SB2 4F Criminal Law Review Second Wave Arts 13 20

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia
ARTICLE 13: Mitigating Circumstances
MARIANO v PEOPLE
G.R. No. 178145 | July 7, 2014
TICKLER: Voluntary Surrender / Jeep-Toyota Pick-up
DOCTRINE: Under Article 365 of RPC, the carelessness, imprudence or negligence

which characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in nature,
extent, and resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just
application of the penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its imposition,
without being bound by what we may call the mathematical formula provided for in
Article 64 of the RPC. On the basis of this particular provision, the trial court was not
bound to apply Paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two
mitigating circumstances in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to offset them.
FACTS:
Ferdinand De Leon was driving his owner type jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat,
Bulacan. With him were his wife, Urbanita, and their two-year old son. Reynaldo
Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, and their helper. The pick-up
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand De Leon and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got mad,
overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up behind the
jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed
that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted that he just
stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him.
Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance of Luis De Leon.
Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis and they went their separate ways.
Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother’s house in San Roque, Angat to pick-up some
items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom.
However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lost
consciousness. Urbanita identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand as
the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.
On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife tried to show that the jeep of Ferdinand
stopped on the road in front at the house of the latter’s mother about five (5) to six (6)
meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an incoming
vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Then he made a signal and overtook the jeep of
Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and
was sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop his pick-up and he
proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might harm him and his companions.
After bringing his companions to their house, Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo in
Bulacan to surrender and report the incident.
Ferdinand suffered multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
orbital wall and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma. Urbanita
received the amount of P50, 000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial
assistance.
CRIME CHARGED: FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
RTC: CONVICTED the petitioner of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.
CA: MODIFIED the felony to RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SERIOUS

PHYSICAL INJURIES.
ISSUE: Can the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated in favor

of the petitioner?
RULING: NO. Under Article 365 of RPC, the carelessness, imprudence or negligence
which characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in nature,
extent, and resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just
application of the penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its imposition,
without being bound by what we may call the mathematical formula provided for in
Article 64 of the RPC. On the basis of this particular provision, the trial court was not
bound to apply Paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two
mitigating circumstances in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to offset them.
In its decision, the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a
fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary
to severe head trauma; that he had become stuporous and disoriented as to time, place
and person. Ferdinand’s physical injuries where those under Article 263, 3, for having
incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which he was habitually engaged
in for more than 90 days. Conformably with Article 365 of the RPC, the proper penalty is
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four
months.
DECISION: RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SERIOUS PHYSICAL

INJURIES. The Court holds that the straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor
was the correct penalty for the petitioner.

ARTICLE 14 and 15: Aggravating and Alternative Circumstances
PEOPLE v MOLO
G.R. No. L-44680 | January 11, 1979
TICKLER: Attacked a dwelling with a bolo at night
DOCTRINE: Elements of voluntary surrender:

a) he had not been actually arrested;
b) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent; and
c) his surrender is voluntary, which circumstances are not present in this case.
FACTS:
In the evening of April 9, 1976 at about 8:00 p.m. at Sitio Dacotan, Barrio Tambac,
Municipality of Romblon, Venancio Gapisa and Simeona Rapa-Gapisa, husband and
wife, retired to sleep. The couple lived in a typical hut made of bamboo flooring and
dilapidated burl walling surrounded by fruit. bearing banana plants. Venancio Gapisa
immediately fell asleep because he was tired from clearing the fields, and besides, had
drunk tuba on that day. He slept near the door lying on his right side.
Not long after the couple had retired, Simeona, who had not yet fallen asleep, heard an
indistinct sound of murmur and gnashing of teeth. Although she was seized by fear, she
managed to peep through the dilapidated buri wall and saw accused Dominador Molo
attired only in short pants. He was alone. Trembling, she immediately lighted a
kerosene lamp and placed it on top of the trunk nearby. She tried to awaken her
husband, but the latter did not respond.
Meanwhile, Molo had already climbed up the house which was only a flight of two steps.
The accused forcibly pushed the sliding door and barged into the house. He inquired
from Simeona where Venancio was and she replied that he was asleep. Finding
Venancio sleeping near the door, he immediately grabbed his left wrist and started
hacking at the sleeping old man. Rudely awakened, Venancio quickly stood up and with
his right hand reached for his bolo which was atop the table nearby; but he was not able
to retaliate in as much as Molo was quick to hack at him again. Fearing for her own life,
Simeona rushed out of the house through the door of the unfinished kitchen to summon
help from her son, Alejandro, who was at a house some 100 meters away. Trembling,
she told him that his father was boloed by Boslo, the name by which accused-appellant
was known in their locality.
Upon being informed, Alejandro and Roman ran towards the house of Venancio,
followed by Simeona. Upon arrival, they saw Venancio bleeding profusely and in
weakened condition. He was sitting on the floor of the kitchen, defecating in his pants.
When Alejandro took him in his arms, Venancio told him that he was boloed by Boslo.
Venancio died of hemorrhage from multiple incised wounds.

CRIME CHARGED: MURDER of Venancio Gapisa, with the use of a bolo, with
aggravating circumstances of (1) dwelling, (2) recidivism and (3) reiteration
*Previous crimes (reiteration): Grave slander; Less Serious Physical Injuries; Qualified
Trespass to Dwelling; Robbery
RTC: Molo is GUILTY of MURDER; Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

which has offset one aggravating circumstance, there remains two other circumstances
CA: N/A; Automatic review to SC of the death sentence.
ISSUE: Is there a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?
Arguments of the Solicitor General
Accused-appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

He did not surrender to the authorities. As admitted by him, he was arrested by a
combined force of policemen and Philippine Constabulary agents at his residence the
day after the killing. Since there are three aggravating circumstances and no mitigating
circumstance, the penalty properly imposable upon accused-appellant is death.
RULING: There is no voluntary surrender.
For in order that the same may be properly appreciated in favor of the accused, it must
appear that —
a) he had not been actually arrested;
b) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent; and
c) his surrender is voluntary, which circumstances are not present in this case.
For appellant admitted that on the day after the killing, police authorities surrounded his
house and arrested him. The fact that he did not try to escape or did not resist arrest
after he was taken into custody by the authorities, does not amount to voluntary
surrender.
*On reiteracion and recidvism
It appears that accused-appellant is an incorrigible criminal with clearly anti-social

proclivities against which the community has the need if not the right, to defend itself.
Where, as in this case, the reformative end of punishment seems to have failed in
amending his criminal tendencies — the imposition of the supreme penalty, is not only
justified by the facts of this case, but is required as a measure of social defense. Society
had given accused-appellant several chances. It would seem that compassion had not
reformed him but had instead made him a hardened criminal and a menace to his fellow
men. To spare his life is to endanger the lives and properties of others.

DECISION: Molo is guilty of MURDER with three aggravating circumstances and no

mitigating circumstance.
PEOPLE v MAXIMO RACE

[G.R. No. 93143 | August 4, 1992]
TICKLER: Rape of Maria Pura, a cross-eyed, mute, retarded, and a polio victim.
Could only nod her head and make signs to communicate.
DOCTRINE: For reiteracion to exist, it is necessary that "the offender has been
previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty."
FACTS:
One morning, Elvira Collantes left her forty-year old sister Maria Pura in their house.
Maria was cross-eyed, mute, retarded, and a polio victim, standing less than four feet
who could only nod her head and make signs to be able to communicate. She can
crawl but cannot stand unsupported.
Maria was left alone in the house with Maximo Race, Jr. also known as Jun. Race
often sleeps outside the extension of the Pura house, particularly in the Pura store,
which is attached to the house.
At around 10 a. m. of the same day, Noel Abila who also lived in the Pura residence
together with Maria, had just come home from school when he heard a voice. He
immediately ran to the kitchen where the voice came from and saw Race putting his
pants.
Noel then saw his Aunt Maria in the dining room. When Noel asked his Aunt Maria
what Race did to her she moved her body forward and backward in a push-pull
movement. Noel thereupon accused Race of raping Maria and threatened to report
the incident.
Noel afterwards informed his uncle Glen Collantes, husband of Elvira Collantes of the
incident. Glen brought Race to Maria Pura, who pointed at Race. When Glen asked
Maria what Race did to her she again made the push-pull movement.
Elena Collantes later went to the Municipal Hall to lodge a complaint. Maria was
examined by Dr. Artemio Capellan, the Municipal health officer, in their house, the
following day where it was found that:
1. No extra genital injuries were noted on the person of Maria Pura.

2. Presence of human semen and dead sperm were noted.
CRIME CHARGED: RAPE

RTC: GUILTY of RAPE, aggravating circumstance of reiteracion
The victim being mentally retarded could not be asked questions as what happened
to her although she sometimes understands some questions. The circumstances
appearing as seen by Noel Abela shows that sexual intercourse was committed on
the person of Maria Pura a mentally retarded, deaf-mute. Maria Pura being mentally
retarded could not actually give consent in order that she could have sexual
intercourse with the accused.
The Court could not even say as testified that force was employed upon the victim but
the appearance of the woman alone and her physical condition could not stop any
physical force. However, for the reason that the accused has been known to the
woman who even slept, though outside of their house in an attachment, moral
compulsion which is tantamount to intimidation was employed by the accused when
the sexual intercourse happened. It is a sorry state that the victim could not testify.
The Court however, is convinced that rape was committed.
It also appreciated against the accused the aggravating circumstance of

reiteracion because he admitted during cross-examination that he was previously,
convicted of the crime of homicide but was out on parole at the time of the rape.
CA: Same with RTC. Although there was no eyewitness to the act, the confluence of
the facts and circumstances unerringly establishes the commission of the act.
ISSUES:
1) Did the information properly charge the accused with the commission of
rape?
2) Assuming that it does, did the evidence for the prosecution establish the
guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING:
1) The information does not specifically describe any of the circumstances

under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the allegation
therein that the accused had sexual intercourse with a woman who is
retarded and an imbecile implies that the victim was not in full possession
and control of her moral reasoning faculty is sufficient enough to have
alerted the accused that the charge against him is for rape under the
circumstance that the woman is deprived of reason.
2) It may be recalled that the trial court convicted the accused based on two
circumstances: (a) the use of intimidation and (b) the inability of the
offended party to give consent because she is "a deaf-mute, retarded and
an embecile".

The first is definitely without basis as no evidence was adduced to prove it.
What has to be determined then is whether the offended party, Maria Pura,
before, during and even after the sexual intercourse on 14 September
1988, suffers from mental retardation or, imbecility which deprived her of
reason at the time the appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
No expert witness was presented to testify on Maria Pura's imbecility.

Fortunately for the Prosecution, the appellant readily admitted that Maria
Pura is mentally deficient:
Thus, in his Brief, he states:
“In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution was not scrutinized
with extreme caution. To stress, there is no reliable eyewitness to the crime
charged. The alleged rape victim is physically and mentally deficient being
a deaf-mute, retarded and imbecile. “
The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the aggravating

circumstance of reiteracion. This circumstance is not alleged in the
information. The prosecution did not prove it. Upon cross-examination of
the accused by the Prosecutor, over the objection of the defense counsel,
the only information elicited is that the accused had earlier been convicted
for the crime of homicide, had served the sentence and had later been
released.
The fact of his being out on parole was brought out upon questioning by
the court after the termination of the cross-examination. It would thus be
unfair to appreciate reiteracion against the accused. Besides, for the same
to exist, it is necessary that "the offender has been previously punished for
an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two
or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty." Appellant was earlier
convicted for the crime of homicide which is punishable by reclusion
temporal. That penalty is not equal or greater — but is definitely lower —
than that provided for the crime of ordinary rape which is reclusion
perpetua.
DECISION: RTC Decision finding accused Maximo Race guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
PEOPLE v MACARIOLA
G.R. No. L-40757 | January 24, 1983
TICKLER: Inmate stabbed a fellow inmate because the victim was a sour loser at
gambling.

DOCTRINE:
1. Self-defense should be established by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
2. Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods or forms which tend
directly and specially to insure the execution of the offense without risk to the
accused arising from the defense which the victim might make.
FACTS:
On September 21, 1971, at around 9:30 am, Romeo Dela Pena who was an inmate at
the New Bilibid prison was standing in his cell (Brigade No. 2D) when he was stabbed
by Ricarte Macariola, who was a fellow inmate, with an improvised weapon called
“MATALAS” after which the victim ran to a certain “kubol” to hide but the appellant
pursued him along with other inmates. Fernando Gomez who was the cell’s MAYOR
went inside the cell when he heard the victim shout and saw appellant on top of the
victim and continued stabbing him even after he is already in a lying position. The
prison keepers then arrived and appellant surrendered his bloody weapon.
On the same day, an investigation was made and the sworn statements of Fernando
Gomez and Romeo Sato, while the appellant in his statement admitted having
stabbed the victim. On the autopsy report, Dr. Garcia found that there was a total of
16 stab wounds and stab wound 11 (left lobe of the liver which penetrated the heart)
and stab wound 12 (5 in number and penetrated the lungs) were considered fatal. Dr.
Garcia noted that the five wounds found in stab wound No. 12 were very near each
other, hence, they could have been delivered while the victim was in a lying position.
The appellant on his part interposes SELF-DEFENSE. He alleges that he and the
victim was playing “HONG CHANG” (gamble) for about 4 hours and the victim lost
around P6.00, and while the appellant was holding the money he won the victim
snatched them from him, and when he was trying to get them back he was kicked by
the victim on the chest, that when he stood up he held his MATALAS (12 inches long)
and upon seeing such the victim also reached under his pillow to get his own
MATALAS, the appellant stabbed him once and the victim failed to get it because it
fell down. They both fell down and the victim was holding him in his neck when he
stabbed him again. Appellant alleges that given the fact the deceased was bigger
than him in terms of height and huskier, that the deceased was a boxer and he has
nowhere to go because their cell was enclosed, he had to use his MATALAS in order
to disable the victim and thinking that his life was in imminent danger, and that upon
the arrival of the prison keepers he surrendered his MATALAS.
CRIME CHARGED: MURDER, qualified “with treachery and evident premeditation,

and armed with improvised deadly weapon did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and wound therewith one Romeo de la Peña No. 29820-P, a
sentenced prisoner in the same institution, inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds,
while then unarmed and unable to defend himself from the attack launched by the
accused, as a result of which the said Romeo de la Peña died instantly.”

RTC: GUILTY of MURDER with aggravating circumstance of Treachery, Evident

Premeditation and Recidivism
CA: Automatic Review to the SC because the penalty is death.
ISSUES:
1. Did the trial court err in not appreciating self-defense in his favor?
2. Is Macariola guilty of murder with treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism?
3. Was the appellant a recidivist?
SC:
1. NO, there is no self-defense. Self-defense should be established by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence, the victims act of kicking him in his chest
did not amount to unlawful aggression as would justify the killing. It was not of
such a nature that posed actual or imminent and real danger to the accused's
life. As per the witness, it was narrated that both of them “nagpormahan na”
meaning they were getting ready to fight which only shows that the action of
the accused is more of a retaliation and not self-defense. Besides even if the
deceased’s act of kicking be considered as unlawful aggression, the same is
not continuous because the deceased ran to a “kubol” when the accused still
pursued him and stabbed him many times. The primal requisite of unlawful
aggression is therefore absent in this case which would not constitute self-
defense.
2. YES, with regard to treachery. The commission of the crime was attended
by treachery. Even though an attack may be begun under conditions not
exhibiting the feature of alevosia yet if the assault is continued and the crime
consummated with alevosia, such circumstance may be taken into
consideration as a qualifying factor in the offense of murder. Treachery exists
when the offender employs means, methods or forms which tend directly and
specially to insure the execution of the offense without risk to the accused
arising from the defense which the victim might make. There are 2 conditions
necessary for treachery to exist 1) the employment of means, method or
manner of execution which would insure the offender's safety from any
defensive or retaliatory act on the party of the offended party, which means
that no opportunity is given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously
chosen.
No evident premeditation because as what can be seen from the evidence and
testimonies of witnesses there is none, on the contrary a quarrel precipitated
the stabbing incident.
3. YES, there is quasi-recidivism. The accused committed this new felony while
serving sentence for Robbery imposed upon him by maximum period of the
Penalty prescribed by law for this new offense should thus be imposed.

The presence of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation is of no

consequence as quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by any ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
DECISION: MURDER WITH TREACHERY. MAXIMUM PENALTY IS DEATH,

however the penalty was commuted to reclusion perpetua.
DISSENTING: AQUINO, J.
Alternatively, Macariola is only guilty of homicide. — If Macariola should be held

criminally liable, then he should be adjudged guilty simply of homicide. The killing
cannot be categorized as murder because of the absence of any qualifying
circumstance.
There was no treachery because the assault was made face-to-face on the spur of
the moment. (On cross-examination, the fiscal consulted defense witness Vivero as to
the difference between murder and homicide. Vivero replied that the killing is
homicide if "you did not plan it" and it is murder if "you planned it "you planned it.")
It is elementary that treachery in order to be regarded as qualifying should exist at the

inception of the attack. A deliberate and unexpected initial attack is the distinguishing
characteristic of alevosia. In this case, there was no such surprise and sudden attack.
De la Peña should have known that after kicking Macariola, the latter would retaliate
and injure De la Peña.
The retaliatory injury inflicted by Macariola was certainly not treacherous in the legal
sense. Since De la Peña commenced hostilities by kicking Macariola on the chest,
that circumstance precludes the appreciation of alevosia as a qualifying circumstance
in the killing of De la Peña by Macariola.
The two extenuating circumstances of provocation and voluntary surrender to the

authorities should be appreciated in favor of Macariola. On the other hand, the special
aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, which was alleged in the information
and admitted by Macariola, would raise the Penalty for homicide to the maximum
period.
The trial court in mentioning recidivism was referring to quasi-recidivism as shown by

the fact that it cited article 160 of the Revised Penal Code on quasi-recidivism and not
to recidivism in article 14 of the said Code
PEOPLE v NAZARENO
GR No. 196434 | October 24, 2012
TICKLER: Argument during wake of a friend.

DOCTRINE: Elements of abuse of superior strength.
FACTS:
On November 10, 1993 David Valdez, Magallanes and Francisco attended the wake of
a friend. While there, they liquor with accused Nazareno and Saliendra. A heated
argument ensued between Magallanes and Nazareno but their companions pacified
them.
On the next day, David, Francisco and Magallanes returned to the wake. Nazareno and
Saliendra also arrived and told the three not to mond the previous altercation. At around
9:30pm while David, Francisco and Aida Unos were walking on the street, Nazareno
and Saliendra blocked their path, Nazareno boxed Francisco who fled but Saliendra
went after him with a balisong. Francisco, who succeeded in hiding saw Nazareno hit
David on the body with a stick while Saliendra struck David’s head with a stone. David
ran towards the gasoline station but Nazareno and Saliendra, aided by some tanods,
caught up with him. As David fell, the tanods took over the assault. This took place as
Magallanes stood about 5 meters across the highway unable to help his friend.
Afterwards, Unos brought David to the hospital. Dr. Rebosa performed surgery on
David’s head but the latter died on Nov 14 due to massive intracranial hemorrhage.
Accused’s Defense
Nazareno claimed that he left his house at around 930pm on Nov 11, 1993 to buy milk.
While on a street near his house, he noted a commotion taking place nearby. He then
bumped into Saliendra, Nazareno proceeded home and went to bed. His wife
supported his testimony claiming that she asked her husband to buy milk for their
children. When Nazareno returned home, he informed her of the commotion outside
and someone bumped into him.
Unos testified that she saw Saliendra chasing David as the latter hang on the rear of a
running jeepney. She claimed that she did not see Nazareno around the place.
CRIME CHARGED: MURDER
RTC: Found Nazareno GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, qualified by abuse of

superior strength and aggravated by treachery.
CA: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION the ruling of RTC; finding no treachery; qualified
only by abuse of superior strength.
ISSUE: Did the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attend the killing
of David?
RULING: YES. The killing of David should be characterized as one of murder with
abused of superior strength:

There is abuse of superior strength when:

1) The aggressors purposely use excessive force rendering the victim unable to
defend himself;
2) The notorious inequality of forces creates an unfair advantage for the aggressor.
Here, Nazareno and Saliendra evidently armed themselves beforehand, Nazareno with
a stick and Saliendra with a heavy stone. David was unarmed. The two chased him
even as he fled from them. And when they caught up with him, aided by some
unnamed tanods, Nazareno exploited their superior strength and knocked on the
defenseless David unconscious. He died from the skull fracture he sustained.
DECISION: AFFIRMED RTC Decision. MURDER qualified by abuse of superior

strength
PEOPLE VS. ALFREDO DULIN

G.R. No. 171284 | June 29, 2015
TICKLER: Fighting cock.
DOCTRINES:
1. The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. The
burden of proving self-defense rests entirely on him, that he must then prove
by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following elements of
self-defense.
2. Retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that
the victim started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but in self-
defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the
aggressor.
3. Under the circumstances, treachery should not be appreciated in the killing of

Batulan because the stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan by surprise due to
his having been sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s impending assault, and being
thus afforded the opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to
recover control of the weapon from Dulin.
FACTS:
A young man came running from the house of Vicente Danao towards the house of
Batulan, shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had been stabbed. Alexander
Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house, which was about 30 meters from his own
house, and there he saw Alfredo Dulin stabbing Francisco Batulan who was already
prostrate face down. Dulin was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot
touching the ground. Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and

thrusting the knife at the latter with his right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran towards
Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the victim’s wife who was his aunt, about
the incident.
Tamayao mentioned of the long-standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of
seeing them fighting in April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two occasions: He will
soon have his day and I will kill him.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE:

He was in his house when Nicanor Annariao and Raymund Soriano arrived at his
house to see the fighting cocks being sold by Alberto Eugenio (Alberto); that Alberto
was not yet around, arriving only at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening to talk with
Raymund and Nicanor about the price of the fighting cocks; that after their
transaction, Alberto served Nicanor and Raymund food, and he (Dulin) and Jun
Danao thereafter accompanied Raymund and Nicanor to the highway to get a tricycle
ride, but on their way, they passed Angel Bancud who called out to him: that he
(Dulin) asked the others to go ahead, and he would just catch up with them; that as
he (Dulin) approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his (Dulin) mother, stabbed him
on the right side of his body and in the left hand; that he complained to Batulan:
Uncle, you hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill you; that he
(Dulin) ran to the upper level of Carolina Danao’s house, pursued by Batulan who
stabbed him again several times; that they grappled for the weapon until he (Dulin)
was able to wrest it from Batulan; that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan with the weapon,
and they struggled until he (Dulin) felt weak, eventually falling to the ground; and that
he (Dulin) regained consciousness only the next day at the hospital. Dulin insisted
that there was no grudge between him and Batulan, but interjected that the barangay
captain would summon him to bring Batulan home each time the latter got drunk at
night.
RTC: MURDER and appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of

INCOMPLETE SELF DEFENSE and NO aggravating circumstance. Reclusion
temporal in its maximum period.
CA: AFFIRMED the RTC’s decision with MODIFICATION. Reclusion perpetua
instead of Reclusion Temporal.
ISSUE:
1. Was there Self Defense?
2. Was there incomplete self Defense?
3. Was there treachery?
SC:
1. No Self Defense
The most important of all the elements of self defense is unlawful aggression, which is
the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance.
Unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the accused, self-defense,

whether complete or incomplete, should not be appreciated, for the two other
essential elements of self-defense would have no factual and legal bases without any
unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds:

(a) actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with
a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to
cause the injury; and
(b) imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening. Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of
the victim
Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying circumstance of self-
defense in his favor because all its elements had been present in the commission of
the crime. In rejecting Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had
initiated the attack against Dulin the unlawful aggression from Batulan effectively
ceased once Dulin had wrested the weapon from the latter. Appellant testified that
after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able to take possession of the weapon
and ran towards the second level of the house of Vicente Danao, away from
FRANCISCO. At that point, the unlawful aggression against him effectively ceased.
When FRANCISCO and appellant again grappled for possession of the weapon,
appellant now became the armed protagonist, and FRANCISCO’s act of trying to
wrest the weapon cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. At that moment,
appellant no longer faced any imminent or immediate danger to his life and limb from
FRANCISCO.
It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to
have sustained twelve stab wounds25 confirmed the cessation of the attack by
Batulan. The numerosity and nature of the wounds inflicted by the accused reflected
his determination to kill Batulan, and the fact that he was not defending himself.
Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by Batulan did not cease
because the latter followed him into Danao’s house with the singular purpose of
ending his life; and that there was no gap in the aggression initiated by Batulan.24
The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan
and then running away from him. With the aggression by Batulan having thereby
ceased, he did not anymore pose any imminent threat against Dulin. Hence, Batulan
was not committing any aggression when Dulin fatally stabbed him.
2. NO. Unlawful aggression is not present.
3. NO. Based on the established facts, Dulin and Batulan grappled for control of
the weapon Batulan had initially wielded against Dulin, who divested Batulan of
it and ran with it into the house of Danao, with Batulan in immediate pursuit.
They continued to grapple for the weapon inside the house of Danao, and it
was at that point when Dulin stabbed Batulan several times. Under the

circumstances, treachery should not be appreciated in the killing of Batulan

because the stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan by surprise due to his
having been sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s impending assault, and being
thus afforded the opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to
recover control of the weapon from Dulin.
DECISION: HOMICIDE.
FANTASTICO v MALICSE
G.R. No. 190912 | January 12, 2015
TICKLER: Family feud, rattan stick, tomahawk axe, lead pipe, abuse of superior
strength.
DOCTRINES:
1. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.
2. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment
of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.
3. There is no treachery where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately
adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the partof the
accused because of the provocative act of the victim.
4. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality
of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime." The appreciation of
this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the
parties.
FACTS:
Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the house of his sister Isabelita Iguiron
(Isabelita) when all of a sudden, he heard Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing
invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him, which
prompted the former to slap the latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was under the
influence of alcohol.
The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the
commotion was taking place in order to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was
eventually persuaded to go home where he drank some coffee. Thereafter, Elpidio

went back to the house of Isabelita to offer reconciliation.
Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus)
and her son-in-law Gary Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find their
parents. Titus and Gary responded, "putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas ka,
punyeta ka."
In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and
saw Isabelita's elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a rattan
stick or arnis. Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced the latter to
bow his head but Salvador delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on the right
eyebrow. Salvador attempted to hit Elpidio for the third time but the latter got hold of
the rattan stick and the two wrestled on the floor and grappled for the possession of
the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two and sprayed something on
Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches of Salvador and to
extricate himself, Elpidio bit Salvador's head.
Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter was
about to go out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to take
the tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio walked away from Titus but Gary, still armed
with the tomahawk axe and Salvador, with his arnis, including Titus, chased him.
Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head
with a lead pipe which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his
assailants to stop, but to no avail. Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs, legs
and knees using the rattan stick.
While he was simultaneously being beaten up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor,
Eugene and Tommy, he tried to cover his face with his arm. Gary hit him with the
tomahawk axe on his right leg, between the knees and the ankle of his leg, which
caused the fracture on his legs and knees. Rolly hit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe,
while Tommy hit him with a piece of wood on the back of his shoulder.
Thereafter, a certain "Mang Gil" tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted at
him: "Huwag makialam, away ng mag-anak ito" and the two continued to maul
Elpidio. The people who witnessed the incident shouted "maawa na kayo" but they
only stopped battering him when a bystander fainted because of the incident. Elpidio
then pretended to be dead. It was then that concerned neighbors approached him
and rushed him to the emergency room of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
CRIME CHARGED: ATTEMPTED MURDER was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus
Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros,
Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva.
RTC:
1. ACQUITTED Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros.

2. Found Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt for ATTEMPTED MURDER. Treachery and abuse of superior
strength are present.
CA: AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC – ATTEMPTED MURDER

ISSUES:
1. Is treachery present in this case?
2. Is there abuse of superior strength?
RULING:
1. NO. In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a
swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.
From the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous, thus, the
second element of treachery is wanting. The incident, which happened at the spur of
the moment, negates the possibility that the petitioners consciously adopted means to
execute the crime committed. There is no treachery where the attack was not
preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden
infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim.
2. YES, there is abuse of superior strength in this case. Abuse of superior strength is
present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous
for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime." "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se
establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being
no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim." The evidence must
establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage. "To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance
depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.
In the case at bar, the attack was a lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed, while
his attackers were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim

was also drunk. This establishes the element of abuse of superior strength.
DECISION: The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification as

to the penalty. ATTEMPTED MURDER.
PEOPLE v BOKINGCO
G.R. No. 187536 | August 10, 2011
TICKLER: Construction workers, Killing of Pasion
DOCTRINES:
1. For the conviction of murder, it is essential that the qualifying circumstances
attendant in the commission of the crime be proven by the prosecution. The
absence of which downgrades the crime to homicide.
2. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him.
3. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it is indispensable to show how
and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it
was carried out.
FACTS:
The victim, Noli Pasion is the employer of the construction workers, Michael Bokingco
and Reynante Col. Vitalicio, one of the lessees in the aparttment owned by Pasion,
heard a commotion and checked Apartment No. 3 on what was happening. He
peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon
seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly attacked him and a struggle ensued where
Vitalicio was hit several times. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually
subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife
that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to
Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor. Col was
allegedly at the second floor of the house where he instructed Elsa, Pasion’s wife, to
open the vault of the pawnshop. Subsequently, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen
door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay na siya." Col immediately let her go and ran
away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her
husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood.
RTC: Found Bokingco and Col GUILTY of MURDER.
CA: AFFIRMED RTC’s ruling. Appreciated the aggravating circumstances of

treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of confidence attendant in the
commission of the crime.
ISSUE: Were the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,

nighttime and abuse of confidence properly appreciated to convict appellant of
Murder?
SC: NO, the aggravating circumstances were not proven by the prosecution.
Treachery
There was no proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For
treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. Nobody
witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness
Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the
victim at that time.
Evident Premeditation
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it is indispensable to show how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried
out. In the instant case, no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was
devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit
him in the head. Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly by
Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack. It was
during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Col’s plan to kill
Pasion. However, Bokingco’s confession was admittedly taken without the assistance
of counsel and hence, inadmissible against him.
Nighttime
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the
presumption that there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident
premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot
be properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show that Bokingco purposely
sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Abuse of confidence
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in
this case. Taking into account that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be
conceded that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there was no
showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate the commission of the crime.
DECISION: A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for

Bokingco for failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying
circumstances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ALBERTO TABRNERO and GARY

TABARNERO
G.R. No. 168169 | February 24, 2010
TICKLER: Gary (accused) is the live-in partner of Mary Jane, the daughter of Ernesto
(victim). Stabbing of Ernesto.
DOCTRINE: There is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a defenseless

situation, as when he was being held by the others while he was being stabbed, as
the accomplishment of the accused's purpose was ensured without risk to him from
any defense the victim may offer.
FACTS:
Gary, a 22-year-old construction worker at the time of his testimony in June 2001,
testified that he stayed in Ernesto’s house from 1997 to 1999, as he and Mary Jane
were living together. Mary Jane is the daughter of Teresita Acibar, the wife of
Ernesto. However, Gary left the house shortly before the October 23, 1999 incident
because of a misunderstanding with Ernesto when the latter allegedly stopped the
planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was pregnant at that time.
On October 23, 1999, Gary was allegedly in his house in Longos, Malolos, Bulacan at
around 11:40 p.m. with his friend, Richard Ulilian; his father, co-appellant Alberto; his
mother, Elvira; and his brother, Jeffrey. Overcome with emotion over being separated
from Mary Jane, Gary then went to Ernesto’s house, but was not able to enter as no
one went out of the house to let him in. He instead shouted his pleas from the outside,
asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that caused Ernesto to break him and Mary
Jane up, and voicing out several times that he loved Mary Jane and was ready to
marry her. When Gary was about to leave, the gate opened and Ernesto purportedly
struck him with a lead pipe. Ernesto was aiming at Gary’s head, but the latter blocked
the blow with his hands, causing his left index finger to be broken. Gary embraced
Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At that point, Gary felt that there was a bladed
weapon tucked at Ernestos back. Losing control of himself, Gary took the bladed
weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many times he did so.
According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, saklolo, tulungan niyo po
ako three times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father, co-appellant Alberto,
coming. Alberto asked Gary, anak, ano ang nangyari? To which Gary
responded nasaksak ko po yata si Ka Erning, referring to Ernesto. Gary and Alberto
fled, allegedly out of fear.
Gary denied that he and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto. Gary claims that it was he
and Ernesto who had a fight, and that he had no choice but to stab Ernesto, who was
going to kill him.

RTC: GUILTY of MURDER
CA: AFFIRMED the RULING of the RTC.
Accused-Appellants argues that treachery cannot be sustained since the lone witness
failed to see how the attacked commenced as decided in previous cases.
However, the solicitor general argued that was amply demonstrated by the restraint
upon Ernesto which rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much
less evade, the assault.
ISSUE: Was there treachery may be appreciated in the killing of Ernesto?
RULING: YES. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. In People v. Alvarado, the
accused and his companions shouted to the victim: Lumabas ka kalbo, kung
matapang ka. When the victim went out of the house, the accuseds companions held
the victims hands while the accused stabbed him. Despite the yelling which should
have warned the victim of a possible attack, the mere fact that the accuseds
companions held the hands of the victim while the accused stabbed him was
considered by this Court to constitute alevosia.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that treachery should not be
appreciated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength would
nevertheless qualify the killing to murder. Despite being alleged in the Information,
this circumstance was not considered in the trial court as the same is already
absorbed in treachery. The act of the accused in stabbing Ernesto while two
persons were holding him clearly shows the deliberate use of excessive force
out of proportion to the defense available to the person attacked.
DECISION: A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for

Bokingco for failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying
circumstances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v VICENTE VILBAR

G.R. No. 186541 | February 1, 2012
TICKLER: Urinate on table.
DOCTRINE: Treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden
and unexpected. It must be proved that the accused consciously adopted such mode
of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.

FACTS:
VICTIM: Guilbert Patricio

ACCUSED: Vicente Vilbar
On May 5, 2000, 7:00 o’clock in the evening, at the public market, the accused,
Vicente Vilbar, without warning suddenly stabbed Guilbert Patricio with a knife after
Guilbert tried to admonish him for urinating in one of the table of their store. Because
of the degree of injury, the victim sustained, he died hours later. On July 31, 2000, the
accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the criminal charge against him. During the
trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Maria Liza, widow of the deceased,
and Pedro Luzon, an eye witness at the scene. Both were consistent with their
accounts that it coincided with the stabbing incident. Whereas the accused witness,
Cerilo Pelos, testimony showed to be incoherent and elusive in giving particular
details of the crime. Thus, the trial court gave credibility to Maria Liza and Pedro
Luzon’s testimonies in positively identifying Vilbar and convicted him.
RTC: GUILTY of MURDER qualified by treachery.
CA: HOMICIDE.
ISSUE: Is the killing attended by treachery?
RULING: NO. Treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was
sudden and unexpected. While it appears that the attack upon the victim was sudden,
the surrounding circumstances attending the stabbing incident, that is, the open area,
the presence of the victims’ families and the attending eyewitnesses, works against
treachery. If accused-appellant wanted to make certain that no risk would come to
him, he could have chosen another time and place to stab the victim. Yet, accused-
appellant nonchalantly stabbed the victim in a public market at 7:00 o’clock in the
evening. In fact, the attack appeared to have been impulsively done, a spur of the
moment act in the heat of anger or extreme annoyance. There are no indications that
accused-appellant deliberately planned to stab the victim at said time and place.
Thus, we can reasonably conclude that accused-appellant, who at that time was
languishing in his alcoholic state, acted brashly and impetuously in suddenly stabbing
the victim. Treachery just cannot be appreciated.
DECISION: HOMICIDE.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v DANIEL MATIBAG

G.R. No. 206381 | March 15, 2015
TICKLER: Special aggravating circumstance of unlicensed firearm, treachery

DOCTRINE: Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked. A frontal attack does not necessarily
rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack
was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his
or her defense.
FACTS:
In the evening of March 27, 2005, Enrico Duhan who just came from a meeting with
the other officers of the homeowners’ association of Twin Villa Subdivision, was
walking along Iron Street in Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City when Matibag
confronted Duhan, and asked, “ano bang pinagsasasabi mo?” Duhan replied “wala,”
and without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow hitting Duhan on the left cheek and
causing him to teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out his gun and shot Duhan,
who fell face-first on the pavement. While Duhan remained in that position, Matibag
shot him several more times.
PO2 Tom Falejo, a member of the PNP, positively identified Matibag and stated on
record that he arrested the latter on the night of March 27, 2005.
Defense: Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida party of his
neighbor when Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the homeowners’
association. Wanting to settle a previous misunderstanding, Matibag approached
Duhan and extended his hand as a gesture of reconciliation. However, Duhan pushed
it away and said, “putang ina mo, ang yabang mo,” thereby provoking Matibag to
punch him in the face. Matibag saw Duhan pull something from his waist and fearing
that it was a gun and Duhan was about to retaliate, Matibag immediately drew his
own gun, shot Duhan, and hurriedly left the place.
RTC: MURDER (Reclusion Perpetua)
1. The RTC refused to give credence to Matibag’s claim of self-defense as he failed to

prove the presence of unlawful aggression on Duhan’s part.
2. The RTC appreciated the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery

since the attack was sudden, unprovoked, and without any warning on the victim who
was unarmed and in a defenseless position.
3. The special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was appreciated

since a firearm was used in the commission of a crime
CA: MURDER (AFFIRMED in toto the above-mentioned RTC decision)
ISSUE: Did the CA correctly upheld the conviction?
RULING: NO, the CA correctly upheld the conviction.
Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The
prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed with a gun, confronted
Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the chest. Although
the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made
rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too that he was
unarmed. Matibag also failed to prove that a heated exchange of words preceded the
incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any impending attack from his
assailant. The deliberateness of Matibag’s act is further evinced from his disposition
preceding the moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out, Matibag was ready
and destined to effect such dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind
when he confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact that he did so, armed with a loaded
handgun. Based on these findings, the Court concludes that treachery was correctly
appreciated.
Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information, should be appreciated
in the imposition of penalty. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, treats the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the
commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special aggravating
circumstance. Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof
was unauthorized under the purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a
special aggravating circumstance. As a result, the imposition of the maximum penalty
of death, which is reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA 9346, stands proper.
To this, the Court adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.
DECISION: Appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated of the Court of Appeals finding
accused-appellant Daniel Matibag GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
PEOPLE VS. DANILO FELICIANO

G.R. No. 196735 | May 5, 2014

TICKLER: Masked fraternity men with baseball bats and lead pipes.
DOCTRINES:
1. Every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven
at trial, will not be appreciated as such.
2. In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like

nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he
carries out his crimes.
3. The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the
victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery was present in this
case.
FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity (SRF) who
were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the UP
Diliman, were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes.
Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina died on Dec 10.
Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, found that Venturina had
"several contusions located at the back of the upper left arm and hematoma on the
back of both hands," "two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the head, generalized
hematoma on the skull," "several fractures on the head," and "inter-cranial
hemorrhage." According to Dr. Victoria, the injuries could have been caused by a
hard, blunt object; he concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.
An information for murder was filed against 12 members of the Scintilla Juris
fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan,
Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo
Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay,
Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the RTC QC, Branch 219.
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of SRF
members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Cristobal Gaston, Jr., and Leandro Lachica, and
the frustrated murder of SRF members Mervin Natalicio and Amel Fortes. Only 11 of
the accused stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at
large. The informations alleged conspiracy.
The accused, in their defense, presented their respective alibis. For the accused
Feliciano, his mother testified that he was in Pampanga on Dec 8, 1994.
CRIME CHARGED: Murder, Frustrated murder Attempted murder + Conspiracy

RTC: Found accused-appellants Alvir, Feliciano, Soliva, Medalla, and Zingapan

guilty of murder and attempted murder.
The trial court acquitted Ablanida, Fajardo, Magpantay, Morano, and Narag. The case
against Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension. RTC
ruled that: After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered
view that of the ten accused, some were sufficiently identified and some were not.
CA:
1. Found accused-appellants guilty of the murder of Feliciano ;
2. Found guilty of attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes;
3. Found that accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical
injuries against Mangrobang, Lachica and Gaston because the former voluntary
desisted from pursuing and inflicting harm to the latter which shows the absence
of intent to kill.
ISSUES:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the
information against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks
despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off;
2. Whether the RTC and CA correctly ruled, that accused were sufficiently identified;
3. Whether the CA correctly ruled that there was no treachery involved; and
4.Whether CA correctly ruled as to the criminal liability of the accused-appellants.
SC:
1. NO. It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged
must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even
if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on
the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that
effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like

nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he
carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the
accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including
disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as
an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the
accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to
sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being
charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing
masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses. The

information charges conspiracy among the accused. This would mean all the accused
had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on
to prove that some of them might not have done so.
2. YES. It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by

a witness destroys the defense of alibi and denial.
3. NO. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a
place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack
by rival fraternity men. The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead
pipes and baseball bats. In a situation where they were unnamed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the
attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any
possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to
retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this
case. As correctly found by the RTC and CA, the offense committed against Dennis
Venturina was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and
with the aid of armed men. But CA erred in ruling out treachery.
4. NO. The trial court’s finding that there was conspiracy among the accused-
appellants was sustained by appellate court. Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect
of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree of participation.
Therefore, it would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness
of the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and
only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill
was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all
of them were liable for that intent to kill.
DECISION: AFFIRMED CA with MODIFICATION. For this reason, the accused-
appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted
murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes,
and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
PEOPLE v WILFREDO GUNDA

G.R. No. 195525 | February 5, 2014
TICKLER: 12 stab wounds caused death - attacked from behind and hit on the head
with a wooden pole. Conspiracy and treachery.
DOCTRINES:
1. Treachery is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence

served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of

the maximum penalty.
2. Conspiracy is not a circumstance which would aggravate or qualify the crime.
FACTS:
Eladio Sr. and Eladio Jr. were walking along a trail at Sitio Candulungon, Barangay
Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar. Suddenly, when Eladio Jr. was about 10
meters ahead of his father, the latter was waylaid (ambushed) by Gunda and his
unidentified companions. The John Does held the victim's arms whereupon appellant
stabbed him several times. Fearing for his life, Eladio Jr. fled. The assailants pursued
him but he was able to outrun them and informed his sister as to the death of their
father. The body of the victim was recovered and post-mortem examinations revealed
that he suffered multiple stab wounds which caused his death.
Ambal who is a brother-in-law of the appellant, also witnessed the crime. While Ambal
was at his farm gathering feeds for his pigs, he saw appellant who was armed with a
wooden pole position himself at the back of the victim and strike the latter’s head with
the wood. The companions of appellant then held the victim’s arms whereupon
appellant drew a bolo locally known as depang from his waist and stabbed the victim
several times.
An information for murder was filed against Gunda with the aggravating circumstance
of the crime being committed in an uninhabited place and abuse of superior strength.
Gunda pleaded not guilty while the other accussed remained at large.
Gunda denied the charge against him. He claimed that in the afternoon of May 25,
1997, he was at Barangay Camada gathering and cleaning rattan poles.
CRIME CHARGED: MURDER (uninhabited place and superior strength)
RTC: MURDER. Testimony of witnesses coincide with medical report that victim
suffered multiple stab wounds.
Gunda failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present where the
crime took place because he even admitted that the distance between the 2
barangays could be traversed in an hour or less.
In imposing the death penalty, the RTC considered treachery and conspiracy as
qualifying circumstances.
CA: AFFIRMED the RTC but modified penalty to reclusion perpetua.
The CA noted that although the trial court properly appreciated treachery and

conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime, the presence of both would
not warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance.

Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time
be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the
maximum penalty. Since treachery qualified the commission of the crime to murder,
this circumstance could no longer be appreciated anew as a generic aggravating
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
Although there was conspiracy in this case, it is neither a qualifying circumstance nor
a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty
of death.
ISSUE: Was the CA correct in reducing the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua?
RULING: YES, the CA was correct.
Appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Two prosecution
witnesses positively identified him as the person who waylaid the victim, and with the
help of his conspirators, stabbed the victim several times. There is also no doubt in
our mind that the attack on the victim was attended by treachery. The victim was
unarmed and had no inkling of the impending attack on his person.
The victim was attacked by appellant from behind with a blow to his head with a
wooden pole. His cohorts then held the victim’s arms rendering him helpless and
immobile. In such position, there is no opportunity for the victim to escape or even
offer a feeble resistance. Appellant then delivered the coup de grâce by stabbing the
victim multiple times. Undoubtedly, treachery qualified the killing to murder.
The CA correctly ruled that conspiracy is not a circumstance which would aggravate
or qualify the crime.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating circumstance other than the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the CA correctly held that the proper imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties.
DECISION: MURDER - CA is AFFIRMED. The killing was qualified by treachery and

no other aggravating circumstance thus the penalty of reclusion perperua is proper.
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 187683 | February 11, 2010

TICKLER: Slapped wife, accident, drunk.
DOCTRINES:
1. For an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the act that causes the
injury has to be lawful.
2. For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance it must be

shown that the intoxication is not habitual, and not subsequent to a plan to
commit a felony, and that the accused's drunkenness affected his mental
faculties.
FACTS:
Joel Song (Joel) testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he
and two others, including the aunt of Victoriano, were playing a card game known
as tong-its just three to four arms length away from the latters house.
While playing tong-its, Joel Song saw Victoriano dela Cruz punching and kicking his
wife in front of their house. then dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latter's
hair, then slammed the door. Joel overheard the couple shouting while they were
already inside the house.
Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house. He asked for Joels help. Joel
noticed blood spurting out of Annas mouth. He then went with them to
the Bulacan Provincial Hospital on board a tricycle. However, Anna died.
The Certificate of Death showed that Anna died of hemorrhagic shock as a result of a
stab wound in the trunk. Moreover, in his Medico-Legal Report also indicated
hematoma on the head, neck and extremities and stab wound on the shoulder of
Anna.
In his defense, Victoriano testified that, at around 6:30 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he
came home very drunk from a friend's house. Before he could enter their house, his
wife, Anna, started nagging him He asked her to go inside their house but she
refused. Thus, Victoriano slapped Anna and dragged her inside their house.
Due to the continuous nagging of Anna, Victoriano pushed her aside so he could go
out of the house. However, she fell on a jalousie window, breaking it in the
process. When he helped her stand up, Victoriano noticed that her back was
punctured by a piece of shattered glass of the jalousie. He brought her outside
immediately and asked the help of his neighbors.
CRIME CHARGED: PARRICIDE
RTC: GUILTY of PARRICIDE.

CA: AFFIRMED RTC decision with MODIFICATION reducing civil indemnity and
deleting exemplary damages
ISSUES:
1. Should Victoriano’s defense of accident be appreciated as an exempting
circumstance in the death of Anna? (Art 12, RPC)
2. Should Victoriano’s intoxicated state be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance under Art. 15 RPC?
RULING:
1. NO. Even if Victoriano’s claim that the injury sustained by his wife was caused by
an accident, without fault or intention of causing it, it is clear that Victoriano was
not performing a lawful act at the time of the incident. Before an accused may be
exempted from criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the
RPC, the following elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act
(2) with due care, and (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident and (4)
without any fault or intention of causing it. For an accident to become an
exempting circumstance, the act that causes the injury has to be lawful.
Victoriano's act of physically maltreating his spouse is definitely not a lawful act.
2. NO. A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of

having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the
crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. In short, the defense
must show that the intoxication is not habitual, and not subsequent to a plan to
commit a felony, and that the accused's drunkenness affected his mental
faculties. In this case, the absence of any independent proof that his alcohol
intake affected his mental faculties militate against Victorianos claim that he was
so intoxicated at the time he committed the crime to mitigate his liability.
DECISION: Petition DENIED. PARRICIDE.
PEOPLE v NAELGA
599 SCRA 477 | September 11, 2009
TICKLER: Naelga sells shabu.
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act
was done upon the decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or
that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in
its commission. This is particularly true in that class of cases where the offense is of a

kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course
of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense
was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective.
FACTS:
Naelga was apprehended for selling shabu through a buy-bust operation. PO2
Sembran, posing as a buyer, approached Naelga and asked if he was a security
guard and what he could suggest so that he could keep himself awake and not be
caught sleeping in his post. Naelga passed his finger under his nose as if sniffing
something and PO2 asked what he meant, Naelga said bato or shabu. PO2 Sembran
said he was willing to try it and asked to buy P500 worth. He initially gave P400 in
marked bills which Naelga used to get the shabu he was about to sell PO2 Sembran.
Naelga was then apprehended during their exchange of the shabu and the P100
balance. Naelgainitially denied the accusation claiming that he was selling CDs when
PO2 Sembran approached him asking for shabu. Naelga then claimed that he was
not certain that what he bought for PO2 Sembran was shabu but that he gave it to
PO2 and then the latter handcuffed him.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Sections 5 and 11(3) Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
RTC: GUILTY of ILLEGAL SALE OF SHABU as charged.
CA: AFFIRMED RTC decision.
ISSUE: Did the RTC err in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt based
on the disputable presumption that the police officers regularly performed their
function?
RULING:
NO. The general rule is that it is no defense that a decoy solicitation was used to
facilitate the entrapment. Mere deception by the detective will not shield the defendant
if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or instigation of the
detective. In this case, the law enforcers already received reports that accused was
engaged in illegal drug trade. There is no instigation as PO2 Sembran merely
pretended to buy. In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose
of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In
instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the
commission of the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar
to prosecution and conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be
acquitted.
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,

dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved.
DECISION: CA Decision AFFIRMED. Guilty of ILLEGAL SALE OF SHABU.

ARTICLE 16-20: Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DINA DULAY y PASCUAL

G.R. No. 193854 | September 24, 2012
TICKLER: “Speed”; AAA; Kubuhan; Tied and Raped; Prostitution
DOCTRINE: Under the RPC, an accused may be considered a principal by direct

participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a
conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
FACTS:
Dina Dulay was introduced to AAA, then 12 yrs. old, by the latter’s sister as someone
who is nice. Thereafter, Dulay convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at
Parañaque City. Before going to the said wake, they went to a casino, and thereafter
to Sto. Niño, to look for Dulay’s boyfriend, but he was not there. When they went to
Bulungan Fish Port to ask for some fish, they saw Dulay's boyfriend. Afterwards,
AAA, Dulay and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back
of the fish port. There, Dulay suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known
by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to Dulay and heard
"Speed" tell Dulay to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife, tied
AAA's hands to the papag, and raped her. AAA asked for Dulay's help when she saw
the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but Dulay did not do so.
After the rape, "Speed" and Dulay told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or
else they would get back at her.
Upon going to Laguna, AAA told her sister what happened and the latter informed
their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at the barangay.
Thereafter, the barangay officials referred the complaint to the police station.
Upon conducting physical examination upon AAA, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal
Report stating that there was no evident injury in the body of AAA, but medical
evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse. During her testimony, Dr. Tan explained
that such impression or conclusion pertains to the ano-genital examination and also
stated that she found multiple abrasions on the back portion of the body of AAA.
CRIME CHARGED: Dulay and one alias “Speed” (at large) as co-conspirators of
RAPE
RTC: Dulay – GUILTY of RAPE as co-principal by indispensable cooperation
CA: Dulay – AFFIRMED RTC Decision. RAPE as co-principal by indispensable

cooperation

CA ratiocinated:
Dulay cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by "Speed" by
acts without which the crime would not have been consummated, since she prepared
the way for the perpetration thereof, convinced the victim to go with her under the
guise of looking for her boyfriend and upon arrival at the kubuhan, she pulled the
victim inside a room where "Speed" was waiting, delivered the victim to him, and
then after receiving some amount of money from "Speed" she settled in another
room together with her boyfriend so that "Speed" might freely consummate the rape
with violence and intimidation, as he did.
ISSUE: Did the RTC and CA err in finding that Dulay was guilty as co-principal of the
crime of Rape?
RULING: NO. Dulay was not guilty as co-conspirator of the crime of rape, but she
should be liable for violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection
of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act – To engage in or
promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution.
Under the RPC, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by

inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable
cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in
criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Nothing in the
evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by
Dulay are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. Anyone could have
accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA
could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in
exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this
disproves the indispensable aspect of Dulay in the crime of rape. It must be
remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was
delivered and offered for a fee by Dulay, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed."
Sec. 5(a) of R.A. 7610 essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. Thus, the act of Dulay in convincing
AAA, who was 12 yrs. old at that time, to go with her and thereafter, offer her for sex
to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under the above-mentioned law.
NOTE: Even if in the Information, the accused was charged with Rape, it must be
noted that all the elements of Sec. 5(a) of R.A. 7610 was alleged in its body. The
sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation
of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information.
DECISION: DENIED. SC MODIFIED the CA decision and held that Dulay shall be
held liable for violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y

USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y
KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL,
MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y
RAFON A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 172707 | October 1, 2013

TICKLER: Fish dealer; Chowking
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an
accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with
the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an
efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
FACTS:
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish
deliveries, which were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the
afternoon of 11 August 1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng
Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chan’s residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to
inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box
of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left. The next
morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as Tony Abao
(Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two
returned in the afternoon, Chan informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive.
Chan offered instead to accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish
allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined and told Chan that
they would be back later that evening.
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to

Chan’s residence that evening. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met
them by the stairs. Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun
at Chan’s son, Levy Chan (Levy), and the house companions. As the unidentified
man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to stop the man by grabbing his
mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levy’s head forcing the latter
to release his grip on Chan’s feet. Levy thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police
Headquarters to report the incident.
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about two hours,
the group stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman)

warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered
to go with two women, later identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas
(Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad). Chan was brought inside a house and was made to
lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol
(Macalinbol). Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that she would be killed unless she
paid 20 Million Pesos.
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the
"Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the
group alighted. Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of the house. Inside
the room were three persons whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal
(Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao). Another woman, later identified as Thian
Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived. At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, a man who was
later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and
asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?” Another man, whom Chan identified
in court as Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed
Chan that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much money she has. Chan was
instructed to talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave instructions to her son
to get the ₱75,000.00 she kept in her cabinet. The group then talked to Chan’s son
and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mother’s release. It was
agreed upon that Levy was to deliver ₱400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at
Buendia Avenue.
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector
Mancao), who were assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation
regarding the kidnapping, were informed that the abductors called and demanded for
ransom in exchange for Chan’s release. During their surveillance the following day,
Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red Transport taxicab entering the route
which led to the victim’s residence. The inspectors observed that the occupants of the
taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The inspectors and their
team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth
Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in
the cottage was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue operation.
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information

that the abductors acceded to a ₱400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at
"Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the
information, the team immediately and strategically positioned themselves around the
vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4
people on board arrived. The four took the ransom money and headed towards the
South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team successfully intercepted the van and
arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman.
The team was also able to recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted

Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of
her abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao,
Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.
CRIME CHARGED: Kidnapping for Ransom
RTC: CONVICTED Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom.
CA: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION the decision of the trial court. They wer found
guilty of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the
supreme penalty of death. It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y
RAFON was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the RTC?
RULING:
NO. The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and
lied several times under oath during the trial. Perpenian lied about substantial details
such as her real name, age, address and the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth
Resort. When asked why she lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared
to be included or identified with the other accused-appellants. The lying and the fear
of being identified with people whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of
discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being committed
at the resort while she was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the
consequences of the unlawful act.
As reflected in the records, the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence
to hold her responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution
had was the testimony of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian
entered the room where the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas
regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian should
not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of

the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice,
namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that
he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way;
and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal
liability. Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a
swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design
of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person
would have suspected something was wrong and would have reported such incident
to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even
spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and giving
moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an
accomplice in the crime committed. It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s
presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of
the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice. Moreover, this
Court is guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et al., where it was stressed that
in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an
accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
considering the evidence presented by the prosecution, linking accused-appellants’
participation in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA
convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them
the supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code.
DECISION: Accused-appellants GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as PRINCIPALS
to the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM. However, pursuant to R.A. No.
9346, we MODIFY the penalty imposed by the trial court and REDUCE the penalty to
Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
JAIME ONG y ONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No.190475 | April 10, 2013]
TICKLER: Truck tires marked with chalk.
DOCTRINES:
1. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3)
the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself
or for another.
2. Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the

buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National
Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located
before offering the item for sale to the public.

FACTS:
FRANCISCO AZAJAR was the owner of 44 Firestone truck tires. He marked the tires
using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in Sucat, Parañaque,
owned by his relative Teody Guano. After appellant sold 6 tires sometime in January
1995, 38 tires remained inside the warehouse. Azajar learned from caretaker Jose
Cabal that 38 truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was
forcibly opened. Azajar, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the
Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Azajar canvassed from numerous business establishments in an attempt to locate the

stolen tires. He chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila,
owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was
selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter
replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which
private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based
on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Azajar then left the store and
reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police
District.
The Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. the buy-
bust team was able to confiscate 13 tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-
buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his
warehouse.
Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the business
of buying and selling tires for 24 years and denying that he had any knowledge that
he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that a certain Ramon
Go offered to sell 13 Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan
City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for P45,500, for which he was issued a
Sales Invoice with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, the Anti-Fencing Law.
RTC: The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all 13 tires
found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having
failed to overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.
CA: AFFIRMED the RTC's findings with MODIFICATION by reducing the minimum
penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correctional.
ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of violation of the anti-fencing law?
RULING: YES. Fencing is defined act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or

dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery
or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice
in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the
said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to
gain for oneself or for another.
The prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that all the
elements of fencing are present in this case:
First, the 38 tires were stolen testified that the crime of robbery had been committed
on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales
Invoice No. 4565 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory List. Witnesses for the
prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their
Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery,
he never denied the fact that 13 tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The
facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime
of robbery. Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link.
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong, who was in the
business of buy and sell of tires for the past 24 years,ought to have known the
ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-
bust operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong
Marketing.
Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D.
1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of
any good, article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station
commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store,
establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact,

Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for
some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss
in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.
DECISION: The Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED –
GUILTY of Violation of P.D. 1612.
DIMAT v PEOPLE
G.R. No. 181184 | January 25, 2012
TICKLER: Anti-fencing. 1997 Nissan safari bought from accused Dimat.
DOCTRINE: The elements of fencing are:

1) A robbery or theft has been committed;
2) The accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or
in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft;
3) The accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that
crime; and
4) He intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
FACTS:
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez
and Ruben Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000, Delgado’s wife,
Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-
569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles engine number as TD42-
126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group
(TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a
suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered
that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-
YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen
vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it
had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.
Mantequilla affirmed that the car had been indeed carnapped at the Robinsons
Gallerias parking area.
DEFENSE:
Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in
good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that

gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-
YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the
Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into
custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave
the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the
old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to
give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. But
Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the
documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce
any certificate of registration or official receipt.
CRIME CHARGED: ANTI-FENCING LAW (P.D. 1612)
RTC: GUILTY of ANTI-FENCING LAW
CA: AFFIRMED RTC Decision, GUILTY of ANTI-FENCING LAW
ISSUE: Is Dimat guilty of the crime of Anti-Fencing Law?
RULING: Yes, Dimat is liable for the crime of Anti- Fencing Law. The elements of
fencing are:
1) A robbery or theft has been committed;
2) The accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or
in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft;
3) The accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that
crime; and
4) He intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
In this case:
First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and
inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the
Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not
reflect the correct numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis.
Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential
Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum
prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. Of course, the prosecution must still
prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and
later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain
some gain out of his acts.
Based on the contention that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the needed documents to

him, evidently show that Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properly documented. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to
produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came
from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently
made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.
DECISION: AFFIRMED conviction for Anti-Fencing Law


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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Outline by Fiscal Victoria Garcia

ARTICLE 13: Mitigating Circumstances

TICKLER: Voluntary Surrender / Jeep-Toyota Pick-up

DOCTRINE: Under Article 365 of RPC, the carelessness, imprudence or negligence

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

RTC: CONVICTED the petitioner of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.

CA: MODIFIED the felony to RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SERIOUS

ISSUE: Can the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated in favor

DECISION: RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SERIOUS PHYSICAL

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

ARTICLE 14 and 15: Aggravating and Alternative Circumstances

TICKLER: Attacked a dwelling with a bolo at night

DOCTRINE: Elements of voluntary surrender:

Venancio died of hemorrhage from multiple incised wounds.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

RTC: Molo is GUILTY of MURDER; Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

CA: N/A; Automatic review to SC of the death sentence.

ISSUE: Is there a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?

Arguments of the Solicitor General

Accused-appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

RULING: There is no voluntary surrender.

*On reiteracion and recidvism

It appears that accused-appellant is an incorrigible criminal with clearly anti-social

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

DECISION: Molo is guilty of MURDER with three aggravating circumstances and no

PEOPLE v MAXIMO RACE

1. No extra genital injuries were noted on the person of Maria Pura.

CRIME CHARGED: RAPE

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

RTC: GUILTY of RAPE, aggravating circumstance of reiteracion

It also appreciated against the accused the aggravating circumstance of

1) The information does not specifically describe any of the circumstances

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

No expert witness was presented to testify on Maria Pura's imbecility.

Thus, in his Brief, he states:

The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the aggravating

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: MURDER, qualified “with treachery and evident premeditation,

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

RTC: GUILTY of MURDER with aggravating circumstance of Treachery, Evident

CA: Automatic Review to the SC because the penalty is death.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

The presence of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation is of no

DECISION: MURDER WITH TREACHERY. MAXIMUM PENALTY IS DEATH,

Alternatively, Macariola is only guilty of homicide. — If Macariola should be held

It is elementary that treachery in order to be regarded as qualifying should exist at the

The two extenuating circumstances of provocation and voluntary surrender to the

The trial court in mentioning recidivism was referring to quasi-recidivism as shown by

TICKLER: Argument during wake of a friend.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

DOCTRINE: Elements of abuse of superior strength.

CRIME CHARGED: MURDER

RTC: Found Nazareno GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, qualified by abuse of

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

There is abuse of superior strength when:

DECISION: AFFIRMED RTC Decision. MURDER qualified by abuse of superior

PEOPLE VS. ALFREDO DULIN

TICKLER: Fighting cock.

3. Under the circumstances, treachery should not be appreciated in the killing of

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE: