M​ary, Did You Know?

Defending the Knowledge Argument against Conee

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Abstract

What kinds of stuff are there ​in our world?​ Is stuff reducible to a single kind, or are there several
kinds? If the latter, can we categorize them? These are pressing metaphysical questions.
Philosophers entertain various answers: some (though very few) believe that stuff is mental
content, nothing more; others believe that all stuff is physical (or material); others still contend
that there exists both physical and non-physical (or immaterial) stuff (or, at least, irreducibly
mental properties). This paper intends to contribute to the debate between the latter two views,
which are typically called ​Physicalism​ and ​Dualism​, respectively. Specifically, this paper will
spotlight the ​Knowledge Argument​, which alleges to deliver a rebutting defeater for Physicalism.
My project is modest: I will target a standard objection to the Knowledge Argument, the
Acquaintance Argument​, and argue that it is unpersuasive. In §1, I will discuss relevant topics in
greater detail: Physicalism, Dualism, the Knowledge Argument, and the Acquaintance
Argument. In §2, I will engage two kinds of objections to the Acquaintance Argument, neither of
which, I argue, succeed in refuting the Acquaintance Argument. In §3, I will develop (what I
take to be) a more promising objection to the Acquaintance Argument. First, I note that the
Acquaintance Argument relies on the truth of what I will call the ​Mere Acquaintance ​premise,
which says that at t​2​, Mary gains ​only ​acquaintance knowledge about color-experience. Second, I
will argue that at t​2​, Mary indeed gains acquaintance knowledge, but not ​only​ acquaintance
knowledge – she also gains knowledge of another sort, namely factual knowledge. In §4, I
consider some possible concerns with my objection. In §5, I will conclude: it is rational to reject
the conclusion of the Acquaintance Argument, thus the Knowledge Argument lives to fight
another day.

1 Introduction
1.1 Physicalism and Dualism
Physicalism (the successor of Materialism) is the thesis that all stuff is physical, or material. That
is, all objects – e.g., trees, human beings, chairs, umbrellas – are composed of physical stuff, or
stuff that is (hypothetically) detectable by the external senses (taste, touch, sight, etc.). This view
denies that there exist objects outside of physical reality (i.e., objects that are composed of
non-physical stuff), like immaterial souls, or spirits, or angels. In slogan form: all objects inhabit
the physical realm.
An alternative to Physicalism is Dualism. Generally, dualists affirm the existence of both
physical and non-physical kinds of things. For example, dualists about properties believe that
there are two fundamental kinds of properties that objects in our world possess: physical and
non-physical. Intuitively, physical properties are those that are (hypothetically) detectable by the
five senses, like the property of being red, or sharp, or cold. Physical facts about an object (its
shape, compactness, color, etc.) determine what physical properties it has. But there is another
kind of property. Dualism says that phenomenal experiences, or subjective conscious
experiences, have non-physical, mental properties. (The technical term for these properties is
qualia.) It is impossible, says the dualist about properties, to provide a complete description of
qualia in physical terms. We need irreducibly mental terms for that. (Note: hereon, I will refer to
Dualism about properties as just Dualism, and dualists about properties as just dualists.)
1.2 The Knowledge Argument
Some dualists use the so-called Knowledge Argument to argue against Physicalism. I will restate
that argument here. First, consider a thought experiment:

[Mary Story]
In the future, there lives a neurophysiologist, Mary, who is the world’s leading expert on
the science of color-experience. In fact, she knows all of the physical facts about
color-experience – she knows all about the kinds of electromagnetic waves there are (esp.
the visible kinds), the wavelengths of every visible color, eye anatomy, how the brain
processes visual information to create images, etc. There is, however, one thing Mary
does not know: ​what it is like ​to see color. Mary has lived her entire life in captivity, and
her evil captors have (somehow) made it so that she has only ever seen shades of black
and white. But one day, Mary escapes her prison. She steals into a nearby garden. Here,
for the first time, Mary experiences color, specifically the redness of a rose. She thinks to
herself, “Aha, so ​this​ is ​what it is like​ to see red.”[1]
From here, we may construct a formal argument:

[Knowledge Argument]
1) At time t​1 – i.e., prior to escaping – Mary knows all the physical facts about
color-experience.
2) At t​2 – i.e., after escaping – Mary learns a new fact about color-experience. *Call
this the ​New Facts ​premise.
3) If, at t​2​, Mary learns a new fact about color-experience, then, at t​1​, she does not
know all the facts about color-experience.
Hence,
4) There are non-physical facts about color-experience. (from 1, 2, and 3)
5) If Physicalism is true, then there are no non-physical facts about color-experience.
Hence,
6) Physicalism is false. (from 4 and 5)[2]

Informally, the Mary Story gives us reasons for thinking that there are non-physical facts. And
clearly, if there are non-physical facts, then physicalism is false. Thus, the Mary Story ​justifies
belief in the denial of physicalism.
Clearly, the Knowledge Argument is deductively valid – i.e., it is not possible for the premises to
be true and the conclusion false. But are the premises true? Which, if any, is false? Each premise
appears plausible, at least ​prima facie​.
1.3 The Acquaintance Argument
Earl Conee takes aim at the New Facts ​premise.[3] He begins by noting that there are
kinds of knowledge that are not identical with (or are distinct from) factual (or propositional)
knowledge. One such kind is acquaintance knowledge. Acquaintance knowledge is that
knowledge we get when we become familiar with (or gain first-hand experience of) the
properties of some object, e.g. when we visit a new city, or meet a new person. Acquaintance
knowledge, says Conee, is identical with knowledge of ​what something is like​.
This​, Conee maintains, is the key to the Mary Story. Rather than learning a new fact,
Mary, at t​2​, becomes ​acquainted with a property (or many properties) of color-experience,
thereby gaining mere acquaintance knowledge. Thus, the New Facts ​premise is false, and the
Knowledge Argument does not go through. Formally:

[Acquaintance Argument]
1) Knowledge of ​what something is like is identical to acquaintance knowledge. (*Call
this the ​Identity​ premise.)
2) At t​2​, Mary gains knowledge of ​what it is like to see the color red, nothing more.
(*Call this the ​Mere Acquaintance ​premise.)
Hence,
3) At t​2​, Mary gains acquaintance knowledge about the color red, nothing more. (from
1 and 2)
4) Acquaintance knowledge is non-factual knowledge.
Hence,
5) At t​2​, Mary gains non-factual knowledge about the color red, nothing more. (from 3
and 4)
6) If, at t​2​, Mary gains non-factual knowledge about color-experience, then the ​Mary
Story​ does not cast doubt on physicalism.
Hence,
7) The ​Mary Story​ does not cast doubt on physicalism. (from 5 and 6)

2 Initial Objections to the Acquaintance Argument

In this section, I will consider two strategies for opposing the Acquaintance Argument. In my
view, neither proves helpful.
2.1 Deny the Identity Premise
Torin Alter recommends that we reject the Identity premise. Like Conee, Alter believes that, at
t​2​, Mary learns ​what it is like ​to see red. What Alter denies is that knowledge of ​what something
is like ​is identical to acquaintance knowledge. The proposition that ​knowledge of what something
is like is identical to acquaintance knowledge simply does not stand to scrutiny, says Alter. It is
vulnerable to counterexamples:
A vivid description of Roger Albritton may convey what he is like to someone who has never met him.
Therefore, it would seem possible to know what someone is like without being acquainted with that person.
 The reverse also seems possible; who would profess to know what every person with whom one is
acquainted is like?[4]
Thus, Alter thinks, knowledge of ​what something is like ​is not reducible to acquaintance
knowledge, and the Identity​ ​premise is false.
In my view, Conee’s account of acquaintance knowledge provides everything that is
needed to defeat Alter’s objection. Recall, for Conee, becoming acquainted with a property ​p is
identical with coming to be familiar with, or coming to know, ​p​, and coming to know ​p is
identical with learning ​what p is like​. I say, reading a detailed description of Roger Albritton’s
e.g. resonant, puffing laugh may supply factual knowledge about it, but not knowledge of ​what
experiencing (or coming to know, or becoming acquainted with) the particular resonance and
puffiness of his laugh ​is actually like​. In the reverse, having been present for one of Roger
Albritton’s laughs – though in an inattentive state – is not sufficient for having acquaintance
knowledge about it, not if acquaintance knowledge is identical to ​coming to know p​, as Conee
claims. Thus, Alter has not shown the Identity​ ​premise to be false.
2.2 Deny the Best-Sort-Of-Basis Requirement
Brie Gertler’s strategy for disputing the conclusion of the Acquaintance ​Argument involves
resisting the following line of reasoning from Conee:

1) Knowledge requires believing on the best sort of basis.

2) The best sort of basis for knowing a property is experience.
Hence,
3) Knowing a property requires experience of it. (from 1 and 2)

Regarding (1), Gertler thinks that there are counterexamples – e.g., much of our factual
knowledge is based on testimony, but testimony is not the best sort of basis for factual
knowledge, so (1) must be false.[5] I say, it would be wise for Conee to concede this point to
Gertler. Surely, it cannot hurt to have knowledge that has best-sort-of-basis justification, but
epistemologists do not typically advocate for such a demanding standard. Sufficient justification
will do.
But this begs the question, which premise of the Acquaintance ​Argument does Gertler intend to
refute? It seems to me, none of the premises of the Acquaintance ​Argument rely heavily on the
best-sort-of-basis requirement, such that it would not obviously be irrational to deny the
best-sort-of-basis requirement yet affirm the conclusion of the Acquaintance ​Argument. In my
view, ​the core of the argument ​survives the defeat of the best-sort-of-basis requirement. Thus,
the threat of the Acquaintance​ ​Argument to the Knowledge Argument​ ​persists.
3 My Objection to the Acquaintance Argument
So far, objections to the Acquaintance Argument that we have seen have been unsuccessful. In
this section, I offer another (hopefully more compelling) objection to the Acquaintance
Argument.
3.1 The General Strategy
I propose that we reject the Mere Acquaintance​ ​premise. It seems to me, the Mere Acquaintance
premise makes an empirical claim: Mary ​positively​ gains ​no​ knowledge​ ​other than knowledge of
what it is like​ to e.g. see the color red. Thus, clearly, to defeat the Mere Acquaintance​ ​premise,
we can either show that Mary does not gain any acquaintance knowledge, or identify some kind
of knowledge that Mary gains in addition to acquaintance knowledge. Because I believe that
Mary, at t​2​, indeed gains acquaintance knowledge about color-experience, I will avoid the former
option.
Instead, I will go the direction outlined by the latter option. I will attempt to identify knowledge
that Mary gains that purports to be (1) non-identical to acquaintance knowledge (i.e., knowledge
of ​what it is like​) (2) factual knowledge. I will start by considering two statements, both of which
attribute some sort of knowledge to Mary, and both of which, I maintain, are implied by the
Mary Story (such that our doxastic attitude toward both statements should match exactly). At
first, the statements may appear identical. However, upon close inspection, it will become clear
that the statements are quite distinct. It will also become clear that one of the statements proposes
a plausible candidate for a fact that Mary learns.
3.2 The Argument
Consider the following statements:

(S1)​ At t​2​, Mary learns ​what it is like ​to see red.

(S2)​ At t​2​, Mary learns that seeing red is ​like this​.

Upon first impression, ​S1 ​and ​S2​ seem redundant. However, in my view, ​S1 ​and ​S2 ​have distinct
meanings. ​S1 ​captures Conee’s intuition that Mary gains acquaintance knowledge about
color-experience. On the other hand, ​S2 ​proposes that Mary, at t​2​, learns a fact, viz. that ​seeing
red is like this​. Below, I will restate ​S1​ and ​S2​ in alternative – though identical – terms. In the
end, the restated versions of ​S1 ​and ​S2 ​will appear obviously distinct. The purpose of this
exercise will be to make clear that (1) ​S1 ​and ​S2 ​are non-identical (2) ​S1 ​implies that Mary gains
acquaintance knowledge (3) ​S2 ​implies that Mary gains factual knowledge.
To begin, let us restate ​S1​:

(S1​*​)​ At t​2​, Mary gains acquaintance knowledge about red.

Is this move controversial? I think not – recall, on Conee’s account, gaining knowledge of ​what
something is like ​is identical to gaining acquaintance knowledge.
Now, let us restate ​S1​*:

(S1​**​)​ At t​2​, Mary has a phenomenal experience of red for the first time.

Again, I say, this move is fair – recall, on Conee’s account, gaining acquaintance knowledge is
identical to having a new phenomenal experience.
Now, the next move I wish to make relies on the following principle:

[Transitivity of Identity Principle]

If ​p​ is identical to ​q​, and ​q​ is identical to ​s​, then ​p​ is identical to ​s​.

If this principle obtains, then, clearly, ​S1​ is identical to ​S1​**, since both are identical to S1*.
Soon, this information will be useful.
Now, consider ​S2. ​Let us restate it like so:

S2​*: At t​2​, Mary learns that having a phenomenal experience of red is ​like this​.

Again, I say, there is no reason to be suspicious of this move. All we have done is replace
“seeing red” with “having a phenomenal experience of the property ​red​.” Surely this is
reasonable.
Next, let us make one more restatement:
 S2​**: At t​2​, Mary learns that having a phenomenal experience of red is
accompanied by ​these mental properties​.

Once more, this move checks out. All we have done is replace “this” with “these properties”
(that is, the properties which characterize the phenomenal experience of red), which is exactly
the thing “this” refers to. Surely we have translated S2* charitably.
And now, again, we are positioned to apply the Transitivity of Identity Principle and deduce that
S2​ is identical to ​S2​**, since both are identical to ​S2​*.
Now, with this discussion complete, let us place our new statements side-by-side:

S1​**: At t​2​, Mary has a phenomenal experience of red for the first time.

S2​**: At t​2​, Mary learns that having a phenomenal experience of red is

accompanied by ​these mental properties​.

With ​S1​**​ ​and ​S2​** juxtaposed, we are able to clearly see that they are non-identical – ​S1​** tells
us that Mary has had a new experience, while ​S2​** tells us that Mary has gained knowledge of a
fact, the fact being that ​having a phenomenal experience of red is accompanied by these mental
properties ​(call this ​Mary’s New Fact​). And, obviously, that ​S1​** and ​S2​** are distinct logically
entails that S1 and S2 are distinct. The upshot is this: contra the Mere Acquaintance​ ​premise,
Mary ​has​ gained knowledge of a fact in addition to acquaintance knowledge. Thus, the Mere
Acquaintance premise being false, the Acquaintance Argument collapses.
4 Objections and Replies
Objection: ​Mary’s New Fact is not a fact at all. Facts are bearers of truth-value, objects of belief,
not insignificant statements about identity. Mary’s New Fact is no more a fact than the
propositions “​p​ is identical to​ p​” or “if ​p​, then​ p​” are facts.
Reply: ​This objection fails. Statements about identify – e.g., “​p​ is identical to ​p​” – ​are ​facts,
despite being unimpressive. Denying that statements about identity are facts on the basis that
they are not profound is absurd. Surely this objection is off track.
Objection: ​Even if Mary’s New Fact is indeed a fact, it is not a ​new ​fact. Surely, even at t​1​ – i.e.,
even having never been acquainted with the mental properties associated with the color red –
Mary is properly epistemically positioned to deduce that “the mental properties associated with
the color red are identical to the mental properties associated with the color red.” This is merely
an obvious truth of logic.
Reply: ​I agree that Mary, at t​1​, is properly epistemically positioned to deduce identity statements
about the qualia of color-experience. Nonetheless, is it only after Mary’s escape that she gains
both (1) acquaintance knowledge about e.g. the color red and (2) knowledge of the fact that
“seeing red is ​like this​.” (Note that the “this” in the previous statement refers to the subjective
experience associated with seeing red. It may be frustrating that we do not have any words
available to us other than “this,” but that is how analyzing subjective experience goes.) At t​1​,
Mary is ​not​ properly epistemically positioned to know Mary’s New Fact, since it is impossible to
deduce, ​a priori​, that seeing red is ​like this ​– i.e., that the phenomenal experience of red is
accompanied by ​these ​mental properties. Thus, when Mary gains knowledge of Mary’s New
Fact, she indeed gains ​new​ knowledge.
5 Conclusion
In sum, I have argued that the Acquaintance Argument does not go through, and so does not
refute the Knowledge Argument. Specifically, I have argued that the Acquaintance Argument
goes wrong when it claims that Mary, at t​2​, gains ​only ​acquaintance knowledge, nothing more. I
have attempted to provide good reasons for thinking that the Mary Story implies that Mary gains
both acquaintance knowledge ​and ​another sort of knowledge, factual knowledge. Contra the
Mere Acquaintance premise (one of the Acquaintance Argument’s central premises), I have
proposed an intuitive candidate for a fact that Mary gains at t​2​, namely Mary’s New Fact. I
conclude thusly: the Acquaintance Argument has no bearing on the Knowledge Argument, and
therefore, the Knowledge Argument retains plausibility.

References
Alter, Torin. (1998). “A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument.” ​Philosophical Studies​,
90 (1):
35-56.
Conee, Earl. (1994). “Phenomenal Knowledge​.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy​, 72 (2):
136-150.
Gertler, Brie. (1999). “A Defense of the Knowledge Argument.” ​Philosophical Studies​, 93 (3):
317-336.
Jackson, Frank. (1986). “What Mary Didn’t Know.” ​Journal of Philosophy​, 83: 291-295.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. (2013). “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.” ​Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy​.

[1] See Jackson (1982).

[2] Some have called this the ​strong ​formulation of the Knowledge Argument. For the ​weak ​formulation, see
Nida-Rümelin (2013).
[3] See Conee (1994).
[4] See Alter (1998).
[5] See Gertler (1999).