Anda di halaman 1dari 31

CASE #1

DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS vs
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREÑO
G.R. No. 193161, August 22, 2011

FACTS:

Spouses Engracia Manungas (Engracia or brevity) and Florentino Manungas (Florentino for
brevity) did not begot a child. Thus, they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila for brevity) on
August 12, 1968. Florentino died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his
adoptive mother. And survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.

Engracia filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. She stated therein that there are no other
legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas
(Ramon for brevity) whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino. Meanwhile,
Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of Rights and Participation renouncing her rights over the
separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia. Thereafter, a Decree of Final
Distribution was issued in the intestate proceedings of Florentino distributing the properties to
surviving heirs, Engracia and Ramon. The RTC appointed Florencio Parreño (Forencio or
brevity), the niece of Engracia as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her
incompetent aunt.

Engracia through Forencio, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the spouses
Diosdado Salinas Manungas (Diosdado for brevity) and Milagros Pacifico (Milagros for brevity)
for illegal detainer and damages with the MTC in Panabo City. Spouses Salinas, in their
Answer to the complaint, claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino. The
answer was filed beyond the reglementary period and thus, was not considered by the MTC
and issued a summary judgment ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore
possession to Engracia. Spouses Salinas appealed the MTC decision to the RTC of Tagum,
Davao City which affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC. Thus,Spouses Salinas filed a
petition to the SC which was denied for having been filed out of time.

Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the
Estate of Engracia (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City,
Davao with the allegation that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino, is an heir of Engracia.
Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto for brevity) and Florencio opposed the petition alleging that
Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that:
1. that he was not a Manungas;
2. that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas;
3. that he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate; and
4. that he was in fact a debtor of the estate having been found liable to Engracia for PhP
177,000 by virtue of a Decision issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 5196-96.
5. that the RTC issued an Order appointing Florencio as the special administrator of the
Estate of Manungas.

Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction arguing that:
1. Florencio’s appointment as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas was by
virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the latter but which relation ceased upon
Engracia’s death, concluding that her appointment as special administrator was
without basis.
2. Florencio was not fit to become a special administrator having already been fined by
the court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia’s property as her judicial
guardian.

1
3. Florencio is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia while he is the illegitimate
son of Florentino.

Thus, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the revocation of its earlier
appointment of Florencio as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing
Diosdado as the Special Administrator.

Hence, Forencio and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA ruled that the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreño as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead. The CA further
reinstated Florencio as the special administrator of the estate. Thuss, Diosdaado filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the appointment of
Diosdado as judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of Florencia as special
administrator?

RULING:

No. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino does not mean that he is
entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the court. However, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal
principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator
is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed as stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80
of the Rules of Court.

Further, evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he
is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate. On the other hand, Florencia, who is a former
Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the latter,
is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so
she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s estate.

The subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia while the estate of Florentino
was already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long been terminated with the
proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. With the
termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir
of Florentino, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part
of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no
interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator.

CASE #2
PIJUAN VS. VDA. DE GURREA
GR NO. L-21917
November 29, 1966

FACTS:
Manuela Ruiz (Mrs. Gurrea) and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain. Then Carlos
abandoned her, took their son, Teodoro, and went to the Philippines, where he lived maritally
with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two children. Carlos died leaving a document purporting
to be his last will and testament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and
disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings at the

2
CFI, for the probate of said will. Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed special
administrator of the estate, without bond. Among others, Mrs. Gurrea moved for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased claiming a right of preference
under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court but which was later on denied.

ISSUE: WON Mrs. Gurrea can be appointed as administratrix.

RULING:

NO, the said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of
these conditions is in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document
purporting to be his will. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. The said
document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is
incompetent therefor. Furthermore, he has not refused the trust, but has also expressly
accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and upon his appointment as special
administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference
accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers
to the appointment of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special
administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate
court and is not appealable.

CASE #4

G.R. No. 92999 October 11, 1990

Mendiola vs Mendiola
FACTS:
The petitioner and private respondents in this case are the surviving heirs of the late
Carlos Mendiola.The petitioner filed for the probate of the will of his father.The RTC allowed
the probate of the will and issued the letters testamentary in favor of the petitioner who was
declared executor of the estate of the deceased in the will. However,the private respondents
filed a motion for the removal of the executor for the reasons that petitioner failed to pay the
estate tax, failed to render an accounting of the estate and settle the same according to law.
Furthermore, he involved the heirs in a transaction with Villarica Pawnshop which, because of
petitioner's failure to honor his part of the bargain, resulted in the filing of a suit by Villarica
against the heirs.The RTC granted the motion.CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the removal of the petitioner as executor is proper
RULING:
YES. Sufficient evidence was adduced in the proceedings to support the allegations
against the petitioner.The removal of the petitioner is in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court that if an executor or administrator neglects to render
his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the
court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its
discretion, may permit him to resign.

3
CASE #5
ALFRED HILADO et al. v. JUDGE AMOR REYES 496 SCRA 282(2006)
FACTS:
Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the
Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The
case was raffled to Judge Amor Reyes, in whose court such a petition was approved. Alfred
Hilado, on the other hand, filed a civil case against the estate of Roberto. For a period of time,
the counsel of Hilado was allowed to examine the records of the case and secure certified true
copies thereof. However, one of Hilado‘s counsels was denied access to records of the estate
by Judge Reyes ratiocinating that only parties or those with authority from the parties are
allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case as the counsel was not under that instance.
Hilado filed before the Supreme Court a petition for mandamus to compel Judge Reyes to
allow them to access, examine and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of the
record of the Hilado‘s case contending that these records are public, and which the public can
freely access.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of mandamus is proper
RULING:
The term “judicial record” or “court record” does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict
of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by
the parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word
testimony which took place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control
of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been
described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film,
audio or video recording, court reporter’s notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials,
whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with
the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has received
in a case. Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest
for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all
citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should
have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public
policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public.

CASE #6
THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO
G.R. No. 156407
January 15, 2014

FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate survived by his second wife and five children, and
his two children from his first marriage.Thelma (child from first marriage) filed in the RTC of
Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita (Emigdio’s second wife) as the
administrator of the estate, which the court granted.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate indicating that at


the time of his death, Emigdio had left no real propertied but only personal properties. Thelma

4
opposed the approval of the inventory claiming that Emigdio had owned real properties that
were excluded from the inventory.

RTC ordered Teresita to re-do the inventory of properties. Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. CA directed the exclusion of certain properties in the inventory which are subject
matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale and Deed of Assignment to Mervin Realty.

ISSUES:
1. WON certiorari is the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the RTC.
2. WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of the
properties in the estate of the decedent.
RULING:
1. Yes. The orders of the RTC denying Teresita’s Motion for Reconsideration and denying
her Motion for Reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the
properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence,
the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as
basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to
revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court
has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The
test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does
the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is
final.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate


special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

2. No. The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC
as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection,
and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to
Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually
part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its
orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.

5
CASE #7
SANTERO ET AL VS. COURT OF FIRSTINSTANCE OF CAVITEG.R. No. L-61700,
September 14, 1987153 SCRA 728, Paras

FACTS:

Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children
with Felixberta Pacursa namely; Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein Petitioners). He also
had four children with Answelma Diaz namely; Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel (herein
Private Respondents). These children are all natural childrensince neither of their mothers,
was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died. During the pendency of the
administration proceedings before the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cavite involving the estate
of the late Pablo Santero, Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
questioning the Decision of CFI Cavite granting allowance in the amount of Php2,000.00 to
the Private Respondents. This includes the tuition fees, clothing materials and subsistence
out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The Petitioners opposed said
Decision on the ground that private respondents were no longer studying. They also averred
that Private Respondents already attained the age of majority. They further averred that all of
them, except for Miguel, are gainfully employed and the administrator did not have sufficient
funds to cover the said expenses. Before the Supreme Court could act on said petitioner, the
Private Respondents filed another motion for allowance with the CFI Cavite which included
Juanita, Estelita and Perdrio, all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with
Anselma Diza, praying that a sum of Php6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as
their allowance from the estate of their father. This was granted by the CFI – Cavite. Later
on, the said court issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of Private
Respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional children included in
the said motion. She said in her clarification that her previous motions, only the last four minor
children were included for support and the three children were then of age should have been
included since all her children have the right to allowance as advance payment of their shares
in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator
to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition of the
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to
allowance?
RULING:
Yes, the Private Respondents are entitled to allowances as advances from their
shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Being of age, gainfully
employed, or married should not be regarded a s t h e d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r t o
t h e i r r i g h t t o a l l o w a n c e u n d e r A r t i c l e s 2 9 0 a n d 1 8 8 o f t h e New Civil Code.
Moreover, what the said court did was just to f o l l o w t h e p r e c e d e n t o f
t h e c o u r t w h i c h granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and private
respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending upon the availability of funds
as granted by the court in several orders.

6
CASE #8
The Estate of Ruiz vs. CA
G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996

FACTS:

Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz,
his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real
properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz
died.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar
Ruiz Montes who filed before the RTC, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.
ISSUE:
Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate’s
debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate
for the support of the testator’s grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain
heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
RULING:
1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the decedent’s estate. The law in Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly
limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend it to the deceased’s
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. It
was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months
after admitting the will to probate.
The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only
the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has
been authenticated. In the case at bar, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the
devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father’s will included the estate of his mother and
allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if
there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive
shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary
cases.
3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of
the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration as Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides.
He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the
fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the
expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which
are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.

7
CASE #9
MOISES SAN DIEGO VS. ADELO NOMBRE & PEDRO ESCANLAR
G.R. NO. L-19265
MAY 29, 1964

FACTS:
On May 1, 1960, Adelo Nombre, a judicial administrator, leased one of the properties of the
intestate estate (a fishpond) to Pedro Escanlar for Php3,000.00 each year in a three-year
term, without however, securing authority from the court. On January 17, 1961, Nombre was
removed as an administrator and Sofronio Campillanos was appointed in his stead.

On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed a motion asking authority to execute a lease contract
for the same fishpond in favor of Moises San Diego. Nombre opposed the motion pointing out
that a valid lease contract in favor of Escanlar is in existence unless declared void in a separate
action.

ISSUE:

Whether a judicial administrator can validly lease a property of the estate without prior judicial
authority and approval.

RULING:

The contract of lease in favor of Escanlar is valid. The Rules of court provides that an executor
or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the real as well as the personal estate
of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of
administration and shall administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by his will. And
lease has been considered as an act of administration.

The court further cited that Article 1878 of the Civil Code which states that special powers of
attorneys is necessary in a lease contract of real property for more than a year, is not a
limitation to the right of a judicial administrator. Furthermore, the said article only applies to
law on agency and not to judicial administrator.

A judicial administrator is appointed by the court and is required to file a bond. This is not
true in the case of an agent who is only answerable to his principal. The protection given by
the law to the principal stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be thru
agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of
the law and orders of the appointing court.

8
CASE #10

ILUMINADA DE GALA-SISON, As Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late


Generoso de Gala, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon and
SOCORRO MANALO, respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent JudgeMadela of CFI Quezonissued orders requiring petitioner-administratrix to
deposit the amount in her possession with a reputable banking institution. Petitioner filed an
amended inventory in compliance with the order but refused to deposit the amount in her
possession on the manifestation that advances and allowances must be made to her as heir
and her compensation as administrator. RTC found no merit in her contention. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Court may award compensation as administrator to herein respondent
RULING:
Section 7 of Rule 85 states that a judicial administrator is entitled by way of compensationfor
the time actually and necesarilly employed byy him as administrator or commission upon the
value of estate as comes into his possession and finally disposed by him. The administrator
may be allowed a greater or additional sum where the estate is large and settlement has been
attended with difficulty. The amount of his fee in special cases is a matter of judicial discretion.
The petitioner’s claim in herein case however are not chargeable against the estate.

CASE #12
MARCOS II vs. CA
273 SCRA 47
GR No. 120880, June 5, 1997

FACTS:
Bongbong Marcos sought for the reversal of the ruling of the Court of Appeals to grant CIR's
petition to levy the properties of the late Pres. Marcos to cover the payment of his tax
delinquencies during the period of his exile in the US. The Marcos family was assessed by the
BIR after it failed to file estate tax returns. However the assessment were not protested
administratively by Mrs. Marcos and the heirs of the late president so that they became final
and unappealable after the period for filing of opposition has prescribed. Marcos contends that
the properties could not be levied to cover the tax dues because they are still pending probate
with the court, and settlement of tax deficiencies could not be had, unless there is an order by
the probate court or until the probate proceedings are terminated. Petitioner also pointed out
that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38-68, the BIR's Notices of Levy on the Marcos
properties were issued beyond the allowed period, and are therefore null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Bongbong Marcos correct?

9
RULING:
No. The deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessment are already
final and unappealable -and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax remedy resorted
to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and separate from the other tax remedies (such
as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is not affected or precluded by the
pendency of any other tax remedies instituted by the government.
The approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the
deceased's estate is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate taxes. On the
contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement court which is bidden
not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of the decedent's estate to deliver any
distributive share to any party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This provision
disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which approves the
assessment and collection of the estate tax.
On the issue of prescription, the omission to file an estate tax return, and the
subsequent failure to contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the
petitioner's cause, as under Sec.223 of the NIRC, in case of failure to file a return, the tax may
be assessed at anytime within 10 years after the omission, and any tax so assessed may be
collected by levy upon real property within 3 years (now 5 years) following the assessment of
the tax. Since the estate tax assessment had become final and unappealable by the
petitioner's default as regards protesting the validity of the said assessment, there is no reason
why the BIR cannot continue with the collection of the said tax.

CASE #13
GR 134100
ALIPIO VS JARING
FACTS
Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco,
Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years. He subleased the fishpond, for the
remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses
Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was payable in two
installments. The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees
only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Despite due
demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their obligation, so the private respondent sued
the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount before the RTC.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband had
passed away and that she can’t be impleaded based on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
RTC denied the motion and ruled in favor of private respondent. On appeal, CA affirmed lower
court’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the
collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership
RULING:
NO. SC held that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary
proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership

10
and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and
debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in
accordance with Rule 73, 2 that, ‘When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband
or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the
debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.’
CASE #16
Danan vs. Buencamino
GR No. l-57205, December 14,1981
Facts:
Dominador Danan died intestate. On November 13, 1973, the court issued an order directing
all persons having money claims against the estate to file them within six months after the
date of the first publication of the order which was December 10, 1973. On June 12, 1974,
Benito Manalansan and Ines Vitug Manalansan filed a contingent claim.
On July 11, 1974, the administratrix filed an answer to the contingent claim. The court allowed
the claim to be heard without prejudice to the right of the administratrix to present rebuttal
evidence. Atty. Navarro, who represented the Manalansans, asked that the presentation of
the exhibits be made during the next hearing wherein the administratrix shall be given the
opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. Accordingly, the court set the next hearing to October
3, 1974, but was reset to November 18, 1974, at the request of the administratrix.
It was only on January 8, 1981, that the administratrix filed an Opposition to Contingent Claim
against Estate. There the administratrix questioned the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the
claim
Issue: WON the court can take cognizance of a claim filed against the Estate when said claim
was filed outside the period.
Ruling:
The contingent claim was filed two days beyond the six-month period stipulated in the order
which directed all persons having money claims against the estate to file them. However, it is
to be noted that the claim was filed on June 12, 1974, whereas the timeliness of its filing was
raised only on January 8, 1981, in the Opposition to the Contingent Claim against Estate. In
the interregnum the administratrix had acquiesced to the entertainment of the claim by filing
an answer thereto on July 11, 1974, and again by asking for postponement of the October 3,
1974, hearing wherein she was to present her rebuttal evidence. She is not only estopped by
her conduct but laches also bar her claim.
Moreover, Rule 86, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court gives the probate court discretion to allow
claims presented beyond the period previously fixed provided that they are filed within one
month from the expiration of such period but in no case beyond the date of entry of the order
of distribution. The contingent claim of the Manalansans was filed within both periods.

11
CASE #17
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC
VS.
REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 147561, JUNE 22, 2006
FACTS:
Republic Asahi Glass Corporation (Asahi) entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr. the
Proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS) for the construction of roadways and a drainage system
in asahi’s compound in Pasig City. Asahi was to pay JDS Php 5,300,000.00 for the
construction, which was supposed to be completed by JDS within 240 days. To guarantee the
faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings, JDS shall post a performance bong
of Php 795,000.00. JDS executed solidarily with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc the
Performance Bond. During the Construction, Asahi called the attention of JDS to the
alarmingly slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will
not be finished within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded
by JDS. Dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken by JDS, Asahi extrajudicially
rescinded the contract. Because of the rescission, Asahi had to hire another contractor to
finish the project, incurring an additional P3,256,874.00. Asahi sent a letter to SICI filing its
claim under the performance bond, but the letter went unheeded. Asahi eventually filed a
complaint against JDS and Stronghold for damages. However, Jose D. Santos, Jr. had already
died and JDS Construction was no longer at its registered address, with its whereabouts
unknown.
In its defense, On July 10, 1991, Stronghold maintains that Asahi’s money claims against it
and JDS have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Strongholds’ liability under the performance bond was
automatically extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.
RULING:
NO. Strongholds’ liability under the performance bond was not automatically extinguished by
the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguished
the obligation. Obligation are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is
prevented by law, the stipulation of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations
that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims
arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are
not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before
the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts
with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provisions of
law,. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities,
which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up
to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, stronghold as surety
cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.

12
CASE #19
G.R. No. L-30453 December 4, 1989

ANGELINA PUENTEVELLA ECHAUS, in her own behalf and as Administratrix of the


Estate of Luis Puentevella, assisted by her husband, RENE ECHAUS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON BLANCO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and
PHILIPPINECOMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, as Administrator of the Testate Estate
of the late Charles Newton Hodges, AVELINA A. MAGNO, as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner in her own behalf and as Administratrix of the intestate estate of her
deceased father, filed a complaint against Charles Newton Hodges praying for an accounting
of the business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the recovery of her share in the profits and
remaining assets of their business and the payment of expenses. However, during the course
of the trial, C.N. Hodges died; no motion to dismiss was filed by his counsel thus the trial
continued and the trial court ordered the substitution of private respondent Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), as administrator of the estate of deceased C. N.
Hodges, as party defendant. Meanwhile, a petition for the settlement of the estate of C.N.
Hodges was filed. The trial court found for petitioner ordering PCIB to pay her and later on
issued an order granting the writ of execution. Said writ was, however, not enforced because
the petitioner instead opted to file a motion in the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
Private respondent Magno filed a petition for relief of judgment and a motion to intervene on
the civil case which was eventually denied on the ground that she was not a party to the case.
Petitioner then prayed for the resolution of her previous motion. However, respondent Judge
Blanco ruled that he cannot yet resolved and holding in abeyance its resolution due to the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court enjoining him from hearing the special
proceedings of the testate estate of the deceased. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus seeking to set aside the order of respondent judge and to order PCIB to pay the
judgement credit in the civil case. The petitioner contends that the judgement in the civil case
is already final and executory and the execution thereof becomes a matter of right under Rule
39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
WON a motion in the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges is the proper remedy to
enforce payment instead of carrying out the writ of execution.

RULING:
Yes. While the judgment in the civil case has become final and executory, execution
is not the proper remedy to enforce payment thereof. The ordinary procedure by which to
settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person is for the claimant to
present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay
the amount thereof. In the case of Domingo v. Garlitos, the Court ruled that he legal basis for
such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestate proceedings to settle the estate of
a deceased person, the properties belonging to the estate are under the jurisdiction of the
Court and such jurisdiction continues until said properties have been distributed among the
heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency of the proceedings all the estate is in custodia
legis and the proper procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in case of a court judgment, to seize
the properties but to ask the court for an order to require the administrator to pay the amount
due from the estate and required to be paid.

13
CASE #21
GUILAS vs. CFI OF PAMPANGA
G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972

Facts:
Jacinta Limson de Lopez, of Guagua, Pampanga was married to Alejandro Lopez y
Siongco. They had no children. Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as
her sole heir and executor.
Petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now married to Federico Guilas, was
declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After
adopting legally Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doña Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil
so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.
In an order in Testate Proceedings, the aforementioned will was admitted to probate
and the surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed executor without bond
by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Accordingly, Alejandro took his oath of office as
executor.
Nevertheless, in a project of partition executed by both Alejandro Lopez and Juanita
Lopez Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was recognized and two Lots
that said to be Jacinta's paraphernal property, both situated in Bacolor Pampanga —were
adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as her share free from all liens, encumbrances and
charges, with the executor Alejandro Lopez, binding himself to free the said two parcels from
such liens, encumbrances and charges. The rest of the estate of the deceased consisting of
other parcels of lands, as well as personal properties were allotted to Don Alejandro who
assumed all the mortgage liens on the estate.
The lower court approved the said project of partition.
Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project
of partition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on the ground of lesion, perpetration
and fraud, and pray further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts
of all the crops and to deliver immediately to Juanita lots allocated to her. Meanwhile, in the
Testate Proceedings, Juanita filed a petition praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to
deliver to her the actual possession of said lots and its produce.
Alejandro opposed the separate petition alleging the testate proceedings had already
been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the
estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the
petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate. The parties have
agreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said petition for the delivery of shares until;
after the civil action aforementioned has been finally settled and decided. TC denied Juanita's
petition on the ground that the parties themselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition
for the delivery of her shares until after the civil action for annulment of the project of partition
has been finally settled and decided. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Issue: WON the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not
the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings, determines the
termination of the probate proceedings

Ruling:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate
the probate proceeding (Timbol vs. Cano; Siguiong vs. Tecson). As long as the order of the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is
not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his
share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil.,

14
137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand
his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for
re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may
thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed
and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar,; Timbol vs.
Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz,; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines).
Sec. 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as, which secures for the heirs
or legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the doctrines.

CASE #25
NUÑAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 94005
April 6, 1993
FACTS:
Sometime in December 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First Instance rendered
its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the partition of the property of the
late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon. The order of partition was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in July 1982 then remanded to the lower court and two years later, a writ of
execution was issued by the latter. On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late
Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the
order of execution with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a
party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land
should not be affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is
unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and participation is concerned, said
share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She further invokes
Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. On January 1987, the lower court issued the
assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the
partition of the property The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA assailing the decision of
the lower court whether or not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-
heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property considering that she was neither a
party plaintiff nor a party defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the
aforesaid property and that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and
executory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy to enforce a right of an excluded heir to a final and executor
judgment of partition is a motion to quash said judgment?
RULING:
No. The Court said that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court
rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction
of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void." Furthermore, "any amendment or
alteration which substantially affects a final and executor judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose." In the case at bar, the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and executory. Thus, upon

15
its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification
that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of
his authority. The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties
in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all
the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.

CASE #26

VICENTE TAN, petitioner vs. CITY OF DAVAO, respondent.


(G.R. No. L-44347 September 29, 1988)

FACTS:

Spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia adopted Dominga Garcia who married
Tan Seng with whom she had three (3) children, named Vicenta, Mariano, and Luis . In 1923,
Dominga and her (3) three children emigrated to Canton, China. In less than a year, Tan Seng
followed his family to China.
According to petitioner, Dominga Garcia died intestate in 1955. She left a 1,966-
square-meter lot on Claveria Street, Davao, registered in her name. Since her departure for
China with her family, neither she, nor any of her family has returned to the Philippines to claim
the lot.
Dominga's adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro, her nephew, Ramon Pizarro, occupied
a part of Dominga's property and collected the rentals from persons occupying the land.
Another nephew of Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, informed the Solicitor General about the
property. The City Fiscal and NBI agents investigated regarding the whereabouts of Dominga
Garcia and her family.

On September 1962, the City of Davao filed a petition in the CFI of Davao, Branch I to
declare Dominga Garcia's land escheated in its favor. Alleging Dominga Garcia and her
children are presumed to be dead and since Dominga left no heir entitled to inherit her estate,
the same should be escheated pursuant to Rule 92 of the Rules of Court.
Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition saying that courts are not authorized
to declare that a person is presumed to be dead.

On March 1972, The trial court ordered the ff:

(A) the land in the name of Dominga Garcia as well as the rentals thereon, shall escheat
and the same are assigned to the City of Davao for the benefit of public schools and
public charitable institutions and centers in the said city.
(B) Ramon Pizarro shall make an accounting of the income he collected from himself and
those who are occupying the land from the time he took possession of it in 1936 when
his aunt Cornelia Pizarro died until the City of Davao takes possession of the property
and shall deliver the same to the city.
(C) Ramon Pizarro shall likewise deliver to the City of Davao the owner's duplicate of TCT

Ramon Pizarro appealed to the Court of Appeals . He passed away on June 1975. On
August,1975, a certain Luis Tan, claiming to be the missing son of Dominga Garcia, filed a

16
motion for intervention in the Court of Appeals. The City of Davao opposed the motion. The
Court of Appeals disallowed said motion for intervention because the trial had long been
terminated, and the intervention, if allowed, would unduly delay the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Vicenta Tan and/or her
attorney-in-fact, Ramon Pizarro appealed by Petition for certiorari to the SC.

ISSUES:
1. WON the city of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition; and
2. WON the CA erred in declaring that petitioner Vicenta Tan may be presumed dead.

RULING:

The Court find no merit in the petition for review.

(1) With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Solicitor-General, may file the escheat petition under Sec. 1, Rule 91 of the
Revised (1964) Rules of Court, the Court ruled that the case did not come under Rule
91 because the petition was filed on September 1962, when the applicable rule was
still Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court which provided:

Sec. 1. When and by whom,petition filed.—When a person dies intestate,


seized of real or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or person
by law entitled to the same, the municipality or city where the deceased last
resided, if he resided in the Philippines, or the municipality or city in which he
had estate if he resided out of the Philippines, may file a petition in the court of
first instance of the province setting forth the facts, and praying that the estate
of the deceased be declared escheated.

The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal of Vicenta Tan and Ramon
Pizarro earlier because Vicenta was never a party in the escheat proceedings. Vicenta Tan,
was never served with summons extra-territorially under Sec 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
She never appeared in the trial court, she never submitted to the court's jurisdiction. Every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest (Sec. 2, Rule
3, Rules of Court); Ramon Pizarro, the alleged administrator of Dominga Garcia's property,
was not a real party in interest. He had no personality to oppose the escheat petition.

(2) The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's ruling that Dominga Garcia
and her heirs may be presumed dead in the escheat proceedings as they are, in effect,
proceedings to settle her estate. Indeed, while a petition instituted for the sole purpose
of securing a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead cannot be
entertained if that were the only question or matter involved in the case, the courts are
not barred from declaring an absentee presumptively dead as an incident of, or in
connection with, an action or proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of
such absentee. Thus ruled this Court in In re Szatraw 81 Phil 461:

... This presumption ... may arise and be invoked in a case, either in an action
or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for-decision
to, competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an
action or special proceeding. (Emphasis added.)

17
Direct evidence proving that Dominga Garcia, her husband and her children are in fact
dead, is not necessary. It may be presumed under Article 390 of the New Civil Code which
provides: ART. 390. After an absence of (7) seven years, it being unknown whether or not
the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of (10) ten years ...

The Court of Appeals found that the City of Davao was able to prove the facts from
which the presumption arises. It said: “ Its evidence preponderantly shows that Dominga
Garcia and her family left the Philippines. Since then nothing had been heard about them. It
is not known whether all or any of them is still alive. No heir, devisee or any other person
entitled to the estate of Dominga Garcia claimed the same except Luis Tan whose status as
alleged heir has still to be proven in the proper court”.

These factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court. They
may not be disturbed in this petition for review where only legal questions may be raised (Sec.
2, Rule 45). WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

CASE #28
G.R. No. L-45460 February 25, 1938

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., applicants-appellants,


vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
FACTS:
The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the Hacienda de
San Pedro Tunasan by the right of Escheat. Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the exclusive
owner of the said hacienda, assailed the petition upon the grounds that the petition does not
allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy prayed for. Carlos Young, claiming
to be a lessee of the hacienda under a contract legally entered with Colegio de San Jose, also
intervened in the case. Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to the appearance
and intervention of CdSJ and Carlos Young but such objection was overruled. Furthermore,
the lower court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of San Pedro.
ISSUE: W/N the petition for escheat should be dismissed?
RULING: YES. According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Sec 1 of Rule 91),
the essential facts which should be alleged in the petition, which are jurisdictional because
they confer jurisdiction upon the CFI are:
1. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will,
2. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner thereof,
3. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the property, and
4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where deceased has
his last residence or in case he should have no residence in the country, the
municipality where the property is situated.

18
Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of Rule 91) provides that after the publications and trial, if the
court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal property situated in the
country and has not left any heir or other person entitled there to, it may order, after payment
of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall adjudicate the
personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his last residence and the real
property to the municipality/ies where they are situated.
Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person
become the property of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is
not an ordinary action but a special proceeding. The proceeding should be commenced by a
petition and not by a complaint.
In a special proceeding for Escheat under section 750to 752 (now sec 1 to 3 of Rule
91), the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have
a direct right or Interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and
necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the
remedy prayed for and even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground
for the court to proceed to the Inquisition provided by law, an interested party should not be
disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is untenable from all standpoint.
And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon this ground the petition may be dismissed
unconditionally.
In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene as an
alleged exclusive owner and a lessee of the property respectively.
CASE #29
Rivero vs CA
GR no. 141273
May 17, 2005
Facts:
In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint against defendants
for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased father. During trial, Mary
Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the sisters entered a compromised agreement with plaintiff
whereby she is acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and pay
petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of their deceased father. RTC granted the
compromised agreement.
Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed for annulment of judgment
and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment and motion to dismiss. CA directed Mary Jane
on the other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her uncle. In her reply, she question
assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of
a compromise agreement.
She further alleged that the parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the compromise
agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their
extrajudicial settlement.CA ruled in favor of the defendants, hence a petition.
Issue:

19
W/N the compromise regarding filiation is valid?
RULING:
NO. The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null
and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil
status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence
or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Such recognition by Mary
Jane, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made personally
by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.

CASE #30
G.R. No. L-5893. February 28, 1956
Pardo de Tavera vs. El Hogar
FACTS:
A parcel of land containing an area of 2,784 square meters as described in transfer certificate
of title No. 36234 issued on 6 September 1930 by the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila
and was registered in the name of Andres Luna de Pardo de Tavera, single;raryCarlos Pardo
de Tavera, married to Belen Ramirez; aryGonzales; ryMaria Audotte Pardo de Tavera y
Ramirez, 3 years of age, single; Roberto Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 9 years of age, single;
ryand Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano, 11 years of age, single (Exhibit B).
The co-owners agreed to organize a corporation under the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. for the
purpose of building a modern structure on the parcel of land and to that end they also agreed
to accept shares of stock of the corporation to be organized in exchange for their respective
shares in the parcel of land and building erected thereon to be transferred to the corporation
(Exhibit D-2). On 12 August 1930 the duly appointed guardian of the minor Carmen Pardo de
Tavera y Lopez Manzano, mother of the minor, filed a petition in the probate court (Special
Proceeding No. 34154) praying for the approval of the agreement referred to (Exhibit D-2) and
seeking authority to accept shares of stock of the corporation in exchange for the share of the
minor in the property (Exhibit D-1). On 28 August 1930 the probate court approved the
agreement in so far as the minor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano was concerned
and authorized the guardian to accept the shares of stock of the corporation in exchange for
the share of the minor in the property (Exhibit E-1). On 17 January 1931 upon application of
the corporation, El Hogar Filipino, Inc., a loan and building association, granted it a loan of
P1,000,000 for the purpose of erecting a concrete building in lieu of the wooden building
standing thereon.
This loan was secured by a first mortgage registered on the certificate.
On 11 February 1932 an additional loan of P300,000 was obtained by the corporation from El
Hogar Filipino, Inc. secured by a mortgage on the same property. The period of the first
mortgage of P1,000,000 was extended.
On 17 November 1942, Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the transfer of her right, share and interest in the
property made by her guardian to Tavera-Luna, Inc.
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment annulling the order of the probate
court that had granted authority to the guardian of the Plaintiff to transfer her ward’s right,

20
share interest in the parcel of land to Tavera-Luna, Inc. and the transfer thereof pursuant
thereto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Carmen is barred by the statute of limitations because she become of
age.
2. Whether El Hogar Filipino, Inc. was a purchaser for value and in good faith.

RULING:
The point that the Plaintiff’s action is barred by the statute of limitations is no longer urged,
because the Plaintiff became of age and released from guardianship on 19 November 1940
(Exhibit N-1 and 0- 1) and the action was brought on 17 November 1942, or within the period
provided for in section 579, Act No. 190, which says:
No action for the recovery of any estate sold by a guardian can be maintained by the
ward, or by any person claiming under him, unless it is commenced within three years next
after the termination of the guardianship, or, when a legal disability to sue exists by reason of
minority or otherwise, at the time when the cause of action accrues, within three years next
after the removal of such disability.
Even if the loan was granted when the certificate of title was still in the name of the Plaintiff and
her co-owners, the fact that the loan was applied for by an entity that was in the process of
organization and by the same persons who were the registered owners of the property, the
mortgagee was entitled to rely upon the order of the probate court granting authority to the
guardian to make the transfer of the share of her ward in the property and was not bound to
inquire further to find out whether there were irregularities committed or defects or vices that
would render the order null and void.
CASE #33
Feliciano Francisco v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Pelagio Francisco
G. R. No. L-57438, January 3, 1984

Guerrero, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. On


August 1974, private respondent Pelagio, first cousin of Estefania petitioned the court for the
removal of the petitioner and for his appointment. One of the grounds raised was the failure of
the petitioner to submit the inventory of the estate of his ward and delay to render accounting.
Further, the lower court ordered the retirement of the petitioner on the ground of old age. The
CA affirmed the decision, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can be removed as the guardian on the ground of old
age?

RULING:

In determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial
situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence, trustworthiness, the morals,
character and conduct as well as the probability of his, being able to exercise the powers and

21
duties of guardian for the full period. Considering that petitioner, is already 76 at the time of
the decision, the advanced age made him unfit to continue the guardianship. This finds support
in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by the petitioner. While age alone is not a
control criterion in the determination of his fitness, it may be a factor for consideration.

CASE #35
Castro vs Gregorio
GR No 188801
15 October 2014

Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which denied
the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate
court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted Rs’ decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they
separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Atty. Castro’s alleged homosexual
tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after
nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima
Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria
Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed
and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After
a Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the Trial Court the petition
was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had
been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-
handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts
to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two
children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied
the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always
offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children that’s why he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.
CA held that while no notice was given by the Trial Court to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, it ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate
child of the adopter. . . should be personally notified of the hearing.”
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth
certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could
not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.
Issues:
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?
2. Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the
adopter is required?
RULING:

22
1. The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through
extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested
party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed
through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest
the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have
hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the
law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted
the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
2. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain
not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III,
Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to
adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained
legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and
Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or
older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
CASE #36

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

Facts:

Herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent, thus, he prayed that
Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that
her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. The trial court rendered a
decision changing the name of the minor to STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Petitioner filed

23
a motion praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name but was dismissed by the court. Hence this petition.

Issue:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name?
RULING:

Yes, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof
of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.

Also, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname
of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact,
the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before
the surname of the mother."7

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.

CASE #37
ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

Facts:

At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the
couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on
legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption.
An order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling
of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of
Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom." A sad turn of
events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the RTC of Naga City. Prior to the institution
of the case, R.A. No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The
new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Jose
Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription
in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission
of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of
the Family Code.

24
Issue:

Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.

Ruling:

No. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at
the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition,
without being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. the Supreme
Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time
the petition was filed. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had
already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court
should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. Interestingly,
even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the
right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right
within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right
entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in
statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created
by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem
to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation
by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at any time
before it has been exercised.

CASE #38
G.R. No. 182497
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, Petitioner
vs.
JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37,
DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO
YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON, Respondents

FACTS:
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed. Investigation
conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identified the perpetrator
as PO1 Ampatuan. PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper
disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.
Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against
PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct
(Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing. The
City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for
further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for

25
other charges/legal grounds. Armed with the recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution
Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus before the RTC, which ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case
against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order
the release of the subject police officer. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition, hence
this petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON a writ of habeas shall be issued.
RULING:
No. The writ of habeas corpus applies only to cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty. The objective of the writ is to determine whether
the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. In this case,
PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8551, clearly provides that members of the police force are
subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Given that PO1 Ampatuan
has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued
detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP
authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for.
CASE #41

G.R. No. 169482 January 29, 2008

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E.


RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the resolutions February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the
C.A. where the petition for habeas corpus was denied.

Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental
health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. Herein petitioner filed for habeas corpus after
demanding the return of Eufemia from her adopted daughters. The C.A. ruled that petitioner
failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of
Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his
legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian.
Thus, in a resolution, the C.A. denied his petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was also denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a
writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether or not a
person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty and that there is no need to consider legal
custody or custodial rights. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not
under the legal custody of another.

26
According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of
liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before
the court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.

However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her
deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his
family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia
paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs.

Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as administrator of the properties of Eufemia
and her deceased spouse. By this appointment, he took charge of collecting payments from
tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the
respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo. Eufemia and the
respondents demanded an inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. His
failure to heed gave rise to a complaint of estafa. Consequently, and by reason of their
mother’s deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia. She willingly
went with them. Petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the
illegality of respondents’ action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted

RULING:
Petition Denied.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is
wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it
contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either through illegal
confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from
someone entitled to such custody.
According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the
person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. In this case, the
C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that
she was not.

CASE #42
Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one
daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted
to return to her old job as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home
together with their daughter and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband

27
filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but was
dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didn’t find them and
the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas
corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it
did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980.)

ISSUE:

W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors
in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such
petitions.

RULING:
Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked
its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of
CA can’t be affirmed because it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course
in obtaining custody. The minor could be transferred from one place to another and habeas
corpus case will be left without legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases
within their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity,
injustice, and contradiction. The literal interpretation of “exclusive” will result in grave injustice
and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children.

CASE #43
G.R. No. 159374
July 12, 2007
FELIPE N. MADRIAN, petitioner
Vs
FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN, respondent
FACTS:

Herein parties married each other on July 7, 1993 in Paraaque City. Their union was blessed
with three sons and a daughter. After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left
their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently
to Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her
and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their
barangay but this too proved futile. Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of
Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing. They initially agreed that petitioner would
return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had a change of
heart and decided to file a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of
their three sons.

28
He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of
RA 8369 (otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of 1997) family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent. Ca
assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of respondent.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over such petitions

RULING:

YES.

The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts
in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.

Note that after petitioner moved out of their Paranaque residence on May 18, 2002, he twice
transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions.

This situation is what the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369s provision on jurisdiction


precisely addressed:

“The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases,
the lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus
will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse
in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors
they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts
whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions.”

Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case
here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed RA 8369.

CASE #44

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,


vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel
Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila,
Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is
anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of
him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.

29
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging
that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

RULING:

NO.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.
RA 9048 governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. RA 9048 provides the
grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.

RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Petition is dismissed.

CASE #45
G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
Versus
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, respondent
FACTS:

30
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna;
such that, her name be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.

She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name “Jennifer
Cagandahan”. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and
female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no
breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well
as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.

ISSUE: WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The
Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in courtincluding the fact that
private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor
that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2)
how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects
the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. The Courtadded that a change of name is not a matter of right
but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that
will follow.

31