406772 Metaphysics 2016-2017 Dr. Donnchadh O’Conaill & Dr.

Tuomas Tahko

Supplementary readings
These readings are not mandatory, but are intended to serve as starting-points should you wish to
investigate a specific topic in more detail, for instance if you wish to write an essay on it. Most of
these readings are available online through the library website, or are available in the library.

General guides to metaphysics

-D. W. Hamlyn (1984) Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-E. J. Lowe (2002) A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-Peter Van Inwagen (1993) Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-Alyssa Ney (2014) Metaphysics: An Introduction. London: Routledge.

Collections of articles in metaphysics

-Robin Le Poidevin et al (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. London: Routledge.
-Michael Loux & Dean Zimmerman (eds.) (2003) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
-Peter Van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.) (2008) Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Oxford:
Blackwell.

Lecture 1 – What is Metaphysics? (Jan 24th)

Overview of metaphysics
-Peter Van Inwagen & Meghan Sullivan (2014) ‘Metaphysics’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/metaphysics/ ).
Challenges to traditional metaphysics
-Paul Boghossian (2006) Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, especially chapters 3 and 4
-Michael Loux ‘The Challenge of Anti-Realism’ in (2006) Metaphysics: A Contemporary
Introduction (third edition). London: Routledge.
-E. J. Lowe (1998) The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 1
-Alyssa Ney (2014) ‘Critiques of Metaphysics’ in Metaphysics: An Introduction. London:
Routledge.
-Hilary Putnam (2004) ‘A Defence of Conceptual Relativity’ in Ethics without Ontology.
Cambridge MA / London: Harvard University Press.

Lecture 2 – Universals: realism (Jan 26th)

-Fraser MacBride (2009) ‘Universals’ in Le Poidevin, R. et al (eds.) The Routledge Companion to
Metaphysics. London: Routledge.
[a clear overview of realism and different kinds of nominalism]
-Bertrand Russell (1912) ‘The World of Universals’ and ‘On Our Knowledge of Universals’ in The
Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[the classic modern statement of realism about universals]
The regress argument and vicious regresses
-Ricki Leigh Bliss (2013) ‘Viciousness and the Structure of Reality’ Philosophical Studies 166 (2):
399-418.
-Anna-Sofia Maurin (2013) ‘Bradley’s Regress’ Philosophy Compass 7 (11): 794-807.
[this is rather difficult, but a comprehensive survey of recent work on this topic]
-Jan Willem Wieland (2013) ‘Infinite Regress Arguments’ Acta Analytica 28 (1): 95-109.

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Exemplification and instantiation
-David Armstrong (1989) Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview, especially
chapter 5
-David Armstrong (1997) A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
esp. chapters 3, 4 and 8.
[each of these books is worth reading as a discussion of realism in general, but these
particular chapters are where Armstrong outlines his notion of states of affairs as the way
universals and particulars co-exist without being related]

Lecture 3 – Universals: nominalism (Jan 31st)

-David Armstrong (1989) Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview, especially
chapters 2 and 3
-Keith Campbell (1981) ‘The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6
(1): 477-488.
[statement of trope theory - this paper is available at www.philpapers.org]
-H. H. Price (1962) ‘Universals and Resemblances’ in Thinking and Experience. Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press.
[classic defence of nominalism]
-W. V. O. Quine (1953) ‘On What There Is’ in From a Logical Point of View. New York: Harper.
[this is a classic paper – the criticisms of universals occur on pp. 9-11, but it is worth reading
the paper from the start to fully appreciate Quine’s argument]
-Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008/2014) ‘Nominalism in Metaphysics’ The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/ ), esp.
sections 2.2, 4.1
-Zoltan Gendler Szabó (2003) ‘Nominalism’ in Michael Loux & Dean Zimmerman (eds.) (2003)
The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lecture 4 – Particulars: bundle theory (Feb 2nd)

-Albert Casullo (1988) ‘A Fourth Version of the Bundle Theory’ Philosophical Studies 54 (1): 125-
139.
-Peter Forrest (1996/2010) ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-indiscernible/ ).
-Herbert Hochberg (2009) ‘Particulars’ in Le Poidevin, R. et al (eds.) The Routledge Companion to
Metaphysics. London: Routledge.
[good summary of the debate between the bundle theorist and the substratum theorist]
-Laurie Paul (2012) ‘Logical Parts’ Noûs 36 (4): 578-596.
[novel version of the bundle theory]
-James Van Cleve (1985) ‘Three Versions of the Bundle Theory’ Philosophical Studies 47 (1): 95-
107.
-D. C. Williams (1953) ‘On The Elements of Being I’ Review of Metaphysics 7 (1): 3-18 (also
available at http://www.fflch.usp.br/df/opessoa/Williams-Elements-part-I.pdf ).

Lecture 5 – Particulars: substratum theory and substances (Feb 7th)

Substratum theory
-Edwin Allaire (1963) ‘Bare Particulars’ Philosophical Studies 14 (1-2): 1-8.
-Andrew Bailey (2013) ‘No Bare Particulars’ Philosophical Studies 158 (1): 31-41.
-C. B. Martin (1980) ‘Substance Substantiated’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1): 3-10.
[occasionally difficult, but an important paper which examines the substratum theory in its
historical and contemporary context – note that Martin means by ‘substance’ what most
writers on this topic call ‘substratum’]

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-J. P. Moreland (1998) ‘Theories of Individuation: A Reconsideration of Bare Particulars’ Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3): 251-263.
-Ted Sider (2006) ‘Bare Particulars’ Philosophical Perspectives 20: 387-397.
Substances
-David Robb (2009) ‘Substance’ in Robin Le Poidevin et al (eds.) The Routledge Companion to
Metaphysics. London: Routledge.
-John Heil (2003) ‘Objects’ in From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
[clear statement and defence of the view that some entities are substances (though Heil
prefers to call these ‘objects’)]
-E. J. Lowe (2000) ‘Locke, Martin and Substance’ Philosophical Quarterly 20 (201): 499-514.

Lecture 6 – Modality: possible worlds (Feb 9th)

-Saul Kripke (1971) ‘Identity and Necessity’ in M. K. Munitz (ed.) Identity and Individuation. New
York: New York University Press.
-David Lewis (1973) ‘Possible Worlds’ in Counterfactuals. Cambridge MA: Harvard University
Press.
-Christopher Menzel (2013) ‘Possible Worlds’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/possible-worlds/ ), esp. section 1
[an overview of possible worlds and modal logic – some of this is quite tricky]
-Penelope Mackie (2006) How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential
Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lecture 7 – Modality: metaphysics of possible worlds (Feb 14th)

Actualism
-Louis deRosset (2009) ‘Possible Worlds II: Non-reductive Theories of Possible Worlds’
Philosophy Compass 4 (6): 1009-1021, esp. sections 3-5
[not easy, but gives an idea of the different ways in which actualism might be developed]
-Christopher Menzel, C. (2013) ‘Possible Worlds’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/possible-worlds/ ).
[section 2.2 is a clear outline of different versions of actualism; section 2.1 discusses modal
realism]
-Alvin Plantinga (1976) ‘Actualism and Possible Worlds’ Theoria 42 (1-3): 139-160.
Modal realism
-Louis deRosset (2009) ‘Possible Worlds I: Modal Realism’ Philosophy Compass 4 (6): 998-1008.
[a little difficult, but a good overview of recent discussions]
-John Divers (2009) ‘Possible Worlds and Possibilia’ (2009) in Robin Le Poidevin et al (eds.) The
Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. London: Routledge.
-David Lewis (1973) ‘Possible Worlds’ in Counterfactuals. Oxford/Malden: Blackwell.
-David Lewis (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lecture 8 – Time: McTaggart’s argument (Feb 16th)

McTaggart on the B-series
-C. D. Broad (1938) ‘Ostensible Temporality’ in An Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy
(volume II). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, esp. pp. 295-300.
-J. E. McTaggart (1968) ‘Time’ in The Nature of Existence (vol 2). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
[this chapter is broadly the same as McTaggart’s 1908 paper – the most important extra
material is the criticism of Russell’s account of change (pp. 13-16)]

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-D. H. Mellor (1998) ‘Change’ in Real Time II. New York: Routledge (or in Real Time, 1981,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.)
McTaggart on the A-series
-C. D. Broad (1938) ‘Ostensible Temporality’ in An Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy
(volume II). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, esp. pp. 309-317
-Barry Dainton (2010) Time and Space (second edition). Durham: Acumen, chapter 2, pp. 15-20
-Michael Dummett (1960) ‘A Defence of McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time’
Philosophical Review 69 (4): 497-504
[not easy, but an influential defence of McTaggart’s argument]

Lecture 9 – Time: the A-theory and the B-theory (Feb 21st)

-Barry Dainton (2010) Time and Space (second edition). Durham: Acumen, chapter 5
-Heather Dyke (2003) ‘Temporal Language and Temporal Reality’ Philosophical Quarterly 53
(212): 380-391.
[sometimes difficult, but a good presentation of recent discussion]
-Katherine Hawley (2009) ‘Metaphysics and Relativity’ in Robin Le Poidevin et al (eds.) The
Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. London: Routledge.
-Robin Le Poidevin (1998) ‘The Past, Present, and Future of the Debate about Tense’ in Questions
of Time and Tense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[good overview of how the debate has developed]
-A. N. Prior (1959) ‘Thank Goodness that’s Over’ Philosophy 34 (128): 12-17.
[the famous example which gives this paper its title is on p. 17]
-J. J. C. Smart (1963) ‘The Space-Time World’ in Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London:
Routledge.
[classic statement of the B-theorist’s view]

Lecture 10 – Persistence: endurance and perdurance (Feb 23rd)

-Sally Haslanger (1989) ‘Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics’ Analysis 49 (3): 119-125.
[a copy of this article is available from me on request]
-Sally Haslanger (2006) ‘Persistence, Change and Explanation’ in Roxanne Kurtz & Sally
Haslanger (eds.) Persistence: Contemporary Readings. London / Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
-Katherine Hawley (2008) ‘Persistence and Determination’ Royal Institute of Philosophy
Supplement 62: 197-212.
-E. J. Lowe (1998) The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 98-135.
[defence of endurantism and discussion of perdurantist arguments]
-Trenton Merricks (1994) ‘Endurance and Indiscernibility’ Journal of Philosophy 91 (4): 165-184.
[defence of endurantism against well-known criticisms]
-Ted Sider (2006) ‘Four-Dimensionalism’ in Roxanne Kurtz & Sally Haslanger (eds.) Persistence:
Contemporary Readings. London / Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Lecture 11 – Persistence: arguments for perdurance (Feb 28th)

-Katherine Hawley (2004/2010) ‘Temporal Parts’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/temporal-parts/ ).
[good overview with a wealth of suggested readings]
-Katherine Hawley (2006) ‘Selections from How Things Persist’ in Roxanne Kurtz & Sally
Haslanger (eds.) Persistence: Contemporary Readings. London / Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
[Hawley’s book How Things Persist is well worth a look – this selection distinguishes stage
theory from more common perdurantist theories, and argues for stage theory]

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-Kathrin Koslicki (2003) ‘The Crooked Path from Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism’
Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2): 107-134.
[criticism of perdurantist arguments]
-David Lewis (1986) ‘Against Overlap’ in On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
[the problem of temporary intrinsics is outlined on pp. 202-204]
-Ted Sider (2001) Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, esp. chapter 3

Lecture 12 – Metaphysics and science (Mar 2nd)

-Steven French & Kerry McKenzie (2012) ‘Thinking Outside the Toolbox’ European Journal of
Analytic Philosophy 8 (1): 42-59.
-Katherine Hawley (2006) ‘Science as a Guide to Metaphysics?’ Synthese 149 (3): 451-470.
-Alyssa Ney (2014) ‘Critiques of Metaphysics’ in Metaphysics: An Introduction. London:
Routledge, esp. pp. 132-137.
-Laurie Paul (2012) ‘Metaphysics as Modelling: The Handmaiden’s Tale’ Philosophical Studies
160 (1): 1-29.
-Don Ross, James Ladyman & Don Spurrett (2003) ‘In Defence of Scientism’, in James Ladyman
& Don Ross Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[a trenchant defence of scientism and criticism of traditional metaphysics]
-Don Ross (2016) ‘Vikings or Normans? The Radicalism of Naturalized Metaphysics’ Metaphysica
17 (2): 213-227.
-Tuomas Tahko (2015) ‘Demarcating Metaphysics and Science: Can Metaphysics be Naturalised?’
in An Introduction to Metametaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[The chapter on ‘The Epistemology of Metaphysics’ may also be relevant]