SCB PHILIPPINES VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,
SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AND CURRENCIES EN BANC
G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007
FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them
before the courts in Metro Manila for selling unregistered
foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code
(RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to
prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future.
The respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to
investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there
were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of
legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction
of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of
legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested
solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing
cases.
RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set
forth in the resolution, as initiated in the privileged speech of
Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal
practices committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered
foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech
"to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as
to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint
before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of
sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy
determination, which may or may not be enacted into law.
Except only when it exercises the power to punish for
contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of
Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is
overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than
proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation,
respondent Committee can only recommend measures to
address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed
during the investigation, although it may include in its Report
a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who
may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with
the evidence, contained in such Report would only be
persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and
the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
EJERCITO v.
JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
509 SCRA 190 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
The Ombudsman has the power to issue subpoena duces
tecum/ad testificandum in relation to cases pending before it.
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman requested the Sandiganbayan to
issue subpoena duces tecum against the Urban Bank relative to
the case against President Joseph Estrada.
Ms. Dela Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office
of the Ombudsman certified copies of manager checks detailed
in thesubpoena duces tecum. The Sandiganbayan granted the
same.
However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the
Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be enforced because
the information found therein, given their ―extremely
detailed‖ character and could only have been obtained by the
Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the
bank officials. Ejercito thus contended that, following the
―fruit of the poisonous tree‖ doctrine, the subpoenas must be
quashed. Moreover, the ―extremely-detailed information
obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned
during a previous investigation of the charges against him,
such inquiry into his bank accounts would itself be illegal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum may
be issued to order the production of statement of bank
accounts even before a case for plunder is filed in court
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to bribery,
and therefore, the exception to R.A. 1405 must also apply to
cases of plunder. The court also reiterated the ruling in
Marquez v. Desierto that before an in camera inspection may
be allowed there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly
identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of
pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet
been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction at the time
the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, he concludes that
the information about his bank accounts were acquired
illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to facilitate a
subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts. Thus, his
attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant
case fails.
The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the
petitioner Ejercito that the bank accounts which where
demanded from certain banks even before the case was filed
before the proper court is inadmissible in evidence being fruits
of poisonous tree. This is because the Ombudsman issued the
subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of Ejercito about four
months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001.
While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in
Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act
of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was
originally passed, the rule is not absolute. Thus, the Court
referred to the teaching of Columbia Pictures Inc., v. Court of
Appeals, that: It is consequently clear that a judicial
interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law
was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view
is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not
apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in
good faith.
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Sia vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 102970, May 13, 1990
Facts:
1. Plaintiff rented a Safety Box of Security Bank wherein he
placed his collection of stamps pursuant to a contract
denominated as a Lease Agreement. The said safety deposit
box leased by the plaintiff was at the bottom or at the lowest
level of the safety deposit boxes of the defendant bank at its
aforesaid Binondo Branch.
2. During the floods that took place in 1985 and 1986,
floodwater entered into the defendant bank’s premises, seeped
into the safety deposit box leased by the plaintiff and caused,
according damage to his stamps collection. Security Bank
rejected the plaintiff’s claim for compensation for his damaged
stamps collection so plaintiff instituted an action for damages
against the defendant bank.
3. Security Bank contended that its contract with the Sia over
safety deposit box was one of lease and not of deposit and,
therefore, governed by the lease agreement - Par. 9-the liability
of the bank by reason of the lease, is limited to the exercise of
the diligence required to prevent the opening of the safe by
any person other than the Renter xxx; Par. 13- The Bank is not
a depository of the contents of the safe and it has neither the
possession nor the control of the same.
4. SB further avers that even without such a limitation of
liability, it should still be absolved from any responsibility for
the damages since the damage was occasioned by a fortuitous
event and that the respondent bank was free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury.
5. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner but was
reversed by the CA.
Issue/Ruling:
1. Whether the contract entered into was for deposit or a
lease, thus, what law shall govern?
Summary: Not governed by provisions on Lease or Deposit but by
provisions on Obligations since it is considered as a SPECIAL
DEPOSIT.
- In the recent case CA Agro-Industrial Development Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly rejected the contention
that a contract for the use of a safety deposit box is a contract
of lease governed by Title VII, Book IV of the Civil Code. Nor
did it fully subscribe to the view that it is a contract of deposit
to be strictly governed by the Civil Code provision on deposit.
It declared that it is a special kind of deposit.
- The prevailing rule in American jurisprudence — that the
relation between a bank renting out safe deposit boxes and its
customer with respect to the contents of the box is that of a
bailor and bailee, the bailment for hire and mutual benefit 15
— has been adopted in this jurisdiction, thus:
In the context of our laws which authorize banking institutions
to rent out safety deposit boxes, it is clear that in this
jurisdiction, the prevailing rule in the United States has been
adopted.
Section 72 of the General Banking Act [R.A. 337, as amended]
pertinently provides:
"Sec. 72. In addition to the operations specifically authorized
elsewhere in this Act, banking institutions other than building
and loan associations may perform the following services:
(a) Receive in custody funds, documents, and valuable
objects, and rent safety deposit boxes for the safeguarding of
such effects.
xxxxxxxxx
The banks shall perform the services permitted under
subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section as depositories or as
agents. . . ."(emphasis supplied)
Note that the primary function is still found within the
parameters of a contract of deposit, i.e., the receiving in
custody of funds, documents and other valuable objects for
safekeeping.The rentingout of the safety deposit boxes is not
independent from, but related to or in conjunction with, this
principal function.
2. Whether the stipulations in the Agreement valid?
- The depositary's responsibility for the safekeeping of the
objects deposited in the case at bar is governed by Title I,
Book IV of the Civil Code on OBLIGATIONS. Accordingly,
the depositary would be liable if, in performing its obligation,
it is found guilty of fraud, negligence, delay or contravention
of the tenor of the agreement [Art. 1170, id.]. In the absence of
any stipulation prescribing the degree of diligence required,
that of a good father of a family is to be observed [Art. 1173,
id.]. Hence, any stipulation exempting the depositary from
any liability arising from the loss of the thing deposited on
account of fraud, negligence or delay would be void for being
contrary to law and public policy.
- Conditions Nos. 13 and 14 are declared as void as they are
contrary to law and public policy. Said provisions are
inconsistent with the respondent Bank's responsibility as a
depositary under Section 72 (a) of the General Banking Act.
The company, in renting safe-deposit boxes, cannot exempt
itself from liability for loss of the contents by its own fraud or
negligence or that, of its agents or servants, and if a provision
of the contract may be construed as an attempt to do so, it will
be held ineffective for the purpose.
BANCO FILIPINO vs. PURISIMA et al
G.R. No. L-56429
May 28, 1988
The inquiry into illegally acquired property – or property not
legitimately acquired –, under the exception under RA
1405 extends to cases where such property is concealed by
being held by or recorded in the name of other persons. This
proposition is made clear by RA 3019 which quite
categorically states that the term “legitimately acquired
property of a public officer or employee shall not include …
property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its
ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, of
held by, respondent’s spouse, ascendants, descendants,
relatives or any other persons.
FACTS: Caturla, special agent of the Bureau of Customs, was
accused by BIR before the Tanodbayan of having allegedly
acquired property manifestly out of proportion to his salary
and other lawful income, in violation of the “Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.”
In the course of the preliminary investigation thereof,
the Tanodbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Banco
Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, commanding its
representative to appear at the Office of the Tanodbayan and
furnish the latter with duly certified copies of the records of
the loans, savings and time deposits and other banking
transactions appearing in the names of Caturla, his wife, their
children and friends .
Caturla moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum arguing that
compliance therewith would result in a violation of Sections 2
and 3 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits.
Then Tanodbayan not only denied the motion for lack of merit,
and directed compliance with the subpoena, but also expanded
its scope through a second and third subpoena duces tecum,
BF Bank took over from Caturla in the effort to nullify
the subpoenae. It filed a complaint for declaratory relief with the
CFI of Manila, praying for a judicial declaration as to whether
its compliance with the subpoenae duces tecumwould constitute
an infringement of the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of R.A.
No. 1405 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. It also asked
that pending final resolution of the question, the Tanodbayan be
provisionally restrained from exacting compliance with
the subpoenae.
Respondent Judge Purisima issued an Order denying for lack
of merit the application by BF Bank for a preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order.
This Order is now impugned in the instant certiorari action
instituted by BF Bank before this Court, as having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
whether or not the “Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits”
precludes production by subpoena duces tecum of bank records
of transactions by or in the names of the wife, children and
friends of the accused
HELD:
the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. NO
The provisions of R.A. No. 1405 subject of BF’s declaratory
action, read as follows:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds
issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered
as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of litigation.
In Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco, we upheld the judgment
of the Trial Court “sustaining the power of the defendants
(special prosecutors of the Department of Justice) to compel
the disclosure (by PNB) of bank accounts of ACCFA
Administrator Jimenez (then under investigation for
unexplained wealth), .. (it being ruled) that, by enacting section
8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Congress clearly
intended to provide an additional ground for the examination
of bank deposits ..
xxx
… while Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are
“absolutely confidential .. and [therefore] may not be
examined, inquired or looked into,” except in those cases
enumerated therein, the Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory
terms that bank deposits “shall be taken into consideration
in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary.” The only conclusion
possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to
amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an
additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank
desposits.
xxx xxx xxx
… Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery
or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two
classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank
deposits confidential. .. This policy expresses the notion that a
public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon
its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so
far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
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Marquez v Desierto G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001
Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be
a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection
limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the
court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the
account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case.
Facts:
Pursuant to an investigation regarding the PEA – AMARI
project, Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to
produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in
camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank
of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the
branch manager..
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in
camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of
the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, was based on a pending
investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado
Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and
(g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public
Estates Authority and AMARI.
Marquez filed a petition for declaratory relief, seeking to
clarify if such an action will violate RA. No. 1405.
Issue:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera
inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception
to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).
Held:
No. Before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there
must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case
before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel
and the account holder must be notified to be present during
the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any
court of competent authority. What is existing is an
investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what
the office of the ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for
additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et.
al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending
case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank
account for inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The
Civil Code provides that” [e]very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons” and punishes as actionable torts
several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. It also holds public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights
and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of
letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal
Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer,
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to
dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act,
and the Intellectual Property Code.
UNIONBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA and sps.
Fermina and Reynaldo Dario
Facts:
A real estate mortgage was executed on 17 December 1991 by
spouses Leopoldo and Jessica Dario (hereafter mortgagors) in
favor of UNIONBANK to secure a P3 million loan, including
interest and other charges. The mortgage covered a Quezon
City propertyin Leopoldo Dario's name and was annotated on
the title on 18 December 1991.
For non-payment of the principal obligation, UNIONBANK
extrajudicially foreclosed the property mortgaged on 12
August 1993 and sold the same at public auction, with itself
posting the highest bid.
On 4 October 1994, one week before the one-year redemption
period expired, private respondents filed a complaint with the
RTC of Quezon City against the mortgagors, UNIONBANK,
the Register of Deeds and the City Sheriff of Quezon City for
annulment of sale and real estate mortgage, reconveyance, and
prayer for restraining notice of lis pendens was annotated on
the title.
During the hearing, UNIONBANK's counsel orally moved for
dismissal of the complaint alleging that a certification of non-
forum shopping-is prescribed by SC-Circular 4-94 was not
attached thereto. Judge Lipana-Reyes settled the motion in
favor of UNIONBANK and dismissed the complaint.
However, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, while the case is pending and without
notifying private respondents, UNIONBANK consolidated its
title over the foreclosed property on 24 October 1994, TCT
No. 41828 was cancelled and TCT No. 120929 in
UNIONBANK's name was issued in its stead. Private
respondents maintain that UNIONBANK's consolidation of
the title in its name was in bad faith, vitiated a standing court
order, is against the law, thus void ab initio. The
application for preliminary injunction was not rendered moot
and academic by consolidation, which took place during the
lifetime of the TRO, and did not follow the proper legal
procedure due to the surreptitious manner it was
accomplished. By treating the application for preliminary
injunction as moot and academic and denying the motion for
indirect contempt without hearing, the RTC order ran afoul
with the requirements of due process.
Issue:
whether or not the consolidation of title in UNIONBANK’s
name is proper.
Ruling:
UNIONBANK's consolidation of title over the property on 24
October 1994 was proper, though precipitate. Contrary to
private respondents' allegation UNIONBANK violated
no standing court order. The only bar to consolidation was the
temporary restraining order issued byJustice Lipana-Reyes on
10 October 1994 which effectively halted the tolling of
the redemption period 7 days short of its expiration. When
private respondents' original complaint was dismissed on 17
October 1994 for failure to append a certification of non-forum
shopping, the TRO, as an ancillary order that cannot stand
independent of the main proceeding, became functus officio.
Thus the tolling of the 12-month redemption period,
interrupted by the filing of the complaint and the TRO,
recommenced and eventually expired 7 days thereafter or on
24 October 1994, the date of the disputed consolidation.
The motion for reconsideration and to amend complaint filed
by private respondent on 20 October 1994 was of no moment,
this Court recognizing that "a dismissal, discontinuance
or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or
temporary injunction has been granted operates as a
dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction,"
regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing the case or appeal
therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in
cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an
action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the
judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary
injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the
action.
We disagree with the appellate court's observation that
consolidation deprived private respondents of their property
without due process. It is settled that the buyer in a
foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year
after the registration of the sale. Consolidation took place as a
matter of right since there was no redemption of the foreclosed
property and the TRO expired upon dismissal of the
complaint. UNIONBANK need not have informed private
respondent that it was consolidaint its title over the property,
upon the expiration of the redemption period, without the
judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption,
the ownership of the property sold becomes consolidated in
the purchaser. Notice to the mortgagors and with more reason,
to private respondents who are not even parties to the
mortgage contract nor to the extra judicial sale is not
necessary.
In real estate mortgage, when the principal obligation is not
paid when due, the mortgage has the right to foreclose the
mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with a
view to applying the proceeds to the payment of the principal
obligation. Foreclosure may be effected either judicially or
extrajudicially.
In a public bidding during extra-judicial foreclosure, the
creditor —mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized to
act for the creditor may participate and purchase the
mortgaged property as any other bidder. Thereafter the
mortgagor has one year within which to redeem the property
from and after registration of sale with the Register of Deeds.
In case of non-redemption, the purchaser at foreclosure sale
shall file with the Register of Deeds, either a final deed of sale
executed by the person authorized by virtue of the power of
attorney embodied in the deed or mortgage, or his sworn
statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption; whereupon,
the Register of Deeds Shall issue a new certificate of title in
favor of the purchaser after the owner's duplicate of the
certificate has been previously delivered and canceled.
Thus, upon failure to redeem foreclosed realty, consolidation
of title becomes a matter of right on the part of the auction
buyer, and the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of the
purchaser becomes ministerial upon the Register of Deeds.
BSB Group v. Go.
GR No 168644
Important points:
1. R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to
discourage private hoarding and at the same time encourage
the people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so
that it may be utilized by way of authorized loans and
thereby assist in economic development.[41] Owing to this
piece of legislation, the confidentiality of bank deposits
remains to be a basic state policy in the
Philippines.[42] Section 2 of the law institutionalized this
policy by characterizing as absolutely confidential in general
all deposits of whatever nature with banks and other
financial institutions in the country. It declares:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks
or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities,
are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature
and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases
where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation.
2. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy
extends its scope to include an individual’s financial privacy
rights and personal financial matters, there is an
intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and
legislators to laws infringing such rights. Should there be
doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of
bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into
such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of
confidentiality. This attitude persists unless congress lifts its
finger to reverse the general state policy respecting the
absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.
Facts:
1. BSB Group, Inc., represented by its president, Ricardo, filed
a case for Qualified Theft against Sally, his wife.
2. Per the complaint, Sally was employed by the company as
cashier, engaged to receive and account for the payments
made by the various customers of the company.
3. Sally was charged when several checks totalling
P1,534,135.50 issued by the company’s customers were
indorsed by her to her personal banking account with the
Security Bank and Trust Company.
4. After a finding of probable cause, the Office of the City
Prosecutor filed an Information charging Sally with Qualified
Theft for theft of “cash” money belonging to BSB Group Inc.
After arraignment, trial ensued on the merits.
5. To prove that Sally deposited the money to her personal
account, the prosecution moved for issuance of subpoena
ducestecum/ad testificandum against the
managers/representatives of SecurityBank, as well as the
Metrobank Jose Abad Santos branch.
6. Sally moved to quash the subpoena to Metrobank, noting
that no mention was made of Sally’s bank account with
Metrobank.
7. While arguing that the account with Metrobank was
immaterial to the case, she waived her objection to the Security
Bank subpoena.
8. BSB opposed the motion to quash, arguing that the
complaint affidavit showed two checks were deposited to the
Metrobank account.
9. Sally also filed a supplemental motion to quash, alleging
secrecy of bank deposits under R.A. 1405.
10. The trial court denied the motions to quash. In the
meantime, the representative of Security Bank testified and
identified the checks deposited to Sally’s Security Bank
account.
11. Before her testimony could be completed, however, Sally
moved to suppress her testimony, invoking irrelevancy and
secrecy of bank deposits under R.A. 1405.
12. Trial court denied again her motion to suppress.
13. Sally the filed a petition with the Court of Appeals, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
denying her motions to quash with respect to the Metrobank
account, and the motion to suppress on the testimony of the
bank representative from Security Bank.
14. The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari
filed by Sally and reversed the assailed orders of the trial court
as well as struck off the testimony of the bank representative of
Security Bank.
15. BSB Group, Inc and Ricardo then filed a petition for
certiorari with SC. They argued that the allegation in the
Information of “cash” money taken by Sally encompass the
checks deposited to the questioned bank accounts of Sally.
Issue:
Whether the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying
documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether they are also
violative of the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits
and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405.
(In other words, are the documents and testimony of
Marasigan admissible as evidence?)
Ruling:
The Court finds the subject evidence to be indeed inadmissible.
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage
private hoarding and at the same time encourage the people to
deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be
utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in
economic development. Owing to this piece of legislation, the
confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic state
policy in the Philippines. Section 2 of the law institutionalized
this policy by characterizing as absolutely confidential in
general all deposits of whatever nature with banks and other
financial institutions in the country. It declares:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines including investments
in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its
political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not
be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in
relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly and
amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, in which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank
deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on
the fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the
subject of the action. Given this perspective, we deduce that
the subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be
determined from the indictment that charges respondent with
the offense, and not from the evidence sought by the
prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the criminal
Information filed with the trial court, respondent,
unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with qualified
theft by abusing petitioner’s trust and confidence and stealing
cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50. The said Information
makes no factual allegation that in some material way involves
the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary
evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in
said Information make mention of the supposed bank account
in which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly
been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the
indictment itself that the Security Bank account is the
ostensible subject of the prosecution’s inquiry. Without
needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged in
the Information, the subject matter of the action in this case is
the money amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged to have been
stolen by respondent, and not the money equivalent of the
checks which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is
that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with its
evidence, and no other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and
documentary evidence relative to respondent’s Security Bank
account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence
of such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It
constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible
inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and
confidentiality of which is protected by law. On this score
alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to
suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy at
the very first instance it was raised before the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on
the particulars of respondent’s supposed bank account with
Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by
the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only
incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405.
They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do
not appear to have any logical and reasonable connection to
the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. We find full
merit in and affirm respondent’s objection to the evidence of
the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct
in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.
A final note: In any given jurisdiction where the right
of privacy extends its scope to include an individual’s financial
privacy rights and personal financial matters, there is an
intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and
legislators to laws infringing such rights. Should there be
doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such
accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the
former. This attitude persists unless congress lifts its finger to
reverse the general state policy respecting the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits.”
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
ONATE V. ABROGAR (G.R. NO. 107303)
Facts:
Sun Life filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for
the immediate issuance of a writ of attachment against
petitioners Onate and Dino. Respondent Judge granted the
prayer and the writ was correspondingly issued. After the
summons were eventually served upon petitioners, the latter
filed motions to discharge/dissolve the attachment.
Meanwhile, Sun Life filed motions for examination of
petitioners’ bank accounts. Respondent judge ruled in all the
motions in favor of Sun Life. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but were denied.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in allowing the
examination of the bank accounts of herein petitioners.
Ruling:
We find both petitions unmeritorious.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that notice need only be
given to the garnishee, but the person who is holding property
or credits belonging to the defendant. The provision does not
require that notice be furnished the defendant himself, except
when there is a need to examine said defendant “for the
purpose of giving information respecting his property.
Furthermore, Section 10 Rule 57 is not incompatible with
Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, “An Act Prohibiting
Disclosure or Inquiry Into, Deposits With Any Banking
Institution and Providing Penalty Therefore,” for Section 2
therefore provides an exception “in cases where the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.”
The examination of the bank records is not a fishing
expedition, but rather a method by which Sun Life could trace
the proceeds of the check it paid to petitioners.
SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
FACTS:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing
four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen
Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and
a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however,
able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the
trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s
fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit
of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused
arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for
declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be
made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD:
NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this
case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in
the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of
Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the
favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and
her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the
economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not
anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law
still denies those entitled to due process of law for being
unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be
good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous
effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the
case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who
argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign
Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits
from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give
the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit
made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives
and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only
for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that
Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court
processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law
depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that
the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to
a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This
would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides
that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail.”
___________
NOTES:
– On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American
tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12
years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg
Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to
February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on
February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7,
1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living
nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained
at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from
Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control
No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank
Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account —
China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877;
5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.)
Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
INTENGAN V. CA (G.R. NO. 128996)
Facts:
Citibank filed a complaint for violation of the Corporation
Code against 2 of its officers. The complaint was attached with
the affidavit of Vic Lim, VP of Citibank, who was then
instructed by the higher management of the bank to
investigate the anomalous/highly irregular activities of the
said officers. As evidence, Lim annexed bank records
purporting to establish the deception practiced by the officers.
Some of the documents pertained to the dollar deposits of
petitioners. As an incident to the foregoing, petitioners filed
respective motions for the exclusion and physical withdrawal
of their bank records that were attached to Lim’s affidavit. The
filing of Informations against private respondents was
recommended for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1405.
Private respondents appealed before the DOJ which ruled in
their favor. Resort to the Court, referred the matter to the CA
which then held that the disclosure was proper and falls under
the exception under R.A. No. 1405.
Issue:
Whether or not the disclosure falls under the exception under
R.A. No. 1405.
Ruling: NO.
Actually, this case should have been studied more carefully by
all concerned. The finest legal minds in the country – from the
parties’ respective counsel, the Provincial Prosecutor, the
Department of Justice, the Solicitor General, and the Court of
Appeals – all appear to have overlooked a single fact which
dictates the outcome of the entire controversy. A circumspect
review of the record shows us the reason. The accounts in
question are U.S. dollar deposits; consequently, the applicable
law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but Republic Act (RA) No.
6426, known as the “Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the
Philippines.”
Thus, under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to
the secrecy of foreign currency deposits, that is, disclosure is
allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor.
Incidentally, the acts of private respondents complained of
happened before the enactment on September 29, 2001 of R.A.
No. 9160 otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act
of 2001.
A case for violation of Republic Act No. 6426 should have been
the proper case brought against private respondents. Private
respondents Lim and Reyes admitted that they had disclosed
details of petitioners’ dollar deposits without the latter’s
written permission. It does not matter if that such disclosure
was necessary to establish Citibank’s case against Dante L.
Santos and Marilou Genuino. Lim’s act of disclosing details of
petitioners’ bank records regarding their foreign currency
deposits, with the authority of Reyes, would appear to belong
to that species of criminal acts punishable by special laws,
called malum prohibitum.
*The decision however was still unfavorable to the petitioners
since there is an issue as to prescription. The action to assail
the disclosure of herein private respondents for them to be
liable for violating RA 6426 had already prescribed.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
G.R. No. 125359 September 4, 2001
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T.
RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA,
SR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Statement of the case:
Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered
on May 23, 1996, by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719. CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 had
affirmed the order dated September 6, 1994, of the Regional
Trial Court, Manila, Branch 26, insofar as it denied petitioners’
 respective Motions to Quash the Informations in twenty-five
(25) criminal cases for violation of Central Bank Circular No.
960. Therein included were informations involving: (a)
consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883 filed
against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Roberto S. Benedicto, and
Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
101884 to 91-101892 filed against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto;
and (c) Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 also
against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto. Note, however, that the
Court of Appeals already dismissed Criminal Case No. 91-
101884.
Statement of the facts:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs.
Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for viola tion of
Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 in relation to Section
34 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as
amended) in five Informations filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the
trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings
from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign
Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the
period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular
prohibited natural and juridical persons from
maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior
authorization from the Central Bank. On August 11, 1994,
petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against
them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884
to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91-101969. Their motion
was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum
shopping, absence of a preliminary investigation and
extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No.
960.On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners'
motion. A similar motion filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos
seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her due to
the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied
by the trial court in its or der dated June
9,1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 1994..
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
denying the Motion to Quash for absence of a valid
preliminary investigation.
2. Whether or not the repeal of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by
Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively,
extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners.
HELD:
1. NO. P r e l i m i n a r y investigation is not part
of the due process guaranteed by the
Constitution. It is an inquiry to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof. Inste ad, the right to
a preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded
to the accused by statute, and can be waived, either
expressly or by implication. When the records of the case were
disclosed to them, in opting to enter their respective pleas to
the charges, and filed various motions and pleadings, they are
deemed to have made an express waiver of their right to have
a preliminary investigation.
2. NO. In the instant case, it must be noted that despite
the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retained
the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving
earnings or profits from non -trade foreign exchange
transactions. Even the most cursory glance at the
repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353
shows that both contain a saving clause, expressly
providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no
effect on pending actions for violation of the latter Circular. A
saving clause operates to except from the effect of the
repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new
law. In the present case, the respective saving clauses of
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to
reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punish
offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where
the cases are either pending or under investigation
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928
and CA G.R. SP No. 35719, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased petitioner,
Roberto S. Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-
101969, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 26, are ordered dropped and that any criminal as well
as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in
the aforesaid cases are declared extinguished by reason of his
death on May 15, 2000. No pronouncement as to costs.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
G.R. No. 189206 June 8, 2011
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE 15th DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS and INDUSTRIAL BANK OF KOREA, TONG
YANG MERCHANT BANK, HANAREUM BANKING
CORP., LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, WESTMONT
BANK and DOMSAT HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.
FACTS:
On December 13, 1996, a surety bond was agreed with
DOMSAT HOLDINGS, INC. as the principal and the GSIS as
administrator and the obligeesare Land Bank of the
Philippines, Tong Yang Merchant Bank, Industrial Bank of
Korea and First Merchant Banking Corporation collectively
known as “The Banks” with the loan granted to DOMSAT of
US $ 11,000,000.00 to be used for the financing of the two-year
lease of a Russian Satellite from INTERSPUTNIK.
Domsat failed to pay the loan and GSIS refused to
comply with its obligation reasoning that Domsat did not use
the loan proceeds for the payment of rental for the satellite.
GSIS alleged that Domsat, with Westmont Bank as the conduit,
transferred the U.S. $11 Million loan proceeds from the
Industrial Bank of Korea to Citibank New York account of
Westmont Bank and from there to the Binondo Branch of
Westmont Bank.The Banks filed a complaint before the RTC of
Makati against Domsat and GSIS.
GSIS requested for the issuance of a subpoena
ducestecum to the custodian of records of Westmont Bank to
produce bank ledger covering the account of Domsat with the
Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank) and other
pertinent documents. The RTC issued the subpoena but
nonetheless, the RTC then granted the second motion for
reconsideration by “The Banks” to quash the subpoena
granted to GSIS.
GSIS assailed its case to the CA and CA partially
granted it’s petition allowing it to look into documents but not
the bank ledger because the US $ 11,000,000.00 deposited by
Domsat to Westmont Bank is covered by R.A. 6426 or the Bank
Secrecy Law.
GSIS now filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court for the decision of CA allowing the quashal by the RTC
of a subpoena for the production of bank ledger.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deposited US $ 11,000,000.00 by Domsat,
Inc. to Westmont Bank is covered by R.A. 6426 as what “The
Banks” contend or it is covered by R.A. 1405 as what GSIS
contends.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of R.A. 6426 and thereby
AFFIRMING the decision of Court of Appeals.
R.A. 1405 was enacted on 1955 while R.A. 6426 was enacted on
1974.These two laws both support the confidentiality of bank
deposits. There is no conflict between them. Republic Act No.
1405 was enacted for the purpose of giving encouragement to
the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and
to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be
properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the
economic development of the country. It covers all bank
deposits in the Philippines and no distinction was made
between domestic and foreign deposits. Thus, Republic Act
No. 1405 is considered a law of general application. On the
other hand, Republic Act No. 6426 was intended to encourage
deposits from foreign lenders and investors. It is a special law
designed especially for foreign currency deposits in the
Philippines. A general law does not nullify a specific or special
law. Generaliaspecialibus non derogant. Therefore, it is beyond
cavil that Republic Act No. 6426 applies in this case.
Intengan v. Court of Appeals affirmed the above-cited
principle and categorically declared that for foreign currency
deposits, such as U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable law is
Republic Act No. 6426.
In said case, Citibank filed an action against its officers for
persuading their clients to transfer their dollar deposits to
competitor banks. Bank records, including dollar deposits of
petitioners, purporting to establish the deception practiced by
the officers, were annexed to the complaint. Petitioners now
complained that Citibank violated Republic Act No. 1405.
Supreme Court ruled that since the accounts in question are
U.S. dollar deposits, the applicable law therefore is not
Republic Act No. 1405 but Republic Act No. 6426.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
China Banking Corporation v Court of Appeals G.R. No.
140687 December 18, 2006
As the owner of the funds unlawfully taken and which are
undisputably now deposited with China Bank, Jose Gotianuy
has the right to inquire into the said deposits.A depositor, in
cases of bank deposits, is one who pays money into the bank
in the usual course of business, to be placed to his credit and
subject to his check or the beneficiary of the funds held by the
bank as trustee.
Facts:
A Complaint for recovery of sums of money and annulment of
sales of real properties and shares of stock docketed as CEB-
21445 was filed by Jose “Joseph” Gotianuy against his son-in-
law, George Dee, and his daughter, Mary Margaret Dee, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. Jose Gotianuy
accused his daughter Mary Margaret Dee of stealing, among
his other properties, US dollar deposits with Citibank N.A.
amounting to not less than P35,000,000.00 and US$864,000.00.
Mary Margaret Dee received these amounts from Citibank
N.A. through checks which she allegedly deposited at China
Banking Corporation (China Bank). He likewise accused his
son-in-law, George Dee, husband of his daughter, Mary
Margaret, of transferring his real properties and shares of stock
in George Dee’s name without any consideration. Jose
Gotianuy, died during the pendency of the case before the trial
court.1 He was substituted by his daughter, Elizabeth
Gotianuy Lo. The latter presented the US Dollar checks
withdrawn by Mary Margaret Dee from his US dollar
placement with Citibank
Under the above provision, the law provides that all foreign
currency deposits authorized under Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended by Sec. 8, Presidential Decree No. 1246, Presidential
Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits
authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034 are considered
absolutely confidential in nature and may not be inquired into.
There is only one exception to the secrecy of foreign currency
deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed upon the written
permission of the depositor. Upon motion of Elizabeth
Gotianuy Lo, the trial court issued a subpoena to Cristota
Labios and Isabel Yap, employees of China Bank, to testify on
the case.
Issue:

Whether or not the subpoena issued by the court violates PD

No. 1035, and further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov.
21, 1977

Held:

As the owner of the funds unlawfully taken and which are

undisputably now deposited with China Bank, Jose Gotianuy
has the right to inquire into the said deposits.A depositor, in
cases of bank deposits, is one who pays money into the bank in
the usual course of business, to be placed to his credit and
subject to his check or the beneficiary of the funds held by the
bank as trustee. Furthermore, it is indubitable that the Citibank
checks were drawn against the foreign currency account with
Citibank, NA. The monies subject of said checks originally
came from the late Jose Gotianuy, the owner of the account.
Thus, he also has legal rights and interests in the CBC account
where said monies were deposited. More importantly, the
Citibank checks readily demonstrate (sic) that the late Jose
Gotianuy is one of the payees of said checks. Being a co-payee
thereof, then he or his estate can be considered as a co-
depositor of said checks. Ergo, since the late Jose Gotianuy is a
co-depositor of the CBC account, then his request for the
assailed subpoena is tantamount to an express permission of a
depositor for the disclosure of the name of the account holder.
The April 16, 1999 Order perforce must be sustained.