CELESTINO TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC SALVADOR A. SURTIDA (Mayor) 2nd ISSUE: W/n TC gave ordin. no.
2nd ISSUE: W/n TC gave ordin. no. 13 meaning other than what it say sby declaring that Tatel violated
1.) Complaints filed by residents of barrio Sta. Elena against Tatel for disturbance caused by operation of
abaca bailing machine inside warehouse of Tatel affected peace and tranquility of neighborhood due to
smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by machine.
2.) Committee- appointed by Munic. council [MC] of Virac to investigate
Findings: crowded nature of neighborhood, accidental fire within warehouse, storing of inflammable
materials created danger to lives and properties of neigbors
3.) Resol. No. 29- passed by MC declaring said warehouse a public nuisance within Art. 694 of NCC.
4.) Tatel’s MR denied by MC, hence he filed Pet. for Prohib. w/ Prelim. Injunc.
5.) Respondent munic. officials Contention: Tatel’s warehouse constructed in viol. of Ordinance No. 13, ss
of 1952, prohibiting construction of warehouses near block of houses either in poblaciono/barrios w/o
maintaining necessary distance of 200 m from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives & properties
by accidental fire.
6.) Tatel’s Cont: ordinance unconst’l, contrary to the due process & equal protection clause and null
and void not passed in accordance with law.
7.) TC FINDINGS & DECISION:
*warehouse legally constructed under valid permit issued by munic. of Virac in accordance with existing
regulations and may not be destroyed or removed from its present location;
*Ordinance No. 13 valid exercise of police power by mc Of Virac of Virac; constit’l
*storage by Tatel of abaca & copra warehouse in viol. of ordinance but poses grave danger to the safety
of lives and properties of neighborhood due to accidental fire hence, a public nuisance under Art. 694
*Tatel was directed to remove from warehouse all abaca and copra and other inflammables w/in (2)
mons. from finality of decision
1st ISSUE: W/N Ord. No.13 is const’l= YES
SC:
1.) Ord. 13 passed by MC of Virac in exercise of its police power.
2.) Munic. corpo.- agencies of State for promotion &maintenance of local self-government
-endowed with police powers to effectively accomplish and carry out declared objects of their creation.
3.) Authority emanates from gen. welfare clause under Admin. Code: MC shall enact ordinances and
make
regul., not repugnant to law, as necessary to effect and discharge powers and duties conferred to it by law
and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health & safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of munic. and inhabitants & for
protection of property.
4.) Req. for Validity of Ordinance- a.) must be w/in corpo. powers of munic.to enact; b)passed accdng to
procedure prescribed by law; c.) in consonance w/well established and basic principles of a substantive
nature.
5.) More Specific Req- a.)not contravene Consti. or statute; b) not unfair/oppressive; c) not
partial/discriminatory; d) not prohibit but may regulate trade; e) general & consistent w/public policy & f)
not unreasonable.
6.) Ordinance No. 13 meets these criteria.
the same by using warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what’s prohibited and penalized by
ordinance is construction of warehouses.= NO
SC: 1.) What is regulated by ordinance is construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are
stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not
the construction per se of a warehouse.
*Purpose=avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire- one of primordial obligation of gov’t.
2.) Casual glance of ordinance at once reveals manifest disregard elemental rules of syntax.
*Sec.1 of Ord- “It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to any person, persons,
entity……..
*Sec.2-Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove their said warehouses this
ordinance by the MC…….
*Experience show that this is common in law making bodies in small towns where local authorities & in
persons charged w/ the drafting and preparation of municipal ordin. lack sufficient education & training
& not well grounded on the basic elements of the English language
3.) But, scrutinizing terms of ordin., SEC. 1- what’s prohib. is construction of warehouses by any person,
entity or corp. wherein copra, hemp, gasoline and other inflammable products may be stored unless at
distance of not less than 200 m from a block of houses either in poblacion/barrios to avoid loss of
property and life due to fire.
4.)Sec. 2, existing warehouses for storage of the prohibited articles given 1 year after approval of ordin. to
remove them but allowed to remain in operation if ceased to store such prohibited articles.
5.) Ambiguity springs from simple error in grammar but meaning & intent is clear that what is prohibited
is construction/maintenance of warehouses for storage of inflammable articles at distance within 200
meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios.
6.) TC NOT add meaning different from what was provided in ordin. It merely stated purpose of ordin. &
what it intends to prohibit to accomplish its purpose.
As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses
similarly situated as that of petitioner were not prosecuted,
3rd ISSUE: W/n TC erred in refusing to take judicial notice of fact that in munic., there are numerous
establishments similarly situated as Tatel’s warehouses but which are not prosecuted= NO
SC: 1.) mere fact that municipal authorities of Virac not proceeded against other warehouses in munic.
allegedly violating Ordin. No. 13 is not reason to claim that ordin. is discriminatory.
2.) Law itself vs manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its
administration and enforcement.
3.) No valid reason for Tatel to complain, in absence of proof that other bodegas mentioned by him are
operating in viol. of the ordin.
.4.) Objections by Tatel to validity of ordin. not substantiated.
5.) No undue restraint is placed upon Tatel/ for anybody to engage in trade but merely prohibition from
storing inflammable products in warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of
the people residing in the vicinity.
6.) As far as public policy is concerned, no better policy than what was conceived by the municipal
government.
7.) Case is simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance, original jurisdiction falls under CFI.
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO v. PAGCOR
1.) TV ad proudly announces: new PAGCOR—responding thru responsible gaming.”
2.) Basco think otherwise, filed instant petition to annul (PAGCOR) Charter-PD 1869, allegedly contrary to
morals, public policy and order; a waiver of a right prejudicial to 3rd person with right recognized by law;
waived Manila City govt’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized
by law;
*PD 1869 intruded into the LG right to impose local taxes and license fees in contravention of local autonomy
*violates equal protection clause for it legalizes PAGCOR— conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices
*violates trend of Cory gov’t away from monopolistic and toward free enterprise and privatization
3.) Basco’s 2nd Amended Pet., PD contrary t “new restored democracy”
4.) (PAGCOR) created by P.D. 1067-A & was granted a franchise under P.D 1067-B “to establish, operate
and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within Philippines.”
*operation originally conducted in floating casino “Philippine Tourist.” w/c proved potential source of revenue
thus, P.D. 1399 was passed for PAGCOR to fully
attain this objective.
5.) PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law,
6.) To attain objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over Philippines.
7.) Under its Charter’s repealing clause, all laws, decrees, inconsistent are repealed.
8.) PAGCOR - third largest source of government revenue, next to BIR &Bureau of Customs.
1st ISSUE: W/n P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of Manila’s right to impose taxes and legal
fees; P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR paying any “tax= NO.
SC: 1.) Statute is presumed to be valid.
of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging
2.) Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But prohibition of gambling not
mean that Gov’t cannot regulate it in exercise of its police power.
3.) Police Power- “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere w/personal liberty/property to
promote gen. welfare; Consists of: a) restraint upon liberty or property, (2) to foster the common good
*most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers
4.) Reason behind of enactment PD1869- regulate & centralize thru appropriate institution all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law
* Regulating and centralizing gambling PAGCOR beneficial not just to govt but to society in general since its
reliable source revenue
* corruptions in gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated.
5.) Manila, being mere Munic. corp. no inherent right to impose taxes
*Its “power to tax” must always yield to legis. act superior passed upon by state itself
w/ “inherent power to tax”
* Charter of Manila subject to control by Congress since munic. corp. mere creatures of Congress
*if Congress can grant, it can also provide exemptions to Manila or even take back the power.
*Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, long been revoked and vested exclusively on National
Government,
*Local govts no power to tax instrum. of Natl Govt.
*PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation w/ orig. charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks
are owned by the National Government.
*PAGCOR’s dual role- to operate and to regulate gambling casinos (governmental placing PAGCOR in category
of agency or instrum.of Govt).
*PAGCOR should be exempt from local taxes otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or
subjected to control by a mere Local government.
*doctrine of“supremacy” of the National Government over local governments.
2nd ISSUE: W/n Local Autonomy Clause of Consti violated by P.D. 1869= NO.
*Art. 10 of Consti- Each local government unit have power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress
may provide
* power of local govt to “impose taxes and fees” always subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by
law.
*Since PD 1869 remains “operative” law until amended, repealed or revoked its “exemption clause” remains as
an exception to exercise of power of local govt to impose taxes and fees.
*principle of local autonomy simply means “decentralization” not make LG sovereign w/in state or an
“imperium in imperio.”
*Local Government (LG)- political subd. of nation/state constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs.
*LG can only be intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio .
* what state powers be “decentralized” and what be delegated to LGUs remains=political questions
*What’s settled is that regulating, taxing/ dealing with gambling is a State concern, hence, it’s sole prerogative
of State to retain it/delegate it to local governments.
*As gambling usually offense against State, legis grant or express charter power is generally necessary to
empower the local corporation to deal with the subject; in absence of express grant of power to enact,
ordinance inconsistent with the state laws are void
3rd ISSUE: W/ P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection because “it legalized PAGCOR—conducted gambling,
while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices= No.
*mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting, sweepstakes, lotteries are legalized under
conditions, while others are prohibited, not render their governing laws,unconstit’l
*equal protection clause not mean that all occupations by same name must be treated the same way;
4th ISSUE: W/n PD 1869 is contrary to trend of Cory gov’t away from monopolistic and toward free enterprise
and privatization= POLITICAL QUESTION
*it is for Executive to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
* judiciary not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be
* policy issues are w/in domain of political branches of govt and people as repository of all state power
*On issue of “monopoly,”Consti provides that monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. State must still decide
whether public interest demands monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for
the Legislature to decide.
**Other Alleged Viol. Personality Dignity; Family; Role of Youth; Social Justice; Educational Values- these are
merely statements of principles and policies hence not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by
Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles; only directives addressed to the executive and the
legislature. If executive & legislature failed to comply w/ directives remedy was not
judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure thru the language of ballot.
*Basco failed to overcome the presumption of consttnlty
PET DIMISSED
Franklin Drilon as DOJ Sec. vs. Mayor Alfredo Lim
1.) Sec. 187 of LGC- Procedure For Approval & Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances & Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings- any question on legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures be raised on appeal w/in (30)
days from the effectivity to the Secretary of Justice who shall render decision w/in 60) days from date of
receipt of appeal
*such appeal shall not have effect of suspending effectivity of ordin. & accrual & payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied:
* w/in (30) days after receipt of decision or lapse of the 60-day period w/o Sec. of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with court of competent jurisdiction.
2.) Sec.of Justice had, on appeal to him of 4 oil companies taxpayer, declared known as the Manila Revenue
Code (MRC) null and void for non-compliance with procedure in enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy
3.)RTC MANILA RULING In petition for certiorari filed by Manila-revoked the Sec’s resolution and sustained
ordinance, holding that procedural req been observed.; declared Section 187 of the LGC unconsttl because of
its vesture in the Sec. of the power of control over LGs in viol. of policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Consti. and of the specific provision therein conferring on Presi. only power of supervision over LGs.
3.) Sec. Argument- argues Sec 187 constitutional and that procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in LGC not observed.
4.) Pet was originally dismissed by SC for failing to submit a certified true copy of challenged decision.However,
on MR with certified true copy of the decision attached, petition was reinstated.
5.) TC declared Section 187 unconstitutional as it empowered the Sec. of Justice to review tax ordinances and,
to annul them.
*control- power of officer to alter/set aside what subordinate officer done in performance of his duties &
substitute judgment of the superior for the subordinate
*supervision- power of superior to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law.
*conclusion was that challenged section gave to Secretary power of control and not supervision only as vested
ISSUE: W/n Section 187 of the Local Government Code constitutional=YES
SC: 1.) Section 187 authorizes the Sec. of Justice to review only consttlty/legality of tax ordinance & if
warranted, to revoke it on either/both of these grounds.
2.) When he alters/modifies/sets aside tax ordin., he is not permitted to substitute his own judgment for
judgment of LG that enacted the measure
3.) Sec. Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but did not replace it w/his own version of what Code
should be; He not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as basis for its annulment; He did not say
that it was a bad law; he found only was that it was illegal.
4.)All he did was determine if Lim, etc were performing their functions accdng law,w/ prescribed procedure
for enactment of tax ordinances & grant of powers to city govt under LG.
5.) Presi. of Phil. shall exercise general supervision over LGs. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, & cities and municipalities with respect to component brgys shall ensure that acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
6.) It was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
*officer in control lays down rules in the doing an act. If not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or do it himself.
* Supervision not cover such authority. Supervisor/superintendent merely sees that rules are followed, but he
not lay down rules, nor have discretion to modify/replace them. If rules not observed, he may order work done
or re-done but only to conform to prescribed rules; may not prescribe his own manner for doing of act; no
judgment on this matter except to see to it rules are followed.
7.) Sec. Drilon did precisely this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
8.) rule similar to Section 187 appeared in Local Autonomy Act Section 2- That section allowed Sec. of Finance
to suspend effectivity of tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax/ fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory.
*Determination of these flaws involve exercise of judgment or discretion not merely examination of w/n
requirements/limitations of law been observed hence, it would strike of control rather than mere supervision.
9.)That power was never questioned before SC but, at any rate, the Sec. of Justice is not given same latitude
under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the consttlty/legality of tax measure, w/o right to
declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretionon this
matter.
10.) Sec. Drilon set aside the MRC only on two grounds: a.)inclusion of ultra vires provisions and b.)
noncompliance w/ prescribed procedure in its enactment.
*These grounds affected legality, not the wisdom/reasonable-ness, of the tax measure.
*issue of non-compliance w/ prescribed procedure in enactment MRC is another matter.
* In his resolution, Sec. Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on proposed
MRC sent to interested parties nor were copies of proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation; No minutes were submitted to show obligatory public hearings had been
held; Neither were copies of measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city; MRC not translated
into Pilipino or Tagalog & disseminated among people for their information and guidance,
*Judge Palattao of TC found otherwise. He declared that all procedural requirements had been observed in
enactment of MRC; that Manila not been able to prove such compliance before the Sec. only because he had
given it only 5 days which to gather and present to him all evidence later submitted to the trial court.
11.) SC carefully examined every one of exhibits and agree with the TC that procedural requirements have
indeed been observed.
*Notices of public hearings sent to interested parties
*minutes of hearings
*ordinances published in the Balita and the Manila Standard
*approved ordinance was published
*only exceptions are posting of ordin. as approved but this omission not affect its validity, considering that its
publication in 3 successive issues ofa newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.
12.) text of ordinance been translated and dissemi-nated, but this requirement applies to approval of local
development plans and public investment programs of LGU and not to tax ordinances.
13.) No ruling on substantive provisions of the MRC as their validity has not been raised in issue in the present
petition.
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered
REVERSING challenged decision of RTC insofar as it declared Section 187 of LGC unconstitutional but
AFFIRMING its finding that procedural requirements in the enactment of MRC have been observed.