominantfigurein Philippinesociety.As one might expect of an
Americancolonial state,mayors,governors,and nationallegislatorshad fargreater
staturethandid bureaucrats workingforcentralagenciesbased in the capital.
At thesametime,thepromotionoflocal autonomyand representative institutions
had not producedmuch democraticsubstance,eitherat the local level (wheretown
government had morein commonwithTammanyHall thanNew England)or at the
nationallevel (wherethe mostambitiousof the provinciallordsnow enjoyeda new
arenaforexertingauthorityand poweroverthe restof the population).Tafthimself
was notentirelycomfortable withtheoverallresultsofhis strategy:as earlyas 1908,
he expressedconcernthattheeffectofAmericancolonialpolicymightmerelybe "to
awaittheorganization ofa Philippineoligarchyoraristocracycompetentto administer
government and thenturnthe Islandsoverto it. "21
This was,in fact,theresult.Forreasonsofexpediency, Tafthadcrafted an intimate
Americanalliancewith the mestizoclass. Over the longerterm,however,he hoped
thatAmericanideals would shinethroughand undercutwhat he had once called "a
kindofquasi slaverycalledcaciquism"(Stanley1974, 67). Morespecifically, he hoped
2"Fortwo revealingexamplesof politicallysensitivecases against governorsthat were

treatedwith greatcautionby the ExecutiveBureau,see Cullinane 1971, 42-44. Writingin
the Commonwealthyears,Hayden observesthat"[iunview of its powersand centralposition
it is perhapsinevitablethatthe ExecutiveBureaushouldhave becomea veryimportantfactor
in Philippinepartypolitics" (1942, 274). In relatedanalysis,AlfonsoreportsthatTaft was
willing "to blink at irregularities
if the wrongdoerwas pro-Americanor a convertto the
Americancause" (1968, 250).
2'EvenstrongerAmericansentimentalong theselines can be foundin the 1914 studyof
PhilippineCommissionerDean Worcester:"We have utilizedthe servicesof Filipinopoliti-
cians who are openlyopposed to the policywhichwe are endeavoringto carryout, and have
thusplaced betweenourselvesand thepeople a screenofshrewdand hostilemen.... Forthis
conditionof things,"he concludes,"we have ourselvesto thank,and theseare the men who
would be governorsunder'self-government' " (quoted in Cullinane 1989, 528).

the combinationof an American-style civil serviceand widespreadpublic education

would,eventually, promote"popularself-government" and enablethecommonpeople
to maintaintheircivil rights"againsta morepowerfulclass" (Cullinane 1971, 16;
Steinberg1987, 278). As Cullinaneexplains,Taftfeltthat"one of themain rolesof
the United Stateswas to be the protectorof the Filipinomassesfromthe menacing
upperclasses,"who wereconsidered"a majorhindranceto thefunctioning ofa truly
democraticsociety"(1971, 15).
Leavingaside the paradoxof foreigncolonialsgiving rhetoricalsupportto the
long-termgoal of "popularself-government" (see Paredes 1989a), it is importantto
notethatwe once again findthe Americansactingquite unlikemostothercolonial
powers.In the Africancolonial state,CrawfordYoung explains,the notionof civil
societywas highlycircumscribed: "the completeness ofits dominationfreedthestate
fromresponsiveness to itssubjectsto a remarkable degree"(1994, 118, 159, quotation
at 159). In the Philippines,on the contrary, the Americansnot onlyput limitson
the scope of theirdomination(as expressedin Root's initial instructionsto the
PhilippineCommission)but also expressedthe ultimategoal ofexpanding the notion
ofcivilsocietydownwardtowardthemasses(albeitin a careful,controlled, and highly
conservative fashion)in orderto undercutthe emergingoligarchy'shold over the
state.22
Over time,however,it becameclear that the expedientstrategiesof the initial
yearsseverelyundercutanyhopesofrealizingtheidealsthatcontinuedto be expressed
in lateryears.The Philippinesdid emergewith a powerfulcivil society,but it was
anythingbut democraticin character.Both the colonialand postcolonialstatehave
been veryresponsiveto civil society,but exceptin rarecases thisresponsiveness
has
been limitedto a narrow,privilegedgroupat its pinnacle.At thesame timethatthe
Americanswere "elaboratingthe evils of elite rule," writesCullinane,theywere
"allowingsuch rule to become firmly implantedthroughtheirassociationwithand
theirdependenceon" this veryelite (1971, 15). Beforelong, Owen argues, the
Americansrealizedthat theiralliance with the Philippineelite frustratedthe "full
panoply of programs the United States envisaged for the islands . . . above all, the
genuinedemocratization ofthePhilippinepolity."It was alwayseasierfortheUnited
Statesto obtainthe supportof the elite thanto tryto implementa reform program
withouttheirhelp (1971, 6). Neitherpolitical educationnor attemptsat greater
centralsupervisionprovedeffective in curbingthe dominanceof this class overthe
basic processesofgovernance.Indeed,Taft'spolicieseffectivelyensuredthatpolitics
would be a playgroundforthe elite: he not only limitedthe rightof suffrage to a
small percentageof the population, but also discouragedany sort of popular
mobilizationthat might threatentheir political dominance.23In the end, the
Americanregimeprovidedtheperfectopportunity forprovincialelitesto build upon
theirpreviously local economicbase,consolidatea powerfullocalpolitical
constructed
betweenthe Africancolonialstate
22Young also observeselementsof cleardifferentiation
and thatofeitherthe Spanishor theAmericanPhilippines.Given its distinctivebackground,
he termsthe Philippines"a unique colonialhybrid"(1994, 257-58, 275-76).
23Bythe timepoliticalparticipationwas expandedin laterdecades,theoligarchy'sdom-
inancewas so well entrenchedthatchallengesfrombelow-motivated by deep social injus-
tices-faced monumentalodds. In thepostwaryears,theUnited Statesactivelysupportedthe
domestichegemonyof the oligarchyin orderto safeguardits major strategicassets in the
Philippines:the militarybases at Subic and Clark. Thanks to BenedictAndersonforhigh-
lightinghow Taft'spolicieslimitingthesuffrage and curbingpopularmobilizationeffectively
ensuredoligarchicdominanceof colonial "self-government."

bailiwick,and proceedto emergeas a nationaloligarchyable to take controlof the

centralgovernment in Manila. This, in turn,broughtcountlessnewopportunities for
further enrichment and empowerment (see Hutchcroft1998).
At thelocal level,theAmericansprovidedconsiderableautonomy,but theresult
was certainlynot quality municipaland provincialgovernance.It is common to
associatedecentralizationwithdemocracy, but thisis a case thatclearlyshowsits not
infrequentcapacity to promote local authoritarianisminstead (Hutchcroft,
forthcoming). SupervisionfromManila was sporadicand generallyineffectual; as local
bosses worked to appropriategovernmentalstructuresfor their own benefit,
competitionfromotherbosses was generallya fargreaterobstaclethan opposition
fromcentralauthority. Plagued by a shortageofpersonnel,theExecutiveBureauhad
to supervisemunicipalities throughincreasingly autonomousprovincialgovernments.
This is not to overlookthe elementsof centralization thatdid exist,norto deny
the great importanceof Manila decision-makingin local politics. The Executive
Bureau reviewedlocal (particularlyprovincial)statutes,and overturnedthose it
deemedobjectionableor illegal. Manila also enacteda hostof regulationsrequiring
provincialand local officialsto obtainpermissionfora rangeof governmental tasks
performed at thesubnationallevel.In addition,local officials had to mastertheartof
lobbyingthe new legislatureforpublic worksappropriations (May 1984, 62). The
centralgovernment quite obviouslyhad a prominentrole,but the overallstrategies
of Americancolonialsended up heighteningratherthanchallengingthe positionof
local bossesand provinciallords. "Despite Manila supervision,"concludesHayden,
"to a considerabledegree the quality of Philippine local governmenthas been
determinedlocally"(1942, 277).
At the nationallevel,systemsof patronageoverwhelmedthe capacityof central
agenciesto superviselowerlevels of government.Shefterdoes not include colonial
states within the scope of his analysis,but in doing so it can be seen that the
administrators ofmoderncolonialstatesareverycommonlya powerful"constituency
forbureaucraticautonomy. "24 CrawfordYoung's studyof Africamakes this point
mostclearly:
Good government... meant "sound administration." Rational, prudent
management ofthecolonialestatesbya professionalcadreofadministrators applying
scientific
increasingly methodsto theirdevelopment and impartial adjudicationof
conflicts:
thiswastherefrain oftheself-composed encomium to colonialrule.As a
Platonicguardianclass,colonialofficialdomrepresented itselfas thedisinterested
servant
ofthesubjectpopulation . .. stillenclosedin thecaveofignorance.
(1994, 165)
In tryingto construct
a reliablecivilservice,therefore,
thePhilippineCommission
was doing nothingunusual. What makes Americancolonial rule distinctiveis the
simultaneouspursuanceof policiespromotingthe rapid emergenceof an extremely
potent"constituency forpatronage."At times,thepromotionofpatronagewas a very
consciouspolicy:recallTaft'sstrategicgrantof patronageprivilegesto the Partido
Federalwhosegrowthhe wantedto nurture.More important, however,was how the
creationof legislativeinstitutionscreateda logic forpatronageat a point when
bureaucraticstructureshad barelyhad a chanceto consolidatetheirstrength.Before
24Inotherwords,moderncolonial statesshould thusbe added to the two historicalcoa-

litionsthatShefteralreadynotes:thoseled by absolutistmonarchsand thoseled by "a ration-
alizing middleclass" (1994, 31).

long, thesestructures wereto be overwhelmed by thosewho wereable to milk their

resourcesforparticularisticadvantage.Nascent attemptsat building an effective
systemof administration, in otherwords,wereengulfedby another,morepowerful
logic. By undercutting centralsupervision,this further (yet unwittingly)advanced
the causeoflocal autonomy.
In manyaccounts,the Americansappear as the defendersof civil serviceand
Filipinos as its detractors.Quezon said it best, perhaps,when in later yearshe
proclaimedhis preference fora government "runlike hell by Filipinosto one runlike
heavenby Americans.'25 U.S. political scientistRalston Hayden (and formervice-
governor,1933-1935) wroteof a "halcyonconditionof affairs"in which"American
administrators were entirelynon-political"thanks to (a) a lack of ambition for
(electoral?)political activities;(b) a systemof incentivesforpromotionbased on
administrative capabilities;and (c) "the convictionof the greatAmericanswho were
politicallyresponsibleforthePhilippines"thatthemeritsystemwas essentialto U.S.
successin "givingthis backwardcountryan honestand efficient administration and
... preparingits people for democraticself-government" (1942, 90). Philippine
politicalscientistOnofreD. Corpuz,similarly,writesthat "the pioneerAmericans
were. . . unhamperedby obstructive vestedinterests"and able to pass a civil service
law thattheyclaimedwas moreadvancedthananyexistingat thetimein theUnited
States(1957, 165).
To be sure,sincefewAmericansranforpublic officein thePhilippinestherewas
less need to use patronageto expanda politicalbase or build a politicalmachine.26
As such,it would notbe surprising ifAmericancolonialsin thePhilippineswereless
inclinedto patronageand corruptionthanwereAmericanpoliticiansat home. This
is not to ignorethe considerablecorruptionthatdid exist,but ratherto point out
thatthecorruption ofAmericancolonialswas likelyto be motivatedmorestrictlyby
personalgain. Forbescomplainedof "whitemenofa verylow order"who sometimes
enteredgovernmentservice(1945, 91), and it has alreadybeen noted that many
Americans-includingfiveprovincialtreasurers-wereconvictedof stealingpublic
fundsin 1902 and 1903.27
Explanationsof Filipino propensitiestoward patronageand corruptionhave
commonlytendedtowardsimplisticculturalinterpretations, and Spanishand Malay
customsgenerallyget the rap. Surprisingly, theseexplanationscan be foundin both
colonialand postcolonial,Americanand Filipino,analyses.A colonial-erahead ofthe
AmericanChamber of Commerce in Manila blamed "Latin Malayism" for the
corruptionthat reemergesfrom "lessened [American] control" of government
(Veneracion1988, 107), and Hayden spoke of "ancientnationalevils" not easily
correctedby theAmerican-sponsored "campaignforgood government" (1942, 298).
More recently,Salamancaexplainsaway the shortcomings of local- and provincial-
25Quezonwas responding,in the early1920s, to Governor-General LeonardWood's as-

sertionthatFilipinoswereunpreparedforself-government (Gopinath 1987, 12).
26This is not to say thatAmericanseschewedpatronagealtogether:in the endlesslegis-
lative horse-trading betweenthe Commissionand the Assembly,the colonialsdid findpa-
tronagea usefultool in urging Filipino politiciansto supporttheirmeasures.Thanks to
Michael Cullinaneforhighlightingthispoint.
27Writingin 1914, Mrs. Taft spoke of "a littleband of whitemen in Bilibid prisonin
Manila todaybecauseoftheirvenalityand breachoftrust.Our mission. . . is based upon the
highestprinciplesand we havealwaysstrivento maintaina highmoraltonein thegovernment
painfulwhen,as happenedtoo oftenat first,
personnel,so it is particularly an Americanwent
wrong"(Gleeck 1976, 135).

level governmentas an inheritanceof a social milieu "partlynative and partly

Castilian" (1984, 51) while Veneracion says that Filipinization enabled "the
traditionalvicesofFilipinos. . . to emergeagain" (1988, 107; fora similaranalysis,
see also de la Torre 1986, 55).
Amongthemanyproblemswiththeseanalysesis thefailureto acknowledgethat
it was preciselyAmerican-inspired structuresof governancethat encouragedthe
particulartype of patronage-driven corruptionmost commonlyassociated with
Filipinos.This behaviorwas by no means"traditional"but rathera distinctly modern
outcomeof the particularconfiguration of the U.S.-craftedcolonialpolity.Shefter's
insightsare valuable in understandingwhy, within the contextof this polity,
Americancolonialstended(withsome notableinconsistencies) to formthe backbone
ofthe"constituency forbureaucraticautonomy,"whileFilipinopoliticians-precisely
because theywerepoliticians-constituted the major "constituency forpatronage.
"28
When representative werecreatedin 1907, thebureaucratic

institutions constituency
had yet to extendits influenceverybroadlyor moredeeply.Not surprisingly, the
logic of patronageemergedsupreme.Hayden tends towarda rosypictureof the
Americancolonialrecord,but nonethelessacknowledgesthat
in themunicipalities,
electiveFilipinoofficials theprovinces,and,after1907,inthe
PhilippineAssemblywere driven,as politiciansare alwaysdriven,to utilize
"government jobs"as politicalcurrency.
... Patronagewastheirpoliticallifeblood
andtherewereneither inhibitionswithinthemselvesnorrestraintsfromtheirpeople
to prevent itsuse.Thesedifferencesin background andpoliticalnecessitybetween
appointed Americans andelectedFilipinossufficiently
explaintheconflictsbetween
themoverthestrictmaintenance ofhighstandardsin thecivilservice.
(1942, 91-92)
Manila-based politicos and provinciallords-the new, national oligarchy-took

advantage of their independentbase of power, and came to exercisepowerful,
particularisticcontroloverall levelsof the governmental apparatusthrougha spoils
systemthat had becomewell entrenchedat the nationallevel earlyin the century.
"Civil servantsfrequentlyowed theiremployment to legislatorpatrons,and up to the
end of the Americanperiod the civilian machineryof state remainedweak and
divided"(Anderson1988, 12).
To returnto theframework introducedat theoutset,we can characterizetheTaft-
era state as decentralizedin both major spheresof activity.Administratively, the
prefectoral modelscommonin othercolonialstateswererejectedin favorofa clearly
articulateddevolutionof authorityto provincialand municipalgovernments;this
occurredin a settingwheretherewas alreadya highdegreeofde factodecentralization
enjoyedbylocal patrimoniallords.Politically,theAmericancolonialstatewas highly
decentralized in eachofthefourareasspecified:nearlyall local executiveswereelected
ratherthan appointed, bosses wielded enormouspower in many localities, an
increasingly influential
nationalAssemblyprovidedwide-rangingexpressionoflocal
interests,and the bureaucracywas not well insulatedfromsystemsofpatronage.The
28Giventhe major restrictionson suffrage that existedduringthe colonial era, Shefter's

insightsneed to be modifiedslightlyto highlightnot the impactof the emergenceof mass
electoralparticipationbut ratherthe impactofthe introduction ofrepresentativeinstitutions.
Discussing an entirelydifferenthistoricalera, Ertmandemonstrates how the presenceor ab-
sence of territorially
based national representative bodies is essentialto understandingthe
processof stateformation in earlymodernEurope (1997, 28-34).

initial impulse towardslocal autonomywas accompaniedby tentativeeffortsat

centralizationand formalisticrequirementsthat the actions of subnational
governments be approvedin Manila (in effect,supervisionby correspondence).But
thecentralbureaucracy's supervisionwas hobbled
capacityforsustainedand effective
by instabilityof personnel as well as patronage pressures.Provinciallybased
legislators,meanwhile,displayed little allegiance to the goal of developing a
meritocraticcivil service.
Reflectionson the Post-TaftPhilippine State
These generaltrendstowardthe simultaneousconsolidationof provincialpower

at thenationalleveland the retentionofa highdegreeofautonomyat thelocal level
actuallyintensified in subsequentyears.Between1913 and 1921, as aspirationsfor
Philippineindependenceweregivenenthusiasticsupportby a Democraticgovernor-
general,provincialpowerholders wereable to consolidatetheircontrolof legislative
institutions (as an electiveSenatereplacedthe PhilippineCommission)and exerta
considerable degreeofexecutiveauthority as well (througha CouncilofStatein which
House SpeakerOsmefiaand SenatePresidentQuezon playeda leadingrole).In 1916,
an Osmefiaallybecameresponsiblebothforsupervisionoflocal governments and the
PhilippineConstabulary;during this period, notes Hayden, therewas "scarcelya
pretenseofAmericansupervisionand inspection"(1942, 282). More generalcontrol
overappointmentsand budgetsenabled the two leading politiciansto enjoy even
greaterpatronagelinkswiththe Philippinebureaucracy.
A hard-nosedRepublicangovernor-general triedto reversesome of thesetrends
in theearly1920s, but thealreadywidespreaddispersalofpowermade it difficult for
Manilato exertcontrolwithanygreateffectiveness. By thelate 1920s and early1930s,
theagencychargedwithoverseeinglocal governments was widelyregardedas being
highlypartisan,and in any case repeatedlycomplainedof insufficient personnelto
effect regularsupervision oflocalities.Between1921 and 1931, theExecutiveBureau
averagedformalannual inspectionsof less than halfof all provincesand 19 percent
of all municipalities(Annual Reports,ExecutiveBureau,variousissues, 1921-31).
Despite repeatedattemptsat reform,the conditionof municipal police did not
improve;meanwhile,the state'sdominanceovercoercivepowerdeclinednotably:by
the 1930s, therewere estimatedto be ten times as manylicensedand unlicensed
firearms in privatehandsas in thehandsoftheConstabulary and themunicipalpolice
(Baja 1933, 243-45, 116).
The assumptionof Philippineleadership,underthe Commonwealthestablished
in 1935, also did littleto promotesystematic administrative controlfromthecenter.
PresidentManuel L. Quezon was given broad powers of supervisionover local
governments in the 1935 constitution, but his attentionseemsto have beendirected
primarilytowardscentralizingcontroloverpatronageresources;the relationshipof
localitiesto thecenteris determinedmorebyelectoralobjectivesthanthepromotion
of administrativeeffectiveness. In these political strategies,Quezon achieved
extraordinary success(see McCoy 1989, 120).
The earlypostwarsystemhad manycharacteristics thatone would notexpectto
findin an "overcentralized" polity,as even the most cursoryexaminationsuggests.
Administrative decisionmakingwas quite centralized(as evenminormattersrequired
permissionfromManila),but therewas by no meansanysustainedcentralsupervision

of local affairs(Romani and Thomas 1954, 123). As in colonial years,moreover,

mayorsenjoyed considerablecontrolover local police forces,and the heightened
postwarprevalenceof "loose firearms" fostered"warlord"armiesthatwereespecially
activeat electiontime.Local leadersdeliveredblocs ofvotesin exchangeforbenefits
fromallies in Manila,while"national"politicsitselfwas oftendominatedbytheneed
of congresspersons to consolidatelocal bailiwicks(throughsuch means as rampant
pork-barrel spending).29
Under the martial-lawregime of FerdinandMarcos (1972-86), there were
important elementsofcentralization,includingmeasuresto bringpolice forcesunder
nationalcontrol,collect "loose firearms," and formtwelve new regionalplanning
bodiesto coordinatenationalpolicyat a newsupraprovincial level.In reality,however,
Marcos restructured but did not overturnthe local, familialbasis of Philippine
politics;like Quezon,he was moreinterested in centralizing
patronageresources than
in centralizingadministrative structures.Since the fall of Marcos in 1986, many
patternsofpre-martial-law politicshave returned.The reopeningof Congressmarks
the returnofdemocraticinstitutions aftera long nightmareof highlyrepressive and
crony-infested authoritarianism;at the same time,however,it has given manyold
provincialdynastiesnewopportunities to reasserttheirinfluenceovernationalpolitics
(Gutierrez1994). By 1991, enoughhigh-powered firearmshad been smuggledinto
the countryto create two additional national armies (PCIJ 1992, 90-91). The
administration ofCorazonAquino showeditselfhighlyaccommodating to localpower
in the provinces(including many "warlord"figuresassociatedwith the previous
regime),and veryresponsiveas well to longstandingsentimentin favorofproviding
moreauthorityto municipaland provincialbodies. In partout of a strongreaction
againstpreviousauthoritarian excesses,thePhilippinesin 1991 adoptedits sweeping
programof decentralization (Rood 1998, 116-17).3?
Conclusion
As notedat the outset,proponentsof thisprojectcommonlybegin by asserting

the longstandingcentralizedcharacterof the Philippinepolity,and proceedto push
decentralizationas a means of resolvingpast ills. This is, of course, a highly
problematicanalysis,not onlyforits historicalinterpretationbut also forits failure
to acknowledgethe continuingimportanceoflocal powerin Philippinepolitics(see,
e.g., Kerkvlietand Mojares 1991; Lande 1965; McCoy 1994; Rocamora1995; and
Sidel 1995). Indeed,one of the moststrikingaspectsof the currentdecentralization
is that it is being undertakenin the absence of any stronghistoricalprocessof
centralization.The Taftera lefta legacyof considerableadministrative and political
decentralization,albeit not withoutcertaincentralizingtendencies.If contemporary
29Foranalysisof the premartiallaw "porkbarrel"system,see Carinio1966. In his exam-

inationof the politicalcareerof SergioOsmenia,Jr.(son of the masterful
colonialpolitician),
Mojares(1986) providesa richportraitof machinepoliticsin the earlypostwaryears.
30Theimportanceof the national bureaucracywas downgraded,as local officialswere
providedwith greaterautonomyin carryingout manybasic governmentalfunctions.Some
70,000 nationalgovernment employeesweredevolvedto thelocal level,and local government
units'shareof internalrevenueallotmentsjumped from11 percentto 40 percent.Local gov-
ernments weregivengreatercontrolovertheplanningprocess,as well as importantnewpowers
intendedto promotelocal revenuemobilization.

reforms areto succeed,theirformulation mustbe basedon carefulanalysisofrelations

betweenManila and the provinces.Local structures should indeed be strengthened
whentheyare capable ofpromotingdemocracyand development,but in manycases
devolutionmay end up promotingforceshostileto democracyand detrimentalto
development-and certain measures of centralizationcould prove essential in
furthering thesegoals. In short,convenientand formalistic simplificationsmust be
replacedby historically groundedanalysisable to capturethe complexinterplayof
administrative and politicalsystems.
The secondmajorobjectiveof this articleis to demonstrate how analysisof the
Tafteraprovidesinsightsforcomparativeinquiryintostateformation, colonialstate
formation, and territorialdimensionsof modernstates.Examinationof this period
puts particularfocuson issuesof compromise,ideology,and the historicaltimingof
the creationof administrative and representational structures.Each of these issues
playsan essentialrole in explainingthe relativeweaknessof centralauthorityin the
modernPhilippinestate.
We knowfromCharlesTilly thatcompromise was partand parcelofEuropeanstate
formation,as central rulers were frequentlyforcedto bargain with competing
concentrations ofcoercionand capital.Crawford Young, similarly, explainsthatmany
Africancolonial statesinstitutedsystemsof indirectrule that accommodatedand
incorporated indigenousstructures ofauthority. In each case,however,it is generally
expectedthat over the long termrulerswill prefer-if possible-to move toward
morecentralizedformsof ruleand largerdegreesof autonomyfrom(and dominance
over)civil society.Imperativesof war were the leading catalystforEuropeanstate-
building, forcingrulers to confrontlocal powerholderswith whom they may
previouslyhavebeen contentto compromise(Tilly 1992, 25-26; Young 1994, 107-
8, 118). Applied to modernpolities,"a primemotivationforstateleadersto attempt
to stretchthestate'srule-making domainwithinits formalboundaries,evenwithall
the risksthathas entailed,has been to build sufficient clout to survivethe dangers
posed by thoseoutsideits boundaries,fromthe worldof states"(Migdal 1988, 21).
Upon arrivingin thePhilippinesin 1900, Taftand his fellowstate-builders used
compromise(dressedup as "benevolentassimilation")to achievetheiroverarching
objectiveofdefeatinga warofindependence;to quote David Steinberg,"Taftreversed
Karl von Clausewitz'smaximbymakingpoliticsan extensionofwarbyothermeans"
(1994, 67). The previouscentury'sprocessof agriculturalcommercialization had
created an elite with independentbases of economic power throughoutthe
archipelago,and Taft proceededto win over this elite by grantingthempolitical
poweras well-beginning in the municipalitiesand quicklyproceedingalso to the
provincialand nationallevels.As such,the creationof the modernPhilippinestate
was verymucha joint,compromiseventureof bothAmericancolonialsand Filipino
collaborators.Compromiseremainedthe dominanttheme:when an externalthreat
(fromJapan) did come to be perceivedby Americanofficials, the reactionof some
(includingTheodoreRoosevelt)was notto build a morecentralizedstateand confront
local powerholders but ratherto let loose the colony.By thesecondhalfofAmerican
colonial rule,the goal of Philippineindependencehad alreadybecomeofficialU.S.
policy(Stanley1974, 220, 214).
Ideology is anotherkeyelementin the formation of the modernPhilippinestate.
Taft'sbrandofcompromisewas clearlymotivatednotonlybyexpediencybut also by
ideals; unlike the rulersof a centralizingstate,he did not sharethe same telos of
overcomingcompeting centersof local power and achieving larger degrees of
autonomyfrom(and dominanceover) civil society.He was, instead,acting out of

distinctlyAmericannotionsofwhata stateis to be. As Root'sinstructions makeclear,

these ideas include definitelimitson governmental authorityand a strongbias in
favoroflocal autonomy.This is notto saythattheAmericanPhilippineswas destined
to becomedecentralized,since thereare indeed diversestrandsof politicalthought
withintheAmericantradition(as evidencedby ongoingtensionson issuesofcentral
controlversusstates'rightssincethefoundingof the republic).But in settingout to
developcolonialgovernancein thePhilippines,Taftand hisfellowstate-builders drew
heavilyon theirown experienceofthe "radicallydeconcentrated" nineteenth-century
American"stateof courtsand parties"(Skowronek1982, 24). My emphasison the
roleof ideologyin stateformation builds on the workofothers,mostnotablyJames
Scott's analysis of the horrificconsequencesthat have come fromstate leaders'
applicationof "high modernist"ideals in a rangeof settingsworldwide(1998). The
Taft era revealshow a dramaticallycontrastingideologyis capable of producingits
own,verydistinct,dysfunctional consequences.
Both expediencyand ideals led Americanofficialstowardveryclose ties with
collaboratingFilipino elites,and throughtheseinteractions the modernPhilippine
statecame to be. Knowledgeof thehistorical timing of the introductionof a national
representative institutionfurtherenhancesour understanding of the characterand
shape of this state.Drawing on the workof MartinShefter,I have shownthat the
"constituency forbureaucratic autonomy"had hardlyhad a chanceto consolidateitself
whenthe Assemblywas convenedin 1907, and as a resultadministrative structures
were soon overwhelmedby enormouspressuresfor patronage.Viewed from a
bureaucraticperspective,one can say thatthe colonialadministrative apparatuswas
itselflargelycolonized by emergentFilipino politiciansfromthe provinces.This
clearlystuntedthe coherenceof the Philippinestate,underminedcentralefforts to
and encouragedthepatternsoframpantpatronageunderwhich
superviselocal affairs,
it still sufferstoday. More fundamentally, however,we must recall how these
provincially basednationalpoliticoscameto haveso muchinfluence overthecharacter
of the colonial state.This resulted,quite clearly,fromthe particulartypeof state
formationinitiallypursued by William Howard Taft and other Americanstate
buildersin theyears1900-13. Having defeatedthe Philippinestrugglefornational
independence, theAmericanseffectivelydivertedthequestforself-government toward
a simultaneousquest for increasedlocal autonomy,expanded national legislative
authority, and moreextensiveopportunities forpatronage.
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Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local

Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913

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W HEN THE UNITED STATES EMBARKED ON A CAMPAIGN of overseascolonial

Paul D. Hutchcroftis AssistantProfessorof Political Scienceat the Universityof Wis-

ofAsian Studies59, no. 2 (May 2000):277-306.

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revolutionary challenge-establishedthefoundations ofthemodernPhilippinepolity.

rightingthe wrongs of the past, in this analysis,is a far-reaching programof

'Ocampo and Panganiban1985, 2. This assertionof a "centralist"historyis a common

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formation, and central-localrelations.In particular,thisanalysisfocusesattentionon

AssessingTerritorialDimensions of Politics and

Over time, Michael Mann emphasizesin a discussionthat draws heavilyon

4Myfocus,throughout, will be on the lowlandChristianprovincesin whichthe bulk of

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like.6For heuristicpurposes,theserealmscan initiallybe conceivedas two distinct

'While my focus is on the administrative and political spheres,I fullyrecognizethat

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next."[Tihe patrimonialrulercannotalwaysdare to destroytheseautonomouslocal

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In Italy, Putnam explains,patronagepractices"allowed local elites and national

The TaftEra, 1900-1913: The Originsofthe

"It is importantto emphasizethat this framework does notattemptto resolvewhat are

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from1901 to 1903. On returning to theUnitedStates,he proceededto becomeU.S.

The Spanish Heritage

9Paredes1989b, 46. Althoughfarfromthearchipelagoin theselateryears,Taft'sattention

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Spanishconquestwas followednot by centuriesof exposureand exploitationbut by

A Fusion of Expediency and Ideals

"0Whereas previouslysuchopportunitieswereconfinedto themunicipallevel(as examined

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Commission(Salamanca1984, 31-32, 237-45). Root initiallytriedtopreparehimself

12Indeed,one can observethat just as Britainbequeathedan "antique polity" upon its

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thatTaftexplicitlyset out to make the "modern

The Impulse Toward Devolution, 1900-1903

Through a combinationof expediencyand ideals, therefore, Taft and other

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linkagesamong variousmunicipalitiesthatsoon emergedas provincewidepolitical

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offices(a privilege formerlyenjoyed primarilyby American militaryofficers)

13OnofreD. Corpuzspeaksofthe " 'co-optation'ofnationalism":as theFilipinoelitewas

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treasurers,majorresponsibility forbothpublic worksand public healthwas removed

14Fora usefulanalysisof Americancolonials'comparativeassumptions,see Adas 1998.

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two "lawyer-politicians"continuedto dominatenationalpoliticsforseveraldecades

Shared Authority:The Commission and the Assembly,

"5Thishad originallybeen the provincialsupervisor,and later(after1905) the superin-

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powerthathad becomeevidenttwo yearsearlier.SergioOsmeniawas electedSpeaker

17AsSalamancaconcludes,Osmefiaand Quezon "did not reallydesireimmediateinde-

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Assemblyalso frequently actedupon requestsforexemptionsofspecifichiringsfrom

Otherproposedmeasureshad thepotentialto affect central-localrelationsin more

181tis not knownwhythe Commissionapprovedthe bill removingcentralcontrolover

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While reformswere reshapingpolitical structuresat all levels of government,

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to judge charges,countercharges, or the reliabilityof witnesseswithouta thorough

The Taft Era in Retrospect

2"Fortwo revealingexamplesof politicallysensitivecases against governorsthat were