William S. Wallace
Lieutenant Colonel
John H. Garabedian
Haroldo Assad Carneiro
Dexter Q. Henson
Associate Editor
Brazilian Army,
Commander,
Brazilian Edition
USACAC
Managing Editor Nancy Mazzia Lieutenant Colonel
Brigadier General
Editor, Latin American Editions
Winona E. Stroble
Argentine Army,
Volney J. Warner
Major Jeffrey L. Wingo
Webmaster
Hispano-American Edition
Deputy Commandant,
Lieutenant Colonel
Production Manager
Patricia L. Wilson
Hernán Diáz
USACGSC
D. M. Giangreco
Secretary
Chilean Army,
Design Editor
Hispano-American Edition
Mental Preparedness
62 Military Application of Performance-Enhancement Psychology
Nathaniel Zinsser, Ph.D.; Colonel Larry D. Perkins, U.S. Army, Retired;
Major Pierre D. Gervais, U.S. Army; and Major Gregory A. Burbelo, U.S. Army
The U.S. Military Academy’s Center for Enhanced Performance and other outreach units have developed a program to improve perform
ance during military training. Many of the program’s elements, particularly teambuilding, have implications for 21st-century Armed Forces.
66 Zero-Defect Leaders: No Second Chance?
Major Claire E. Steele, U.S. Army
Four illustrious officers—Chester Nimitz, John Lejeune, George S. Patton, Jr., and Henry H. “Hap” Arnold—rose to the top of their military
professions despite serious mistakes and poor officer evaluation reports. Would this happen today in the zero-defect military services?
71 Machines, the Military, and Strategic Thought
Colonel Antonio M. Lopez, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.; Colonel Jerome J. Comello, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.;
and Lieutenant Colonel William H. Cleckner, U.S. Army, Retired
Throughout history, the military has used machines to gain operational advantage over opponents. Now the Army is poised to use comput
ers with artificial intelligence to read Clausewitz, analyze the enemy’s center of gravity, and share strategic conclusions with commanders.
78 Mentorship: Growing Company Grade Officers
Major Nate Hunsinger, U.S. Army
In 1985, Chief of Staff of the Army General John A. Wickham, Jr., designated “leadership” as that year’s Army theme and ordered senior
leaders to challenge officers to mentor subordinates. Mentoring quickly became an Army paradigm.
86 From One to Three Sixty: Assessing Leaders
Major Craig Whiteside, U.S. Army
The Army has yet to address how subordinates or peers evaluate their leaders. A 360-degree leader-evaluation tool would help the Future
Force produce better leaders.
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Letters to Military Review should be sent to 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
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Understanding Hamas consider the two to be that similar. rection that then paves the way for
Ms Chong Yee Ming, Librarian, For example, a direct quote from John future operational doctrine. In a
Institute of Defence and Strategic E. Jessup, Jr., Robert W. Coakley, and sense, all the lessons provide some
Studies, Nanyang Technological James Lawton Collins’s text, A Guide insight; the tragedy is, these experi
University, Singapore —I refer to to the Study and Use of Military ences were rarely documented, and
Lieutenant Commander Youssef History [University Press of the Pa the Army has had to rely heavily on
H. Aboul-Enein’s Review Essay, cific, Honolulu, HI, 2000], in relation the memories of its soldiers to pre
“Hamas: Understanding the Organi to operations in the Philippines, serve many of the lessons from the
zation,” published in the July-August states, “This irregular warfare, far war, just as it had during the earlier
2003 Military Review. While arguing different from what the Army had Native American campaigns. In the
the righteousness of the Islamist known against the Indians, raised continuing hope to prevent repeat
cause of liberating Palestine, it is new problems of bringing the enemy ing the same mistakes, the article was
important to understand Hamas’s to terms.” meant to cement some past insight
inner workings. Heavily modeled on A host of rationales for this par into present thought.
the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has ticular position vary, from dissention
created community services while within the United States in conduct
maintaining military wings that carry ing these operations, to the actual Kudos to Paparone
out suicide bombings. conduct of cooperation and amity LTC Stewart A. Underwood, Com
between the Filipinos and the Ameri mander, Mountain Warrior Recruit
cans at the conclusion of hostilities. ing Battalion, Beckley, WV—Please
An Unconventional War Another example is derived from pass on to Colonel Christopher R.
LTC Rosser Bobbitt, U.S. Army, Andrew J. Birtle’s book U.S. Army Paparone, U.S. Army, that his article,
Retired — In Major Thomas S. Counterinsurgency and Contin “What is Joint Interdependence Any
Bundt’s article, “An Unconventional gency Operations Doctrine 1860 way?” in the July-August 2004 Mili
War: The Philippine Insurrection, 1941 [Diane Publishing Co., Collings tary Review, was great, tremendous!
1899,” in the May-June 2004 Mili dale, PA, 1998], which states, “From I have sent the article to a dozen
tary Review, he presupposes the Civil the frontier, the men who directed the other battalion commanders and com
War as the experience base of the operational level of the Philippine mand sergeant majors and to each of
Army going into the Philippines. He my subordinate commanders!
War brought with them a mindset
seems to miss completely the Army’s that was accustomed to conducting
experience in America’s Indian Wars,
in which it used many of the same
small-unit constabulatory operations Additional Information
from dispersed posts and that en on Sea-Basing
tactics and procedures Bundt says couraged adaptability, individual ini
the Army leaned toward in the Phil Mike Weaver, Command and Gen
tiative, and aggressiveness. These eral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
ippines. attributes contributed much more to KS—Major Henry B. Cook has done
Bundt’s Reply the Army’s success than did the a good job gathering facts for his
MAJ Thomas S. Bundt, U.S. Army, transference of any specific tech article, Sea-Basing and the Maritime
Ph.D.—I would like to thank Lieu niques of Indian-fighting or prairie Pre-positioning Force (Future), in
tenant Colonel Rosser Bobbit for his field craft, few of which could be di the July-August 2004 Military Re
insight. I completely agree that the rectly applied in the Philippine’s tropi view. His description of the require
Army’s involvement in the Native cal jungles. By blending old con ments for a Maritime Pre-positioning
American campaigns did produce cepts with techniques adapted to the Force (MPF) (Future) (F) is particu
strong examples of select guerrilla- situation at hand, the old frontier larly good. However, I think it would
warfare experiences. However, even Army successfully adjusted to the be helpful to address some key con
if the earlier Native American cam demands of overseas constabulatory cepts that are misleading. I would
paigns had been used as the basic service.” also like to provide additional
building blocks for training the Army As these statements attest, there sources of information.
of 1898 in guerrilla-warfare tactics, is relevance for the Native American Cook correctly identifies sea-bas
textbooks related to the Spanish- campaigns experience, but this is not ing as an enabler of U.S. Navy (USN)
American War and the Philippine indicative of the established tech and U.S Marine Corps (USMC) con
Insurrection from 1898 to 1907 do not niques used in the Philippine insur cepts. One concept—Objective Ma
The lesson of this war [Afghanistan] is that ef collective warfighting skills at the CTCs. The Army’s
fectiveness in combat will depend heavily on shift to modular units drives its training strategy to
jointness and how well the different branches of include a joint context in key training events so Army
the military can communicate and coordinate formations can rapidly contribute to the joint team.
their efforts on the battlefield. . . . Achieving joint- DOD’s T2 strategy acknowledges that to achieve
ness in wartime requires building that jointness success on future battlefields we must fight as part
in peacetime. We need to train like we fight and of a joint team. The DOD T2 strategy expands be
fight like we train and, too often, we don’t. yond interoperability issues and deconflicting service
—Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld1 operations, providing training guidance and specific
programs to achieve joint interdependence down to
recognize that few rotations will be linked to a JNTC units are ready to operate in a JIM environment. Still,
event, and JNTC might narrow the focus of joint establishing a joint context for training goes beyond
context to a specific joint tactical task or joint train establishing the joint C4ISR structure around an
ing objective. However, each CTC must provide joint Army exercise.
context across all battlefield operating systems re The working draft of “Serving a Nation at War–
gardless of any link to a JNTC event. A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expe
The 2003 draft of DOD’s A Strategy for Joint ditionary Mindset” describes five key interdependen
Training explains that joint context includes joint C2 cies between the Army and the joint team.5 The
architectures above the functional component and/ CTCs must establish the right conditions in each of
or tactical forces, using real-world command, con these areas to build on these interdependent rela
trol, communications, computers, intelligence, surveil tionships and foster the understanding that operat
lance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities.4 Our ing jointly implies that the battlespace will be shared
historical relationship between a BCT and a division among members of the joint team.
headquarters has mitigated the need to train in a joint
context at the CTCs. That relationship has also Joint Battle Command
evolved. The doctrinal concepts for a modular unit (Joint Publication [JP] 6-02, Joint Doctrine for Em
of action (UA) will employ future BCTs in a joint ployment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control,
environment and require them to have the C4ISR Communications, and Computer Systems)6
connectivity to a division that might be acting as a The joint force command, control, communication,
joint task force (JTF) or be directly connected to and computer (C4) structure will allow command
higher levels in the joint C2 structure. ers to “pull” information from theater- and national-
Important to note is that creating a joint context level information sources, establish a common op
for tactical operations at the CTCs is not intended erational picture (COP) of the joint area of
to dictate joint training objectives or create a JTF responsibility (AOR), and see the relationship be
headquarters training opportunity. The BCT’s tween JIM team members. This top-down network
capstone collective training event should replicate includes the protocols and standards for joint C4
these C4ISR relationships so leaders, soldiers, and interoperability and information management. Spe
WARFIGHTING
WARFIGHTING
OFF DEF
MRX (OEF/OIF)
OFF DEF STAB SPT
MRE (SFOR/KFOR)
OFF DEF STAB SPT
STAB SPT
Enduring Freedom; OFF - offensive; OIF - Operation Iraqi Freedom; SFOR - stabilization force; STAB - stabilization; SPT - support
cial considerations are needed for interagency and with a prewar scenario.
multinational battle command integration. CTC higher headquarters control cell (HICON)
The Battle Command System (BCS) for modu provides the BCT with a standing joint task force
lar brigades will enable these UAs to rapidly inte (SJTF) standard operating procedures (SOP) for
grate with the joint C4 architecture and will facili reports, information management, and battle rhythm.
tate all joint interdependencies. The BCS will be a If the BCT/UA is conducting a mission rehearsal
network operating in a secure, distributed, collabo or readiness exercise in preparation for a known de
rative environment using standard software and ployment, the CTC HICON should issue the actual
equipment and will provide the science to enable the deployment higher headquarters’ SOP to the train
art of leadership and decisionmaking while facilitat ing BCT/UA.
ing situational understanding. Although the technical CTC has the capability to provide a relevant,
aspects of C4 connectivity and simulation wrap joint wraparound COP that can simulate or stimu
around are essential for battle command, there are late data in the BCT’s BCS. Information require
additional measures that can establish a joint con ments include friendly locations (including intelli
text for training at the tactical level, as seen in the gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; fire
following examples: support; and air defense sensors, enemy informa
CTC scenario has the BCT working directly tion, joint graphic control measures, joint information
for a unit of employment X (UEx) or a JTF head data bases, joint text messaging).
quarters rather than a U.S. Army Training and Doc CTC replicates print or broadcast media out
trine Command common scenario unit (52d Mecha lets (domestic or foreign) in support of training unit
nized, 21st Infantry Division [Light], 10th Corps). information operations (IO). These outlets should
CTC scenarios “cycle” modular BCTs into the have a positive or negative influence on a unit’s IO
rotation with a relief in place (under pressure) of plan, and the OPFOR can use them for counter IO.
the previous training unit, rather than starting BCT establishes 360-degree communication with or
US Army
Joint Air and Missile Defense defensive counterair measures. Besides establishing
(JP 3-01, Counterair)8 connectivity to the air and missile defense C4ISR
The purpose of joint counterair operations is to at network, there are other measures to effectively rep
tain a degree of air superiority to allow freedom of licate this to create interdependency. Examples in
action and to protect the force. Joint counterair mis clude the following:
sions might employ aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, CTC replicates the AMD TF headquarters and
surface-to-surface missiles, artillery, SOF, or IO populates the BCT’s Air and Missile Defense Work
against a variety of threats. Offensive measures at station with airspace control measures and opera
tempt to dominate enemy airspace and prevent the tional information.
launch of air threats, while defensive counterair at JTF HICON operations order (OPORD) or
tempts to defeat the threat after launch. Key C2 fragmentary order restricts aircraft engagement au
nodes in this effort include, but are not limited to, thority for certain periods.
the Air Operations Center, the Air Force Control and JTF HICON OPORD directs specific identi
Reporting Center, the Marine Corps Tactical Air fication, friend or foe, procedures.
Operations Center, the Navy AEGIS Control Infor BCT understands the AMD TF’s active and
mation Center, and the Army Air and Missile De passive support capabilities in the BCT AO and their
fense (AMD) Task Force (TF) headquarters. AMD ability to provide situational awareness and airspace
TFs are modular and tailorable units that can sup management.
port a BCT with active AMD measures to protect BCT integrates air defense assets into the
the force. AMD TFs are also linked to a joint iden AMD TF and the joint defensive counterair plan.
tification engagement authority and can assist in air BCT is linked to and receives timely early
space management. warning on ballistic missile, UAV, cruise missile, and
Tactical training at CTCs might include offensive asymmetric attacks on BCT high-value assets.
counterair operations (raids, SEAD, EW), if the unit BCT maintains a COP (through CTC wrap
lists those operations as part of their training objec around) of enemy air and missile activity in adjacent
tives. The joint air and missile defense-training con unit areas. If BCT does not increase protective mea
text at the CTCs should include active and passive sures, they also receive attacks.
mentalized joint special operations task force, tive target missions in the BCT rear area.
Operations Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom ex BCT coordinates aviation operations in support
periences and lessons learned have driven a more of joint SOF requirements.
integrated relationship between conventional BCT is directed to provide security or logisti
units and SOF and might signal changes in joint cal support to SOF ODA during operations or at a
doctrine. As with joint participation, operational forward operating base. Support should include Class
requirements often limit SOF participation at the I and III(b) forecasting and distribution and medical
CTCs. The CTCs can, however, still create full evacuation.
SOF integration effects for training throughout Unanticipated SOF aircraft enter the BCT AO.
the entire rotational period. Examples include the SOF operations within the BCT area that af
following: fect or provide support to BCT operations.
BCT is required to create a flexible, respon BCT commander and staff understand the ca
sive C2 relationship with SOF operating in the BCT pabilities of joint SOF teams and can integrate SOF
battlespace for short periods. operations into conventional operations.
CTC scenario includes covert and overt joint
SOF activity in and around the BCT, creating coor The Future
dination requirements for converging forces. The Army will organize, equip, train, and sustain
Scenario includes SOF acting as advisers to its first modular BCTs by the end of fiscal year 2004.
coalition, host-nation, or irregular forces in the BCT The CTCs are directly involved in ensuring these
area. UAs are a relevant and ready now land power for
SOF units under tactical control (TACON) to the combatant commander and in preparing them to
the BCT or BCT units TACON to SOF for short operate as decisive members of the joint team. Work
periods to execute time-sensitive targets. on the effort to establish a joint context for training
BCT is tasked to provide a reaction force to at the CTCs has begun.
assist SOF in the zone of action and is required to CTC EXCON and HICON cell adjustments and
effect appropriate coordination. a more extensive L-V-C wraparound can realis
BCT and SOF units exchange valuable/action tically replicate many of the desired conditions
able intelligence, which answers priority intelligence and effects. Still, we must continue to develop
requirements and affects BCT courses of action. this concept through discussion, innovation, sharing
BCT establishes contact or exchanges LNOs ideas, and leveraging the initial JNTC experiences.
with the joint SOF team. The CTC program continues to evolve, but its role
Directed no-fire areas around SOF Opera as a culture driver and engine of change remains
tional Detachment (ODA) A or SOF time-sensi steady. MR
NOTES
1. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, remarks at the National Defense 4. U.S. Department of Defense, “A Strategy for Joint Training,” Washington, D.C., draft.
University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 31 January 2002, on-line at <www.defense 5. Joint and Expeditionary Mindset (JEM) white paper, “Serving a Nation at War: A
link.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html>, accessed 28 July 2002. Campaign-Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset,” draft.
2. Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training,” 6. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 6-02, Joint Doctrine for Em-
memorandum, Washington, D.C., 10 June 2002, on-line at <www.t2net.org/ ployment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Sys
StrategicPlanMemo_061002.pdf>, accessed 28 July 2004. tems (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1 October 1996).
3. Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, address to the CTC/BCTP 7. JCS, JP 3-09, Fire Support (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1988).
Focus Area Task Force. See Gary Sheftick, “Focus TF linking joint virtual training to 8. JCS, JP 3-01, Counterair (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1989).
‘box,’” Army Chief of Staff Focus Series, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 9. JCS, JP 4-0, Logistics Support (Washington, DC: GPO, April 2000).
Pennsylvania, on-line at <http://Carlisle-www.army.mil/banner/focus.htm>, accessed 28 10. JCS, JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, August 2001),
July 2004. and JP 4-01-2, Sealift Support (Washington, DC: GPO, October 1998).
Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army, is the commanding general of the
Combined Arms Center (CAC) and Fort Leavenworth. He attended the Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and the U.S.
Naval War College. He has an M.S. in Operations Analysis and an M.A. in International Rela
tions. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States
(CONUS), Vietnam, Germany, and Iraq.
Brigadier General Timothy D. Livsey, U.S. Army, is the deputy commanding general for CAC-
Training. He graduated as a distinguished military graduate from North Georgia College, and
he is a graduate of the CGSC School of Advanced Military Studies and the Army War College.
He has served in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Germany, and Korea.
Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Toleben, U.S. Army, is chief of the Combat Training Center
Directorate, Fort Leavenworth. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, and he has been
selected to attend the U.S. Army War College Corresponding Studies Program. He has served
in various command and staff positions in CONUS, Germany, and Bosnia.
British paratroopers
on patrol in Northern
Ireland. Note that
protective screens on
the center vehicles
are similar to those
added to Stryker com
bat vehicles in Iraq.
Aviation has replaced artillery as the source of method. During 19th-century wargames, German
most firepower, but otherwise (and despite the junior officers routinely received problems that could
USMC’s formal doctrine, which is Third Generation only be solved by disobeying orders. Orders them
maneuver warfare), the U.S. military today is as selves specified the result to be achieved, but never
French as white wine and cheese. At the USMC the method (Auftragstaktik). Initiative was more im
desert warfare training center in California, the only portant than obedience. (Mistakes were tolerated as
thing missing is the tricolor and a picture of General long as they came from too much initiative rather
Maurice Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is than too little.) And, it all depended on self-discipline,
true at the Army’s Armor School at Fort Knox, Ken not imposed discipline. The Kaiserheer and the
tucky, where one instructor began his class by say Wehrmacht could put on great parades, but in real
ing, “I don’t know why I have to teach you all this ity, they had broken with the culture of order.
old French crap, but I do.” The Fourth Generation. Characteristics such
The Third Generation. Third Generation war, as decentralization and initiative carry over from the
also a product of World War I, was developed by Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects
the German Army and is commonly known as blitz the Fourth Generation marks the most radical change
krieg or maneuver warfare. Third Generation war since the Peace of Westphalia. In Fourth Genera
is based not on firepower and attrition but speed, sur tion war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All over
prise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tac the world, state militaries find themselves fighting
tically, in the attack, a Third Generation military seeks nonstate opponents such as al-Qaeda, Hamas,
to get into the enemy’s rear areas and collapse him Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
from the rear forward. Instead of “close with and Colombia. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.
destroy,” the motto is “bypass and collapse.” In the Fourth Generation war is also marked by a re
defense, it attempts to draw the enemy in, then cut turn to a world of cultures, not merely states, in con
him off. War ceases to be a shoving contest, where flict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian
forces attempt to hold or advance a line. Third Gen West’s oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam.
eration war is nonlinear. After about three centuries on the strategic defen
Tactics change in Third Generation war, as does sive, following the failure of the second Turkish siege
military culture. A Third Generation military focuses of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic
outward, on the situation, the enemy, and the result offensive expanding outward in every direction. In
the situation requires, not inward on process and Fourth Generation war, invasion by immigration can
be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army. Group members recently decided it was time to
Nor is Fourth Generation war merely something go public with a few of the ideas it has come up
we import, as we did on 9/11. At its core lies a uni with. We have no magic solutions to offer, only some
versal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that cri thoughts. We recognized from the outset that the
sis means many countries will evolve Fourth Gen whole task might be hopeless; state militaries might
eration war on their soil. America, with a closed not be able to come to grips with Fourth Generation
political system (regardless of which party wins, the enemies no matter what they do. But for what they
Establishment remains in power and nothing really are worth, here are some of our thoughts.
changes) and a poisonous ideology of multicul Points to Ponder
turalism, is a prime candidate for the homegrown If America had some Third Generation ground
variety of Fourth Generation war, which is by far forces capable of maneuver warfare, we might be
the most dangerous kind. able to fight battles of encirclement. The inability to
Where does the war in Iraq fit into this frame fight battles of encirclement is what led to the fail
work? I suggest that the war we have seen thus ure of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, where
far is merely a powder train leading to the maga al-Qaeda stood, fought us, and got away, suffering
zine. The magazine is Fourth Generation war by a few casualties. To fight such battles we need some
wide variety of Islamic nonstate actors, directed at true light infantry that can move farther and faster
America and Americans (and local governments on its feet than the enemy can, has a full tactical
friendly to America) everywhere. The longer repertoire (not just bumping into the enemy and call
America occupies Iraq, the greater the chance the ing for fire), and can fight with its own weapons in
magazine will explode. If it does, God help us all. stead of depending on supporting arms. We estimate
For almost 2 years, a small group has been meet that USMC infantry today has a sustained march
ing at my house to discuss how to fight the Fourth rate of 10 to 15 kilometers per day; German World
Generation war. The group is made up mostly of War II line, not light, infantry could sustain 40 kilo
Marines, but it includes one Army officer, one Na meters.
tional Guard captain, and one foreign officer. We felt Fourth Generation opponents will not sign up to
somebody should be working on the most difficult the Geneva Conventions, but some might be open
question facing the U.S. Armed Forces, and no one to a chivalric code governing how war with them
else seemed to be. would be fought. This is worth exploring.
Civilian Protections?
POW status, even though they are not combatants. A Polish contractor
This group of individuals are “[p]ersons who accom wearing body armor
pany the armed force without actually being mem in Al Tufail, Iraq,
28 June 2004.
bers” of the Armed Forces.21 To be afforded POW
status, these civilians can take no direct or active
part in hostilities: “[C]ivilian members of the military
aircraft crews . . . , supply contractors, [and] mem
bers of labor units or of services responsible for the
welfare of the armed force” are examples of civil
ians who qualify as lawful civilians accompanying
the force.22
Some commentators, understanding the different
nature of “general population” civilians and civilians
who accompany the force, have referred to the lat
ter category as “quasi-combatants.”23 Yet, there is
no mention of this distinction in international law. In
fact, a special quasi-combatant status was proposed
during the drafting of the Additional Protocol and
US Army
was specifically rejected.24 International law contin
ues to recognize only two valid status labels: com
batants and civilians. When any unit now deploys, the ratio of civilians
Under international law, if any civilian commits a to combatants is increased in terms of the numbers
hostile act; that is, takes a direct or active role in of civilians who deploy; “[t]he tasks [of civilians ac
hostilities, that civilian is subject to attack. Further companying the force] have changed as well.”26
more, if the same civilian is captured, the civilian can While some civilians perform traditional support roles,
be tried for such hostile acts. The effect of this rule such as building airfields and providing billeting sup
is clear: a civilian accompanying the force who en port and food services, an increasing number of ci
gages in a hostile act receives little protection, ei vilians are providing frontline troops with technical
ther with regard to targeting decisions the enemy support on state-of-the-art weapons systems.27
makes or in being afforded immunity from trial for For commanders the result is an increased pool
warlike acts. The goal for commanders, therefore, of civilians who are increasingly placed in harm’s
is to ensure that civilians under their command are way and for whom they are responsible. While the
not placed in positions of jeopardy, but that if they commander is responsibe for protecting frontline ci
are, they understand the risks they assume when vilians, the civilians, while not actually pulling the trig
they engage in activities that constitute or might be ger, are working hand-in-hand with combatants to
construed as constituting direct or active participa ensure that soldiers can pull the trigger. The result
tion in hostilities. might well mean an enemy could justifiably conclude
General guidelines for commanders. Even that civilians have directly or actively taken part in
though the principle of distinction is a bedrock prin hostilities “to cause actual harm to the personnel and
ciple of the law of war, the number of civilians ac equipment of the enemy armed forces.”28
companying the force has steadily increased. In part, Accordingly, the commander must understand
this is because of the personnel reduction and cost- that a real risk exists that civilians for whom he is
cutting efforts the Pentagon has undertaken since responsible will be targeted and, if captured, subject
the early 1990s to privatize and outsource many to trial by the enemy for hostile acts. This reality re
functions military personnel previously performed. sults from the fact that, aside from the “actual harm
The driving force behind this effort is the assump to the enemy” test found in the law of war, there is
tion that civilian contractors can perform certain no bright-line test as to what constitutes direct or
tasks just as or more effectively and efficiently than active participation in hostilities. One commentator
can military combat support or combat service sup aptly stated, “The current practice of merely warn
port personnel, thus preserving military billets for ing commanders with generalities not to jeopardize
“trigger pullers.” For better or for worse, this effort civilian status is insufficient.”29
has “made the Armed Forces dependent on civilian Several policies have been promulgated in an ef
specialist[s.]”25 fort to prevent civilians accompanying the force from
procedural fiat. Under congressional dicta, an indi Paramilitary operatives who take an active and
vidual must meet specific criteria to be a member direct part in hostilities are unlawful combatants; that
of the U.S. Armed Forces and binds himself, via con is, civilians illegally committing warlike acts in an in
tract, to certain obligations.40 Unlike CIA paramili ternational armed conflict. As unlawful combatants,
tary operatives, members of the Armed Forces are what protections, if any, do they possess if captured
subject to the worldwide jurisdiction of the Uniform by the enemy? The simple answer is that existing
Code of Military Justice.41 protections are minimal. Paramilitary operatives do
Under international law, if the paramilitary opera not receive POW status. Instead, the legal rights to
tive is not a combatant, then he is a civilian. He is be afforded paramilitary operatives are merely pro
not, however, a civilian accompanying the force, for cedural: they have the right to be tried by “an im
three separate and distinct reasons: partial and regularly constituted court respecting the
1. The U.S. Government does not assert that generally recognized principles of regular judicial pro
paramilitary operatives are civilians accompanying cedures.”43 These procedural rights include, at a
the force, as evidenced by the fact that they are not minimum—
issued appropriate identification cards. The right to know the charges against them.
2. Paramilitary operatives do not function in the The right to be presumed innocent until proven
traditional roles of civilians accompanying the force, guilty.
such as supply or system supporters. The right to an attorney.
3. A paramilitary operative’s purpose is to take an The right to a bar against being tried twice for
active or direct part in hostilities, contrary to the the same crime (double jeopardy).
bright-line restriction articulated by the law of war. Paramilitary operatives could be tried in an
Like a civilian in the general population, a para enemy’s court system for domestic criminal viola
military operative who has participated in hostilities tions stemming from their warlike acts. Murder of
by taking up arms can be punished for the sole rea an enemy soldier, for example, would constitute a
son of taking up arms: “[A]nyone whose status as domestic-law violation. Also, paramilitary operatives
a member of the Armed Forces is recognized, is en could be tried for perfidy, an international-law viola
titled to be treated as a prisoner of war in the event tion.44 Among other things, perfidy is the treacher
that he is captured; anyone who takes up arms with ous killing, injuring, or capturing of an enemy by
out being able to claim this status will be left to be feigning civilian or noncombatant status. That is,
dealt with by the enemy and its military tribunals in an individual who intentionally feigns civilian status
the event that he is captured.”42 while conducting military operations can be tried for
otherwise the whole system based on the concept the appearance of being civilians; and that they un
of distinction will break down.”52 derstand that the more involved they become in the
actual prosecution of combat operations, the more
Leadership at Tactical tenuous their postcapture protections.
and Strategic Levels The time has come for military leaders to deal with
The obligation to protect civilians accompanying this fundamentally important issue at the policy-
the force falls mainly to the tactical commander. The development stage, before the tactical execution of
theory behind this obligation is that at the unit level future operations. If U.S. policy focuses only on ap
the command has the greatest say in which opera pearance, military leaders will never grapple with the
tions civilians who accompany the force will be in larger policy issue. During military operations, what
volved. The commander can therefore control such type of conduct is off-limits to civilians accompany
civilians’ appearance and tasks. Yet the international ing the force? The tradeoff is clear, as is the di
obligation persists: conduct by civilians who accom lemma, if civilians’ conduct is restricted to the ex
pany the force that amounts to direct or active par tent that it comports with international law, many of
ticipation in combatant activity is forbidden. their current responsibilities will fall to military mem
In the absence of specific guidelines that clearly bers. Outsourcing and privatization, even if efficient
delineate this conduct, tactical commanders should and effective, will be curtailed. Such a step, how
apply a common-sense test: “[C]ivilians may sup ever, would require at least a partial reversal of cur
port and participate in military activities as long as rent trends in U.S. military thinking.
they are not integrated into combat operations.”53 If military leaders need to grapple with policy
Joint doctrine supports this proposed position.54 considerations for civilians accompanying the force,
Moreover, the Navy’s policy closely parallels this then these same leaders need to create a policy for
position, defining more precisely the conduct that trig paramilitary operatives. Unlike civilians accompany
gers the forbidden direct or active participation as ing the force, the tactical commander is not directly
“support by civilians to those actually participating responsible for paramilitary operatives. Military com
in battle or directly supporting battle action, and mili manders do not control the appearance and tasks
tary work done by civilians in the midst of an ongo of paramilitary operatives who generally answer to
ing engagement.”55 The Department of Defense’s other U.S. agencies. Yet the danger of intermingling
(DOD’s) Law of War Working Group has offered civilians accompanying the force with paramilitary
a broad reaffirmation of this demarcation: “A civil operatives is real: paramilitary operatives eviscerate
ian accompanying the Armed Forces in the field may the line of distinction between civilians and combat
not engage in or be ordered to engage in activities ants. Eliminating this line leads to two potential un
inconsistent with his or her civilian status.”56 The desirable results for all civilians; in particular, civil
Army and Air Force, however, appear to accept the ians who accompany the force. These civilians
notion that civilians can and do perform “duties di become lawful targets and, if captured, face crim
rectly supporting military operations [and thereby] inal prosecution. If U.S. enemies cannot distinguish
may be subject to direct, intentional attack.”57 The between these two groups of civilians during cap
problem with this position is, of course, that it po tivity, they might choose to deny all civilians, includ
tentially runs afoul of international law: civilians who ing civilians accompanying the force, POW status
trip the “direct or active participation” wire might be and to prosecute all as war or domestic criminals.
targeted and exposed to criminal prosecution if cap If the U.S. uses un-uniformed civilians to conduct
tured, and their conduct might also violate interna military operations, an enemy might not be able—
tional law. or might not choose—to distinguish a civilian accom
In his thesis, “Contractors on the Battlefield: Dis panying the force from a paramilitary operative. Ab
tinction Makes a Difference,” Paul E. Kantwell cor sent this ability to distinguish between lawful civilians
rectly concludes that “[a]s the trend to replace uni and unlawful combatants, an enemy might well be
formed troops with civilian augmentees continues, left with one of two targeting choices: do not en
the United States must evaluate obligations to those gage any civilians, even though some are engaging
civilians under the principle of distinction.”58 Absent its forces, or engage every enemy civilian on the
more concrete guidance, the most a tactical com battlefield. The latter choice will likely prevail. Thus,
mander can do to protect civilians accompanying the through its own actions, the U.S. has vitiated the con
force is to ensure that, to the extent possible, he does cept of distinction. If asked to justify its conduct, an
not place them in positions of jeopardy; that they give enemy will likely cite the U.S. violation of the prin-
unlawful combatant (the paramilitary operative).63 lation by the U.S. of the principle of distinction.
In this hypothetical situation, the U.S. would A nation’s conduct in war speaks volumes of its
be violating the law by using unlawful combat collective character. This conduct is judged, in large
ants. Violating this fundamental principle of dis measure, by its adherence to the law of war. Our
tinction, the U.S. would place in jeopardy the status military leaders should not condone operational tac
claim of any U.S. civilian. Through its apparent tics that trump the law of war. When we use un
violation of the law of war or, at a minimum, its lawful combatants on the battlefield, regardless of
cavalier approach to using paramilitary personnel, the perceived tactical advantage to be gained, we
the U.S. would be increasing the risk to all mem abandon the rule of law and place U.S. civilian per
bers of the force. Put differently, the presump sonnel in jeopardy. Moreover, with this abandonment,
tion of status for many civilians accompanying we lose legal as well as moral authority. The result
U.S. forces under international law might be is a profound and unmistakable loss of U.S. leader
negated, if not reversed, by the intentional vio- ship within the community of nations. MR
NOTES
1. John M. Broder, “Commandos Rescue P.O.W. and Locate Bodies,” New York “Emergency-Essential (E-E) DOD U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees,” 10 April 1992,
Times, 3 April 2003, A Nation at War Section, 1. P6.9.8.
2. Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 32. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield (Washing
(1907), in Documents on the Laws of War, ed. Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (Great ton, DC: GPO, January 2003), chap. 6.
Britain: Oxford University Press, 2002), 67-84; Geneva Convention III, relative to the Treat 33. Kenneth J. Oscar and Alma B. Moore, “Policy Memorandum—Contractors on the
ment of Prisoners of War (1949), in Documents on the Laws of War, 243-98 [Geneva Battlefield,” 12 December 1997, 3.
Convention III]. 34. Ibid., 1.
3. Geoffrey S. Corn and Michael L. Smidt, “‘To Be or Not to Be, That is the Ques 35. JP 4-0, V-7; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, 33.
tion,’ Contemporary Military Operations and the Status of Captured Personnel,” The Army 36. Parks, 532.
Lawyer (June 1999): 13-14. 37. Ibid., 532-35.
4. Commentary to the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Au 38. Kathryn Stone, “‘All Necessary Means’—Employing CIA Operatives in a
gust 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, 8 June Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces,” Strategy Research Project for
1977, ed. Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmerman (International the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 7 April 2003, 7, on-line at
Committee for the Red Cross), 598 [Commentary to Protocol I]. The U.S. has never ratified <www.fas.org/irp/eprint/stone.pdf>; Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence
the First Additional Protocol of 1977 but considers a number of its provisions to be re Activities,” para. 1.8, 46 Federal Register 59941, 1981.
flective of customary international law. The provisions of the Protocol discussed in this 39. Stone, 10, citing Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence—The Secret
paper—Articles [art.] 37, 48, 50, 51(1) through subsection (3), and 75—are considered Side of American History (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 168.
customary international law and accepted, as such, by the U.S. Government. Michael J. 40. U.S. Code, Title 10, chap. 31 (Enlistments), secs. 501-20, 2002.
Matheson, remarks on The United States Position on the Relation of Customary Inter 41. Ibid., U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice, secs. 801 and others, 2003.
national Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, “The Sixth 42. Commentary to Protocol I, 509, citing Hague Convention.
Annual American Red Cross Washington College of Law Conference on International 43. Protocol I, 464, art. 75(4).
Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols 44. Ibid., 442, art. 37.
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,” The American University Journal of Inter 45. Geneva Convention III, 247.
national Law and Policy 2, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 419-27. This speech by then-U.S. State 46. During the Persian Gulf war, for example, Article 5 Tribunals were conducted to
Department Deputy Legal Advisor Matheson enumerated which principles enshrined in verify a captive’s status. Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, Judge Advocate
the First Additional Protocol were considered part of customary international law by the General Operational Law Handbook, ed. William O’Brien (2003), 22, note 2.
U.S. 47. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S.1 (1942).
5. Protocol I, 447. 48. George Lardner, Jr., “Nazi Saboteurs Captured! FDR Orders Secret Tribunal;
6.I bid., 444, art. 43(2). 1942 Precedent Invoked by Bush Against al Qaeda,” Washington Post Magazine (13
7. Corn and Smidt, 9-15. January 2002): 2.
8. Geneva Convention III, 246, art. 4 (A)(2)(a)-(d). 49. Ex Parte Quirin, 37.
9. Protocol I, 444, art. 44(3). 50. Ibid., 35-6.
10. Ibid., 448, art. 50(1). 51. For an excellent discussion of Ex Parte Quirin and perfidy, see William H. Ferrell
11. Geneva Convention IV, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War III, “No Shirt; No Shoes; No Status: Uniforms, Distinction, and Special Operations
(1949), in Documents on the Laws of War, 301-69. in International Armed Conflict,” The Military Law Review 178 (Winter 2003): 94. Ex
12. J.M. Spaight, War Rights on Land (London: MacMillan, 1911), 37, quoted in W. Parte Quirin has been criticized by law of war scholars. The main criticism of the Court’s
Hays Parks, “Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms,” Chicago Journal of In “law of war scholarship” has been its nondelineation between military personnel in
ternational Law 4 (Fall 2003): 514. civilian attire and civilians taking a direct part in hostilities. Some scholars contend
13. Declaration to the Effect of Prohibiting the Use of Certain Projectiles in Wartime, that military members in civilian attire are not in violation of the law of war. What seems
The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, quoted in the Commentary to Protocol I, 598. not to be in contention from the Court’s decision is that civilians taking a direct part
14. Fritz Kalshoven, The Laws of Warfare (Geneva: A.W. Sijthoff, 1973), 31. in hostilities are in violation of the law of war. This is the standard, both in international
15. Commentary to Protocol I, 615. law circles and, since the law of war is part and parcel of U.S. Federal law, in the U.S.
16. Protocol I, 448, art. 51(2). as well.
17. Commentary to Protocol I, 615. 52. The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, ed. Dieter Fleck, Michael
18. Parks, “Law of War Status of Civilians Accompanying Military Forces in the Field,” Bothe, Horst Fischer, Christopher Greenwood, Karl Josef Partsch, Walter Rabus (Great
Memorandum of Law for the Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, 6 May Britain: Oxford University Press, 1995), 471.
1999, 1. 53. Guillory, 134.
19. Protocol I, 448, art. 51(3). 54. JP 4-0.
20. Commentary to Protocol I, 618. 55. Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Op
21. Geneva Convention III, 246, art. 4(A)(4). erations, ed. A.R. Thomas and James C. Duncan (1999), 484, note 14.
22. Ibid., 245, art. 3(1). Unlike the Geneva Conventions of 1949’s use of “active,” the 56. Quote from the DOD Working Group is cited by one of its members in the Parks
First Additional Protocol states that civilians cannot take a “direct part in hostilities” (Pro Memorandum of Law, 4.
tocol I, 448, art. 51(3)). For the purposes of this paper, the terms “active” and “direct” as 57. Ibid., 4; Lisa L. Turner and Lynn G. Norton, “Civilians at the Tip of the Spear,” Air
synonymous. Geneva Convention III, 246, art. 4(A)(4). Force Law Review 51 (2001): 30-31.
23. Michael E. Guillory, “Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the 58. Paul E. Kantwill, “Contractors on the Battlefield: Distinction Makes a Difference,”
Rubicon?” Air Force Law Review 51 (2001): 115-16. Guillory contains an excellent dis unpublished thesis presented to The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army, April
cussion of the quasi-combatant status. 1999, 75.
24. Commentary to Protocol I, 515. 59. Geneva Convention III, 246, art. 4(A)(2)(d).
25. Guillory, 111. 60. Bill Gertz, “Fedayeen Saddam ‘Essentially Terrorist,’” Washington Times, 26 March
26. Ibid., 112. 2003, 1. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld correctly concluded: “I’m not going
27. Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations to call [the Fedayeen] troops, because they’re traveling in civilian clothes and they’re es
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 6 April 2000), chap. 5, out sentially terrorists.”
lines the three types of contracts for logistics. 61. DODD 5100.77, “DOD Law of War Program,” 9 December 1998, dictates that law
28. Commentary to Protocol I, 618. of war violations be reported up the chain of command.
29. Guillory, 132. 62. Stone, 16.
30. JP 4-0, V-1. 63. Our current detention of alleged hostiles in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from Opera
31. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Army Contractors Accompanying the tion Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) is but one example of individuals claiming they were
Force (CAF)(AKA Contractors on the Battlefield) Guidebook (Washington, DC: GPO, not committing warlike acts but, rather, were civilians in the wrong place at the wrong
8 September 2003), 33; U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive (DODD) 1404.10, time.
Lieutenant Colonel Mark David “Max” Maxwell, U.S. Army, is the Deputy Staff Judge
Advocate, I Corps and Fort Lewis, Washington. He is a graduate of Duke University
and the University of North Carolina School of Law.
reason to destroy Iraq’s infrastructure, even targets as human shields against government forces. 12
with obvious dual-use potential, because of the rela- Israel charges that Palestinian militants routinely
tively certain outcome of the war and the subse- commingled with civilians to protect themselves from
quent responsibility to attack. When Pales-
Courtesy CNN
rebuild the infrastruc tinian gunmen posi
ture.7 tioned themselves
Given the political among demonstrators
risk involved in doing and began firing on
so, the United States Israeli troops at
is unlikely to apply Qana, Israel’s re
the principles of tar sponse had tragic re
geting to preclude sults.13
considering the pres Chechen rebels
ence of voluntary hu used ethnic Russian
man shields. The civilians as human
news media attention shields during the bru
given to peace activ tal war in Chechnya.
ists, their lack of mili Also, civil war in Co
tary importance, and “guests,” unlucky enough to be in Iraq, at selected military and nuclear lombia between the
During Operation Desert Shield, Saddam Hussein placed foreign
U.S. policy makes sites. They were released only when it became clear to him that their National Liberation
this unlikely. 8 captivity might provoke, instead of prevent, Coalition action. Army and paramili
tary forces support
Examples of Human Shields ing the Colombian government has raged for a num
Recently, human shields have been used for a va ber of years. Voluntary human shields from the
riety of purposes. Iraq, the most notable violator of London-based Peace Brigade were used to protect
international prohibitions against using human shields, government personnel under the threat of death from
used human shields during the Iran-Iraq war in the the rebels.14
1980s, Operation Desert Storm in 1991, allied bomb Some uses of human shields are not as instantly
ings in 1997, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.9 recognizable as the examples in Iraq or Kosovo. A
Bosnian Serbs used human shields strategically to classic example of the passive use of proximity hu
countertarget NATO forces during Operation Allied man shields is the bloody Rwandan genocide in 1994,
Force and tactically against Muslim and Croat forces when refugees fled the civil war to Zaire. Remnants
to immunize themselves from indirect and direct fire. of the defeated extremist government and militia
The International Tribunal for the former Yugosla staged attacks into Rwanda from the camps and
via indicted Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for then sought refuge there using refugees as shields
violations of international humanitarian law around from counterattacks.15
and in Srebrenica in 1995. Zatko Aleksovski was In 1993, the United States attempted to apprehend
also convicted for using detainees as human shields warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid in Somalia in order
and sentenced to 7 years in prison.10 to restore order to the country. During a raid on a
Cambodia violated international humanitarian meeting of Habr Gidr leaders, elements of the 75th
law, including the use of human shields, during Ranger Regiment and Operational Detachment
the Vietnam war. Cambodian government forces Delta were forced to withdraw to the U.S. com
used ethnic Vietnamese civilians as human shields pound at the Mogadishu airport. Somali gunmen in
as they advanced on Vietnamese positions.11 U.S. terspersed among the crowd engaged U.S. forces,
forces are likely to encounter this tactical use of stepping out of large crowds of civilians, then retreat
human shields in future low-intensity conflicts. En ing into the crowd, using the civilians as human
emy forces that cannot match U.S. forces’ fire shields. The gunmen also used hospitals and other
power, mobility, and technology will rely on U.S. civilian buildings as places from which to direct fire
reluctance to engage civilians except when abso at U.S. forces. This engagement underscores the
lutely necessary. unique challenges of military operations on urban ter
Throughout the civil war in Sierra Leone during rain with an enemy that disregards international hu
the 1990s, members of the Revolutionary United manitarian law or uses tactics to mitigate U.S. su
Front routinely abducted children and used them periority.16
its norms.25 In 1987, U.S. State Department Deputy have serious consequences. The Rome Statute for
Legal Advisor Michael J. Matheson enumerated the ICC lists “extensive destruction and appropria
many of the principles in Additional Protocol I that tion of property, not justified by military necessity and
the U.S. considers customary international law, in carried out unlawfully and wantonly” as a grave
cluding Articles 51 and 52.26 The 1998 Rome Stat breach.32
ute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has the Principle of discrimination (distinction). Com
jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes, including “uti manders must distinguish civilians and civilian objects
lizing the presence of a civilian or other protected from combatants and military objects under the prin
person to render certain points, areas, or military ciple of discrimination. Civilians enjoy immunity in
forces immune from military objectives.”27 sofar as they “enjoy general protection against dan
gers arising from military operations” and “shall not
Targeting Principles be the object of attack.”33 The principle of discrimi
Given the modern nature of war and the transi nation is codified in Additional Protocol I, Articles
tion of most societies to an industrialized economy 51(4-5) and 57(2)(a)(i), which prohibit indiscriminate
with urban centers as their focal point, it seems likely attacks.34 Attacks must be directed at specific mili
that legitimate military targets will be located near tary objectives and cannot “employ a method or
civilians or civilian objects simply out of efficiency means of combat which cannot be directed at a spe
or because of urban growth. The Geneva Conven cific military objective.”35 Examples of indiscriminate
tions and Additional Protocol I still mandate a duty attacks are carpet bombing and Iraqi Scud launches
on a party to a conflict to remove civilians from such during Operation Desert Storm.
an area, but that might not be practical in all situa Principle of humanity. This principle, applicable
tions. Regardless, U.S. war planners confronted with to all targets, simply means parties are forbidden
the enemy’s use of involuntary or voluntary proxi from employing arms, projectiles, or materiel calcu
mate human shields, remain under a duty to apply lated to cause unnecessary suffering. It most closely
basic targeting principles to ensure the minimal loss ties in with the principle of necessity in that it ex
of civilian life.28 tends to unnecessary destruction of property.36
Targets protected by human shields might still be Principle of proportionality. The U.S. Army’s
attacked subject to the attacking party’s obligations definition of the principle of proportionality states that
under international law to minimize collateral dam the “anticipated loss of life and damage to property
age. Collateral damage usually occurs when attacks incidental to attacks must not be excessive in rela
targeting military objectives cause civilian casualties tion to the concrete and direct military advantage
and damage to civilian objects. It often occurs when expected to be gained.”37 This definition is clearly
military targets are located in urban areas.29 based on Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b),
Principle of military necessity. Any attack must which states that when collateral damage is ex
be justified by military necessity, which means at pected or unavoidable, it must be proportionate to
tacks should be limited to legitimate military targets the military advantages of striking the target.38
such as armed forces and civilian combatants; po
sitions or installations occupied by armed forces, as Targeting Decisionmaking
well as objectives that are directly contested in battle; When a commander is presented with the deci
and military installations such as barracks, war min sion to strike a target that is being illegally protected
istries, munitions or fuel dumps, storage yards for by human shields, the principles of targeting and in
vehicles, airfields, rocket launch ramps, and naval ternational humanitarian law mandate a “balancing
bases. Legitimate but not purely military targets are test.” The commander must evaluate—
commonly referred to as dual-use targets and include The mission.
infrastructure, communications, and military-indus Time available.
trial, military research, and energy production facili Military advantage or purpose for destroying
ties.30 the target.
A more succinct definition of targeting is the use Intelligence available.
of “measures of regulated force not forbidden by in Assets available to attack the target.
ternational law which are indispensable for secur The political ramifications of striking the
ing the prompt submission of the enemy, with the target.
least possible expenditures of economic re All likely collateral damage, including the
sources.”31 Failure to adhere to this principle could human shields likely to be killed in the attack.
mander; however, it is unique and challenging be bate on the quasi-combatant status of human shields,
cause of the media attention they receive and the the requirement to minimize collateral damage to pro
political visibility involved. The illegal use of human tect civilians has not changed. Perhaps the remedy
shields will not cease because forces with little re for the use of human shields lies with the Interna
sources have little incentive to comply with interna tional Criminal Court, which has the power to indict
tional humanitarian law. Although there is some de- and prosecute violators of international law. MR
NOTES
1. Kenneth Anderson, William C. Bradford, Lee A. Casey, Samuel Estreicher, Dou cials because the political ramifications of killing a Westerner might result in increased
glas Kmiec, Jerome Marcus, Madeline Morris, Jeremy A. Rabkin, David Rieff, David B. support for the Colombian Government. Apparently, this tactic has placed the human shields
Rivkin, Jr., Abraham D. Sofaer, Don Wallace, Jr., Paul Williams, and Edwin D. at equal risk because the National Liberation Army has declared them to be military tar
Williamson, “A Public Call for International Attention to Legal Obligations of Defending gets.
Forces as Well as Attacking Forces to Protect Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Crimes of 15. See Robert Block, “Shields,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.
War Project, The War in Iraq, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/ org/thebook/shields.html>, accessed 14 April 2003. NATO’s decision to not strike legiti
news_iraq3.html>, accessed 19 March 2003. The authors classify human shields as in mate military targets where UN hostages were present required a different type of tar
voluntary and voluntary. I have broken these two categories into further subcategories. geting analysis than was used for analyzing possible U.S. attacks against targets in Iraq
See also Matthew Lippman, “Aerial Attack on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: that were being protected by voluntary human shields.
Technology and Terror from World War I to Afghanistan,” California Western Interna 16. See Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down (New York: Penguin Books 2000), 85, 106.
tional Law Journal 33 (2002): 1, 36; Additional Protocol I, Geneva Conventions, 12 Au 17. See Geneva Convention III, art. 3; Roberts and Guelff, 245.
gust 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 51(7), 18. Geneva Convention III, art. 23, para. 1; Roberts, 254.
8 June 1977; Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 19. Geneva Convention IV, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 449; U.S. Department of Defense 12 August 1949; Roberts and Guelff, 312.
(DOD), Briefing on Human Shields in Iraq, on-line at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/ 20. Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, art. 51(7), “Protection of the Civilian
t02262003_t0226humanasst.html>, accessed 26 February 2003. Population.”
2. See MAJ Ariane L. DeSaussure, “The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict During 21. Additional Protocol I, art. 51(8); Roberts and Guelff, 449.
the Persian Gulf War: An Overview,” Air Force Law Review 37 (1994): 41, 52-53. Iraq 22. Additional Protocol I, art. 52(2); Roberts and Guelff, 450.
released the hostages under intense international pressure before hostilities began. 23. Additional Protocol I, art. 52(1); Roberts and Guelff, 449.
3. Sean Maguire, “Hostages,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar. 24. Additional Protocol I, art. 58(a-c); Roberts and Guelff, 453.
org/thebook/hostages.html>, accessed 19 April 2003. 25. See Lippman, “Aerial Attacks on Civilians,” 45.
4. See Scott Peterson, “‘Human shields’ in tug-of-war,” The Christian Science Moni 26. Michael J. Matheson, remarks on the U.S. Position on the Relation of Customary
tor, on-line at <www.csmonitor.com/2003/0317/p01s04-woiq.html>, accessed 17 March International Law to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Hu
2003. man Rights Watch, The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law
5. Human Rights Watch, Backgrounder, “International Humanitarian Law Issues in Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International
a Potential War in Iraq,” on-line at <www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm>, Law and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, The American
accessed 20 February 2003. University Journal of International Law and Policy 2, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 419-27.
6. Anderson and others; Peterson. Some volunteer human shields left Iraq before 27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii), 17 July 1998;
the war began because they were being located near purely military targets. See Crimes Roberts and Guelff, 678.
of War Project, “In America’s Sights: Targeting Decisions in a War With Iraq,” on-line 28. See W. Hays Parks, “Responding to Rogue Regimes: From Smart Bombs to Smart
at <www.crimesofwar.org/print/onnews/iraq-print.html>, accessed 6 March 2003. Sanctions,” New England Law Review 36 (Summer 2002): 755, 761; Additional Proto
8. Anderson. col I, art. 58(a); Roberts, 453. See also Krista Nelson, Iraq: Questions Regarding the
9. See Lippman, “Aerial Attacks on Civilians,” 45; James S. Robbins, “War Crimes: Laws of War, Center for Defense Information, on-line at <www.cdi.org/iraq/lawsofwar
The Case of Iraq,” Fletcher Forum on World Affairs 18 (1994): 45, 49-50; Peterson; LT pr.cfm>, accessed 18 March 2003.
Robert A. Bailey, “Why Do States Violate the Law of War? A Comparison of Iraqi Viola 29. See Human Rights Watch. See also Anderson. At least one case from U.S. law
tions in Two Gulf Wars,” Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 27 (Winter held a bank negligent when a bank employee fired shots at bank robbers and struck a
2000): 103, 122; Maguire. When Serb forces used captured UN peacekeepers as hu human shield. Horst Fischer, “Collateral Damage,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at
man shields in 1995, the UN declared that these persons were hostages. The Interna <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/collateral-damage.html>, accessed 19 April 2003.
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) disagreed with this assessment. Because 30. See Gaby Rado, “Legitimate Military Targets,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at
the UN had ordered air strikes and become involved in the Bosnian conflict, the ICRC <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/legit-military-target.html>, accessed 19 April 2003.
saw the hostages as prisoners of war. By either categorization, their use violated inter 31. Desaussure, 46, citing U.S. Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law: The
national humanitarian law. Unfortunately, the Serb tactic worked because NATO avoided Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Air
targets shielded by UN peacekeeper hostages. Force, 1976).
10. Tania Voon, “Pointing the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the 32. See Victoria Brittain, “Property: Wanton Destruction,” Crimes of War Project, on
Kosovo Conflict,” American University International Law Review 16 (2001): 1,083, 1,110 line at <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/property-wanton.html>, accessed 17 April 2003;
1,111. Voon addresses allegations of possible NATO war crimes in the bombing of a Rome Statute, art. 8, “War Crimes,” (2)(iv), on-line at <www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
Korisa Village on 14 May 1999 that killed approximately 87 civilians who might have been romefra.htm>, accessed 8 July 2004.
present at a legitimate military objective; Florence Hartmann, “Bosnia,” Crimes of War 33. See Heike Spieker, “Civilian Immunity,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at
Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/bosnia.html>, accessed 19 April 2003; <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/civilian-immunity.html>, accessed 14 April. See also Pro
Mohamed S. Elewa, “Genocide at the Safe Area of Srebrenica: A Search for a New Strat tocol I, arts. 51-52.
egy for Protecting Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflict,” Michigan State Univer 34. Additional Protocol I, art. 51(4)(a) (b); Roberts and Guelff, 448-49.
sity-Detroit College of Law, Journal of International Law 10 (Fall 2001): 429-31; Lippman, 35. Ibid. See also Roy Gutman and Daoud Kuttab, “Indiscriminate Attack,” Crimes of
“Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility,” Tulsa Jour War Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/indiscriminate-attack.html>, ac
nal of Comparative & International Law 9 (Fall 2001): 75-76. cessed 19 April 2003.
11. Sydney Schanberg, “Cambodia,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimes 36. See COL Tia Johnson in LCDR William O’Brien, Operational Law Handbook 9
ofwar.org/thebook/cambodia.html>, accessed 14 April 2003. (Charlottesville, VA: International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate
12. Ismene Zarifis, “Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Sol General’s Legal Center and School, 2003).
diers,” Humanitarian Rights 9, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 18, 19. Although the Revolutionary 37. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington, DC:
United Front is arguably composed of unprivileged combatants, [forbidding] the use of GPO, 1956), para. 41, change 1.
human shields is considered to be customary international law, and there are clear vio 38. Protocol I, art. 51(5)(b); Roberts and Guelff, 449.
lations of Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions III, relative to the Treatment of Prison 39. See FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997),
ers of War, 12 August 1949, on-line at <www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm>, accessed 1-152. The Army’s definition of targeting is “the process of selecting targets and match
8 July 2004. Sierra Leone became a signatory to Additional Protocol II, Geneva Conven ing the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and
tions, 1949, on 8 June 1977. capabilities. The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander’s mission, ob
13. See also W. Michael Reisman, “The Lessons of Qana,” Yale Journal of Interna jectives, and capabilities at the commander’s disposal, to identify and nominate specific
tional Law 22 (1997): 381, 382; Mark Dennis, “Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Laws of War,” vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander’s purpose through de
Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimesofwar.org/expert/arabisrael-print.html>, laying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the en
accessed 14 April 2003. There are charges that Israel employed snipers in an attempt emy.”
to discriminate between military and civilian targets, but there have been many civilian 40. See Peterson, 9, 10.
deaths as a result of this practice. 41. Targeting analysis might occur in some type of formulaic style, but at the battalion
14. See Barry Renfrew, “Chechnya,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at <www.crimes level it is usually done with a sole emphasis on the tactical decision rather than consid
ofwar.org/thebook/chechnya.html>, accessed 19 April 2003; Teun Voeten, “Barran eration of any strategic implications.
cabermaja: Murder Capital of the World,” Crimes of War Project, on-line at 42. See Johnson. The actual document is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff In
<www.crimesofwar.org/colombia-mag/teun-print.html>, accessed August 2001. It was struction 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) for U.S. Forces (portions
hoped that the presence of foreigners would limit attacks on Colombian government offi of this document are classified SECRET) (Washington, DC: GPO, 15 January 2000).
Captain Daniel P. Schoenekase, U.S. Army National Guard, is the Commander, Com
pany D, 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry, Illinois Army National Guard. He received a B.S.
from Truman State University and a J.D. from Saint Louis University School of Law. He
has served in various active-duty infantry assignments with the 1st Battalion, 27th In
fantry, 25th Infantry Division, including Rifle Platoon Leader, Rifle Company Executive
Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company Executive Officer, Battalion Mainte
nance Officer, and Battalion Logistics Officer.
Refugees from
Rwanda’s bitter
civil war between
the Hutu and
Tutsi tribes.
in response to Kuwait’s production and sale of oil bility operation with the potential to escalate into a
at prices low enough to adversely affect Iraq’s regional conflict. Although it is difficult to predict the
economy. Iraq exploited a resource-related civil vul level of NATO involvement, given concerns over the
nerability when it set fire to oil wells in Kuwait. The use of weapons of mass destruction and their pro
U.S. Agency for International Development notes liferation in the Caucasus, the prospect for NATO
that struggles over land use and resources contrib and U.S. involvement is strong.13
ute to global pollution, resource degradation, and the According to RAND, the United States must
loss of biological diversity and can lead to conflicts engage the potential threat early by supporting
that threaten U.S. trade interests and that might draw UN and European Union initiatives to mitigate
the United States into regional conflicts.11 conflict in the Caspian Sea area.14 The United
One volatile regional dispute involving resources States should support programs that promote local
is occurring in oil-producing areas around the economic institutions, human rights, and democ
Caspian Sea. A RAND study notes that Caspian oil racy and provide disaster preparedness, refugee
production is significant because it could reduce U.S. control, and counternarcotics trafficking assistance.
reliance on oil from the Middle East, enable former The U.S. military can support civilian agencies in any
Soviet states to become less dependent on Russia, of these tasks. These missions are stability opera
and discourage Russian expansionism. 12 The tions and support operations with the priority of
Caspian states are struggling with unstable econo effort being to engage the civil COG and related
mies, income disparities, clan and tribal conflicts, po vulnerabilities.
litical repression, and a dearth of government insti A significant opportunity exists for peacetime en
tutions. Events in the Caspian Sea region also affect gagement of the civil COG in the environmental field.
Turkey, China, Russia, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Af Civil affairs units in USPACOM’s area of opera
ghanistan. The region is at risk for conflict, and the tions currently conduct disaster preparedness
involvement of Turkish, Russian, or Chinese military mitigation assessments at the request of the Depart
intervention could draw the United States into a sta ment of State (DOS) and country teams in select
countries. Task-organized teams of military and ci lim, a development that could have derailed the
vilian agencies deploy to these countries to assess peace process. The U.S. military team assigned
their vulnerability to disasters and provide recom to support the IPTF recognized this and helped
mendations to remedy their deficiencies. This type the IPTF restructure the BPF so its ethnic com
of mission clearly engages the civil COG, usually a position was more representative of the prewar
ministry or civil defense agency. state.15 In military terms, ensuring the police
would not become a source of conflict later was
National and International the decisive point in securing Sarajevo’s public
Governance safety. The source of strength, or civil COG, for
Governance is not just a system of government; the Bosnian Government was Muslim dominance
it also includes respect for human rights, civil-mili of the Bosnian police force. The U.S. strategy
tary relations, and tolerance of opposition movements was to engage that civil COG and its related vul
or parties. Most issues related to governance are nerabilities by developing strong working relation
probably best handled through diplomatic and politi ships with area UN elements, DOS representa
cal channels, but in stability operations and support tives at IPTF, local government leaders, and the
operations, the military must address them whether population.
it wants to or not. Aside from postwar Iraq and Af East Timor. U.S. military operations in East
ghanistan, one of the clearest examples of direct Timor also engaged a civil COG. The UN admin
military involvement in local political processes was istered East Timor under the auspices of the UN
U.S. military support to the UN International Police Transitional Authority-East Timor (UNTAET) un
Task Force (IPTF) during the transitions of govern til the emerging state held elections and became
ment in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia. capable of self-administration. U.S. military sup
Bosnia. The IPTF had the critical task of en port was limited to relief and recovery operations,
suring a secure environment during the transitions but the United States engaged the civil COG, in this
from Serb to Muslim control of the local govern case the UNTAET, and for force protection and
ment and the creation of the Bosnian Federation practical reasons, coordinated relief efforts with UN
Police (BFP). Under the Bosnian Government’s Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) to ensure its military
transition plan, the ethnic composition of the po components were aware of U.S. intentions in the
lice force would have been overwhelmingly Mus area. The U.S. Support Group-East Timor estab
lished an ongoing relationship with the PKF civil-mili appropriate courses of action, and parameters of suc
tary affairs office and UNTAET infrastructure di cess, the COG is deliberately defined as a broad set
rectorates—the civil COG. of components.
African states. The African Crisis Response Ini Related civil vulnerabilities are civil influencers;
tiative is a training assistance program the United that is, peripheral nonmilitary components of the AO
States conducts to help African states become more that indirectly affect mission success. Civil influ
self-sufficient in regional crises and during peace encers are integral to the mission, and the military
keeping operations. Army Special Operations planner must incorporate them into the plan early.
Forces have taken the lead for the U.S. military The influencers might first be peripheral to the mis
contribution to the instruction package for sion and then become the COG as the mission
peacekeeping and humanitarian-relief missions. evolves. For example, the United States might in
Other agencies involved include the UN High Com vade country X, where the COG is a paramilitary
missioner for Refugees, the International Commit organization. Country X’s police, a related civil in
tee for the Red Cross, the U.S. Agency for Inter fluencer, are still in the AO, and do not present a
national Development, World Vision, and many threat, but they are ineffective against the paramili
humanitarian agencies.16 The COG might differ de tary organization. While attacking the paramilitary or
pending on the instructions. Some instruction is for ganization, the United States should also engage the
military units, such as Special Forces training in Mali police to develop a working relationship as early as
and Senegal. Certain aspects of the instruction, how possible. Once hostilities cease, the U.S. objective
ever, are intended for civilian and military leaders, might be to restore law and order to prevent loot
as for example, when civil affairs personnel con ing. The COG then becomes the police force.
ducted classes on the military’s role in a democracy The United States must remain prepared to con
for Uganda’s Ministry of Defense.17 duct operations throughout the spectrum of conflict.
Traditional doctrine appropriate for conventional op
Redefining the Civil Dimension erations must evolve to reflect the new environment
The current operational environment requires a of conflict. Low-intensity conflicts, now stability op
better definition of the civil COG and its related vul erations and support operations, have characterized
nerabilities. The civil COG is that broad set of non conflicts in the last decade, reflecting the uncertainty
military components in the AO that is the priority of and unpredictability of the geopolitical environment.
effort for the mission and has a direct effect on mis An increasingly large number of nonmilitary com
sion success. The nature of the operation defines ponents of the battlefield exist in conventional op
the COG, whether the COG is an organization or erations as well. Integrating the civil COG and re
agency, a group of individuals, an institution, or an lated civil vulnerabilities or influencers into doctrine
infrastructure function. To give the operational plan will enhance the Army’s ability to plan both conven
ner great flexibility in defining his mission, objectives, tional and unconventional operations. MR
NOTES
1. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Wash 10. Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington DC: National
ington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 November 2000). Defense University Press, January 1995).
2. Ibid. 11. U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID and the Environment, on-line
3. CIA, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Ex at <www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/>, accessed 16 June 2004.
perts (Washington, DC: GPO, December 2000). 12. Richard Sokolsky and Tanya Charlick-Pulley, NATO and Caspian Security: A Mis
4. Timothy L. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Com sion Too Far? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).
bat,” Parameters (Summer 1999). 13. Ibid.
5. Max G. Manwaring, “Thinking Again about Contemporary Conflict,” The Officer 14. Ibid.
(March 2001). 15. For more detailed information on this mission, see MAJ Richard K. Sele, “Civil
6. John A. Gentry, “Complex Civil-Military Operations: A U.S. Military-Centric Per Military Operations in the Post War Sarajevo Region,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law
spective,” Naval War College Review (Autumn 2000). Enforcement (Spring 1999).
7. Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis (NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 247. 16. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, African Crisis Response Initiative (May
8. The UN Population Division Report, World Urbanization Prospects: The 1999 2000), on-line at <www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/acri/fact0500.htm>, accessed 16
Revision, on-line at <www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup1999/wup99.htm>, June 2004.
accessed 29 June 2004. 17. News Briefing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs),
9. CPT Phillip R. Parker, U.S. Army, Counterintelligence and Civil Affairs in Soma DOD Briefing on African Crisis Response Initiative, 29 July 1997, transcript on-line
lia and PSYOP and CA Contributions in Somalia (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1997/t07311997_tacri.html>, accessed 16 June
Lessons Learned), available to Department of Defense (DOD) personnel on-line at <http:/ 2004.
/call.army.mil>.
Major Richard K. Sele, U.S. Army, is a civil affairs officer with the 351st Civil Affairs Com
mand, Mountain View, California. He received a B.A. from the University of North Caro
lina-Greensboro, an M.A. from Salve Regina University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College. His operational experience includes Operation Desert
Storm, Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Pacific Haven, Operation Stabilize, and Op
eration Enduring Freedom. His article “Civil-Military Operations in the Post-War Sarajevo
Region” appeared in Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement (Spring 1999).
US Army
ficient fidelity for proper weaponeering and engage For typical air-to-air rules of engagement (ROE),
ment.4 Fixing includes the precise location as well the logic follows the steps in figure 1. In addition to
as CID of aircraft. Combat identification at this junc IFF modes 2, 3, 4, 5, and C (which provides altitude
ture starts with cooperative identification capabilities readouts), the pilot can assess LOF using coopera
to determine cooperating friends. But CID requires tive identification systems like Link 16, interflight
entirely different capabilities to perform noncoopera datalinks, and JBFSA. Noncooperative identification
tive identification. Noncooperative identification ca capabilities include noncooperative target recognition,
pabilities must distinguish neutrals from enemies to electronic fingerprinting, a special air-to-air interro
link up the rest of the kill chain. gator (mode X), and standard JBFSA surveillance
CID is not final as a pilot transitions from fix to capabilities characterizing the unknown radar con
track to target. With sensors and platforms brought tact.
into the process, the goal continues to be to engage The ROE for the kill chain follows an orderly se
enemy forces. At any time during this process the quence: determine LOF, determine presence of en
kill chain can be broken to prevent fratricide. emy, and determine whether the enemy is a com
The term “fratricide” has taken on disproportion batant with hostile intent. The last step, which is not
ate importance because it describes sensitive inci often addressed, must account for a clear avenue
dents. But, if the only goal is to prevent fratricide, of fire, or the wingman crossing between friendly
one can do so by never firing a shot. From the stand aircraft and the enemy could become a fratricide sta
point of effectively destroying the enemy, fratricide tistic.
is but one metric by which to measure poor CID. Cooperative identification systems can detect LOF
Procuring capabilities to prevent fratricide is and hostile intent. Noncooperative systems can de
necessary, but elaborate CID capabilities potentially tect the presence of an enemy or combatant as well
slow down the ability to engage and destroy the as hostile intent. Therefore BFT and JBFSA can
enemy. BFT and JBFSA do not complete the kill only contribute to a portion of CID, which enables
chain; they break the kill chain. With refresh rates completion of the kill chain. Interestingly, BFT and
potentially in the range of several minutes, waiting JBFSA can actually close the kill chain—but only
for a BFT interrogation could actually increase force for an adversary who has gained access to the
vulnerability. friendly aircraft’s information. That adversary has
LOF, POE, and hostile intent information.
Air-to-Air Engagements
The response from a BFT interrogation is either Air-to-Ground Engagements
“positive friendly” or “unknown.” Positive friendly Similar ROE exist for air-to-ground engagements,
breaks the kill chain. An unknown response requires but different technologies are required to complete
continuing the CID process; it does not mean the kill chain (figure 2). The cooperative identifica
engage. tion systems currently available to provide the
Analogically, the guerrilla fights the war of the With the right mindset and with a broader, deeper
flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s dis knowledge of lessons from previous successes, the
advantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiq war against the flea can be won. The Army has suc
uitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. cessfully fought counterguerrilla wars. However, the
If the war continues long enough—this is the contradiction emanating from America’s unsuccessful
theory—the dog succumbs to exhaustion and expedition in Vietnam is that, because the experi
anemia without ever having found anything on ence was perceived as anathema to the U.S.
which to close its jaws or to rake with its claws. military’s core culture, hard lessons learned there
—Robert Taber1 about fighting guerrillas were not preserved or rooted
in the Army’s institutional memory. The U.S. mili
propensities can block innovation in ways of war unhinge them and to sap their will. This technique
fare that are outside perceived central or core emerged in one form or another in the Philippines,
roles. A preference for a big-war paradigm has during the Banana Wars, and during the Vietnam
hitherto been an obstacle to learning how to fight war.
guerrillas.3 The Army must analyze U.S. involve Andrew J. Birtle’s U.S. Army Counterinsur
ment in, and the nature of, small wars, insurgen gency and Contingency Operations Doctrine
cies, and counterinsurgencies. Without some sense 1860-1941, one of the better books on the Army’s
of historical continuity, American soldiers will have role in the Indian wars, describes Captain Randolph
to relearn the lessons of history each time they face B. Marcy’s The Prairie Traveler: A Handbook
a new small war.4 for Overland Expeditions as “perhaps the single
most important work on the conduct of frontier
The Indian Wars and expeditions published under the aegis of the War
Beating Guerrillas Department.”5 In essence, Marcy’s book was a
The Indian wars of the 19th century provide some how-to manual for packing, traveling, tracking, and
counterinsurgency lessons and demonstrate that the bivouacking on the plains and a primer on fighting
guiding principles for fighting insurgents can endure the Indians. In formulating pacification principles,
the test of time. Without codified doctrine and little Marcy looked at his own experiences on the fron
institutional memory for fighting guerrillas, the late tier as well as Turkish and French experiences
19th century Army had to adapt to Indian tactics on pacifying North Africa. He arrived at the follow
the fly. A loose body of principles for fighting an un ing conclusions:
orthodox enemy emerged from the Indian wars, in Over-dispersion strips the counterinsurgent
cluding the following: force of initiative, increases its vulnerability, and saps
Ensure close civil-military coordination of the its morale.
pacification effort. Mobility is imperative. (Mounting infantry on
Provide firm but fair paternalistic governance. mules was one way of increasing mobility during
Reform the economic and educational spheres. that era.)
Good treatment of prisoners, attention to Indian Surprise is paramount. Employing mobile
grievances, and avoiding killing women and children mounted forces at night to surprise the enemy at
(a lesson learned by trial and error) were also re dawn was the best way to counter the elusive Indi
garded as fundamental to any long-term solution. ans. The Prairie Traveler conveys one principal
The Army’s most skilled Indian fighter, General message that is still relevant: soldiers must possess
George Crook, developed the tactic of inserting small the self-reliance, the individuality, and the rapid
teams from friendly Apache tribes into insurgent mobility of the insurgent, along with conventional
Apache groups to neutralize and psychologically military discipline.6
US Army
The Philippine Insurgency The U.S. military enhanced the legitimacy of the
During the Philippine Insurgency from 1899 to Filipino regime it supported by allowing former in
1902, the U.S. military achieved victory and estab surgents to organize antiregime political parties. In
lished the foundation for an amicable future between an award-winning study, Max Boot ascribes U.S.
the United States and the Philippines. Guerrilla war success in the Philippines to a measured application
scholar Anthony James Joes notes, “There were no of incentives and disincentives: the U.S. military used
screaming jets accidentally bombing helpless villages, aggressive patrolling and force to pursue and crush
no B-52s, no napalm, no artillery barrages, no col insurgents, but it treated captured rebels well and
lateral damage. Instead, the Americans conducted generated goodwill among the population by running
a decentralized war of small mobile units armed schools and hospitals and improving sanitation.8
mainly with rifles and aided by native Filipinos, hunt Brigadier General John J. Pershing returned to the
ing guerrillas who were increasingly isolated both by Philippines to serve as military governor of the Moro
the indifference or hostility of much of the popula Province from 1909 to 1913. To pacify the Moros,
tion and by the concentration of scattered peasant he applied the lessons he had learned as a captain
groups into larger settlements.”7 during the Philippine Insurrection. He established a
The U.S. military learned to— Philippine constabulary of loyal indigenous troops and
Avoid big-unit search-and-destroy missions did not attempt to apply military force by itself. He
because they were counterproductive in a coun “felt that an understanding of Moro customs and
terinsurgency context. habits was essential in successfully dealing with
Maximize the use of indigenous scouts and them, and he went to extraordinary lengths to un
paramilitary forces to increase and sustain decen derstand Moro society and culture.”9
tralized patrolling. Pershing also comprehended the need to have
Mobilize popular support by focusing on the im U.S. forces involved at the grassroots level. He un
provement of hospitals, schools, and infrastructure. derstood the sociopolitical aspects, and he realized
der areas from Viet Cong (VC) and regular North leadership in an economy of force while maximiz
Vietnamese Army (NVA) units. ing the use of indigenous troops. A modest invest
From 1966 to 1967, U.S. field commanders in ment of U.S. forces at the village level yielded ma
creasingly employed SF-led units in long-range re jor improvements in local security and intelligence.16
connaissance missions or as economy-of-force se Even though CORDS was integrated under
curity elements for regular units. Other CIDG-type MACV in 1967, Abrams and William Colby, Direc
forces, called mobile guerrilla forces, raided enemy tor of CORDS, expanded the program and invested
base areas and employed hit-and-run guerrilla tac it with good people and resources. Under Abrams’
tics against regular enemy units. The SF also re one-war approach to Vietnam, CORDS provided
cruited extensively among Nung tribes for the Delta, oversight of the pacification effort. After 1968,
Sigma, and Omega units, which were SF-led recon Abrams and Colby made CORDS and pacification
naissance and reaction forces. the principal effort. A rejuvenated civil and rural de
The CIDG program made a significant contribu velopment program provided increased support, ad
tion to the war effort. The approximately 2,500 sol visers, and fundings to police and territorial forces
diers assigned to the 5th SF Group essentially raised (regional forces and popular forces). The new em
and led an army of 50,000 tribal fighters to operate phasis on rural development allowed military and ci
in some of the most difficult and dangerous terrain vilian advisers from the U.S. Agency for Interna
in Vietnam. CIDG patrols of border infiltration ar tional Development to work better with their
eas provided reliable tactical intelligence, and the Vietnamese counterparts at the provincial and vil
CIDG secured populations in areas that might have lage levels to improve local security and develop in
been otherwise conceded to the enemy.15 frastructure.
The Marine Corps’ CAP was another initiative Eliminating the VC infrastructure was critical to
that significantly improved the U.S. military’s capac pacification. Colby’s approach—the Accelerated
ity to secure the population and to acquire better tac Pacification Campaign—included the Phoenix
tical intelligence. Under CAP, a Marine rifle squad (Phuong Hoang) program to neutralize VC infra
assisted a platoon of local indigenous forces. This structure. Although the program received some bad
combined Marine and indigenous platoon trained, press, its use of former VC and indigenous Provi
patrolled, defended, and lived together in the sional Reconnaissance Units to root out the enemy’s
platoon’s village. CAP’s missions were to— secret underground network was quite effective.
Destroy VC infrastructure within the village or The CORDS Accelerated Pacification Campaign fo
hamlet area of responsibility. cused on territorial security, neutralizing VC infra
Provide public security and help maintain law structure, and supporting self-defense and self-gov
and order. ernment at the local level.17
Protect friendly infrastructure. Begun in November 1968, the Accelerated Paci
Protect bases and communications within the fication Campaign helped the Government of Viet
villages and hamlets. nam (GVN) control most of the countryside by late
Organize indigenous intelligence nets. 1970. The “other war”—pacification—had been
Participate in civic action and conduct propa practically won. The four million members of the
ganda against the VC. People’s Self-Defense Force, armed with some
Civic action played an important role in efforts 600,000 weapons, were examples of the population’s
to destroy the VC because it brought important commitment to the GVN. Regional and popular
intelligence about enemy activity from the local pop forces also experienced significant improvements.
ulation. Because CAP protected the villagers from Under CORDS, these forces provided close-in se
reprisals, it was ideal for acquiring intelligence curity for the rural population. Although imperfect
from locals. The Marines’ focus on pacifying highly and quantitative, MACV’s Hamlet Evaluation Sys
populated areas prevented guerrillas from coerc tem showed that between 1969 and 1970 CORDS
ing the local population into providing rice, intel efforts contributed to the pacification of 2,600 ham
ligence, and sanctuary. The Marines would clear lets (three million people).
and hold a village in this way and then expand the Other more practical measures of the Acceler
secured area. ated Pacification Campaign’s success were a reduc
CAP units accounted for 7.6 percent of the en tion in VC extortion and recruitment in South Viet
emy killed while representing only 1.5 percent of the nam and a decrease in food provisions taken from
Marines in Vietnam. CAP employed U.S. troops and the villagers. To be fair, however, other factors also
NOTES
1. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice 12. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Government
(New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1965), 27-28. Printing Office, 1940), 1-1-1-31; USMC Combat Development Command, Small Wars
2. See Robert M. Cassidy, “Prophets or Praetorians: The Uptonian Paradox and the (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marines Corps, 2004 Draft), iii-iv; Boot, “A Century of Small Wars
Powell Corollary,” Parameters (Autumn 2003): 132-33. Shows They Can Be Won,” New York Times Week in Review, 6 July 2003.
3. For a short discussion on military culture and big-war preferences, see Cassidy, 13. Ibid.
Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of 14. U.S. Department of the Army, A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term De
Asymmetric Conflict (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 8, 54 velopment of South Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1966), 1-9;
60. Lewis Sorley, A Better War (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1999), 10-125.
4. Sam C. Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and 15. Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years (Washington, DC: U.S.
Lessons for the Future (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 245. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 196-207.
5. Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doc 16. Frank Pelli, “Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Marines in Vietnam,” unpub
trine 1860-1941 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 55-92; lished paper, USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 1990, 13-16; Brooks
CPT Randolph B. Marcy, The Prairie Traveler: A Handbook in Overland Expeditions R. Brewington, “Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement,” unpub
(Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, January 1988). lished paper, USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 1996, 13-19.
6. Birtle, 64-65. 17. Sorley, 22-23, 64-67.
7. Anthony James Joes, America and Guerrilla Warfare (Lexington: University Press 18. Ibid., 64-67, 72-73, and 217-24.
of Kentucky, 2000), 120-23. 19. Ibid., 1.
8. Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power 20. Clarke, 207; Keith F. Kopets, “The Combined Action Program: Vietnam,” Military
(New York: Basic Books, 2003), 126. Review (July-August 2002): 78-79.
9. Sarkesian, 178-180. 21. Mao Tse-Tung, cited in E.L. Katzenbach, Jr., “Time, Space, and Will: The Politi
10. Ibid. cal-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung” in The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, ed. T.N.
11. Ibid. Greene (New York: Praeger, 1962), 17.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, is a member of the U.S. Army Eu
rope Commanding General’s Initiatives Group, Heidelberg, Germany. He received a B.A.
from Fitchburg State College, an M.A. from Boston University, and an M.A.L.D. and a
Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He has served in various com
mand and staff positions in the continental United States and Germany. His article “Re
naissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Fight” appeared in the July-August 2003
issue of Military Review.
encourages exaggerating good news and minimiz Did the villager blame me personally? No, but he
ing bad news. Run that tendency through several concluded that Americans had little interest in his
layers of command and the chance is slim of higher concerns. The United States missed a chance to
headquarters understanding what is important in any make a friend and an opportunity to shorten our
exchange between a nationbuilder and a civilian. stay in Bosnia.
A Vietnam war story provides one example of fail Bottom-up success. The weapons harvest is a
ure of the top-down command structure. The com semiannual event in Bosnia in which the Stabiliza
mand decided that building local schools would be a tion Force (SFOR) attempts to remove military-
good hearts and minds thing to do. Military forces grade weapons from the civilian population. Differ
went into local villages and built schools. Ceremo ent units take different approaches. My unit took a
nies were conducted to celebrate the wonderful ad positive, supporting approach. The local authorities
vance the new schools represented. Pictures were were in charge. We would help. They set the dates
taken. Speeches were made. Officers congratulated and locations for action and coordinated the effort.
each other. And, shortly thereafter, the Vietnamese We did not threaten or intimidate the civilian popu
burned the schools down. lace, and by taking this approach, we secured sev
The decision to construct schools was a top-down eral antitank weapons; hundreds of automatic weap
decision. No one asked the villagers what they ons, grenades, and rocket-propelled grenades; and
thought about it. The villagers were not involved hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition.
in the decision or the construction. As a result, they Other SFOR contingents took a top-down ap
saw the school not as a benefit, but as a tool of proach. With minimal coordination with local authori
repression. ties, SFOR soldiers searched local homes with or
During my tour of duty in Bosnia, my unit met an without owners’ consent. One unit that had taken
older gentleman who asked us for help. We went this intrusive approach confiscated only an old pis
to his home where he pointed out a man-size pit in tol and one hand grenade after several weeks of
his back yard, which he believed was an unmarked work. The skills required to conduct a successful mili
grave. He asked for help to investigate the situation tary operation are not the skills required for
and hopefully bring closure to some family’s grief. nationbuilding.
I promised to see if I could get some help, and I The small hammer. When my unit arrived in
reported the situation up my chain of command. Bosnia, we spent 2 weeks with the unit we were
I reported it four times, but I never found out any replacing to learn the mission. My predecessor told
information for the villager. My superiors took no me he would introduce me to the mayor of the lo
action or allowed me to do so; it was not a com cal village in our area of responsibility. He explained
mand priority. We did nothing other than embarrass that the mayor was a difficult man who dodged
ourselves. meetings, did not like Americans, and only tolerated
our presence. When we arrived at the townhall, a specific knowledge. The ability to speak the local
secretary informed us the mayor was in a meeting language is critical to the ability to communicate. The
and would be unable to see us. My predecessor an use of interpreters is a poor substitute for commu
nounced, “I am SFOR! The mayor will see me nicating directly. Speaking the language immediately
now!” We then stomped up the stairs and barged confers a status far beyond simple communication
into the mayor’s meeting. I do not speak Serbo- and is the first big step toward trust. Communica
Croatian, but I could read the mayor’s body language: tion skills can be learned. The sales industry has de
he was quite unhappy with the intrusion. My veloped countless communication models that can
predecessor’s problem was less the mayor’s dislike be adapted easily to communication in nationbuilding.
for Americans than his dislike for a particular Amer After all, the United States is attempting to “sell”
ican. However, my predecessor executed the some of its basic beliefs.
mission the way he had been instructed. His only The Reserve Component contains a reservoir of
requirement was to maintain a safe, secure environ uncataloged civilian skills. Making a living as an ar
ment. Unfortunately, he acted more like a conqueror chitect has little application in combat operations, but
than a nationbuilder. the same ability could have great application in
A few weeks later, I went back to the townhall nationbuilding. The Army should catalog and certify
and asked for an appointment to see the mayor at such reservist civilian skills and use them when ap
his convenience. Then I made sure I was there propriate.
when he was willing to see me. I did so because it The great Broadway show The Music Man opens
was good manners and because my unit would be with the musical number “You Gotta Know the Ter
both safer and more effective with the mayor as an ritory!” Knowing the territory is vital and entails more
ally, not an adversary. Eventually, the mayor and I than understanding geography; it entails appreciat
were able to work well together. He was not anti- ing how the locals think of themselves as a group.
American. He simply wanted to be treated with the Not many people wake up in the morning and say,
respect he deserved as the town’s mayor. Good My culture and I are worthless and insignificant.
manners go a long way in any culture. People need to respect themselves, especially in un
Uncommon task training. The skills nation- certain times. Every group has some accomplish
builders need to be effective, which are not now in ment it can point to with pride. The way to create
common task training manuals, fall into two cat support for nationbuilding is to respect, appreci
egories: interpersonal communication skills and area- ate, and acknowledge the local people’s historic
Terrorist groups are flexible, patient, and use glo territories. Economic interdependence among TBA
balization to achieve their objectives. Unless its lead nations further complicates matters. For example,
ers cooperate with the U.S. National Strategy for each day, 30,000 people cross the International
Combating Terrorism, Latin America will remain a Friendship Bridge that connects Brazil and Para
lucrative target for terrorist funding, recruiting, and guay. Tight security measures and better enforce
safe haven.11 ment of the laws on contraband hurt commerce and
anger tourists, consumers, and business people.
Counterterrorism and Representatives from Mercosur (the Latin Ameri
Regional Cooperation can common market) have discussed ways to in
The Organization of American States (OAS) fos crease security and facilitate the movement of
ters international cooperation to counter terrorism. people and commerce between member countries.14
A 1998 Argentine initiative created the Inter-Ameri In 2002, the Mercosur countries signed an agree
can Committee to Combat Terrorism, and shortly ment making it easier for their citizens to travel and
after 11 September 2001, the OAS created the In- obtain resident visas. The agreement also permits
ter-American Committee Against Terrorism to en inspection-free transportation of commercial contain
hance hemispheric security through improved re ers. Such open borders make the region inviting for
gional cooperation. The committee established terrorists and make an already difficult law-enforce
financial intelligence units to collect, analyze, and dis ment situation worse.
seminate information on terrorist offenses and im
proved border control measures to detect and pre Regional Capabilities
vent movement of terrorists and terrorist-related to Combat Terrorism
materials.12 On 28 September 2001, the UN Secu Latin America must use the economic, political,
rity Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373, intelligence-gathering, and military elements of na
requiring states under international law to deny fi tional power to cut off terrorism’s life-blood—financ
nancing, support, and safe harbor of terrorists.13 ing and state support. However, most countries in
Regrettably, a huge gap often exists between a the region cannot afford to control their borders,
government’s good intentions and its ability or politi deny terrorists safe haven in ungoverned territories,
cal will to act. Most countries in Latin America sup eliminate money laundering, or restrict terrorists’
port international counterterrorism efforts in open abilities to operate.
fora, but do little to control their porous borders; Resource needs are great, fiscal challenges se
crack down on illegal arms shipments and illegal vere, and available funding insufficient. Latin Ameri
immigration; or tighten weak financial controls. Full can militaries and law-enforcement agencies are not
cooperation between and among nations is quite suitably organized for or adequately used to confront
minimal. terrorist networks. The constitutions of many Latin
Several Latin American countries do not consider American countries prohibit using military forces for
the GWOT their war and do not actively participate internal security. Memories of the military dictator
in it. Preoccupied with pressing social issues like pov ships of the 1970s and 1980s have not been forgot
erty and unemployment, most Latin American gov ten, and the people are afraid such dictatorships
ernments are reluctant to support what they perceive might return if the military’s role expands. Law-
as a politically unpopular cause. Only the Domini enforcement agencies are not well funded and
can Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicara trained and are notoriously corrupt. Distrust between
gua provided troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom’s the military and law-enforcement institutions im
international stabilization force. Some regional politi pedes routine coordination.
cal leaders even denounced preemptive U.S. mili
tary action against suspected terrorist threats, al U.S. Efforts
though many high-ranking military officers privately U.S. policymakers have not attacked the condi
expressed their support of and willingness to pro tions that attract people to terrorism. The United
vide troops for Operations Enduring Freedom and States and its allies can win spectacular military
Iraqi Freedom. victories; freeze terrorists’ bank accounts and cut
Many Latin American governments do not have off their weapons supplies; and capture or kill
the legal infrastructure to counter transnational terrorist masterminds, but such triumphs are not
threats or the law-enforcement, intelligence, or mili enough to eliminate an entire generation of brain
tary capabilities to assert effective control over their washed extremists who have a profound hatred
pressed groups whose destabilizing power is grow terrorism does not directly affect them, nations in the
ing, whose leaders are gaining political prominence, TBA will place economic considerations ahead of
and who could be susceptible to terrorism’s appeals. security concerns, seek economic prosperity, and
The TBA’s exact role in attracting terrorist groups remain reluctant to tighten border controls or place
is not entirely clear, but Ciudad del Este’s Arab and new restrictions on commerce and transportation.
Muslim community has raised funds through money The potential for terrorism in the TBA and else
laundering, illicit drug and weapons trafficking, smug where in Latin America is clearly no myth. The TBA
gling, and piracy, with some of the funds reportedly and several other tri-border areas in Latin America
going to Hezbollah and Hamas to support terrorist will emerge as ideal breeding grounds for terrorists
acts against Israel. The FARC also reportedly main and those groups that support them, unless countries
tains a fundraising presence in the TBA. This ex in the region make changes in their judicial systems,
tensive terrorist financial network also stretches to improve their law-enforcement and military capabili
Margarita Island, Panama, and the Caribbean. ties, take effective anticorruption measures, and co
The TBA’s dangerous combination of vast ungov operate with each other. The potential for Middle
erned areas, poverty, illicit activity, disenfranchised East terrorists to operate in the TBA and elsewhere
groups, ill-equipped law-enforcement agencies and in Latin America warrants closer scrutiny.
militaries, and fragile democracies is an open invi The United States can only win the GWOT if it
tation to terrorists and their supporters. Undeterred has regional partners ready and willing to take pre
criminal activity, economic inequality, and the rise of emptive action and not just wait for the United
disenfranchised groups with the potential to collabo States to act. Closing down charities that fund ter
rate with terrorists present a daunting challenge. rorism, rounding up suspected terrorists, and de
Terrorism today is transnational and decentralized. nouncing terrorism is in the regional partners’ self
International support of a multidimensional counter interest.21 Only effective diplomacy can bring this
terrorism strategy is necessary to defeat it. to pass. According to Ambassador J. Cofer Black,
Colombia’s less-than-successful counternarcotics DOS Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “[Diplo
strategy demonstrates that unilateral action does not macy] is the instrument of power that builds politi
necessarily eradicate or eliminate drug trafficking. cal will and strengthens international cooperation.
The same is true of terrorism. Unilateral action in Through diplomatic exchanges, we promote
Afghanistan has not eliminated the global terrorist counterterrorism cooperation with friendly nations,
threat. Without multilateral, cooperative deterrence, enhance the capabilities of our allies, take the war
terrorist organizations will simply migrate across po to the terrorists, and ultimately cut off the resources
rous borders to less scrutinized areas. As long as they depend on to survive.”22 MR
NOTES
1. John Price, “International Terrorism in Latin America, a Broad and Costly Secu storyid=342429>, accessed 2 August 2004.
rity Risk,” InfoAmericas, October 2001, on-line at <http://tendencias.infoamericas.com/ 11. The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, on
article_archive/ 2001/1001/1001_regional_trends.htm>, accessed 2 August 2004. line at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_
2. Rex Hudson, Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) terrorism_strategy.pdf>, accessed 2 August 2004.
of South America, Federal Research Division, The Library of Congress (Washington, 12. Department of State (DOS), Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, “Latin
DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], July 2003), 53. American Overview,” Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001).
3. Anthony Faiola, “U.S. Terrorist Search Reaches Paraguay: Black Market Border 13. DOS, Fact Sheet on Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, Washington,
Hub Called Key Finance Center for Middle East Extremists,” Washington Post, 13 Oc D.C., 31 May 2002, on-line at <http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/Inter-Ameri
tober 2001, A21. can_Convention.html>, accessed 2 August 2004.
4. Mario Daniel Montoya, “Israel Takes Special Interest in Triple Border Area,” Jane’s 14. Mercosur, the Common Market of South America, has four permanent members
Intelligence Review 13, December 2001, 13-14. (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and three associate members (Bolivia, Chile,
5. Mike Boettcher, “South America’s Tri-Border Back on Terrorism Radar,” CNN, and Peru).
8 November 2002, on-line at <www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/americas/11/07/terror. 15. Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Ter
triborder/>, accessed 2 August 2004. rorism (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2003), 184.
6. Ibid. 16. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.
7. Chris Moss, “Latin America’s First Mega-Mosque Opens Eyes to Islam,” on-line 17. Ibid.
at <http://hispanicmuslims.com/articles/other/openseyes.html>, accessed 16 August 18. Charles Knight, “Essential Elements Missing in the National Security Strategy of
2004. 2002,” Commonwealth Institute, Project on Defense Alternatives Commentary, Cambridge,
8. Horacio Verbitsky, Pagina 12, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 26 January 2003, 124, MA, November 2002, on-line at <www.comw.org/qdr/0210knight.html>, accessed 16 Au
Internet version. (No other publishing information given.) gust 2004.
9. J. Cofer Black, Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony 19. Ibid.
to the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, 20. Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruc
Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., tion (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 251.
26 March 2003, on-line at <wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/blac0326.htm>, 21. Thomas Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes: The World in the Age of Terrorism
accessed 16 August 2004. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), 236.
10. Martin Arostegui, “Chavez Plans for Terrorist Regime,” Insight, 24 December 22. Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr., “Foreign Terrorist List Vital in Global War on Terror
2002, on-line at <www.insightmag.com/global_user_elements/printpage.cfm? ism,” DOS, 5 January 2004.
Lieutenant Colonel Philip K. Abbott, U.S. Army, is Army Section Chief, United States
Military Group, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. He received a B.A. from Norwich University,
an M.A. from Kansas University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the con
tinental United States, Latin America, and Europe.
Operations in Kosovo
UNMIK and KFOR US and Russian soldiers block an angry mob waving the Albanian
had to influence Albanian flag, Domorovce, Kosovo, 14 August 2000. After two Serbian men
disappeared, Serbians believed Albanians abducted the men
and Serb organizations and began to make threats and block roads. The Albanians then
and the individuals and began to form a mob to confront the Serbians.
groups within them. De
pending on the extent
and character of their in
fluence, these individuals
and groups were either
supportive of or threaten
ing to MNB(E)’s mis
sion.
To further complicate
the matter, neither Alba
nian nor Serbian societ
ies were monolithic en
tities. Kosovo’s Albanian
society was individualis
tic and decentralized. At
the local level, family re
lationships dominated
formal and informal
US Army
power structures. At the
municipal and provincial
levels, political, paramili
tary, and organized crime organizations were influ way struggle among the IC, Albanians, and Serbs.
ential. On the other hand, Kosovo’s Serbian society To accomplish the mission, UNMIK and KFOR had
was collectivist or centralized. Concentrated into eth to gain and maintain support of the populace.
nic enclaves, the populace lacked any formal struc Other important characteristics of the information
ture other than the Serbian Orthodox Church. environment that affected KFOR’s mission were the
Serbian and Albanian factions competed for con dilapidated state of Kosovo’s information infrastruc
trol of their respective communities and, in the case ture (for example, the power grid and public tele
of the Albanians, for the entire province as well. phone system) and the media’s biased reporting,
Armed Albanian insurgent groups, supported by ex which was either pro-Albanian or pro-Serb. Most
tremist elements within Kosovo, desired to expand of Kosovo’s information environment was not un
Kosovo’s current boundaries to the east and south. der the IC’s direct control, which limited UNMIK’s
The factionalism produced a complex, multidimen and KFOR’s abilities to communicate with the
sional operating environment. populace.
Information was an important part of KFOR’s
operating environment, and the most significant char MNB(E) Operations
acteristic of the information environment was people. The MNB(E)’s mission was to maintain a safe,
Conceptually, Kosovo’s populace (both Albanian and secure environment. Its AOR, in the southeast cor
Serb) was considered the information environment’s ner of Kosovo, was some 30 kilometers wide and
key terrain; that is, an entity the control of which 80 kilometers long, or approximately 2,300 square
afforded a marked advantage to either IC (that is, kilometers. The AOR was subdivided into six bat
UNMIK and KFOR) or Albanian and Serb factions. talion task force (TF) sectors, three of which were
The presence of the international community re U.S.-supervised and three multinational (Russian,
strained Albanian and Serb factions and compelled Greek, and Polish-Ukrainian).
them to compete in the information environment To provide a safe, secure environment, MNB(E)
rather than on the battlefield. planned and executed tactical operations within a
Each faction used information to build legitimacy framework of maneuver, civil-military, and informa
and power by shaping the populace’s perceptions tion operations. Because the populace and KFOR
and attitudes. This information conflict was a three- troops resided in the physical environment (vice the
US Army
MNB(E) retained the moral high ground within the
information environment, ensuring legitimacy for its
forces and activities. Both offensive and defensive
information operations activities accomplished this.
Offensively, MNB (E) leaders and soldiers engaged
key Albanian and Serb leaders (organization
decisionmakers) and discrete population groups, such
as communities near ethnic faultlines. Truthful infor
mation was also disseminated to target audiences to
influence certain segments of the populace. All in
formation operations were integrated and synchro
nized with civil-military and nonlethal maneuver op
erations.
Defensively, information operations protected
MNB(E)’s intentions and freedom of operation by
U.S. soldiers
question an countering misinformation and propaganda, particu
Albanian family larly that disseminated through local and regional me
during a cordon
and search dia. By actively disseminating MNB(E)’s point of
mission, Crnilo, view regarding critical events and issues in the AOR,
Kosovo, August
2000. information operations limited and, as possible, neu
tralized the effects of inflammatory rhetoric and anti-
UNMIK and KFOR propaganda. Operations secu
rity supported this effort by denying specific
forewarning of MNB(E) intentions.
information environment), maneuver operations were Information operations activities were organized
decisive, and information operations supported them. into two synchronized operations: one to shape the
Maneuver operations controlled the AOR through operating environment for future operations; the
troop presence and noncombat activities. Troop pres other to provide direct support to battalion TFs. The
ence included manning fixed sites to guard Serb primary difference between these two operations
enclaves and patrimonial sites; establishing check was timing and intended effects. Both used the same
points to control populace activity and flow; and pa assets and means, and both sought to modify the
trolling to demonstrate commitment and resolve. Non populace’s perceptions, attitudes, and behavior.
combat operations included cordons and searches The shaping operation was analogous to the deep
to seize weapons caches; reconnaissance and sur battle in conventional conflict. MNB(E) targeted key
veillance to guide future operations; and security Albanian and Serb leaders and influential populace
operations to control the AOR’s boundaries. Much groups throughout the AOR to modify attitudes and
of MNB(E)’s maneuver elements’ attention and ef behavior well before a critical event occurred. For
fort was fixed on ethnic faultline activity and bound example, during the campaigning phase of provin
ary operations. The constraint to use lethal force only cial elections, MNB(E) personnel engaged key po
in self-defense and the need to remain impartial gov litical leaders in face-to-face meetings to avoid po
erned maneuver operations. litical violence.
Civil-military operations provided humanitarian and Information operations support to the battalion
civic assistance to gain and maintain the support of TFs was analogous to the close battle. In reaction
the populace and support maneuver operations by to events unfolding in the AOR, the MNB(E) allo
directing resources and aid to cooperative populace cated IO-capable assets to maneuver elements, and
groups. Such aid included humanitarian assistance, battalion TFs engaged local leaders and the popu
infrastructure rehabilitation, short-term employment lace. For example, grenade attacks and house bomb
projects, school visits, and medical assistance pro ings near an ethnic faultline could result in face-to
grams. Civil-military operations were a positive, tan face meetings with local leaders, distribution of
gible means of influencing the populace. PSYOP handbills to local residents, and increased
To gain information superiority, MNB(E) had to patrols—all intended to prevent the continuance or
maintain credibility with the populace and quickly dis renewal of violence.
for future operations. Procedurally, the process fol responsibility. The IO section also synchronized
lowed the decide, detect, deliver, and assess meth the MNB(E) information operation with the in
odology in FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and formation activities of KFOR, UNMIK, and the ad
Procedures for the Targeting Process.7 However, jacent Multi-National Brigade. At the battalion
to integrate MNB(E)’s various and nonlethal assets TFs, information operations integration and syn
and means into a cohesive effort, the process ex chronization was the responsibility of the IO of
panded to include nonlethal targeting objectives (re ficer. Synchronization of the various assets in sec
duce, minimize, increase) and effects (inform, influ tor included not only organic TF assets, but also
ence, warn, co-opt). Each targeting cycle produced MNB(E) assets such as civil affairs, PSYOP, com
a target synchronization matrix that directed nonle bat camera, and medical teams operating in the TF
thal engagement of key leaders and populace sector.
groups.8 The fire support element led the targeting Monitor execution. MNB(E) directed informa
effort. tion operations through execution, target synchroni
Coordinate. MNB(E)’s information operations zation matrixes (TSMs), and battle drills. Depend
staff was the focal point for information operations. ing on the tempo of operations, TSMs were issued
Day-to-day IO activities were coordinated within the either weekly or every other week. The TSMs co
command group, battle staff, and subordinate units ordinated IO activities across the AOR by assign
in regularly scheduled staff meetings or by direct ing a task and purpose to each MNB(E) asset
staff coordination. An IO working group served as (PSYOP, CA, and public affairs) and the subordi
a forum for the IO staff to monitor and coordinate nate battalion TFs. The activities directed by the
the information operations of MNB(E)-level assets TSM shaped the operating environment through non
and subordinate battalions TFs. Meeting attendees lethal engagement of specific leaders and popula
included the IO staff, battalion TF information op tion groups. In response to unplanned critical events
erations officers, and representatives from G2, G3, that occurred in the AOR, such as a violent dem
command surgeon, combat camera, MPAD, G5, and onstration or act of violence against KFOR soldiers,
PSYOP sections.9 the IO staff used battle drills to plan and rapidly
Integrate and synchronize. Information op coordinate employment of IO-capable assets.
erations were integrated into the maneuver plan Each drill included a proposed IO concept of em
through the MDMP and targeting process. At the ployment, a desired end state, and generic tasks to
MNB(E) level, this was the IO staff section’s those assets the MNB(E) commander normally em
ploys. During crisis-action planning, the commander conducted a weekly analysis of local and regional
and staff refined the concept and tasks to address media reporting. The analysis examined media re
the situation at hand. porting of events in the AOR to identified subject
matter broadcast to the populace and to detect pro
Assessment paganda directed against segments of the populace
Assessing information operations during peace and KFOR. The staff assessed media reports as
operations was a challenge. Without quantifiable positive; neutral; or negative and factual; or non-
physical evidence, IO effects were subtle—a tar factual. A summary of the results helped determine
get audience’s response or nonresponse, changes in the main topics and themes Kosovo’s Albanian and
efforts and techniques, or an absence of activity. In Serbian media disseminated.
formation operations effects also manifested as As part of MNB(E), the 1st Armored Division
trends, activities, and patterns in the operational en (1AD), employed tactical information operations
vironment. Overcoming these imprecise effects re from June 2000 to May 2001 during Operation Joint
quired a thorough understanding of the operating en Guardian in Kosovo. Based on existing doctrine and
vironment. tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), the 1AD
The effectiveness of MNB(E)’s information op used information operations to shape the perceptions,
eration was determined by analyzing trends within attitudes, and behavior of the adversary and the
the AOR, unit assessment reporting, and media re populace in the AOR.
porting. Trend analysis data from unit intelligence The 1AD’s experience in Kosovo confirmed the
summaries and operations reports identified, evalu value of information operations to peace operations.
ated, and categorized incidents as either negative or The MNB(E)’s information operations successfully
positive. Negative incidents were those that were shaped the environment for its day-to-day operations
counter to a safe, secure environment, such as in and defused several potentially volatile situations.
terethnic violence, anti-KFOR propaganda, and Success was possible because the MNB(E) inte
populace interference with UNMIK and KFOR ac grated information operations into the overall mis
tivities. Positive incidents were those that supported sion instead of regarding them as separate, parallel
the KFOR mission. Examples included interethnic operations. Building on the previous experiences of
cooperation or observance of the rule of law. The U.S. forces in the Balkans, the 1AD expanded and
occurrence of these incidents was tracked to deter refined existing information operations TTP to include
mine trends by time, ethnicity, and geographic loca integration and synchronization of information opera
tion. tions within the maneuver operation. Using standard
Unit assessments analyzed the information envi processes—the MDMP, IPB, and targeting—the IO
ronment in the TF sectors and the IO effects on the staff visualized Kosovo’s information environment
target audiences. Daily and weekly reporting of bat and developed a focused, integrated operation to
talion TFs, CA battalions, and PSYOP detachments shape the operating environment and support
presented a detailed assessment of the entire AOR. battalion TF efforts to maintain public safety and
The IO staff section, with the MPAD and G2, security. MR
NOTES
1. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, July 1994).
Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 6. LTC David C. Grohoski and MAJ Marc J. Romanych, “Templating the Informa
28 November 2003), 1-13. tion Threat,” Cyber Sword: The Professional Journal of Joint Information Operations
2. FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 June 2001), 11-2. (Summer 2001): 5-8.
3. Steven M. Seybert, “Shaping the Environment for Future Operations: Experiences 7. FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process
with Information Operations in Kosovo” in Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience, (Washington, DC: GPO, 8 May 1996).
ed. Larry K. Wentz, Department of Defense (DOD) Command and Control Research 8. CWO2 Richard L. Gonzales and MAJ Marc J. Romanych, “Nonlethal Targeting
Program Publication Series, Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, Assistant Revisited,” Field Artillery (May-June 2001): 6-10.
Secretary of Defense (C3I), DOD, Washington, D.C., July 2002. 9. Each battalion TF in MNB(E) had an IO officer. In U.S. Army battalions, the fire
4. Drita Perezic, “Kosovo Primer,” unpublished manuscript, New York, March 2001. support officer generally filled the IO position. In non-U.S. battalions, the IO officer was
5. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington, DC: GPO, 8 usually an officer on the operations staff.
Major Marc J. Romanych, U.S. Army, Retired, works for JBM, Inc., contracted to the
U.S. Army 1st Information Operations Command. He received a B.A. from Syracuse
University, a B.A. from the University of Maryland, and an M.A. from St. Mary’s Uni
versity of San Antonio. He has served in various command and staff positions in the
continental United States, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq.
LTC Kenneth M. Krumm, U.S. Army, is assigned to the Combined Arms Center G7
Information Operations Office and serves as the U.S. Army IO Specified Proponent. He
received a B.A. from Northern State University, an M.A. from Webster University, and
he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
Major Pierre D. Gervais, U.S. Army; and Major Gregory A. Burbelo, U.S. Army
These competencies improve individual and team apart from their peers. The top recruiters confirmed
performance by empowering individuals to— the results during a feedback presentation. This valu
Create effective thinking habits and perform able information revealed that noncommissioned of
with confidence. ficers’ intangible characteristics and skills can be
Improve attention to important details. crystallized, shared, and implemented and that ap
Control physical, emotional, and mental plied performance psychology has occupational uses.
responces to high-performance demands.
Operate with a sense of clarity regarding im Teambuilding
mediate actions and their long-term results. Because the team is important to successful re
Those who train in the full performance-enhance cruiter performance, CEP personnel conducted
ment curriculum maximize their training and readi teambuilding seminars with recruiting battalions to
ness for competition. Cadets also engage in training help build a culture of success and to sustain ex
to improve physical skills, gain confidence, or learn ceptional recruiter performance. One of the meth
self-regulation skills. ods CEP used to build team cohesion was the Great
Teams and units also use the Performance En Teams exercise, which included the following steps:
hancement Program. Military competition teams 1. Identify the traits of great teams. This involves
have used video analysis of stream-crossing and introspection and disclosure of each team member’s
wall-climbing strategies to ensure smooth, coordi experience of being on a great team. Commonly
nated movement. Entire cadet corps teams have identified traits such as focus, strong work ethic, one
participated in teambuilding sessions to establish heart, and so forth are often identified as qualities
standards of behavior for the coming season and to that give a team its unique identity and account for
set goals as a group. its great success.
The Performance Enhancement Program oper 2. Select traits to apply to the team. Once a list
ates out of six staff office/training rooms equipped of great team traits has been brainstormed, team
with audiovisual and biofeedback equipment and members select three to five traits from the list that
ergonomically designed chairs for relaxation train would be most beneficial to the present team.
ing. A conference room, classroom, and a “Kines 3. Obtain consensus on key team traits. The en
thetic Room” with life-size projection video equip tire team discusses how to align the team around
ment for motor-control training and an audio/video selected traits.
production studio also support every phase of the 4. Identify behavioral indicators of key traits. This
program. process translates the great team traits into specific
Pre- and postprogram measures of self-reported observable, verifiable behaviors and actions. Team
coping skills and optimism levels show significant members specify what a neutral observer of the
gains as a result of participation in the program. Ca team will see or hear that unambiguously demon
dets who trained at CEP accounted for a dispropor strates each trait.
tionately high number of postseason performance- 5. Demonstrate key traits through small- and
award winners. Hundreds of enthusiastic testimonials large-group exercises. The team uses innovative
from cadets indicate that many took their athletic, exercises to demonstrate selected traits under un
academic, and military performance to new levels. usual constraints. The exercises reveal team tenden
cies to fall back into familiar behavioral patterns
Army Recruiting Command when under stress but facilitate adopting new pat
and Unit Training terns.
The CEP has expanded performance-enhance 6. Create a poster-size written mission statement
ment training beyond the USMA with tailored out incorporating traits and action steps.
reach programs to the U.S. Army Recruiting Com The first five steps identify traits or characteris
mand (USAREC), the World Class Army Program tics and corresponding behavior the team could edit
(WCAP), the Army Marksmanship Unit, Stryker into a 3- to 4-paragraph team contract—a cross be
Brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort Wain tween a command philosophy and an Army creed—
wright, Alaska, and most recently, the 3d Infantry as a visible reminder of the team’s uniqueness and
Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia. commitment to its mission.
The top 150 Army recruiters in the United States The team contract provides a clear sense of the
participated in a CEP study that used survey ques unit’s importance, unique capabilities, and dedica
tionnaires to gather critical information about stellar tion to professionalism. Because the team contract
recruiters’ intangible thinking and beliefs. The data was developed from the bottom up, it facilitates to
revealed common mental strategies that contributed tal buy-in and allows everyone to see organizational
to participants’ success and allowed them to stand standards.
(used here in
hancement Program includes goal-setting pro
Afghanistan),
cedures for individuals or teams to develop action
all enhance
trust and confidence emerges from our daily com achieve any task requested of them.
mitment to our Army values: loyalty, duty, respect, Gives soldiers the mindset to trust their abili
selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal cour ties and allow for instinctual release of their skills,
age. Without trust, there can be no dignity and re bringing out their best consistently without thinking.
spect for the individual soldier, and cohesion and Encourages soldiers to listen; focus; manage
morale in our units would suffer.”3 Shinseki’s state their time and energy; and see the battlefield as their
ment mandates the Army to explore performance arena and the outcomes as successful.
psychology as a training resource. Shinseki said, “[The Army Vision] is not just about
The CEP has created a mobile training team of people or equipment. It is about an investment in fu
officers trained in performance enhancement. The ture American leadership and security. . . . We will
team provides introductory and advanced perfor repay America’s investment in its Army with qual
mance psychology training to Army units. To date, ity people, warfighting readiness, and . . . a land force
the 172d Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the 1st transformed to meet threats all across the spectrum
Brigade, 25th Infantry Division have participated in of operations. . . . Achieving this vision will enable
full-day training sessions to familiarize all leaders— our Army to better meet the diverse and complex
from squad leader to brigade staff—with the key demands of tomorrow’s security environment [and
concepts, terminology, and training methods of per will give] the Nation an array of deployable, agile,
formance enhancement. The 3d Infantry Division is versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable forma
participating in this training throughout the fall of tions, which are affordable and capable of revers
2004. The CEP training teams provide each unit with ing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and re
guided visualization audio CDs that enable soldiers solving conflicts decisively. The Army’s deployment
to mentally rehearse common tasks such as cordon is the surest sign of America’s commitment to
and search, react to contact, and react to ambush. accomplish[ing] any mission that occurs on land.
Implications [We] know we must change; we have an idea of
The uses for performance-enhancement training what we want to be—we don’t know all the an
in the versatile and ever-changing Army are many. swers, but we’re asking the right questions and we’ll
With new types of weapons systems, equipment, and go where the answers are.”4 One of those answers
organizations appearing at an almost unfathomable is performance-enhancement training at all levels in
pace, the U.S. soldier remains at the forefront of the U.S. Army. MR
change and must meet or exceed high performance
standards despite obstacles and distractions. The NOTES
1. U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100, Leadership (Washington, DC:
Army can benefit from training that— Government Printing Office, 1990), 46.
2. Edwin A. Locke and Gary P. Latham, A Theory of Goal-Setting and Task Perfor
Quantifies and makes tangible, to all Army mance (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990).
leaders, that confidence and composure in any situ 3. GEN Eric K. Shinseki, “Dignity and Respect,” on-line at <www.army.mil/ig>,
accessed 14 July 2004.
ation is a skill. 4. Shinseki, “The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in
Peace, Invincible in War,” speech at the annual meeting of the Association of the United
Creates a belief in soldiers, squads, platoons, States Army, Washington, D.C., 12 October 1999, on-line at <www.usarpac.army.mil/
OLD_WEBPAGE_JUNE2003/docs/transformation/Gen%20Shinseki%20
and higher level commands and instills the power to transfor mation%20speech.htm>, accessed 4 August 2004.
Zero-Defect Leaders:
No Second Chance?
Bradford, captain of the Bennington, thought the postwar Army. Patton was unpopular with the
Lejeune was a poor performer. On Lejeune’s first division staff and brigade commanders because he
fitness report, Bradford evaluated Lejeune as “good consistently wrote papers and after-action reports
in professional ability and general conduct . . . ex that admonished subordinate commanders and units
cellent in sobriety and health [but] not good in at and described them as incompetent. Major General
tention to duty and efficiency of William R. Smith, the Hawaiian
US Marine Corps
US Army
Colonel George S. Patton, Jr.,
during World War I. Patton
reverted to his regular rank of
major in the postwar Army and
was relieved of a divisional
staff position after writing
papers and after-action
reports that strongly
admonished subordinate
commanders and units he
found incompetent.
tor in future promotions. The lieutenant is free to fo a mark of Promotable is perceived as disenfranchis
cus on learning his job instead of vying for the top ing junior officers, thereby shifting their focus from
block within the battalion. earning warfare qualifications to competing with
In 1988, the Air Force attempted to change its peers. [E]arly competition in the initial period of of
reputation as the “one-mistake Air Force” by rede ficer development is counterproductive and not in the
signing its evaluation system. The Air Force mea Navy’s best interest, particularly for officers who
sures officers on six standards with each officer ei have not reached their minimum service obliga
ther meeting or not meeting the standard.20 An tion.”24
officer’s senior rater completes a separate promo The Marine Corps has changed its system as well,
tion recommendation form and forwards it to a cen allowing one rater to numerically rank all officers in
tral selection board with his recommendation of a the same grade under his supervision. Now, the rater
promotion category of “Definitely Promote,” “Pro ranks each officer against all others of the same
mote,” or “Do Not Promote.” The “Definitely Pro grade that he has rated in his career. The rater is
mote” category has a fixed number of openings for not allowed to restart his profile and must keep the
officers at the rank of major and above. Junior of same rating standards, which reduces cutthroat com
ficers do not compete against each other for “Defi petition among officers within the same command.25
nitely Promote” rankings.21 In 1999 and 2000, four Navy amphibious ships,
Navy regulations forbid the numerical ranking of the USS Underwood, Shreveport, Oak Hill, and
peers on all evaluation reports, either direct or im LaMoure County, ran aground. Two commanders
plied.22 Instead, raters rank officers as “Early Pro were relieved, one “disciplined,” and one remained
mote,” “Must Promote,” “Promotable,” “Progress in command and continued his mission.26 Will their
ing,” or “Significant Problems.” Limits exist on how supervisors remember that Nimitz once also ran a
many officers the Navy can place in the top cat ship aground? Will the Navy promote any of the four
egory.23 In 1998, the Navy decided that ensigns and to the next rank? How many will attend the War
lieutenants junior grade would not be rated higher College? Only time will tell.
than “Promotable,” saying, “Forced ranking of jun Officers’ supervisors can determine the future
ior officers has been a major concern voiced by se course of their careers. The Air Force aptly defines
nior officers. . . . With the current ranking scheme, rating supervisors as “those who know the officer
NOTES
1. GEN James L. Jones, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, speech to the U.S. Army Com 18. Ibid., 386.
mand and General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC) class of 2001, Fort Leavenworth, 19. U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 623-105, The Officer Evaluation Report
Kansas, 1 December 2000. ing System “In Brief” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1 Oc
2. Ibid. tober 1997), 1.
3. GEN John M. Keane, letter to senior commanders concerning junior officer re 20. U.S. Air Force (AF) Pamphlet (Pam) 36-2404, Guide to the Officer Evaluation Sys
tention, 2000. No further information given. tem (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 December 1996), 26.
4. Dede W. Casad and Frank A. Driskill, Chester W. Nimitz, Admiral of the Hills (Aus 21. Ibid, 37.
tin, TX: Eakin Press, 1983), 75. 22. Navy BUPERSINST 1610.10, Navy Performance Evaluation and Counseling Sys
5. Ibid., 78-79. tem (2 August 1995), A-11. No further publishing information given.
6. Merrill L. Bartlett, “An Era of Candor: John A. Lejeune’s First Series of Bad Fit 23. Ibid., A-12.
ness Reports,” Marine Corps Gazette (November 1994): 76. 24. NAVADMIN 276/98, Interim Change to Navy Performance Evaluation and Coun
7. Ibid, 77. seling System Instruction (221546Z DEC 98). No further publishing information given.
8. Ibid. 25. U.S. Marine Corps Order P1610.7E with Erratum and Changes 1-2, Performance
9. Ibid. Evaluation System (1 January 1999), Appendix G. No further publishing information
10. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 341. given.
11. Ibid., 533-35. 26. Jack Dorsey, “Norfolk-Based Navy Ship Hits Reef Off Coast of Chile,” The Vir
12. Ibid., 536. ginian-Pilot, 13 September 2000.
13. Thomas M. Coffey, Hap (New York: The Viking Press, 1982), 4. 27. AF Pam 36-2404, 26.
14. Ibid., 89. 28. CGSOC 2001-Staff Group 4B, leadership discussion during C700, Fundamentals
15. Ibid., 5. of Excellence, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS,
16. Ibid., 127. September 2000.
17. Ibid., 128. 29. Personal conversation with a Marine Corps officer, 10 January 2001.
We have to think differently. The enemy who cisionmaking.3 The Semantic Web will be another
appeared on September 11th seeks to evade our step forward in the military use of intelligent-agent
strength and constantly searches for our weak technology.4
nesses. So America is required once again to The Semantic Web is the envisioned end state for
change the way our military thinks and fights. the movement of the World Wide Web from words,
—President George W. Bush1 images, and audio understood only by humans to the
same data “wrapped in” organizing concepts and
a kind of
a kind of
provokes
policy war
NSCT
NSCT military operations
invokes a part of
a kind of
a kind of
strategy dictates
operations
a kind of
NSCT strategic goal
a kind of
instance of strategic goal a part of
NSCT FBI operations
produces
“help the student organize and develop his ideas of Objective 1.1. Identify terrorists and terrorist or
war, which he draws from experience, study, and ganizations.
history [so] the exploration of the past extends the Objective 1.2. Locate terrorists and their organi
reality that any one individual can experience.”34 Ex zations.
perience and the past are important, but the need to Objective 1.3. Destroy terrorists and their orga
understand more precisely how economic, religious, nizations.36
and ideological factors affect war is becoming just Can the ontological representations in figure 1 in
as important. corporate the reasoning expressed here? We believe
When conditions Napoleon understood and had they can and that they can help the military orga
mastered began to change, he had to change his nize and develop ideas about this type of war.
strategic concepts. When a network of terrorist Expansion of the previous ontological represen
organizations and cells confronts the United States, tation is possible at a higher level of abstraction. An
how does the military organize and develop new intelligent agent could read the NSCT on the Seman
ideas? Consider the National Strategy for Com tic Web and begin to understand the specifics of the
bating Terrorism (NSCT).35 U.S. policy is for its strategy (the what) but would have to look elsewhere
citizens and other civilized people around the world on the web for operations (the how).
to lead lives free of fear from terrorist attacks. Suppose the FBI, the CIA, and other government
Based on this policy, the NSCT presents several stra agencies create Semantic Web pages that present
tegic goals, each having its own objectives. For ex their goals for conducting the GWOT. For example,
ample, the objectives of goal 1—to defeat terror the FBI identifies terrorist cells and organizations op
ists and their organizations—might include the erating within U.S. borders, and the CIA identifies
following: them outside U.S. borders. If it knows the strategy,
provokes
invokes
dictates dictates
NSCT FBI operations NSCT NSTC military operations
produces produces
has SCT strategic objective has
pose, everything that entered into war—social and prepare for the future use of the Semantic Web.
economic preparation, strategic planning, the conduct Creating new ontologies, if nothing else, will help
of operations, the use of violence on all levels— clarify military thinking. Furthermore, we can
should be determined by this purpose, or at least in use such ontologies to expand the understanding
accord with it.”39 of agents such as Disciple-RKF/COG. Having
Thinking differently does not begin with an in an intelligent agent with knowledge of the COG
telligent agent; it begins with the agent’s intelligent theory and traditional warfare is a significant advan
partner—the SME who sees into the future and tage. As different military thought patterns evolve
develops the needed ontologies. The military needs for a new, global, networked model, they can be tried
a new model to update and expand Clausewitz’s on the intelligent agent and reviewed to see which
COG theory at the strategic level. The model are helpful in finding the SCOG for the new en
should use existing intelligent-agent technology and vironment. MR
NOTES
1. George W. Bush, speech at The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, 11 Decem 18. Deborah L. McGuinness, Richard Fikes, James Hendler, and Lynn Andrea Stein,
ber 2001. “DAML + OIL: An Ontology Language for the Semantic Web,” IEEE Intelligent Systems
2. Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (Up (September-October 2002): 72-80.
per Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995). 19. Kenyon, 60.
3. William Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000). 20. John Davis, Dieter Fensel, and Frank van Harmelen, Towards the Semantic Web:
4. Henry S. Kenyon, “Computer Language Seeks Deeper Meaning,” Signal (June Ontology-Driven Knowledge Management (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).
2003): 59-61. 21. Nicola Guarino and Pierdaniele Giaretta, “Ontologies and Knowledge Bases: To
5. Tim Berners-Lee, James Hendler, and Ora Lassila, “The Semantic Web,” Scien wards a Terminological Clarification,” in Towards Very Large Knowledge Bases: Knowl
tific American (May 2001): 34-43. edge Building and Knowledge Sharing, ed. N.J.I. Mars (Amsterdam: ISO Press, 1995),
6. Otis Port, “The Next Web: Think the World Wide Web is a Godsend? By 2005, 25-32.
Tim Berners-Lee aims to be replacing it with the Semantic Web, which will understand 22. Michael Bowman; Antonio M. Lopez, Jr.; and Gheorghe Tecuci, “Ontology Devel
human language,” Business Week, 4 March 2002, 96-102. opment for Military Applications,” Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual ACM South
7. Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age east Conference, New York, ACM Press, 2001, 112-17.
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 141. 23. Benners-Lee, 42.
8. James Allen, “AI Growing Up,” AI Magazine (Winter 1998): 13-23. 24. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and
9. Frederick Hayes-Roth, “Artificial Intelligence: What Works and What Doesn’t?” Associated Terms (Washington DC: GPO, 12 April 2001), on-line at <www.dtic.mil/
AI Magazine (Summer 1997): 99-113. doctrine/jel/doddict>.
10. Sarah Reese Hedberg, “DART: Revolutionizing Logistics Planning,” IEEE Intel 25. Ian Roxborough, “From Revolution to Transformation: The State of the Field,” Joint
ligent Systems (May-June 2002): 81-83. Forces Quarterly 32 (2002): 68-75.
11. Christopher R. Johnson, Larry Birnbaum, Ray Bareiss, and Tom Hinrichs, “War 26. Richard K. Betts, “The Trouble with Strategy: Bridging Policy and Operations,”
Stories: Harnessing Organizational Memories to Support Task Performance,” Intelli Joint Forces Quarterly 29 (2002): 23-30.
gence (April 2000): 17-31. 27. Ibid., 24.
12. Gheorghe Tecuci, Mihai Boicu, Michael Bowman, and Dorin Marcu, “An Innova 28. Ibid.
tive Application from the DARPA Knowledge Bases Programs: Rapid Development of a 29. Duncan J. Watts, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age (New York: W.W.
High Performance Knowledge Base for Course of Action Critiquing,” AI Magazine Norton & Company, 2003), 51.
(March 2001): 43-61. 30. Christopher Fowler; William Cleckner; Antonio M. Lopez, Jr.; Gheorghe Tecuci;
13. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret and Jerome Comello, “Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis for Operations Other Than
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595. War Through Learning Agent Technologies,” Proceedings from the Forty-First Meet
14. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print ing of the Army Operations Research Society, 2002, CD-ROM: Special Session 2, The
ing Office [GPO], 2001). Application of Information Technology on the Battlefield, Fort Lee, Virginia, Center for
15. Antonio M. Lopez, Jr.; Jerome J. Comello; Michael Bowman; James J. Donlon; Army Analysis, U.S. Army Logistics Management College, 2002.
and Gheorgh Tecuci, “Clausewitz Meets Learning Agent Technology,” Military Review 31. Paret, 141.
(November-December 2002): 10-17. 32. Ibid., 193.
16. P.K. Giles and T.R. Calvin, Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Appli 33. Clausewitz, 69.
cation (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Center for Strategic Leadership, 1996, updated 34. Paret, 193.
2002). 35. The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC:
17. Gheorghe Tecuci; Mihai Boicu; Dorin Marcu; Bogdan Stanescu; Cristina Boicu; 2003), on-line at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/
Jerome J. Comello; Antonio M. Lopez, Jr.; James J. Donlon; and William Cleckner, “De counter_terrorism_ strategy.pdf>, accessed 16 July 2004.
velopment and Deployment of a Disciple Agent for Center of Gravity Analysis,” Proceed 36. Ibid., 15-16.
ings of the Eighteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the Fourteenth 37. Paret, 193.
Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, Menlo Park, CA, AAAI 38. Ibid.
Press, 2002, 853-60. 39. Clausewitz, 6.
Colonel Antonio M. Lopez, Jr., U.S. Army Reserve, Retired, Ph.D., holds the
Conrad N. Hilton Endowed Chair in computer science at Xavier University of Loui
siana. He received a B.S. from Loyola University, an M.S. and a Ph.D. from Clemson
University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col
lege (CGSC). He has served in various positions in the continental United States (CO
NUS), Kuwait, and Qatar.
Colonel Jerome J. Comello, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D., is a professor of military
studies at the U.S. Army War College (AWC). He received a B.S. from the U.S. Mili
tary Academy (USMA), an M.S. from George Washington University, and a Ph.D.
from Temple University. He is a graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff
and the National War College. He has served in various positions in CONUS, Viet
nam, and Germany.
Lieutenant Colonel William H. Cleckner, U.S. Army, Retired, is a professor of op
erational research at the AWC. He received a B.S. from the USMA, an M.S. from the
Naval Postgraduate School, and he is a graduate of CGSC. He has served in vari
ous positions in CONUS and Germany.
only along with subjects like coaching, teaching, and Vincenza, Italy, approximately 20 U.S. military of
counseling. Instructors make no attempt to explore ficers from various career disciplines—fighter pilots,
the concept in depth. The only documented curricu navigators, airlifters, air defenders, and so forth—
lum on mentorship I found was at the Infantry formed the “Douhet Society,” named after Italian
School. During the mid-1980s, the leadership cur General Giulio Douhet, author of The Command of
riculum at the Infantry Officer Advanced Course the Air.28
defined a mentor as “a trusted counselor and a As the society took shape, many officers dis
guide, teacher, a coach, and more. He [has] the com played great interest by writing papers, establishing
mitment of a guardian and the duty of a tutor. He reading lists, and holding discussions based on their
has a personal stake in the positive development of personal experiences. In the foreword to USAF
his subordinates and is considered an expert in his Pamphlet 36-13, Officer Professional Develop
field.”26 ment Guide, former USAF Chief of Staff General
The U.S. Navy takes a similar position. In 1999, Larry Welch says professional development is a
691 active and retired admirals were asked for rec “daily business.”29 USAF Manual 1-1, Basic Aero
ommendations for improving the mentoring process space Doctrine of the United States Air Force,
in the Navy. They responded emphatically that they gives officers the “vector” to develop themselves and
did not want a formalized system. Although they en their subordinates professionally.30 The Douhet So
dorsed the value and importance of mentoring, they ciety is a tool that commanders, units, or groups of
believed such relationships must develop spontane interested officers can use to achieve that end. In
ously and that senior officers must choose carefully the absence of a written policy, it provides mutually
those they wish to mentor. directed guidance that can enhance an organization’s
In the article, “Does Mentoring Foster Success,” combat effectiveness organization while profession
Brad Johnson and others say, “True mentorship can ally developing its members.
not be ordered, forced, or taught. It is a natural re At the beginning of the 20th century, the U.S.
sult of harmonious rapport inherent in the people Marine Corps (USMC) introduced the TEAM Prin
themselves and the relationship they develop. It is a ciple—a model to train, empower, acknowledge, and
natural process that needs no planned process. If mentor its junior leaders. This simple, but effective
you are good, you will be recognized, and if you are principle teaches young marines to become techni
fortunate, your superiors will have the opportunity cally and tactically proficient through tough, realis
to assist in your career development. Mentoring is tic training on how to be successful on the battle
a natural process; don’t mess with it.”27 field. Giving them the responsibility and authority to
In 1993, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) took another carry out assigned missions fosters trust and respect
approach to mentoring. At Headquarters, Fifth Al that enhances and furthers mission accomplishment.
lied Tactical Air Force, a NATO headquarters in The Society rewards Marines with ribbons at the
each was initiated because of a mutual need and tains to the limit of their experience; brigade com
desire and developed according to individual lead manders can mentor captains in how to become suc
ership styles. The success of the relationship resulted cessful company commanders.
from the mentor’s exceptional ability, self-confidence, 5. [T]he goal of any mentorship should be to al
commitment, dedication, and experience and the low the mentee to develop to his or her full poten
mentees’ uniquely great potential. It follows then that tial, thereby making the Army better, rather than just
the traditional model of mentorship is available and furthering the mentee’s career.”37
applicable to only a select few.
In March 1989, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Wil Possible Solutions
son, referencing the Marshall example, wrote a pa There are three possible courses of action
per on the application of mentorship at the Army War (COAs) to implement a viable mentorship program
College, addressing five steps that must occur for a in the Army, each having its pros and cons.
mentorship to take place where a traditional model COA 1. Develop and implement a mentorship
is not present:36 policy from the top down that uses researched
1. “[T]he mentor must invest a great deal of time metrics for every commander to use as a bench
and energy into his mentee’s development. The vo mark for mentoring.
luminous correspondence between Marshall and Pros. The program can—
Eisenhower during World War II speaks highly of Fill the current void that exists in Army policy
their commitment to success and the importance by defining mentorship and by providing guidance on
they attached to the relationship. how to be an effective mentor.
2. [T]he mentor cannot expect the mentee to be Be subject to revision based on feedback from
come his clone. One of the prominent features of the field.
the Marshall relationships was that neither [were] Be used as a teaching tool in the service
characterized by the mentor actively trying to shape schools instead of the minimal coverage that
his mentee into a mirror image of himself. mentorship presently receives.
3. [B]oth parties must benefit from the experi Give junior leaders guidance on how to be ef
ence. Pershing and Marshall derived great satisfac fective mentors as their experience begins to build.
tion not just from the fact that their mentees suc Instill trust and confidence that senior leaders
ceeded but that they succeeded while reinforcing the recognize the need for a formal program and are
values of their mentors. willing to address it.
4. [S]uccessful mentorship can occur at any level Cons. A formal mentorship program might result
in the Army. Colonels can effectively mentor cap in ambiguity because the definition and practice of
NOTES
1. John C. Krysa, “Mentoring—More Than Just Another Trendy Concept,” Field Ar 23. Ibid., 37.
tillery Journal (November-December 1985): 17. 24. Ibid., 36-37.
2. U.S. Department of the Army (DA), “Results of the Professional Development of 25. Ibid., 39.
Officers Study (PDOS) Group Report,” Washington, D.C., February 1985, 8. 26. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “Officer Advanced Course Leadership Core
3. GEN John A. Wickham, Jr., letter to the Army’s General Officers, 8 November Curriculum,” Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 1984, 7-12.
1985. (No other publishing data given.) 27. W. Brad Johnson, Jennifer M. Huwe, Anne M. Fallow, LCDR Rakesh Lall, CPT
4. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Lev Elizabeth K. Holmes, and William Hall, “Does Mentoring Foster Success,” Proceed
els (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], June 1987), 9-10. ings (December 1999): 46.
5. DA Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989). 28. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1984);
6. Ibid. LTC Kimble D. Stohry, “The Douhet Society,” Airpower Journal (Spring 1993): 22.
7. Ibid., 50. 29. GEN Larry Welch, in U.S. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 36-2611 (formerly AFP
8. FM 22-100, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: GPO, August 1999). 36-13), Officer Professional Development Guide, foreword. (No other publishing data
9. LTG Charles W. Bagnal, Earl C. Pence, and LTC Thomas N. Meriwether, “Lead given.)
ers as Mentors,” Military Review (July 1985): 6. 30. U.S. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air
10. Ibid., 5. Force (March 1984, revised March 1992). (No other publishing data given.)
11. Kathy E. Kram, Mentoring at Work: Developmental Relationships in Organizational 31. MG John A. Kejeune, Marine Corps Manual, quoted in Marine Corps Reference
Life (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1985), 2. Publication 6-11B, Marine Corps Values: A Users Guide for Discussion Leaders (Wash
12. Ibid. ington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, 20 October 1998), 20-1.
13. Bagnal and others, 7. 32. CPT Chris S. Richie, “Try the TEAM Principle,” Proceedings (July 2001): 77.
14. MG Kenneth A. Joelmore, “The Mentor: More Than a Teacher, More Than a 33. DA, PDOS Report, 52.
Coach,” Military Review (July 1986): 8-10. 34. Ibid., C4.
15. Kram, 23. 35. Ibid., 5.
16. Ibid., 51-53. 36. LTC Stephen E. Wilson, “Senior Leader Mentorship,” Study Project, U.S. Army
17. Ibid., 53. War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 1989, 25-26.
18. Ibid., 49. 37. Ibid., 25-26.
19. Ibid., 56-57. 38. Erik J. Van Slyke, Bud Van Slyke, “Mentoring: A Results Oriented Approach,” HR
20. Ibid., 49. Focus (February 1998): 14.
21. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945 (New 39. Jim Tice, “Junior Officers want more communication, new report says,” Army Times,
York: The Viking Press, 1973), 483. 11 June 2001, 14.
22. MAJ James O. Patterson, “Defining Mentorship,” Armor (November-December 40. COL Albert Johnson, quoted in Tice.
1985): 38. 41. Ibid.
Major Nathan B. Hunsinger, Jr., U.S. Army, is the Operations Officer, Division Mate
riel Management Center of the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York. He received
a B.A. from DeSales University, an M.S. from Webster University, and he is a graduate of
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command
and staff positions in Germany, Bosnia, Jordan, Iraq, and the continental United States.
Assessing
Leaders
Major Craig Whiteside, U.S. Army
The efficiency report is the most disturbing ad review others’ perceptions of their leadership abili
ministrative farce in the Army. It is the measure ties and characteristics and could spur self-reflec
of “following” and not leading. Its weight in tion when their self-perception differs from others’.
“tickets of success” allows officers of incompe Does the Army really need a 360-degree evalua
tence in leadership to advance. tion system? The Army recently revamped the Of
—anonymous Army captain, U.S. Army War Col ficer Evaluation System with an emphasis on more
lege Study on Military Professionalism, 1970 senior-to-subordinate counseling and Officer Evalu
The General Officers in the U.S. Army would ation Report (OER) counseling at the end of the rat
gain much from having instruction and develop ing period. This has improved the dialogue from se
ing an understanding on “selfless service” ver niors to subordinates, especially since the new OER
has blocks in which to report mandatory counseling
sus “selfish service.” Most are preoccupied with
meetings. In addition to counseling, the Army’s
their careers. Unfortunately, this is the type of leader-development program is an effective process
officer the system moves along. that provides periodic feedback for subordinates to
—anonymous Army major, U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College Survey, 2000 improve over time.1 Yet all these programs are
senior-to-subordinate-intensive. None give raters a
US Military Academy
An engineering instructor working with
cadets at the U.S. Military Academy. Twice a
semester, cadets submit reports on super
visors, selected peers, and all subordinates
for review by company tactical officers
responsible for cadet development.
veys have touched on subordinates’ perceptions of development program as found in the earlier AWC
leaders, with some disturbing conclusions. study.5 Little progress had been made in standard
In 1970, the Army fought one war in Vietnam izing a leader-development process outside of com
while also preparing for a possible war with the So missioning sources or education systems.
viet Union. Chief of Staff of the Army General Wil In contrast, since 1970, the proliferation of the
liam C. Westmoreland tasked the U.S. Army War 360-degree evaluation tool in the private sector has
College (AWC) to conduct a study of Army pro been spectacular. Many leading Fortune 500 com
fessionalism. Many of the comments the report cap panies use some form of 360-degree feedback in
tured reflected a decline in standards of ethics and their sophisticated leader-development and fast-track
leadership that threatened Army professionalism. programs. In a business environment where orga
The report made dozens of recommendations to nizations fight to keep highly trained and motivated
Army leaders to help address junior officers’ con workers from moving to rival companies, CEOs
cerns. One recommendation was to implement “as have a vested interest in knowing what subordinates
a supplementary input to officer efficiency files, the feel about midlevel managers and which ones are
results of peer ratings which would be compiled from accomplishing organizational goals and objectives
periodic solicitations . . . of comments by selected while maintaining a productive work environment.
officers on those contemporaries with whom they Consulting organizations such as the Center for Cre
have served.”3 Another recommendation was to ative Leadership offer clients many versions of 360
have “students at the [U.S. Army Command and degree systems.6
General Staff College] and [the U.S. Army War Many Army schools that use the 360-degree as
College] submit confidential comments on prospec sessment system have a high reputation for leader
tive selectees to brigadier general [to] the president development. The U.S. Army Ranger School has
of the board to use as he [saw] fit.”4 The study long used a combination of evaluated patrols by lane
found one source of problems to be the promotion walkers and peer reports to determine whether a
of officers whose superiors viewed them much student should continue to the next phase of the
more positively than did their subordinates. course. Infantry School leaders apparently believe
In the spring of 2000, Chief of Staff of the Army peer rankings and comments are important in a
General Eric K. Shinseki initiated a review of Army course that demands close teamwork and a combi
leadership as part of the Transformation effort. nation of leadership and service to other leaders.
Shinseki’s Army Training and Leader Development Another leadership institution, the U.S. Military
Panel study revealed some of the same shortcom Academy (USMA), uses a 360-degree assess
ings in the area of “senior-subordinate confidence ment process as an integral part of the leader de
and contact” and the lack of a functional leader- velopment of cadets each year. Twice a semester,
US Air Force
The third step was to conduct a legal review with Militia officers and Swiss Department of Defense
the support of Parliament—as well as the popula professional officers and civilians say the success
tion—to allow for a flexible transformation. of Armed Forces XXI will be based on the ability
The fourth step was to develop a new doctrine to operate under an autonomous national or inter
and corresponding force structure based on the 2004 national command structure. But, Armed Forces can
Armed Forces White Paper.5 In the security policy be international partners only if they are credible and
report, the Federal Assembly opted for several po if credibility is based on—
litical choices to lead the Swiss Armed Forces XXI The ability to identify common threat or equiva
transformation to— lent readiness standards with benchmarking force
Construct future Armed Forces on the prin on-force exercises with foreign formations and a
ciples of a militia system. Mandatory military ser relative certification process. The goal is to attain
vice is anchored in the federal constitution, as well interoperability.
as Swiss society itself.6 The capability to respond after an initial warn
Support the new engagement policy. Active ing to a threat. A risk analysis, similar to those of
units should be available at all times. The increase other neutral countries, shows that conventional war
in active units is a sine qua non for the success of is only one potential scenario and that other impor
the reform. tant asymmetrical threats should be taken into con
Guarantee good military basic training. Improv sideration.
ing the Armed Forces’ multifunctional and interna The capability to cooperate with other Armed
tional interoperability would increase the number of Forces while helping stabilize the Swiss strategic en
professional soldiers (instructors).7 vironment by promoting peace.
To secure the Armed Forces transformation, Armed Forces XXI strategic doctrine brings a dif
Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Hans- ferent concept into the sectors where the means
Ulrich Scherrer imposed a new philosophy cemented must be engaged. Being exclusively centered on the
by U.S. Army General Gordon R. Sullivan’s “doc national territory for centuries, the Swiss Armed
trine and design,” imperatives: quality people, leader Forces must distinguish three zones:
development, modern equipment, doctrine, force mix, 1. The strategic environment (essentially in Eu
and training.8 rope) in which Swiss Armed Forces contribute to
promoting peace and obtaining interoperability with creased military training cooperation. On 2 Decem
other Armed Forces. ber 2001, 78 percent of the population defeated a
2. The operative terrain, where Armed Forces proposal to eliminate the Armed Forces. On 3 March
XXI should cooperate with the concerned countries 2002, with 54.6 percent of the vote, Switzerland ap
(in the case of preparation) and after the decision proved the people’s initiative for Switzerland’s mem
of the political authorities (in the case of defense). bership in the UN.10 The votes show distrust and
3. The regional area, where Swiss Armed Forces doubt concerning the Armed Forces and the Fed
are free to prepare the country’s defense using ex eral Council’s “security through cooperation.” At the
isting infrastructure. same time, however, the military has the support of
The Armed Forces must perform their required the majority of citizens. The Federal Assembly ac
tasks with a $3 billion annual defense budget. They cepted the transformation and the Armed Forces
must make up lost ground in the area of armament White Paper in September 2002, foreseeing person
investment because last decade’s budget cuts were nel strength decreasing from 400,000 to 200,000 and
made more quickly than they could be implemented. reserve forces decreasing to an end-state strength
Consequently, the proportion of the defense budget of 80,000.
spent on operating costs rose while arms procure Readiness. The structure of the Swiss Armed
ment dropped.9 Forces can be described as basic. As soon as there
is a specific task demanding operational readiness,
Contours of Armed Forces XXI the brigades and the territorial regions can be struc
Elements of the national strategy that deal with tured to undertake the task. The operational struc
politics and security had to overcome opposition in ture will then transition to a core mission-fulfillment
the Parliament and with the public. On 26 Novem process. Mission-fulfillment leads from the Armed
ber 2000, 62.5 percent of the population opposed a Forces’ resources to specific required missions, in
socialists initiative asking for a 50 percent defense cluding:
cut to pay for social programs. On 10 June 2001, Generating basic readiness based on general
51 percent of the population opposed a double ref staff directives. Each service generates basic readi
erendum by nationalists and antimilitarists against the ness. The Army attaches reserve component bat
arming of soldiers in missions abroad and against in talions to brigade and territorial region commands for
ways moving. Instead, prefabricated, synthetic Physiological and psychological effects become
domes (igloos) are used.6 The domes are easy to more pronounced at altitudes above 8,000 feet. Sol
carry and assemble even at 18,000 feet and above. diers must take preventive measures and be trained
They can be retrieved from even large amounts of to detect signs of illness in colleagues. Common
snow and set up again quickly. symptoms include severe, persistent headaches;
Soldiers must also be trained to wear proper cloth coughing; difficulty in breathing; and aloofness. Other
ing. Loose-fitting layers and insulated and polypro symptoms might include swelling around the eyelids,
pylene clothing that does not allow perspiration to incoherent speech, intolerance, and even outright
accumulate close to the body are best. Developing aggressiveness.13
frostbite from touching metal equipment with one’s Many problems, including altitude sickness, can
bare hands is possible when temperatures drop to occur during the initial stages of a soldier’s arrival
minus 22 degrees Fahrenheit. Pressurized sleeping at high altitude. The biggest killer, cerebral or pul
bags help stabilize soldiers suffering from altitude- monary edema, is difficult to detect, but often de
related sicknesses.7 velops if soldiers stay too long at high altitude.14
Basic mountaineering and high-altitude skills are The normal practice in glaciated areas is to not
vital for soldiers to develop confidence and survive keep soldiers above 19,000 feet for more than 3 to
in mountainous environments and essential in com 4 weeks before returning them to lower elevations.
bat. As mountain height increases, so does the re If soldiers experience any signs of altitude illnesses,
quired skill level. At altitudes below 13,000 feet, it commanders must evacuate them promptly. For most
might be enough for soldiers to understand climbing mountain illnesses, evacuation to below at least 3,000
techniques, navigation, route selection, the use of feet is the first requirement for saving a person’s
ropes, and procedures to avoid landslides and snow life.15 Delaying evacuation might not only cost the
avalanches, but at high altitudes, soldiers must learn soldier’s life, but imperil the lives of the soldiers who
more complex techniques, such as those required for might have to conduct evacuation procedures dur
mountain expeditions.8 ing bad weather.
Because it is not always possible to transport ma Replacements being sent to high-altitude environ
terial by helicopter, troops are often required to carry ments must have operated at heights similar to those
awkward loads, including kerosene oilcans, rations, to which they are being sent for at least 10 to 15
and building materials for bunkers. The Soviets days. If not, they could quickly become casualties
learned this lesson while fighting in difficult terrain themselves. Well-trained, acclimatized troops must
in Afghanistan.9 be available to replace those at higher altitudes.
At high altitudes, where it is difficult to keep High-altitude environments can take heavy physi
weapons functioning, covering and protecting weap cal and mental tolls on soldiers. While in the
ons and equipment against snow and ice is a ne Caucasus, the Germans learned that troops wore
cessity. Batteries often will not perform optimally in down much faster in mountains despite the fact they
the cold, and complicated mechanisms, such as those were elite troops, picked for their mental abilities and
in surface-to-air missiles, can easily malfunction. physical prowess. Operations in such environments
Also, artillery shells sometimes behave erratically involve extreme physical exertion.16 Living condi
because of thin air and gusting winds.10 tions in mountainous terrain can be difficult. At times
Surviving and operating in mountainous terrain re all movement is stopped, soldiers do not receive mail,
quires more energy than usual. A soldier who needs and replacements might not arrive on time. These
3,000 to 4,000 calories under normal circumstances factors can lead to depression and boredom and a
will require 6,000 or more calories in the mountains. sharp decrease in fighting spirit. Simple tasks such
To complicate the situation, high altitude adversely as manning weapons, sentry duty, and patrolling re
affects a person’s appetite. Soldiers tend to eat and quire determination.
drink less in high altitudes, which reduces morale and Offensive actions in mountainous terrain are dif
fighting capabilities and makes them more suscep ficult and costly. Not only must soldiers fight the en
tible to mountain-related illnesses.11 U.S. soldiers emy, they must also brave the elements of harsh ter
conducting mountain-warfare training at Abbotabad, rain, which are equally formidable. These conditions
Pakistan, which is at 4,000 feet, lost approximately call for strong leadership by junior leaders, who must
25 pounds during a 3-week training period.12 Com physically lead and be mentally tough.
manders must ensure soldiers consume proper di Leadership. Mountainous and high-altitude en
ets and are well-hydrated. vironments are extremely demanding and require a
US Army
high level of leadership at the small-unit level as well overwhelming odds. Such leadership inspires subor
as at higher levels. Leaders must understand the dinates and raises the morale of the entire unit.
constraints placed on their soldiers’ performances At high altitudes, small-unit leaders must be
and should include terrain and weather in planning trained to recognize and address physical and psy
and executing actions to avoid miscalculating the chological fatigue in their soldiers, including loneli
timeframe, logistic requirements, and force capa ness, depression, and violent mood swings. The re
bility. lationship between officers and troops is more
Mountain combat is decentralized and often takes intimate than under normal circumstances, so lead
place at the platoon or squad level. The quality of ers should be able to identify signs of deterioration
junior leadership is decisive. The Russians observed in soldiers before they become pronounced.
in Afghanistan that even a small unit, maneuvering Decisions at higher levels influence the conduct
boldly, could decide the outcome of a battle.17 of tactical actions. The German Army emphasized
A hallmark of German alpine troops during World the importance of meticulous planning and prepara
Wars I and II was the quality of their leadership. tion even for small-scale operations.18
German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who began Field Manual 3-97.6 emphasizes realistic time
his career in a German mountain regiment during tables based on reconnaissance and the com
World War I, relentlessly advanced his small detach mander’s practical knowledge of the mountain battle
ment in difficult terrain capturing one hilltop after field.19 Planners must understand that mountainous
another. terrain adversely affects time and space calcula
Mountainous environments demand that junior tions—an important lesson learned during the U.S.
leaders set the example of physical fitness and en Marine Corps (USMC) exercise Alpine Warrior at
durance. During the Pakistan-India conflict at Kargill Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, in 1986.20
in northern Kashmir in 1998, Captain Sher Khan Cost-effective mountain combat requires skilled
was posthumously awarded the “Nishan-E-Haider,” and well-trained troops. Soldiers cannot be sent into
Pakistan’s highest military award, for conducting a fight at high altitude at the last moment. Doing so
daring raids with a handful of men against enemy could invite disaster. One example of such an ac
patrols and convoys. His last action included a suc tion is the employment of the 7th Indian Brigade
cessful counterattack to recapture a post against against the Chinese in the 1962 Himalayan con
flict.21 The brigade had not been stationed in the and lines of communication by strongpoints. An in
mountains previously, and when things began going tegrated defense is not possible in cut up, mountain
badly, the brigade was moved from the plains straight ous terrain. During training, commanders need to
into mountain combat. The soldiers, who had not understand the techniques of defense with all-around
been acclimatized or equipped to fight in the moun protection and emplacement of direct fighting weap
tains, suffered heavy casualties because of frostbite, ons. Field Manual 3-97.6 highlights that reserves
edema, and other high-altitude-induced illnesses. must be closer to important defense locations be
Communications. Terrain and unpredictable cause reaction times in mountainous terrains are
weather conditions affect communications at high longer than usual, which could require several small
altitudes. Satellite communications and the use of rather than one large centralized reserve.26
command and control (C2) aircraft can offset some Mountainous terrain offers opportunities for infil
terrain limitations and reduce reliance on bulky ra tration, requiring defenders to be aggressive at all
dio equipment. Crews responsible for installing and times. Aggressive patrolling enhances security and
maintaining retransmission stations—often situated keeps soldiers active and sharp. In Kashmir this
on the highest peaks to provide adequate range and helped prevent a bunker mentality. Although sensors
coverage—must be well trained in mountain-survival provide some protection, mountainous terrain is too
techniques. Also, these isolated stations are targets compartmentalized for complete electronic surveil
for guerrilla bands, as the Soviets discovered when lance. Combat service support (CSS) elements must
they tried to protect similar sites in Afghanistan.22 provide their own protection and must train in pa
Fire support. Mountainous terrain significantly trolling and perimeter defense while developing a
influences artillery fire support. Targets are located mindset focused on constant vigilance.
on peaks, in ravines, and on reverse slopes; no con Offensive operations require meticulous planning
tinuous front exists; and weather conditions are un and preparation because of the inherent strength
predictable. Undulating terrain and intervening crests mountainous terrain provides to the defender. Train
require a large number of observers located on ing plays a vital role in ensuring an edge for the at
dominating heights to cover the entire area of op tackers. Since the defender has an advantage, suc
erations. Gun positions that are ideal for range and cessful attacks should isolate the defender and keep
coverage might not be suitable because of intervening him under constant pressure. The Soviets laid great
features and masking fire. At other times a location emphasis on junior leaders and company-level moun
might be tactically sound but will be an area prone tain operations, advocating envelopment by smaller,
to avalanches or flash floods. Once guns are de autonomous groups.
ployed, major engineering and logistical efforts might During Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, U.S.
be necessary to shift them to alternate locations in forces used more decentralized combat than on nor
a timely fashion. mal terrain. Junior leaders’ initiative and skill is vital
Air burst and variable time fuzes are more effec to the mission’s success, especially in security and
tive than point-detonating artillery rounds. Howitzers reconnaissance missions. Mountainous terrain and
and mortars are more effective because of their abil bad weather provide opportunities for small forces
ity to engage targets on reverse slopes. The Taliban to concentrate and achieve surprise. Russian and
used mortars to hit U.S. troops successfully during Afghan government forces suffered heavily when
operations in Afghanistan.23 they neglected this aspect of the battlefield environ
Maneuver. Mountainous terrain is ideally suited ment.27
for the defense. During World War II, some of the The Soviets used helicopters in Afghanistan to air
heaviest casualties in the Italian Theater occurred lift troops and supplies into battle.28 Helicopter gun
during an attempt to overcome German defenses at ships effectively supported ground operations until
Mount Casino. In Afghanistan, the Russians attacked the Mujahideen obtained Stinger missiles, which tilted
the strategic Panjshir Valley repeatedly but were the situation in their favor.
unable to clear it despite their advantage in firepower U.S. forces also rely on helicopters for transpor
and mobility.24 The line of control in Kashmir in 2003 tation and movement in the mountains, requiring
was not much different from the cease-fire line of aviation planners to be involved in the planning pro
the India-Pakistan war in 1949.25 Both Indian and cess early. With beyond-line-of-sight and precision-
Pakistan forces found that an assault on well- guided munitions, aviation and air assets
defended positions was extremely costly. Defense have neutralized many inherent problems in moun
requires the control of dominating heights, passes, tain warfare, but they have not eliminated the need
US Army
for specialized training. Because mountain combat ited and often do not support vehicles that require
tends to be decentralized, control of supporting fire large turning radii. Many roads do not permit two-
is more difficult. Tight control of jet aircraft and hel way traffic.
icopter gunships is necessary to avoid fratricide. While tactical plans take into account main roads,
Logistics. Logistics support in the mountains is tactical engagements do not usually occur close to
difficult and time-consuming. In Kashmir, a variety roadheads. At Siachen, the Pakistan Army built
of transport is used for logistical support, road trans roads near forward defenses, but the real challenge
port being the most reliable and cost-effective. At was in transporting supplies across the last few miles
higher altitudes where tracks cannot be maintained from roadheads to forward posts.
because of snow and difficult terrain, mules are a The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
preferred means of transport.29 At altitudes where analysis of the operation in Afghanistan recognized
even mules cannot go, porters can. Porters are lo the need to have logistics as far forward as possible:
cal people capable of carrying heavy loads across “It might require additional staff work from the lo
difficult terrain. gisticians to deploy the logistics to the work area (like
In the Caucasus Campaign, the German army rations to the platoons, mortar rounds to the mor
used sleds, mules, and horses in addition to trucks.30 tars), but the advantage is reduced expenditure of
Recently, despite technological advances, the U.S. energy for those on the ground.”32
Army had to use horses and mules in Afghanistan. Logistics estimates and loads must be customized
Helicopters are a quick, versatile means of trans for the mountainous environment. For example, us
portation, but at higher altitudes their lift capability ing mules requires loads be broken up according to
is severely limited. The French Alouette helicopter their carrying capacity. Also, overages must be built
can fly higher than U.S helicopters can, but even it into supply estimates because there is always a need
can deliver only about 180 pounds above 20,000 feet. for a large reserve of items that wear out quickly,
Because helicopters cannot be used in adverse such as boots, jackets, and gloves. If soldiers use
weather, a mixture of resources is necessary to en improper or worn clothing for even a short time, the
sure reliability and flexibility.31 chance of developing altitude and cold-related sick
The road network in the mountains is generally a nesses increases significantly. In addition, combat
logistician’s nightmare. Main supply routes are lim casualty evacuation involves many challenges. Air
evacuation remains the preferred method, but be cross crevasses. They then move in stages from
cause of the dispersed nature of troops, expert medi 13,000 feet to forward posts at heights up to 21,000
cal help might not be available quickly. Therefore, feet. The basic principle is to bivouac one night for
self-aid, buddy help, and the availability of more com about every 3,000-foot increase in altitude. Troops
bat life savers in the unit is important.33 returning from leave must repeat the process.
Canadian small-unit support vehicles, specially de Because the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division
signed for restrictive terrain, were particularly use is not stationed in a high-altitude environment and
ful for logistics support at high altitude in Afghani its soldiers are not acclimatized, deployment to high
stan, whereas the bulky ground-held laser designating mountains would require an additional 2 to 3 weeks
system was not. Soldiers’ personal loads of more of acclimatization. This also applies to units that have
than 50 pounds were too heavy at high altitudes. conducted mountain-warfare training but are not
Equipment must be upgraded for future mountain currently stationed at high altitudes. Physical condi
warfare.34 tioning is essential to mountain combat in Afghan
istan.38
Training for Mountain Warfare Leadership training. Leadership training is ex
Recent operations by U.S. and other Allied forces tremely important for mountain warfare. During
confirm the need for specialized mountain-warfare World War II, German alpine troops displayed strong
training. CALL’s analysis recognizes that soldiers leadership traits based on their culture of auftrags
with mountain experience exhibit exceptional morale, taktik.39 In the Pakistan Army, mountain training is
physical stamina, and technical competence in de considered part of overall training. The Soviet Army
cisive combat operations. The analysis also recog recognized the critical importance of junior-leader
nizes that coalition forces specially trained in moun initiative during its experiences in Afghanistan.40 The
tainous environments are better trained overall.35 U.S. Army focuses on leadership, but it does not
Acclimatization training. Mountain troops have a package designed specifically for training at
should be stationed at high altitudes to maintain a different levels of leadership in mountainous envi
high standard of physical fitness and acclimatization. ronments. Mountain leadership training should be
Before World War I, German alpine troops were sta based on the unique characteristics and demands
tioned in the Bavarian Alps.36 In Transcaucasia at placed on leaders.
6,500 feet, Soviet troops occupied ideal terrain to train Junior leader training requires initiative, personnel
soldiers.37 Pakistan and India maintain a large num management, and mental toughness. In the Pakistan
ber of troops on the line of control in Kashmir. This Army, most of these skills are learned through ex
automatically provides ample opportunities for ac perience and exposure to tough environments. Dur
climatization. The U.S. 10th Mountain Division, how ing mountain-combat deployment, junior-leaders
ever, is stationed at Fort Drum, New York, which is often conduct patrols, lead expeditions, and direct
not in high mountains. command posts, despite sometimes having to endure
Although troops need to be acclimatized for any heavy artillery shelling and adverse living and
kind of mountainous terrain, the duration depends on weather conditions. The U.S. Army Mountain War
the altitude at which the unit must operate. Ac fare School emphasizes gaining mountaineering
climatization for mountains below 13,000 feet takes skills rather than training combat leaders. The U.S.
3 to 4 weeks. Pakistan troops train by bivouacking Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Center has a
at high altitudes and conducting routine administra mountain leader course designed for junior leaders,
tive activities and route marches. Each week they but it is heavily skills-oriented.41
conduct hill climbing at increasingly higher altitudes Mountain leader training should begin with an in
to increase their ability to function. The rigorous troduction to issues and problems unique to moun
training also helps identify soldiers who have medi tainous terrain. Practical exercises and historical
cal problems. case studies increase leader awareness. Training
Acclimatization for higher altitudes is rigid, and the outdoors in command positions with specific tasks,
length of training cannot be shortened without seri such as navigation, patrolling, raids, and ambushes,
ous consequences. Although the pattern of training should be conducted at altitudes above 8,000 feet.
remains the same, troops are trained at an altitude of Simulations that force junior leaders to make tough
between 8,000 and 10,000 feet for 2 weeks, followed choices between their soldiers’ physical capabilities
by 1 month’s training at 11,000 feet. The troops con and mission accomplishment are essential to moun
duct route marches, fire weapons, climb rocks, and tain leader training.
Many senior leaders consider themselves well- treme terrain and weather conditions in the moun
equipped to plan and conduct operations in any en tains. Physical conditioning is the first prerequisite
vironment, but commanders who have served in the of mountain warfare. Training should be progressive,
mountains as young leaders are far better at under starting with light physical exertion followed by route
standing and planning for such environments. marches and mountain climbing, culminating in test
Wargames and live exercises are valuable tools to exercises in difficult terrain. Most schools have simi
help senior leaders understand mountain warfare. lar programs for this purpose. Although training in
Live exercises illustrate human limitations in such an dividuals at heights up to 10,000 feet can achieve a
environment. great deal, to develop high-altitude skills, some train
Individual/team training. Most armies from ing should occur above 13,000 feet.
countries with mountainous terrain have well-estab The ability to navigate and move across difficult
lished training institutions. Location of training insti terrain builds confidence and enables soldiers to plan
tutions is an important consideration for mountain and execute maneuvers across seemingly impen
training. The Pakistan Army’s High-Altitude School, etrable and inhospitable terrain. The small-unit moun
at Rattu in Northern Kashmir, is an ideal location tain operation exercise the U.S. Army Mountain
on the confluence of the Hindukush, Himalayas, and Warfare School conducts is a good example.43 Par
Karakorum ranges. The school conducts training ticipants must navigate to six different sites within a
throughout the year and includes mountain climbing set time. The exercise incorporates various skills sol
on peaks ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 feet and sur diers need to complete actions successfully in a time-
vival on glaciated terrain and in snowy and icy con compressed, competitive environment. Some skills
ditions. The Indian Army’s high-altitude warfare frequently required during mountain warfare include
school is at Gulmarg, which is at 8,000 feet.42 The using rope bridges and vertical haul lines and medi
U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School is located in cal evacuation. Mobility in winter has several pre
Vermont, while the USMC Mountain Warfare requisites, including using snowshoes, skiing, climb
School is located in Bridgeport, California, which is ing ice, crossing crevasses, and detecting avalanche
at 9,000 feet. hazards.
The purpose of these training institutions is to train A key training objective in mountain training is
individuals to survive and take advantage of the ex properly using winter clothing, weapons, and equip
ment and recognizing and preventing cold-weather ing is primarily mission-centric, based on the nature
injuries. Such skills are especially important for of of tasks assigned to the units, and includes offen
ficers and noncommissioned officers who must en sive and defensive tasks and small-unit actions.
force these practices. Lectures, demonstrations, and The U.S. Army does not conduct collective train
practical experience can help address these prob ing in mountain warfare; it focuses more on survival
lems. The Pakistan Army’s standard training proce training rather than high-altitude combat.45 The
dures cover most safety issues, such as frostbite pre USMC conducts infantry battalion training, but the
vention, high-altitude sickness, and pulmonary and training does not include artillery, engineers, aviation,
cerebral edema. or other supporting arms.46 Considering the unique
The U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School teaches requirements of mountainous and high-altitude en
winter sustainment using the Akhio tent and stove vironments, these can be serious limiting factors for
group. The Akhio sledge contains a 10-man arctic coordinating and synchronizing the combined arms
tent, a diesel-fired stove, fuel, and other basic sup fight and can easily lead to faulty planning and wrong
plies. Kashmir tents have a short lifespan because assumptions about each other’s capabilities and limi
of the wear and tear from blizzards and heavy tations.
snowfall. Stone structures and synthetic igloos are Operation Anaconda demonstrated that fighting in
the preferred structures. In noncontiguous and non the mountains is not a special operation or exclu
linear battlefield environments, soldiers must build sively an infantry domain.47 Mountain warfare in
protective shields around winter shelters to avoid volves logistics, aviation, artillery, communications,
becoming targets for raiding parties and artillery fire. and air assets. With the level of sophistication in these
Once trainees understand mountainous terrain and branches and services, there is an even greater need
its effects on combat, the next step is to conduct for collective training in order to use their unique
small exercises involving patrolling, raids, and am characteristics fully.
bushes. These exercises should incorporate moun Branch-specific training. All branches and ser
taineering skills in situations that tests trainees’ abili vices need to train for mountain combat to under
ties to modify traditional tactics to mountainous stand the capabilities and limitations of their equip
terrain. These exercises build leadership skills, ini ment. Aviation is critical to mobility, timely logistics,
tiative, flexibility, and team spirit. Although no oppos and precision firepower. Pilots should be well trained
ing force (OPFOR) exists in the Pakistan Army’s in mountain flying and in understanding an
High-Altitude School or at the U.S. Army Moun infantryman’s problems in mountainous terrain. The
tain Warfare School, an OPFOR is necessary for Pakistan Army’s 8th Aviation Squadron supports op
creating a realistic environment and developing erations in Kashmir. Pilots have hundreds of hours
mountain warfare skills. of combat flying experience and understand the
U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School instructors mountainous environment.
are topnotch mountaineers. However, most do not With the enhanced capabilities of Apache helicop
have actual mountain-combat experience.44 Posting ters to acquire and engage targets beyond visual
officers who served in Afghanistan to the Mountain range, U.S. Army pilots, in conjunction with ground
Warfare School might address this problem. troops, need to practice firing in the mountain. The
Collective training. Collective training is an op Russians recognized the need for close coordination
portunity to test units and formations in actual moun between aviation and ground troops during their war
tainous environments, reinforcing and building on in Afghanistan.48 The U.S experience in Afghani
skills gained through acclimatization and individual stan highlighted the need for attack aviation to train
training and allowing commanders to check the vi with Special Operations Forces and to practice us
ability of their assumptions and plans in a realistic ing night-vision devices.49 Pilots for cargo and troop-
setting. Synchronization and coordination between carrying helicopters also need to train in mountains
fighting and supporting arms and among all the battle in various weather conditions. High-altitude training
field operating systems are also key elements of this combining attack and cargo helicopters is essential
training. for high-altitude combat.50
Collective training in winter and summer environ The U.S. Army has a variety of sophisticated
ments is a regular part of the Pakistan Army’s moun communication equipment. Although some equipment
tain training. Because altitude is an important con works well in the mountains, some requires impro
sideration, reserve units train at heights equivalent visation and alternatives because FM communi
to those at which they are expected to fight. Train- cations are often ineffective at high altitudes and
NOTES
1. James Lucas, Alpine Elite: German Mountain Troops of World War II (London: 24. Robert F. Baumann, “Russian Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central
Janes, 1980), 13, 130. Asia, and Afghanistan,” Leavenworth Papers 20, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, November
2. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-97.6, Mountain Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. 2000, 141.
Government Printing Office [GPO], 28 November 2000). 25. Ahmed Ashfaq, Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen (Rawalpindi: Pak American
3. CPT John Clearwater, Above and Beyond, on-line at <www.pakmil/com/army/insti/ Commercial, 1991), 25.
highalti.html>, 1, accessed 12 September 2002. 26. FM 3-97.6, 3-29.
4. Bruce C. Patton, Cold Casualties and Conquests: The Effects of Cold on War 27. Sray, 16-18, Grau and Ali a Jalali, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen
fare, 23, on-line at <www.Armymedicine.Mil/history/Borden/medaspofharshenvrnmnts>, Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Washington, DC, GPO), 187.
accessed 29 November 2002. 28. Gerhard Sheppe, Mountain Warfare in Europe (Kingston, Canada, 1983), 37.
5. FM 3-97.6. At 18,000 to 22,000 feet, the glaciated area in northern Kashmir is 29. Fedarko, 50.
considered the highest battleground in the world. 30. Lucas, 130.
6. Brigadier Ghazanfar Ali and A. Ghani, Siachen: The World’s Highest Battle 31. Ali and Ghani, 3; FM 3-97.6, 5-7.
field, on-line at <www.Pakdef.info/pakmil/army/siachen/>, 3, accessed 2 December 32. Mordica, 9.
2002. 33. Ibid., 5-13.
7. CPT John R. Ballard, “Training an Arctic Raid Force,” Marine Corps Gazette 34. Ibid., 4-5.
(February 1987): 64; LTC Salman Beg, “Operations in Glaciated Areas,” Pakistan Army 35. Ibid., 4.
Journal (Spring 1994): 3. 36. Ibid.
8. Kevin Fedarko, “War at 21,000 Feet,” Outside Magazine (April 2002): 41, 44. 27. Sheppe, 35.
9. LTC John E. Sray, Mountain Warfare: The Russian Perspective (Washington, DC: 38. Mordica, 4.
GPO, March 1994), 20, on-line at <www.fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fsmopubs/issues/ 39. Lucas, 197.
mountain>, accessed 12 September 2002. 40. Sheppe, 35.
10. Ali and Ghani, 4. 41. Grau, interview by author, January 2003.
11. Ibid. 42. Indian Armed Forces, Training Institutions, on-line at <www.indianarmedforces.
12. Clearwater, 2. com/def/army/def9.html>, 6, accessed 12 September 2002.
13. Lester W. Grau and William K. Jorgensen, “Medical Implications of High Altitude 43. Grau and Jorgensen, 5.
Combat,” U.S. Army Medical Journal (April 2002): 1; Ali and Ghani, 3. 44. Grau interview.
14. Fedarko, 50. 45. Major John G. Bechtol, “Fighting the Cold: The Need for Standing Cold Weather
15. LT Craig M. Banull, “High Altitude Medicine: Case Report,” Navy Medicine (Janu Combat Capabilities,” unpublished article, Naval War College, 4 February 2002.
ary-February 2000): 27. 46. Grau interview.
16. Ibid., 48. 47. Mordica, 4-5.
17. Sray, 1. 48. Sray, 20.
18. Lucas, 196. 49. Mordica, 4-5.
19. FM 3-97.6, 2-15. 50. Ibid, 8.
20. Ballard, 63. 51. Ibid, 9.
21. MG D.K. Palit, War in High Himalaya (London: Lancer International, 1991), 205. 52. Grau, The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan
22. Sray, 8. (Collingsdale, PA: Diane Publishing Co, March 1996), 128.
23. George J. Mordica, High Altitude Operations, on-line at <http//call.army.mil/ 53. Lucas, 210.
products/trngqtr/tq4-02/mordica>, accessed 2 December 2002, 7. 54. Grau and Jorgensen, 5.
Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army, received an M.M.A.S. from the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College. He also attended the Command and Staff
College, Quelta, Pakistan. He has served as Brigade Major of an Infantry Brigade; an
instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul; a company commander of an Infantry
Company, Siachen Glacier, Kashmir; aide-de-camp to the corps commander; and a pla
toon commander and adjutant of the 12th Baloch Regiment, Infantry, Kashmir.
Korean Peninsula
Beyond the
Nuclear Crisis
Colonel David S. Maxwell, U.S.Army
US Army
from which the KFR gains its le
gitimacy. When comparing these
ideas with the free market system and ROK’s lib the regime has set for itself by resting its legitimacy
eral semi-democracy, it is easy to see how the two on the Chuche ideology and the deification of Kim
systems are mutually exclusive. For the DPRK, re Il Sung.12
10
unification is a zero-sum game. The DPRK is in a no-win situation, one that has
Four simple concepts or national objectives sum no good options. It needs to reform its economic sys
up DPRK’s strategy: tem to be self-sufficient and to ensure its survival.
1. The survival of the Kim family regime— However, doing so would undermine the KFR’s le
a vital national interest. gitimacy, implying that the system Kim Il Sung built
2. Reunification of the Korean Peninsula — was flawed and that reform would lead to more
a strategic aim. North Koreans being exposed to information outside
3. Recognition of the DPRK as a world power— the inner KFR’s inner circle, which would expose
a strategic objective. the myth of the regime and its bankrupt ideology. If
4. Removal or neutralization of U.S. forces from the regime is undermined and faced with imminent
the Korean Peninsula—a required condition to collapse, it might turn to its only option—the use of
achieve the strategic aim. military force—to reunify the Peninsula to ensure
The DPRK has been following this strategy since the regime’s survival.13
1948. The regime’s survival is paramount, and the An important part of the DPRK’s efforts has
regime makes all decisions. Reunification under the been to use Sun Tzu’s strategy of splitting alliances.14
DPRK system ensures regime survival. The regime The DPRK has attempted to capitalize on the de
has sought to be the leader in the nonaligned move teriorating relations between the ROK and United
ment, and both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have States, which were worsened by the tragic accident in
demonstrated that they want North Korea to be June 2002 in which two teenage Korean girls were
recognized as a world power. Finally, because re hit and killed by a U.S. armored vehicle during a rou
unification under regime control can only happen tine training exercise, and by U.S. initiatives to relo
through a force of arms, the DPRK needs U.S. cate U.S. forces farther south on the Peninsula.
forces to either withdraw or be neutralized so the The DPRK has attempted to win the hearts and
DPRK will have the correlation of forces necessary minds of the ROK people by supporting family re
to be successful.11 unions, agreeing to open economic corridors, and re
Academics and media pundits question how a establishing rail links between North and South.
country as bankrupt as the DPRK can do anything These attempts have led the younger generation par
except attempt economic reforms. How can a coun ticularly to view the DPRK more favorably. The
try that cannot feed its people embark on such an DPRK’s goal is for the ROK and America to con
ambitious and expensive project as developing clude that the United States no longer belongs on
nuclear weapons? The answer lies in the trap that the Peninsula.
US Army
But let us never fear to negoti
ate’”17 Although we should not as
sume that the DPRK would negotiate as we would ment. Given the dangers of regime collapse and the
like them to, this does not mean that negotiation potential for war, Kim Jong Il’s survival illusion
should not be an important element of the new should remain alive.18 As long as Kim Jong Il be
strategy. lieves he will survive and has the possibility to
achieve reunification under his terms, he can be de
Priorities terred from attacking.
Any strategy we choose should give the KFR two To sustain this illusion, the United States and ROK
of its four national objectives—ensure the regime’s must initiate an information operations program. As
survival and recognize it as a world power. Reunifi an example, the ROK and United States would
cation by force would not be an option, and the project a withdrawal date for U.S. forces to fore
United States would not withdraw forces from the stall Kim Jong Il from any deliberate attack and to
Peninsula until the situation was resolved. This could buy the alliance a few years to execute its long-term
be demonstrated through a peace treaty between the strategy.
ROK and the DPRK. Although it seems counterintuitive, the regime
The United States’ first priority must be to rebuild needs to have a strong ROK-US alliance with a mili
its alliance with the ROK through close consulta tary capability on the Peninsula to support the
tions and working toward a mutually agreed on long- DPRK’s military-first policy to allow it to continue
US Air Force
existence.”19 U.S. for
ces would actually en
hance the regime’s le
gitimacy.
The United States
and the ROK should
immediately normalize
relations with the
DPRK. Despite the
regime’s repulsiveness,
normalizing relations
helps maintain perma
nent communications
channels. More impor
tant, normalized rela
tions might provide the
potential for increased
access to the regime
and to the population.
Members of the 2d Infantry
Normalization must be Division refill their truck from
comprehensive and a creek during a nuclear, bio
logical, and chemical exercise.
include the removal of
all barriers to trade.
As part of normalization, the U.S. should reex trade and counterfeiting, which would reduce the in
amine the 1953 Armistice Agreement and initiate a centive to proliferate weapons of mass destruction.
negotiation process for a formal peace treaty with An economic investment would promote outside
out consideration of the DPRK nuclear development contact for the country and its population. Initially,
program. A key factor in influencing the regime to Kim Jong Il would resist this contact, and when there
negotiate might be to recognize that the DPRK was too much contact, he would likely provoke a
possesses a nuclear capability and that the ROK, crisis that would cause a reduction in investment and
the United States, and the United Nations are will contact. With persistent attempts to invest in the
ing to negotiate a peace treaty disconnected to DPRK, however, Kim Jong Il might eventually
DPRK’s nuclear capability. Kim Jong Il would likely relent as he began to enjoy the “profits” he was
be viewed as a world power with significant influ receiving.
ence. Although this could be a long process, along
with normalization, it could serve to maintain a Changing the Outlook
dialogue and access to the regime and, potentially, Contact with the outside world could be instru
to many officials in the middle and upper levels of mental in changing the outlook of the population and
the party. would lay the foundation for two important future
The critical aspect of the strategy is unconditional events. The population has been long-suffering un
engagement.20 Although the ROK has undertaken der the yoke of the Chuche ideology. If reunifica
a fairly aggressive economic engagement approach, tion occurs, knowledge of the outside world could
especially under the Kim Dae Jung administration ease the eventual integration process with the ROK.
with its “Sunshine Policy,” U.S. corporations, the Eu Outside knowledge could provide a catalyst for the
ropean Union, the Association of Southeast Asian people to undermine the regime and solve the Ko
Nations, and other nations throughout the interna rea question internally.
tional community, must authorize and encourage There will be extreme danger when the KFR is
economic investment. This strategy’s purpose is faced with the potential for collapse. The alliance
threefold: it sustains the illusion that the regime can must continue to plan for the spectrum of conflict
survive; its economic investment would strengthen from a deliberate attack to spill over from civil war
its ability to control the nation; and legitimate prof and chaos that would occur if Kim’s governing ability
its would offset illegal activities, such as the drug eroded. A strong, well-trained, integrated force
NOTES
1. Stephen Bradner, Commander in Chief, UN Command Special Adviser in Korea 10. Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs: America and
uses the term “Kim Family Regime” extensively in UN Command/Combined Forces the World, Debating the New Shape of International Politics, Council of Foreign Rela
Command/U.S. Forces, Korea, briefings. See Bradner, “North Korea’s Strategy,” tions, 2002, 137, n 4.
presentation at the third Nonproliferation Policy Education Center/Institute for National 11. Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, DC: AEI Press), 1999,
Security Studies/Army War College, Arlington, Virginia, 12-14 June 2000. See on 28-40. Eberstadt’s is one of the best analyses of KFR strategy; Bradner, n 2.
line at <www.npec-web.org/essay/Bradner.htm>, accessed 11 May 2004. For more 12. Thomas J. Belke, Juche: A Christian Study of North Korea’s State Religion
detailed information on the Kim Family Regime and its origins, see Adrian Buzo, (Bartlesville, OK: Living Sacrifice Press, 1999) and “The Spirit of Human Bombs.” (No
The Guerrilla Dynasty Politics and Leadership in North Korea (Boulder CO: Westview publishing data given).
Press, 1999); Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: 13. Robert Collins, “Patterns of Collapse in North Korea,” The Combined Forces Com
Columbia University Press, 1988), and Sydney A. Seiler, Kim Il Song 1941-1948: The mand C5 Civil Affairs Newsletter, Seoul, January 1996, 2-12.
Creation of a Legend, the Building of a Regime (Lanham, MD: University Press of 14. Sun Tzu, 78.
America, 1994). 15. See on-line at <www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/koreaaf.htm>, accessed
2. The phrase “Korea question” is from the 1953 Armistice Agreement, sect. IV, para. on 11 May 2004. The United States brokered the Agreed Framework to “freeze” the DPRK
60. For more information, see on-line at <www.intellnet.org/resources/korean_war_docs/ nuclear program in 1994. The agreement called for the DPRK to receive two light water
armistic.htm>, accessed 11 May 2004. The Korea question refers to a final political so reactors (LWR) by 2003; 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year; and that both sides would
lution about how the people of Korea will choose to govern themselves. move toward full normalization and reduction of trade barriers. See also “Agreement on
3. Richard Halloran, “Bush’s Skipping South Korea Points To Shaky Relations,” Ho Reconciliation, Nonagression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and
nolulu Advertiser, 19 October 2003. the North,” on-line at <www.intellnet.org/resources/korean_war_docs/arne.htm>, ac
4. Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochhizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninusla (New cessed 11 May 2004.
York: McGraw Hill, 2003), 83-112. 16. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report, “Military-First Ideol
5. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engage ogy is an Ever-Victorious, Invincible Banner for Our Era’s Cause of Independence,” Nau
ment Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 161-65. tilus Institution, 11 April 2003, on-line at <www.nautilus.org/pub/ftp/napsnet/
6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University special_reports/MilitaryFirstDPRK.txt>, accessed 11 May 2004.
Press, 1963), 84. 17. William Perry, lecture, The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 24 January 2003.
7. Buzo, 27. 18. Colonel Rick Gribling, Chief, Plans Division, CJ3, UN Command/Combined
8. Han S. Park, ed., North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Forces Command, Korea/U.S. Forces, Korea, coined the phrase “sustaining the illu
Prentice Hall, 1996), 15. Park describes Chuche (Juche) as theology. See also KukPang sion that Kim Jong Il will survive” during a crisis-action planning session in June 1997.
Ilbo, editorial, Korea, 15 March 1999, 6. Chuche’s basic concept is, “Man rules all things; 19. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report.
man decides all things.” 20. Richard N. Haas and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Engaging Problem Countries,”
9. Chosen Ilbo, on-line at “North Korean Human Rights/HwangJong-yop, <www. Brookings Policy Brief #61, June 2000, on-line at <www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/
chosen.com/w21data/html/news/199912/19991202034.ht>, accessed 2 December 1999. pb61.htm>, accessed 11 May 2004.
Colonel David S. Maxwell, U.S. Army, is a student at the National War Col
lege, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. He received a B.A. from Miami University,
Oxford, Ohio, and an M.M.A.S. from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, School of Advanced Military Studies. He has held various command and
staff positions in the continental United States, Germany, Korea, Okinawa, and
the Philippines. His next assignment will be Chief of Staff, Special Operations
Command-Korea.
Osama bin-Laden’s news medium phone. Ismail was taken to many safe undertook the construction of the
of choice, the Al-Jazeera television houses and never knew if he was prophet’s mosque in Medina. When
network, has enabled him to con temporarily stopping for a rest or if the Jordanian government an
verse in a religious style of Arabic this was the place his interview nounced a bid to renovate the Dome
used by learned men of theology in would occur. It took 16 months to of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem,
Saudi Arabia. Al-Jazeera correspon secure a face-to-face interview with he gathered all his architects and
dent Jamal Abdul-Latif Ismail, author Bin-Laden. Bin-Laden no longer engineers and asked them to place a
of Bin Laden, Al-Jazeera, and I (Bin grants personal interviews, no doubt bid without any profit. They insisted
Laaden wa al-Jazeerah wa Ana) con because al-Qaeda used a hit team that they could submit a competitive
ducted a most insightful interview posing as a television crew on 9 Sep bid and make a little profit on this
with Bin-Laden in 1999.1 This essay tember 2001 to assassinate Northern project. So, may Allah have mercy
focuses on excerpts from this inter Alliance commander Ahmed Shah on his soul, he further reduced the
view and helps the reader understand Masood in Afghanistan. Bin-Laden bid in order to guarantee serving
the meaning behind Bin-Laden’s now videotapes his messages. this project. It is with Allah’s grace
words. Interview and Assessment that he would occasionally pray in
Getting the Interview Ismail’s interview affords much all three mosques in one day. It is
Ismail begins his book by describ insight into Bin-Laden’s ego, mind, no secret that he was one of the
ing how he obtained interviews with and psyche. Bin-Laden uses sym founders of the Kingdom of Saudi
Bin-Laden and the number two al- bols and imagery that requires inter Arabia’s infrastructure.
Qaeda leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. pretation and chooses words care After this I studied in the Hijaz and
Getting to Bin-Laden involved many fully to create a mystique and image majored in economics at Jeddah Uni
false starts and required working for Arab audiences. Excerpts from the versity or what is called King Abdul-
with contacts in London, Cairo, and interview follow: Aziz University, I learned early the
Peshawar: an al-Qaeda operative Ismail: Who is Osama bin-Laden, inner-workings of my father’s com
would set up an interview with Ismail and what does he want? pany, may Allah bless him, despite
then abruptly cancel it. It is impor Bin-Laden: Praise be to Allah, the fact that my father died when I
tant to understand that Ayman Al- Usama bin Muhammed bin Awad bin was 10 years old, this is briefly who
Zawahiri and members of his Egyp Laden was by Allah’s grace born to Osama bin-Laden is.
tian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) orchestrated Muslim parents on the Arabian Assessment: What Bin-Laden
media events. Al-Zawahiri, who has Peninsula in the Malaaz District of does and does not reveal about him
a keen understanding of the power Riyadh in the year 1377 Hejirah self speaks volumes. He opens his
of media, imagery, and slogans, is a [1957]. With Allah’s grace, we went interview by giving his full name,
prolific writer about the past and fu to Medina 6 months after my birth. which establishes his Arab and Is
ture of Islamic militancy. His book I then spent my entire life in the lamic bloodline. He never mentions
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner Hijaz between Mecca, Medina, and Saudi Arabia by name; he refers to
is required reading for those who Jeddah. the country as the Arabian Penin
wish to understand al-Qaeda.2 The My father Sheikh Muhammed sula. Bin-Laden wants his audience
book explains the rationale behind Al bin Awad bin Laden was born in to understand that he grew up in the
Zawahiri’s strategic shift from attack Hadramaut and left to work in the Hijaz province, where Islam was
ing Egypt to directly attacking the Hijaz over 70 years ago. With Allah’s founded 14 centuries ago.
United States. grace, he was given an honor not Bin-Laden is tremendously proud
Ismail dealt with several al-Qaeda bestowed on any contractor and that of his father but purposefully does
front men before landing the inter is the building of the holy mosque not mention his mother, a Syrian
view with Bin-Laden. Meetings at in Mecca, which contains the bless woman who did not remain married
hotels and telephone calls at speci ed Kaaba. [Muslims believe this is to his father for long. Bin-Laden did
fied times finally resulted in Ismail’s the first House of God established not want to detract from his image
contact with Al-Zawahiri via tele by the Prophet Abraham.] He then as a pure Arab fighter by disclosing
incredible misunderstanding of the against this obscene occupation. For from his belief that any cleric who
events of World War II. He has no it is up to Muslims, particularly the does not espouse Bin-Laden’s reli
comprehension of World War II, Ahl al-Hal Wal-Aqd [those leaders gious view is being paid by Arab
Operation Olympic, or U.S. President that loosen and bind communities]; regimes. He considers the Saudi
Harry S. Truman’s decision to use the those of truthful Ulama, believing Council of Ulama a mouthpiece of
atomic bomb to shorten the war.3 Bin merchants, and heads of tribes must the government. Bin-Laden admires
Laden’s reference to World War II immigrate for Allah’s sake and find militant Saudi clerics like Sheikh Safar
and his manipulation of Islamic his for themselves a place where they Al-Hawali, whose sermons about an
tory and the law shows how he takes can raise the banner of [offensive] inevitable clash between Islam and
pieces of history and alters them to jihad. To make their umma [commu the West are widely disseminated by
justify his arguments. He views the nities] aware of [the importance of] cassette tape. Al-Hawali’s diatribes,
Japanese self-sacrifice and kamikaze preserving their religion and dignity, which appeal to many young Saudi
ethic from a jihadist perspective. otherwise all shall be lost. They must students, offer an alternate and mili
Bin-Laden’s vehement anti- reflect on what has happened to our tant explanation to the perceived im
Semitism is a staple of many Islamic brothers in Palestine . . . the Pales potence of the Saudi regime during
militant groups but also shows his tinian nation used to be famous for Operation Desert Storm. Al-Hawali’s
fixation on Israel and the demonizing its agricultural prowess. . . . This radical speeches include diatribes
of Jews, partly because of the Wah nation today has made refugees un about a worldwide conspiracy
habi doctrine by which he was welcome and rejected around the against Islam by the United States
raised. It is not to Bin-Laden’s advan world. . . . Why is there no response and Israel.
tage to reveal Muhammed’s relation when the Holy Mosque in Jerusalem There are indications that the reli
ship with the Jews in Medina, where is under attack, what will make 1.2 gious and political views of the 15
there was a societal compact be billion Muslims move? This is some Saudis among the terrorists who at
tween Muslims and Jews to live as thing that is incredulous that must be tacked the World Trade Center were
one community. It is also not in Bin addressed. . . . Anyone believing that shaped by Al-Hawali’s tapes. An
Laden’s interest to mention that early [America will not] strike is living in a other popular militant Saudi cleric,
Christians helped sustain early Islam. fantasy. Skeikh Salman Al-Auda, has written
One must also remember Bin-Laden’s Assessment: Bin-Laden’s refer a book, The End of History, which
religious education is steeped in the ence to immigrating to a place where highlights the decay of Western civi
teachings of Wahhabism. Wahhab a banner of jihad can be raised is lization and uses Muslims to accel
ism’s founder, Muhammed bin intended to encourage Muslims to erate the collapse of the West.5
Abdul-Wahab, in Kitab al-Tawheed join him in Afghanistan. Playing on Ismail: Will there be a response to
wrote, “The ways of the people of Islamic history once again, Bin-Laden the cruise-missile attacks on Af
the book (Jews and Christians) are describes how Muhammed was ghanistan of 1998?
condemned as polytheist.”4 Abdul forced to leave Mecca to go to Bin-Laden: With Allah’s grace we
Wahab’s Islam is far more intolerant Medina, where he established the have formulated with many of our
than 7th-century Muslim doctrine. first Muslim society. Bin-Laden takes brothers around the globe the World
Bin-Laden’s focus is on incitement at this hijra (withdrawal) out of context. Islamic Front for the Jihad Against
all costs, and he prefers a simple ex Muhammed was ordered to leave the Jews and Crusaders. The Front’s
planation of a world in which Mus Mecca to spare Muslims from geno organization and coordination is
lims are perpetual victims and self- cide. Bin-Laden also conveniently coming along in an exceptional man
examination is discouraged. excludes how Muhammed peacefully ner. It will have a wider ability to
Ismail: What impact did the Brit interacted with non-Muslims in move and achieve victory for the
ish and American strikes on Baghdad Medina and how he attempted to faith and take revenge on the Jews,
have on anti-American sentiments in construct a single community made Christians, and Americans.
the region, and [do you] see military up of Muslims, Jews, and other non- Assessment: Bin-Laden’s re
responses curbing [your] terrorist Muslims. sponse demonstrates his patience
efforts? Bin-Laden’s idea of migration and and unwillingness to strike without
Bin-Laden: Praise Allah, what waging offensive jihad was also careful planning and coordination.
must be understood regarding this used in the 1970s and 1980s by an This is not the answer of an impul
question is that the Muslim nations Egyptian terrorist group called Takfir sive person.
after this attack are nations that are wal Hijrah whose followers left Cairo Ismail points out to Bin-Laden
not in control of its destiny. Our en and traveled to remote regions of that there have been no operations
emies roam freely and with conceit southern Egypt to wage war against carried out since the announcement
through our homes, lands, and air Egyptian authorities. No doubt Bin- at the World Islamic Front.
space. They strike [Muslims] without Laden and his Egyptian ideologue, Bin-Laden: [This organization]
seeking anyone’s permission and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, have discussed has not gained firm roots, and its
especially during this attack. . . . The many Islamic militant movements and members come from varied back
current [Arab] regimes are in a deep their tactics. grounds around the world. They
conspiracy [with the adversary, and Bin-Laden’s reference to truthful have wide activities within the move
have lost the] ability to do anything Ulama (religious scholars) comes ment. It is also not necessary to
?
mines, they were able to crush the
greatest superpower known to
mankind. Bin-Laden is convinced
that the United States is weaker than Considering Writing
the former Soviet Union, citing the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Somalia as a sign of American weak
for MilitaryReview
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under the banner of the United Please use endnotes rather than footnotes for documentation and ensure there are
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Nations, killed 13,000 Somalis. Bin-
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nomic, social, and military survival. show Hitler the devastation he had rable. Bradley writes, “Looking into
Britain’s life blood depended on its created diminished his argument for the eyes of arguably the most accom
ability to trade with and receive sup more and better boats versus the plished and successful man alive,” he
port from the United States and Luftwaffe’s argument for more air saw the same survivor’s guilt he had
Canada. Britain’s leaders knew this, craft. The inability to visualize the observed in other veterans. The
and so did many Nazi leaders, includ effect of the U-boat battle on both former president said he “thinks
ing German Admiral Karl Donitz. Us sides of the channel bought time for about those guys all the time.”
ing the U-boat, Donitz developed the Allies to reverse their fortunes. Although Flyboys tells the avia
tactics, techniques, and procedures Williams does an excellent job tors’ stories, readers looking for an
to sever Britain’s lifeline. bringing the battle to life once again. exact replica of Flags of Our Fathers
Donitz’s crews saw themselves as The reader is introduced to both pro might be disappointed. Bradley ex
elites and members of a family sav tagonists, and shown how they lived, pands on this story much more than
ing the German Fatherland. Working fought, and often died. The Allies’ in his previous book and uses the
tirelessly to find technological advan desperation is palpable, and emo story of the eight aviators to explore
tages to keep ahead of the Allies, tions ranging from arrogance to de the evolution of Japanese militarism
Donitz devised a plan for U-boat spair on the part of Germany are eas and the underlying reasons behind
warfare to strangle and starve Great ily felt. the bushido code, the Japanese per
Britain and cause its downfall. He LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC, spective on expansion in China, and
almost succeeded. Retired, Camp Pendleton, California the Japanese philosophy toward kill
From the war’s beginning, the ing and atrocities. Bradley writes that
German U-boat campaign achieved the Japanese viewed America as
remarkable success. By the war’s end, FLYBOYS: A True Story of Courage, hypocritical because of U.S. atroci
Allied losses amounted to approxi James Bradley, Little Brown and Company, ties during previous wars and during
New York, 400 pages, $25.95.
mately 50,000 men and 15 million tons the country’s Westward expansion.
of materiel. Losses reached such a Flyboys, a great, haunting work, Bradley tells the story of the Doolittle
level that Great Britain was using and quickly engages readers. James Bra raid and how fire-bombing the Japa
losing more supplies and food than dley, the bestselling author of Flags nese mainland led to Japan’s hatred
it could replace. Stocks were at such of Our Fathers (Bantam, New York, of aviators and its desire for revenge,
minimal levels that nationwide star 2000) tells the remarkable tale of avia a desire that resulted in the deaths
vation was only weeks away. The tors and their courage in the Pacific of over 250,000 Chinese and the pas
course of the war was hanging in the during World War II. Bradley con sage of the Enemy Airmens’Act that
balance, and victory was within the tacted Bill Doran who attended the led to the execution of three Doolittle
grasp of the Third Reich. Great Brit trials of the Japanese defendants fol flyers.
ain, however, prevailed, and the Na lowing the war. Doran had signed a Bradley’s storytelling style allows
zis were defeated. How was such a nondisclosure statement following readers to get to know the people he
reversal of fortunes possible? the proceedings, but he always be writes about. He interviews friends
The Allies worked just as hard to lieved the aviator’s story needed to and family and describes the capture
fight the U-boat menace as the Ger be told. With the information declas of the seven aviators and their inter
mans did in preparing it. Technologi sified, he could. rogations, beatings, and interactions
cal advances, such as sonar and ra The story began on the island of with the Japanese. Bradley also
dar, combined with convoy tactics Chichi Jima. Bradley details the back describes how each aviator faced
and aggressive long-range air cover grounds, missions, capture, and sub execution, why Japanese command
effectively combated the early advan sequent execution of seven Navy ers ordered the executions, why the
tages U-boats enjoyed. The success and Marine Corps aviators just as the subordinates who carried them out
ful efforts of code breakers was also battle of Iwo Jima was raging to the had a misguided sense of honor and
important in the course of the battle. south. The shape of Chichi Jima warrior spirit, and describes the hor
Yet, all this took time. How was Great made bombing runs hazardous, yet ror and barbarity that occurred after
Britain able to buy the time needed the communications stations on the the executions. Readers will be left
to counteract the effects of the U- island had to be destroyed. Bombing wondering how men could do such
boat battle? missions cost many aviators their things to other men.
The battles between U-boats and lives and caused the capture of sev The book includes the poignant
Allied shipping took place outside eral more. Bradley recounts one re story of the aviators’ families who
the public’s view. There were no hor markable story of a naval aviator who were first told their sons were miss
rific photographs of destroyed build was shot down. The pilot was res ing, then that the men were killed in
ings and cities in flames and no cued by a U.S. submarine before the action, but the families were never
stream of refugees reciting the hor Japanese could attempt capture. The told the details of their deaths. The
rors of war and spreading fear and aviator’s name was George H.W. family’s emotional journeys and the
panic. Great Britain’s government Bush. effect their loved ones’ deaths had on
kept the devastation from the pub Bush’s insights and emotions their lives are compelling. The later
lic, minimizing its psychological ef about being shot down and the loss war crimes trials on Chichi Jima were
fect. That Donitz was never able to of his two crew members are memo conducted in secret, partly to spare
son Turner, Charles Beard, and Perry der. This is unfortunate, because the ment, the military can conduct a revo
Miller, were born in the first quarter book does not really discuss typical, lution in the way America wages war.
of the last century.) He could have lesser-known hate criminals. Gaylin America could transform its military
labeled the scholars the “Cold War does complete his mission of show into a smaller, more flexible and lethal,
generation” because they published ing why passionate attachment turns and less expensive force. He devel
their most important works in the into large-scale hatred and violence. ops his argument with historical ex
decades after 1945. Palmer set himself One of the book’s weaker points amples of how failure to adapt force
an almost impossible task in trying to is a blanket and all-too-simple as structure, doctrine, and tactics, and
sort through an entire generation of sumption that some hatred, such as training new technology, led to de
historians. The scope of the subjects’ against Israel, is caused by the com feat for France in the Franco-Prussian
collective scholarship is as stagger mon emotion, jealousy. This is some War, for the Confederacy at Gettys
ing as its quality, encompassing vir what disappointing considering burg, and, he argues, for NATO in its
tually every facet of modern history. Gaylin’s credentials and his handling air war over Kosovo and Yugoslavia.
The first half of the book sketches of most of the controversial issues. To Owens, the largest obstacle to
the historians’ personal and profes Perhaps, the subject is so broad one change is not the American public or
sional lives. Palmer’s recitation of might assume Gaylin had to crunch America’s policymakers, but the
ancient academic catfights and other some of his theories because of armed services themselves. What is
tribal lore are numbingly familiar to space. most needed, he argues, is a trans
any history graduate student and While he offers little hope of a formation in the zero-sum mindset of
completely uninteresting to anyone solution, the fascinating tales of well- America’s military leaders.
not a member of the guild. The sec known incidents and what probably True military Transformation might
ond half examines the scholars’ led to the mindset that caused them mean the loss or realignment of the
works. Palmer opines that the book makes this book worth reading. services’ traditional roles and mis
shares as a central theme, a new “no Stephanie B. Mojica, sions, resulting in fewer budget dol
tion of submerged reality. . . . Histori Los Angeles, California lars for the losing service. Military
cal truth, like an iceberg, is never leaders, primarily concerned with or
what it appears on the surface.” But, LIFTING THE FOG OF WAR, ganizational survival in a fiscally con
Palmer claims too much here. He over Admiral Bill Owens, with Ed Offley, The strained environment, impede the
reaches when he asserts his subjects John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, military’s transformation into a truly
were first to move decisively beyond MD, 2001, 296 pages, $16.95. joint force that could best and least
mere narrative history to richer the In Lifting the Fog of War, Admiral expensively leverage the Nation’s
matic analyses, as his own discus Bill Owens, former Vice Chairman of information technology advantages
sion of the scholars’ mentors reveals. the Joint Chiefs of Staff, states that to pursue national objectives.
The preceding generation of histori few Americans, including few Ameri Owens skillfully portrays the state
ans framed highly sophisticated ana can policymakers, have personal of America’s military and offers con
lytical histories that engage to this experience with our all-volunteer mili crete steps to solve its problems. I
day. tary. When watching CNN news re recommend the book to senior mili
Other superior group portraits of ports of America’s easy military tary leaders, civilian policymakers,
past masters are in print, and several successes in the Persian Gulf, Koso and civilians who wonder, “If it ain’t
of those profiled by Palmer have writ vo, and Afghanistan, Americans broke, why fix it?”
ten autobiographies. Readers would might think that their military is suf MAJ Robert P. Mooney, Jr., USA,
be better served by reading the origi ficiently strong to dominate all con Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
nal masterpieces composed by these flicts for the foreseeable future.
great historians. When defense budget discussions
COL Alan Cate, USA, arise, they might ask, “If the military TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania ain’t broke, why spend all those bil AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY, F.
Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Santa
lions to fix it?” Monica, CA, RAND (National Security
Owens shows that, while appear Research Division), 2003, 217 pages,
HATRED: The Psychological Descent ing formidable, America’s military is, $24.00.
into Violence, Willard Gaylin, Public-
Affairs, New York, 2003, 256 pages, in fact, “running on empty.” Because Nations act in accordance with
$24.00. of force reductions, frequent deploy self-interest. When nations refine
Written by Willard Gaylin, a pro ments, and aging combat systems those interests, however, their allies
fessor of clinical psychology, Ha fast approaching obsolescence, and partners must be attentive to the
tred: The Psychological Descent America’s military is in danger of intensity and direction of change.
into Violence is a worthwhile book imploding. This is particularly true of Turkey,
with few flaws. Gaylin uses a clinical Owens offers a relatively inex whose role and identity has changed
model to discuss modern problems. pensive fix. By integrating advanced more than once during the 20th
Looking into the roles of fanatical information technology into rede century. Today, Turkey’s regional
social and religious leaders, Gaylin signed force structures and by devel and bilateral relationships are more
suggests hatred is not necessarily an oping innovative doctrine, tactics, complex and changeable than ever.
emotion, but a psychological disor and training to govern their employ According to F. Stephen Larrabee
might affect China’s market reforms Graham’s career effectively covered targets during the Vietnam war, but
and democratization. ACDA history, the reader is led President Bill Clinton’s National Se
Current through July-August though the bureaucratic machina curity Advisor, Tony Lake, kept
2003, the book serves as a handy tions that occurred from administra Clinton out of the room to avoid any
reference with well-presented statis tion to administration on the role public perception of a crisis.
tical data that combines mainstream, ACDA would play. The adminis Nerve Center discusses critical
short-term analysis of the region’s trative history of an independent events through the years, key deci
major actors. ACDA ended when it was folded sions made, and the people involved.
Clifton W. Sherrill, Ph.D., into the U.S. Department of State in Photographs and floor plans supply
Tallahassee, Florida 1999. a visual perspective. The book also
The book, laden with jargon, is at provides a good historical back
DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: times quite technical. A detailed glos ground—with one drawback. The fi
Three Decades of Arms Control and sary would have helped those not nal chapter is a fictional account of
International Law, Thomas Graham, Jr., conversant with the names of the a future crisis and how the room’s
University of Washington Press, Seattle, Soviet missiles or acronyms for trea duty staff might respond. Bohn tries
2002, 362 pages, $35.00. ties or arms control initiatives. Be to show how advanced computer
Thomas Graham, Jr., contends that cause the book is a personal recol and communications might work and
Disarmament Sketches: Three De lection, it contains no footnotes or suggests the staff’s human side
cades of Arms Control and Interna bibliography. These are minor criti would remain the same.
tional Law was written as a personal cisms, however, when compared to I recommend this book to anyone
account of his 27 years of experi the book’s value. Those specializing interested in knowing what goes on
ences at the Arms Control and Dis in arms control should read this in the White House situation room,
armament Agency (ACDA), not as book; it is a valuable beginning its limitations, and its capabilities.
an exhaustive history of arms control. primer on the subject. COL Robert S. Driscoll, USA,
In truth, however, it is much closer John C. Binkley, Ph.D., Retired, Washington, D.C.
to the latter than the former. Because Adelphi, Maryland
of Graham’s involvement in all as MARINE RIFLEMAN: Forty-Three
pects of arms control, including be NERVE CENTER: Inside the White Years in the Corps, Wesley L. Fox,
ing the general counsel and acting House Situation Room, Michael K. Brassey’s Inc., Dulles, VA, 2002, 395
director of ACDA, this personal ac Bohn, Brassey’s Inc., Dulles, VA, 2003, pages, $27.95.
count becomes a history of arms 239 pages, $24.95. An old axiom says that in every
control policy development within The Situation Room is a series of life there is a story to tell. Whether
the U.S. Government as well as a his rooms in the West Wing’s basement that is true for every life is debatable,
tory of the ACDA. staffed by members of government but the axiom holds true for the life
Instead of approaching the sub agencies responsible for national of Wesley L. Fox. Marine Rifleman:
ject as a straight-line chronological security. After working in the U.S. Forty-Three Years in the Corps is
narrative, Graham builds his work Army Europe’s (USAREUR) War proof. Recipient of the Medal of
around the key arms control initia Room and the National Military Com Honor, two Legion of Merit awards,
tives that occurred from the time of mand Center in the Pentagon (and a Bronze Star with a Combat V (with
President Richard M. Nixon’s admin watching NBC’s West Wing), I valor), and three Purple Heart med
istration to that of President Bill thought I had an idea of what the als, Fox—a man who consistently
Clinton. Of value is an insider’s ex White House Situation Room looked aspired to follow a code of honor and
planation of the internal and bureau like. I was wrong. ethics—inspires military and civilians
cratic debates that surrounded those Michael K. Bohn, the director of alike.
initiatives and how policies devel the Situation Room during President Fox tells the story of his life as he
oped. The reader receives a com Ronald Reagan’s administration, dis lived it, from the influences of his
plete understanding of how interpre pels “Sit Room” myths that show it mother and father and 9 siblings, to
tations of the Antiballistic Missile as an underground command center his 43 years in the Marine Corps,
Treaty became a point of contention with big-screen monitors and military culminating with his retirement in
when President Ronald Reagan’s personnel in direct communication 1993 at age 62. Fox then served as
administration opined that a broad with fighter planes. His book, Nerve Deputy Commandant of Cadets at
reading of the treaty allowed for de Center Inside the White House Situ Virginia Tech, a position he held un
veloping and testing “Star Wars.” ation Room, looks at the room from til his retirement in 2001. A “gungy
The reader also receives an apprecia when President John F. Kennedy cre Marine” who did it all from Korea to
tion for the debate’s intensity. Gra ated it in May 1961 to President Vietnam and beyond, Fox would
ham was deeply involved in all these George W. Bush’s use of it after the have been forgiven for his autobiog
policies, so he gives depth to key September 2001 terrorist attacks. raphy being a bit self-congratulatory,
American and Russian players’ per Every president who used the but he has not snared himself in such
sonalities. room, used it differently. President a trap and avoids hyperbole. Doing
The policy discussions are only Lyndon Johnson met in the room so makes the story all the more re
one aspect of this work. Because daily with military planners to select markable.