Assignment On Self-Incrimination

JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA UNIVERSITY
ASSIGNMENT
ON
CONSTITUTION
RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 1

PROJECT–PROFILE
RIGHT AGAINST
SELF
INCRIMINATION:
ARTICLE 20(3)
SUBMITTED TO – SUBMITTED BY –
Dr. MOHAMMAD ASAD MALIK AZEEM MIAN
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR B.A.LL.B(Regular)
JMI IV SEMESTER

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First and foremost, I would like to thank our subject teacher Dr. Mohammad Asad
Malik, for the valuable guidance and advice. He inspired us greatly to work on this
interesting assignment. His willingness to motivate us contributed tremendously to our
assignment. I also would like to thank him for showing us some sample assignments on how
to go about the research assignment. It gave me an opportunity to analyze and learn about the
operation of various Articles of Constitution of India relating to the topic. Besides, I would
like to thank the Faculty staff for providing us with a good environment and facilities for
completing this assignment. In addition, I would also like to thank my seniors who provided
me with the valuable information acting as a source of guidance in making the assignment.
Finally, an honorable mention goes to my family and friends for their understandings and
supports in completing this assignment. Without the help of the particulars mentioned above,
making of this assignment would not have been possible.
THANK YOU!

SYNOPSIS
 INTRODUCTION.
THE PILLARS OF ARTICLE 20(3)
STATUS OF PROVISION IN DIFFERNT

COUNTRIES
 U.S.A
 BRITAIN
 INDIA
 AUSTRALIA
 CANADA
 HONGKONG
 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 1948 ARTICLE 11(1)
WHOS IS ACCUSED
ACCUSED OF AN OFFENCE.

TYPE OF INCRIMINATION EVIDENCE

COVERED BY ARTICLE 20(3)
WHAT IS COMPULSION
PERSON ACCUSED OF AN OFFENCE
CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
SCIENTIFIC TEST – INVOLUNTARY
EXCEPTION
DNA TEST
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY UNDESIRABLE

MEANS
DOCUMENT WHICH IS POSSESSION BUT

NOT BASED ON PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE

SEARCH AND SEIZURES
CONFESSION MADE UNDER PROMISE

OF SECRECY ETC
TAPE- RECORDING OF STATEMENTS BY

THE ACCUSED.
CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION
"..throughout the web of English criminal law, one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is
the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt1"
The main provision regarding crime investigation and trial in the Indian Constitution is
Art.20(3). It deals with the privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege against `self-
incrimination is a fundamental canon of Common law criminal jurisprudence2. Art. 20(3)
which embody this privilege read, "No person accused of any offence shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself". No one is bound to criminate himself. Hence although an
accused person may of his own accord make a voluntary statement as to the charge against
himself, a justice, before receiving such statement from him is required to caution him that he
is not obliged to say anything and that what he does say may be given in evidence against
himself. Hence also arises the rule that evidence of a confession by the accused is not
admissible unless it is proved that such confession was free and voluntary3.
The privilege against self-incrimination thus enables the maintenance of human privacy in the
enforcement of criminal justice. It also goes with the maxim Nemo Tenetur Seipsum
Accusare4 i.e., ‘No man, not even the accused himself can be compelled to answer any
question, which may tend to prove him guilty of a crime, he has been accused of.’ If the
confession from the accused is derived from any physical or moral compulsion (be it under a
hypnotic state of mind) it should stand to be rejected by the court. The right against forced
self-incrimination, widely known as the Right to Silence is enshrined in the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) and the Indian Constitution. In the Cr.P.C. the legislature
has guarded a citizen’s right against self-incrimination. S.161(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure states that “every person is bound to answer truthfully all questions, put to
him by [a police] officer, other than questions the answers to which would have a
tendency to expose that person to a criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture”. But where
the accused makes a confession without any inducement, threat or promise art 20(3) does not
apply.
1
Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 is a famous House of Lords case in English law, where the presumption
of innocence was first articulated in the Commonwealth.By- Viscount Sankey
2
Criminal law jurisprudence prevails in “common law system”
3
The Law Lexicon, 2nd edition, 2006, justice Y.V.Chandrachud, pg- 1298
4
Black’s Law Dictionary,9th Edn.

THE PILLARS OF ARTICLE 20(3)

“The exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power.”5
The right against self-incrimination was afforded by the courts in consonance with the
principles of an adversarial system of jurisprudence. The mid-18th and mid-19th centuries’
criminal trials saw the origins of this privilege and other tools to the accused such as the
‘beyond-reasonable-doubt’ and ‘burden of proof on the prosecution’ doctrines which
equipped him with political liberties that could be used to defend himself in trial against the
State, in a way minimizing the relative disadvantage which the individual defendants would
face, as compared to the vast trial resources of the State.6 The rationale underlying the
judicial provision against testimonial compulsion was well recognized long before our
Constitution came into existence. The cornerstone of the protection against self-incrimination
is best stated by the Court in Saunders v. the United Kingdom.7 This case explained that the
right lies for the protection of the accused by the improper compulsion of the authorities,
thereby contributing to the avoidance of the miscarriages of justice.8 According to the author,
ethics and reliability are the two pillars of the right against self-incrimination. The ethical
rationale for voluntariness addresses the need to protect the accused from brutalization and
torture by investigation agencies; the rationale is that if involuntary statements were readily
given weight during the trial, the investigators would have a strong incentive to compel such
statements, often through methods involving coercion, threats, inducement or deception.9
Even if such involuntary statements are proved to be true, the law should not incentivize the
use of interrogation tactics that violate the dignity and bodily integrity of the person being
examined.10 This situation is considered as a violation of basic human rights of life and limb.
Hence, the right against self-incrimination serves as a vital safeguard against torture and other
‘third-degree methods’ that could be used to elicit information. It serves as a check on
5
Wigmore, EVIDENCE, 2264 (2nd edn, 1923) as cited in Fred Inbau, Self-Incrimination: what can a Accused
Person be compelled to do?, 28(2) JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 261, 264 (1937).
6
Gautam Swarup, Narco Analysis and Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India: Blending the Much Awaited,
(2009), available at: http://works.bepress.com/gautam_swarup/2 (Last visited on October 12, 2013)
7
Saunders v. United Kingdom, (1997) 23 EHRR 313.
8
Saunders v. United Kingdom, (1997) 23 EHRR 313 as cited in Mike Redmayne, Rethinking the Privilege
against
9
Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to remain silent, 94(8)
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 2625, 2627 (1995).
10
Smt. Selvi v. State of Karnataka, 2010 7 SCC 263 (Supreme Court of India).[“Selvi”]

police behavior during the course of the investigation. The exclusion of compelled testimony
is important or investigators will be more inclined to extract information through such
compulsion routinely rather than through the more difficult path of collecting independent
evidence.11 In the view of this researcher, another concern behind the right against self-
incrimination seems to be protecting a wholly or partially innocent person from making a
false statement under stress and thereby needlessly reinforcing the needle of suspicion upon
him or her. Similarly, for the guilty, the protection affords a shield from aggravating his or
her offense by misrepresentation or concealment of evidence. The accused is also shielded
from a reading of motives into what evidence he or she might give.
There were several contrary views among the makers of the Constitution, but it was
widely accepted by those who devoted serious thought to it, that the easy path of procuring
evidence, oral or documentary, by compulsion from an accused would do more harm than
good to the administration of justice; it was felt that existence of this path would tend to
discourage investigators or prosecution to indulge in a diligent search for reliable independent
evidence and also dissuade them to exercise care while sifting through available evidence for
the ascertainment of truth.12 If law permitted evidence to be obtained by coercion,
investigators would never take up the onus of partaking in the laborious investigation and
prolonged examination of other associated persons, material, and documents. It has been
rightly said that the absence of the privilege against self-incrimination would incentivize
those in charge of the enforcement of the law ‘to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red
pepper into the devil’s eye rather than go about in the sun hunting up evidence.’13
The privilege also serves the goal of reliability.14 When a person suspected or accused of
a crime is compelled to testify on his/ her own behalf through methods involving coercion,
threats or inducements during the investigative stage, there is a higher likelihood of such
testimony being false or distorted out of sheer despair, anxiety, and fear.15 Their mental status
may serve as an impetus to offer evidence in order to avoid the unpleasantness of the current
situation and complications that follow. Thus, involuntary statements from the accused may
amount to false testimony which is likely to mislead the judge and the prosecutor, thereby
11
Selvi, 2010 7 SCC 263
12
Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808 ¶ 34
13
James F. Stephen, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW, Vol. 1, 442, (1883) as cited in Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808.
14
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 US 433 (1974) as cited in Akhil Reed Amar and Renee B Lettow, Fifth Amendment
First Principles: the Self-Incrimination Clause, 93(5) MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 857, 895 (1995).
15
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 26(1) VALPARAISO
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 311, 318 (1991).

impeding and vitiating the process of trial, and potentially leading to a miscarriage of justice
with erroneous and unjust convictions. Even during the investigative stage, false statements
are likely to cause delays and obstructions in the investigative efforts. Therefore, the privilege
ensures that investigation agencies do not take the easy path of ‘involuntary confessions’ to
supplant the diligent route of meaningful investigations and that the reliability of the
testimony presented for trial is of a high order.

Status of Provision in Different

Countries16
 U.S.A. -
The fifth amendment of the U.S. constitution provides that :-
“No person shall be compelled in any criminal Case, to be a witness against himself”
By judicial Interpretation, the above provision has been given a very wide connotation. The
privilege against Self-Incrimination has been held to apply to witnesses as well as parties in
proceedings- criminal and civil. It covers documentary evidence and oral evidence, and
extends to all disclosures including answers which by themselves support a criminal
conviction or furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed for a conviction.
 BRITAIN-
It is a fundamental principle of the Common Law that a person accused of any offence shall
not be compelled to discover documents or objects which incriminate him. No witness,
whether party or stranger is, except in a few cases, compellable to answer any question or to
produce any document the tendency of which is to expose the witness (or the spouse of the
witness), to any criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture.
The privilege is based on the policy of encouraging persons to come forward with evidence in
courts of justice, protecting them, as far as possible, from injury, or needless annoyance, in
consequence of doing so.
 INDIA-
The privilege against self incrimination is a fundamental canon of common law criminal
jurisprudence .The characteristics features of this principle are-
 That the accused is presumed to be innocent
 That it is for the prosecution to establish his guilt, and
16
M.P.Jain’s Indian Constitutional Law,fifth Edn..,Wadhwa Nagpur,Reprint,2007

 That the accused need not make any statement against his will.
These propositions emanate from an apprehension that if compulsory examination of an

accused were to be permitted then forced and torture may be used against him to entrap him
into fatal contradiction. The privilege against self-incrimination thus enables the maintenance
of human privacy and observance of civilized standards in the enforcement of criminal
justice.
Article 20(3) which embodies this privilege reads “No person accused of any offence shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself”
On the analysis, this provision will be found to contain the following component:
(1) It is a right available to a person ‘accused of an offence’
(2) It is a protection against ‘compulsion’ ‘to be a witness’
(3) It is a protection against such ‘compulsion’ resulting in his giving evidence ‘against
himself’
All the three ingredients must necessarily co-exist before the protection of Article 20(3) can
be claimed. If any of these ingredients is missing, Article 20(3) cannot be invoked.
 AUSTRALIA-
Australia has no constitutional protection for the right to silence, but it is broadly recognized
by State and Federal Crimes Acts and Codes and is regarded by the courts as an important
common law right. In general, criminal suspects in Australia have the right to refuse to
answer questions posed to them by police before trial and to refuse to give evidence at trial.
 CANADA-
The right to silence is protected under section 7 and section 11(c) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. The accused may not be compelled as a witness against himself in
criminal proceedings, and therefore only voluntary statements made to police are admissible
as evidence.
 HONG KONG-
The right to silence is protected according to common law

 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS –
The concept of right to silence is not specifically mentioned in the European Convention on
Human Rights but the European Court of Human Rights has held that the right to remain
silent under police questioning and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally
recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure
under Article 6.
 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, 1948. ART. 11.1 –
“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to the law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary
for his defense.

WHO IS ACCUSED?
The expression “accused person” connotes a person against whom evidence is sought to be
led in a criminal proceeding. Thus an accused is a person whom an allegation has been made
that he has committed an offence or who is charged with an offence. It does not predicate a
condition of that person at the time of making the statement.
The expression “accused person” in section 24 of the Evidence Act includes a person who
subsequently becomes an accused, and that he need not have been accused of an offence
when he made the confession in question17.
The protection of Article 20 (3) of the constitution becomes available to a person as soon as
he is named as an accused either in an FIR made under section 154, of Cr.P.C or in complaint
institute against him court.18
The protection given under Article 20(3) is in the nature of privilege to be exercised by a
person accused of any offence. Accused includes a suspect or a person against whom there is
some oral or circumstantial evidence pointing towards guilt. Thus as per Constitutional
mandate, when a person is interrogated and during interrogation he perceives that he is being
suspected for commission of some offence or when he is treated as an accused or suspect by
the interrogating agency, he should have liberty to claim the privilege granted to him under
Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
The right to silence is also mentioned under Article 14 (g) of the ICCPR. Enjoins a person to
answer truthfully the questions put to him by investigation officers, this constitutional
provision gives protection against self-incrimination.
The right to silence has been interpreted as essential features of a fair trial within the meaning
of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
17
State of U. P v. Deoman upadhyaya AIR 1960 SC 1125
18
Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneek Phiroz Mistry AIR 1961 SC29

ACCUSED OF AN OFFENCE
The privilege under this clause is only available to an accused i.e., a person against whom a
formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which in the
normal course may result in the prosecution. It is however not necessary, to avail the
privilege, that the actual trial or inquiry should have commenced before the court or tribunal.
Thus a person against whom the FIR has been recorded by the police and investigation
ordered by the Magistrate can claim the benefit of the protection.
Even if his name is not mentioned in the FIR as an accused, it will not take him out of the
category. In America, the right against self-incrimination is not only available to accused but
also to the witness. But not under Indian laws.
But in Nandini satpathey Vs. P.L. Dani19 It was subsequently held that, the right extends to
witness and accused alike, that the expression 'accused of any offence’, must mean formally
accused in “praesenti not in future”, that it applies at every stage at which furnishing of
information and collection of materials takes place, that the privilege extends not only to the
deployment of the information obtained as evidence in a criminal prosecution but to the
extraction of the information itself.
In Narayan Lal v. Maneek S. Mistry20 it must appear that a formal accusation has been made
against the party pleading the guarantee and that it relates to the commission of an offence
which in the normal course result in persecution. To claim the protection of Article-20(3) the
person must be an accused person either before or at a time when he is compelled to give
evidence against himself and thus, a person cannot claim the protection of Article 20(3).
19
AIR 1978 SC 1025
20
AIR 1961 SC 29

Type of incriminating evidence covered by

article 20(3)
The privilege applies to ‘testimonial compulsion’. It no doubt covers oral testimony by an

accused. But judicial opinion has fluctuated on the question whether article 20(3) covers
something more besides oral evidence.
In M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra21, the supreme court taking a broad view of article 20(3)
stated that to limit article 20(3) the oral evidence of a person standing trial of an offence is
“to confine the content of the constitutional guarantee to eat barely literal import”; and
so to limit article 20(3) would be to rob the guarantee of it substantial purpose and to miss the
substance.
A person can be a witness not merely by giving oral evidence but also by producing
documents are making intelligible gestures as in the case of a dumb witness. The phrase “to
be a witness” in article 20(3), the Court ruled, meant nothing more than to furnish evidence
and this could be done through lips, or by the production of a thing or a document, or in any
other mode. Every positive volitional act which furnishes evidence is testimony, and
testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which procures the positive volitional evidentiary
act of the person as opposed to the negative attitude of silence or submission on his part.
The Supreme Court ruling in Sharma v. Satish, thus gave a broad import to article 20(3) as it
was held to cover not only the oral testimony or statements in writing of the accused but also
the production of a thing or of evidence by other modes.
The Supreme Court reconsidered the matter in the State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu oghad22 a
bench of 11 judges was constituted to consider the issue involved.
21
AIR 1954 SC 300 : 1954 SCR 1077
22
AIR 1961 SC 1808 : (1962) 3 SCR 10.

The main question involved was whether article 20(3) is violated when the accused is
directed to give his specimen handwriting, or signature or the impression of his Palms and
fingers.
The answer to this question depended on the interpretation of the word “to be a witness”
found in article 20(3).
The court now ruled that article 20(3) is not violated in any of the above situations. The court
is stated that “self-incrimination must mean conveying information based upon the
personal knowledge of the person giving information” and covers only “personal
testimony which must depend upon his volition.” the court stated in oghad:
“ ‘to be a witness’ may be equivalent to ‘furnishing evidence’ in the sense of making oral
or written statement, but not in the larger sense of the expression so as to include giving of
thumb impression or impression of palm or foot or fingers or specimen writing or exposing
a part of the body by an accused person for purpose of identification.”
The court emphasized that it is as much necessary to protect an accused person against being
compelled to incriminate himself, as to arm the Agents of law and the Law Courts with
legitimate powers of bringing the offender to justice. The courts stated regarding the
production of documents in the possession of the accused, that “if it is a document which is
not his statement conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him,
he may be called upon by the court to produce that document.”
Several types of evidence excluded from the purview of article 20(3). This is done with a
view to drawing a balance between the exigencies of investigation of crimes and the need to
safeguard the individual from being subjected to third-degree methods.
The court has reiterated that the prohibition in article 20(3) cover oral testimony given by a
person accused of an offence both in and out of the court, as well as the written statements by
him having a bearing on the controversy with reference to the charges against him.
But article 20(3) would not include signature, thumb impression, impression of the palm or
put or fingers, or specimen of handwriting, or exposing parts of his body by an accused for

purpose of identification, although “it main amount of furnishing evidence in the largest
sense, is not included within the expression to be witness”.23
Thus, article 20(3) is not violated by compelling a witness to stand up and show his face for
the purpose of identification. He can also be ordered to disclose any tell-tale scar on his body
for the purpose of identification.24
The accused may have documentary evidence in his possession which made throw some light
on the controversy, if it is a document which is not his statement conveying his personal
knowledge relating to the charge against him, he may be called upon by the court to produce
the same. On this the point, the court stated in oghad: The accused person may be in
possession of a document which is in his handwriting or which contain his Signature or his
thumb impression. The production of such a document, with a view to a comparison of the
writing or the signature or the impression, “is not the statement of an accused person,
which can be said to be of the nature of a personal testimony”. The court observed
further:
“ When an accused person is called upon by the court or any other authority holding an
investigation to give his finger impression or Signature or a specimen of his handwriting, he
is not giving any testimony of the nature of a ‘personal testimony’. The giving offer ‘personal
testimony’ must depend upon his volition. He can make any kind of statement Omi refuse to
make any statement. But his finger impression or his handwriting in spite of effort at
concealing the true nature of it dissimulation cannot change their intrinsic character. Thus,
the giving of a finger impression or of a specimen writing or of signatures by an accused
person, though it may amount of furnishing evidence in the largest sense, is not included
within the expression ‘to be a witness’.25
Article 20(3) is directed against self-incrimination buy an accused. Self-incrimination must

mean conveying information based upon the personal knowledge of the person giving the
information and cannot include merely the mechanical process of producing documents in
23
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Boota singh, AIR 1978 SC 1770 : (1979) 1 SCC 31
24
Akhar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1978 Punj 194, 298
25
AIR 1961 SC At 1815 : (1962) 3 SCR 10

court which may throw light on any point in controversy, but which do not contain any
statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge.
Section 73, Evidence Act, authorizes a Court trying a criminal case, in the interest of the
justice, to direct the accused person appearing before it to give his sample writing for
comparison. In the interest of Justice, the court can direct an accused person appearing before
it, to give his sample writing to enable the same to be compared by a handwriting expert
approved by the court, with any disputed writing by the accused.26
Section 94(1), Cr.P.C. of the old code, or section 91 of the new code, authorizes a court or
an officer in charge of a police station to issue a written order of the person having possession
of the document to produce the same. The Supreme Court held by a majority in the State of
Gujarat vs Shyamlal Mohanlal Choksi27 that under this provision, an accused person cannot
be asked to produce documents in his possession.
One of the considerations before the court to reach this conclusion was that under the Kalu
Oghad ruling, an accused person cannot be compelled to disclose documents which are
incriminatory and based on his knowledge. But the language of section 94 being general, any
document cannot be called under it. “If section 94 is construed to include an accused
person, some unfortunate consequences could follow.”
In the instant, case, the respondent, a money lender, was prosecuted under the money lenders
act for not keeping proper accounts. The prosecutor applied to the magistrate to direct the
accused to produce the accounts but the court refused to do so keeping in view article 20(3).
Ultimately, the matter came before the Supreme Court by way of appeal from the High Court
and Supreme Court agreed with the magistrates ruling holding that section 94, Cr.P.C. does
not cover an accused person.
26
State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram, AIR 1979 SC 14 : (1979) 2 SCC 158
27
AIR 1965 SC 1251 : (1965) 2 SCR 457

Article 20(3) is not violated when an accused is compelled to stand up and show his face for
the purpose of identification, for it does not amount to giving of testimony as for the physical
facts which are noticed speak for themselves.28
When the accused was taken to the doctor for medical examination to determine whether he
was intoxicated or not, and the doctor recorded his observations of the physical features and
other symptoms exhibited by the accused, and he was not compelled to give any evidence,
the high court held that the symptoms observed by the doctor could not be regarded as
evidence obtained from the accused by comparison.29
The compulsory taking of urine and blood samples from an accused is not hit by Article 20(3)
as it is not testimonial compulsion.30
During the course of Investigation of a crime by the police, if an accused person work to
point out the place where the corpus delicit was lying concealed, and in pursuance of search
information the discovery was made within the meaning of section 27 of the Evidence Act,
search information and the discovery made as a result thereof may be proved in evidence
even though it may tend to incriminate the person giving the information while in a police
custody, unless compulsion has been used in obtaining the information.
Section 27 of the evidence act has been held to fall outside the prohibition of article 20(3).31
Unless compulsion has been used in obtaining the information. If the self-incriminatory
information has been given buy inactive person without any threat that will be admissible in
evidence and will not be hit by article 20(3).32
Admission of tape-recorded evidence against the accused does not violate article 20(3) when
the conversation on his part was voluntary and there was no compulsion the fact that the
attaching of the tape recording instrument was unknown to the accused would not render the
evidence of conversation inadmissible. The accused person’s conversation is not extracted
under duress or compulsion. Recording of the conversation on tape was “a Mechanical
contrivance to play the role of an eavesdropper.”33
28
Pakhar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 Punj 204
29
In Re Palani Goundan, AIR 1957 Mad 546
30
Subbaya Gounder v. Bhoopala, AIR 1959 Mad 396
31
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, supra, note 61, at 1815
32
Ibid; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhaya, AIR 1960 SC 1125 : (1961) 1 SCR 14; Md Dastagir v.
State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 756 : (1960) 3 SCR 116
33
R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157, 163-164 : (1973) 1 SCC 471

WHAT IS COMPULSION
In order to bring the evidence within the inhibition of Article 20(3), it must be shown that
not only the person making the statement was an accused at the time of making the
statement34 and that it had a material bearing on the criminality of the maker of the statement,
but also that he was compelled to make the statement.
‘Compulsion’ is duress; compulsion has to be a physical objective act and not the state of
mind of the person making the statement, except where the mind has been so conditioned by
some extraneous process as to render the making of the statement involuntary and, therefore,
extorted. The mere asking by the police officer investigating a crime against a certain
individual to do a certain thing is not compulsion within the meaning of Article 20 (3).
The mere fact that the accused was in police custody at the time he made the statement would
not, by itself, be the foundation for the inference of law that the accused was compelled to be
a witness against himself merely because he made a statement while in police custody
without anything more. As a proposition of law, the mere fact of being in police custody at
the time of making the statement does not by itself lead to the inference that the accused has
been compelled to make the statement.35 However, if the police obtain the statement by
employing a third-degree method, the statement would be barred under Art.20(3).36
The accuse may, however, show that while he was in police custody at the relevant time, he
was subjected to treatment which amounted to compulsion. In other words, it will be a
portion of fact in each case to be determined by the court on weighing the facts and
circumstances disclosed in the evidence before it.37
Compulsion may take many forms; an accused may be subjected to physical or mental
torture; he may be starved or beaten and the confession extorted from him.
34
See, infra, (f) on “Person accused of an offence”.
35
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, supra; Pershadi v. State of Uttar Pradesh,AIR 1957 SC 211 1957 Cri
LJ 328
36
Ghazi v. State of U.P. AIR 1966 AII 142
37
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, Supra, at 1816
Also, R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Aministration, AIR 1962 SC 1812 : (1963) 1 SCR 253

In Nandini Satpathy,38 IYER, J., advocated an expensive interpretation of the phrase

‘compelled testimony’. According to him, it is evidence procured “not merely by physical
threat or violence” but also “by psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, and
environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory
methods, and the like”. Any mode of pressure, “subtle or crude, mental or physical direct
or indirect, but sufficiently substantial”, applied by the police to obtain information from
an accused strongly suggestive of guilt becomes a compulsion. However, legal Perils
following up on refusal to answer, or answer truthfully, do not amount to compulsion with an
Article 20(3). But “frequent threats eprosecution if there is a failure to answer me takes
on the complexion of undue pressure” violating Article 20(3).
When a trap is laid and the accused talks, then there is no element of duress, coercion or
compulsion, and he cannot claim the protection of article20(3) in such a situation.39
Telephonic conversation between two parties was tape recorder by the police with the
permission of one of the parties. The Supreme Court ruled in R.M. Malkani v. the State of
Maharashtra,40 that the conversation could be used in evidence as it was voluntary and there
was no duress or compulsion to extract the same. The the fact that the tape recording
instrument was attached without the appellant’s knowledge does not make the conversation
inadmissible against him. Further, there was no case against him at the time of the
conversation so there was no scope for holding that he was made to incriminate himself.
Art 20(3) is not violated when the accused volunteers evidence against him. Since the
article gives only a privilege, the accused may waive it if he so likes.41
There are, however, a number of safeguards in Indian law subject to which oral evidence of
the accused can be recorded by the police so that chances of police so that chances of police
exerting duress or compulsion against the accused may be minimized.
Till 1955, in India, an accused was not a competent witness and could not testify on his
behalf even if he wanted to do so. S 342A added to the Criminal Procedure Code in 1955
38
Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025 : (1978) 2 SCC 424.
39
Yusufalli v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 147 : (1967) 3 SCR 720.
40
AIR 1973 SC 157 : (1973) 1 SCC 471
41
Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 sc 938 : (1968) 2 SCR 624

permits the accused to offer himself as a witness. It, however, lays down that the accused’s
failure to give evidence is not to be the subject of any comment by any party or the court, or
is not to give to any presumption against him. No adverse inference can thus be drawn from
the failure of the accused to testify.42
Under S. 26 of the Evidence Act, no confession made by a person while in police custody is
to be proved against him unless it has been made in the immediate presence of a magistrate.
A confession by an accused is recorded under S. 164, Cr.PC., but he later retracts it in the
magistrate’s court. Can the confession used against him at the sessions trial? Does Art.
20(3) bar the use of a retracted confession against the accused? The supreme court has
ruled that the confession has to be voluntary; a confession made under threat, inducement or
compulsion is inadmissible. Art. 20(3) would not apply if the confession is made otherwise
than under threat, promise or inducement. A retracted confession has little probative value
but is not inadmissible under art20 (3).43
In Mohd Dastgir v. State of Madras,44 The accused went to the house of the police officer
and offered him some currency notes as a bribe which he threw at the face of the accused.
Shortly, thereafter, the officer asked the accused to produce the currency notes which he did.
The accused was then tried for the offence of offering a bribe. It was argued on behalf of the
accused that he was compelled to produce the envelope containing the currency notes and
there was thus a violation of Article 20(3).
The supreme court rejected the contention. The court argued that before Article 20(3) could
come into play, two facts must be established, viz:
(1) That the individual concerned was a person accused of an offence; and
(2) That he was compelled to be a witness against himself
The requirement of Art.20(3) would not be fulfilled if only one of these facts and not the
other is established. The supreme court held in the instant case that the accused could not
claim the benefit of Art20(3) as he was not compelled by the officer to produce the currency
notes. Although the accused was asked to produce the money, it was within his power to
refuse to comply with the officer’s request.
42
T.G. Gaokar v. R.N. Shukla , AIR 1968 SC 1050 1968) 3 SCR 422
43
Kalawati v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 131 : 1953 SCR 546
44
AIR 1960 SC 756 : (1960) 3 SCR 116

Privilege against self-incrimination has not been applied in India to searches and seizures, or
seizure of document under a search warrant. A search of the premises in possession of a
person accused of an offence, under a search warrant, and seizure of documents, under the
provision of Ss. 94 and 95, Cr.P.C. (old), or S. 94, Cr.P.C. (new), is not a compelled
production within the meaning of the Article 20(3) and, hence, would not offend that
constitutional provision. The reason is that a search warrant is issued to a police officer and
so search and seizures cannot be regarded as the acts of the occupier of the premises in
question; they are the acts of another to which the occupier is obliged to submit and are,
therefore, not his testimonial acts in any sense.45
The Supreme Court has reiterated this view in V.S. Kuttan Pillai v. Ramakrishnan.46
Document found on the premises can be seized irrespective of the fact that they contain some
statements made by the accused upon his personal knowledge and which, when proved, may
have the tendency to incriminate him.
The immunity against self-incrimination extends to incriminating evidence which the accused
may be compelled to give, but not to such situation where incriminating evidence is being
collected without in any manner compelling the accused, or asking him to be a party to the
collection thereof. Search and seizure under a search warrant do not have even the remotest
tendency to compel the accused to incriminate himself. “A passive submission to search
cannot be styled as a compulsion on the accused and if anything is recovered during
such search which may provide incriminating evidence against the accused it cannot be
styled as a compelled testimony.”
S. 342, Cr.P.C., 1898, or S. 313, Cr.P.C., 1973, permits the courts to question the accused
generally after witnesses for him have been examined. The court may draw such inference
from his refusal or answers as it thinks just. The section does not contravene Article 20(3)
because the answer by the accused can only be taken in consideration at the inquiry and they
are not in substitution of the evidence by the prosecution which must make out its case by
evidence. The object of the section is not to build up a case against the accused from his
answer or non-answer but to test by explanation furnished by him, the truth of the prosecution
version.
45
M.P. Sharma v. Satish, AIR 1954 SC 300, 306 : 1954 SCR 1077
46
AIR 1980 SC 185 : (1980) 1 SCC 264

When the answers given by the accused satisfactorily explain the prosecution evidence, there
could be no conviction: if they do not rebut the prosecution evidence, he would be convicted.
The accused is not in the position of a witness as he does not testify on oath. His statement is
not evidence but only a matter which the court can take into consideration, and is not covered
by Article 20(3) which applies to evidence and not to a matter. This may, however, be to
narrow a view to take of the constitutional provision which does not use any words to confine
its operation only to evidence in the strict sense. The guarantee is against ‘testimonial
compulsion’ which does not appear to be restricted to evidence only.47
Somewhat in line with S. 342, Cr.P.C., 1898 (s. 313, Cr.P.C. 1973), is S. 124 of the bombay
police act which states that whoever has in his possession anything which there is reason to
believe is stolen property, shall, if he fails to account for such possession, on conviction, be
imprisoned for certain period. The provision has been held no to contravene Article. 20(3)
because the accused is to account for his possession only after the prosecution has proved that
there is a reason to believe that property in his possession is stolen property.48
A Punjab ordinance provided that on prima facie cause being shown that a person has
obtained through some criminal offences some property, the district judge could issue an
interim attachment order with regard to the property, and at the same time issue a notice to
the person concerned to show cause as to why the interim order should not be made absolute.
The provision was held not to contravene Article 20(3) on the ground that the accused was
not compelled to be witness against himself, since presumably his answer to the notice must
be that he was innocent and there could be no objection to his getting on record as early as
possible his reasons for saying no.49
Criminal prosecution of the appellant for several offences was imminent. On the same facts,
the collector of customs initiated proceedings against him under the Customs Act. It was
argued that this violated Article 20(3) as the appellant would be forced to give evidence and
thus incriminate himself. Rejecting the arguement, the Supreme Court said: “he may, if he
chooses, not appear as a witness in the proceedings” under the customs act. “The
necessity to enter the witness box for substantiating his defence is not such a compulsion
as would attract the prosecution of Article 20(3).”
47
In Re Ramamkrishna, AIR 1955 Mad 100; Banwarilal v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 ALL 341 ; In Re Vinda
Reddy, AIR 1958 Mys 150
48
State of Maharashtra v. Fundan Lakhanmal, AIR 1960 Bom 377.
49
G.L. Salwan v. Union of India, AIR 1960 Punj 351.

It may be very necessary for the accused to enter the witness-box for substantiating his
defence, but this is no reason for saying the criminal trial compel him to be a witness against
himself in violation of Article 20(3). “Compulsion in the context of Article 20(3) must
proceed from another person or authority. The appellant is not compelled to be a
witness if he voluntarily gives evidence in his defence.” In the instant case, the customs
authorities gave an undertaking not to use in criminal proceedings any statements which may
be made by the appellant during the adjudication proceedings.50 S. 132, Evidence Act, could
also be invoked to protect him.51
The protection of Article 20(3) is against the accused to incriminate himself under
compulsion. This does not mean that he need not give information regarding matters which
do not tend to incriminate him.52 Self-incrimination testimony falling within the prohibition
of Article 20(3) is to be of such a character that by itself it should have the tendency of
incriminating the accused, if not also of actually doing so. “In other words, it should be a
statement which makes the case against the accused person at least probable considered
by itself.”53
Criminal proceedings were launched against the father for kidnapping his child from the
lawful custody of the child’s mother. Later, a habeas corpus petition was filed by the mother
in which he was directed to produce the child in court which he did not. He stated that as he
was protected by Article 20(3), he need not divulge his defence in the criminal case. He was
condemned to imprisonment for two months for contempt of court. The court observed that a
criminal prosecution is not a fortress against all other actions in law.54
Under S.15 of the TADA Act [The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (prevention) Act,
1987], confession made by the accused was made admissible in evidence. The Supreme
Court ruled in Ayub v. State of Uttar Pradesh55 that under Art. 20(3), the accused person has
a protection from being compelled to be a witness against himself. Therefore, the confession
made under S.15, TADA Act, must be strictly according to the procedure laid down in the act
for recording confession. The confession should appear to have been made voluntarily and
the police officer who records the confession should satisfy himself that the same was being
50
T.G. Gaokar v. R.N. Shukla, AIR 1968 SC 1050 : (1968) 3 SCR 422
51
Maniklal Soni v. Union of India, 1984 Cr LJ 1359.
52
R.B. Shah v. D.K. Guha, AIR 1973 SC 1196 : (1973) 1 SCC 696
53
State of Bombay v.Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808 : ( 1962) 3 SCR 10.
54
DushyantSomal v. Sushma Somal, AIR 1981 SC 1027 : (1981) 2 SCC 277
55
(2002) 3 SCC 510

made voluntarily by the maker of that statement. The recorded confession must indicate that
these safeguards had been fully complied with.
PERSON ACCUSED OF AN OFFENCE
The privilege under Article 20(3) is available not only to an individual, but even to an
incorporated body, if “accused of an offence”.
In order to avail of the protection of Article 20(3) against self-incrimination, a condition to be

fulfilled is that the person claiming the protection should be one “accused of an offence” at
the time he makes the statement. Article 20(3) does not apply if the person is not an accused
at the time he makes the statement but becomes an accused by the time when later the
statement made by him is sought to be proved. This means a person against whom a formal
accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled and although the actual
trial may not have commenced as yet, but which in normal course may result in his
prosecution.
The Supreme Court has stated in Raja Narayanla:56 “For invoking the constitutional right
against testimonial compulsion guaranteed under Art.20(3), it must appear that a
formal accusation has been made against the party pleading the guarantee and that it
relates to the commission of an offence which in the normal course may result in
prosecution.” When, therefore, a person claims the benefit of the privilege, the question has
to be asked whether he has been accused of any offence. A person cannot claim privilege if at
the time he made the statement he was not an accused but became an accused thereafter.57
What constitutes a formal accusation is rather flexible. To answer the question whether a
person is accused or not at a particular time, it is necessary to make a reference to the nature
and scope of the proceedings, the nature of the accusation and its probable consequence.58
Accusing a person of committing a crime in the first information report, or in the formal
complaint before a magistrate, amount to a formal accusation and the person concerned can
56
Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Firoz Mistry, AIR 1961 SC 29 : (1961) 1 SCR 417
57
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808 : (1962) 3 SCR 10 ; Md. Dastgir v. State of
Madras, AIR 1960 SC 756 : (1960) 3 SCR 116
58
Sharma v. Satish, supra note 60

claim the privileges. As the Supreme Court has observed in Guha:59 “It is well settled that
the lodging of a first information report a person is accused of an offence within the
meanng of Article 20(3).”
Accusation can also be made in any other formal document or notice served on that person
which ordinarily results in his prosecution in court.60 Therefore, statement made by a person
to the police when he did not stand in the character of a person accused of n offence were not
protected by Article 20(3). It is not enough that he should become an accused any time after
he has made a statement. When a person was arrested under S.6 of the Railway Property
(unlawful possession) Act, 1966, but no formal accusation was made against him at the time
his statement was recorded, Art 20(3) would not apply.61
The privilege in Article 20(3) is undoubtedly available at the trial stage in the court room.62
But it is available even at the pre-trial stage, i.e., during the course of a police investigation if
the person concerned can be regarded as an accused.
In Sharma v. Satish63, The Supreme Court has pointed out that there is no reason to think
that the protection of Article 20(3) is confined to what transpires at the trial in a courtroom.
The phrase used in Article 20(3) is “to be a witness” and not to “appear as a witness.” “It
follows that the protection afforded to an accused in so far as it is related to the phrase
‘to be a witness’ is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the courtroom but
may well extend to the compelled testimony previously obtained from him. It is
available therefore to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the
commission o an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in
prosecution.”
In Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani,64 Nandini Satpathy was directed to appear at the police
station for being examined in connection with a case registered against her under the
Prevention of Corruption Act. On the basis of the first information report, the investigation
was commenced against her and she was interrogated by the police with reference to a long
sting of questions, but she refused to answer, claiming the protection of Article 20(3)
59
R.B. Shah v. D.K. Guha, AIR 1973 SC 119 : (1973) 1 SCC 696
60
Balkishanv. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 379 : (1980) 4 SCC 600
61
Amin v. State of U.P. AIR 1958 ALL 293
62
Kathi Kalu Oghad, supra, note 3
63
AIR 1954 SC 300: 1954 SCR 1677
64
AIR 1978 SC 1025 : ( 1978) 2 SCC 424

The Supreme Court held that S. 160(1), Cr.P.C., which bars calling of women to a police
station, was breached in this case. But the court took opportunity to dilate at length on the
scope of Article 20(3). K. IYER, J., delivering the court’s decision considered the question
whether Article 20(3) applies only to a person “accused”, or also to a ‘suspect’, who is not
formally accused, when the police is holding an investigation against him. The case-law
hitherto, viz., Oghad and Maneck Pheroze had held that a suspect was not an accused and
so Article 20(3) would not apply to him. But KRISHNA IYER, J., in Nandini expressed a
different opinion on this issue. He ruled that Article 20(3) ought to extend to police
investigation also since inquiries under criminal statutes with the quasi-criminal
investigation are of an accusatory nature and are sure to end in prosecution if the offence id
grave and evidence gathered is good. To deny the protection of Article 20(3) to suspect
because the inquiry is preliminary and may possibly not reach the court is to erode the
substance. Art 20(3) is not confined merely to a court trial. It extends to “any compulsory
process for the production of evidentiary documents which are reasonably likely to
support a production against him. Not only compelled testimony previously obtained is
executed but “the preventive blow falls also on pre-court testimonial compulsion.”
The learned judge also ruled that the ban on self-accusation and the right to silence, while
investigation or trial is underway, goes beyond that case and protects the accused in regard to
other offence pending or imminent. “He is entitled to keep his mouth shut if the answer
sought has a reasonable prospect of exposing him to guilt in some other accusation
actual or imminent, even though the investigation underway is not with reference to
that.”65 Further, the judge held that the police must invariably warn, and record the facts,
“about the right to silence against self-incrimination; and where the accused is literate
take his written statement,” the court has also stated that the police must inform the accused
that he has a right to call a lawyer before answering to any of their questions.
But this liberal view of Article 20(3), expressed by KRISHNA IYER, J., in Nandini
Satpathy is nothing more than an obiter for the judge himself says in this regard: “we are
not directly concerned with this facet of Article 20 (3); nor are we free to go against the
settled view of this court. There it is”.
The fact remains that use of third-degree methods are common in India during custodial
interrogation by the police so much so that custodial deaths are not mine. The law
65
Ibid., 1046

commission has also referred to this aspect of the criminal justice system in India in its paper
on “custodial crimes”. To mitigate this evil, the view expressed by K. IYER, J., in Nandini
can be very useful. However, in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,66 the Supreme Court has
accepted KRISHNA IYER J’s, opinion in Nandini. It has been pointed out that there is a lot
of custodial violence and abuse of police power in India.
The court has pointed out that a distance balance needs to be drawn to protect the innocent
from conviction and the need for the society to ensure that the offence is punished. Everyone
has a right against self-incrimination and a right to be silent under Article 20(3) which
implies his freedom from police or anybody else. The Supreme Court has thus observed in
Kartar Singh:67
“ the acts of the person, of course, is neither negative attitude of silence or submission
on his part, nor is there any reason to think the prosecution in respect of the evidence
procured is confined to what transpired at the trial in the courtroom. The phrase used in
Article 20(3) is to be a witness and not to appear as a witness. It follows that the protection
accorded to an accused insofar as it is related to the phrase ‘to be a witness’ is not merely
in respect of the testimonial compulsion in the courtroom but may well extend to compelled
testimony previously obtained from him.”
In Delhi judicial service association v. State of Gujarat,68 the Supreme Court has ruled that
mere issue of a notice of contempt of court to a person for the pendency of contempt of court
proceedings against him, does not attract Article 20(3) because the contemner against whom
the notice is issued is not accused of an offence. Contempt proceeding is sui generis, it has
several peculiar features which are not to be found in criminal proceedings. As for instance, a
criminal offence is tried according to the procedure laid down in the criminal procedures
code, but a contempt charge is tried on summary process without any fixed procedure and the
courts free to evolve its own procedure consistent with fairplay and natural justice. The
power to make proceedings for contempt code does not apply to such a proceeding.69
Proceeding for contempt of court are of peculiar nature. Proceeding for contempt of court are
not taken in the exercise of original criminal jurisdiction. In certain aspects, these
proceedings are quasi-criminal but in any view taken are not exercised as part of the original
66
(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 Cri LJ 3139 (SC)
67
ibid
68
AIR 1991 SC 2176, at 2190
69
See, chs IV, Sec. C(i) and VIII, Sec. C(i), supra, on contempt of the supreme court and the high courts.

criminal jurisdiction o the court. A contemptner is not in the position of an accused. He does
not stand in the position of a “person accused of an offence” merely on account of issue of
notice of comtempt by the supreme court and, therefore, Article 20(3) would not apply in
such a situation.

CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
The protection under Article 20(3) is available only in criminal proceeding or proceedings
of criminal nature before a court of law or other tribunal before which a person may be
accused of an offence as defined in section3(38) of the General Clauses Act, that is , an act
punishnable under the Penal Code or a special or local law.
The protection of Article20(3) does not therefore extend to parties and witnesses in civil
proceedings or proceedings other than criminal.70
70
Shyam Sunder Chowkhani v. Kajal Kanti Biswas, AIR 1999 Gauh 101

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Article 20(3) is not applicable to administrative investigations even though the primary aim
of these proceedings may be to finds out whether the individual has committed an offence or
not.
Under section 45G of the Banking Companies Act, after an order for the winding up of a
banking company has been made, the official liquidator has to submit a report whether in his
opinion any loss has been caused to the company by any act or omission of the directors,
amounting to fraud. After considering the report, the High Court may publicly examine he
directors, promoters, auditors, etc. Of the company regarding their conduct and dealings in
relation to the affairs of the company.
In Augusthi,71 the appellant was ordered to appear before the court for examination under
section 45G. He challenges section 45G as unconstitutional vis-a-vis Article 20(3), but the
Supreme Court upheld the same. The Supreme Court conceded that under section 45G, a
person could be compelled to answer incriminating questions put to him by the High Court,
and subsequently even charges might be levelled against the directors, nevertheless, the
privilege against self-incriminating would not apply as there was no formal accusation
against the directors at that stage.
The object of the inquiry thereunder is to collect evidence and decide whether any acts or
omissions have caused loss to the company. If as a result of the inquiry, the court comes to
the conclusion that acts or omission did cause loss to the company, then some action might be
taken against the persons examined. Thus, an accusation may or may not follow the enquiry,
but there is no accusation at the time of the inquiry. The accusation of an offence is a
condition precedent for the application of Article 20(3) and this essential condition is lacking
in cases covered by S. 45G of the Banking Companies Act because the persons called for
public examination under section 45G are not accused of any offence.
Article 20(3) is not violated even when the liquidator accuses the director of fraud in his
report, and thereupon the court decided to hold the enquiry under S.45G, as the official
71
K.Joseph Augusthi v. Narayanan, AIR 1964 SC 1552 : (1964) 7 SCR 137

liquidator’s report does not amount to an accusation within meaning Article 20 (3).72 In such
a proceeding, a person cannot refuse to give an answer on the plea that it might tend to
subject him to a criminal prosecution at a future date.
In Raja Narayanlal Bansila v. Maneck Firoz Mistry,73 the Registrar in his report to the
Central Government [made under S. 137 (5) of the Companies Act, 1913] alleged that the
business of the company was being carried on in fraud of the contributories. The government
appointed an inspector to investigate into the affairs of the company. He issued notices to the
appellants to attend his office for being examined on oath in relation to the affairs of the
company (as provided in Ss. 239 and 240 of the Companies Act, 1956). The appellant
claimed the privilege against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) on the ground that the
main object of the investigation was to discover whether he had committed any offence or
not.
Denying that the appellant could claim any immunity under Article 20(3), the Supreme Court
pointed out that the privilege was available to an accused person only, and as no formal
accusation was laid against the appellant, he could not claim the privilege. The inquiry was
in substance “an enquiry into the affairs of the company concerned”; that “the
investigation carried on by the inspectors is no more than the work of a fact-finding
commission,” and that the investigation begins broadly with a view to examine the
management of the company to find out whether any irregularities have been
committed or not.”
At no in the inquiry, there is an accused person or accuser or accusation against anyone that
he has committed an offence. The commission of offences might be discovered as a result of
the inquiry and then the government may institute criminal proceedings against the offending
persons but the fact that a prosecution may ultimately be launched would not retrospectively
change the complexion of the proceedings held by the inspector. The registrar’s report could
hardly amount to an accusation against the appellants as it was “only intended to enable the
Central Government to decide whether it should appoint an inspector”. At the
investigation be against the appellant: the function of the investigation was not to find out
whether the said accusation was proved or not.
72
Popular Bank v Madhav Nair, AIR 1965 SC 654 : (2964
73
AIR 1961 SC 29 : (1961) 1 SCR 417

Proceedings held before the customs authorities under. 171A of the Sea Customs Act for the
confiscation of goods and imposition of a penalty on the ground of smuggling of goods do
not fall within the purview of Article 20(3). Even when the custom officer arrests a person
suspected of smuggling, he is not an accused within Article 20(3) and a confession obtained
from him is not hit by Article 20(3)
These proceedings are not under the criminal law; there is no accusation and only
departmental penalties could be imposed. The only concern of the customs officer is to
prevent smuggling and recover customs duties. Even if the customs officer arrests a person or
suspicion of his having infringed a provision of the Customs Act, and holds an inquiry after
informing the person of the cause of his arrest [Article.22(1)], the person concerned id not
one accused of a crime. It is only when a complaint is lodged against him before a magistrate
that the person becomes an accused.
In Romesh,74 the appellant was searched at the Calcutta Airport. As a consequence, currency,
pearls, and jewelry were found on his person and in his baggage. He was charged under the
Sea Customs Act. During his trial, reliance was placed on his confession statement made by
him before the Customs Authorities. It was argued that it was inadmissible in evidence
because of Article 20(3).
Rejecting the objection, the court ruled that the guarantee against testimonial compulsion
contained in Article 20(3) can be claimed by a person only if he was accused of an offence at
the time he made the statement. Under the Sea Customs Act, the Customs Officer does not
accuse a person of any offence when he calls upon a person smuggling goods to make a
statement. The officer holds the inquiry with a view to adjudge consfiscation of goods
dutiable or prohibited and imposing penalties. His primary duty is to prevent smuggling; he is
not accusing any person of any offence triable before a magistrate.
In Illias v. Collector of Customs,75 it has been held that the customs officers are not police
officers and any statement recorded by them under Ss. 107 and 108, Customs Act, is not
inadmissible in evidence.
A person was arrested under S. 19B of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the
grounds of arrest served on him included the accusation relating to a transaction with
74
Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 940 : (1969) 2 SCR 461
75
AIR 1970 SC 1065

reference to which he was summoned before the Enforcement Directorate to give evidence.
The petitioner pointed out that he was accused at the time of his arrest of having committed
an offence which was the subject-matter of the inquiry and, therefore, the summons against
him should be withdrawn. The director rejected the request and asserted that the appellant
must comply the same.
On the above facts, the Supreme Court considered the matter and ruled that the First
Information Report had been lodge earlier in the case, and with the lodging of the FIR, a
person is accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20(3). Accordingly, the
appellant was held entitled to partial relief. The court emphasized that the only protection
given by Article 20(3) to a person accused of an offence is that he can not be compelled to be
a witness against himself. But, this does not mean that he need not give information regarding
matters which do not tend to incriminate him. The court directed the appellant to appear
before the directorate to answer such questions as would not tend to incriminate him. The
court clarified that permitting him not to answer self-incriminate questions was because he
was an accused on the relevant date.
There was a difference of opinion among the High Court on the question whether persons
have entitled to the presence of their lawyers when they are being questioned during the
investigation under Customs Act, or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA). The
argument was that in a situation where there exist the possibilities of the person under
interrogation being prosecuted as an accused, he would be entitled to the assistance of a
lawyer during the questioning because to deny him such a right would be violative of Article
20(3).
In Poolandi v. Superintendent, Central Exercise,76 the Supreme Court has now answered the
question in the negative. The court has again explained the scope of Article 20(3) which
embodies a guarantee against self- incrimination. It is an established proposition that the
guarantee against self-incrimination can be claimed only by a person who is accused of an
offence at the time he is compelled to make the incriminating statement. “It does not refer to
the hypothetical person who may in the future be discovered to have been guilty of
some offence.”
76
AIR 1992 SC 1795 : (1992) 3 SCC 259

The broad operation given to Article20(3) in the Nandini Satpathy case with reference to
criminal offences was not acceptable to the court in the instant case and the court preferred to
follow its ruling in Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal and Illias v. Collector
of Customs, both cases under the Customs Act, but both were pre-Nandini Satpathy cases.
The court also rejected the argument that to call a person away from the comforts and
convenience of his home to the Customs office and to question him there without the
assistance of a lawyer amounts to mental torture whcih violates Article 21 the court stated:77
“The purpose o the inquiry under the Customs Act and the other similar statutes will be
Completely frustated if the whims of the person in possession of useful information for the
Department are allowed to prevail. For achieving the objectof such an inquiry if the
appropriate authorities be of the view that such persons sholud be dissociated from the
atmosphere and the company of persons who provide encouragement to them in adopting a
non co-operative attitudes to the machineries of law, there cannot be any legitimate
objection in depriving them of such company. The relevnt provisions of the constitution in
this regard have to be construed in the spirit they were made and the benefits thereunder
should not be ‘expanded’ to favour exploiters engaged in tax evasion at the cost of public
exchequer. Applying the ‘just, fair and reasonable test’ we hold that there is no merit in the
stand of the appellant before us.”
It seemsthat the court has adopted a more stringent attitude in respect of economi offences
than ordinary criminal offences. Also, the court distinguishes between proceedings under the
criminal procedure code and administrative investigatory proceedings. Only on that basis can
be explained the court’s refusal to follow the dicta in Nandini Satpathy.
From the above, it becomes clear that the immunity under Article 20(3) cannot be claimed by
a person in proceedings before administrative bodies on the narrow ground that there is no
criminal accusation against him. This is the result of the Supreme Court interprting the words
“accused” in Article 20(3) as a person “formally accused of an offence”. This approach
very much restricts the effectiveness of the immunity in Article 20(3) in these days of
proliferation of adjudicatory bodies outside the regular hierarchy of courts.
The aim of administrative investgations is not only to find out facts, but also to collect
evidence on which a prosecution may be based later. As for example, in the Maneck Phiroze
77
AIR 1992 SC AT 1800.

case, the inspector making the investigation was told to bear in mind that “for a successful
prosecution the evidence in support of a charge must be clear, tangible and cogent”. The
obvious implications of this direction were that he should fish out evidence against the
persons concerned which may be of probative value in criminal proceedings to be launched
subsequently. This means that what cannot be achieved through a formal criminal proceeding
can be easily achieved through administrative proceedings and evidence thus collected can be
used against the person concerned when formally prosecuted later in a criminal court. From
thispoint of view, the privilege against self-incrimination loses much of its efficacy in this era
of growth of administrative process.

SCIENTIFIC TESTS –
INVOLUNTARY
Narcoanalysis, polygraphy and brain finger printing tests of accused violates Article 20(3).
In a significant judgement in Selvi V. State of Karnataka78 the accused have challenge the
validity of certain scientific techniques, namely, Narcoanyalysis, polygraphy and brain finger
printing (BEAP) tests “without consent” as violative of Article 20(3) as well as Article 21 of
the constitution. The state argued that it is desirable that crime should be efficiently
investigated particularly sex crimes as ordinary methods are not helpful in these cases. So the
issue was between ‘efficient investigation’ and preservation of individual liberty. A three
judge bench of supreme court unanimously held that these tests are testimonial compulsions
and are prohibited by Article 20(3) of the constitution. These tests do not fall within the scope
of expression “such other tests” in expression of section 53 of Criminal Procedure Code,
the protection of self-incrimination. The drug is known as sodium pentothal used or
introduced general anesthesia in surgical operations. The polygraphy and brain finger
printing (BEAP) test is also known as the wave test. Electric waves are introduced into the
mind. It was held that compulsory administration of the narcoanalysis techniques constitutes
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in the context. Article 21 of the constitution
disapproves of involuntary testimony irrespective of the nature and degree of coercion,
threats fraud or inducement used to elicit the evidence. The popular means of the terms such
as ‘torture and cruel’ inhuman or degrading treatment are associated with gory images of
blood letting and broken bones. A forcible invasion into a person’s mental, process is also an
affront to human dignity and liberty often with grave and long and lasting consequences. The
court also refereed the international conventions though not ratified by parliament, as
persuasive value. Since they represent an involving international consensus on the issue
convention ‘against torture and other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
(1984). Regarding the contention raised by the respondents that compelling interests demands
such techniques for investigation of crimes in future the court said that it was the function of
the legislature to consider and make proper law on the issue. But if such matter comes before
78
AIR 2010 SC 1974

the court, the court shall interpret the mandate of the constitutional provisions available to the
citizens and apply in this favour. The court laid down the following guidelines for these tests:
(1) No lie Detector Tests should be administered except the basis of consent of the accused.
An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
(2) If the accused volunteers for a lie Detector Test, he should be given access to lawyer and
physical, emotional and legal implications of such a test should be explained to him by the
police and his lawyer.
(3) The consent should be recorded by the judicial magistrate.
(4) During the hearing before the magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be
duly represented by a lawyer.
(5) At the hearing the person in questions should also be told in clear terms that the statement
that if made shall not be a confidential statement to the magistrate but will have the statement
made to the police.
(6) The magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of
detention and the nature of the interogation.
(7) The actual recording of the Lie Detector shall be done by an independent agency (such as
a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
(8) A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be
taken on record.
Protection under Article 20(3) of the constitution does not extend to any kind of evidence
but only of self-incriminating statement relating to the charges brought against an accused. In
this case the court had refused to allow narcotic analysis and use of truth-serum against the
accused according to the court it violates the right against self-incrimination available to all
citizens in terms of Article 20(3) of the constitution of India. In recent decision, the supreme
court however has delineated the limitations of this provision in much as it declared that this
right is not available to a person to avoid answering questions in a matter where he has not
been charged for an offence.
Called upon to decide the question as to ‘whether protection under Article 20(3) of the
constitution is available to the appellant, who though not an accused in the police case in

which he has been asked to depose as a witness but figures as an accused in the complaint
case filed later on in relation to the same incident”, the Supreme Court in Balasaheb V. State
of Maharashtra79: declared the law in the following terms protection under Article 20(3) of
the constitution does not extend to any kind of evidence but only to selfincriminating
statement relating to the charges brought against an accused within the prohibition of
constitutional protection, it must be of such character that by itself it tend to incriminate the
accused. Appellant is not an accused in the police case and in fact a witness, whose statement
was recorded under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and therefore, not
entitled to a blanket protection. However, in case of trail in the police case answer to certain
question it tends to incriminate the appellant he can seek protection at that stage. Whether
answer to a question is in-criminating or otherwise has to be considered at the time it put.
Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of this court in the case of State of
Bombay Vs. Kathi Kalud Oghad80. where in it has been held as follows- ‘in order that a
testimony be an accused person may be said to have been self-incriminatory the compulsion
of the constitutional provision, it must be of such a character that by itself it should have the
tendency of incriminating the accused, if not also of actually doing so. In other worlds, it
should be a statement which makes the case against the accused person atleast probable
considered by itself.’
EXCEPTION
The right of silence has various facets, on is that the burden is on the state or rather the
prosecution to prove that the accused is guilty. Another is that an accused is presumed to be
innocent till he is proved to be guilty. A third is the right of the accused against self
incrimination, namely, the right to be silent and that he cannot be compelled to incriminate
himself. But there are also exceptions of this rule.
79
1994 CriLJ 3044
80
1961 AIR 1808, 1962 SCR (3) 10

DNA TEST
An accused can be compelled to submit to investigation by allowing his photographs taken,

voice recorded, his blood sample tested, his hair or other bodily material used for DNA
testing etc. It follows that giving thumb-impression or impression of foot or plam or fingers
or specimen of writings or exposing parts of body by way of identification are not covered by
the expression ‘to be a witness’ under article 20 (3) In these cases, the accused is not giving
any personal testimony. They are merely materials for comparison.
Selvi vs. State of Karnataka81 In this case it was held that subjecting the accused to Narco
Analysis, DNA profiling, polygraph and brain fingerprinting, without his or her consent, is
violative of Article 20(3) as they are compulsory exposures of the accused. The Supreme
Court further observed that Section 156 and 161 of CrPC, which give police officers the
right to investigate offences and orally examine any person acquainted with the facts of the
case, do not and cannot override the constitutional protection given under Article 20(3). As
mentioned at the earlier stage, the Supreme Court of India altered the previous stand
regarding extent of protection under Article 20(3). The apex court made following
observations: The right against self-incrimination protects:
1. Persons who have been formally accused as well as those who are examined as suspects in
criminal cases.
2. Witnesses who apprehend that their answers would expose them to criminal charges in the
ongoing investigation or even in cases other than the one being investigated.
81
Supra note. 78

EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY
UNDESIRABLE MEANS
The supreme court has made it clear in Pushpa Devi Ram Jatia Vs. M. L. Wadhwan 82 that
where ‘evidence’ offered comes within the meaning of its definition, the court can act on it
and need not concern itself with the method by which the evidence in question was obtained.
The court cited the observation of ‘Sir Lawrence Jenkins’ in Barindra Kumar Ghose V.
Emperor83’ to the effect that relevant evidence remains relevant even if it was obtained in the
course of search or seizure in violation of the provisions of the criminal procedure code. The
court found support in the following observation of LORD GODDARD. CJ in judgement of
the Privy Council in Kuruma V. Reginam84.
“The test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible in whether it is

relevant to the matter in issue. If it is, admissible and the court is not concerned with how it
was obtained. In their Lordships opinion, when it is a question of the admission of a evidence
strictly it is not whether the method by which it was obtained is tortious but whether what has
been obtained is relevant to the issue being tried.
Similarly in R. Vs. Sang85 the House of Lords observed that however much the judge may
dislike the way in which a particular piece of evidence was obtained before proceedings were
commenced, it is admissible evidence and is probative of the accused’s guilt, it is no part of
the judicial function to exclude it by this reason. He has no discretion to refuse to admit
relevant evidence on the ground that it was obtained by improper or unfair means. The House
of Lords would sanction the exclusion of such evidence only where the accused had been
lured into incriminating himself by deception on after the commission of an offence.
82
1987 AIR 1748, 1987 SCR (3) 46
83
(1910) ILR 37 Cal 467
84
(1979) 2 All E.r. 1222, 1230-31
85
R Vs Sang (1979) 2 All E.r. 1222, R Vs. Apecella (1985) 82 Cr. App. 295, blood sample taken during remand
for diagnostic, but was put to other tests with positive indication of a disease. The sample was allowed to be
used in evidence R v. Adams (1980) QB575 (CA). Evidence discovered during unlawful search allowed. R V.
Fox 1986 AC 281, conviction on the basis of sample of breath obtained during unlawful arrest. The House of
Lords upheld the admission of such evidence.

The fact of entrapment, if proved, would be one of the circumstances which the judge or
magistrate should take into account when carrying out his balancing exercise, Breaches of
French Law and of the European convention of Human Rights, all these formed part of the
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained. The supreme court noted the only
exception to the rule, which is that where after the alleged offence, improper methods have
been used to obtain evidence for it and the judge is of the view that the prejudicial effect of
such evidence would be out of proportion to its evidentiary value, the judge may exclude it.
When considering whether the admission of evidence would have such an adverse effect on
the fairness of the proceedings as to justify exclusion the court has to have regard to all the
circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained. The impact
on the fairness of the proceedings is the crucial determining factor. A unique example is to be
seen in R. V. Christou86. The police operated for about three months by establishing a shop
of jewelers and putting up the shady image of being interested in buying stolen property. The
object was to recover stolen goods and to obtain evidence against those involved in theft and
handling. All the transactions in the shop were filmed and conversation recorded and the
dealings were observed by other officers through video link. The evidence so collected was
not allowed to be excluded from the trail, the court saying: ‘The trick was not applied to the
appellants (accused person) they voluntarily applied themselves to the trick. It is not every
trick producing evidence against an accused which results in unfairness. The fairness of the
proceedings as a whole is generally more likely to be compromised in a situation, where the
suspect has been deluded after being formally subjected to the control of the police.
86
[1992] 3 W.L.R. 228

DOCUMENT WHICH IS POSSESSION BUT

NOT BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
Self-incrimination in the context of Article 20(3) only means conveying information based
upon personal knowledge of the person giving information. Therefore, where an accused is
compelled to produce a document in his possession which is not based on the personal
knowledge of the accused, there is no violation of Article 20(3), because he does not become
a witness by the mere fact that he has produce it. Directing the accused to give his specimen
signature and handwriting does not amount to testimonial compulsion offending Article
20(3).
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Provisions of Article 20(3) does not violates of the proceedings on search and seizures. It
has been held that the protection of Articles 20(3) does not extend to searchers made in
pursuance of a warrant issued under section 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973.
In Indian law, there is no basis for the assumption that a search or seizure of the thing or
document, was in itself to be treated as a compelled production of it. Since the search warrant
is addressed to an officer of the government generally, a police officer and not to the person
whose premises or property is to be searched, it is not the act of the accused but of a third
person the police officer to which the accused is obliged to submit and is therefore, not his
testimonial act in any sense and does not involved a violation of Article 20(3).
Again in V.S. Kuttan Pillai V. RamaKrishanan87, the Supreme Court held that search of the
premises occupied by the accused without the accused being compelled to be a party to such
search would not be violative of the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 20(3).
Section 27 of Evidence Act 1872 and Article 20(3) of the constitution.
Section 27 of Evidence Act 1872 provides that when at a trail evidence is led to the effect
that some fact was discovered in consequence of the information given by the accused in
87
1980 AIR 185, 1980 SCR (1) 673

custody, so much of the information as relates to the facts discovered, may be proved
irrespective of the fact whether that information amounts to confession or not. It has been
held that the provision of this section are not within the prohibition of Article 20(3), unless
compulsion had been used in obtaining the information. In Prasadi Vs. State of UP the
accused while in police custody stated that he killed the accused with a dagger and had
concealed the dagger and blood stained clothes of the deceased in a pit. He led the police to
the pit from where, the dagger and the clothes of deceased were recovered. The court held
that the statement of the accused leading to the recovery of the dagger and the clothes of the
deceased was admissible and could not be held to be compelled testimony within the meaning
of Article 20(3). But, where the statement leading to the discovery of some facts was
obtained by employing third degree methods, the statements would be hit by Article 20(3).
CONFESSION MADE UNDER PROMISE OF

SECRECY ETC.
An confession unlike an admission, is relevant even if it is made under promise of secrecy.

Section 29 of Evidence Act also provides that “if such a confession in otherwise relevant it
does not become irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy or in
consequence of a deception practiced on the accused person for the purpose of obtaining it, or
when he was drunk or because it was made in answer to question which he need not have
answered, whatever may have been the form of those questions or because he was not warned
that he was not bound to make such confession and that evidence of it might be given against
him.
In addition to this, section 29 provides for many other things also. The effect of the section is
that a confession is relevant even if it is obtained under the following circumstances.
(a) By making a promise to the accused that it will be kept secret or that evidence of it
shall not be given against him – It may be recalled that an admission made in civil case
under promise that evidence of it shall not be given is not relevant, the policy being that
litigants should be encouraged to compromise their difference. That policy has no relevance
to criminal cases because here the public interest lies in criminal prosecuting and not
compromise with them. Consequently, therefore, where an accused person is persuaded to

confess by assuring him of the secrecy of his statement the confession is nevertheless
relevant.
(b) By practicising a deception on the accused for the purpose of obtaining his
confession – Where the confession is the outcome of the Fraud being played with the accused
it is nevertheless relevant. Thus where the two accused persons were left in a room where
they thought they were all alone, but secret tape recorders were recording their conversation
the confessions thus recorded were held to be relevant. Similarly, where an accused persuded
to submit for a medical examination for an innocent purpose which was infact conducted for
criminal purpose, his statements to the doctor and the doctors report were held to be relevant
at the discretion of the court. He was charged with drunken driving and he was told that the
medical examination was not to ascertain his fitness to drive but to determine other illness or
physical disability and in particular whether he was fit to leave the police station. Basing his
judgement on the courts’ cases, Lord Parker CJ, ruled that the court should have in its
discretion refused to allow the evidence to be given on the basis that if the defendant that the
doctor was likely to evidence on the matter he might refuse to submit himself to examination.
(c) When the accused was drunk – A confession obtained by intoxicating the accused is
equally relevant. The law is concerned to see that the confession is free and voluntary and if
this is so it does not matter that the accused confessed under the influence of drink.
According to the English practice the judge will have discretion in the matter.
(d) In answer to questions which the need not have answered – A confession obtained in
answer to question which the accused need not have answered is valid, whatever even if the
accused was not warned that he was not bound to answer such questions or that his answers
will be used in evidence against him. this principle applies only to extra judicial confessions,
that is to say, confession which are made ‘outside the court’ to a private person. For
recording a confession before the court the provisions of section 164(3) of the Criminal
Procedure Code 1973, would have to he observed. It has been held by the supreme court in
state of U.P. Vs. Singhara Singh88 that this section overrides section 29 of the Evidence Act.
The relevant provision is that the magistrate should before recording the confession warn the
accused that he is not bound to make it and that if he did make it, it will be use in evidence
against him. In English law it is one of the judge’s rules that the person being interrogated
88
1963 AIR 358, 1964 SCR (4) 485

should be told or you are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you
say may be put into writing and given in evidence.
TAPE-RECORDING OF STATEMENTS BY THE

ACCUSED
Tape recording of statement of an accused does not fall in Article 20(3). It has been held
that the tape-recording of statement made by the accused, though the recording was done
without his knowledge, but without force or oppression, is not hit by Article 20(3). Since
there is no element of compulsion with the meaning of this clause.
The protection under 20(3) is confined to an accused in a criminal proceedings and does not
apply to witness or to civil proceedings or proceeding other than criminal. In America the
privilege against selfincrimination is not confined to accused only but it extends to witness
also. Same is the position under the English law. But in Indian Legal System it is confined an
accused only, in-criminal proceedings.

CONCLUSION
Article 20(3) invoked protection against self-incrimination and gives an accused the right to
remain silent over any issue which tends to incriminate him. This protection by the Indian
constitution is also extended to suspects. Article 20(3) has been carefully crafted to protect
the accused from further selfincriminating himself only if any statement of his might result in
prosecution. For the benefit of the courts, the supreme court has distinguished between the
terms ‘witness’ and ‘furnish evidence’ the former including furnishing statements from
one’s own knowledge and the latter, referring to simply presenting documents required by the
court under which protection under Article 20(3) cannot be sought. This article also stretches
its privileges to a person who is compulsorily being made a witness and also covers search
and seizures wherein, an accused or the person being searched is under no obligation to be a
part of the search. If any confession or a mere statement is made based on which some
material corroboration is found then that statement cannot be protected under Article 20(3).
Under the law, an accused cannot be tortured to make a statement or a confession and no
duress can be exercised in order to obtain some information out of him, in such a case the
statement would be void and the privileges under Article 20(3) would be applicable. Narco-
analysis tests, polygraph analysis etc. which refer to involuntary administration of mental
process, are considered violative of Article 20(3) and can only be done in a few cases, as it
disrupts the right to privacy. But with advancement in medical sciences, that certainty of such
scientific tests has increased and the author thinks that they provide an effective tool of
furnish evidence which help in speedy disposal of cases. By balancing the harmony between
the protective rights and need for speedy disposal. Law is living process, which changes
according to the changes in society, science, ethics and so on. The legal system should imbibe
developments and advances that take place in science as long as they do not violate
fundamental legal principles and are for the good of the society. The criminal justice system
should be based on just and equitable principles.

BIBLIOGRAPGHY
Online database-
 MANUPATRA
 SCC ONLINE
 LEGAL SERVICE INDIA
 INDIAN KANOON
 LEGAL CRYSTAL
 LAWYERS CLUB
Various Acts-
 INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973
 BANKING COMPANIES ACT, 1970
 GENERAL CLAUSE ACT, 1897
 PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT,1988
 COMPANIES ACT, 1913
 COMPANIES ACT, 1956

 CUSTOMS ACT
 SEA CUSTOMS ACT
 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT (FERA)
Books referred-
 M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, WADHWA
AND COMPANY NAGPUR, EDN 5TH , 2003, VOLUME 1ST
 Dr. J.N PANDEY, THE CONTITUIONAL LAW OF INDIA,
CENTRAL LAW AGENCY TEXT BOOK, EDITION 56TH, 2017
 Dr. DURGA DAS BASU, INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, LEXIS NEXIS, EDITION 21ST ,
2013
REPORTS-
 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, 180TH REPORT, ON ARTICLE
20(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND THE RIGHT
TO SILENCE.

THANK
YOU!

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JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA UNIVERSITY

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 1

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 2

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 3

THE PILLARS OF ARTICLE 20(3)

STATUS OF PROVISION IN DIFFERNT

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 4

TYPE OF INCRIMINATION EVIDENCE

PERSON ACCUSED OF AN OFFENCE

SCIENTIFIC TEST – INVOLUNTARY

EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY UNDESIRABLE

DOCUMENT WHICH IS POSSESSION BUT

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 5

SEARCH AND SEIZURES

CONFESSION MADE UNDER PROMISE

TAPE- RECORDING OF STATEMENTS BY

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 6

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 7

THE PILLARS OF ARTICLE 20(3)

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 8

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 9

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 10

Status of Provision in Different

 That the accused is presumed to be innocent

 That it is for the prosecution to establish his guilt, and

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 11

These propositions emanate from an apprehension that if compulsory examination of an

(1) It is a right available to a person ‘accused of an offence’

(2) It is a protection against ‘compulsion’ ‘to be a witness’

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 12

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 13

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 14

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 15

Type of incriminating evidence covered by

The privilege applies to ‘testimonial compulsion’. It no doubt covers oral testimony by an

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 16

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 17

Article 20(3) is directed against self-incrimination buy an accused. Self-incrimination must

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 18

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 19

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 20

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 21

In Nandini Satpathy,38 IYER, J., advocated an expensive interpretation of the phrase

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RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 26

PERSON ACCUSED OF AN OFFENCE

In order to avail of the protection of Article 20(3) against self-incrimination, a condition to be

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Art 20(3) Page 27

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