the decision of the Court of First Instance, directing the respondent to submit to the Department
of Labor its payrolls as called for in the decision rendered by the regional labor attorney, the
La Union Labor Union v. Phil Tobacco Fluecuring and Redrying Corp, 108 Phil 145 (1960)
Facts: Petitioner La Union Labor Union (LULU) filed an action in the Court of Industrial Relations
against the respondent PTFR involving demands affecting the improvement of the working
conditions and wages of its members employed by the PTFR. The parties entered into an
agreement which in a way settled the labor dispute between them, but with a proviso that all other
points not covered by the agreement, such as questions relating to salary differentials and claims
for overtime compensation subsequent to the filing of the petition will be presented to the Wage
Administration Service (WAS) for adjudication.
Thereafter, the LULU, in behalf of its members, filed a claim for wage differentials with the WAS.
After investigation, the regional attorney of the WAS rendered a decision in favor of the claimants
and ordered the PTFR to submit the payroll pertaining to the period covered by the claims. From
respondent appealed contending that the decision rendered by the regional labor attorney was
null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Under Section 9, Article 7(c), Chapter 3 of the Code of Rules and Procedure promulgated on Jan.
20, 1953, by the Secretary of Labor, to implement the provisions of the Minimum Wage Law, the
Wage Administration Service was empowered to render a decision binding on the parties in cases
involving claims for wages, underpayments, etc. in case the parties enter into a written agreement
to submit their dispute to the WAS for arbitration.
Issue: Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, did the Wage Administration Service acquire
jurisdiction to render a decision binding on the parties?
Held: No. (1) Ordinary function of WAS limited to conciliation of dispute involving claims for wages.
— "The ordinary function of the WAS is to hear complaints or claims for wages and conciliate the
parties, if possible, and if they are willing to submit their case for arbitration, to have said parties
enter into a written agreement that they submit the case for arbitration and decision, and that they
would abide by the result of said arbitration, otherwise, all that WAS could do, if it found the claims
for wages meritorious, is to file the corresponding complaint in a competent court. The agreement
of the parties before the Court of Industrial Relations, particularly the proviso, was insufficient to
confer power and jurisdiction on the WAS to decide the case."
(2) WAS decision not flowing from arbitration not binding. — "The law and the Code of Rules and
Procedure abovementioned required a written agreement signed by the parties to submit to
arbitration and to abide by the result of the decision flowing from said arbitration. Consequently,
the WAS being without jurisdiction, its decision is without any legal force and effect. The decision
of the Court of First Instance is accordingly reversed."
Roxas v. Sayoc 200 Phil 448 (1956)
Governing law expired after Commissioner of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Facts: On May 6, 1952, Petitioner Leonora T. Roxas was issued Import Control License No. 11591
by the defunct Import Control Commission for the importation of cotton counterpanes and by virtue
of such license she imported from Japan fourteen (14) bales of cotton counterpanes which arrived
on June 24, 1952 on board the “SS China Mail”, and declared as Custom Entry No. 40569, series
of 1952. The license was, however, issued in favor of the Petitioner in violation of Executive Order
No. 471 of the President dated August 24, 1951 which was an implementation of Republic Act No.
650, otherwise known as the Import Control Law, whereby the importation of cotton counterpanes
was banned, hence the cotton counterpanes in question were seized by the Collector of Customs
of Manila. Immediately thereafter, the Petitioner requested for the release of the said goods and
to that effect she even filed a petition with the Cabinet but the latter denied it declaring at the same
time that the license issued in her favor was in violation of the aforementioned Executive Order.
The Collector of Customs declared certain belongings forfeited to the Government. His decision
was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs. Subsequently, R.A. No. 650, otherwise known as
the Import Control Law, expired. R contended that upon the expiration of the said law, the
Commissioner of Customs lost jurisdiction over the case and, therefore, his decision was null and
void.
Issue: Did the expiration of R.A. No. 650 divest the Commissioner of Customs of his jurisdiction
duly acquired while said law was still in force?
Field: No. jurisdiction duly acquired not affected by expiration of governing law. — "It is a settled
rule that a court, be it judicial or administrative, that has acquired jurisdiction over a case, retains
it even after the expiration of the law governing the case. The case at bar is concerned with the
expiration of a law, not with the abrogation of law. The Commissioner of Customs having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, the mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650 did not affect such
jurisdiction."

Feliciano v. Director of Patents, 93 Phil. 115[1953]
Director of Patents is asked by intervenor to rule on the terms and stipulations of an executory
contract whereby intervenor is to act as selling agent for the investors of the patent.
Facts: An application for patent was filed with the Patent Office.
Pending examination of the application, Meliton D. Albaña filed a motion to intervene claiming that
the applicant-inventors had "sold and/or bartered and assigned to him their right to contract or
deal the sale of their invention called Fel-Tap Meter Guard and Detector to or though the
Corporation that they were then organizing under his direction and to fix and decide on the
purchase price of it to at least P200,000 in installments cash and P300,000 in shares of stock of
said Corporation . . ." and praying that applicant-inventor Maximo D. Tapinio be compelled to sign
a contract (Appendix I) and, together with the other applicant-inventor Dolorito M. Feliciano who
had already signed it, to acknowledge it and another contract (Appendix II) before a notary public,
to have both contracts recorded in the Patent Office and in the Office of the Register of Deeds,
and that the patent for the invention be issued in his name and in the name of the inventors.
The motion was denied on the ground that under the provisions of the Patent Law (R.A. No. 165.),
the Director of Patents has no jurisdiction or power to decide the question submitted to him.
Issue: Does the Director of Patents have power and authority to compel the applicant-inventors to
do what the appellant is asking them to perform?
Held: No. (1) Case involves contractual obligations.—"The alleged assignment is not of the
invention but it is an agreement whereby M is to act as selling agent for the inventors of the patent
(if granted) and of the invention covered thereby, and to receive compensation therefor.
Assignments of patents and inventions covered thereby may be recorded in books and records
kept for the purpose in the Patent Office if presented in due form; but the appellant does not ask
for the registration of the alleged agreement between him and the investors, because as it is not
in due form, it cannot be recorded, but prays that the Director of Patents compel applicant-inventor
T to sign the contract executed and signed by the other applicant-inventor F and both applicant-
inventors to acknowledge it and another document which by all indications refer to the minutes of
a meeting of the organizers of the Manufacturing Corporation before the notary public and then to
have both documents recorded in the Patent Office and in the office of the Register of Deeds."
(2) Jurisdiction pertains to the courts. — "Under the provisions of the Patent Law (Rep. Act No.
165.), the Director of Patents has no power and authority to compel the applicant-inventors to do
what the appellant is asking them to perform. What the appellant asked the Director of Patents to
do for him is essentially a judicial function which would require the determination or finding by a
court of competent jurisdiction as to whether there was a meeting of the minds between the
contracting parties. Aside from want of authority and power, the Director of Patents lacks the
means to make such determination and finding which would be necessary before he could act on
M's motion." (Feliciano v. Director of Patents, 93 Phil. 115[1953].)
Sangguniang Baranggay of Don Mariano Marcos vs. Martinez, G.R. no. 170626 March 3,
2008
PJ Navarro
DOCTRINE: The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) or Sangguniang Panglungsod (SP) cannot order
the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts (RTC) are
exclusively vested with this under Section 60 of the LGC.
Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found
guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the regional
trial court. The most extreme penalty that the Sanggunian may impose is suspension.
FACTS:
 December 2004 – Severino Martinez, Punong Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos
(Bayombong, Nueva Vizacaya) was administratively charged with Dishonesty, Misconduct in
Office and violation of the Anti-Graft and Practices Act by petitioner (Sanggunian Barangay)
through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan.
 Pursuant to Section 61 of the LGC, the SB is the disciplining authority over
elective barangay officials.
 Charges, among others (6 in all) were for failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay
Treasurer the income of their solid waste management project particularly the sale of
fertilizer and recyclable materials derived from composting and garbage collection. There
was also a charge for failure to liquidate his travelling expenses for the 2003 Lakbay-aral.
 Martinez failed to file an Answer, thus was declared by SB in default,
 July 2005 - the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed the penalty of
removal from office.
 August 2005 - The Decision was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor (Severino Bagasao) for
its implementation. Mayor issued a Memorandum, stating that SB is not empowered to order
Martinez’s removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and
must be executed by him.
 Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for TRO and Preliminary
Injunction before the trial court against SB and Mayor.
 TC - Order of SB null and void. The proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to
remove an elective local official from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local
Government Code.
Note: Although Martinez’s term as Punong Baranggay expired in 2007 and, thus, rendering this
petition moot and academic, the Court will nevertheless settle a legal question that is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
ISSUE/HELD: WON the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from
office. NO. SC affirmed RTC. PETITION DENIED.
RATIO:
1. Textual
Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove
elective local officials from office: “Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.—An
elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the
following grounds: …
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court.
2. Legislative Intent – Only RTC
During the deliberations of the Senate on the LGC, the legislative intent to confine to the
courts, i.e., RTCs, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases
involving the removal of elective local officials was evident.
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the
President is without any power to remove elected officials. Court invalidated Article 125, Rule
XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (which
provides that “An elective local official may be removed from office … by order of the proper
court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
other.
3. Ratio for making it an exclusive judicial prerogative
The Sanggunian Brgy contends that administrative cases involving elective barangay
officials may be filed with, heard and decided by the SP or SB concerned, which can,
 thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from office. It further claims that the courts are is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions
merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the SP or SB finds that a penalty of involved are essentially judicial.
removal is warranted.

This would counter the rationale for making the removal of elective officials an exclusive In this case, it is apparent that the SB acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
judicial prerogative. Order removing Martinez from office. Such act was patently illegal and, therefore, Martinez
Pablico v. Villapando: It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective was no longer required to avail himself of an administrative appeal in order to annul the said
local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. The law on suspension or Order of the Sangguniang Bayan. Thus, his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was
removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority justified.
in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good
faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people
through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to
naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority.

The rule is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority.
It must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public.
Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial tribunal, the court.
Furthermore, LGUs are not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials; rather,
they are prevented from imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal.

4. Courts not merely an implementing arm of SB

Argument of Sanggunian is an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers,
thus placing the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments. The
courts would be stripped of their power of review, and their discretion in imposing the extreme
penalty of removal from office is thus left to be exercised by political factions which stand to
benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official concerned, the very evil which
Congress sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code.

Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a trial
before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure
impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings. Elevating the removal of
an elective local official from office from an administrative case to a court case may be
justified by the fact that such removal not only punishes the official concerned but also, in
effect, deprives the electorate of the services of the official for whom they voted.

5. Power of the Sanggunian

As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for
the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the SP
or SB. However, the Sangguniang cannot order the removal of an erring
elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this
power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code.

Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature
and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should
be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a
penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme
penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the
erring elective barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the
official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed
in court.

6. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not inflexible

As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have
been exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the challenged administrative act