CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST ARTICLE 161-189

ART 168 – ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FALSE TREASURY/ BANK NOTES

CLEMENTE VS PEOPLE

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DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the March
29, 2010 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the November 3, 2008 Judgment [2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 7, convicting petitioner of illegal possession and use of false bank notes under Article 168 [3] of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended. Also assailed is the CA Resolution dated October 14, 2010[4] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Article 168 of the RPC under an Information [5] which reads:

That on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to use, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control twenty[-]four (24) pcs. [of]
P500.00 bill with Markings [] IIB-1 to IIB-24, respectively and specifically enumerated, to wit:

SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT

PX626388 1 P500.00 CC077337 1 P500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
BB020523 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
PX626388 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00
PX626388 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
UU710062 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00
Which are false and falsified.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

The version of the prosecution and the defense, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:[6]

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: Jail Officer 1 (JO1) Michael Michelle Passilan, the Investigator of the
Manila City Jail; JO1 Domingo David, Jr.; and Loida Marcega Cruz, the Assistant Manager of the Cash Department of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas.

[Their testimonies established the following:]

Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On August 7, 2007, at around 3:30 pm, an informant in the person of inmate
Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The informant narrated that he received a counterfeit
P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however,
recognized the bill as a fake and refused to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant,
proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. Pursuant to their agreement, the informant entered the cubicle first and found
appellant therein, lying in bed. The informant returned to appellant the latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and
announced a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet
were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked them
sequentially with IIB-2 to II-B24. They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was returned by informant to appellant with IIB-1. Appellant
was consequently arrested and brought out of his cell into the office of the Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of
the Manila City jail for interrogation.
 Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant were turned over to the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting Assistant Manager Loida Marcega Cruz of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and found the following bills as counterfeit, viz: one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6)
P500.00 bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9) P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five (5) P500.00 bills with Serial
Number PX626388; one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number UU710062; and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial Number WW164152.

For the defense, appellant was the lone witness presented on the stand.

Appellant simply raised the defense of frame-up. He testified that in the afternoon of August 5, 2007, he was inside his room
located at Dorm 1 of the Manila City Jail. At around 3:00 pm, JO1 Michael Passilan entered appellant's room while JO1 Domingo David,
Jr. posted himself outside. Without any warning, JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and confiscated his wallet containing one (1) P1,000.00
bill. JO1s David and Passilan left immediately thereafter. Appellant was left with no other choice but to follow them in order to get back
his wallet. Appellant followed the jail officers to the Intelligence Office of the Manila City Jail where he saw JO1 Passilan place the
P500.00 bills inside the confiscated black wallet. Appellant was then told that the P500.00 bills were counterfeit and that he was being
charged with illegal possession and use thereof. Appellant also added that JO1 Passilan bore a grudge against him. This was because
appellant refused to extend a loan [to] JO1 Passilan because the latter cannot offer any collateral therefor. Since then, JO1 Passilan
treated him severely, threatening him and, at times, putting him in isolation.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC gave credence to the prosecution's
witnesses in finding that the counterfeit money were discovered in petitioner's possession during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the
counterfeit money were planted to incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of pieces involved. [7] The RTC also did not find that the
jail officers were motivated by improper motive in arresting petitioner, [8] and applied in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties considering the absence of contrary evidence. As to petitioners defense of frame-up, the RTC held that the purported frame-up allegedly
staged by JO1 Passilan would not affect the prosecution's evidence since the testimony of JO1 David could stand by itself. The RTC likewise found that
it was strange that petitioner did not remonstrate despite the fact that he was allegedly being framed.[9]

As to the elements of the crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00 bills found in petitioners possession were forgeries was confirmed
by the certification issued by the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which was testified into by Acting Assistant Manager Loida A.
Cruz.[10] The RTC also ruled that petitioner knew the bills were counterfeit as shown by his conduct during the surprise search and his possession of the
bills. As to the element of intention to use the false bank notes, the RTC ruled that the fact that petitioner intended to use the bills was confirmed by the
information received by the jail officers from another inmate.[11]

Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment. Petitioner argued that the evidence used against him was obtained in violation of
his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Petitioner also argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because of the non-presentation of the informant-inmate, Francis dela Cruz, who could have corroborated the testimonies of the jail
officers.

Unconvinced, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The RTC, however, only ruled that there was no violation of petitioners
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures because the seizure was done pursuant to a valid arrest for violation of Article 168 of
the RPC. The trial court pointed out that prior to the search, a crime was committed and the criminal responsibility pointed to petitioner. [12]

On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article 168 of the
RPC. Petitioner contended that one of the elements of the crime which is intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established because the informant
Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand.[13]

The CA, however, found the appeal unmeritorious and denied petitioners appeal. [14] The appellate court found that the fact the petitioner was
caught in possession of twenty-four (24) pieces of fake P500.00 bills already casts doubt on his allegation that he was merely framed by the jail guards.
The CA agreed with the RTC that even without the testimony of JO1 Passilan, the testimony of JO1 David was already sufficient to establish petitioners
guilt since petitioner did not impute any ill motive on the latter except to point out that JO1 David was JO1 Passilans friend. [15]

Regarding the element of intent to use, the CA found that there are several circumstances which, if taken together, lead to the logical
conclusion that petitioner intended to use the counterfeit bills in his possession. The CA pointed out that jail officers were informed by inmate Francis
dela Cruz that he received a fake P500.00 bill from petitioner who told him to buy soft drinks from the Manila City jail bakery. After Francis dela Cruz
identified petitioner as the person who gave him the fake money, the jail officers conducted a surprise inspection. Said inspection yielded twenty-three
(23) pieces of counterfeit P500.00 bills inside petitioner's black wallet, which was taken from his back pocket. The CA further held that the non-
presentation of Francis dela Cruz would not affect the prosecution's case because even without his testimony, petitioners intent to use the counterfeit
bills was established. The CA added that the matter of which witnesses to present is a matter best left to the discretion of the prosecution. [16]

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution
dated October 14, 2010.[17]Hence, the present appeal.

Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CONVICTING
PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE AN ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE COUNTERFEIT BILLS SINCE THEY WERE DERIVED FROM
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.[18]

The petition is meritorious.

Generally, the trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the

lower court has overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The exception

applies when it is established that the trial court has ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if

considered, will change the outcome of the case.[19]

Here, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA had overlooked certain substantial facts of value to warrant a reversal of its factual
assessments. While petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence,
said defense must be given credence in this case as the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.

Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. Unless the act be one of

those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his

possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next

lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles. [Emphasis supplied.]

The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to

bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender

knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified

instruments.[20] As held in People v. Digoro, [21] possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to

constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes.[22]
 In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis
dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they
were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short,
the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill.[23] Their account, however, is
hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.[24]

This Court, of course, is not unaware of its rulings that the matter of presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for the accused or, except in
a limited sense, for the trial court to dictate. Discretion belongs to the city or provincial prosecutor as to how the prosecution should present its case.
[25]
However, in this case, the non-presentation of the informant as witness weakens the prosecution's evidence since he was the only one who had
knowledge of the act which manifested petitioner's intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as
its witness, if in fact such person existed, but it did not present him. Hence, the trial court did not have before it evidence of an essential element of the
crime. The twenty-three (23) pieces of counterfeit bills allegedly seized on petitioner is not sufficient to show intent, which is a state of mind, for there
must be an overt act to manifest such intent.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 29, 2010 and Resolution dated October 14, 2010
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32365 are REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

[G. R. No. 113218. November 22, 2001]

ALEJANDRO TECSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us on appeal by certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11744 promulgated on August 31, 1993, and its
Resolution dated December 23, 1993, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

This case stemmed from a charge of illegal possession and use of counterfeit US dollar notes, as defined and penalized under Article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code, against herein petitioner Alejandro Tecson y Florencio. The Information reads:

That on or about April 28, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control, with intent to use and pass, as in fact he did use and pass ten (10) pieces of 100-US dollar notes of
the Federal Reserve Note, or a sum of $1,000.00 (US Dollar) to Pedro C. Labita, a confidential assistant of the Central Bank of the Philippines, which
bills were in the resemblance and similitude of the dollar bills issued by the United States Government, the said accused knowing, as he did, that the
said US dollar bills were forged and falsified.

Contrary to law.

Upon being arraigned on July 20, 1990, the petitioner entered the plea of Not guilty to the charge.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision[2] dated May 6, 1991, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares accused ALEJANDRO F. TECSON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense as defined in Art. 168
and penalized in Art. 166 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; and hereby sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from EIGHT (8)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor in its medium period as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00; and to pay the cost.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to burn the ten (10) pieces of 100 US dollar notes subject of the offense.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court in
toto on August 31, 1993. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court but it was denied on December 23, 1993. [3]

Hence, the instant petition.

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that a civilian informer personally informed the Cash Department of the Central Bank of
the Philippines that a certain Mang Andy was involved in a syndicate engaging in the business of counterfeit US dollar notes. On April 26, 1990 a test-
buy operation was ordered by Atty. Pio Chan, Jr., Chief of the Investigation Staff of the Central Bank, which resulted in the purchase from Mang Andy of
one (1) US dollar note for Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) that was found to be counterfeit by the Currency Analysis and Redemption Division of the
Central Bank.Consequently, Atty. Chan formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation composed of prosecution witnesses Pedro Labita, Confidential
Assistant of the Investigation Staff of the Central Bank, and Cpl. Johnny Marqueta, a representative of the US Secret Service, together with William
Pasive, Warren Castillo and Carlos Toralde, Jr. also of the Investigation Staff of the Central Bank.[4]

On April 28, 1990, at about 11:30 oclock in the morning, the team proceeded to the Jollibee restaurant in Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila. Three (3)
members of the team namely: William Pasive, Carlos Toralde, Jr., and Warren Castillo positioned themselves outside the Jollibee restaurant while Pedro
Labita and Johnny Marqueta proceeded inside. Subsequently, the civilian informer arrived inside the restaurant and approached a man who was seated
two (2) tables away from where Labita and Marqueta were positioned. The informer introduced to Mang Andy the said Pedro Labita and Johnny
Marqueta as the persons interested in buying US dollar notes. Apparently convinced, the man drew ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes from his
wallet. At that moment, and upon a pre-arranged signal from the informer, Labita and Marqueta introduced themselves as Central Bank operatives and
apprehended the man called Mang Andy whom they later identified as the herein petitioner Alejandro Tecson. [5]

During the investigation at the Central Bank, the petitioner affixed his initial on the dorsal portion of each of the ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar
notes[6] and signed the corresponding receipt[7] for the said US dollar notes seized from him. He also executed a Pagpapatunay[8] attesting to the proper
conduct of the investigation by the Central Bank operatives on the petitioner. Subsequent examination by the Currency Analysis and Redemption
Division of the Central Bank shows that the ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes confiscated from the petitioner are indeed counterfeit. [9]

The defense denied any liability of the petitioner for the crime of illegal possession and use of counterfeit US dollar notes. Petitioner testified that
he was inside the Jollibee restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Manila on April 28, 1990 to meet a certain Nora Dizon, wife of his friend, Reynaldo de Guzman, who
previously sought his assistance in securing insurance payment bond. After Noras arrival at the restaurant, she handed to him a sealed envelope which
he accepted thinking that it contained the documents pertaining to the insurance payment bond. Upon receipt of the sealed envelope, however, two (2)
male persons approached and immediately handcuffed him. They dragged him outside the restaurant where three (3) other persons were waiting. After
boarding a taxi, they blindfolded the petitioner and took him to the Central Bank building in F. B. Harrison St., Manila where he was investigated. [10]

The investigators inquired from the petitioner about the source of the fake US dollar notes. Petitioner vehemently denied having possession nor
any knowledge as to the source of the fake US dollar notes and claimed that the same were merely planted by the arresting officers. Petitioner also
claimed that he was tortured into initialing the dorsal portions of the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes and into signing the Receipt and Inventory
for Property/Articles Seized as well as the Pagpapatunay.[11]

The instant appeal by certiorari[12] reveals the following assignment of errors:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO FIND THAT THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PETITIONERS
CONVICTION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS NOT
ADMISSIBLE IN LAW.

In essence, petitioner claimed that no buy-bust operation took place inside the Jollibee restaurant in Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila on April 28, 1990
inasmuch as there was no haggling as to the price between him and the poseur buyers, and that no money changed hands. He was merely framed up
by the Central Bank operatives by planting fake US dollar notes inside the envelope which was handed to him by the wife of his friend who earlier asked
for his assistance regarding insurance payment bond. He accepted the envelope thinking that it contained the documents pertaining to the insurance
payment bond.

Assuming arguendo that a buy-bust operation was conducted, the petitioner claimed that the testimony of prosecution witness Pedro Labita to the
effect that the civilian informer had to convince the petitioner negated any alleged intent on his part to sell counterfeit US dollar notes to the poseur
buyers. In addition, he averred that prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta had no personal knowledge as to petitioners alleged possession of
counterfeit US dollar notes as they merely relied on the predetermined signal of the civilian informer before making the arrest. Hence, the ten (10)
counterfeit US $100 dollar notes allegedly confiscated from him (petitioner) incidental to his arrest are inadmissible in evidence. Likewise, his initial on
the dorsal portion of the said US dollar notes and his signature on the Pagpapatunay are inadmissible for having been obtained without the aid of
counsel. That is the version of the petitioner.

The respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered in their Comment that the absence of haggling among the
parties to the buy-bust operation did not negate petitioners actual possession and use of the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes, which fact of
possession is punishable by law. Prosecution witnesses Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta, who acted as poseur buyers, testified that they saw the
petitioner drew the subject fake US dollar notes from his wallet [13] in order to sell the same to them.

While respondents, through counsel, conceded that the Pagpapatunay and the Receipt and Inventory for Property/Articles Seized which were
signed by the petitioner during his custodial investigation are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in the absence of his counsel, they
maintained that there are sufficient independent evidence on record to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [14]
 By way of reply,[15] the petitioner, who is now 70 years of age, [16] contends that possession should be coupled with intent to use the counterfeit US
dollar bills in order to hold him liable under the provision of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit.Unless the act be one of those coming under the
provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified
instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.

The elements of the crime charged for violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, are: 1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or
other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified
by another person; 2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and 3) that he either used or possessed with intent to
use any of such forged or falsified instruments.[17] Hence, possession of fake dollar notes must be coupled with the act of using or at least with intent to
use the same as shown by a clear and deliberate overt act in order to constitute a crime,[18] as was sufficiently proven in the case at bar.

We find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the case at bar. The prosecution established, through the testimonies of Pedro Labita
and Johnny Marqueta, that a buy-bust operation was conducted by the combined agents of the Central Bank of the Philippines and the US Secret
Service, and that the petitioner was therein caught in flagrante delicto in the possession of and in the act of offering to sell counterfeit US dollar
notes. During the buy-bust operation, prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta were introduced by the civilian informer to the petitioner as interested
buyers of fake US dollar notes. When the petitioner was in the act of drawing the ten (10) pieces of fake US $100 dollar notes from his wallet, he was
immediately placed under arrest by Labita and his team.

The testimony of Pedro Labita which was corroborated by Johnny Marqueta and the presentation during the trial of the ten (10) counterfeit US
$100 dollar notes, which were confiscated from the petitioner when he was arrested, proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the
crime of illegal possession and use of fake US dollar notes under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court in its decision characterized the
respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta as clear, straightforward, impartial and (thus) convincing. [19] We fail to discern any
ill motive on the part of the said prosecution witnesses in testifying against the petitioner whom they met for the first time only on April 28,
1990. Petitioner himself admitted during the trial that he was not aware of any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to implicate him in the
crime of counterfeiting US dollar notes.[20] The settled rule is that the testimony of even a lone prosecution witness as long as it is positive and clear and
not arising from an improper motive to impute a serious offense to the accused, deserves full credit. [21]

The absence of haggling as to the price of the subject fake US dollar notes between the petitioner and the poseur buyers did not negate the fact of
the buy-bust operation. Significantly, the transaction for the purchase of fake US dollar notes was only at its inception when the Central Bank operatives
at that point decided to apprehend the petitioner. Mere possession coupled with intent to use the counterfeit US dollar notes, as proven in the case at
bar, is sufficient to constitute the crime under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.

The facts, as established by the evidence adduced, show that the civilian informer introduced prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta to the
petitioner as the persons interested in buying fake US dollar notes. Having been thus convinced, petitioner removed his wallet from his pocket and drew
the ten (10) pieces of fake US $100 dollar notes to show the same to the supposed buyers. Petitioners natural reaction to the seeming interest of the
poseur buyers to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly showed his intention to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. In
any event, what we have here is a case of entrapment which is allowed, and not instigation.

Petitioner cannot validly claim that he had no intention of committing the crime by citing the testimony of Pedro Labita to the effect that he
(petitioner) was merely convinced by the civilian informer that Labita and Marqueta were interested to buy fake US dollar notes. The pertinent portion of
Labitas testimony reads, thus:

ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR:

Q All right, let me clarify this, Mr. Witness. This informant or informer that you mentioned, he also arrived there at the Jollibee Restaurant, Mr.
Witness?

A Yes, sir, but he arrived late.

Q So, he arrived late. Now, after the arrival of this informant at the Jollibee Restaurant, what did this informant do inside the Jollibee restaurant while
you were there, Mr. Witness?

A Our informer tried to convince the accused and after convincing that we are the buyers of said counterfeit notes, he immediately draws (sic) from
his wallet that (sic) counterfeit notes, and upon pre-signal of our informer, we immediately apprehended the accused, sir. [22]

The above-quoted testimony of prosecution witness Labita negates the petitioners claim that he was merely instigated into committing the crime
by the civilian informer. It appears that prior to the buy-bust operation, the petitioner already had the intention to sell counterfeit US dollar notes as he, in
fact, had an agreement with the civilian informer to arrange for a meeting with interested buyers. In other words, the civilian informer did not have to
convince the petitioner to sell fake US dollar notes during the buy-bust operation on April 28, 1990 inside the Jollibee restaurant in Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz,
Manila.What the informer actually did during the buy-bust operation was simply to convince the petitioner that prosecution witnesses Labita and
Marqueta were interested buyers of counterfeit US dollar notes.

The petitioner cannot validly impugn the admissibility of the subject ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes confiscated from him when he was
thus arrested. It is clear from the testimony of prosecution witness Pedro Labita that he saw the petitioner drew several pieces of fake US dollar notes
from his wallet to show to them after they were introduced by the civilian informer as the interested buyers while they were inside the Jollibee restaurant,
thus:

ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, after this Johnny Marqueta and you were introduced to the accused, what did the accused do after the introduction?

A He immediately drew his counterfeit dollar notes from his wallet and right after that we identified ourselves as agents of the Central Bank, sir. [23]

When the arrest of the petitioner was made, Labita did not have to rely on the prearranged signal of the informer inasmuch as he (Labita) had
unhindered view and appreciation of what was then taking place right before his eyes. Hence, the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes are
admissible in evidence for the reason that the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto by the prosecution witnesses during the said buy-bust
operation. In other words, this is a case of a legally valid warrantless arrest and seizure of the evidence of the crime.

In view of the foregoing, petitioners allegation that he was framed-up by the Central Bank agents does not deserve any consideration. This
hackneyed defense of alleged frame-up of the accused caught inflagrante delicto during a buy-bust operation has been viewed with disdain by the
courts for it is easy to concoct and difficult to prove. [24] Besides, there is a legal presumption that public officers, including arresting officers, regularly
perform their official duties.[25] That legal presumption was not overcome by any credible evidence to the contrary.

concoct and difficult to prove.24 Besides, there is a legal presumption that public officers, including arresting officers, regularly perform their official
duties.25 That legal presumption was not overcome by any credible evidence to the contrary.

Apparently clutching at the last straws, as it were, petitioner also alleged that he was tortured into signing the dorsal portions of the fake ten (10)
US $100 dollar notes confiscated from him by the arresting officers and the Pagpapatunay. Other than his self-serving testimony, the petitioner failed to
prove his allegation of torture. Also, he did not file any criminal or administrative action against his alleged tormentors. Suffice it to state that petitioners
conviction for the crime charged in the information is not anchored on the evidence obtained during his custodial investigation which were disregarded
by respondent appellate court for having been obtained without the assistance of his counsel.

In sum, there is no reversible error in the subject Decision of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11744 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ON FORGERY

G.R. No. L-16806 December 22, 1961

SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

P. N. Stuart del Rosario for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Davao of illegal possession of said forged treasury notes and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor, and pay a fine of P5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as a proportionate part of the
costs. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate penalty which was increased
to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor. The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by Sergio del Rosario.

It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario the Philippine one-peso bills Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine two-peso bill
Exhibit H, and inducing him to believe that the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in fact they were genuine treasury
notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had been altered and changed, the aforementioned defendants had succeeded in
obtaining P1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of Davao, on June 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of more
counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines. The only question raised in this appeal is whether the possession of said Exhibits C, E, G and H constitutes
a violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant maintains that, being genuine treasury notes of our government, the possession thereof
cannot be illegal. We find no merit in this pretense.lawphil.net

It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had been erased and changed so as to read 0 and that similar
erasures and changes had been made in the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the last digit in Serial No. D-716326 of Exhibit
G, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No.
D-716329 of Exhibit H.

Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. — Unless the act be one of those coming
under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of
the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.

ART. 169. How forgery is committed. — The forgery referred to in this section may be committed by any of the following means;

1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true and
genuine document.

2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein.

It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or signs contained" in
which had been erased and or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner
adverted to above, is punishable under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil.,
398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785).

Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the decision appealed from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs against petitioner Sergio del Rosario. It is
so ordered.

ARTICLE 171 FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER

[G.R. Nos. 107041-42. May 15, 1996]

FELICIANO MALIWAT, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Special First Division, and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; RIGHT NOT DENIED WHERE ACCUSED WHO TESTIFIED SOUGHT AND
GRANTED THE POSTPONEMENT AND CANCELLATION OF HEARING FOR NO LESS THAN 40 TIMES. - Maliwat cannot claim that he was
denied due process. The records show that he did testify on his own behalf and was cross-examined by the prosecution. Admittedly, he was
unable to adduce additional documentary evidence that he claims would establish his innocence and which he now attaches as annexes in his
petition for review and memorandum of law before the Court. But as noted earlier, it was Maliwat who had sought the postponements and
cancellations of the hearings for no less than forty (40) times, from the date of his arraignment to the promulgation of judgment, a fact that
spanned almost a decade (1978 to 1988).

2. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; MUST RENDER JUST AND IMPARTIAL JUDGMENT FREE FROM ANY SUSPICION; GRANTING OF ACCUSED'S
SEVERAL REQUESTS FOR POSTPONEMENT, LENIENCY NOT IMPARTIALITY. - The guiding rule is that a judge must not only render a just,
correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. As
applied to the case at bar, the attitude exhibited by Judge Diaz speaks more of extraordinary leniency to the accused in granting all his requests
for postponements, even to the extent of reconsidering his orders declaring the accused as having waived his right to present further evidence.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; JUDGES NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM SITTING AND DECIDING CASE WHERE HE AS THE
THEN CLERK OF COURT TESTIFIED ON THE SAME CASE AFFECTING AN ISSUED CERTIFICATION. - Under Rule 137, Sec. 1 of the Rules
of Court, Judge Diaz' previous actuations in testifying as then clerk of court on the issued official certification did not render him legally disqualified
from sitting and deciding the case. The suggestion that he is not wholly free, disinterested and independent could have been buttressed by the
exercise of his sound discretion in voluntarily disqualifying himself. Yet, the manner in which he exhibited himself during the trial negates any
suspicion of prejudgment in the case.

4. ID.; EVIDENCE; GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. - The only remaining issue then is whether or not
petitioner's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the interest of justice, the Court treated the annexes attached to the petition which
had been marked as exhibits in the course of the trial but were not formally offered, to form part of the records of this case. And after close scrutiny
thereof, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that petitioner was correctly convicted of having committed the crime of falsification of
public documents.

5. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTIONS; PERSON TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT, PRESUMED THE MATERIAL AUTHOR OF THE
'FALSIFICATION. - The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged
document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it),
taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Tranquilino, R. Gale, and Pacifico C. Yadao for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision [1] of public respondent Court of Appeals (CA)
dated 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. Nos. 09428-09429, entitled People of the Philippines versus Feliciano Maliwat, as well as the resolution dated 17
September 1992 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The CA decision and resolution affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City which convicted herein petitioner of falsification of public documents as defined and penalized under Article 172 par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code.

In a resolution dated 16 November 1992, this Court denied the present petition for review for failure to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular
28 -9 1.[2] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court denied with finality on 18 January 1993. [3] Petitioner followed with a second motion
for reconsideration which the Court noted without action in its 3 March 1993 resolution.[4]

On 21 June 1993, petitioner filed a motion for declaration of mistrial, pleading for the first time that his constitutional right to due process was
impaired when Judge Rolando Diaz rendered the judgment of conviction in Criminal Cases Nos. 158-77 and 159-77, knowing fully well that he (Judge
Diaz) previously testified against the petitioner (then accused) in said cases, while then the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Branches 2
and 3 of Cavite City.
 The Court issued a resolution[5] on 7 July 1993 requiring Judge Diaz to comment on the said motion for declaration of mistrial. On 14 July 1993,
petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and inhibition order against Judge Diaz. On 21 July 1993, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Diaz from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 158-77 and 159-77 (entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Feliciano Maliwat, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17).[6]

Judge Diaz filed his comment on petitioner's motion. [7] After careful deliberations, the Court resolved on 14 March 1994 to lift the entry of final
judgment dated 3 February 1993 and to reinstate and give due course to this petition for review. The parties were required to file their respective
memoranda as the Court ordered the RTC of Cavite City to forward the records of the cases to the Court.[8]

The antecedent facts of the case may be summarized as follows:

On 18 November 1977, two (2) separate informations were filed before the then CFI of Cavite, Branch 3 (now RTC, Branch 17) charging petitioner
with the crime of Falsification of Public and Official Documents.

The first information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 158-77, reads as follows:

"That on or about the first week of November 1975, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a private person, having somehow obtained possession of a blank form of a transfer certificate of title with Serial No.
1403456, which is a public and official document, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of falsification, by then and there,
filling, typing and inserting on the blank spaces therein or causing to be filled, typed and inserted on said public and official document, the technical
descriptions of a parcel of land, Lot No. 5825 of the Imus Estate Subdivision, Province of Cavite, with an area of 553,853 sq. meters including the
corresponding title number, and making it appear that the same is the owner's reconstituted copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-11850 of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, with the herein accused as the registered owner and that the said public and official document was
reconstituted by virtue of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dated November 13, 1963 and causing it to appear further that the then
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, Escolastico Cuevas had participated in the preparation and signing of the said falsified Owner's copy of TCT
No. RT-11850, when in truth and in fact, the said accused well knew that said parcel of land is already registered in the name of Green Valley Realty
Corporation and that then Register of Deeds Escolastico Cuevas never intervened in the preparation and signing of said falsified document much less
did he authorize anybody to write his name or affix his signature therein nor was there any judicial proceedings for reconstitution nor order from the
Court regarding TCT RT-11850, and thereafter, the above-named accused presented the said falsified owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-11850, in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite, for the purpose of reconstituting the original thereof.

Contrary to law."[9]

The second information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 159-77 and recited the same allegations as in the first information, except that the
number of the TCT involved in the second information was TCT No. RT 11854 with serial no. 1403457, allegedly covering lot no. 5826 of the Imus Estate
Subdivision, with an area of 299,403 sq. meters.

Petitioner was arraigned on 2 August 1978 at which, he pleaded not guilty to each charge. Thereafter, joint trial of the two (2) cases ensued.

On 12 February 1986, the trial court rendered a decision, later amended on 28 June 1988, the dispositive part of which, as amended, reads as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Feliciano Maliwat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in par. 1, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to - in Crim. Case No. 158-77 to an
indeterminate prison term of from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prison correccional as maximum
and to pay a fine of P5,000.00; in Crim. Case No. 159-77 to an indeterminate [prison] term of from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prison correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of P5,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs in both instances.

SO ORDERED."[10]

The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that sometime in October 1975, Maliwat, accompanied by two (2) other persons, went to the
office of Atty. Milagros Santiago, then the acting Register of Deeds of Cavite, to inquire about the originals of TCT Nos. T-11850 and T-11854 covering
lots 5825 and 5826 of the Imus Estate Subdivision. The original copies of said titles, however, could not be located by the vault keeper of the
office. Meanwhile, Atty. Santiago examined the owner's duplicate copies presented to her by Maliwat and upon closer scrutiny, she noticed the
annotations on the lower part of the two (2) titles which read: "reconstituted as per order of CFI/Cavite City dated November 13, 1963 Sgd. Escolastico
Cuevas." The same annotation on the two (2) titles aroused her suspicion because she was familiar with the customary signature of Escolastico Cuevas,
and the signatures of Cuevas appearing in the two (2) titles,[11] appeared to be forged.

Atty. Santiago did not confront Maliwat about the said signatures, instead, she referred the latter to the Clerk of Court (of the CFI) to verify the
existence of such an order from the court records. Maliwat allegedly obliged but did not return to the office of the Register of Deeds. That same
afternoon, Atty. Santiago went to see the Clerk of Court, Atty. Rolando Diaz, who informed her that the court had no record of the said orders.

On 6 November 1975, Atty. Santiago wrote a letter to the NBI Director to report the existence of the alleged dubious certificates of title in Maliwat's
possession and requested for an investigation of the matter. [12] The following year, Atty. Santiago went on sick leave and Atty. Jorge Gutierrez was
designated by the Land Registration Commission Head Office to act in her stead from 26 January - 17 February 1976. When Atty. Santiago resumed her
position on 17 February, she received a letter [13] from Atty. Gutierrez informing her that during her absence, Feliciano Maliwat had applied for
administrative reconstitution of title and that he (Gutierrez) approved the same, based on the owner's duplicate certificates of title submitted to him.

Concerned with these developments, Atty. Santiago informed the NBI about the reconstitution of the two (2) alleged fake titles and requested for
an immediate investigation. The NBI acted swiftly and sent subpoenas to Feliciano Maliwat, Atty. Gutierrez, Atty. Santiago and Atty. Cuevas who all
appeared and testified before NBI agent Tobias Lozada.

Agent Tobias Lozada's investigation [14] revealed that on his first day in office as acting Register of Deeds (of Cavite), Atty. Gutierrez met a person in
his office who introduced himself as Feliciano Maliwat. Maliwat inquired why certain titles he had presented for reconstitution as early as 14 January
1976 had not been acted upon. Atty. Gutierrez had the papers located and seeing no formal defects and believing them to be in order, reconstituted the
titles. Due to some typing errors, however, only one title was delivered to Maliwat on that day.
 The following day, when the deputy Register of Deeds Atty. Alejandro Villanueva reported for work, Atty. Gutierrez recounted to him the events of
the previous day including the fact that he had reconstituted the titles belonging to Feliciano Maliwat.

Atty. Villanueva informed Atty. Gutierrez that he should not have reconstituted the titles since Atty. Santiago believed that they were spurious and
had in fact requested the NBI to look into the matter. Atty. Villanueva also informed Atty. Gutierrez that Maliwat had been previously convicted for estafa
thru falsification of public document and was generally believed to be part of a criminal syndicate operating in Cavite.

With this information, Atty. Gutierrez told the NBI that he made his own investigation and discovered that Maliwat had subsequently tried to obtain
a tax declaration from the Provincial Assessor's Office (PAO) but this was denied because the PAO personnel doubted the authenticity of his titles. Upon
verification with the LRC main office, he (Gutierrez) was further informed that no such titles were originally issued to Maliwat. A similar Verification with
the Bureau of Lands yielded the same results. Atty. Gutierrez alleged that the formal requisites presented by Maliwat for reconstitution were the
following:

(a) a verified petition for issuance of new titles under R.A. 26 signed and sworn to by Feliciano Maliwat before Salvador R. Aguinaldo, a notary public for
Manila and recorded in the latter's notarial book as Document No. 1215 on Page3 of Book No. 116, Series of 1976 (Annex D).

(b) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-11850 on Form No. 1403456 (Annex E) and TCT No. RT-11854 on Form No. 1403457 (Annex E-2).

Atty. Gutierrez properly identified these documents before the NBI.

Atty. Escolastico Cuevas, retired Register of Deeds of Cavite Province, whose signatures on the certificates of title were allegedly forged, testified
before the court a quo denying his alleged signature appearing on the two (2) titles, i.e., TCT No. RT-11850 on form No. 1403456 and TCT No. RT-
11854 on form No. 1403457. He also stated that he executed a sworn statement [15] before the NBI where he similarly made the same denial. In that
affidavit, he recalled that as witness for the prosecution in a certain criminal case before Judge Coquia (of the CFI Manila) several years before the
present incident, he encountered the very same titles in open court, and he testified that the signatures attributed to him in the two (2) titles were not his,
but were plain forgeries.

Maliwat, for his part, denied authorship of the two (2) forged titles and claimed that he bought the two (2) parcels of land from a certain Benigno T.
Aseo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale [16] dated 2 January 1963. He registered the same and surrendered Aseo's titles to the Register of Deeds
for cancellation, after which he was issued two (2) new titles, namely: TCT No. RT- 11850 with Serial No. 603461 and RT- 11854 with Serial
number 603462.[17] Maliwat further claimed that he witnessed Escolastico Cuevas, the then Register of Deeds, actually sign his name over the said titles
before they were issued to him.[18]

Thus, from the issuance of his titles in 1963 up to 1975, Maliwat averred that he took physical possession of the lands covered thereby, and paid
real estate taxes thereon except in 1974 when he went to Canada. He was not aware of any title adverse to his own titles and that he was informed only
during the trial that a certain Green Valley Corporation had titles to said property and had been paying the real estate taxes thereon. Although he had a
location plan over the said properties, he did not have them relocated anymore to determine whether or not there was an overlap of titles.

In 1975, Maliwat alleged that certain buyers were interested in his property. Together with a friend named Judge Alejo, they went to the Register of
Deeds to have his titles verified but the Register of Deeds allegedly could not locate the original file copy of Maliwat's owner's duplicate TCTs in their
records. Maliwat was then informed that since the Registry of Deeds was burned twice in the past, the file (original) titles were presumably destroyed.

Maliwat admitted that in January 1976, he filed two (2) petitions for reconstitution of the titles before the Register of Deeds, after which he received
a letter from then acting, Register of Deeds Gutierrez requiring him to submit the owner's duplicate copies before the Register of Deeds as basis for the
reconstitution of title. Maliwat claimed that Atty. Gutierrez got back the letter [19]when his wife and his lawyer, Moreno Gaid, went to the office of Atty.
Gutierrez to surrender the owner's duplicate copies - which bore Serial Nos. 603461 and 603462 respectively, and not Serial Nos. 1403456 and
1403457 as evidenced by a receipt[20] issued by Atty. Gutierrez. Maliwat denied having any knowledge of the existence of TCT-11850 RT and T-11854 RT
with serial nos. 1403456 and 1403457 which found their way into the Register of Deeds of Cavite and maintained that what were surrendered to Atty.
Gutierrez were genuine owner's duplicate copies of TCT 11850-RT and T-11854 RT bearing serial numbers 603461 and 603462.

After giving due course to the petition at bar, the Court painstakingly reviewed the records to inquire and determine whether or not petitioner was
given a fair trial in the lower court.

The Court notes that from the time of petitioner's arraignment on 2 August 1978 up to the time the prosecution offered its evidence, and rested, the
hearings were either reset or cancelled no less than thirty (30) times owing to a variety of reasons proffered by petitioner. As early as 20 May 1982, the
case was set for hearing of the evidence for the defense, but the case was reset for another eight (8) times, again owing to petitioner's absences. Within
said period, the defense also failed to file any written objections to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence. When Judge Diaz took over the case on 12
April 1983, Maliwat moved to postpone for yet another eight (8) times, prompting Judge Diaz to issue an order on 17 October 1983 declaring Maliwat to
have waived his right to present further evidence.

This was not, however, the end of the trial court's leniency in Maliwat's favor. Owing to Maliwat's manifestation that he was suffering from chronic
malaria, Judge Diaz reconsidered[21]and set the case for hearing on 26 March 1984. When Maliwat and counsel still failed to appear on said date, Judge
Diaz deemed the case submitted for decision, but again reconsidered and set another hearing on 11 June 1984 to allow the defense to present
additional evidence. When both accused and counsel still failed to appear, Judge Diaz deemed the case submitted for decision and required the parties
to file their respective memoranda. Maliwat's lawyer appealed this order to the Court of Appeals but the appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed
on 24 October 1987.[22]

Maliwat's absences continued up to the promulgation of judgment by the trial court which also had to be reset four (4) times. It was only after then
that Maliwat's counsel filed a motion for new trial before the trial court. When the motion was denied on 14 September 1988, Maliwat appealed the
decision to the appellate court. Maliwat could have filed another motion for new trial before the appellate court on the ground of newly discovered
evidence material to his defense under Rule 124, Sec. 14 of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure, but he did not.Instead he sought affirmative relief by
prosecuting his appeal from the judgment of conviction until the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of conviction of the
court a quo.

Under the foregoing facts and circumstances, Maliwat certainly cannot claim that he was denied due process. The records show that he did testify
on his own behalf and was cross-examined by the prosecution. Admittedly, he was unable to adduce additional documentary evidence that he claims
would establish his innocence and which he now attaches as annexes in his petition for review and memorandum of law before the Court. But as noted
earlier, it was Maliwat who had sought the postponements and cancellations of the hearings for no less than forty (40) times, from the date of his
arraignment to the promulgation of judgment, a fact that spanned almost a decade (1978 to 1988).
 Although admittedly a belated plea, petitioner argues that there was a mistrial since a vital prosecution witness, then Clerk of Court Rolando Diaz,
became the judge of the case and had no choice but to render a judgment of conviction against him.

The records show that Rolando Diaz, then Clerk of Court of the CFI of Cavite City, indeed testified for the prosecution. But as explained by the
Solicitor General, his testimony was limited to certain facts directly connected with or arising from the performance of his official duties as Clerk of Court,
without any reference to or pronouncement as to the innocence or guilt of the accused. And as explained by Judge Diaz himself in his comment before
this Court dated 19 January 1994,

"That the only participation of the undersigned Judge as [then] Clerk of Court was to issue a certification and the only testimony given in this case was,
while still a Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Cavite with station at Cavite City, he saw the accused Feliciano Maliwat in his office after he
was referred to him by the Acting Register of Deeds of Cavite Province, Atty. Milagros Santiago and who presented to him two certificates of title and
requested for the production of the order annotated at the bottom of the face of said certificates of title wherein it was shown that the same had been
reconstituted as per order of the Court of First Instance dated November 30, 1983 and which after diligent search he could not produce, as either the
said order or a copy of the petition were actually inexistent (sic) and he noticed further that the signature of Escolastico Cuevas, Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite at the time said order was issued was not the signature of Atty. Cuevas with which he was familiar;

That the undersigned did not consider said testimony as bias on his part against the herein accused and he based his conviction of the accused in these
cases not on his prejudgment but rather on the over-all evidence presented before the Court;

That accused did not question his actuations in these cases during the trial and instead opted for the continuation thereof thus perhaps believing that the
undersigned would render judgment according to the evidence presented;

That he did not likewise question the actuations of the Judge in his appeal to the Court of Appeals nor on certiorari to this Honorable Court which denied
his petition for review for failure to comply the Rules of Court in Circular No. 28-91 in a resolution of November 13, 1992 whereby entry of Judgment was
issued on February 3, 1993 by the Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Judicial Records Office and it was only on June 21, 1993 did he file the instant
motion so as to hold in abeyance the promulgation of judgment on the ground of mistrial";[23]

The guiding rule is that a judge must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from
any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. As applied to the case at bar, the attitude exhibited by Judge Diaz speaks more of
extraordinary leniency to the accused in granting all his requests for postponements, even to the extent of reconsidering his orders declaring the
accused as having waived his right to present further evidence.

Under Rule 137, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, Judge Diaz' previous actuations did not render him legally disqualified from sitting and deciding the
case. The suggestion that he is not wholly free, disinterested and independent could have been buttressed by the exercise of his sound discretion in
voluntarily disqualifying himself. Yet, the manner in which he exhibited himself during the trial negates any suspicion of prejudgment in the case.

The only remaining issue then is whether or not petitioner's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the interest of justice, the Court
treated the annexes attached to the petition which had been marked as exhibits in the course of the trial but were not formally offered, to form part of the
records of this case. And after close scrutiny thereof, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that petitioner was correctly
convicted of having committed the crime of falsification of public documents. As clearly observed by the trial court which was evidently in the best
position to weigh and evaluate the evidence:

"From the evidence submitted, there is no question that the two certificates of title RT-11850 with serial no. 1403456 and RT- 11854 with Serial No.
1403457 Exhibits A and B are falsified; that as per finding of the NBI, testified to by then Senior Agent Toribio Lozada the same were among those
intended for the province of Cotabato but which were lost in transit as per certification issued by Fortunato T. Pascual of the Land Registration
Commission (Exhs. Q and Q-2); and a memorandum circular of the loss was issued by then Acting Commissioner Gregorio Bilog Jr. of the LRC (Exh. O)
and the titles found their way into the office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite Province pursuant to a petition for reconstitution filed by the herein
accused on January 8, 1976 (Exh. R) and the same were administratively reconstituted by then Acting Register of Deeds of Cavite province Atty. Jorge
V. Gutierrez and for which the said owners duplicate were surrendered to the office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite province and new owner's
duplicates issued to the herein accused. The Court cannot give credence thereto over the positive identification made by Atty. Santiago in open Court
together with the confirmation made by the NBI agent on the case. Atty. Tobias Lazada and the former Register of Deeds, Atty. Escolastico Cuevas
whose signature thereon was forged. (Italics supplied)

Moreover, a closer scrutiny of the numbering of the titles in question which accused alleges to have gotten from the office of the Register of Deeds
of Cavite Province when he registered the sale executed in his favor by Benigno T. Aseo shows the letters 'RT' precedes the number which the Court
can take judicial notice of that the letters RT stand for reconstituted title and these initials with the corresponding number follow the original number of
the title issued, but in this case the same is missing and does not state the original number of the title which is out of the ordinary procedure of the
Register of Deeds.

Likewise, it is quite absurd to see that Exhibits 'A' and 'B' which are accountable forms bearing consecutive serial numbers (1403456 and
1403457) respectively would have been given nonconsecutive title numbers (RT-11850 and RT-11854) and would have been issued ten months apart
(RT-11850) was issued on November 15, 1983 while RT-11854 was issued on January 18, 1963.

Moreover, RT-11850 does not bear the number of the certificate of titles from which it was transferred whereas TCT No. RT-11854 is supposed to
have canceled T-8331 and which apparently conflicts with the allegation of the accused that he acquired these two parcels of land from Benigno T. Aseo
whose ownership was evidenced by TCT No. T-2474 and T-2475. If that were the case then, the said title number would have appeared on Exhibits 'A'
and 'B'.

Anent, the testimony of the accused that the certificate of title, the owner's duplicate of TCT No. RT-11850 and RT-11854 which he presented for
reconstitution bore the serial Nos. 603461 and 603462 it will be noted that he only presented xerox copies of the said titles without producing the
originals and during the investigation at the NBI as per report marked as Exhibits H and H-4 he never submitted the originals thereof. Whichever serial
numbers they bore, it appears that said title forms were falsified in view of the attestations of the Land Registration Commission that they were
never intended for the Register of Deeds of Cavite Province." (Italics supplied)[24]

Additionally, the Court observes that the titles presented by Maliwat for reconstitution were allegedly owner's duplicate reconstituted titles, since
the numbers were preceded by the letters RT. This fact, assuming it to be true, negates petitioner's allegation that these titles were obtained from the
Registry of Deeds by canceling Aseo's (the vendor's) titles which were not reconstituted titles. It also bears stressing that there must have been a petition
for reconstitution, whether judicial or administrative, before Maliwat could be issued said reconstituted titles.But no such petition was produced. From
Maliwat's testimony, he averred that he obtained the said titles when Aseo's titles were canceled by virtue of a deed of absolute sale between him and
Aseo.

The Court also observes that Exh. 1-A, which is TCT Nos. RT-11850 and Exh. 4-A which is TCT No. RT-11854 [25] were made to appear by accused
as reconstituted titles. Thus, whether or not what were issued to the accused bore SN 603461 and 603462 or SN 1403456 and 1403457 is of no
moment because both titles should never have been reconstituted titles in the first place. More so, because the evidence [26] shows that Judicial Forms
with SN 603461 and 603462 were issued to the Registry of Deeds of Cotabato province in May 1963.Hence, the titles in Maliwat's possession cannot be
genuine.

The Court further notes that the signatures of Escolastico Cuevas in SN-1403456; SN-1403457 and SN-603461 and SN-603462 were not the
same and, as plain to the naked eye, very different from the specimen signature of Register of Deeds Escolastico Cuevas [27] executed before the NBI. It
is ineluctable, therefore, that these titles were falsified and the evidence points to Maliwat as the author of the falsification under par. 1 of Article 172 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

"When Judicial Forms 109-D, with Serial Nos. 1403456 and 1403457 were filled up, issued and made to appear in form, as Transfer Certificates of
Titles Nos. RT-11850 and RT-11854, respectively, both in the name of Feliciano Maliwat to show his ownership of Lots Nos. 5825 and 5826 which are
included in the Imus Estate Subdivision although they were not, falsification as defined in paragraph 7 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code was
committed.

Again, when in the same forms it was made to appear that they were signed and issued by Register of Deeds Escolastico Cuevas, although in
truth and in fact he has neither signed, issued nor filled up the same, falsification penalized under paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the same Article of the
Revised Penal Code has also been committed.

The fact that no proof was introduced to prove or show as to who committed the falsification abovementioned, does not exempt or exculpate the
herein accused-appellant from liability.The accused-appellant is the person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the documents in question as
such, 'it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsifications.' (Sarep vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 440; 449).[28]

The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and
therefore guilty of falsification.[29]

If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, -the clear
presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.[30]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. Nos. 0942829 dated 29 November 1991, which
upholds the amended decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dated 28 June 1988 in Criminal Cases Nos. 158-77 and 159-77 is hereby
AFFIRMED en toto. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 42557. December 7, 1935.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO REODICA and SINFOROSO CORDERO, Defendants. LORENZO
REODICA, Appellant.

Claudio R. Sandoval for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Hilado for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT; MUNICIPAL PAYROLL. — Under the facts set out in the decision, Held: That the
appellant municipal treasurer is not guilty of the crime of falsification of a payroll which was presented to him by the municipal president already signed
and approved by the latter, with the certification that the services of the officers therein mentioned were in fact rendered. In view of the leave granted to
S. C., for the purposes of the-payment of his salary, this amounted to his having rendered services for the period of the leave.

2. ID.; ID.; ALTERATIONS NOT AFFECTING THE DOCUMENT. — Alterations made in a public document not affecting either the veracity thereof or its
effects, do not constitute the crime of falsification. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 25, 1885, and June 21, 1886.)

DECISION

AVANCEÑA, C.J. :

The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Palawan, for the falsification of a public document, to an indeterminate penalty of from two
years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum.

About the month of July, 1931, the appellant was municipal treasurer of Bacuit, Province of Palawan. The information alleges that he falsified the
municipal payroll corresponding to that month by making it appear therein that one, Sinforoso cordero, rendered services as municipal secretary from
July 23 to July 31, which was not true, for said sinforoso Cordero was absent from the municipality of Bacuit from July 23, 1931, and did not return until
1933.
The evidence discloses that this municipal payroll was submitted to the appellant by the municipal president, already prepared, together with a letter
(Exhibit 3) authorizing him to pay Sinforoso Cordero’s salary for the second half month, and other documents showing that said sinforoso Cordero was
granted a leave of eight days from July 23 to July 31. When this payroll was received by the appellant on July 23, it was already signed and payment
thereof approved by the president, with the latter’s certification that the services therein mentioned were rendered.

This being the case, the appellant is not guilty of the falsification of this payroll, as alleged in the information, because the president and not he is the
one who certifies that the services of the officers mentioned therein were in fact rendered.

However, in view of the leave granted to Sinforoso Cordero from July 23 to July 31, for the purposes of the payment of his salary, this amounted to his
having rendered services during this period.

While in the payroll that he paid Sinforoso Cordero’s salary on July 31, 1931, it does not allege, however, that this was not true, and although it appears
that the appellant made this payment on July 23, he was not charged with falsification in this sense. At any rate, Sinforoso Cordero having been in fact
paid, it was immaterial whether this was done on July 23 or July 31.

Such alterations, even granting that the appellant was responsible therefor, do not affect either the veracity of the document or the effects thereof, and
do not constitute the crime of falsification. (Decisions of the Supreme court of Spain of February 25, 1885, and June 21, 1886.)

For the foregoing considerations, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-67472 July 3, 1987

DARIO CABIGAS Y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

PARAS, J.:

Under separate informations both dated September 20, 1982, the Office of the Tanodbayan charges Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y
Lopez on two (2) counts, with the crime of Falsification of Official Documents allegedly committed in the following manner:

(1) Criminal Case No. 6529

That on or about March 29, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dario
Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, both public officers being then employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving
Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or controlled corporation, conspiring
together, taking advantage of their official position and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their Office, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify ... Securities Delivery Receipt dated March 9, 1982 ... evidencing, among others, receipt by them in
their official capacity of Treasury Bills bearing Serial No. A-000064 up to A000082 of the 795th series, by then and there making alterations
and/or intercalations thereon to the effect that only treasury bills bearing SN-A-000064 to A-000076 were received by them on March 9, 1982,
for the purpose of hiding or concealing the loss while in their custody of six (6) treasury bills bearing SN-A-000077 to A-000082 of the 795th
series, thereby changing the meaning of said Securities Delivery Receipt.

(2) Criminal Case No. 6938

That on or about March 30, 1982 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dario
Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, both public officers, being then employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving
Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or controlled corporation, conspiring
together, and taking advantage of their official positions and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify the Daily Report of Securities/Documents under custody dated March 30, 1982, which is an official
document evidencing the securities transactions and/or operations of the Makati Branch of the aforenamed bank, and which it was their official
duty to prepare and submit to their superiors, by then and there indicating in said document, for the purpose of hiding the loss or
disappearance while in their custody of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series, with face value of P500,000.00 each, that the beginning
balance of securities under their custody as to volume was 1,533 pieces, when, the ending balance as to volume in the previous day's report
was 1,539 pieces and that the beginning balance as to face value in the previous day's report was P610,095,000.00 and thereafter falsely
stating in the footnote of the same document that the reduction was due to "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" the
truth being that the six (6) pieces of treasury bills with aggregate face value of P3,000,000.00 were not erroneously entered in either the
Securities Delivery Receipt or the Daily Report of Securities /Documents under Custody, both dated March 9, 1982, but were discovered to
have been missing after an inventory conducted by accused on March 20, 1982, thereby making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts
in violation of par. 4 of Articles 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

After arraignment and trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in both cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In Criminal Case No. 6529 ACQUITTING the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio and
ordering their bail bonds in the said case cancelled.

2. In Criminal Case No. 6938:

 a) Finding the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Falsification of a
Public or Official Document defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code without any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances; and applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

b) ACQUITTING accused Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio, an ordering his bail bond cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

The instant petition is an appeal, interposed by herein petitioner Dario Cabigas y Cacho from the foregoing decision in Criminal Case No.
6938.

The following pertinent facts are not disputed: Petitioner Dario Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Securities Section of the Land Bank
of the Philippines assigned to its branch at Makati, Metro Manila. Assisting him in his work is Benedicto Reynes, the securities receiving clerk.
The Fund Management Department (FMD) of the Land Bank of the Philippines is engaged in money market and securities trading
transactions. The securities which are in the form of treasury notes and bills are in turn deposited with the Securities Section of the Land Bank
of the Philippines, Makati Branch.

On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management Department, delivered to the Securities Section, Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines,
for safekeeping, 112 pieces of treasury notes and treasury bills worth P46,000,000.00 and for which a copy of the Securities Delivery Receipt
(SDR) Exh. D, was issued to the Fund Management Dept. while the original of the same was retained by the Securities Section. Included in
the securities received on March 9, 1982 are 19 pieces of treasury bills with Serial Nos. A-000064 to A-000082, 795th series, in the
denomination of P500,000.00 each, or a total amount of P9,500,000.00. After receiving the securities, the accused would prepare the Daily
Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) evidencing the securities transactions and operations of the Makati Branch of the
Land Bank of the Philippines. This has been the routine procedure being adopted by the accused in the performance of his duty as a Security
Custodian.

On March 29, 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasury notes and bills deposited with them, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss
of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series with a total value of P3,000,000.00. Upon verification that Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) dated
March 9, 1982, Exhibit C, was the source document of the missing securities which were delivered to them for safekeeping, accused Reynes
crossed out with a red ink in the said document the last two digits "82" and the addition after them of the figure "76" on the serial numbers A-
000064 to A-000082 of the 19 treasury bills of the 795th series with a total maturity value of P9,500,000.00. Then at the bottom of the SDR
Cabigas placed the notation "For adjustment" and below it the date "3/29/82." Then upon Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to
their branch manager, Aurora Pigram When the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 was prepared, the number of treasury bills of the 795th series
stood at 1,539 pieces with a total face value of P610,095,000.00.

The following day, Reynes prepared a draft report for March 30, 1982 by Carrying forward the ending balance of the treasury bills of the 795th
series reflected in the DR SDUC dated March 29, 1982. However, instead of following the draft prepared by Reynes, Cabigas prepared his
own report-DR SDUC (Exh. "G ") dated March 30, 1982 wherein he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills of the 795th series with a total
amount of P607,095,000.00 which the latter claimed to be the number of securities of the 795th series in his possession at the time of the
preparation of said report. At the bottom of DR SDUC (Exh. "G") Cabigas place the notation "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated
March 9, 1982" as legend of the asterisk (*) sign which appears after the figure "1,533."

On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central Bank of the Philippines a treasury bill of the 795th
series with Serial No. A-000082 in the amount of P500,000.00. Upon investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered that the Land Bank of the
Philippines Makati Branch Manager, Aurora Pigram was the one who negotiated the said treasury bill with the Gainsbo Commodities. Further
investigation revealed that the five (5) missing treasury bills with series numbers A-000077 to A-000081 were negotiated by Pigram with the
Home Savings Bank to secure a loan. The Land Bank immediately sought the assistance of the NBI in investigating the case. On May 24,
1982, Cabigas and Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. After the investigation, Cabigas and Reynes were arrested for having allegedly
conspired together in falsifying the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) dated March 9, 1982 (Exh. "C") and the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents under custody (DR SDUC) Exh. G dated March 30, 1982 and for which the corresponding informations were filed with
the Sandiganbayan. Both accused were acquitted in Criminal Case No. 6529. However, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho was convicted in
Criminal Case No. 6938, while his co-accused was acquitted therein.

In convicting accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho, the Sandiganbayan stated in its now assailed Decision that

In the case of Exhibit "G", the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) for March 30, 1982, the alleged
falsification consists of the following entries (figures) pertaining to treasury bills: "1,533", "607,095,000.00", "1,533 and
607,095,000.00 "marked on the document as Exhibit G-1, and the legend of the asterisk (*) sign at the bottom portion reading,
"Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" marked as Exhibit G-2. The numbers "1,533" and "607,095,000.00"
represent the volume and the total face/maturity value, respectively, of the treasury bills supposedly in the custody of the Securities
Section as of March 30, 1982. Those entries were falsifications, the prosecution maintains, because the correct number of treasury
bills deposited with the Securities Section as of that date was 1,539 valued at P610,095,000.00; that the said figures were altered to
"1,533 and 607,095,000.00," respectively, to conceal the loss or disappearance of 6 treasury bills worth P3,000,000.00, and that the
footnote at the bottom portion of the document (Exh. G-2) was written to attribute the reduction in the number of treasury bills from
"1,539" to "1,533" to mistake or error in the entries in the Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C).

The discrepancy in the figures is indeed apparent. In the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 (Exh. F), the ending balance on the number
of treasury bills at the close of office hours on that day was 1,539 pieces with a total face/maturity value of P610,095,000.00 (Exh. F-
1). Accordingly, the beginning balance on the number of the same treasury bills on the following day, March 30, 1982, must also be
 1,539 pieces with a total face/Maturity value of P610,095,000.00. But as it was made to appear in the DR SDUC for March 30, 1982
(Exhs. G and G-1), the beginning and ending balances on the number and value of treasury bills for that date were 1,533 pieces and
P607,095,000.00 maturity value.1avvphi1

The question now is, who caused the alterations and what was caused the alteration and what was the purpose behind them.

xxx xxx xxx

By changing the original figures in the draft of the DR SDUC from "1,539" and "610" to "1,533" and "607" respectively, and causing
Reynes to type the final copy of the DR SDUC on the basis of the corrected draft Cabigas caused the document to show that the
treasury bills in their custody as of March 30, 1982 were 1,533 pieces with a total face/maturity value of P607,095,000.00. By
placing, likewise, an asterisk (*) sign after the figure "1,533" and writing the words "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated
3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk (*) sign, Cabigas caused to make it appear that the discrepancy of 6 treasury bills valued at
P3,000,000.00 was due to error in the entries in the Securities Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982(Exh. C). Considering that the said
SDR of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C) did not contain any error but reflected the number of securities received by them on that day, it is
obvious that Cabigas made the alterations in Exhibit G and the misleading footnote (Exh. G-2) in order to suppress, hide or conceal
the fact that the 6 treasury bills comprising the discrepancy were lost while in their custody.

The alterations amounted to falsification of Exhibit G, a public or official document, under paragraph No. 4, Article 171, of the
Revised Penal Code, by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. As Securities Custodian, Cabigas was under obligation
to disclose in the said document the correct number and total maturity value of the securities under his official custody as of March
30, 1982.

It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par. No. 4 of Article 171, which reads-"by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts,"-the following elements must concur-

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;

(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and

(d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.

Herein petitioner contends that the foregoing elements are not present in the case at bar. The correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533
pieces to conform to the actual number of treasury under custody is not falsification because it was made to speak the truth (US vs. Mateo, 25
Phil. 324). The placing of an asterisk (*) sign after the figure "1,533" and writing the words, "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated
3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk sign, contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, was not effected to hide or conceal the fact that the
missing 6 treasury bills were lost. It would be far more difficult to detect or discover the loss if there was no asterisk or footnote in the DR
SDUC Exh. G. In fact, the evidence discloses that immediately upon discovery of the loss on March 29, 1982, petitioner reported the matter to
his immediate supervisor, Estela L. Espiritu and Branch Manager of the Securities Section, Aurora Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of
motive on the part of petitioner to conceal the said loss.

Petitioner further argues that the Daily Report on Securities/Documents under Custody (DR SDUC) is a form purely devised and adopted by
him. This form was never required, neither was it introduced nor prescribed by the Land Bank. Petitioner, therefore, was not under "legal
obligation" to disclose in the DR SDUC or SDR, the correct number and total maturity value of the securities under their official custody as of a
given date. It is purely optional on the part of petitioner to use the said forms.

The Honorable Solicitor General recommends that the accused be acquitted because —

There is nothing to show the DR SDUC dated March 30, 1982, Exh. G, for the alleged falsification of which petitioner was convicted in
Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the submission of which was or is required by law. In the petition for review, petitioner points out that as
testified by him the form was not an official form of the Land Bank. The form was his own initiative adopted "for our own convenience and also
for reference purposes." Petitioner therefore, was not under legal obligation to disclose or reveal the truth by said DR SDUC. In the absence of
such obligation and of the alleged wrongful intent, defendant cannot be legally convicted of the crime of falsification of public document with
which he is charged. (People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333).

WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 6938 is hereby REVERSED and another one
rendered ACQUITTING the petitioner, Dario Cabigas y Cacho.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON and defendant-appellant.

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,

vs.
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *

Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.

Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:

In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of
Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the
provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of
P57,048.23.

The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred
is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative.

The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein
that the creditor vouches that the expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably
because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects.

Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is signed by the provincial engineer.

Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds being available therefore." This is signed by the
provincial treasurer.

Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969, reads:

I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-
seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.

This is signed by the auditor.

Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the
amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two
part of the voucher.

Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was
signed according to the prosecution by Juan Samson, a point which is disputed by him):

Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of Pangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven
pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in full payment of the above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by Check
No. .................................

CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON

According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer.
By Juan Samson."

Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences the payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction
Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-Tayug road
in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference to invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.

The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:

(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company
dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.

(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to the provincial government

(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher (RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A),
covering the same lumber and hardware ma the signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P.
Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's
office. These four office denied that their signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures.

(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: For and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B.
Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.

(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18, 1969, containing a description and the prices of the lumber
and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company's invoice No. 3327
was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied that his alleged signature on Exhibit B is his signature.

(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged. Those documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February
10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of lumber allegedly
purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a district forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and
E are his signatures.

(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature on the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).

The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.

Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co.
for lumber and hardware materials supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the following:

(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81 for number and hardware materials allegedly
used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).

(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or lumber and hardware materials allegedly used
in the repair of the Panganiban bridge at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)

(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used
in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).

(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used
in the repair of the Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).

(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used
in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).

As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their signatures in the said five vouchers are not their
genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the papers supporting
the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting papers could not be presented in evidence.

Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified that the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in
the five vouchers were never delivered by his company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were
cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges were fictitious.

The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and hardware materials. The receipts evidencing
payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the serial
numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with the provincial government.

Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with
several firms doing business with the provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He represented that
firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those
provincial officials and the employees of their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).

The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita
Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).

Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a laborer in that office who performed the chore of
recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upper lefthand
corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had
presented the said papers to him, Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing and for
the latter's signature (Exh. WW).

From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).

Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson
went to the provincial treasurer's office where the amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as
representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that
date) as shown on the face of the vouchers.

The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of
Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial office
concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.

Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered
thereby as representative of the lumber and hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's office
(Exh. 6-12 — Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine.

In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with malversation through falsification in three docketed as
follows:

1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-
33252.

2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871 dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for
the respective amounts of P5,187.28, P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-33253.

3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29, 1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-
33254.

After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty of malversation through falsification of public or
official documents imposing each of the following penalties:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to
eighteen years, two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to indemnify
solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial
government of Pangasinan in the same amount; and

(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to
eighteen year two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to indemnify
solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount.

Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.

Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death extinguished his criminal liability remained. The
resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's appeal read s follows:

The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction rendered against him
by the lower court became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the personal or
imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo
Penal, 4th Ed., 565).

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final
judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation
through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct
from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court).
 The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance,
the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S.
vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him,
thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an order of
attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific
assignment of error affecting the civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this
Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration
and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil
action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife
and ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased).

The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto the following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of
Licerio P. Sendaydiego.

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate
would be liable for which his estate would be liable.

Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error,
wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no complex crime of
malversation through falsification committed by negligence.

In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case
thereby allegledly subjecting the accused to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest.

Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution of the case from the preliminary investigation, which
started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of the trial on July 29, 1970.

At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquired whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial
board to act as private prosecutor in representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there was a board
resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.

The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he had authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor
(4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).

Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order of
June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of Criminal Case No. 23350).

After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three
informations against the accused all dated November 4, 1969.

At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for
the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to our (the fiscal's) control
and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).

At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to examine the prosecution witnesses under his
supervision and control The trial court granted the motion (155 tsn).

The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal were present together with the private prosecutor.

Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under
the direction and control of the fiscal" and that "the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec. 1683,
Revised Administrative Code).

The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment,
bias and political interest which attended the proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality. The
evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of the documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the
decisive factor on which the trial court anchored the judgment of conviction.

Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the propriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as
will be shown later, reclusion perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex.
The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of malversation through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers, evinced "malice or
fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.

Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the
usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure
because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with the provincial treasurer
and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had already signed the voucher (54 tsn
July 3, 1969).

Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court erred in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers
before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial (75 tsn July 3,
1969).

The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the amounts covered thereby should be paid in cash. That
indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1" placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The bookkeeper was in.
instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he (Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment
should be made in cas. There were instances when the treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson.

The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the cashier was summoned to make the cash payments
(11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's office when that
was a ministerial chore of the cashier.

The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to
receive the payments. The space in the vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were received, was blank.
The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to require the exhibition of Samson's residence certificate.

Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried
Construction Supply Co., if the payments had been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would have returned them to the
treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any payments at all. The trial court said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's
collusion with Samson.

Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the
amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the assistant
provincial treasurer.

The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the payments were made. However, Ulanday died before the
preliminary investigation was started. On May 27, 1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial , stating that he paid to
Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. 13).

Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the treasurers inner office because his table was near the main door
of the treasurers office or was about fifteen meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers office because the
cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier came out of the treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13
tsn).

Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation is a crime which can be committed by means
of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same). This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by the
prosecution show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned vouchers.

The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the auditor, then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter
of course. We see no merit in that contention because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its evidence against the
auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor based his
defense on the undeniable fact that the treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon by the
auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditor apparently assumed to have been made in good faith when in
truth it was made in bad faith.

We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of
Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the amounts
malversed was duly substantial.

Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the expert testimony that his
signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on
circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.

As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and
as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had conducted the preliminary investigation.

Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary
investigation, was the one who tried the case and convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had
already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying
the case after it had found probable cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The rule assumes that
the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case on the merits.

We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the
preliminary investigation.

The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and then tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation
where an inferior court conducts a preliminary investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating the preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to
remand the case to the Court of First Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil. 350;
Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption is that the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained
bias or undue prejudice.

Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that
his signatures on the vouchers are not his signatures.

Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of Samson have fundamental differences. The expert
concluded that the questioned signatures and the exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20).

After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in
declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there are radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures.

But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in implying that Samson had no hand in the writing
thereof.

The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in his residence certificates, income tax returns and the
genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled.

On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial government are in angular form; his surname is not
encircled, and the questioned signatures terminate in angular and horizontal strokes.

Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the
signature which is different from his signature in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the Carried
Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a
person may have two forms of signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970).

Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and when necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting
and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).

Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).

Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the vouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn
July 16, 1970).

The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-
carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He
actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the
presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection
with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49
Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).

In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the
forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).

Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government and another form of signatures of his valid
transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification in the first
voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to

Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers, Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).

As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the trial court made absolutely no finding of any supposed
conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, is not correct.
We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows
that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds of the
vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's office (p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial
court said that the fact that Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).

Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of the vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding
on that point is based on very strong circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers).

Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under the six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He
asserts that the six vouchers are genuine (although he contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no proof that the amounts
covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).

These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the
alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).

And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carried Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned
over to the company the proceeds of the six vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from Sendaydiego. The six vouchers
appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of construction materials.

Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six
vouchers that he received from Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.

The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based on a shaky foundation or is predicated on
circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct.

Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures
of Samson and the officials in the provincial engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had approved the vouchers. The
tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier,
Carried Construction Co.

On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received the said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's
office.

These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the
voucehrs and followed up their processing in the offices of the provicial government the construction materials described in the six vouchers and denied
having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.

The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's
pretension of having acted in good faith or having committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.

The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation
by means of the six vouchers which have some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake.

Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through falsification of public documents were committed in this
case. That assumption is wrong.

The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and malversation were committed. These are not cases
where the execution of a single act constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit malversation.

In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the
malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671; People vs.
Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).

In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated
April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts
covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the
said street project and the persons mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor.

It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex crime because the falsifications were not necessary
means for the co on of the malversations. Each falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished
separately.

The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct penalties were imposed.

In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it
without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.

The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-
Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).

And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a
co-principal in each of the said twelve offenses.

As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession of the forged vouchers and he used them in order
to receive public monies from the provincial treasurer.

He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court
correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation (People vs.
Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).

Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of parricide or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not
guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3, article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).

Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.

For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty
provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayorminimum and medium.

For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty
provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.

For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided in paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion
temporal medium and maximum.

In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the imprisonment penalty.

In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no modifying circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal
Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate sentence.

WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of malversation.

In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties:

For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison
correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccionalmedium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos.

For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of
P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-33252).

For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of
P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254).

For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years
of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify
the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9)
years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5)
years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify
the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years
of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify
the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed
(People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).

The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs.
Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil. 58).

The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23.

Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 5426 & 5427. March 7, 1910. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINO SUMANGIL, Defendant-Appellant.

Isauro Gabaldon, for Appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS; EVIDENCE; PENALTY. — Held, That the evidence of record in these two cases fully sustains the
conviction of the defendant for the crime of falsification of public documents, but attention of the Chief Executive is invited to the severe penalties
necessarily imposed under the provisions of the Penal Code.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

These are two separate proceedings against the same defendant for two separate offenses, in each of which the accused was convicted and sentenced
to fourteen years eight months and one day of cadena temporal, together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and in each of which separate
appeal was taken to this court.

For reasons of convenience, and especially on account of the recommendation of clemency hereinafter set out, the separate appeals in these cases are
taken up together and decided in a single opinion.

The information in case No. 5426 charges the defendant with the commission of the crime of falsification of a public document, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On or about the 16th day of May, of the year 1908, the said defendant, being the municipal treasurer of Cuyapo, maliciously and criminally abused his
office by issuing an official document as a voucher for certain expenses, in which was set forth a payment of P3.50 made to Tomas Daprosa for the
transportation, from Paniqui to Cuyapo, of certain boxes belonging to the municipality, when the sum actually paid was P0.60 and not that herein before
stated, making such false statement of facts for the purpose of appropriating the balance. The act was committed in the municipality of Cuyapo, Province
of Nueva Ecija, P. I., in violation of the law."cralaw virtua1aw library

The information in case No. 5427 charges the defendant with the commission of the crime of falsification of a public document, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On or about the 19th day of may, of the year 1908, the said defendant, being the municipal treasurer of Cuyapo, maliciously and criminally abused his
office by issuing an official voucher for expenses in which was set forth a payment of P1.50 made to Vicente Defiesta, for the transportation of three
cases of oil belonging to the municipality from Paniqui to Cuyapo, this not being the true amount paid, which was P0.50, making such false statement of
facts for the purpose of appropriating the balance. The act took place in the municipality of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands, contrary
to law."cralaw virtua1aw library

The evidence of record in both cases fully sustains the findings of fact by the trial court and established the guilt of the defendant of the crime with which
he was charged in each case beyond the peradventure of doubt. We find no error in the proceedings in either case prejudicial to the substantial interests
of the accused, and the judgments of conviction and the sentences imposed in both cases should, therefore, be affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the Appellant.

Under the provisions of article 2 of the Penal Code, and in view of what seems to us to be the excessive penalty ("taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the crime" of which defendant was convicted in each case), which it was the duty of the court below, under strict
application of the provisions of the code, to imposed in both cases, and which it now becomes our duty to affirm, we deem it proper to invite the attention
of the Chief Executive to the nature and character of the two separate offenses committed by the accused and the severe penalties necessarily imposed
upon him upon conviction thereof, for such action as shall be deemed proper in the premises. So ordered.

G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989

MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J.:

The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of falsification of public document
under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan,
Isabela reads as follows:

That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable
court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such Municipal Mayor
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and, sign a false document, knowing it to be false, to wit. An official communication to the
Civil Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is required by law in order to support the appointment of a certain Jesusa B. Carreon to the
position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and making it appear in said document that there
was such a position existing and that funds therefore were available. When in truth and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic), there was no such
position or item and no funds were available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76, nor was there any special ordinance
creating said position and appropriating the necessary funds therefor.

xxx

[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) are as follows:

It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused
Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and her
friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was any vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she went to see
the accused in his house.

The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter,
however, was not there. Even so, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day and that she should be included in the budget.
The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Calo Battung the treasurer agreed that she could report for work.

One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to the accused, she was told to go
back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her appointment papers.

She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the accused.

xxx

Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds CS Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the
accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil
Service, Manila (Exh. "C").

xxx

Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same day. Her monthly salary was P 120.00. She
rendered services for the months of July, August, September, October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-5"). She was not,
however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In
November 1975, she went to see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the treasurer who told her that there was no
money. because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her
unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment
papers. hereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against the accused. Her complaint is addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy
(Exhibit "G" and "G-1").

It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal
Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and "H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was
deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for
the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budget was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan.
In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was no new item or appropriation for the
position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the office of the Municipal Council appearing
in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 1974- 1975, was filled up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed
Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla
for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4"). As early
as June 28, 1974, the same position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K" and "K-l").

xxx

[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]

After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document as charged in the
information, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00)
PESOS.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and is hereby therefore affirmed. Costs against the accused-
appellant.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]

Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends that the
respondent court has decided a question of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting
him of the crime of falsification despite the following

A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, shows the absence of criminal intent on the part of the
accused.

B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor when he made the allegedly falsified certification.

C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law.

D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded with the trial in his absence despite a pending petition for
change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p. 13.]

Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.

The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any public officer, employee or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a
narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur:

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.

All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela,
made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the appointment of complainant
Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public official in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi,
34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed received the document
issued by petitioner. Since the certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the government (specifically
the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S.
v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document
was committed when the petitioner stated that funds were available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in
reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor.

Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of law is not meritorious. The respondent
court, upholding the Solicitor General's arguments, correctly ruled as follows:
Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination of facts stated but by the
application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law Dict., p. 362].

From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that 'funds for the position are available' does not require the
application of the artificial rules of law. To certify that funds are available for the position what one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla
of personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists and funds are allocated therefor.

In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position and funds therefor referred to in the certification, the
appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the records, certified falsely that "funds for the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41).

It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and
therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh.
"B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to
the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is no
appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in his certification utterly
false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in what is
declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the first and third
requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.

The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and regulations, specifically the Guidelines in the Preparation of
Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be
signed by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification which is
designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said
certification which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the position being filled up.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document is a public
document. This has already been authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The Court in the
aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of
falsification of public document. The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of public and private documents has been stated by the
Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present
the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47
Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the existence of
any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra].

Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on his part must be denied. While
this Court has declared good faith as a valid defense to falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v.
San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist
in the case at bar.

Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of the municipal council [Section
2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised
Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of
Angadanan, Isabela which was the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that under the
Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal secretary. His knowledge of
these facts is shown by the fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and
Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a certification of the
availability of funds for the questioned position since at the time he issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already
commenced and no new ordinance creating the new position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the municipal council.

In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely false certification as to the availability
of funds for the subject position. The law considers his act criminal since it amounts to an untruthful statement in a narration of facts in a public
document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who
executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption that
petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted.

Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in falsifying the document should likewise be rejected. This
essential element of falsification of a public document by public officer requires that the offender "abuse his office or use the influences prestige or
ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present
when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in
the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was
charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the case in the absence of the petitioner
despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A careful and thorough review of the record reveals that
petitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court, in view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the defense to
present its evidence although the prosecution had rested its case as early as December 7, 1978. [See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.]

It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v.
Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid down this criterion to determine whether an
accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded due process of law:
 . . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law,
and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded
within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21,
1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946); Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated, unjustifiable
failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the prosecution. For under
such circumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court] and
his right to adduce evidence on his behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]

It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the date set for the hearing of the petitioner's urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings in the trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also failed to appear [See Order dated January 18,
1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trial court that he was -
withdrawing as counsel for his client for the reason that he has lost contact with the latter who already went abroad [See Original Records, p. 435].
Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented by the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.

Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and Julio Llorente for appellant Romualdez.
Vicente J. Francisco and Claro M. Recto for appellant Mabunay.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila:

Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of falsification of public and official documents, committed, according to the
information, as follows:

That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the accused Estela Romualdez, who, by
appointment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, was then taking part in the discharge of public functions as secretary to
the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court, and by reason of said duty had under her care the
compositions and other papers and documents having reference to the examinations for the admission of candidates to the bar held
in the months of August and September, 1926, which were then kept in the archives of the said court, confabulating with her
coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting in common accord with him, who was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar
Examinations, willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from the said archives of the Supreme Court certain public and official
documents, to wit: the compositions, which were written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis Mabunay in that examination.
Once in possession of the same, the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay, conspiring together and acting in common
accord, willfully, illegally, and criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to
the composition in Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-four
(64%); and also erased the grade of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario to the
composition in Civil Law written and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote seventy-three (73%), and by means
of these alterations the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able to change the relative merits of those
compositions, thereby attributing to the said correctors, statements and declarations contrary to what they really made, and the
accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of falsifications made by them in the aforesaid public and
official documents in making it appear that Luis Mabunay obtained the general average required by the rules of the Supreme Court,
and in securing the latter's admission to the practice of law, as in fact he was admitted, to the great prejudice of the public.

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.

Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of evidence, oral and documentary, the presentation of which consumed
considerable of the court's time.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not disputed either by the prosecution or by the defense:

The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation of Justice Norberto Romualdez of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands as his secretary on November 1, 1921, and continued as such until September 15, 1928.
The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to the bar examinations held in 1926.

The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed to that office on July 11, 1912, acts every year as the secretary ex
oficio of the examination committee for admission to the bar.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee for admission
to the bar in the year 1926, and upon recommendation of Clerk Vicente Albert, he appointed the following as members of the examination
committee, with their respective subjects: Attorney Francisco Ortigas, Civil Law; Judge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law; Attorney
Godofredo Reyes, Criminal Law; Judge Jose Abreu, Remedial Law; Attorney C. A. DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-General Delfin Jaranilla,
Political Law; and Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.

Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a committee of correctors was appointed, composed of the following attorneys:
Amado del Rosario, Assistant Director of Civil Service, and Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as correctors in Civil Law;
Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson, and Fulgencio Vega, Secretary of Justice Malcolm, as correctors in Mercantile Law; Cecilio
Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal, and Remo, of the Bureau of Audits, as correctors in Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of Audits and
Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of the Executive Bureau, and the accused Estela Romualdez,
as correctors in Political Law; Rufino Luna, of the Executive Bureau, and Zoilo Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as correctors in International
Law; and Anatalio Mañalac, of the Bureau of Lands, and Jeronimo Samson as correctors in Legal Ethics. On account of illness, Mr. Remo was
substituted by Jeronimo Samson as corrector in Penal Law. All said correctors were designated by clerk of court Albert with the approval of the
chairman of the examination committee.

The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to the preparation of the questions in their respective subjects and of a
memorandum or note of the articles, legal provisions and jurisprudence showing the sources from which the questions were taken. The work
of reviewing and grading the compositions was entrusted to the correctors designated for each subject. Each corrector was furnished with this
note or memorandum, and a set of rules, patterned after those of the Civil Service, was prepared by corrector Amado del Rosario to guide the
correctors in grading the examination papers.

The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on the subject assigned to them, noting the grades given to each
answer, not on the composition, but in a separate note book, which were later checked with the grades given by the other corrector in the
same subject, for the purpose of determining the general average to be given to the composition.

The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar examination for the year 1926 was submitted, under date of March 2,
1927, to the Supreme Court and was published on the fifth of said month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there appeared the
name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of 75%. The grades of Mabunay in each subject, according to the list Exhibit C-2,
which was prepared after the publication of the result of the examination, are: 73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal Law, 76 in
Political Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises. However, a later revision of the
composition of Luis Mabunay showed that the grades of seventy-three (73 in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial Law
(Exhibit B-2) had been written on the first page of said compositions after striking out the grades of sixty-three (63) therefore given to the
composition in Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fifty-eight (58) theretofore given to the composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigation
of this irregularity by the City Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the information in this case.

Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez

Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence tending to show the identity of the person who altered the grades
appearing on the first pages of the compositions Exhibits-B-1 and B-2, the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously and with the conformity
of her attorneys made of record an admission as follows (p. 395, s. n.):

"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73% inclosed in parenthesis are in my regular handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2
the words sixty-four and the figures 64% inclosed in parenthesis appearing in said composition are also in my regular handwriting."

Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades

In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that she was the person who wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-
2 the words and figures alleged to have been falsified, it now appears that the burden of establishing the authority under which said changes
and alterations were made is on the accused. On this point the evidence for the defense tended to show that the accused Estela Romualdez,
both in her capacity as private secretary of the chairman of the examination committee and as corrector and at the same time supervisor of the
correctors, was authorized by said chairman to revise the compositions already reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades
given by them.

Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he considered the accused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk Samson
as supervisors of the correctors; and explaining the powers of the former he said (page 721, s. n.):

"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her to understand that in order to do justice to the compositions, she
could review the compositions already graded by the other correctors; provided, I want to add, that the new revision was done in
order to do justice to the compositions and before the names of the candidates were known."

Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to the grades given by the corresponding correctors to compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness testified that said alterations were made within the limits of the powers he had given to said accused
(pages 723, 726, s. n.).
For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, said that the chairman of the examining committee,
gave her to understand that she "was authorized to correct any composition in any subject" in the bar examinations of the year 1926 and that
she had never corrected any composition after the name of the corresponding candidate was identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She denied
having known Luis Mabunay, and said that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case (page 783, s. n.).

Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney

The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused Estela Romualdez may be summarized in two following propositions:
1st — that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the examination committee, did not have authority to delegate to his secretary, the accused
Estela Romualdez, the power to revise compositions in subjects in which she was not a corrector and which had already been graded by the
other correctors, and much less the power to alter or change the grades given to and written on said compositions; 2nd — that granting that
the chairman of the examination committee had such authority, the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the same in the manner
prescribed by said chairman, namely, in order to do justice to the compositions and on the condition that the revision and the changes of
grades should be made before the names of the candidates, to whom the compositions belonged, were known.

In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains that Justice Romualdez was appointed by the Supreme Court as
chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, so that he would supervise the examinations in accordance with law and the
rules, and that precisely, in accordance with the rules the chairman can not by himself exercise the individual powers of the committee, among
which were the powers to review, and to change or alter the grades given to the compositions.

As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that the evidence adduced by the prosecution, specially the testimony of the
Deputy Clerk Samson, shows that the accused Estela Romualdez made the changes in the grades given by the correctors to compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis Mabunay, to whom she knew said compositions belonged, thus violating the
conditions imposed upon her by the chairman of the examination committee when she was given said authority.

As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains that the evidence for the prosecution shows that he was in
connivance with the accused Estela Romualdez in the alteration by the latter of his grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the purpose of
raising to 75% the general average of 72.8 which he had obtained.

Theory of the Defense

In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense argues that the power of supervision given by Justice Romualdez to his
secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, is not contrary to law, rules or precedents. This assertion is based on the testimony of said Justice
that the appointment of a committee of attorneys in accordance with section 2 of the rules had not been followed by the Supreme Court for a
number of years prior to 1926, and that when said court designated Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee without
designating the examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and conferred upon him ample powers to do what in his judgment was most in
line with justice and the law, and that no Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to determine the propriety or illegality of the procedure
employed by the chairman of the examination committee, or of the powers conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman
was responsible only to the Supreme Court for his acts.

The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not have known to whom compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at
the time of making the alteration of the grades appearing on the first pages thereof, because, according to the testimony of said accused,
corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of those who helped in the preparation of the list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes
containing the names and the identification numbers of the candidates were opened just one day before the publication of the result of the
examination, and that in order to finish this work and to place the names of the candidates on said list, they had to work continuously from 8
o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the evening on the day prior to the publication of the result of the examinations.

Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties

Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a witness for the defense, the court finds that the accused Estela Romualdez,
as secretary of the chairman of the examination committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the Supreme Court were considered by
said chairman not only as correctors in the subjects assigned to them but also as supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s. n.), both of them
with equal powers and authority so that neither could consider himself superior to the other (page 727, s. n.). It appears, however, that while
the chairman of the committee gave his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, to understand that she "was authorized to revise the
compositions already graded by the other correctors provided the new revisions were made for the purpose of doing justice to the
compositions and that the same were mad before the names of the candidates were known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the same
with respect to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo Samson, to whom he said nothing about this matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that the accused
Estela Romualdez had never informed the chairman of the committee about the corrections or alterations made by her in compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did the latter examine said compositions to determine whether or not their merits justified the changes so made,
and he only knew of said changes upon the filing of the information against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.). For her part, she made no
report to the chairman of the examination committee of any error or injustice committed by any corrector, and she only told him during the
progress of the work of grading the papers that they were being graded very strictly and that "she feared that some injustice might be
committed" (page 729, s. n.), and for that reason Justice Romualdez told his secretary, Estela Romualdez, that "should a case of the kind
come to her knowledge, she should take special notice of the same in order to do justice," that is to say, if any person should bring to her
attention any such case in which, in her opinion, some injustice had been committed, she was authorized to put things in order (page 781, s.
n.), and the revision in such cases was left to the judgment of his secretary (page 780, s. n.).

The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee upon his secretary,
Estela Romualdez, gave her so ample a discretionary power of supervision that in its exercise she should act independently, not only of the
correctors and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson, but also of the examination committee. Now, granting that Justice Romualdez, as a
chairman of the committee appointed by the Supreme Court to conduct the bar examinations of 1926, was authorized to confer such power of
supervision upon his secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner did she exercise that power when she made the changes in the
compositions in question?

The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission, made the alterations of the grades originally given by the correctors to
compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is the only person who could give an account of and explain the circumstances under which said
alterations were made. But said accused, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, was not able to explain how and under what circumstances
she made those alterations. When pressed by the fiscal during the cross-examination to state the circumstances under which she came
across those compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez said: "If I were to make any statement with reference to the
circumstances under which I came across these compositions, you would compel me to tell a lie, because I do not really remember" (page
823, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember why she did not put her initials under or at the side of those alterations she made on
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, limiting herself to say, when she saw the other compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and X-2) bearing her
initials which were exhibited to her by the fiscal, that she placed her initials on said compositions because she graded them as corrector, and
she did not put her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 because she revised them in her capacity as supervisor (pages 824- 832, s.
n.). She also said, that, as corrector, she had instructions to put her initials when writing the original grade on any composition, but as
supervisor "she was under no obligation" to put her initials (page 830, s. n.) and that the chairman of the examination committee "has not gone
into such minor details" (page 831, s. n.). Upon being questioned by the fiscal as to why she wrote the altered grade on composition Exhibit B-
2 on the same line and immediately before the initials of the correctors she said: "Because on that occasion it pleased me to do so" (page 836,
s. n.). Neither does the accused remember whether or not she exercised her supervisory authority with respect to the other five compositions
forming part of those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page 840, s. n.); and when asked by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increase
given by her to the grades originally given to said compositions had the effect of raising the general average of the compositions of the same
candidate to 75%, the accused answered that "the fiscal ought to know that in this life there are happy coincidences" (page 848, s. n.). With
these answers and others appearing in her testimony, the accused instead of giving a satisfactory explanation of her conduct, has
demonstrated that with the encouragement given by Justice Romualdez to the effect that the new revision of the compositions was left to her
discretion (page 780, s. n.) she assumed that the powers exercised by her in the bar examinations of 1926 were such that she could revise
any composition in any subject already graded and increase or decrease the grades given by the correctors; in other words, that she could, at
her pleasure, do or undo the work done by the correctors without the necessity of accounting to anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of keeping
a note or memorandum of the compositions so revised and the alteration of the grades.

The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in reviewing, in his capacity as chairman of the examination committee, the
compositions of the candidates who filed motions for reconsideration of the grades given them, after the publication of the result of the
examinations, performed his work with such diligence and zeal that he noted in a memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the grades given to
each answer of the candidate, but also the total grade obtained by the candidate in the revision, together with such other data which would
explain the increase of the grades of this or that candidate.

The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his secretary to understand that she had such unlimited powers, or that the
Supreme Court in designating said Justice as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to confer such
powers upon his secretary, because it is an undisputed fact that his designation was made so that he should conduct the examinations in
accordance with law and the rules.

But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the grades given by the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2
she acted in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her by the chairman of the examination committee, is there any ground in support of
her claim that she made those alterations only to do justice to the compositions, and without knowing the name of the candidate to whom they
belonged?

Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the prosecution, Juan Villaflor, which, according to the defense is not worthy of
credit because of the contradictions and inconsistencies therein noted, the record contains other evidence establishing certain facts from
which such knowledge can be inferred.

It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the compositions numbering over 8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in pencil.
This list was prepared with the intervention of the said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine Stevens, assisted by Catalina Pons, Juan Villaflor
and the accused Estela Romualdez. However, before the preparation of this list, sometime during the first day of February, 1927, the sealed
envelopes containing the identification numbers attached to each composition were opened. Said numbers were written either on the upper
part of each envelope or on the first page of the composition, and that work lasted several days (pages 162, 163, s. n.). In the list Exhibit C-1
the numbers of the candidates contained in the envelopes attached to the compositions were first written (page 166, s. n.), and then the
grades in each subject, followed by the general average (pages 71, 184, s. n.), leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page
166, s. n.). Deputy Clerk Samson wrote on an adding machine the grades in each composition as they were read out by one of the helpers,
and then the corresponding general average as computed by him (page 71, s. n.), and, at the same time, Josephine Stevens wrote said
grades in the space corresponding to each subject (page 188, s. n.). The roll of paper used by Deputy Clerk Samson on the adding machine
was presented as Exhibit C-6.

After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the general average of each candidate, who was theretofore known by his
identification number only, was prepared, the envelopes containing the names corresponding to the identification numbers written on said list
were taken from the safe of the office of the clerk, and the names of the candidates were inserted in said list by those who assisted in the
preparation thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.) among whom was the accused Estela Romualdez, who admitted, upon cross-examination, having
written many of the names appearing on several pages of said list (pages 859-861, s. n.). After said list Exhibit C-1 was prepared the
examination committee submitted to the Supreme Court a report recommending the admission to the bar and not only for those candidates
with a general average of 75% or more, but also of those who had obtained a general average of 70 or more but below 75%, and said
automatic increase was ordered noted on said list Exhibit C-1. However, this recommendation was not approved by the Supreme Court on the
ground that said automatic increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s. n.), and for that reason the clerk of court, Mr. Albert, instructed his deputy,
Mr. Samson, to prepare another list containing only the names of the candidates who had originally obtained a general average of 75% without
having obtained less than 60% in any subject, and in pursuance thereof the typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was prepared (page 77, s. n.), which
was approved by the Supreme Court and published on March 5, 1927. In this list Luis Mabunay is included with an average of 75%.
Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations the list Exhibit C-2 was prepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1 taking
the grades directly from the compositions; while one of the helpers read them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on the adding machine and
computed the general average of each candidate. The roll of paper used by Deputy Samson on this occasion was also presented and marked
as Exhibit C-7.

Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2, were kept in the office of Justice Romualdez and were only taken
out when the investigation of the irregularities in the examinations of 1926 was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in the course of that
investigation it was discovered that the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay, identified with number 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list Exhibit
C-1, which had been prepared simultaneously, did not agree, because, while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade in Civil Law of candidate
No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1 shows that the grade of the same candidate is 73; and while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade of
candidate No. 898 was 58 (in Remedial Law), his grade in the list Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in the same subject), a difference also being noted
between the general average of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit C-6, which is 72.8%, and his general average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75%
(pages 73, 74, s. n.). This discovery led to the revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in the examinations of 1926, which were united to
his personal record (Exhibit B), which showed that the grades given to, and written by the respective correctors on the compositions of said
candidate in Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered, and further, that the grades that appeared on said
compositions before the alterations were identical with those that appeared on the roll, Exhibit C-6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of said
Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the numbers 73, 64, and 75 in the columns corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and General
Average, respectively, were written after erasing with rubber what was there originally written. It may also be noted, upon an examination of
the alterations appearing on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, that the grades originally written by the correctors,
authenticated by their initials, had been stricken out in such a way that it is difficult to make out said original grades, leaving, however, intact,
the initials of the correctors.

From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and altered the grades written by the correctors on the first pages of
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to make it appear that said alterations had been made by the correctors themselves; second, that
said alterations were made after the grades written by the correctors had been noted on the adding machine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list
Exhibit C-1 which were prepared simultaneously; third, that after said alterations had been made, and in order that the grades so altered
should agree with the grades already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law were erased with rubber, and in
place thereof were written the grades now appearing in said compositions. The accused Estela Romualdez having admitted that she was the
author of such alterations, the only logical inference from her admission and the facts above set out, is that she was also the person who
erased not only the grades originally written by the correctors on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but also those appearing in the
columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law on the list Exhibit C-1, and the same person who wrote the grades now appearing in
said columns, and which agree with those written by her on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2. Now, if the accused Estela Romualdez erased
in the manner stated the grades originally written, and substituted for them the grades now appearing in said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-
2 as well as in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law in the list Exhibit C-1, it cannot be doubted that in making such
erasures and alterations she not only acted with the intent of concealing her identity, but she also knew the number and the name of the
candidate to whom said composition belonged, because at that time the numbers and the names of the candidates were already written on the
list Exhibit C-1, and that list was kept in the office of Justice Romualdez (page 83, s. n.), were she had complete and absolute control as
private secretary and supervisor of the examinations.

Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay

Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that one Luis Mabunay called up the accused Estela Romualdez on the
telephone a few days before the publication of the results of the examinations, there is, indeed, no direct proof in the record showing the
participation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is other evidence for the prosecution establishing certain facts which show strong
indications that he operated in the act before or at the time of its execution by his coaccused. It has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates who took the bar examinations in 1926; that the general average obtained by him,
according to the computation appearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of the adding machine and that originally written in the list Exhibit C-1 was
72.8%; that after the Supreme Court denied the recommendation of the examination committee that all grades from and between 70% and
75% be automatically raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the list of successful candidates which was published on March 5,
1927 (Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due to the increase of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2),
which was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades theretofore given by the correctors.

It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that she had no motive whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis
Mabunay, testified that she did not know him and that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case. However, in view
of her inability to explain why precisely the compositions of said Luis Mabunay had been benefited by the revision, and in view of the
admission of Justice Romualdez that the power to revise conferred upon Estela Romualdez could be exercised by her in the compositions
already graded by the correctors in all cases of injustice which came to her knowledge, or which might be brought to her attention (page 781,
s. n.), her testimony lacks foundation, because it is absurd to believe that her revision of the compositions of her coaccused Luis Mabunay
was due only and solely to a happy coincidence.

Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the evidence for the prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the
amount of P600 from his savings account in the Philippine Trust Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three days before the
publication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when correlated with the deposit of the sum of P400 made by the accused Estela
Romualdez in her current account (Exhibit H) with the Bank of the Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said March, 1927, may, perhaps,
give an explanation of the motive of said accused for increasing the grades of Mabunay with just the necessary points to reach the lowest
passing general average. It is also true that Estela Romualdez testified that said amount had been sent to her by her cousin named Prisca
Magpayo Redona from the province for the purchase of merchandise for sale at the latter's store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that
respect was not corroborated either by her said cousin, or by any other persons mentioned by her as the bearers of said amount, or by the
corresponding check or postal money order, as she had done when referring other deposits in the bank.

Conclusion

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the allegations of the information are sufficiently supported by the evidence and
that the accused, Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as principal and the latter as
 accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official documents with which they are charged and, therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing
Estela Romualdez, who was a Government employee at the time of the commission of the crime, to suffer, in accordance with article 300 of
the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, six years and one day of prision mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to
pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in view of the nature of the penalty, and also to suffer the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis Mabunay, who was a private individual with respect to said examination, to suffer,
under the provisions of article 301 as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code, the penalty of four months and
one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and each to pay one-half part of the costs.

The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the following assignments of error:

I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty of the crime of "falsification of public and official documents" and in
sentencing her to suffer imprisonment without due process of law, contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, entitled "An Act to
Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to the future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a
More Autonomous Government for those Islands".

II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela Romualdez, was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the
composition papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2 of the Government, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted testimony of Mr.
Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.

III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela Romualdez a fair and impartial trial.

The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court committed the following errors:

I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez with reference to his authority as chairman of the bar
examination committee of the year 1926, to confer upon the accused Estela Romualdez, the powers he in fact conferred upon her, in
connection with said examination.

II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez as to the fact that he, as chairman of the bar examination
committee of 1926, really and truly conferred upon the accused Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that examination.

III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the powers conferred upon her by the chairman of the bar
examination committee of 1926, within the limits fixed by said chairman, to wit: that the new revision and grading of the compositions be made
in order to do justice thereto, and before the names of the corresponding candidates were known.

IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez changed the general average and the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay
in Civil Law and Remedial law on the list Exhibit C-1.

V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits 26
and 27, containing the opinion of said lawyers as to the grades to which said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly entitled.

VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same powers exercised by the accused in the bar examination of 1926.

VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay
when she reviewed and regraded them, the court erred in concluding that said act constitutes the offense charged in the information.

VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, was not authorized by the Supreme Court to
confer upon Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that examination, the court erred in concluding that she altered the grades
of said compositions willfully and feloniously.

IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez intended to conceal her identity when she revised and regraded
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.

X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in exercising her powers as supervisor of the correctors in said bar
examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 only, in order to regrade them.

XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had
received from her coaccused Luis Mabunay the sum of P400.

XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense of falsification with which she is charged, the lower court erred in
concluding that Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.

In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for the appellants filed a joint memorandum on July 10, 1929. The Attorney-General
filed a brief on behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands and a reply to the memorandum for the defense.

The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez, was disqualified to sit in this case. Upon a consideration of the case
on its merits, four justices were in favor of affirming the decision of the trial court and the same number were in favor of acquitting the defendants. The
court being unable to reach a decision in the usual course, an attempt was made on February 11, 1930 to break the deadlock, as is evidenced by the
following resolution:

The court having under consideration again the case of People vs. Romualdez, et al., No. 31012, those participating being all the members of
the court, except Mr. Justice Romualdez, who was disqualified, it was moved that following precedents elsewhere, particularly in the United
States Supreme Court, to the effect that when there is an equal division in the court and there is no prospect of a change in the vote the
judgment appealed from stand affirmed, and in accordance with the action taken in the case of Nacionalista Party vs.Municipal Board of
Manila, No. 21265 — the judgment in the case at bar be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Avanceña and Messrs. Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and
Johns voted in favor of the motion. Messrs. Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Villa-Real voted against the motion. Mr. Justice Johnson
based his dissent on the peculiar statutory provisions in force in the Philippine Islands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.

The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case until the further order of the court.

On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case against him be considered separately and he be absolved from the complaint.
This motion was denied by the court. He renewed his motion on August 1, 1931. This motion was also denied on the ground that no severance had been
asked for in the lower court, and for the further reason that there was a prospect that the membership of the court would soon be increased.

The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to the death or retirement of three justices only six of the former members
remained. On June 23, 1932 Courtney Whitney as attorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case be set for a rehearing before the
court as newly constituted. This motion was granted. On July 2, 1932 he filed a motion for the dismissal of the information, alleging that because of the
inability of the court to reach a determination from the facts as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, she had been
denied her right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied.

After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed an additional memorandum, to which the Attorney-General filed a reply.

Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain that even if the lower court's findings of fact be justified by the evidence
of record, "they fail to sustain that any criminal offense, recognized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, has been committed." They contend that the
appointment of the committee of attorneys by Justice Romualdez to read and grade the examination papers was not warranted by law, and that
therefore the alteration by the defendant Estela Romualdez, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades in question did not
constitute a crime.

The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense, completely refutes this contention. He testified that the bar examining
committee was composed of two groups of attorneys: Those that were appointed to prepare the questions, and those that were appointed to grade the
papers. He further testified that the court was informed of the way in which the examination was conducted and that it approved thereof. There were
more than a thousand candidates and some eight thousand papers. According to the contention of appellant's attorneys only the seven attorneys
appointed to prepare the questions or the court itself could lawfully grade these papers. Such a contention is clearly untenable. The attorneys that
prepared the questions did not intervene in the grading of the papers, but they prepared a key to the questions, which served the other group of
attorneys, the readers or "correctors", as a guide in grading the papers. The intervention of the "correctors" was just as legal as that of the attorneys that
prepared the questions, and the intervention of the two groups of attorneys was perfectly regular and valid.

It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant Estela Romualdez altered were not public or official documents. That contention is
likewise without merit. As stated by her attorneys, the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore be
maintained with any show of reason that the papers submitted by the candidates in the course of the examination were not public and official
documents, or that the alteration, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades given to such papers by the "correctors" was not a
crime. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where this court refers to the falsification of his examination papers as "falsification of public documents";
People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where the conviction of Castro for the falsification of his examination papers was affirmed.)

In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its members each year make all the necessary arrangements for the bar
examination, the Chief Justice in 1926 designated Justice Romualdez for that purpose, and in pursuance thereof he appointed one group of attorneys to
prepare the questions and another group to grade the papers. If any of these attorneys were designated by the clerk of the court, it was with the advice
and consent and on the authority of Justice Romualdez.

The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal code in the ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical
meaning, and according to article 300 may be committed in the following eight ways:

1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.

2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.

3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them.

4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

5. By altering true dates.

6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.

7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or by including in
such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original.
 8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.

The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in the grades in such a way as to make it appear that the
"correctors" had participated therein, because she blotted out the grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials,
without indicating by her own initials that she had made the alterations. She in that way attributed to the "correctors" statements other than those in fact
made by them. Her only explanation of why she altered the grades in that way was that it pleased her to do so.

A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is referred to in the American Bar Association Journal for August, 1932, p.
497. A bill was presented in the Massachusetts Senate prohibiting the marking of the examination papers of applicants for admission to the bar by any
person not a member of the board of bar examiners. The Senate wished to know whether such a bill, if enacted, would be an unconstitutional
interference with the functions of the Judicial Department, and asked the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion. They replied
that such a law would be unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion they said: "If the judicial department decides that the marking of the written
examinations may be performed by competent persons not members of the board but acting under the direction of such members, that pertains directly
to the ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute of the judicial department and not an immaterial incident." It was also
stated that the plan of employing assistants to aid the bar examiners in marking the papers had been approved by the Supreme Judicial Court.

In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez maintains that the trial court erred in not finding that she was fully authorized to
make the alterations she in fact made on the examination papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted
testimony of Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.

In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the accused the authority which she claims to have received; and in the
second place, even if it be assumed that he gave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it in accordance with the terms thereof.

The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his secretary, Estela Romualdez, and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, who
were themselves "correctors" as supervisors of the other "correctors", and that he authorized Estela Romualdez to revise any grade to correct an
injustice, without consulting or notifying the other supervisor, Samson, or the "correctors' who had graded the paper, without requiring her to initial the
alteration, or to make any record thereof or any report to him or to anybody else.

Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination in accordance with the law and the Rules of Court. He himself had
no such authority as he is alleged to have given his secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his duties in accordance with the law, and it is
inconceivable that he would without any warrant of law give or attempt to give his secretary the unlimited authority which she claims to have received,
thereby enabling her to alter at will any grade or any paper, without making any record thereof or any report to anybody. The mere statement of such a
claim shows that it is preposterous.

No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice Romualdez was regarded by him as a supervisor of equal rank with Estela
Romualdez. Samson was never notified that he was regarded as a supervisor, and he never acted in that capacity.

Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been granted to the accused Estela Romualdez.

It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive statement. Justice Romualdez testified that he believed that on a
certain occasion he gave his secretary to understand that if a case should be brought to her attention she might revise any grade to prevent an injustice,
so long as she did not know the name of the candidate to whom the paper belonged. When asked where she was when the pretended authority was
given to her, the accused could not remember.

There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent Samson from revising the revision of Estela Romualdez, because she did not initial
the changes made by her, and he was supposed to be a supervisor of equal rank.

If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the authority which she claims to have received, nevertheless
she was not authorized to change the grades now in question, because when she made the changes she already knew that the papers belonged to her
coaccused Luis Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining that conclusion is carefully set forth by the trial court, and it is unnecessary for us to review it.
The testimony of Justice Romualdez to the effect that the accused acted within the authority granted her in changing the grades in question was a mere
expression of opinion. It was clearly inadmissible and not binding on the court. The accused Estela Romualdez did not even attempt to explain under
what circumstances she raised the grades of her coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the necessary general average of 75 per cent. She did not
confer with the "correctors" who had graded the papers in question. She di not attempt to explain how she arrived at the increased grades, or how she
came to revise the grades in question, how she happened to pick these two papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades that
had been altered by her.

Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez also alleges that she freely and voluntarily admitted from the start of the trial of
her case that the alterations had been made by her, and concludes therefrom that she acted in good faith. We cannot agree either with the statement of
fact or the conclusion. The accused Estela Romualdez did not admit that the alterations were made by her until after the prosecuting attorney had
presented three hundred and fifty pages of testimony and announced his readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the alterations were in the
handwriting of the accused. The evidence shows that before the trial defendant's attorney from the fiscal's office a photograph that had been made for
the purpose of comparing a specimen of defendant's handwriting and that of the altered grades. The fact that the defendant Estela Romualdez made the
alterations under the circumstances which we have mentioned, when she already knew that the papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves any contention
that she acted in good faith.

In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court said:
 When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by competent evidence, criminal intent may be and will be presumed,
unless such intent is rebutted by the introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption, and satisfactorily disclosing the absence
of such criminal intent.

The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is that the trial court erred in failing to extend to her a fair and impartial trial. We
shall not waste much time on this assignment of error, which is utterly without merit. The record itself completely refutes any such contention. If the
learned trial judge erred, it was in permitting the attorneys for the defendants too great latitude in arguing their objections. Arguments four and five pages
long were incorporated into the stenographic record of the evidence. The record shows a most unjustifiable attack on the good faith of the fiscal and a
persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting his evidence against the accused.

The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They are for the most part embraced in the assignments of error of his coaccused
which we have already considered. These remain only his fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error. In his fifth assignment of error it is alleged
that the lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of attorneys Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits
26 and 27, which contain the opinion of said attorneys as to the correct grades which the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.

The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony of these three attorneys on the ground that it was not the best evidence, and
suggested that the defense might call the members of the examining committee that prepared the questions in Remedial Law and Civil Law and the key
thereto. The attorneys for the defense did not see fit to adopt the suggestion of the court. It is not true therefore that the lower court deprived the
accused of an opportunity of showing that the examination papers in question deserved the increased grades which the defendant Estela Romualdez
gave them. The attorneys that prepared the questions and the key to the answers were certainly the persons best qualified to decide whether or not the
questions were correctly answered. The opinion of other attorneys, who had nothing to do with the examination, would only lead to confusion. We find no
merit in this assignment of error.

The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in insinuating that the motive of the accused Estela Romualdez in reviewing and regrading
the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 was the fact that she had received four hundred pesos from her co-accused Luis Mabunay.

The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the crime of falsification imputed to her in the
information, the court erred in concluding that the accused Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.

For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of error together.

In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show that Estela Romualdez ever reviewed the examination papers of her coaccused.
So far as the evidence shows, she merely raised his grades in two subjects, thus giving him by "a happy coincidence", to use her own words, a passing
mark. She could not or would not enlighten the court as to why she raised the grades of Luis Mabunay so as to enable him to be admitted to the bar. As
already stated, the record does not show that she raised the grades of any other candidate.

The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations, and that he failed in the examination in question, receiving a general
average of only 72.8%. The bar examining committee recommended that not only those having the required general average of 75 per cent be admitted,
but also that those who had received between 70 and 75 per cent. This is referred to in the record as "an automatic increase". It was not automatic but
arbitrary, and was disapproved by the Supreme Court, and the committee was directed to prepare a new list and to include therein only those who had
obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay was included in the new list submitted three days later, notwithstanding the fact
that he had obtained a general average of only 72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez had in the meantime raised the grades now in
question so that he appeared to have obtained the general average required for admission to the bar.

The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine Trust Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez
deposited P510 in the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any evidence to show for what purpose he
withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the first list was disapproved.

In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking for the court said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State
to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy
indeed if he demand and expect the same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek
to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by
which it may assist him.

In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, 316), Chief Justice Shaw laid down the following rule:

When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support the charge, and it is apparent that the accused is so situated that
he could offer evidence of all the facts and circumstances as they existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious circumstances
can be accounted for consistency with his innocence, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if produced,
instead of rebutting, would tend to sustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously applied, and only in cases where it is manifest that proofs are
in the power of the accused, not accessible to the prosecution.

Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and only P10 by her brother, but she could not satisfactorily
prove where the remaining P400 came from. She said it was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods, but she
could not name the person that brought the money to her, or explain why she deposited it in the bank. She did not attempt to show that she had paid it
out by means of checks for the purchase of goods for her cousin. She did not call her cousin as a witness.
 An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of failure to produce evidence. The inference, unless the failure to
produce evidence is explained away, is that the tenor of the specific unproduced evidence would not support the party's case. (U.
S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.)

In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules as stated by Dean Wigmore in his work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3148:

The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own testimony, is open to inference against a party accused, with the same
limitations applicable to civil parties. Here the effect of the burden of proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the burden is on the
prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of law to produce evidence; but nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference
from nonproduction. This seeming paradox, which has been already sufficiently noticed in treating of the general principle, has misled a few
courts to deny that any inference may be drawn.

The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit of her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made
willfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Court had rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent. The alterations were therefore
made after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from his coaccused that he had failed. It was under those
circumstances incumbent upon the accused Mabunay to present evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from the bank.
As this court said in the case of Worcester vs. Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):

When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and
rebut the inferences which the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof,
if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion.

The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe del Rosario failed for the third time in the bar examination of 1926. He then filed
a motion for the revision of his grades, based on an alleged mistake in computation. This motion was granted, and he was admitted to the bar. It was
subsequently found that alterations had been made in his examination papers, and he and Juan Villaflor were prosecuted for the falsification of a public
document. Villaflor assumed full responsibility for the commission of the crime, and testified that Del Rosario did not know anything about the making of
the alterations. The trial court acquitted Del Rosario, but upon a view of the case for the purpose of taking disciplinary actin against him Justice Malcolm,
speaking for the court in banc, said:

It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal
machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.

The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.

In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was charged with the falsification of a public document. The evidence showed that in
the Register of Attorneys the name of an attorney had been erased, and that the accused had written his own name in that space, although he had not
admitted to the bar. The accused contended that he wrote his name in the register under the direction of an employee of the court, and that he acted in
good faith. He was convicted, and on appeal the decision was affirmed. This court in its decision said: "The trial court suggests in the opinion that the
offense committed required the participation of some unfaithful employee of the court. But this fact, as the court found, did not lessen the criminal
responsibility of the appellant."

It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in common accord in the commission of the crime. As the Attorney-General
says, a conspiracy can seldom be proved except by circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of the conspirators are the acts of all.
(U. S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)

The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred
by the jury from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete
whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and
a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Evidence of
actual participation, rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of others is
relevant to show the criminal intention of the passive party, and generally the smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the
act or words of one against the others. (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by the evidence.

As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in committing the crime, the trial court found her guilty of a violation of article
300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, and sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision mayor, and the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold any public office.

The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six years and one day to twelve years, and the penalty under the Revised
Penal Code being the same, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty should be
imposed in the medium degree, which is from eight years and one day to ten years. The penalty imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore
increased to eight years and one day of prision mayor.

The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article 301 of the Penal Code, the crime not being connected with the
performance of his duties as an employee of the Government, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor, and the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The defendants were each
sentenced to pay one-half of the costs.
We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He was a conspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez.
The penalty provided by article 301 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the maximum degree, but that has been
changed by the Revised Penal Code toprision correccional in the medium and maximum degrees, and the medium degree of that penalty is from three
years, six months, and twenty-one days to four years, nine months and ten days. The prison sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore increased to three
years, six months, and twenty- one days of prision correccional.

The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.

NORMA DELOS REYES VDA. G.R. No. 186030

DEL PRADO, EULOGIA R.
DEL PRADO, NORMITA R. Present:
DEL PRADO and RODELIA
R. DEL PRADO, CARPIO, J.,
Petitioners, Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
-versus- SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. March 21, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to assail and set aside the following issuances of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in the case docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 and entitled Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado, Normita

R. Del Prado and Rodelia R. Del Prado v. People of the Philippines":

1) the Decision[1] dated September 15, 2008 affirming with modification the decision and order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38,

Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. L-8015; and

2) the Resolution[2] dated January 6, 2009 denying the motion for reconsideration of the Decision of September 15, 2008.

The Factual Antecedents

This petition stems from an Information for falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article 171(4), of the Revised Penal Code filed against herein

petitioners Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado (Norma), Normita Del Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado (Eulogia) and Rodelia [3] Del Prado (Rodelia)

with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of July, 1991, in the [M]unicipality of Lingayen, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified, execute[d] and cause[d] the preparation of the DEED OF SUCCESSION, by
stating and making it appear in said document that they were the only heirs of the late Rafael del Prado, when in truth and in fact, all
the accused well knew, that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim is also an heir who is entitled to inherit from the late Rafael Del Prado, and
 all the accused deliberately used the DEED OF SUCCESSION to claim ownership and possession of the land mentioned in the
DEED OF SUCCESSION to the exclusion of the complainant Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[4]

Upon arraignment, the accused therein entered their plea of not guilty. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution claimed that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim (Corazon), private complainant in the criminal case, was the daughter of the late Rafael Del

Prado (Rafael) by his marriage to Daisy Cragin (Daisy). After Daisy died in 1956, the late Rafael married Norma with whom he had five children, namely:

Rafael, Jr., Antonio, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia.

The late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29, 1979, Corazon, as a daughter of the late Rafael, and Norma, as the late Rafaels surviving spouse

and representative of their five minor children, executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of Rafael Del Prado to cover the distribution of

several properties owned by the late Rafael, including the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22848, measuring 17,624

square meters, more or less, and situated at Libsong, Lingayen, Pangasinan.

Per agreement of the heirs, Corazon was to get a 3,000-square meter portion of the land covered by OCT No. P-22848. This right of Corazon was also

affirmed in the Deed of Exchange dated October 15, 1982 and Confirmation of Subdivision which she executed with Norma.

Corazon, however, later discovered that her right over the subject parcel of land was never registered by Norma, contrary to the latters undertaking. The

petitioners instead executed on July 19, 1991 a Deed of Succession wherein they, together with Rafael, Jr. and Antonio, partitioned and adjudicated unto

themselves the property covered by OCT No. P-22848, to the exclusion of Corazon. The deed was notarized by Loreto L. Fernando (Loreto), and

provides in part:

WHEREAS, on the 12[th] day of July 1978, RAFAEL DEL PRADO[,] SR., died intestate in the City of Dagupan, leaving certain
parcel of land, and more particularly described and bounded to wit:

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-22848

A certain parcel of land (Lot No. 5518, Cad-373-D) Lingayen Cadastre, situated in Poblacion, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos. 5522, 5515; and 6287; on the SE., by Lots
Nos. 5516, 5517, 55 and Road; on the SW., by Road, and Lots Nos. 5521, 5510, and 5520; and on the NW., by
Road; x x x containing an area of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (17,624) Square
Meters, more or less. Covered by Psd-307996 (LRC), consisting of two lots. Lot No. 5510-A and Lot 5518-B.

WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the
children of the decedent;

xxx

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and invoking the provisions of Rule 74, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court,
the parties hereto do by these presents, agree to divide and partition the entire estate above[-]described and accordingly adjudicate,
as they do hereby adjudicate the same among themselves, herein below specified to wit:

x x x[5]

By virtue of the said Deed of Succession, OCT No. P-22848 was cancelled and several new titles were issued under the names of Corazons co-

heirs. When Corazon discovered this, she filed a criminal complaint against now petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia. Antonio and Rafael,

Jr. had both died before the filing of said complaint.

Among the witnesses presented during the trial was Loreto, who confirmed that upon the request of Norma and Antonio, he prepared and notarized the

deed of succession. He claimed that the petitioners appeared and signed the document before him.
For their defense, the petitioners denied having signed the Deed of Succession, or having appeared before notary public Loreto. They also claimed that

Corazon was not a daughter, but a niece, of the late Rafael. Norma claimed that she only later knew that a deed of succession was prepared by her son

Antonio, although she admitted having executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of mortgagee Prudential Bank over portions of the subject

parcel of land already covered by the new titles.

The Ruling of the MTC

The MTC rejected for being unsubstantiated the petitioners denial of any participation in the execution of the deed of succession, further noting that they

benefited from the property after its transfer in their names. Thus, on August 9, 2006, the court rendered its decision[6] finding petitioners Norma, Eulogia,

Normita and Rodelia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, sentencing them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four months and one

day of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four months and one day of prision correccional as maximum. They were also ordered to pay a fine

of P5,000.00 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of fine.

Considering the minority of Rodelia at the time of the commission of the crime, she was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four months

of arresto mayor, plus payment of fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment.

All the petitioners were ordered to indemnify Corazon in the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

Unsatisfied with the MTCs ruling, the petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the grounds of alleged gross error of law, irregularities during the trial, and

new and material evidence. To prove that they did not intend to exclude Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael, the petitioners cited their recognition

of Corazons right to the estate in the deed of extra-judicial partition, confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange, joint affidavit and petition for

guardianship of minors Rafael, Jr., Eulogia, Antonio and Normita, which they had earlier executed. [7] Again, the petitioners denied having signed the

deed of succession, and instead insisted that their signatures in the deed were forged.

The motion was denied by the MTC via a resolution[8] dated December 21, 2006, prompting the filing of an appeal with the RTC.

The Ruling of the RTC

On August 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision [9] affirming the MTCs decision, with modification in that the case against Rodelia was dismissed in

view of her minority at the time of the commission of the crime. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan dated August 9,
2006 is hereby AFFIRMED, but modified as to accused Rodelia R. Del Prado as the case against her is hereby DISMISSED on
account of her minority at the time of the commission of the offense.

SO ORDERED.[10]

A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the RTC via its resolution[11] dated October 31, 2007. Hence, Norma, Eulogia and Normita

filed a petition for review with the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

On September 15, 2008, the CA rendered its decision [12] dismissing the petition and affirming the RTCs ruling, with modification as to the imposable

penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated August 10, 2007 and Order dated
October 31, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Pangasinan, in Crim. Case No. L-8015
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Norma delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado and Normita R. Del
Prado are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[13]

The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA in its resolution [14] dated January 6, 2009. Feeling aggrieved, the

petitioners appealed from the decision and resolution of the CA to this Court, through a petition for review on certiorari[15] under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court.

The Present Petition

The petitioners present the following assignment of errors to support their petition:

A. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT COMPLAINANT MA. CORAZON DEL
PRADO-LIM WAS EXCLUDED AS AN HEIR OF THE LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.

B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT IN SEVERAL
DOCUMENTS/INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED BY THE PETITIONERS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF COMPLAINANT MS.
CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM, SHE WAS SPECIFICALLY NAMED AS AN HEIR WITH CORRESPONDING
SHARES/INHERITANCE IN THE ESTATE OF THE LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.

C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE GOOD FAITH OF THE
PETITIONERS WHICH NEGATES THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF FALSIFICATION ON THEIR PART.

D. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONERS NOT HAVING BEEN
OVERCOME BY THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.

E. WITH DUE RESPECT [THE LOWER COURT ERRED] IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CASE IS PURELY CIVIL ONE[,] NOT
CRIMINAL.[16]

To support their assigned errors, the petitioners invoke the existence and contents of the several documents which they had presented before

the MTC, including the deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Rafael Del Prado dated October 29, 1979, confirmation of subdivision, deed of

exchange and petition in the guardianship proceedings for the minor Del Prado children filed by Norma, in which documents they claim to have indicated

and confirmed that Corazon is also an heir of the late Rafael. Given these documents, the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged with falsification

for having excluded Corazon as an heir of their decedent.

In sum, the issue for this Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioners conviction for falsification, notwithstanding

the said petitioners defense that they never intended to exclude private complainant Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael.

This Courts Ruling

The petition is bound to fail.

Only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.

First, the questions being raised by the petitioners refer to factual matters that are not proper subjects of a petition for review under Rule

45. Settled is the rule that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. It is not this Courts function to analyze or weigh all

over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been

committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect. A question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.
[17]
This is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized
by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time
during its pendency. (Emphasis supplied)

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is settled. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to

what the law is on a certain state of facts. Such a question does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the

litigants or any of them. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts or when the

query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific

surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation. [18]

Contrary to these rules, the petitioners ask us to review the lower courts factual finding on Carmens exclusion in the subject deed of succession, to

reconsider its contents and those of the other documentary evidence which they have submitted with the court a quo, all of which involve questions of

fact rather than questions of law. In their assignment of errors, petitioners even fully question the factual basis for the courts finding of their

guilt. However, as we have explained in Medina v. Asistio, Jr.:[19]

Petitioners allegation that the Court of Appeals grossly disregarded their Exhibits A, B, C, D and E, in effect, asks us to re-
examine all the [evidence] already presented and evaluated as well as the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. Thus,
in Sotto v. Teves (86 SCRA 154 [1978]), [w]e held that the appreciation of evidence is within the domain of the Court of Appeals
because its findings of fact are not reviewable by this Court (Manlapaz v. CA, 147 SCRA 236 [1987]; Knecht v. CA, 158 SCRA 80
[1988] and a long line of cases).

It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. (Nicolas[,] et al., v. CA, 154 SCRA 635 [1987]; Tiongco v. de la
Merced, 58 SCRA 89 [1974]).

There are recognized exceptions to this rule on questions of law as subjects of petitions for review, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on

speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of

discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the

CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CAs findings

are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based, (9) when the

acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are

premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant

facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [20] After a consideration of the petitioners arguments,

this Court holds that the present appeal does not fall under any of these exceptions.

There can be no good faith on the part of the petitioners since they knew of the
untruthful character of statements contained in their deed of succession.

Even granting that the present petition may be admitted, we find no cogent reason to reverse the CA decision appealed from, considering that

the elements of the crime of falsification under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172 thereof, were duly proved during the

proceedings below. Said elements are as follows:

(a) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
 (c) The facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false.[21]

These elements are based on the provisions of Art. 172, in relation to Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxx

4. Making untruthful statements in narration of facts;

xxx

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any
public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

xxx

The material document claimed to be falsified in this case is the Deed of Succession dated July 19, 1991, the presentation of which before the

Register of Deeds and other government agencies allowed the cancellation of OCT No. P-22848, and the issuance of several new titles in its stead. The

first and third elements were committed by the inclusion in the subject deed of the clause that states, (w)hereas, the parties hereto are the only heirs of

the decedent, the first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent. [22] The untruthfulness of said statement is clear from

the several other documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners anchor their defense, such as the deed of extrajudicial partition dated October 29,

1979, the parties confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and Normas petition for guardianship of her then minor children. Specifically mentioned

in these documents is the fact that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir, of the late Rafael.

The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the truth in their deed of succession is clear, taking into account the very nature of the document

falsified. The deed, which was transformed into a public document upon acknowledgement before a notary public, required only truthful statements from

the petitioners. It was a legal requirement to effect the cancellation of the original certificate of title and the issuance of new titles by the Register of

Deeds. The false statement made in the deed greatly affected the indefeasibility normally accorded to titles over properties brought under the coverage

of land registration, to the injury of Corazon who was deprived of her right as a landowner, and the clear prejudice of third persons who would rely on the

land titles issued on the basis of the deed.

We cannot subscribe to the petitioners claim of good faith because several documents prove that they knew of the untruthful character of their

statement in the deed of succession. The petitioners alleged good faith is disputed by their prior confirmation and recognition of Corazons right as an

heir, because despite knowledge of said fact, they included in the deed a statement to the contrary. The wrongful intent to injure Corazon is clear from

their execution of the deed, showing a desire to appropriate only unto themselves the subject parcel of land. Corazon was unduly deprived of what was

due her not only under the provisions of the law on succession, but also under contracts that she had previously executed with the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 15, 2008 and

Resolution dated January 6, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31225 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 174730-37 February 9, 2011

ROSALIO S. GALEOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 174845-52

PAULINO S. ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The consolidated petitions at bar seek to reverse and set aside the Decision1 promulgated on August 18, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan convicting
petitioners Paulino S. Ong (Ong) of eight counts and Rosalio S. Galeos (Galeos) of four counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The facts are as follows:

Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16, 1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality
in 1988 and served as such until 1998.2

On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of Construction and Maintenance
Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer.3 Prior to their permanent appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual
employees of the municipal government.

In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year 1993, Galeos answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your
knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" on
the space for the list of the names of relatives referred to in the said query. 4 The boxes for "Yes" and "No" to the said query were left in blank by Galeos
in his 1994 and 1995 SALN.5 Rivera in his 1995 SALN answered "No" to the question on relatives in government.6 In their 1996 SALN, both Galeos and
Rivera also did not fill up the boxes indicating their answers to the same query. 7Ong’s signature appears in all the foregoing documents as the person
who administered the oath when Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.

In a letter-certification dated June 1, 1994 addressed to Ms. Benita O. Santos, Regional Director, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Regional Office 7,
Cebu City, it was attested that:

This is to certify that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, all restrictions/requirements
relative to creation of positions, hiring and issuance of appointments, Section 325 on the limitations for personal services in the total/supplemental
appropriation of a local government unit; salary rates; abolition and creation of positions, etc.; Section 76, organizational structure and staffing pattern;
Section 79 on nepotism; Section 80, posting of vacancy and personnel selection board; Section 81 on compensation, etc. have been duly complied with
in the issuance of this appointment.

This is to certify further that the faithful observance of these restrictions/requirements was made in accordance with the requirements of the Civil Service
Commission before the appointment was submitted for review and action.8(Emphasis supplied.)

The above certification was signed by Ong and HR Officer-Designate Editha C. Garcia.

On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, Cebu filed a letter-complaint9 before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-
Visayas against Ong (then incumbent Vice-Mayor of Naga), Galeos and Rivera for dishonesty, nepotism, violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employeesand Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of falsification of public documents.

On August 11, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal charges be
filed against Ong, Galeos and Rivera for falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in connection with
the Certification dated June 1, 1994 issued by Ong and the false statements in the 1993, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Rivera and the 1993, 1994, 1995 and
1996 SALN of Galeos.10

On August 16, 2000, the following Informations11 were filed against the petitioners:

Criminal Case No. 26181

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and
Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very well k[n]ew that they are
related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of
accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26182

That on or about the 15th day of February 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of
the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In the Government Service as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to before
accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that
they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of
Federico T. Rivera’s wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26183

That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and
Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity thereby making false statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are
related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of
accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26184

That on or about the 1st day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of
the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In The Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to
before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused
very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of
affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26185

That on or about the 5th day of February 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of
the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In The Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to
before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused
very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of
affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26186

That on or about the 3rd day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and
Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Services, as of December 31, 1994, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are
related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of
accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26187

That on or about the 11th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating, together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and
Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are
related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of
accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26188

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of
a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-Region VII,
Cebu City dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment, certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of the
requirement/restriction provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, as Construction and Maintenance Man
of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact as accused
very well knew that the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos was nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as
Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused within the fourth degree of consanguinity, since the mother of Rosalio S. Galeos is the sister of the mother of
accused, which Certification caused the approval of the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, to the detriment of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26189

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of
a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region VII,
Cebu City, dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment, certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of the
requirement/restriction provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, a Plumber I of the Office of the
Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact as accused very well knew that
the appointment of Federico T. Rivera was nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as Federico T. Rivera is
related to accused within the fourth degree of affinity, since the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife is the sister of the mother of accused, which
certification caused the approval of the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, to the detriment of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted to the court a quo, the accused made the following admissions: (1) Ong was the Municipal Mayor of Cebu
at all times relevant to these cases; (2) Ong is related to Galeos, within the fourth degree of consanguinity as his mother is the sister of Galeos’ mother,
and to Rivera within the fourth degree of affinity as his mother is the sister of the mother of Rivera’s wife; and (3) Galeos and Rivera were employed as
Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Municipal Government of Naga, Cebu at all times relevant to these cases. Ong
likewise admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary exhibits presented by the prosecutor (copies of SALNs and Certification dated
June 1, 1994) except for Exhibit "H" (Certification dated June 1, 1994 offered by the prosecution as "allegedly supporting the appointment of Rosalio S.
Galeos"12).13

As lone witness for the prosecution, Esperidion R. Canoneo testified that he has been a resident of Pangdan, Naga, Cebu since 1930 and claimed to be
friends with Ong, Galeos and Rivera. He knows the mother of Galeos, Pining Suarez or Peñaranda Suarez. But when the prosecutor mentioned "Bining
Suarez," Canoneo stated that Bining Suarez is the mother of Galeos and that Bining Suarez is the same person as "Bernardita Suarez." Ong is related
to Galeos because Ong’s mother, Conchita Suarez, and Galeos’ mother, Bernardita Suarez, are sisters. As to Rivera, his wife Kensiana, 14 is the
daughter of Mercedes Suarez who is also a sister of Conchita Suarez. He knew the Suarez sisters because they were the neighbors of his grandmother
whom he frequently visited when he was still studying.15

Both Galeos and Rivera testified that they only provided the entries in their SALN but did not personally fill up the forms as these were already filled up
by "people in the municipal hall" when they signed them.

Galeos, when shown his 1993 SALN,16 confirmed his signature thereon. When he was asked if he understood the question "To the best of your
knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to anyone working in the government?" he answered in the negative. He
claimed that the "X" mark corresponding to the answer "No" to said question, as well as the other entries in his SALN, were already filled up when he
signed it. When shown his SALN for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996, Galeos reiterated that they were already filled up and he was only made to sign
them by an employee of the municipal hall whom he only remembers by face. He also admitted that he carefully read the documents and all the entries
therein were explained to him before he affixed his signature on the document. However, when asked whether he understands the term "fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity" stated in the SALNs, he answered in the negative.17

Rivera testified that he was not aware that his wife was a close relative of the Municipal Mayor because when he asked her, the latter told him that Ong
was a distant relative of hers. Rivera added that it was not Ong who first appointed him as a casual employee but Ong’s predecessor, Mayor Vicente
Mendiola.18

On the part of Ong, he testified that at the time he was serving as Municipal Mayor of Naga, he did not know that he and Galeos are relatives, as in fact
there are several persons with the surname "Galeos" in the municipality. He signed Galeos’ 1993 SALN when it was presented to him by Galeos at his
office. There were many of them who brought such documents and he would administer their oaths on what were written on their SALN, among them
were Galeos and Rivera. He came to know of the defect in the employment of Galeos when the case was filed by his "political enemy" in the
Ombudsman just after he was elected Vice-Mayor in 1998. As to Rivera, Ong claimed that he knows him as a casual employee of the previous
administration. As successor of the former mayor, he had to re-appoint these casual employees and he delegated this matter to his subordinates. He
maintained that his family was not very close to their other relatives because when he was not yet Mayor, he was doing business in Cebu and Manila.
When queried by the court if he had known his relatives while he was campaigning considering that in the provinces even relatives within the 6th and 7th
degree are still regarded as close relatives especially among politicians, Ong insisted that his style of campaigning was based only on his performance
of duties and that he did not go from house to house. Ong admitted that he had been a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth. He could no longer recall
those SALN of most of the employees whose oaths he had administered. He admitted that he was the one who appointed Galeos and Rivera to their
permanent positions and signed their official appointment (Civil Service Form No. 33) but he was not aware at that time that he was related to them. It
was only after the filing of the case that he came to know the wife of Rivera. As to the qualifications of these appointees, he no longer inquired about it
and their appointments were no longer submitted to the Selection Board. When the appointment forms for Galeos and Rivera were brought to his office,
the accompanying documents were attached thereto. Ong, however, admitted that before the permanent appointment is approved by the CSC, he
issues a certification to the effect that all requirements of law and the CSC have been complied with. 19

On August 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision convicting Ong, Galeos and Rivera, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the following:

In Criminal Case No. 26181, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26182, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26183, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).1auuphil

In Criminal Case No. 26184, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26185, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26186, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26187, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26188, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong NOT GUILTY for Violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and

In Criminal Case No. 26189, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Falsification of Public
Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium as the
minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.20

In its Resolution21 dated August 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration of Ong and Galeos. However, in view of the death
of Rivera on August 22, 2003 before the promulgation of the decision, the cases (Criminal Case Nos. 26182, 26184 and 26185) against him were
dismissed.

In G.R. Nos. 174730-37, Galeos contends that the Sandiganbayan erred when:

1) . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF
FACTS.

2) . . . IT DID NOT CONSIDER PETITIONER’S VALID DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH AND LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIMES
IMPUTED.

3) . . . IT GAVE FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION. 22

In support of his assigned errors, Galeos argues that he did not make untruthful or false statements in his SALN since a "statement" requires a positive
averment and thus silence or non-disclosure cannot be considered one. And even if they are considered statements, Galeos contends that they were not
made in a "narration of facts" and the least they could be considered are "conclusions of law." He also argues that the prosecution failed to adduce any
evidence to support the finding that he was aware of their relationship at the time of the execution of the SALN. With the presence of good faith, Galeos
avers that the fourth element of the crime – the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person –
is missing. He also faults the Sandiganbayan for its heavy reliance on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution’s sole witness despite the fact
that there are aspects in his testimony that do not inspire belief.

On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 174845-52, Ong argues that the Sandiganbayan erred when:

(a)

. . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

(b)

IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 26181-26187, [IT HELD] THAT A PERSON MERELY ADMINISTERING THE OATH IN A DOCUMENT IS GUILTY
OF THE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION BY MAKING UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

(c)

. . . IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26189, … IT INFER[R]ED, DESPITE THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY RELEVANT AND MATERIAL
EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENT’S EXHIBIT "I" (OR PETITIONER’S EXHIBIT "8") REFERS TO OR SUPPORTS THE APPOINTMENT OF
FEDERICO T. RIVERA.23

Ong similarly argues that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements containing a narration of facts and that there was no wrongful intent
of injuring a third person at the time of the execution of the documents. He contends that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely
administering the oath in a document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer administering the oath to certify the truthfulness and/or
veracity of the contents of the document. Neither can he be made liable for falsification regarding the letter-certification he issued since there was no
evidence adduced that it was made to support Rivera’s appointment.

In the Joint Memorandum filed by the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Sandiganbayan, it was pointed out that Galeos
categorically admitted during his testimony that before affixing his signature on the subject SALN, he carefully read its contents and the entries therein
have been explained to him. Moreover, the admission made by Ong during the pre-trial under the joint stipulation of facts indicated no qualification at all
that he became aware of his relationship with Galeos and Rivera only after the execution of the subject documents. The defense of lack of knowledge of
a particular fact in issue, being a state of mind and therefore self-serving, it can be legally assumed that the admission of that particular fact without
qualification reckons from the time the imputed act, to which the particular fact relates, was committed. As to mistaken reliance on the testimony of
prosecution witness, the analysis and findings in the assailed decision do not show that such testimony was even taken into consideration in arriving at
the conviction of petitioners.24

With respect to Ong’s liability as conspirator in the execution of the SALN containing untruthful statements, the Special Prosecutor argues that as a
general rule, it is not the duty of the administering officer to ascertain the truth of the statements found in a document. The reason for this is that the
administering officer has no way of knowing if the facts stated therein are indeed truthful. However, when the facts laid out in the document directly
involves the administering officer, then he has an opportunity to know of their truth or falsity. When an administering officer nevertheless administers the
oath despite the false contents of the document, which are known to him to be false, he is liable, not because he violated his duty as an administering
officer, but because he participated in the falsification of a document. 25

After a thorough review, we find the petitions unmeritorious.

Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)

The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:

(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26

In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making
the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to
make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he
falsifies.27Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed.28

Falsification of Public Document

by making untruthful statements
concerning relatives in the
government service

All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been established by the prosecution.

Petitioners argue that the statements "they are not related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" and "that Section 79 of the Local
Government Code has been complied with in the issuance of the appointments" are not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law, as both require the
application of the rules on relationship under the law of succession. Thus, they cite People v. Tugbang 29 where it was held that "a statement expressing
an erroneous conclusion of law cannot be considered a falsification." Likewise, in People v. Yanza, 30 it was held that when defendant certified that she
was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law, which turned out to be incorrect or erroneous; hence, she may not be declared
guilty of falsification because the law violated pertains to narration of facts.

We disagree.

A conclusion of law is a determination by a judge or ruling authority regarding the law that applies in a particular case. It is opposed to a finding of fact,
which interprets the factual circumstances to which the law is to be applied.31A narration of facts is merely an account or description of the particulars of
an event or occurrence.32 We have held that a certification by accused officials in the Statement of Time Elapsed and Work Accomplished qualifies as a
narration of facts as contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as it consisted not only of figures and numbers but also words were
used therein giving an account of the status of the flood control project.33
In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a
description of such relationship; it does not call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil
Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The
question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners’
assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a
government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts
contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship
have no relevance to the employee’s eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.

Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for the
answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong,34 it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and personal
data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By
withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the
disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article
168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:

No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the
appointing power or recommending authority.

Section 7 (e), Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides that
the CSC shall disapprove the appointment of a person who "has been issued such appointment in violation of existing Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations." Among the prohibited appointments enumerated in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993 are appointments in the LGUs of
persons who are related to the appointing or recommending authority within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity. 35

The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998 dated December 14, 1998)
contain a similar prohibition under Rule XIII, Section 9:

SEC. 9. No appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned
or controlled corporations with original charters shall be made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the
bureau or office or of the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the word "relative" and the members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.

In the local government career service, the prohibition extends to the relatives of the appointing or recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity.

xxxx

The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and reemployment regardless of status including casuals and
contractuals except consultants. (Emphasis supplied.)

The second element is likewise present. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts
narrated.36 Permanent employees employed by local government units are required to file the following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net
worth (SALN); (b) lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service; (c) financial and business interests;
and (d) personal data sheets as required by law.37 A similar requirement is imposed by Section 8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, thus:

(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives38. – It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to identify and disclose to the best of his
knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.

Section 11 of the same law penalizes the violation of the above provision, either with imprisonment or fine, and, in the discretion of the court of
competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office. Such violation if proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall also be sufficient cause
for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos’ negative answer reflected in his SALN is absolutely false. During the trial, both Ong and Galeos
admitted the fact that they are first cousins but denied having knowledge of such relationship at the time the subject documents were executed. The
Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their defense of being unaware that they are related within the fourth degree of consanguinity. Given the Filipino
cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended family ties, it was unlikely for Galeos who had been working for several years in the municipal
government, not to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a prominent public figure having ran and won in the local elections four times
(three terms as Mayor and as Vice-Mayor in the 1998 elections), after serving as OIC Mayor of the same municipality in 1986 until 1988.

The same thing can be said of Ong, whose unbelievable claim that he had no knowledge that a first cousin (Galeos) was working in the municipal
government and appointed by him to a permanent position during his incumbency, was correctly disregarded by the Sandiganbayan. It was simply
unthinkable that as a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth and a politician at that, he was all the time unaware that he himself appointed to permanent
positions the son of his mother’s sister (Galeos) and the husband of his first cousin (Rivera). Indeed, the reality of local politics and Filipino culture
renders his defense of good faith (lack of knowledge of their relationship) unavailing. Despite his knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the subject
SALN, Ong still administered the oath to Galeos and Rivera who made the false statement under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in finding
that Ong connived with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have no relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity
in the government service.

Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime,39 as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused
which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime.40 In this case, Ong administered the oaths to Galeos and
Rivera in the subject SALN not just once, but three times, a clear manifestation that he concurred with the making of the untruthful statement therein
concerning relatives in the government service.

Falsification by making
untruthful statements
in the Certification re:
compliance with the
prohibition on nepotism

As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the certification recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos’
appointment although he admitted only the authenticity and due execution of Exhibit "I". Since Ong was duty bound to observe the prohibition on
nepotistic appointments, his certification stating compliance with Section 7941 of R.A. No. 7160 constitutes a solemn affirmation of the fact that the
appointee is not related to him within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Having executed the certification despite his knowledge that he
and Rivera were related to each other within the fourth degree of affinity, as in fact Rivera was his cousin-in-law because the mother of Rivera’s wife is
the sister of Ong’s mother, Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in a narration of facts. He also took
advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under the Civil Service rules, is required to issue such certification.

The importance of the certification submitted to the CSC by the proper appointing authority in the local government unit, regarding compliance with the
prohibition against nepotism under R.A. No. 7160 cannot be overemphasized. Under Section 67, Book V, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code of
1987, a head of office or appointing official who issues an appointment or employs any person in violation of Civil Service Law and Rules or who
commits fraud, deceit or intentional misrepresentation of material facts concerning other civil service matters, or anyone who violates, refuses or
neglects to comply with any of such provisions or rules, may be held criminally liable. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 42 we held that mere
issuance of appointment in favor of a relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity is sufficient to constitute a violation of the law. Although
herein petitioners were prosecuted for the criminal offense of falsification of public document, it becomes obvious that the requirement of disclosure of
relationship to the appointing power in the local government units simply aims to ensure strict enforcement of the prohibition against nepotism.1avvphil

Relevant then is our pronouncement in Dacoycoy:

Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or
objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one." "The Court was
unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of
corruption that must be nipped in the bud or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is not
only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the ‘outstanding’ civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist
on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law." 43 (Emphasis supplied.)

The prosecution having established with moral certainty the guilt of petitioners for falsification of public documents under Article 171 (4) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, we find no legal ground to reverse petitioners’ conviction.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26181-26187 and 26189 is
AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

LAURINIO GOMA and NATALIO UMALE, G.R. No. 168437

Petitioners,
Present:
- versus -
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES,
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF TINGA,
THE PHILIPPINES, and SANGGUNIAN MEMBER VELASCO, JR., and
MANUEL G. TORRALBA, BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:

January 8, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
 Appealed, via this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, is the Decision[1] dated June 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-

G.R. CR No. 27963, affirming the July 28, 2003 Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26 in Santa Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. SC-

6712. The RTC convicted petitioners of the crime of falsification of public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

On the basis of the affidavit-complaint of Manuel Torralba and two other members of the Sangguniang Barangay of Brgy. Cabanbanan,

Pagsanjan, Laguna, the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon filed with the RTC in Sta. Cruz, Laguna an Information for falsification of public document

under Art. 171(2) of the RPC against petitioners Laurinio Goma and Natalio Umale. [3] Specifically, the complaint alleged that Laurinio and Natalio,

as barangay chairperson and secretary, respectively, falsified a barangay resolution dated September 24, 1995, allocating the amount of PhP 18,000 as

disbursement for a seminar for the two officials. The indicting information, docketed as Crim. Case No. SC-6712 and raffled to Branch 26 of the Sta.

Cruz RTC, alleged as follows:

That on or about September 24, 1995 in Barangay Cabanban [sic], Pagsanjan, Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused LAURINIO GOMA and NATALIO A. UMALI, both public officials,
being the Barangay Chairman and Barangay Secretary, respectively, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the
offense in relation to their office, in connivance and conspiracy with each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a Resolution dated September 24, 1995, an official document, by indicating therein that aforesaid Resolution was
passed on motion of Kagawad Renato Dizon, seconded by Kagawad Recaredo C. Dela Cruz and unanimously approved by those
present in the meeting held on September 24, 1995 at 2:00 P.M., when in truth and in fact no meeting was held as no quorum was
mustered, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

When arraigned, both Laurinio and Natalio, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the above charge. Pre-trial and trial then ensued.

The prosecution presented the three complaining witnesses, [5] who testified that, for lack of quorum, no actual session of the sanggunian of

Brgy. Cabanbanan took place on September 24, 1995, the day the disputed resolution was allegedly passed. On that day, according to the three, they

went to the barangay health center to attend a pre-scheduled session which, however, did not push through as, apart from them, only one other

member, i.e., Laurinio, came. But they later got wind of the existence of subject Resolution No. T-95 (Res. T-95) dated September 24, 1995, in which it

was made to appear that all the sanggunian members attended the session of September 24, 1995 and unanimously approved, upon motion

of kagawad Renato Dizon, duly seconded by kagawad Ricaredo dela Cruz, the allocation of PhP 18,000 to defray the expenses of two officials who

would attend a seminar in Zamboanga. On the face of the resolution appears the signature of Natalio and Laurinio, in their respective capacities

as barangaysecretary and chairperson. It also bore the official seal of the barangay.

On October 15, 1995, the sanggunian held a special session during which it passed a resolution therein stating that no session was held

on September 24, 1995.[6]

In their defense, Natalio and Laurinio, while admitting having affixed their signatures on the adverted falsified resolution, alleged that said

resolution was nothing more than a mere proposal or a draft which Natalio, as was the practice, prepared and signed a week before the scheduled

September 24, 1995. They also alleged that the same resolution was not the enabling instrument for the release of the seminar funds.

The Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered on July 28, 2003 judgment, finding both Laurinio and Natalio guilty as charged and, accordingly, sentenced them,

thus:
 WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused Laurinio Goma and Natalio A. Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals in the felony of falsification of public document punishable under Section [sic] 171 of the Revised Penal Code and there
being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, hereby imposes upon each of said accused the penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years, and two (2) months of prision mayor, as maximum.

Costs against both accused.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The RTC found Res. T-95 to have all the appearance of a complete and true and genuine document, sealed and signed by

the Sanggunian secretary.[8] And for reasons set out in its decision, the trial court dismissed, as incredulous, the defenses theory, and the arguments

propping it, about the subject resolution being just a mere proposal.

The Ruling of the CA

From the RTC decision, Laurinio and Natalio appealed to the CA, their recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27963, raising three issues, to

wit: (a) whether Res. T-95 is a public document; (b) whether they violated Art. 171(2) of the RPC; and (c) whether the penalty imposed is proper.

Answering all three issues in the affirmative, the CA, by its Decision dated June 6, 2005, affirmed that of the trial court, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the 28 July 2003 Decision of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna finding accused-
appellants Laurinio Goma and Natalio A. Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document under
Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correctional [sic], as minimum, to eight (8) years, and two (2) months of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellants.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Petitioners are now before this Court raising the very same issues they earlier invoked before the CA, the first two of which may be reduced

into the following proposition:Whether Res. T-95 may be characterized as a public document to bring the case, and render petitioners liable on the basis

of the evidence adduced, under Art. 171(2) of the RPC.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

As a preliminary consideration, petitioners, in this recourse, merely highlight and discuss their defense that the subject resolution is a mere

draft or proposed resolution not acted upon by the sanggunian for lack of quorum on September 24, 1995, and that they never had any criminal intent

when they signed such proposed resolution. They deny having affixed the barangay official seal on the subject resolution.

Subject Resolution a Public Document

Under Sec. 19(a) of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, public documents include [t]he written official acts, or records of the official acts of

the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. Verily, resolutions and

ordinances of sanggunians, be they of the sanggunian panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan, or barangay, come within the pale of the above provision, such

issuances being their written official acts in the exercise of their legislative authority. As a matter of common practice, an action appropriating money for

some public purpose or creating liability takes the form of an ordinance or resolution.
 Black defines a public document as a document of public interest issued or published by a political body or otherwise connected with public
[10]
business. The term is also described as a document in the execution of which a person in authority or notary public takes part. [11] There can be no

denying that the public money-disbursing and seemingly genuine Res. T-95, in the preparation of which petitioners, in their official capacity, had a hand,

is, in context, a public document in a criminal prosecution for falsification of public document. And it bears to stress that in falsification under Art. 171(2)

of the RPC, it is not necessary that there be a genuine document; it is enough that the document fabricated or simulated has the appearance of a true

and genuine document or of apparent legal efficacy.[12]

Petitioners Guilty of Falsification

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Court usually defers to factual findings of the trial court, more so when such findings receive a

confirmatory nod from the appellate court. We explained in one case:

The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment
of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.[13]

And this factual determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal,
except only for the most convincing reasons,[14] such as when that determination is clearly without evidentiary support on record [15] or when the judgment
is based on misapprehension of facts or overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [16] This is as
it should be since it is not the function of the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to evaluate and weigh all over again the evidence presented or
the premises supportive of the factual holdings of lower courts.[17]
The case disposition of the CA and the factual and logical premises holding it together commend themselves for concurrence. Its inculpatory
findings on the guilt of petitioners for falsification under Art. 171(2) of the RPC, confirmatory of those of the trial court, are amply supported by the
evidence on record, consisting mainly of the testimony of the complaining witnesses and a copy of the subject resolution.

Art. 171(2) of the RPC provides as follows:

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister.The penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxxx

(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.

The elements of the crime of falsification of public documents, as above defined and penalized, are:

1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.

2. That he takes advantage of his official position.

3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding.

4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding.[18]

The first two elements clearly obtain, petitioners, during the period material, being local government elected officials who, by reason of their

position, certified, as Natalio did, as to the holding of a barangay session and falsely attested, as Laurinio did, as to the veracity of a resolution

supposedly taken up therein. The other two elements are likewise present. As correctly observed by the CA:
 x x x [Petitioners] made it appear in the Barangay resolution dated 24 September 1995 that all members of the
Sangguniang Barangay deliberated upon and unanimously approved the questioned resolution, when in fact no such deliberation
and approval occurred. The non-participation of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay in the passage of the resolution was
established by the 15 October 1995 resolution issued by 7 of the 8 members of the Sangguniang Barangay denying that the
challenged resolution was passed upon and approved by the council.[19]

Petitioners bid to pass off the resolution in question as a mere proposal or a draft cannot be accorded merit in the light of the manner they

worded and made it appear.Consider the following apt observations of the trial court:

Barangay Resolution No. T-95 does not appear to be a proposed resolution in all aspects x x x

xxxx

b) the opening paragraph unequivocally states that the contents thereof were copied from the minutes of the ordinary
session of Sanggunian held on September 24, 1995 meeting, at 2:00 oclock pm;
c) it announces all the names of the members of the Sanggunian who attended the session during which said resolution
[was] passed;
d) it bears the resolution number, not the proposed resolution number;
e) the title clearly states that the Sanggunian had already approved the allocation of P18,000.00 for two (2) barangay
officials x x x;
f) it made mention that Kagawad Renato M. Dizon made the motion, duly seconded by Kagawad [Ricaredo] C. de la Cruz,
for the passing of said resolution; and
g) accused Natalio A. Umali, in his official capacity as Barangay Kalihim, certified said resolution as true and correct, and
accused Laurinio A. Goma, Punong Barangay, attested to the truthfulness of said resolution.[20]

Indeed, the contents and appearance of Res. T- 95 argue against the very idea of its being merely a proposal or a

draft barangay enactment. Res ipsa loquitur. A draft resolution would not be numbered or be carrying certificatory and attestative signatures, let alone

impressed with the dry seal of the barangay. It would not also include such particulars as the attendance of all members of the sanggunian and the

identity of the moving and seconding kagawads relative to the passage of the resolution, for such details are not certain; unless they have been

rehearsed or planned beforehand. But the notion that a plan had been arranged by the sanggunian as a body would be negated by subsequent

development which saw the approval of a resolution dated October 15, 1995 duly signed by seven kagawads virtually trashing Res. T-95 as a falsity. The

sequence of events would readily show that petitioners falsified the subject resolution, but only to be exposed by private complainants.

Petitioners allegation that kagawad Torralba was the one who affixed the seal or that he harbored ill-feelings towards them strikes this Court

as a mere afterthought, absent convincing evidence to support the imputation.

Finally, petitioners urge their acquittal on the theory that they did not benefit from, or that the public was not prejudiced by, the resolution in

question, it not having been used to obtain the PhP 18,000 seminar funds. The argument holds no water. Falsification of a public document is

consummated upon the execution of the false document. And criminal intent is presumed upon the execution of the criminal act. Erring public officers

failure to attain their objectives, if that really be the case, is not determinative of their guilt or innocence. The simulation of a public document, done in a

manner so as to give it the appearance of a true and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its authenticity, constitutes the crime of

falsification.[21]

In fine, the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third party as a result of the falsification, or tarnishing of a

documents integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of public documents. [22] What is punished in falsification of public document is

principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly proclaimed therein. In this particular crime, therefore, the

controlling consideration lies in the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to

cause such damage becomes immaterial.[23]

Third Issue: Imposed Penalty Proper

 Finally, the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, is proper. Art. 171 of the RPC provides for a single divisible penalty of prision

mayor to public officers or employees who, taking advantage of their official positions, shall cause it to appear that persons have participated in any act

or proceeding when they did not in fact participate. And where neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the execution of the offense, as

here, the imposable penalty is, according to Art. 64 of the RPC, that of the medium period provided. The medium period for prision mayor is from eight

(8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable would be that of a degree lower than the medium period of prision mayor as

minimum, and the maximum is any period included in the medium period of prision mayor. The degree lower than the medium period of prision mayor is

the medium period of prision correccional which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.

The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and two (2) months of prision mayor,

as maximum, thus imposed on petitioners is well within the authorized imposable range, and is, therefore, proper.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the appealed CA Decision dated June 6, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No.
27963 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 154886. July 28, 2005]

LUDWIG H. ADAZA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (the First DIVISION composed of Justices GREGORIO S. ONG, CATALINO R.
CASTANEDA, JR. and FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by SPECIAL
PROSECUTION OFFICE, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 19, 2002 Decision [1] and July 3, 2002
Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Ludwig H. Adaza (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Document
penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and denying his motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Culled from the records of the case are the following facts:

Sometime in 1996, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) of the 1 st District of Zamboanga del Norte awarded to the Parents and
Teachers Association (PTA) of Manawan National High School (MNHS) in Manawan, Jose Dalman, Zamboanga del Norte a contract for the construction
of a school building consisting of two classrooms at an agreed consideration of P111,319.50.[3] Petitioner at that time was municipal mayor of Jose
Dalman.

The project was completed on June 24, 1997 per Certificate of Completion and Turnover for Custody [4] issued by the DPWH, but the PTA failed to
receive the last installment payment therefor in the amount of P20,847.17.[5]

Upon verification with the DPWH, PTA President Felix Mejorada (Mejorada) was informed by Hazel Pearanda (Pearanda), Cashier II of the
1st Engineering District of Zamboanga del Norte, that the check for P20,847.17 had been released to petitioner.[6]

Mejorada thereupon went to the Office of the Auditor of the DPWH and requested that he be furnished with certified true copies of the relevant
documents pertaining to the contract, including the disbursement voucher and the corresponding check representing the last payment made by the
DPWH for the project.[7]

Confronted with Disbursement Voucher No. B-1019707309 [8] issued by the DPWH, 1st Engineering District, Sta. Isabel, Dipolog City, in the amount
of P20,847.17 for payment to him as PTA President, approved by District Engineer Jesus T. Estimo, Mejorada detected that the signature above his
printed name thereon acknowledging receipt of the check from Releasing Officer-Cashier Pearanda was not his. And he noticed that petitioners
signature was affixed on the voucher.[9]
 Upon perusal of DBP Check No. 0000718668 [10] dated July 18, 1997 issued to payee PTA Pres. By: Felix Mejorada and drawn by OIC Assistant
District Engineer Jesus G. Sy and District Engineer Estimo, Mejorada noticed that there were two signatures at the dorsal portion thereof, his forged
signature and another which he found to be that of Aristela Adaza (Aristela), wife of petitioner. [11]

Asked by Mejorada to explain the circumstances behind the release of the check, Pearanda related that one afternoon in July 1997, petitioner
approached her and inquired whether the check for the final installment payment on the contract was already prepared, to which she replied that the
check was ready but that it could not be released without claimant Mejorada affixing his signature on the disbursement voucher. Pearanda further related
that petitioner offered to take the disbursement voucher and have it signed by Mejorada, hence, she handed it to petitioner but kept the check in her
custody; and when petitioner returned the voucher to Pearanda later that day, the check already bore a signature purporting to be that of Mejorada. [12]

Continuing, Pearanda related that petitioner thereupon requested that the corresponding check be given to him in behalf of Mejorada. [13] In order to
exculpate herself from any liability, Pearanda asked petitioner to sign the voucher before releasing the check. Petitioner obliged by affixing his signature
on the space below the purported signature of Mejorada. Pearanda then released the check to petitioner.

The check was allegedly encashed by Aristela on July 22, 1997.[14]

Mejorada was later to claim that on November 2, 1997, petitioner went to his house informing him, in the presence of his brother Rotchel Mejorada
and his nephew Anecito Mejorada, that he would be paid within the week. No payment was, however, made. [15]

On December 16, 1997, Mejorada repaired to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Dipolog City where he filed a complaint against petitioner
and his wife Aristela, and executed a Sworn Statement.[16]

On January 6, 1998, Pearanda likewise executed a Sworn Statement[17] before the NBI.

The complaint, for falsification of public document, was forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman where it was docketed as Case No. OMB-MIN-
98-0096. During the pendency of the preliminary investigation, Mejorada executed an Affidavit of Desistance [18] dated May 8, 1998 alleging that his and
the PTAs claims had been paid in full by the spouses Adaza and requesting that the cases against them be dismissed or considered withdrawn.

Petitioner and Aristela subsequently filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit [19] dated May 28, 1998, stating that Mejoradas claim had already been paid in
full and that they had not in any way benefited from the proceeds of the subject disbursement voucher and check as the proceeds thereof were actually
paid to the laborers who constructed the school building pursuant to the contract. They likewise stated that there was only a communication gap
between them and Mejorada and that after the records have been reconciled and verified, Mejorada was convinced that the money in question had been
paid to the laborers.

On July 31, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution [20] finding probable cause against petitioner and Aristela. The dispositive
portion of the Resolution reads, quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds probable cause to conclude that the crimes (sic) of Falsification of Public Document are (sic)
probably committed [by] Mayor Ludwig Adaza and another crime of Falsification of Public Document was probably committed by respondents (sic)
Mayor and his co-respondent wife. Accordingly, let the appropriate Informations be filed in court.

SO RESOLVED.[21]

On even date, petitioner was charged in two Informations filed before the Sandiganbayan. The inculpatory portion of the first, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 24854, reads as follows:

That sometime on or about 18 July 1997, or shortly subsequent thereto, in Dipolog City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused Ludwig Adaza, a public officer being then the Mayor with salary grade 27 of Jose Dalman, Zamboanga del Norte, while in the performance
of his official duties, committing the offense in relation to his official function and taking advantage of his public position, did there and then, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, falsify a public document, namely Disbursement Voucher No. B-1019707309 of the DPWH 1st Engineering District, Dipolog
City, by counterfeiting therein the signature of Felix Mejorada when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, Felix Mejorada did not affix his
signature on the document and did not authorize the accused to affix Mejoradas signature therein.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[22] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner was charged together with Aristela in the second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 24853, the inculpatory portion of which
reads:

That sometime on or about 18 July 1997, or shortly subsequent thereto, in Dipolog City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused Ludwig Adaza, a public officer being then the Mayor with salary grade 27 of Jose Dalman, Zamboanga del Norte, while in the performance
of his official duties, committing the offense in relation to his official function and taking advantage of his public position, conspiring, cooperating and
confederating with accused Aristela Adaza, did there and then, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, falsify a public document, namely DPB Check No.
0000718668 issued by the DPWH 1st Engineering District, Dipolog City, by counterfeiting therein the signature of indorsement of Felix Mejorada when in
truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, Felix Mejorada did not affix his signature on the document and did not authorize the accused to affix
Mejoradas signature therein.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[23] (Underscoring supplied)

After petitioner and his co-accused wife Aristela posted their respective bail bonds for their provisional liberty, Mejorada filed an Affidavit of
Confirmation[24] dated October 28, 1998 affirming the truth and veracity of the contents of his Affidavit of Desistance dated May 22, 1998 and further
alleging that he believed that there was no crime of falsification committed.

Mejorada subsequently filed still another Affidavit of Confirmation [25] dated November 9, 1998 reiterating his allegations in the Affidavit of
Confirmation dated October 28, 1998.
 Petitioner and Aristela later filed a Motion for Reconsideration [26] dated November 9, 1998 of the July 31, 1998 Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman finding probable cause against them, which motion was denied by Resolution [27] of December 10, 1998.

On arraignment, petitioner and Aristela, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty[28] to the charges, whereupon trial commenced.

By Decision of June 19, 2002, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty in the first case, and acquitted him and his wife Aristela in the second
case for insufficiency of evidence.

Petitioner filed on June 28, 2002 a Motion for Reconsideration [29] of the decision which was denied by Resolution of July 3, 2002, the
Sandiganbayan holding that the same was pro forma as it was not properly set for hearing in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration [30] of the July 3, 2002 Sandiganbayan Resolution and attached thereto a Notice [31] setting his
June 28, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration for hearing.

By Resolution[32] of August 21, 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Urgent Motion for lack of merit.

On August 23, 2002, a Bench Warrant of Arrest[33] was issued by the Sandiganbayan against petitioner for execution of judgment.

Hence, petitioners present petition for certiorari[34] faulting the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion:

. . . BY CONSIDERING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS DECISION AS PRO FORMA

. . . BY ALLOWING BALD TECHNICALITY TO PREVAIL OVER THE MERITS OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THUS IGNORING
SECTION 6 OF RULE 1 OF THE REVISED RULES AND THE APPROPRIATELY APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE

. . . BY IGNORING THE MERITS OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND BY CONVICTING THE ACCUSED/PETITIONER WHEN THERE IS
ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCEWHATSOEVER FOR CONVICTING THE ACCUSED/PETITIONER BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT [35] (Underscoring
supplied)

On October 29, 2002, the law office of Atty. Felipe Antonio B. Remollo entered its appearance for petitioner. [36] On even date, petitioner filed a
Supplement[37] to the petition raising the following additional arguments:

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED OF
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 172 PARAGRAPH 1 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171 PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE AGAINST THE ACCUSED (FORMER) MUNICIPAL MAYOR (WITH SALARY GRADE 27) WHO DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE CRIME AS RULED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN. SUCH BEING THE CASE, THE
ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS NOT COMMITTED IN RELATION TO THE OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR WHICH IS OUTSIDE THE
JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN.

II

THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IS ENSHRINED IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. THIS RIGHT
SHOULD BE UPHELD AT ALL TIMES AND SHOULD NOT BE OUTWEIGHT (sic) OR DISLODGED BY WHATEVER GROSS PROCEDURAL LAPSES
IN SUCCESSION THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY HAVE COMMITTED TANTAMOUNT TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IN THE INTEREST OF
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE.

III

THE PETITION WAS FILED WITH A STRONG SENSE OF URGENCY IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN
ORDERED THE IMMEDIATE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED IN ITS AUGUST 21, 2002 RESOLUTION (SUBJECT OF HEREIN PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI) ON THE THEORY THAT THE ORDER OF CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED PETITIONER HAS BECOME FINAL BY SHEER
TECHNICALITY THAT ON (sic) THE ACCUSEDS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT BEAR A NOTICE OF HEARING. [38] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Petitioners counsel of record Homobono A. Adaza later withdrew his appearance. [39]

The Office of the Special Prosecutor has filed its Comment [40] on the petition, to which petitioner filed his Reply [41] reiterating his arguments raised
in his Supplement to the petition.

On the issue of jurisdiction, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 (An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the
Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes) provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of superior superintendent or
higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection
a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For an offense to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed
is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or
(e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a
public official or employee[42] holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph A of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.[43]

Discussion shall be limited to the first case, subject of the present petition.

The charge against petitioner falls under above-quoted Section 4, paragraph B of R.A. 8249. It is undisputed that at the time the alleged crime was
committed, he was the municipal mayor of Jose Dalman, a position corresponding to salary grade 27 under the Local Government Code of 1991,
[44]
which fact was properly alleged in the information. It is thus imperative to determine whether the offense, as charged, may be considered as having
been committed in relation to office as this phrase is employed in the above-quoted provision of R.A. 8249. For, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive
jurisdiction, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties be alleged in
the information.[45]

In Montilla v. Hilario,[46] this Court held that for an offense to be committed in relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office
must be direct and not accidental, such that the offense cannot exist without the office.

People v. Montejo,[47] by way of exception, enunciated the principle that although public office is not an element of the offense charged, as long as
the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions, the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.

These rulings were reiterated in Sanchez v. Demetriou,[48] Republic v. Asuncion,[49] Cunanan v. Arceo,[50] People v. Magallanes,[51] Alarilla v.
Sandiganbayan [52] and Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[53]

That the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at
the trial,[54] is settled.
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts. The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.[55] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It does not thus suffice to merely allege in the information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office or that he
took advantage of his position as these are conclusions of law. [56] The specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy
between the discharge of the offenders official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed
in relation to public office,[57] are controlling.

It bears noting that in Montejo,[58] where this Court held that the allegations in the information for murder were sufficient to bring the case squarely
within the meaning of an offense committed in relation to the accuseds public office, the phrase committed in relation to public office does not even
appear in the information, which only underscores the fact that said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus the
information in said case read:

Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and
xxx special policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp xxx at Tipo-tipo which is under his
command xxx supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding
investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court
and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his co-defendants arrested and maltreated
Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.

In Alarilla,[59] apart from the phrase in relation to and taking advantage of his official functions, the information alleged specific factual allegations
showing how the therein petitioner committed the crime of grave threats as a consequence of his office as municipal mayor, which allegations led this
Court to conclude that the crime charged was intimately connected with the discharge of his official functions. Thus it read:

That on or about October 13, 1982, in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage of his official
functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously level and aim a .45 caliber pistol at and threaten to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi, during a
public hearing about the pollution from the operations of the Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after the said complainant rendered a
privilege speech critical of the abuses and excesses of the administration of said accused.

Although herein petitioner was described in the information as a public officer being then the Mayor with salary grade 27 of Jose Dalman,
Zamboanga del Norte, there was no allegation showing that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately connected to the
duties of his office as mayor to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Neither was there any allegation to show how he made use of
his position as mayor to facilitate the commission of the crimes charged. The information merely alleges that petitioner falsified the disbursement
voucher by counterfeiting therein the signature of Mejorada. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is this allegation that is controlling, not the
evidence presented by the prosecution during the trial.

In Bartolome v. People[60] where the therein accused was charged with falsification of official document, the information alleged as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rolando
Bartolome y Perez, a public officer having been duly appointed and qualified as Senior Labor Regulation Officer and Chief of the Labor Regulations
Section, Ministry of Labor, National Capital Region, Manila, conspiring and conniving with the other accused Elino Coronel y Santos, also a public officer
having been duly appointed and qualified as Labor Regulation Officer of the same office, taking advantage of their official positions, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and falsify an official document, to wit: the CS Personal Data Sheet (Civil Service Form No. 212) which bears
the Residence Certificate No. A-9086374 issued at Manila on January 12, 1977, by making it appear in said document that accused Rolando Bartolome
y Perez had taken and passed the Career Service (Professional Qualifying Examination) on May 2, 1976 with a rating of 73.35% in Manila and that he
was a 4th Year AB student at the Far Eastern University (FEU), when in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew, accused Rolando Bartolome y
Perez had not taken and passed the same nor was he a 4th Year AB student, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. (Underscoring
supplied)

This Court held:

In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was committed by the accused, if at all, as a consequence of, and while they were
discharging, official functions. The information does not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the
commission of the offense. xxx

Clearly therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation to the office of the accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. It follows that all its acts in the instant case are null and void ab initio.[61] (Underscoring supplied)

As for petitioners assertion that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense of falsification under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code, to buttress which he argues that the offender under Article 172, paragraph 1 is not supposed to be a public official who takes
advantage of his position, thus equating the requirement of taking advantage of ones public position as stated in the aforementioned provisions of the
Revised Penal Code with the prerequisite in relation to ones office for the acquisition of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided for in R.A. 8249,
the same must be discredited.

Article 171 reads:

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

xxx

On the other hand, Article 172, paragraph 1 reads:

ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of
exchange or any other kind of commercial document; xxx

The offender under Article 172 must be a private individual or maybe a public officer, employee or notary public who does not take advantage of
his official position.[62] Under Article 171, an essential element of the crime is that the act of falsification must be committed by a public officer, employee
or notary who takes advantage of his official position.

The offender takes advantage of his official position in falsifying a document when (1) he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise intervene
in the preparation of the document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.[63]

It is thus apparent that for purposes of acquisition of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan, the requirement imposed by R.A. 8249 that the offense be
committed in relation to the offenders office is entirely distinct from the concept of taking advantage of ones position as provided under Articles 171 and
172 of the Revised Penal Code.

R.A. 8249 mandates that for as long as the offenders public office is intimately connected with the offense charged or is used to facilitate the
commission of said offense and the same is properly alleged in the information, the Sandiganbayan acquires jurisdiction. [64] Indeed, the law specifically
states that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over all other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of Section 4 in relation to their office. Public office, it bears reiterating, need not be an element of the
offense charged.

On the other hand, the element of taking advantage of ones position under the Revised Penal Code becomes relevant only in the present case,
not for the purpose of determining whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, but for purposes of determining whether petitioner, if he is held to be
liable at all, would be legally responsible under Article 171 or Article 172.

While the Sandiganbayan is declared bereft of jurisdiction over the criminal case filed against petitioner, the prosecution is not precluded from filing
the appropriate charge against him before the proper court.

In light of the foregoing, further discussion on the other issues raised has become unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 19, 2002 and Resolution dated July 3, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan are SET
ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 133472. December 5, 2000]

CONSOLACION A. LUMANCAS and YOLANDO O. URIARTE, petitioners, vs. VIRGINIA B. INTAS, respondent.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J .:
 CONSOLACION A. LUMANCAS and YOLANDO O. URIARTE seek in this petition for review the reversal of the Amended Resolution of the Office
of the Ombudsman dated 16 August 1996 finding them administratively liable for falsification, dishonesty and grave misconduct, and consequently
ordering their dismissal from the service, as well as its Order dated 12 February 1998 denying their Motions for Reconsideration.

Petitioners were regular employees of the Philippine Postal Corporation in Tandag, Surigao del Sur. They were charged by their co-employee
Virginia B. Intas, respondent herein, for making false entries in their respective Personal Data Sheets (PDS, [CSC Form 212]) regarding their
educational attainment, resulting in their promotion to higher positions to the prejudice of other postal employees who had been in the service for a
longer period.

As found by the Office of the Ombudsman, [1] Consolacion A. Lumancas' original appointment as mail sorter with the Bureau of Posts showed that
her highest educational attainment was Fourth Year Pharmacy.[2] Her official Transcript of Records from the International Harvardian University (IHU),
Davao City, showed that she took up Bachelor of Science in Commerce (BSC), Major in Management, from 1974 to 1978 when she graduated and was
issued Special Order No. 5-276 dated 6 November 1978. Lumancas' answers however in her three (3) PDS accomplished in 1989, 1991 and 1993 were
inconsistent. In her PDS accomplished in 1989 [3] Lumancas stated that she finished Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy [4] from 1970 to 1975 at the Centro
Escolar University. In her PDS accomplished in 1991 [5] she stated that she obtained her BS Pharmacy at the Centro Escolar University in 1974 and had
her post graduate studies at the IHU in 1978. [6] In her PDS accomplished in 1993[7] Lumancas stated that she graduated with the degree of Bachelor of
Science in Commerce, Major in Management, at the IHU from 1970-1974 inclusive. [8] In filling up her PDS for 1989 however she stated that she studied
at the Centro Escolar University from 1970 to 1975. When requested to submit the academic records of herein petitioner Consolacion A. Lumancas, the
IHU submitted several records but the original of her Special Order was not among them. According to Severina O. Villarin, Chief, Higher Education
Division, Region XI, Lumancas' name could not be found in the IHU enrollment list filed with her office (Higher Education Division), Region XI, from
school years 1974-75 to 1978-79, meaning, that she had not enrolled with the school during those terms.

When directed to answer, Lumancas denied the allegations. She averred that while it was true that in her 3 February 1989 appointment she
indicated that her highest educational attainment was Fourth Year Pharmacy, despite her allegedly having finished Bachelor of Science in Commerce in
1978 at the IHU, this was because at that time she had not yet received her Transcript of Records and Special Order from the IHU, so that she was not
sure whether she had passed all her subjects. Since her position did not require her to be a graduate of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, she did not
bother to check whether she graduated from the course.

Lumancas also claimed that her Special Order was authentic considering that even the copy attached to the complaint [9] was supposedly checked
and verified against the original and was in fact certified by Severina O. Villarin, Chief, Higher Education Division, Region XI, Commission on Higher
Education (CHED). Lumancas admitted that there were mistakes in the entries made in her 1989 and 1993 PDS but denied making any mistake in
1991. She averred that there was no malice nor intent on her part to falsify the entries in her PDS and that she was just in a hurry to fill these up. [10]

As regards petitioner Yolando O. Uriarte, the Office of the Ombudsman found that he and a certain Mario L. Julve [11] also acquired falsified
Transcripts of Records and Special Orders from the IHU as the Bureau of Higher Education of DECS in Manila through Director III Diosdada C. Boiser
denied that her Office issued Special Orders to them. [12] Petitioners Lumancas and Uriarte, together with Mario L. Julve, had since been promoted one
(1) rank higher on the bases of the questioned documents presented as part of their credentials. [13]

On her part, Yolando O. Uriarte asserted that he finished his Bachelor of Science in Commerce, Major in Management, at the IHU in 1968 [14] and
that his Transcript of Records and Special Order were issued on the basis of his completion of the academic requirements for the course. He also
claimed that his Transcript of Records and Special Order No. (B) 5-0035 were authentic as these were checked and verified by the same Severina O.
Villarin of CHED. He also insisted that his promotion was based on his qualifications considering that he was with the postal service since 1975 without
any derogatory record and was even cited several times for his outstanding performance.[15]

On 31 July 1995, in reply to a query from the Office of the Ombudsman dated 11 July 1995, Severina O. Villarin informed the Office [16] that she had
conducted an investigation and discovered that the clerk who prepared Uriartes certifications relied only on photocopies of the Special Orders
purportedly issued to the IHU by the Bureau of Higher Education, Manila, in favor of Uriarte. However, the Bureau denied having issued the Special
Orders, thus she herself had ordered the cancellation of the certifications for being spurious.[17]

As regards the case of Lumancas, the IHU was requested to submit her academic records; consequently, several records were submitted but the
original of the Special Order was not among them. Villarin further declared that Lumancas name could not be found in the IHU enrollment list filed with
their office from school years 1974-75 to 1978-79, meaning, that she had not enrolled during those terms. [18]

Petitioners Lumancas and Uriarte moved for a formal hearing but the Office of the Ombudsman denied their motion on the ground that it was
apparently intended merely to delay the proceedings. [19] It noted that the motion praying for a formal hearing was filed only on 3 July 1996, or more than
nine (9) months after the parties failed to appear for the preliminary conference on 18 September 1995, [20] and after they failed to submit their
memorandum despite an order[21] dated 6 October 1995 from the Office of the Ombudsman granting their motion for extension of time to submit their
memorandum.[22]

After evaluating the evidence, the Office of the Ombudsman issued the Amended Resolution of 16 August 1996, [23] released 17 January 1997,
finding Lumancas and Uriarte guilty as charged and dismissed them from the service without prejudice to their right to appeal as provided under Sec. 27,
RA 6770.[24]

On 6 February 1997 and 7 February 1997 respondents Lumancas and Uriarte, now herein petitioners, filed their respective motions for
reconsideration insisting on a formal hearing, which the Office of the Ombudsman finally granted. Thereafter, hearings were held on 14-17 April
1997[25] after which the Office of the Ombudsman conclusively held that despite the burning of the records of the DECS Regional Office XI in 1991, other
records at the DECS-CHED did not show that Lumancas and Uriarte had been enrolled at the IHU during the years they allegedly took their respective
courses as stated in their respective PDS.[26]

On 12 February 1998 Lumancas and Uriartes Motions for Reconsideration were denied by the Office of the Ombudsman; hence, this petition for
review.

Section 27 of RA 6770[27] provides in part that "(f)indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive." According to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the evidence sustains the conclusion that Lumancas and Uriarte are not college
graduates, and that their contention that the Special Orders issued in their favor are authentic, banking on the certification issued by Severina O. Villarin,
Chief, BHE, Regional Office XI, is without merit. In fact, upon verification by the same office from the Bureau of Higher Education, Manila, the same BHE
Regional Office XI, through Villarin herself, cancelled the certification it previously issued and notified this Office that the Special Orders issued in favor
of Uriarte and Julve were spurious.[28]

An examination of the records of the DECS, as verified by CHED officers during the hearings, particularly Form 19, [29] failed to disclose that
petitioners names were among the list of students enrolled in the IHU during their alleged period of study. In the case of Uriarte, although his Transcript
of Records reflects that he was enrolled in the second semester of 1964-65 and the summer thereafter, and received grades for subjects taken during
those terms, his name was not included in the list of students submitted by the IHU to DECS. The same is true with Lumancas, whose name could not
be found among the DECS records for the first and second semesters of schoolyears 1976-78 although her Transcript of Records shows that she was
enrolled for that period and in fact received grades for subjects taken during those semesters.

Laura Geronilla, Assistant Registrar of the IHU, claimed that the omissions were unavoidable in the preparation of Form 19 by hand. But this
testimony alone cannot overturn the fact that there exists no records at the DECS of Lumancas' or Uriartes enrollment at the IHU. Strangely, the
omission did not happen just once, but repeated many times over involving several semesters and to students enrolled in different school years. Hence,
there can only be one conclusion - that petitioners were never reported to DECS as students of the IHU because indeed they were never enrolled
thereat.

In her certification dated 14 September 1994 [30] Laura Geronilla stated that according to available academic records, Yolando O. Uriarte was
indeed a graduate of the IHU the school year 1967-68 with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce (BSC), Major in Management, and that his
Form 19 "had already been resubmitted to DECSRO XI for the issuance of a corrective Special Order due to the accidental omission/exclusion of his
name in the DECS microfilm files despite its vivid inclusion in the original paper copy submitted." Petitioners however failed to submit a copy of such
original paper or the DECS microfilm wherein Uriartes name was allegedly missing, nor presented evidence that such request had been favorably acted
upon by the DECS.

It may also be noted that on 20 November 1981 [31] Geronilla issued another certification in favor of Uriarte certifying that he had "completed all the
requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce (BSC), Major in Management, as of March 1979. This is to certify further that his
application for graduation has been forwarded to the DECS Regional Office for the issuance of his Special Order." [32] However, Uriartes Special Order
which was allegedly issued by the DECS is dated 8 January 1969. If Uriarte had actually graduated in 1968, what was the purpose of this 1981
certification? On the other hand, if Uriarte actually completed all the requirements for graduation only in March 1979, then why was he issued a Special
Order which antedated the day when he became qualified to be a graduate of the school?

Quite obviously, neither Lumancas nor Uriarte is a graduate of a four (4)-year course and thus is not qualified to be promoted to a higher
position. The use of false documents attesting that they are college graduates when in truth and in fact they are not, makes them administratively liable
for dishonesty through the use of falsified documents.

The elements of "use of falsified documents," which is a crime under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (a) That the offender knew that a
document was falsified by another person; (b) That the false document is embraced in Art. 171 or in any of subdivisions 1 or 2 of Art. 172; (c) That he
used such document (not in judicial proceedings); and, (d) That the use of the false document caused damage to another or at least it was used with
intent to cause such damage. The fact that they used the false certifications in support of this promotion resulted in prejudice to other applicants
genuinely qualified for the position. In this connection, we refer to the Courts observation in Diaz v. People[33]

As correctly observed by the trial court, 'It is also quite significant to note in this score that the accused in his defense failed to present any corroborating
piece of evidence which will show that he was indeed enrolled in the Philippine Harvardian Colleges x x x x If he had enrolled as a student during this
period of time and he was positive that the transcript of records issued to him and in his possession is genuine and valid, it could have been easy for him
to introduce corroborating evidence, i.e., the testimony of any of his classmates or teachers in the different subjects that he took to support his claim that
he studied and passed these collegiate courses at the said school. But this he failed to do despite all the opportunities open to him and in the face of
damning evidence all showing that he had not really enrolled in this school x x x x'[34]

Finally, petitioners act of falsifying their Personal Data Sheets (PDS) to reflect that they are graduates of BSC, Major in Management, from the IHU
when in truth and in fact they are not, is a ground for disciplinary action. Lumancas made different and inconsistent entries in her 1989, 1991 and 1993
PDS. Likewise, Uriarte made conflicting entries in his PDS of February 1987 [35] and March 1990.[36] As responsible public servants who are due for
promotion, petitioners are expected to be noble exemplars and should be models of good morals. Their repeated acts of dishonesty are repugnant to the
established code of conduct and ethical standards required of public officials and employees.[37]

As regular members of the career service, they are bound by the Civil Service Law and Rules. Chapter 7, Sec. 46, Book V, of EO 292 [38] provides
"x x x x b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action: (1) Dishonesty x x x x (2) Misconduct x x x x (13) Falsification of official document x x x
x" It should be emphasized that this is an administrative case, not a criminal case; thus, petitioners argument that they were not charged with the proper
offense under the Revised Penal Code is unimportant. Any of the above charges may be cited as grounds to subject them to disciplinary action.

All the elements of falsification through the making of untruthful statements in a narration of facts are present: (a) That the offender makes in a
document statements in a narration of facts; (b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; (c) That the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a
third person. In People v. Po Giok To[39] the Court held that "in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed." Hence, the
last requisite need not be present.Also, petitioners themselves have affirmed in their petition that their Personal Data Sheets were not sworn to before
any administering officer[40] thereby taking their case away from the confines of perjury. Nonetheless, they argue that they have no legal obligation to
disclose the truth in their PDS since these are not official documents. We disagree. In Inting v. Tanodbayan[41] the Court held that "the accomplishment of
the Personal Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the
making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment x x x x" [42] The filing of a Personal Data Sheet is
required in connection with the promotion to a higher position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise,
enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position.

The Court notes that it is not uncommon for employees to do everything in their power to better their lot in order to survive the nations worsening
economic crisis. However, let this case serve as a stern warning to all who may be tempted to do the same that dishonesty and disrespect for the law,
however motivated, will never be countenanced by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the Amended Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman dated 16 August 1996
dismissing petitioners Consolation A. Lumancas and Yolando O. Uriarte from the service, as well as its Order dated 12 February 1998 denying
reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-49483-86 March 30, 1981

SALUD P. BERADIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

By petition for review on certiorari, Salud P. Beradio, an election registrar of the COMELEC in Rosales, Pangasinan, who was convicted on four (4)
counts of the crime of falsification of public or official documents of the seven (7) separate informations filed against her for making false entries in her
daily time records, elevates to the Court, the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 20319 to 20322 promulgated on September 18, 1978,
affirming in toto the judgment of conviction rendered on July 30, 1976 by the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City. The dispositive
portion of the decision of the lower court reads as follows:

FOR THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION, and with the prosecution not having established by proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of the herein accused and for insufficiency of evidence or the lack of it, the Court hereby finds. as it so holds, accussed Salud P.
Beradio NOT GUILTY of the charges in Criminal cases Nos. CCC-0258, CCC-0259, and CCC-0263; consequently, she is hereby
acquitted therefrom with costs de oficio; and decreeing the bail bonds posted for her provisional release in these cases cancelled
and discharged.

On the other hand, however, the Court so finds and holds accused Salud P. Beradio GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of falsification of public or official document as charged in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 as to entry on July 13, 1973 only, Criminal
Case No. CCC-0261; Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 as to entry on May 28, 1973 only, and Criminal Case No. CCC-0264, defined
and penalized under Article 17 1, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Act, hereby accordingly sentences said Salud P. Beradio to serve an indeterminate prison
term in the following manner, to wit:

a) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 — a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to
pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and, to pay the cost;

b) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0261 — a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost;

c) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 - a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correcional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to
pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.

d) In Criminal Case No. CCC-026-1 — a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and 0NE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to
pay fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2.000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.

The penalties herein imposed shall be served successively with the maximum duration of the sentences not to exceed threefold the
length of tune corresponding to one penalty imposed upon tier in accordance with Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to charges of falsification on July 12, 1973 in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260, and on May 30, 1973, the Court finds no sufficient
Evidence to hold the accused liable. Consequently, the accused is hereby absolved therefrom.

The facts pertinent to the specified dates of falsification as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

... On the following particular dates, as reflected in her daily time records (Exhs. "D" to "H"), BERADIO reported her attendance in
office and actual hours of work performed as:

On
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The veracity of the foregoing reports were negated by the following:

1) On March l5, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the applicants at the initial hearing and reception of evidence in land
Registration Case No. 19-R before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Rosales, in both morning and afternoon
sessions (Exhs. "K", "K-1" and "K-2").

2) In the morning of March 23, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the petitioner in the hearing of Special Proceedings No. 24-
R (summary settlement of the estate of Vicente Oria, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, at Resales, which was
called first in open court and later, in chambers (Exhs. "M" and M-1 ").

3) On May 28, 1973, in the same case, Sp. Proc. No. 24-R, BERADIO again appeared as counsel for the petitioner in the same
court which held sessions from 8:45 to 11:45 (Exh. "M").

4) In the morning of June 6, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the defendant in CAR Case No. 19882-.TP '73, entitled
"Pepito Felipe vs. Ismael Pontes and Camilo Tamce before CAR Branch 11 in Tayug, Pangasinan (Exh. "J"). Minutes of the pre-trial
conference which the appellant attended are manifest in the pre-trial order that was dictated in open court (Exh. "J-1").

5) In the morning of June 22, 1973, Beradio appeared in Sp. Proc. No. 24-R before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch XIV at Rosales (Exh. "M").

6) In the morning of July 13, 1973, Beradio appeared as counsel for plaintiff at the pre-trial conference of Civil Case No. 137R,
"Venancia Diaz vs. Armando Ordonio" before Branch XIV of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Exhs. "L" to "I-3").

It is thus clear that while in the six abovementioned dates, BERADIO made it appear in her daily time records that she was in her
office and performed her work on the dates and hours she specified, the facts were that she was elsewhere attending court
sessions. 2

From the said decision of the Court of Appeals and the denial of her motion for reconsideration on November 28, 1978, Salud Beradio filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari to the Court. We asked the Solicitor General to comment on the petition and thereafter, We resolved to give due course to
said petition it appearing that the issues raised are, in the main questions of law rendered novel by the peculiar circumstances of the case. Thus, he
raised the following legal issues:

WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 171,
PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS LEGAL AND PROPER.

II

WHETHER THE PETITIONER COULD STILL BE LEGALLY AND PROPERLY PROSECUTED FOR AN OFFENSE WHERE SHE
WAS NO LONGER A PUBLIC OFFICIAL

III

WHETHER PETITIONER !S UNDER LEGAL OBLIGATION TO FILL UP AND SUBMIT TIME RECORD.
 IV

ASSUMING THAT SHE IS, DO THE STATEMENTS THEREIN REFLECTED IN HER TIME RECORD BEAR ANY' COLOR OF
TRUTH'.

WHETHER DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL DOCUMENT IS TOTALLY OF NO

MOMENT.

VI

IT FAILED TO HOLD THAT. UNDER THE ESTABLISHED FACTS, THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW AND WELL-SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ACQUITTAL ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.

Salud P. Beradio, petitioner, is a lady-lawyer appointed as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on February 1, 1964
(Exhibits A and A-1). In 1972 and 1973, she was stationed in Resales, Pangasinan, as Chief of Office, Office of the Election Registrar, COMELEC
holding office beside the municipal building from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As the nature of her job
was field work, she was required to fill up and submit to the COMELEC's main office in Manila her daily time records after having been counter-signed by
her provincial supervisor. 3

On March 29, 1973, the COMELEC by resolution (Exhibits 1 and 1-A, CCC-0261) granted her request for permission to appear as counsel for her
cousins and cousins-in-law in the case before the Court of Agrarian Relations in Rosales, Pangasinan. 4

During her assignment as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, one Raymundo Valdez filed with the COMELEC, sometime in September, 1973,
an administrative complaint charging her of unauthorized practice of law. On the other hand, Salud Beradio tendered her resignation as Election
Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, which, by COMELEC resolution (Exhibit B) of October 25, 1973, was accepted and made to retroact on the close of
office hours on September 30, 1973. She was duly granted clearance by all the offices of the COMELEC, and she received her retirement benefits under
the law.

Raymundo Valdez made an inquiry with the COMELEC on the status of his administrative case against Salud P. Beradio, and upon being informed of
her separation from the service, he initiated the filing of criminal charges against Salud Beradio on grounds of falsification of daily time records defined
and penalized under Article 17 1, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code as falsification of public documents. In the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan where he lodged the criminal charges, Jose Peralta, and his wife Paz de Guzman-Peralta, trial attorney of Agrarian Legal Assistance (DAR)
submitted affidavits in support of the charges against Salud P. Beradio.

On August 4, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed seven (7) separate informations all dated July 7, 1975 with the Circuit Criminal Court, Third
Judicial District, Dagupan City, charging Salud P. Beradio with falsification of public or official documents for making false entries in her daily time
.records on: 1) October 12, 1972 in Criminal Case CCC-0258; 2) September 4, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0259; 3) July 12 and 13, 1973 in Criminal
Case CCC-0260; 4) June 6 and 22, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0261; 5) May 28 and 30, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0262; 6) April 3, 1973 in Criminal
Case CCC-0263; and 7) March 15 and 23, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0264 that she submitted to the Commission on Election in Manila. 5 The separate
informations allege that petitioner was absent the whole day on the days mentioned therein but to the "damage and prejudice of the National
Government," she made it appear in her time records that she was not so absent from the office, when in fact she well knew that on such date or time
she was in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Resales, Pangasinan, appearing in her cases .

While petitioner raised the above-quoted legal issues which, to Us, point to the more basic issues inherent in acts mala in se as contra distinguished
from mala prohibita, We narrowed down these issues, for proper disposition of the instant case, into whether or not the alleged acts of falsification of
public documents imputed against the petitioner were tainted with criminal intent (dolo), and whether or not the act of alleged false narration of facts in
the daily time record bears, under the law, some semblance of colorable truth. This We did in full considerations of the peculiar circumstances which
render the instant case novel in some respects, worthy of pronouncements from this Court.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that for a conviction of the offense of falsification of public or official documents, defined and penalized under Article
171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the requisite elements thereof must be clearly established, namely: 1) the offender makes in a document
false statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by him are
absolutely false, and 4) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. 6

Of weight in Our criminal justice system is the principle that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent (dolo), without which it cannot exist. 7 Actus
non facit reum nisi mens set rea, the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code clearly
indicates that malice or criminal intent (dolo) in some form is an essential requisite of all crimes and offenses defined in the Code, except in those cases
where the element required is negligence (culpa).

On one point, however, the claim of the petitioner that she is not under strict obligation to keep and submit a time record is not at all empty with
justification. While it is true, as held by the respondent court, 8 that the obligation to disclose the literal truth in filling up the daily time record is required of
all officers and employees in the civil service of the government in accordance with Civil Service Rule XV, Executive Order No. 5, Series of 1909, this
vague provision, however, is rendered clear by Section 4, Rule XV of the Civil Service Rule, dated December 3, 1962, later Memorandum Circular No. II,
Series of 1965 which exempt from requirements of keeping and submitting the daily time records three categories of public officers, namely: 1)
Presidential appointees; 2) chiefs and assistant chiefs of agencies; and 3) officers in the three branches of the government. Clearly thus, petitioner as
Chief of theOffice, Office ofElection Registrar, COMELEC in the municipality of Rosales, Pangasinan exercising supervision over four (4) subordinate
employess, would fall under the third category aforementioned. An Election Registrar of the municipality performing the powers, dutied , responsibilities
of the COMELEC, a constitutional body, in the conduct of national or local election, referenda, and plebiscites, in aparticular voting district may be
regarded as an officer who rank higher thab such chiefs or assistant chiefs of agencies although he may not be a presidential appointee. Notwithstan
ding such an exemption, if the election registrars of the various municipalities all throughout the country, who occassionaly work more than ordinary
eight-hours on the last day of the registration or on lection day, are keeping and submitting the daily time records to the main office in Manila, it may be
only to the sake of adminstrative procedural convenience or as a matter of practice, but by reason of strict legal obligation.

On the main point, assuming, however, that petitioner is under strict legal obligation to keep and submit the daily time records, We are definitely inclined
to the view that the alleged false entries made in the time records on the specified dates contained in the information do not constitute falsification for
having been made with no malice or deliberate intent. Noteworthy is the fact that petitioner consistently did not dispute, but admitted in all candor her
appearances in six (6) different ways, on March 15, March 23, May 28, June 22, July 13,, all in 1973 before the Court of First Instance, Branch XIV,
Rosales, Pangasinan, in the aforementiones cases, claiming that she did not reflect this absences in her daily time records because they were for few
minute-duration, the longest was on March 15, 1973 being for forty-five (45) minutes; they could be absorbed within the allowed coffee breaks of 30
minutes in the morning and in the afternoon; that as Chief of Office, and all Election Registrars of the COMELEC for that matter, she is allowed to have
one (1) day leave during week days provided she worked on a Saturday: and that her brief absences did not in any way interfere with or interrupt her
official duties as an Election Registrar. Above all, petitioner categorically emphasized that her appearances in court were duly authorized by the
COMELEC, which in certain instances were as counsel de oficio, and no remuneration whatsoever from her clients was received by her,

Finding that the justifications claimed by Beradio as unavailing, the Court of Appeals ruled that her various appearances in court were not on official
business, and the permission granted her by the COMELEC was to appear in behalf of her relatives, and she was still obligated to reflect in her daily
time records only the hours when she was actually in the office. 9

We are not convinced. The Court of First Instance, Branch XIV, in Rosales, Pangasinan, is only two (2) meters from her own office as Election Registrar
in the said municipality. She had standing authority to act as de oficio counsel given by the COMELEC evidently in furtherance of the free legal aid
service program of the Integrated Bar, and an Identical policy of the Government itself, 10 especially as COMELEC lawyers, before any election had been
held during the regime of martial law, did not have much office work to keep them busy. This state of virtual absence of electoral activities is what
prompted COMELEC to authorize its lawyers to take active part in the free legal aid program above adverted to, if to do so would not unduly interfere
with their work. In recognition of the long standing policy of the COMELEC in response to the legal aid program of the Government 11 and the "free
access to the courts" provision of the 1973 Constitution, 12 the COMELEC, by Resolution No. 1401, 13 formally created the Legal Assistance Office
thereby constituting all COMELEC lawyers with rank of division chief and below as COMELEC Legal Assistance Officers. Even prior to the formal
creation of the Legal Assistance Office, the liberal policy of the COMELEC in allowing its Election Registrars to act as counsel in areas where there are
no lawyers available is, indeed, laudable.

Under the attendant facts and circumstances in the instant case, no criminal intent to commit the crime with which she is charged can be imputed
against the petitioner. In the information, it was alleged that the petitioner was not in her office for the full office hours from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and
from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the specified dates therein as she was then busy attending her cases in court. On the contrary, the evidence of the
prosecution belies its allegation of the wholeday absence in office as Election Registrar. Records reveal that petitioner had stayed in court for only 5, 30,
40 or 45 minutes a day for her appearances therein, at no instance exceeding one (1) hours.

If petitioner filled up her daily time record for the six days in question making it appear that she attended her office from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and
from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. there is more than color of truth in the entry made. It is not shown that she did not report first to her office as Election
Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, before going to the courtroom just two (2) meters away. Petitioner thus likened her appearance to going out for the
usual coffee breaks. The comparison is not even apt for during the while she appeared in court, she was rendering service more, if not wholly, for the
public good, than just for her own well-being as when she goes out for snack during the coffee-break period. The court being only two (2) meters away
from her office, she did not even have to go so far as when one goes out for snack. What is more, everytime she appeared in court, she surely must
have made this fact officially of record in the court proceedings, something which is not done with leaving the office room for coffee breaks. In fine, the
entries in petitioner's daily time records were not absolutely false. The alleged false entry may be said to have a color of truth, not a downright and willful
falsehood which alone would constitute falsification as a crime. 14 As Cuello Calon stated: "La mera inexacted tio es bastante para integrar este
delito (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal 6th Ed. Vol. 11, p. 216, cited in People vs. Villena, et al., 51 O.G. 5691; People vs. La Corte, CA-G. R. No. 05818-
CR; U.S. vs. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518)."

In thus preparing her daily time record the way she did, it was evidently in her belief in her belief that she was just making of record the fact that, as was
her honest opinion, she was entitled to receive her full pay even for those days she appeared in court, rendering what she felt was no less a public
service, being in furtherance of a public policy on free legal assistance. As a lawyer, and as in officer of the court, she, for one, aids in the administration
of justice, oathbound servant of society whose duty is not solely for the benefit of her clients but for the public, particularly in the administration of justice.
The court a quo itself recognize, that the COMELEC registrars, at that time, are directed to appear as counsel de oficio when there are no lawyers to
represent the parties in litigation. 15 If petitioner is not at all appointed as counsel de oficio strictly in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court, Rule
138, it is an undisputed fact, as reflected in court records, that petitioner, true to her oath, acted as counsel in certain cases. On this point, if one fills up
his daily time record in the belief that, on the basis of the time so indicated therein, she is merely making an honest claim for the pay corresponding to
the time so indicated, no intent to commit the crime of falsification of public document can be ascribed to her. In the case of the herein petitioner, she
was only submitting a time record she knew would be the basis for computing the pay she honestly felt she deserved for the period indicated. Indeed,
the time record is required primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of serving as basis for the determination of the amount of pay an employee is entitled to
receive for a given period.

Further, on the issue of malus animus or criminal intent, it was ruled by the court a quo, confirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals, that in
falsification of public document, in contradistinction to private document, the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, for, what is
penalized is the undermining or infringement of the public faith and the violation of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, invoking the case of People
vs. Po Giok Te, 96 Phil. 918. Arguing against this ruling, petitioner cited the case of People us. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48, which the ponente in the instant
case upheld in the case of People vs. Motus, CA-G.R. No. 18267-CR when he was in the Court of Appeals, that although the Idea of gain or the intent to
injure a third person is unnecessary, htis Court emphasized that "it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in th epublic document must be
such as to affect the integrity of the same or change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change the effects
which it would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is
required by Article 1 (now Article 3) of the Penal Code.

We find the petitioner's stand tenable. the evident purpose of requiring government employees to keep time record is to show their attendance in office
to work and to be paid accordingly. Closely adhering tot he policy of no work no pay, a daily time record is primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent
damage or loss tot he government as would result in instances where it pays an employee for no work done. The integrity of the daily time record as an
official document, however, remains untarnished if the damages sought to be prevented has not been produced. As this ponente observed in the case
of People v. Motus, supra while it is true that a time record is an official document, it is not criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as
when it does not cause damage to the government. It may be different in the case of a public document with continuing interest affecting the public
welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified where the truth is necessary for the safeguard and protection of that general interest. In
the instant case, the time records have already served their purpose. They have not caused any damage to the government or third person because
under the facts duly proven, petitioner may be said to have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper permission from her superiors. They
may now even be condemned as having no more use to require their continued safe- keeping. Public interest has not been harmed by their contents,
and continuing faith in their verity is not affected.

As pointed out, the obligation to make entries in the daily time records of officers and employees in the Government service is a matter of administrative
procedural convenience in the computation of salary for a given period, characteristically, not an outright and strict measure of professional discipline,
efficiency, dedication, honestly and competence.

Under the proven and admitted facts, petitioner-appellant surely is entitled to receive the pay as if she had stayed in her office the whole period covered
by the official hours prescribed. ,She had perhaps made herself even more useful in the general benefit of the public than if she had remained practically
Idle in her office as Election Registrar with perhaps no work at all to attend to, its is generally the case long before elections take place, specially during
the martial law regime. The COMELEC must have been fully cognizant of the legal implications of the peculiar facts and circumstances that obtained in
this case, when it gave petitioner full clearance after she presented her resignation when an administrative charge was filed against her by the same
complainant as in the criminal charge. The courts, in the present criminal prosecution, should do no less. It would be too harsh and cruel for the courts to
punish petitioner not only with imprisonment but with general disqualification and possible disbarment, for an act or omission which she performed or
failed to perform without any criminal intent. Such an insignificant transgression, if ever it is one, would not beam the scales of justice against the
petitioner, for courts must always be, as they are, the repositories of fairness and justice. It is inconceivable that a person who, without any attempt to
conceal her appearances in court for this is a matter always made officially of record in the court proceedings, emphatically, not for his own private gain,
but animated by the zeal of service not wanting in public benefit, and as an officer of the court, petitioner could have acted with a deliberate criminal
intent. Moreover, what she stated in her daily time record, as earlier observed, had more than a mere color of truth to exclude such act from the pale of
the criminal offense of falsification of public document with which she is charged.

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of petitioner not to have been established beyond reasonable doubt, the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent
court in affirming that of the trial court is hereby reversed, and petitioner, acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04 February 22, 1982

PILAR S. LUAGUE, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 22414-16 CR which affirmed the decision of The Court of First Instance of Samar,
Branch X, convicting the petitioner of three counts of falsification of commercial documents in Criminal Cases Nos. 599, 600 and 601.

The facts are stated in the poorly written decision of the Court of Appeals thus:

Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk in the district office of Laoang II, Northern Samar, died at the G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital at
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 24, 1972 after he was confined in said hospital since January 3, 1972.

Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased's salary warrants [Exhibits A (599), A (600) and A (601)] to the
Superintendent of schools at Catarman Northern Samar who in turn forwarded them to the District Supervisor, Florencio Guillermo.
A payroll-warrant register accompanied the checks.

The paychecks delivered, Florencio Guillermo signed the payroll-warrant registers certifying that on his official oath, each employee
whose name appeared on the rolls had received the salary warrant indicated opposite his name on February 7, 1972, February 17,
1972 and February 25, 1972, respectively, and returned the same to Jose Figueroa, the District Administrative Officer of Northern
Samar.

Exhibit A (599) was personally received by Pilar S. Luague, while Exhibit A (600) was received by Glen S. Luague. Exhibit A (601)
was received by Edmundo Echano, a relative of Iliuminado Luague and who claimed to be employed in the Office of the District
Supervisor.

Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he asked appellant to return the treasury warrants issued in the
name of her husband Iluminado Luague, further claiming that appellant promised to do so, but actually did not. Upon the receipt of
the xerox copies from the IBM Section of the Bureau of Public Schools, Guillermo discovered that the treasury warrants in question
had been encashed by appellant and Glen Luague with different local stores at Laoang. Exhibit A (599) was cleared on February 22,
1972, while Exhibit A (600) was deposited to the account of a certain Lee and/or Nicol Chu, Jr. at Philippine Bank of
 Communications; and Exhibit A (601) was deposited to the account of Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. Appellant admitted having
endorsed the treasury warrants by means of which she was able to encash the same.

For signing the name of her husband Iluminado Luague as payee on three treasury warrants for purposes of endorsement,
appellant stands charged with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. [Note: The appellant was charged
with three counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial document but was convicted of falsification only.]

It is the petitioner's contention before Us as well as in the Court of Appeals that she acted in good faith or had no criminal intent when she cashed her
deceased husband's paychecks. As stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals:

Appellant puts up the defense of good faith in signing theme of her deceased husband in the treasury warrants in question.

Her version: The late Iluminado Luague was on leave from January 3 to February 9, 1972, as evidenced by his approved application
for sick leave. On January 23, 1972, the Principal, Jose Infante, while visiting Iluminado Luague in the hospital, handed to Luague a
check representing his differentials. Luague in turn handed over the check to his wife, the herein appellant, who was then present.
Before Infante left, he informed the Luague spouses that Luague's pay check for the second half of January 1972 had arrived and
advised Mrs. Luague to get the same from Florencio Guillermo so that she could use it to pay for medicine and hospital expenses of
her husband.

Iluminado Luague instructed her [his (sic)] wife to get the check from Florencio Guillermo. Appellant went to the house of Guillermo
in the afternoon of January 23, 1972. Guillermo asked her to sign the name of her husband on the payroll warrant register and
counter-sign with her initials. Guillermo then handed her the treasury warrant [Exhibit A (599)].

Iluminado Luague died on January 24, 1972. From the proceeds of the warrants they received were paid the amount the Luague
family owed the drugstores owned by Amor Carandang, Purisima Saba and Luz Tan. A treasury warrant was also paid to Edward
Kam from whom they bought construction materials for the tomb of the deceased and to Ong Kiat store for the payment of materials
used for the coffin of the late Iluminado Luague which were purchased on credit.

Upon the instruction of Amor Carandang and on her belief and upon suggestion of Florencio Guillermo himself that the warrants
could be used to settle their financial obligations incurred by the hospitalization and death of her late husband, appellant indorsed
the said treasury warrants by signing the name of Iluminado Luague.

Heirs of deceased government employees are entitled to whatever unpaid salaries the deceased employee failed to receive.
Appellant claims that it was upon this honest belief that she endorsed the treasury warrants of her late husband to defray for the
necessary expenses incurred due to the latter's hospitalization, funeral and burial.

The Court of Appeals did not reject the petitioner's version, except in respect of the date when the first paycheck was delivered. In affirming the decision
of the trial court, the Court of Appeals followed the simplistic procedure of applying literally the letter of the law, namely: there was falsification because
the petitioner "signed her husband's name in indorsing the treasury warrants in question." The Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following
facts: That the petitioner signed her husband's name to the checks because they were delivered to her by no less than her husband's district supervisor
long after the husband's death which was known to the supervisor; that she used the proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of her husband's
last illness and his burial; and that she believed that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment for her husband's vacation and sick leave
credits the money value of which exceeded the value of the checks. In the fight of these circumstances, We cannot ascribe criminal intent to the
petitioner. We sustain her claim that she acted in good faith.

During the hearing, it was brought out that the government did not sustain any financial loss due to the encashment of the checks because the
petitioner's husband had accumulated vacation and sick leaves the money value of which exceeded the value of the three paychecks and the value of
the checks was simply deducted from the money value of the leaves. This explains why the petitioner was not convicted of estafa but of falsification only.
While we do not mean to imply that if there is no damage there can be no falsification, We do say that the absence of damage is an element to be
considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent.

We notice here the lack of compassion on the part of the prosecuting fiscal, the trial judge, and the Court of Appeals. Even the Solicitor General who is
alert in seeking to correct improper convictions by trial courts has somehow misappreciated the evidence in this case.

The accused is a poor widow who was obviously in a state of bewilderment due to the recent death of her husband when she cashed the paychecks.
She was also in dire need of money to settle the expenses for her husband's last illness and his burial. A compassionate attitude repeatedly urged by the
First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, would have been highly in order under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the petitioner is acquitted of the charges against her. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

ON USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS

G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991

MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

KV. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.

FERNAN, C.J.:

On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitioner Michael T. Dava, then holder of non-professional driver's
license No. 14744271 with official receipt No. 7023037,2 bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to former
and physical injuries to the latter.

As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to Mandaluyong Police headquarters where his driver's license was confiscated by Cpl. Daniel
Severino who later submitted Dava's driver's license to the fiscal's office in Pasig, Rizal. license was thereafter presented as prosecution evidence in
criminal case for homicide and serious physical injuries reckless imprudence filed against Dava in the then Court First Instance of Rizal in Pasig. 3

On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava driving a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-type) car with
plate No. AD-902 B. Knowing that Dava's driver's license was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to Dava,
Roxas sought the help of then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a license. 4 The Ministry of Defense later
indorsed Roxas' request for assistance to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG).

At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978, M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya of the CHPG saw the maroon Volkswagen car described
by Roxas parked in front of the Uniwide Department Store near the then Nation theater in Cubao, Quezon City. When the driver and his companion
arrived, Lising and Viduya confronted them and asked the driver for his license. They were shown non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 5 with
official receipt No. 06058706 issued by Agency 2L Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava
informed them that his officemate had secured it for him.

Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG office in Camp Crame, Quezon City for questioning. Dava refused to give a statement upon the advice of
his lawyer. Lising then submitted a spot report to Col. Maristela stating therein that "subject had violated Section 31 of RA 4136 for false representation
in the application of a driver's license intended to be used as a legal license."7 In his affidavit of apprehension dated November 16, 1978, Lising stated
that he was 'about to book him for violation of Section 31 of Rep. Act 4136, when subsequent investigation revealed that the Driver's License above-
mentioned is a Fake and a Falsity' and therefore a case for falsification and use of falsified documents under Section 172 of the Revised Penal Code
should be filed against Dava.8 Lising concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake because when he compared it with the xerox copy of Dava's license
which was attached to the record of the criminal case in Pasig, the signatures and the dates of birth indicated in the two licenses did "not tally." 9

Accordingly, an information for falsification of a public document was filed against Dava in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon
City.10 One of the prosecution witnesses was Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT). He testified that
hen was then the registrar of the said office when Dava's driver' license was brought to him by lawyer Jose Francisco who was interested in knowing
whether it was genuine or fake and if was issued by the Angeles City agency of the BLT. He examine it and found out that it was "fake or illegally issued"
because form No. 2706887 was one of the fifty (50) forms which had been reported missing from their office sometime in November, 1976 and that it
was never issued to any applicant for a license.11He added that any license that was not included their office index card was considered as "coming from
illegal source' and "not legally issued by any agency."12

Vinluan stated that although the form used for the license was genuine,13 the signature of the issuing official was fake.14 He "believed" certain persons
had been apprehended for "plasticization" of licenses outside their office15 and that sometime November, 1976, agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation raided the house of a certain person who had in his possession some of the forms which had been missing from office. 16 He concluded that
the license was fake because the form was issued by the central office to the Angeles agency, the license appeared on its face to have been issued the
San Fernando, Pampanga agency.17

Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to then Court of Appeals18 which affirmed the lower court's decision on January 29, 1982. Dava
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the case. On April 27, 1982, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside its decision and issued a resolution the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is hereby reconsidered and set aside, and another judgment shall be entered annulling the
proceedings in the court a quo without prejudice to the refiling of the charges with the proper court. (Rollo, pp. 35-36.)

Consequently, the case was refiled with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 47 at San Fernando as Criminal Case No. 2422. The information
for falsification of a public document reads as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of April, 1978, and for sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MICHAEL T. DAVA, a private individual, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified, a Non-Professional Driver's license with Serial No. 2706887 covered by
Official Receipt No. 0605870, dated January 24, 1978, a public document, by making it appear that the signatories therein who are officials of
 the Pampanga LTC Agency participated in the preparation thereof, when in truth and in fact they did not so participate and the accused made
use of the same knowing it to be falsified.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Antonio Roxas who testified on how he saw Dava driving a car and that, knowing that Dava's license had been
confiscated as a result of the filing of the homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence case, he thereafter sought the assistance
of then Minister Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a license.19 For his part, Domingo Lising, who apprehended Dava, narrated in court how
he first saw Daya driving a car along Banahaw and N. Domingo Sts. in Quezon City until he finally confronted Dava at the vicinity of the Araneta
Coliseum and confiscated his driver's license. As earlier stated, he conclude that the driver's license shown to him by Dava was fake because he noticed
that, when compared with the license attached to record of the criminal case filed against Dava, the license confiscated bore a different signature and
date of birth.20

Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong police, testified that he investigated the traffic incident along Shaw Boulevard on October 19, 1975
which involved Dava and the two relatives of Antonio Roxas. He himself confiscated Dava's no professional driver's license No. 1474427 which he later
turn over to the fiscal's office.21

In the course of Severino's testimony, the defense counsel informed the court that, upon a resolution of the Court of Appeals, Dava was allowed by the
lower court having jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 16474 to withdraw his driver's license 1474427 from the records of said case. 22 When confronted
by the court, Dava volunteered that he withdrew said license in December, 1982 and surrendered it to the BLT Western District Office so that he could
renew his license.23 Hence, the evidence presented before the Court was a mere xerox copy of said license 24 which also bears a notation that Dava
received original driver's license and its receipt on December 15, 1982.25

Victor Martin, who had been the head of the San Fernando Pampanga branch of the BLT and whose name appears registrar thereof in official receipt
No. 0605870 which was supposed to be attached to Dava's driver's license No. 270688 admitted that the form of the said license was genuine although
he could not tell whether its contents were likewise genuine because it was "opened" and "spliced."26 He asserted, however, that since the said form "did
not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed" over his name, said license was "not OK". 27

Martin said that he was informed by the property section of the BLT regional office that the number in the license was one of "the numbers requisitioned
by (the) Angeles City agency."28 He affirmed that drivers license No. 2706887 "was not issued by (their) agency"29 although when recalled to the stand,
he admitted that the "2L" filled in the space for "Agency Code No." on the face of license No. 2706887 referred to the San Fernando agency. 30 Martin
also confirmed the genuineness of official receipt No. 0605870 although it was his assistant who signed it for him 31 and affirmed that the amount of
P10.00 indicated therein had been collected and received by his office.32

Lawyer Jose Francisco testified that he went to the Angeles City office of the BLT to see its chief and inquire about the number of driver's license issued
to Dava and whether said office had indeed issued them. According to him, the head of the office, Caroline Vinluan, advised him to verify from the index
card in the possession of the License Division head whether the Angeles City agency had indeed issued Dava's license. 33 Thereafter, the officer-in-
charge of the License Division of the BLT in East Avenue, Quezon City, Leonardo R. Medina, issued a certification dated December 24, 1979 to the
effect that non-professional drivers license No. 2706887 in the name of Dava was "not registered in (their) Index Card." 34

Francisco also informed the court that Carolino Vinluan, the former head of the Angeles City BLT agency, had died on May 12, 1980. 35 He offered in
evidence Vinluan's death certificate as Exh. J.

Another evidence presented by the prosecution was the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of Carolino Vinluan which was taken on
January 8, 1980 at the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-10759 before the then Court of First Instance Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City. It was marked as Exh.
K said exhibit was part of the record of Criminal Case No. 10759 which was transmitted to the Regional Trial Court Pampanga. 36

The defense presented only one witness: Felizardo Manalili. A friend of Dava and his former co-trainee at the Sandoz Philippines, a pharmaceutical firm,
Manalili testified that Dava quested him to secure a driver's license for him because he had none. Manalili went to the San Fernando office of the Land
Transportation Commission (LTC) where he used to secure own license. At the LTC branch office, he was "approached" 37 the fixers who roamed around
the compound. When he as them how much it would cost to secure a driver's license, he told that it would amount to P70 .00. 38 He agreed to pay
amount and gave the fixers the personal data of Dava.39

After an hour, the fixers gave Manalili the license which was inside a plastic jacket. (Manalili identified the license as Exh. B.) He examined it and found
out that it looked "like a genuine and authentic driver's license" to him. The license, which opened and unsealed, bore a signature in the portion which
showed the name Romeo Edu and contained all the personal data of Dava. Because it did not bear the signature of Dava Manalili immediately gave the
license to Dava and told him to sign it immediately. Dava did so in Manalili's presence. 40

On March 22, 1984, the lower court rendered a decision41 finding that the license in question was "fake or spurious", that was not duly issued by any
proper government licensing age and that the accused directly participated in the commission of the falsification or caused said falsification. The court
took into account the facts that Dava was "in dire need' of a license because of his work as a detailman; that he received his genuine license from the
court only on December 15, 1982, and that Dava himself personally requested his friend, Manalili, to secure the license for him. It arrived at the
conclusion that since Dava was the possessor or user of the fake license, he himself was the forger or the one who caused its forgery or falsification.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Michael T. Dava guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the came of
Falsification of a Public Document, as defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment of one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correecional as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and
ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum; and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Five Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
plus the costs of this suit.
 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dava appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court,42 which on September 30, 1985 affirmed in in toto the decision of the trial court. On February
27, 1986, the appellate court denied Dava's motion for the reconsideration of said decision finding that no new grounds had been raised therein. Hence,
the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner assails herein the reliance of the courts below on the testimony of Carolino Vinluan on the ground that being a part of the annulled
proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-10759, it may not be considered as admissible in evidence as it cannot qualify as a "testimony at a former trial"
under the provisions of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious. The resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 24312-CR, expressly annulled
the proceedings had in Criminal Case No. Q-10759 for lack of jurisdiction of the Quezon City court over the case. That ruling is founded on solid
jurisprudence. We had time and again held that in the absence of proof that the party raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction is barred by estoppel, 43 a
decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is a total nullity.44 Being worthless in itself, all the proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless.45 Hence, the testimony of Vinluan is not only inadmissible in evidence but may well be considered as totally nonexistent.

With the testimony of the late Carolino Vinluan out of the way, is there sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of petitioner for the crime charged?

The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear in his driver's license No. 2706887 that "officials of the Pampanga LTC
agency participated" in in-preparation and with having used the said driver's license knowing that it was falsified. The charges therefore are found on the
provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any private individual who shall commit any the falsification enumerated in Article
171 specifically paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of causing it to appear that persons (public officials) have participated in any act proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate. The information also charges Dava with having knowingly used a false document under the last paragraph of
Article 172.

The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that he had no driver's license, asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him. Sometime
in November, 1976, Manalili, who used to get his own driver's license in San Fernando, Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's driver's license No.
2706887 through fixers at the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) agency in said locality.46 On January 24, 1978, petitioner renewed his license at
the said office by paying the amount of P10.00 for which he was issued official receipt No. 0605870. 47

In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to present an official receipt showing that at the previous year the licensee had paid for
his driver's license to any agency of the LTC, and to pay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction did not involve the issuance of "another form," a
driver did not have to fill up an application form for the renewal of a license. The said agency would then issue an official receipt evidencing the renewal
of the license but the driver's license itself would not be changed.48

Thus. on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887 together with official receipt No. 86432149 were presented to the San Fernando LTC
agency, the personnel therein issued official-receipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner. Although the receipt was not personally signed by office
registrar Victor Martin but by his assistant, the receipt50 was genuine and the amount indicated therein was actually paid to and collected by the San
Fernando agency.51 The driver's license itself may not have been issued by said agency52 but its form was likewise genuine. However, according to
Martin, it was 'not OK' because it "did not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed over" his name therein. 53 Moreover, according to the
officer-in-charge of the license Division of the Bureau of Land Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, non-professional driver's license No. 2706887
in the name of Michael Dava Tolosa "is not registered" in their index card.54

Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one, the evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the actual falsifier.
Unfortunately, however, there are pieces of evidence which prove beyond reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification and made use of the falsified
driver's license knowing it to be so.

The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of
Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in
any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused
damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage.55 Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond reason
doubt in this case.

It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time
been issued a driver's license.56 Through this misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a driver's
license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner to perform duties as detailman, petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce
Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in so short a
without having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a sincere desire to help a friend,
did not hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he knew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid P70.00 for the license even if the legal fee then
was only P15.00.57 As it was in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili and
not petitioner who dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a principal
by inducement in the commission of said crime.

Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second driver's license No. 2706887. Having already obtained a driver's license, he
knew that it was not legally possible for him to secure another one. Otherwise, there would have been no need for him to misrepresent to his friend
Manalili that he was not then a holder of a driver's license. But even with this misrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to believe that Manalili
would be able to secure a driver's license through legal means in about an hour's time.58 The patent irregularity in obtaining driver's license No. 2706887
was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautious and prudent man as to its genuineness and authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified
that he himself was surprised when the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the driver's license of Michael Dava on November 4, 1976, a few hours
after he had sought the fixer's assistance.59 In those days, all plastic jackets emanated from the LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delay in the
release of the license applied for. Under these circumstances, no "reasonable and fairminded man" would say that petitioner did not know that his
license was a fake.60
A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document the
moment it is accomplished.61 Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and the signature of the region of the
San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, the driver's license became a public document.

The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that when petitioner was apprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in his
possession and it was what he presented Lising to show that he had a license. Because he was a detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it is
probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978, petitioner used driver's license No. 2706887.

The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another person or at least an intent to cause such
damage has become immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith and
the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.62

In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego,63 should be applied in his favor:

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting
thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged
documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the
forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People vs. De
Lara, 45 PMI. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28: People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). In the absence
of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger
(Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs. Caragao,
L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). (Emphasis supplied.)

We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absolute as it is subject to the exception that the accused
should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in possession of a false document.64 His explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly in
passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As stated above, Manalili himself could not have acted on his own accord without the prodding of petitioner.

We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in government agencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" who could do
things fast for the right amount. He is "not necessarily involved in the commission of forgery or falsification of official documents" and he shares his fees
with "insiders."65

Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government licensing agencies. Why they proliferate is a sad commentary not only on our bureaucracy
but also on our own people. While not all fixers are engaged in illegal activities for some simple serve as "facilitators," they nonetheless provide sources
for exploitation of the unknowing common people who transact business with the government and for corruption of the gullible government employees.
Their unwanted presence must be dealt with accordingly and the soonest this is undertaken by our government agencies the better for all of us.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby affirmed. Let a copy of this decision be served on that Department of
Transportation and Communication. Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ON USING FICTITIOUS NAME

G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984

CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Felipe O. Pascual for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari to review and reverse a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.

In the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, as
amended. The information against her reads:

That on or about November 4th, 1974, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully use the substitute or alias name CORAZON L. REYES, which is different from
Corazon Legamia y Rivera with which she was christened or by which she has been known since childhood, nor as a pseudonym
 for literary purpose and without having been previously authorized by a competent Court to do so; that it was discovered only on or
about November 4th, 1974. (Rollo, pp. 11-12.)

She was convicted by the trial court which sentenced her to an indeterminate prison term of only (1) year, as minimum, to two (2) years, as maximum; to
pay a fine a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment; and to pay the costs. The trial court recommended, however, that she be extended executive clemency. On
appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the sentence was affirmed in toto. Hence the instant petition.

The facts:

Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in
arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on October 18, 1971.

From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes;
and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.

Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's
death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes."
The voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."

For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's
prosecution. Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that which is due to each legitimate child in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code" per advice given by Atty. Diomedes A. Bragado of the Agricultural Credit Administration to Felicisima. (Rollo, pp. 14-15.)

The law:

Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he
was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien,
with which he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been
baptized have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. (As amended by R.A. No. 6085.)

The issue:

Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestated?

The resolution:

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that
the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be
Identified who are living with men prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his
family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because
ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed.

In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and
his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a
boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because
some of them probably had their own Corazons.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set aside; the petitioner is acquitted of the charge. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 177 USURPATION

[G.R. No. 9405. December 24, 1914. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADEL HERNANDEZ ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Lucas Paredes for Appellants.

Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.

 SYLLABUS

1. SEDUCTION; SENTENCE; RECOGNITION OF OFFSPRING. — When the case shows by the statement of the injured girl herself that in two years of
carnal intercourse with the offender she had no offspring, nor had she been pregnant, and that since March 1, 1912, they had been definitely separated,
the complaint having been filed on July 3, 1913, there is no ground for sentencing the offender to recognize the offspring, "if in due time any should be
had," since there would be no offspring as a result of the crime. (Decision of October 7, 1903.)

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

Adel Hernandez, in order to enjoy a girl of 15 years, named Elena M. Santos, had a talk with the other defendant, Juan Bautista; between them they
concocted a plan and then he proposed marriage to the girl. She agreed and was told to come to a house, No. 104 Calle Isaac Peral, in Ermita. The girl
left the school she was attending (Meisic Intermediate) to keep the engagement, and there Juan Bautista, under the name of Aniceto de Castro, a
fictitious name, made out that he was a Protestant minister and before two women who pretended to be witnesses he simulated the performance of a
marriage ceremony. Afterwards he certified, issuing the suitable document, that Adel Hernandez and Elena M. Santos "were legally united in holy
matrimony by me" (says Bautista) "in the presence of Maxima Rambel and Manuela Agustin." Bautista also certified, over the name of "Aniceto de
Castro, Protestant minister," that "the contracting parties were of the age fixed by the law for contracting it." (Exhibit A.) In the certificate the age of the
girl was set down as 20 years when she was only 15.

After the ceremony had been performed, Elena M. Santos returned to her parents’ house and did not join Adel Hernandez. According to her, she went on
thus for several months. Both before and after the ceremony in Calle Isaac Peral, Adel Hernandez visited her in her house as a teacher and as such was
received by the girl’s mother. But during the lesson one afternoon, her mother caught them in dalliance and scolded her daughter, so that the latter felt
compelled to declare that they were married, showing Exhibit A.

Convinced that they were married, the mother received Adel Hernandez in her house, and Adel Hernandez and Elena M. Santos lived therein as a
married couple. So they continued for two years, but Elena did not conceive of Adel nor did they have any offspring. But on March 1, 1912, Adel
Hernandez told Elena that he was going to enter a college in Calle Almansa to continue his studies. Elena went to visit him in said college twice, but the
second time she did not find him there. He had gone to the provinces.

He returned from the provinces and Elena, accompanied by her mother, had an interview with him and finally made an agreement of separation before a
lawyer who drew up the grounds therefor, which were signed by both of them in a notarial instrument in the presence of two witnesses; but when the
lawyer saw Exhibit A he then learned that it was not a genuine but a simulated marriage.

The matter having been reported to the secret service, in this case that on July 1, 1913, he conducted the investigation regarding the false marriage
certificate and Adel Hernandez told him that he had in fact taken Elena on January 31, 1909, to the house at No. 104 Calle Isaac Peral before Juan
Bautista, and when asked why he had not taken her to a real minister of some religion to get married, he replied that Elena’s parents were forcing him by
threats to marry her, and what he did was to reach an understanding with a friend of his, Juan Bautista, in order to make it appear that he had got
married; he did not apply to a real minister of religion, because his parents had not given their consent to his marriage with the girl; that he had lived with
her some six months; that house, No. 104 Calle Isaac Peral, belonged to his women friends who figure as witnesses in Exhibit A. With reference to Juan
Bautista, Marshall stated that he was examined by him, Marshall, on the afternoon of the same day, July 1, 1913, regarding the document Exhibit A, and
Bautista told him that he had written it at the request of Adel Hernandez, who "asked him to make out this document so that he might have carnal
intercourse with that girl;" that he signed "Aniceto de Castro, Protestant minister," because his friend Adel Hernandez begged him to make out the
document so that, as has been said, "he might have complete liberty with that woman" and to put down everything he might wish.

Adriano Herrera, who acted as interpreter in these declarations, corroborated them and added that "Adel Hernandez declared the document to be false,
and that he had made it out as such solely in order to deceive the injured girl," and that Juan Bautista declared that he was the author of the document
and had made it out in order to please his intimate friend Adel Hernandez, "so that the latter might exercise complete liberty over Elena M. Santos by
demonstrating that they were joined in marriage."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence the criminal complaint filed on July 3, 1913, drawn up in these terms: That Adel Hernandez, by means of false promises of marriage and availing
himself of a simulated ceremony, seduced Elena Miclat Santos, a virgin over 12 and under 23 years, and succeeded in having carnal intercourse and in
living in marital relations with her; that in the commission of this crime, Juan Bautista, conspiring and confederating with Adel Hernandez, took part as a
principal through acts of cooperation without which the crime could not have been consummated, simulating and pretending to be a Protestant and a
minister authorized to perform marriage ceremonies, and simulating that he was performing a marriage ceremony between said Adel Hernandez and
Elena Miclat Santos in order thus the more easily to deceive said injured girl and cause her to live in marital relations, as she in fact did, with the
defendant Adel Hernandez.

The Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced Adel Hernandez, as guilty of seduction, to four months of arresto mayor, to pay one-half of the
costs of the trial, to endow the injured girl with the sum of P500 Philippine currency, or in case of insolvency to the equivalent subsidiary imprisonment,
and to recognize and maintain the offspring in due time, if there were any. It sentenced Juan Bautista, as accomplice of the foregoing convict, to a fine of
325 pesetas, or in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment according to law, and to pay the other half of the costs. Both defendants
appealed.

The first thing they allege, with respect to procedure, is that the lower court erred in denying their petition for the transfer of the hearing in the case to
another day. This ground of error cannot be sustained. The right of the accused, after their plea, is to request a period of two days at least, in order to
prepare their defense. They pleaded "not guilty," according to the record of the case, on July 7, 1913. On the 15th next subsequent, they acknowledged
summons to appear for trial, which was to take place on the 22d. They had sufficient time to prepare their evidence, and they did not request any time to
prepare their defense until the trial had actually commenced.

With respect to the merits of the case, it is contended that it is erroneous to affirm that the accused Adel Hernandez committed seduction on the person
of Elena M. Santos. But there is nothing clearer than that this defendant, by means of deception, succeeded in enjoying the girl — the fact is evident not
only from the testimony of witnesses, but also from documents demonstrating the deception and by facts not denied or controverted at the trial by the
defendant himself, that he had enjoyed the girl by living in marital relations with her only when her mother was informed from the false certificate of
marriage, issued by a pretended Protestant minister, that they were married.

With reference to the responsibility of the defendants, the part of accomplice cannot be attributed to Juan Bautista; for he was a principal; it was really he
who supplied the essential element of deception without which there would not have existed in the present case the crime of seduction, "cooperating in
the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished." (Penal Code, art. 13, No. 3.)

But furthermore, as the prosecuting attorney remarks in this instance, he cooperated in the commission of the act by an act that in itself constitutes
another crime. He is thus really on a par with one who cooperates in the commission of a fraud by means of the falsification of a document which in itself
is another crime. The law. (Penal Code, art. 328) says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Anyone who, without legal right or legitimate cause, shall perform acts properly pertaining to any person in authority or a public officer, assuming an
official character, shall be punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium degree."cralaw virtua1aw library

Without legal right Juan Bautista performed an act properly pertaining to a person in authority, assuming the official character of a minister of a religious
sect in order to legalize a marriage, and issuing a certificate, signed moreover, with a false name under the predication, in an additional signature, of
being a Protestant minister. The crime charged in the information is, therefore, the complex one of seduction by means of usurpation of functions
Hernandez was likewise a coprincipal by inducement to this crime actually committed by Bautista. Marshall said that it appeared from his investigation
that Bautista made out the marriage certificate at the instance of an intimate friend of his called Adel Hernandez, and that the latter admitted that he had
made that request because he wanted to live with a female cousin of his — "he reached an understanding with an intimate friend of his called Juan
Bautista, in order to make out this document, so as to make it appear that he had got married" (p. 29). "I acceded to this request," said Bautista in his
turn, "and I made out the document; the reason was because this friend of mine, Adel Hernandez, begged me to make out the document so that he
might have complete liberty with that woman and he asked me to put down everything I might wish."cralaw virtua1aw library

Adriano Herrera testified that Adel Hernandez stated, as the previous witness has said, that the document was false and that he had made it out solely
as such in order to deceive the injured girl; and that Juan Bautista stated that he made out this document only in order to please Adel Hernandez who
had told him of his desire to possess Elena M. Santos.

"Those who directly force or induce others to commit a crime are considered as principals." (Penal Code, art. 13.)

"Inducement exists if the compact, the command, or the advice is of such a nature that without its concurrence the crime would not have been
committed." (Decision of December 2, 1902.)

"Fixing of individual responsibility is only proper when between the proposals and the acts of each defendant there is the necessary independence for
weighing them separately, not when there exist unity of action and mutual assistance." (Decision of October 4, 1901.)

This being so, according to article 89 of the Penal Code, only the penalty for the more serious crime will be imposed, to be applied in its maximum
degree, which, in this case, is the Penalty for the crime of usurpation of functions — that is, the maximum degree of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium degrees — two years eleven months and eleven days to four years and two months.

Both the trial court and the prosecuting attorney in this instance agree that the defendant Adel Hernandez must recognize and support the offspring if in
due time any should be had. But Elena M. Santos, the injured girl, testified in these words:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q. How long did you and Adel live together in your mother’s house? — A. Over two years.

"Q. Did Adel Hernandez live there, sleep there, and also eat there? — A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Did you live a life of complete marital relations? — Yes, sir.

"Q. Were you ever pregnant? — A. No, sir.

"Q. So you haven’t any offspring? — A. No, sir.

"Q. When did you and Adel separate? — A. The year 1912; he asked my permission to enter a college in order to finish his course of study. I went to the
college twice, and the second time I went I didn’t find him any more.

"Q. And since then he hasn’t returned to your house? — A. No, sir." (p. 24.)

This admitted, there is no ground for decreeing the forcible recognition of the offspring that in the year 1912 or since July 3, 1913, the date of the
complaint, the injured girl could or might have had.

On August 4 last Juan Bautista withdrew his appeal and his withdrawal was entered on the record on the 6th next following. The appeal actually pending
is solely that of Adel Hernandez.

On the foregoing grounds, Adel Hernandez is sentenced to two years eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional, to endow the injured girl
with P500 Philippine currency, and to pay one-half of the costs.

G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008 Decision1 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-
0039 to 0259, which convicted Leovegildo R. Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar, Quezon, of Usurpation of Official Functions penalized under
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed
of civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest
products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the organizational meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and
Chairperson of TIPAN, an environmental non-government organization that operates in the municipalities of General Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon
province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall
issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.2

Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of
which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T.
Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.3

On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or
Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.

Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person given the permit, and official receipt number, the said Informations uniformly
read:

That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in General Nakar, Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol and Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal
Administrator, respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of their official position and committing the offense in relation to their office,
conspiring and confederating with each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest product)
to (person given the permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number) under the pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so,
such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The details for each Information are as follows:5

Criminal Date of Description of Forest Person Given the Official

Case No. Commission Product Permit Receipt No.

0039 20 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat/ David Villareal Jr. 1623446
marang

0040 16 Jan. 2004 600 board ft lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623463

0041 15 Jan. 2004 100 pcs. malaruhat Francisco Mendoza 1708352

(assorted sizes)

0042 15 Jan. 2004 300 cubic m or 3,000 board Edmundo dela Vega 1708353
ft good lumber

0043 15 Jan. 2004 600 board ft good lumber David Villareal, Jr. 1708321

0044 15 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft good lumber Romeo Sabiduria 1708322

0045 12 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1625521

0046 09 Jan. 2004 4,000 board ft good lumber Naty Orozco 1623421
(assorted sizes)

0047 08 Jan. 2004 700 board ft lauan Winnie Aceboque 1623415

0048 05 Jan. 2004 500 board ft lauan Edmundo dela Vega 1623041

0049 07 Jan. 2004 4 x 5 haligi Mercy Vargas 1623314

0050 06 Jan. 2004 good lumber Mario Pujeda 1623310

0051 21 Oct. 2002 1,000 board ft sliced Conchita Odi 0830825

lumber

0052 21 Oct. 2002 400 board ft sliced lumber Lita Crisostomo 0830826

0053 28 Oct. 2002 450 board ft marang Agosto Astoveza 0830829

lumber
0054 08 Jan. 2003 300 board ft sliced lumber Edna E. Moises 0943941
(assorted sizes)

0055 13 Jan. 2003 1,500 board ft sliced Dante Z. Medina 0943964

lumber (assorted sizes)

0056 16 Jan. 2003 400 board ft sliced lumber Johnny A. Astoveza 0943975
(assorted sizes)

0057 27 Jan. 2003 7 pcs sliced lumber & 1 Sonny Leynes 1181827
piece 18 roda

0058 14 Feb. 2003 2,000 pcs trophy (wood Flordeliza Espiritu 1182033
carvings)

0059 17 Feb. 2003 700 board ft sliced lumber Nestor Astejada 1181917
(assorted sizes)

0060 18 Feb. 2003 1,632 board ft hard wood, Arthur/ Lanie 1182207
kisame & sanipa Occeña

0061 20 Feb. 2004 126 pcs lumber Lamberto 1708810

Aumentado

0062 3 March 2003 450 board ft hard wood Nestor Astoveza 1182413
(assorted sizes)

0063 6 March 2003 160 pcs sliced lumber Remedios Orozco 1182366
(assorted sizes)

0064 10 March 2003 1,500 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1181996

(assorted sizes)

0065 11 March 2003 900 board ft sliced lumber Fernando Calzado 1182233
(assorted sizes)

0066 13 March 2003 1,408 board ft hard wood Nestor Astejada 1182553
(assorted sizes)

0067 20 March 2003 90 pcs. sliced lumber Remy Orozco 1182157

(assorted sizes)

0068 21 March 2003 90 pcs. sliced lumber Rene Francia 1182168

(assorted sizes)

0069 25 March 2003 500 board ft lumber Thelma Ramia 1182179

(assorted sizes)

0070 26 March 2003 1 pc. 60 x 75 bed (narra) Roy Justo 1182246

finished product

0071 14 April 2004 95 pcs. kalap (9 ft.); 6 pcs. Anita Solloza 3651059
post (10 ft.) & 500 pcs.
Anahaw

0072 08 April 2004 460 board ft lumber Remy Orozco 3651101

(assorted sizes)

0073 14 April 2004 69 pcs. sliced lumber Dindo America 3651101

(assorted sizes)

0074 23 April 2003 870 board ft hard lumber Amado Pradillada 3651268
(assorted sizes)

0075 24 April 2003 400 board ft lumber Romy Buendicho 3651237

(assorted sizes)

0076 24 April 2003 400 board ft rattan Emmanuel 3651324

Buendicho

0077 30 April 2004 1,000 board ft good lumber Mylene Moises 3651335-C
(assorted sizes)

0078 30 April 2004 500 board ft sliced lumber Carlito Vargas 3651336
(assorted sizes)

0079 08 May 2003 72 x 78 bed (narra); 3 pcs. Fely Justo 3651519

60 x 75 bed (ling manok)
& 1 pc. 48 x 75 ed (kuling
manok) finished product

0080 12 May 2003 294 board ft lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 3650927

0081 13 May 2003 43 pcs. sliced lumber Amando Lareza 3651783
(assorted sizes)

0082 14 May 2003 750 board ft good lumber Wilma Cuerdo 3651529

0083 15 May 2003 440 board ft lumber Marte Cuballes 3651532

0084 15 May 2003 214 pcs. 2x6x7 or 1,500 Anneliza Vargas 3651531
board ft finished product

0085 26 May 2003 57 pcs. sliced lumber Danny Sanchez 3651585

(assorted sizes)

0086 27 May 2003 400 board ft cut woods Emy Francia 3651394

0087 30 May 2003 300 board ft lumber Daisy Cuerdo 3650943

0088 30 May 2003 1,000 board ft lumber Lea Astoveza 3651161

(assorted sizes)

0089 05 June 2003 130 pcs. or 1,500 board ft Jose Noly Moises 3651809
lumber cut woods

0090 06 June 2003 300 board ft lumber Mercy Escaraga 3651169

0091 18 June 2003 800 board ft good lumber Dante Medena 3651749

0092 24 June 2003 28 pcs. good lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 1247102

(assorted sizes)

0093 25 June 2003 190 pcs. good lumber Dante Medina 1247205
(assorted sizes)

0094 02 July 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Dante Medina 1247221

0095 02 July 2003 105 pcs. fresh cut lumber Emmanuel Lusang 1247167
(assorted sizes)

0096 04 July 2003 Assorted sizes of good Alberto dela Cruz 1247172
Lumber

0097 07 July 2003 Bulukan woods Conchita Ligaya 1247175

0098 07 July 2003 6 pcs. Haligi Jane Bulagay 1247173

0099 11 July 2003 700 board ft. cut woods Dominador Aveno 1247452

0100 14 July 200 800 board ft. cut wood/ Dante Medina 1247180
lumber

0101 16 July 2003 600 board ft. cut lumber Rachelle Solana 1247182

0102 23 July 2003 1,200 board ft. hard lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247188

0103 23 July 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1247129

0104 28 July 2003 959 board ft. cut lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247428

0105 29 July 2003 600 board ft. lumber Marilou Astejada 1247191

0106 01 Aug. 2003 1,000 board Malaruhat Ruel Ruzol 1247198

0107 05 Aug. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Virgilio Aumentado 1322853

0108 08 Aug. 2003 4.8 cubic ft. Amlang Rosa Turgo 1322862
woods

0109 12 Aug. 2003 788 Board ft. cut woods Maria Teresa 1322865
Adornado

0110 25 Aug. 2003 500 board ft. assorted Romy Buendicho 1322929
lumber

0111 28 Aug. 2003 2 sala sets Roy Justo 1322879

0112 29 Aug. 2003 456 pieces good lumber Marilou Astejada 1323056
(assorted sizes)

0113 03 Sept. 2003 5 cubic ft softwoods Rosa Turgo 1322834

(assorted sizes)

0114 05 Sept. 2003 1,000 board ft. good Agustin Vargas 1323064
lumber (assorted sizes)
0115 08 Sept. 2003 80 pcs. wood post Peter Banton 1323124

0116 09 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (soft wood) Efifania V. Astrega 1323023

0117 11 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (assorted Noling Multi 1323072

species) Purpose Corp.

0118 11 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Agustin Vargas 1323071

0119 12 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1323073
(assorted sizes)

0120 15 Sept. 2003 950 board ft. Malaruhat Edna Moises 1323128

0121 16 Sept. 2003 14 pcs. Panel door Roy Justo 1323041

0122 17 Sept. 2003 546 board ft. soft woods Mr. Marquez 1322951

0123 19 Sept. 2003 1,600 board ft. good Decembrano 1323085

lumber (assorted sizes) Sabiduria

0124 22 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Jeffrey dela Vega 1323095

0125 22 Sept. 2003 1 Jeep load hard wood Federico Marquez 1323100

0126 25 Sept. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/ Virgilio Villareal 1323252
Marang

0127 03 Oct. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/ Virgilio Villareal 1323252
Marang

0128 02 Oct. 2003 60 pcs. good lumber Nestor Astorza 1482662

(assorted sizes)

0129 03 Oct. 2003 1,600 board ft. good Virgilio Villareal 1482666
lumber (assorted sizes)

0130 03 Oct. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Amado Pradillada 1482815
(assorted sizes)

0131 03 Oct. 2003 1 full load (soft wood) Flordeliza Espiritu 1482867

0132 03 Oct. 2003 6,342 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482716

0133 03 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482717

0134 07 Oct. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Mylene Moises 1482670
(assorted sizes)

0135 13 Oct. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Acebaque 1482734
(assorted sizes)

0136 13 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Bautista 1482740
(assorted sizes)

0137 13 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Lawaan Trinidad Guerero 1482774
(assorted sizes)

0138 16 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Lawaan Federico Marquez 1482782

0139 17 Oct. 2003 4,602 board ft. good Nenita Juntreal 1482787
lumber (assorted sizes)

0140 20 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat Belen Ordinado 1482793
(assorted sizes)

0141 23 Oct. 2003 66 pcs. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1482847

(assorted sizes)

0142 25 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. good Dante Medina 1323277
lumber

0143 27 Oct. 2003 1,800 board ft. good Dante Medina 1482951
lumber (assorted sizes)

0144 28 Oct. 2003 1,254 board ft. good Jonathan Supremo 1323281
lumber (assorted sizes)

0145 28 Oct. 2003 2,500 board ft. lumber Ramir Sanchez 1483001
(assorted sizes)

0146 28 Oct. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Rolando Franela 1323280
(assorted sizes)
0147 03 Nov. 2003 850 finished products Naty Orozco 1483020
(cabinet component,
balusters, door jambs)

0148 03 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. good lumber Elizabeth Junio 1483022
(assorted sizes) & 6
bundles of sticks

0149 10 Nov. 2003 1,770 board ft. good Dante Medina 1483032
lumber (assorted sizes)

0150 10 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483033

0151 12 Nov. 2003 900 board ft. lumber Federico Marquez 1483041
(assorted sizes)

0152 12 Nov. 2003 Mini dump truck good Rizalito Francia 1483042
lumber (assorted sizes)

0153 14 Nov. 2003 500 components, 100 pcs Annie Gonzales 1483070
balusters (assorted sizes of
stringers, tassels)

0154 14 Nov. 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Winnie Aceboque 1323287

0155 17 Nov. 2003 1,600 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483072
lumber (assorted sizes)

0156 05 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. Tapil & 7 Belen Ordinado 1483023
pcs. 1x10x14

0157 05 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Leonardo Aveno 1623003
(assorted sizes)

0158 05 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1483027

0159 07 Nov. 2003 433 bundles of semi-finished products Naty Orozco 1483031

0160 08 Nov. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Armando Pradillada 1483134
(assorted sizes)

0161 25 Nov. 2003 30 pcs. sliced lumber Ariel Molina 1632059

0162 19 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. good Dante Medina 1623053
lumber (assorted sizes)

0163 20 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Maria Teresa 1323288
(assorted sizes) Adornado

0164 20 Nov. 2003 1,500 board ft. good Romeo Sabiduria 1483080
lumber (assorted sizes)

0165 21 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1623057
lumber (assorted sizes)

0166 25 Oct. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber Federico Marquez 1322982
(assorted sizes)

0167 25 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483090

0168 25 Nov. 2003 70 bundles of Rattan Manuel Buendicho 1483095

(assorted sizes)

0169 28 Nov. 2003 6,542 board ft. finished Nenita Juntareal 1623019
products (cabinet and
components)

0170 01 Dec. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1623061

0171 01 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1483123

0172 01 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. lumber Belen Ordinado 1623063
(assorted sizes)

0173 03 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. Laniti Rosa Turgo 1483125

0174 04 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Dante Medina 1483127

0175 04 Dec. 2003 26 pcs. lumber (assorted Nenita Juntareal 1483128

sizes) & 2 bundles of sticks

0176 05 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483131
0177 08 Dec. 2003 678 board ft. good lumber Elenor Rutaquio 1623082
(assorted sizes)

0178 08 Dec. 2003 200 board ft. lumber William Rutaquio 1623010
(assorted sizes)

0179 09 Dec. 2003 1,800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1623090

0180 12 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good Angelo Avellano 1623099
lumber (assorted sizes)

0181 12 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good Angelo Avellano 1623099
lumber (assorted sizes)

0182 12 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1483147

0183 16 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Malaruhat Jonathan Marcial 1623033

0184 16 Dec. 2003 650 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1482987

0185 16 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1482986

0186 18 Dec. 2003 100 board ft. lumber Aladin Aveno 1322992

0187 19 Dec. 2003 780 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1323000

0188 19 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. coco Felecita Marquez 1322998
lumber

0189 22 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. lumber Belen C. Ordinado 1623209

0190 29 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Aciboque 1623211

0191 29 Dec. 2003 300 board ft. lumber Yolanda Crisostomo 1623210

0192 30 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. Lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623215

0193 20 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1483086
(assorted sizes)

0194 30 June 2003 450 board ft. fresh cut Mylene Moises 1247126
lumber

0195 13 July 2001 1 L-300 load of finished Evangeline Moises 9894843-Q

and semi-finished products

0196 02 July 2001 96 pcs. good lumber Rollie L. Velasco 9894996-Q

(assorted sizes)

0197 07 May 2004 1,500 board ft. babayahin Nemia Molina 200647
lumber

0198 19 April 2004 107 pcs. sliced lumber Carlo Gudmalin 1868050
(assorted sizes)

0199 5 March 2004 10 pcs. Deadwood Elizabeth Junio 1708899

(Bulakan)

0200 2 March 2004 600 board ft. Amalang Roda Turgo 1867608
wood

0201 1 March 2004 149 sliced lumber (assorted Necito Crisostomo 1708891
sizes)

0202 1 March 2004 80 bundles of rattan Manuel Buendicho 1708890

0203 23 Feb. 2004 30 pcs. sliced lumber Leonardo Aveno 1708863

(assorted sizes)

0204 13 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Federico Marquez 1708698
(assorted sizes)

0205 12 Feb. 2004 69 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Florencio Borreo 1708694
(assorted sizes)

0206 17 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Ronnie Astejada 1708774
(assorted sizes)

0207 04 Feb. 2004 600 board ft. sliced lumber Pepito Aumentado 1708486
(assorted sizes)

0208 1 March 2004 21 pcs. Lawaan (assorted Atan Marquez 1708878

sizes)
0209 4 Feb. 2004 563 board ft. sliced lumber Decembrano 1708487
(assorted sizes) Sabiduria

0210 06 Feb. 2004 80 pcs. Buukan (Ugat) Maila S. Orozco 1708547

0211 30 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good Pepito Aumentado 1708534
lumber (assorted sizes)

0212 29 Jan. 2004 950 board ft. good lumber Leonardo Moises 1708528
(assorted sizes)

0213 28 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good Pepito Aumentado 1708518
lumber (assorted sizes)

0214 28 Jan. 2004 5, 000 board ft. good Carmelita Lorenzo 1708521
lumber (assorted sizes)

0215 28 Jan. 2004 350 board ft. good lumber Amando Pradillada 1708368
(assorted sizes)

0216 23 Jan. 2004 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1708517
(assorted sizes)

0217 21 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft. good Romeo Sabiduria 1708508
lumber (assorted sizes)

0218 06 April 2004 800 board ft. sliced lumber Mylene Moises 1868025
(assorted sizes)

0219 11 March 2004 300 pieces or 1, 200 board Ernesto Aumentado 1708975
ft. sliced lumber (assorted
sizes)

0220 02 Feb. 2004 7,000 board ft. good Carmelita Lorenzo 1708376
lumber

0221 08 Jan. 2004 600 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1623451

0222 10 Dec. 2003 300 pieces good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1623096

0223 18 Nov. 2003 6,432 board ft. assorted Naty Orozco 1483048
species

0224 30 Oct. 2003 8,000 board ft. Malauban Ma. Teresa 1483019
Adornado

0225 21 Oct. 2003 1,770 board ft. good Dante Medina 1482796
lumber (assorted sizes)

0226 21 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Malaruhat Leonardo S. Aveno 1323271
(assorted sizes)

0227 21 Oct. 2003 10,875 board ft. lumber Annie Gonzales 1323273
(assorted sizes)

0228 20 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. sliced lumber Bernardo Gonzalvo 1482835

0229 17 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft. lumber Naty Orozco 1482834

0230 17 Oct. 2003 16 pcs. panel door Roy Justo 1482743

(finished product)

0231 01 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. good lumber Analiza Vargas 1482710
(assorted sizes)

0232 01 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Malaruhat Engr. Mercado 1482760
(assorted sizes)

0233 30 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. sliced lumber Mylene Moises 1482810
(assorted sizes)

0234 29 Sept. 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Wennie Acebuque 1482703
(assorted sizes)

0235 15 Sept. 2003 1,500 board ft. malaruhat Decembrano 1323076

lumber (assorted sizes) Sabiduria

0236 10 Sept. 2003 200 board ft. good lumber Junier Franquia 1323027
(assorted sizes)

0237 29 Aug. 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Annaliza Vargas 1322830
 0238 07 Aug. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber Abilardo dela Cruz 1247200
(assorted sizes)

0239 06 Aug. 2003 1,000 board ft. hardwood Jennifer Nudalo 1322802

0240 25 June 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Roy Justo 1247024

0241 26 May 2003 800 board ft. lumber Adelino Lareza 3651096

0242 26 May 2003 Assorted sizes good lumber Rollie Velasco 3651587

0243 23 May 2003 342 sliced lumber (assorted Dolores S. Gloria 3651499
sizes)

0244 20 May 2003 500 board ft. lumber Marylyn de Loreto/ 3651574
Melita Masilang

0245 02 May 2003 123 pieces sliced lumber Armando Lariza 3651656
(assorted sizes)

0246 17 Feb. 2003 70 pieces sliced lumber Efren Tena/ Romeo 1182204
(assorted sizes) Serafines

0247 07 Feb. 2003 1 piece narra bed; 1 piece Roy D. Justo 1182060
narra panel door; 6 pcs.
Refrigerator stand & 1 pc.
Narra cabinet (finished
product)

0248 05 Dec. 2002 140 pcs. round poles Lamberto R. Ruzol 0943647

0249 20 Nov. 2002 500 board ft. lumber Luz Astoveza 0943618
(assorted sizes)

0250 30 Oct. 2002 1,200 board ft. sliced Arceli Fortunado 0830698
lumber (assorted sizes)

0251 04 Oct. 2002 500 board ft. Huling Roy Justo 0830646
Manok

0252 27 Sept. 2002 300 board ft. sliced lumber Roy Justo 0830625
(assorted sizes)

0253 24 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced Inna L. Customerado 0830771
lumber (assorted sizes)

0254 23 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced Normelita L. 0830610

lumber (assorted sizes) Curioso

0255 03 Sept. 2002 2,000 pcs. trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 686642

carvings) Espiritu

0256 7 March 2002 2,000 sets trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 090549

carvings) Espiritu

0257 03 Dec. 2001 10,000 sets trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 090769

carvings) Espiritu

0258 12 Sept. 2001 1,075 board ft of sticks & Lea A. Rivera 7786333
1,450 board ft. Bollilo
(assorted sizes)

0259 07 Oct. 2003 Assorted lumber Roy D. Justo 1482765

Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence and submit the
case for decision based on the documentary evidence and joint stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Order. Thereafter, the accused and the
prosecution submitted their respective memoranda.6

Ruzol's Defense

As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his innocence based on following arguments:

(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to issue permits to transport forest products pursuant to
RA 7160 which give the LGU not only express powers but also those powers that are necessarily implied from the powers expressly granted
as well as those that are necessary, appropriate or incidental to the LGU’s efficient and effective governance. The LGU is likewise given
powers that are essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the inhabitants. The general welfare clause provided in Section 16,
Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of R.A. 7160 is a massive grant of authority that enables LGUs to perform or exercise just about any power that
will benefit their local constituencies.
 (2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities of the DENR to the LGU. And the permits to
transport were issued pursuant to the devolved function to manage and control communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers.

(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the payment of Transport Fees levied by the municipality for the use of local public
roads for the transport of salvaged forest products. Under (a) Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title One
Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186, Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A. 7160, the municipality is granted the power to
create its own sources of revenue and to levy fees in accordance therewith.

(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber or lumber is denominated "Certificate of Timber Origin" or CTO for logs
and "Certificate of Lumber Origin" or CLO for lumber; hence, even if accused issued the Transport Permits on his side, a person wanting to
transport the said forest products would have to apply and obtain a CTO or CLO from the DENR. The Transport Permits issued by the
accused were never taken as a substitute for the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why said permits contain the annotation "Subject to
DENR rules, laws and regulations."

(5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The Transport Permits were issued by accused Sabiduria in his capacity as
Municipal Administrator and his mere issuance is not enough to impute upon the accused Ruzol any transgression or wrongdoing that may
have been committed in the issuance thereof following the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA 309).

(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of the 221 Transport permits through the Provincial Environment and
natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.

(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority since they did not act "under the pretense of official position," accused Ruzol
having issued the permits in his capacity as Mayor and there was no pretense or misrepresentation on his part that he was an officer of
DENR.7

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a Decision, acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases as follows:

1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is hereby rendered finding him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Two Hundred
Twenty One (221) counts of the offense of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to suffer for each case a straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY.

However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be entitled to the benefit of the three-fold rule as provided in Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused GUILLERMO M. SABIDURIA is ACQUITTED of all 221 charges. The cash bond posted by him
for his provisional liberty may now be withdrawn by said accused upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof subject
to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. The hold departure procedure issued by this Court dated 16 April 2008 is set aside and the
Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 29 April 2008 including the name of Sabiduria in the Hold Departure List is ordered recalled
and cancelled.

SO ORDERED.8

The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport permits with respect to salvaged forest products lies with
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved to the local government of General
Nakar.9 To the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official functions of the DENR.

The Issue

The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of Ruzol for usurpation revolves around the validity of the subject permits to
transport, which in turn resolves itself into the question of whether the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest product is
solely with the DENR, and no one else.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Subsidiary Issue:

Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid

In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs), has the authority to issue transportation permits of salvaged forest products, the
Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines and in relation to
Executive Order No. 192, Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

Section 5 of PD 705 provides:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management shall have jurisdiction and authority over all forest land, grazing lands, and all
forest reservations including watershed reservations presently administered by other government agencies or instrumentalities.

It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management, regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and supervision of
the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees for the taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof; the implementation
of multiple use and sustained yield management in forest lands; the protection, development and preservation of national parks, marine parks, game
refuges and wildlife; the implementation of measures and programs to prevent kaingin and managed occupancy of forest and grazing lands; in
collaboration with other bureaus, the effective, efficient and economic classification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of forestry,
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules, and regulations.

The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of sawmills, veneer and plywood mills and other wood processing plants and conduct studies
of domestic and world markets of forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)

On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state:

SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as maybe provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of
the present and future generations of Filipinos.

xxxx

SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following functions:

xxxx

(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposal lands, and mineral resources and in the process of exercising
such control the Department shall impose appropriate payments, fees, charges, rentals and any such revenues for the exploration,
development, utilization or gathering of such resources.

xxxx

(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country’s forest, land and mineral resources;

(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection, conservation, licensing and regulation as provided for by law, where
applicable, of all natural resources; the regulation and monitoring of service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permittees for the extraction,
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources products; the implementation of programs and measures with the end in view of
promoting close collaboration between the government and the private sector; the effective and efficient classification and sub-classification of
lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of natural resources laws, rules and regulations;

(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreements, licenses,
permits, concessions, leases and such other privileges and arrangement concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the
country’s natural resources and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; to cancel or cause to cancel such
privileges and arrangement upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulations, orders, and for all other causes which are
furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interests;

xxxx

(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the processing of forest products, grading and inspection of lumber and other
forest products and monitoring of the movement of timber and other forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)

Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78) which mandates that the permittee should secure the necessary transport and
other related documents before the retrieved wood materials are sold to the buyers/users and/or wood processing plants. 10 DAO 2000-78 obliges the
entity or person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permit––a "permit issued by the DENR to gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs, drifted
logs, sunken logs, uprooted, and fire and typhoon damaged tress, tree stumps, tops and branches." 11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only be
allowed to gather or recover logs or timber which had already been marked and inventoried by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer.12 To the Sandiganbayan, this mandatory requirement for Wood Recovery Permit illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested with the
authority to regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products.1âwphi1

The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and regulating salvaged forest products" is not one of the DENR’s functions which had been
devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 which provides:
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently
vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.
Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate,
or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

xxxx

(2) For a Municipality:

xxxx

(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects which
include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50)
square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)

According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved functions of the DENR to the LGUs to the following: (1) the
implementation of community-based forestry products; (2) management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; and (3) establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development projects. 13 It also referred to DENR Administrative Order No.
30, Series of 1992 (DAO 1992-30), which enumerates the forest management functions, programs and projects of the DENR which had been devolved
to the LGUs, as follows:14

Section 3.1 Forest Management

a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects:

i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of regular appropriations, except at least one project per province that
shall serve as research and training laboratory, as identified by the DENR, and those areas located in protected areas and critical
watersheds;

ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except those areas located in protected areas and critical watersheds;

iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation projects, subject to policies and procedures prescribed by the
DENR;

iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and other
guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and

v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of financing institution(s), if foreign assisted.

b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers or five thousand (5,000) hectares, as
defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that the concerned LGUs shall endeavor to convert said areas into community forestry projects;

c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small watershed areas which are sources of local water supply as identified or to
be identified by the DENR; and

d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project areas, small watershed areas and communal forests, as defined in Section
2 above, such as but not limited to:

i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;

ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations;

iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;

iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora
and fauna, slash and burn farming and other unlawful activities; and

v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances, equipment and other implements used in the commission of offenses
penalized under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987 and other forestry laws, rules and regulations.

Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the devolved areas above mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest products was not included in the above enumeration of devolved functions,
the correlative authority to issue transport permits remains with the DENR15and, thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity. As shall be discussed shortly, the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991,
ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set forth
by law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.

While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of
the environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law has
designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive
prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or
"exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to
the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs.

On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution16 in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991, which provides:

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphasis Ours.)

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with authority to enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the municipality. 17

As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment." In ensuring that this duty is upheld and maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed
at enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly, provide adequate measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural
resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzol’s memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it
was in the pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to transport were issued by Ruzol––to regulate the salvaged forest products found within the
municipality of General Nakar and, hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the area. 19

In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of salvaged forest products through the issuance of appropriate
permits is a shared responsibility which may be done either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus: the "LGUs
shall share with the national government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the sustainable management and development of the environment
and natural resources within their territorial jurisdiction."20 The significant role of the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in Joint
Memorandum Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-DILG-LGU Partnership on Devolved and other Forest
Management Functions, which was promulgated jointly by the DILG and the DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:

Section 1. Basic Policies

Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the following basic
policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-DILG-LGU partnership on devolved and other forest management functions:

1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, protection, proper use and sustainable development of the country’s environment and natural resources.

1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the sustainable management and development of the forest resources within their
territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs shall endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and partnership in forest
management.

1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important tools in the holistic and efficient management of forest resources.
Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs together with other government agencies shall undertake forest land use planning as an integral
activity of comprehensive land use planning to determine the optimum and balanced use of natural resources to support local, regional and
national growth and development.

1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities in the sustainable management of forest land resources, the DENR, in
coordination with DILG, shall enhance the capacities of the LGUs in the various aspects of forest management. Initially, the DENR shall
coordinate, guide and train the LGUs in the management of the devolved functions. As the LGUs’ capacity in forest management is enhanced,
the primary tasks in the management of devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs and the role of the DENR becomes assistive and
coordinative.

1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation with the LGUs shall devolved [sic] additional functions and responsibilities
to the local government units, or enter into agreements with them for enlarged forest management and other ENR-related functions.

1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve community empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the partnership
and cooperation of the LGUs and other concerned sectors in seeking and strengthening the participation of local communities for forest
management including enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations. (Emphasis Ours.)
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather an
additional measure which was meant to complement DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.

This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation,
courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the
government."21 Hence, if there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes, rules or regulations issued by different government
instrumentalities, the proper action is not to immediately uphold one and annul the other, but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if
possible.22 Accordingly, although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its
power under the general welfare clause, complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
products.

Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth
by law for its enforcement.

Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature of transport fees levied by the municipality for the use of public roads. 23 In
this regard, he argues that he has been conferred by law the right to issue subject permits as an incident to the LGU’s power to create its own sources of
revenue pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC:

Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. – Local government units may impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.

xxxx

Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base
or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other
applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national
policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the
purpose. (Emphasis Ours.)

Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his power and authority as Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the same law:

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance;

xxxx

vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other resources of the municipality; provide efficient and
effective property and supply management in the municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality. (Emphasis
Ours.)

Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the subject permits with validity. As correctly held by
the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an appropriate
ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.24 Needless to say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal
administration is that "local revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance." 25

It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority of the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant
to a law or ordinance." It is the Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated by law to enact ordinances against
acts which endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of logs and other natural resources. 26

In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s Revised Municipal Revenue Code 27 and Municipal Environment
Code28 reveals that there is no provision unto which the issuance of the permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance for
the regulation and transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are infirm.

Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s devolved function to "manage and control communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and
DAO 1992-3029 is specious. Although We recognize the LGU’s authority in the management and control of communal forests within its territorial
jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in accordance with the procedural parameters established by law for its
effective and efficient execution. As can be gleaned from the same Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGU’s authority to manage and control communal forests
should be "pursuant to national policies and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR."

As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal forest"30 has a well-defined and technical meaning.31Consequently, as an entity endowed
with specialized competence and knowledge on forest resources, the DENR cannot be discounted in the establishment of communal forest. The DILG,
on behalf of the LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC 1998-01 which outlined the following procedure:

Section 8.4 Communal Forest

8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest

The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city and municipal governments shall be governed by the following general
procedures:
 (a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall undertake the actual identification and assessment of existing communal forests.
The assessment shall determine the suitability of the existing communal forests. If these are no longer suitable, then these communal forests
may be disestablished. The Approval for disestablishment shall be by the RED upon recommendation of the DENR-LGU assessment Team
through the PENRO and the RTD for Forestry;

(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by the DENR-LGU Assessment Team as still suitable to achieve their
purpose shall be maintained as such. Thereafter, the Sangguniang Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan where the communal forest is located
shall pass resolution requesting the DENR Secretary for the turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality. Upon receipt of said
resolution, the DENR Secretary shall issue an Administrative Order officially transferring said communal forest to the concerned LGU. The
DENR RED shall effect the official transfer to the concerned LGU within fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the administrative order;

(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative Order and turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality, the
LGU to which the communal forest was transferred shall formulate and submit to the Provincial ENR Council for approval a management plan
governing the sustainable development of the communal forest.

For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management plan, DENR shall, in coordination with the concerned LGU, undertake a forest
resource inventory and determine the sustainable level of forest resource utilization and provide the LGU technical assistance in all facets of forest
management planning to ensure sustainable development. The management plan should include provision for replanting by the communities and the
LGUs of the communal forests to ensure sustainability.

8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest

The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the following guidelines:

(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned city/municipal LGU shall jointly identify potential communal forest areas within the
geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality.

(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a forest land use planning to be undertaken jointly between the DENR and
the concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land use plan shall indicate, among others, the site and location of the communal forests within the
production forest categorized as such in the forest land use plan;

(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief executive shall initiate the passage by the LGU’s sanggunian of a
resolution requesting the DENR Secretary to issue an Administrative Order declaring the identified area as a communal forest. The required
administrative order shall be issued within sixty (60) days after receipt of the resolution;

(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest, the city/municipal LGU shall formulate the management plan and submit
the same to its ENR Council. The management plan shall include provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the communal
forests to ensure sustainability.

The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total of 5,000 hectares. (Emphasis Ours.)

It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest, the following requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of
potential communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall indicate,
among other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued by DENR Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest.

In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these requirements were complied with. Thus, in the absence of an established
communal forest within the Municipality of General Nakar, there was no way that the subject permits to transport were issued as an incident to the
management and control of a communal forest.

This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory requirements for the issuance of permits to transport foregoes the necessity
of obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. As earlier discussed, the permits to transport may be issued to complement, and not substitute,
the Wood Recovery Permit, and may be used only as an additional measure in the regulation of salvaged forest products. To elucidate, a person seeking
to transport salvaged forest products still has to acquire a Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before obtaining the corresponding
permit to transport issued by the LGU.

Main Issue:

Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions

The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC, to
wit:

Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or
representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall
perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof,
without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of committing this crime: first, by knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an
officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or second, under pretense of
official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or
any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so.32 The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter act constitutes
the crime of usurpation of official functions.33

In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged forest products under the
alleged "pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources."34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were attendant in the present case because the authority to issue the
subject permits belongs solely to the DENR.35

We rule otherwise.

First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and that to overcome the presumption, nothing but
proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution.36As held by this Court in People v. Sitco:37

The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a
stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that his
conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis supplied.)

Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:

Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the
Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take "a more than
casual consideration" of every circumstance of doubt proving the innocence of petitioner. (Emphasis added.)

Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt and it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to
present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty. 39 As explained by
this Court in People v. Berroya:40

The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the
contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded
as public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant
engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to
be no conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."

Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainly
only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 41 However, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, We
find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of
usurpation of official functions of the DENR.

We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that
can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the
DENR.

But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation
of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned
from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol
required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The
records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least
as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.

Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.

It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano,42 this Court enunciated that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of
official functions.43 The term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even
though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction
unconscientious."44 Good faith is actually a question of intention and although something internal, it can be ascertained by relying not on one’s self-
serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts. 45

In dismissing Ruzol’s claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan reasoned as follows:

If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A. 7160 to issue the subject permits, why did he have to secure the approval of the
various NGOs, People’s Organizations and religious organizations before issuing the said permits? He could very well have issued subject permits even
without the approval of these various organizations if he truly believed that he was legally empowered to do so considering that the endorsement of
these organizations is not required by law. That Ruzol had to arm himself with their endorsement could only mean that he actually knew that he had no
legal basis for issuing the said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support and back-up. 46 (Emphasis Ours.)
We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis nor established doctrine to draw a conclusion that good faith is negated
when an accused sought another person’s approval. Neither is there any doctrine in law which provides that bad faith is present when one seeks the
opinion or affirmation of others.

Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the conduct of the public consultation was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign
supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward
illegal logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to transport was not Ruzol’s decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a
result of the collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was
the participants who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the Mayor of General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter’s
authority as local chief executive.47

The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol’s good faith is negated by the fact that if he truly believed he was authorized to issue the subject
permits, Ruzol did not have to request the presence and obtain the permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly. 48

The graft court’s above posture, however, does not commend itself for concurrence. If, indeed, Ruzol willfully and deliberately intended to usurp the
official functions of the DENR as averred by the prosecution, he would not have asked the presence of a DENR official who has the authority and
credibility to publicly object against Ruzol’s allegedly intended usurpation. Thus, the presence of PENRO Delgado during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly
does not negate, but strengthens Ruzol’s claim of good faith.

As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us,
whether in an official or private capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not only a responsibility but also a
right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of
natural resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in the responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.

Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by exercising his authority as municipal mayor––an act which was executed with the
concurrence and cooperation of non-governmental organizations, industry stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of General Nakar. Admittedly, We
consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the
settled principle that "all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused." 49

Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to exist," as "there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting."50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject
permits. What is clear from the records is that Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest products within General
Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him criminally liable for these seemingly noble intentions would
be a step backward and would run contrary to the standing advocacy of encouraging people to take a pro-active stance in the protection of the
environment and conservation of our natural resources.

Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and considering further that this case demands only the determination of Ruzol's
guilt or innocence for usurpation of official functions under the RPC, for which the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to Transport is only
subsidiary, We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this instance, pro hac vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s
acquittal.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to
0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt of the crimes as charged.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988

MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

YAP, C.J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 01119 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Melencio Gigantoni y Javier," promulgated on November 13, 1985, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, Pasig, Metro
Manila, finding the accused guilty of usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code with modification of the penalty by reducing the
same to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, after crediting the accused with a
mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary confession of guilt.

Petitioner Melencio Gigantoni y Javier, was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Pasig, with the crime of usurpation of authority in violation
of Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code upon an information alleging that the crime was committed as follows:
 That on or about the 14th and 15th day of May, 1981, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is not a bonafide agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and falsely represented himself as a bonafide agent of the CIS, Philippine
Constabulary, said accused, knowing fully well his representation to be false.

After arraignment during which the accused pleaded not guilty and after trial, the lower court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty as charged.
On appeal to the appellate court, the judgment was affirmed with modification only as to the penalty imposed.

The facts of the case, as recited in the decision of the appellate court, are as follows:

During the period material to this case, or in 1981, accused-appellant Melencio Gigantoni was an employee of Black Mountain
Mining Inc. and Tetra Management Corporation, which are both private companies doing business in the Philippines .... On May 14,
1981, as an employee of said companies, Gigantoni went to the office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) at Vernida Building, Legaspi
Street, Makati, Metro Manila, allegedly to conduct verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's officials. Upon reaching the
said PAL office, he falsely represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case, and
requested that he be shown the PAL records particularly the passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights covering the
period February 1 to 3 1981. He explained that he was then at the tracking stage of aforementioned kidnapping case. ... To further
convince the PAL officials of his supposed mission, Gigantoni exhibited his Identification card purporting to show that he was a PC-
CIS agent. ... Thereupon, his aforesaid request was granted, and PAL legal officer Atty. Conrado A. Boro showed to him the
requested PAL records. Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the requested manifest ...and the used PAL tickets of one Cesar
(Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor, and that of a certain Daisy Britanico, an employee of Black Mountain. Thereafter, he left the PAL
premises.

When Gigantoni was no longer around, PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr., inquired from Atty. Boro about Gigantoni's purpose
in securing copies of PAL records. They then became suspicious of the accused" real identity prompting them to conduct verification
from the PC-CIS office. They subsequently learned from General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no longer a CIS agent since
June 30, 1980 as he had been dismissed from the service for gross misconduct ... brought about by the extortion charges filed
against him and his final conviction by the Sandiganbayan for the said offense.... Upon discovering the foregoing, Atty. Puno
immediately alerted the NBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to the PAL office the following day. ...

On May 15, 1981, when Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office, he was brought by Atty. Puno to their conference room while
awaiting for the arrival of the NBI agents who were earlier contacted. In the presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security, Gigantoni
was confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real Identity. He later admitted that he was no longer with the CIS; that he was working for the
Black Mountain Mining Corporation; and that he was just checking on a claim for per diem of one of their employees who had
travelled. ...

Upon the arrival of NBI agents Teodoro Pangilinan, Lolito Utitco and Dante Crisologo, Attys. Puno and Boro turned over the person
of Gigantoni to the NBI. They also submitted a complaint affidavit against Gigantoni .... On that same day, after the investigation,
arrest and booking conducted by the NBI, Gigantoni was charged before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, thru its office in
Makati, with the crime of Usurpation of Authority.

The petitioner-accused raised substantially the same errors on appeal to respondent appellate court, to wit:

1. The appellate court erred in interpreting that presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, its applicable in the case at bar;

2. The appellate court erred in its interpretation of the difference between suspension and dismissal.

The gist of petitioner's contention is that he could not be guilty of the crime charged because at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, he
was still a CIS agent who was merely suspended and was not yet informed of his termination from the service. Furthermore, he avers that the receipt by
him of the notice of dismissal, if there was any, could not be established on mere presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed.

Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or official functions, under which the petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a)
who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of
any foreign government; or (b) who, under pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime of
usurpation of authority under which the petitioner stands charged, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.

The question before us is—did petitioner knowingly and falsely represent himself as an agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary? Petitioner admits that
he received a notice of his suspension from the CIS effective June 20, 1980. This admission is supported by the record (Annex "D") which shows the
letter of Lt. Col. Sabas Edades to petitioner, dated June 23, 1980, regarding said action. Said official letter was also sent to the Commissioner of the
Merit Systems Board, Civil Service Commission, the Minister of National Defense and the Commanding General of the CIS. However, as to petitioner's
alleged dismissal effective June 20, 1980, he denies having been informed thereof. The record is bereft of any evidence or proof adduced by the
prosecution showing that the dismissal was actually conveyed to petitioner. That is why the court, in convicting him, relied on the disputable presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed, that is, that it is presumed that he was duly notified of his dismissal.

The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the charge that he "knowingly and
falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent. The constitutional presumption of innocence can only be overturned by competent and credible proof and
never by mere disputable presumptions, as what the lower and appellate courts did when they presumed that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal
by applying the disputable presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed." It was not for the accused to prove a negative fact, namely, that
he did not receive the order of dismissal. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution. Hence, it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by positive evidence the allegation that the accused falsely represented himself as a CIS agent, by
presenting proof that he knew that he was no longer a CIS agent, having been duly notified of his dismissal. It is essential to present proof that he
actually knew at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was already dismissed from the service. A mere disputable presumption that
he received notice of his dismissal would not be sufficient.

The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference whether the accused was suspended or dismissed from the service,
"for both imply the absence of power to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was
deprived of " (Emphasis supplied). The observation of the Solicitor General is correct if the accused were charged with usurpation of official function
(second part of Article 177), but not if he is charged merely with usurpation of authority (first part of Article 177). The information charges the accused
with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government."

Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been shown that the information given by PAL to the accused was confidential and
was given to him only because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official function. He was not charged in the information for such an
offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the case that the information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was readily made
available to the accused because PAL officials believed at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the only offense with which he was charged in
the information, that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent.

Premises considered, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court is reversed and set
aside. Petitioner-accused, Melencio Gigantoni y Javier is hereby aquitted of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 183 –PERJURY

G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990

REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

In Criminal Case No. 934 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VI, San Fernando, Pampanga, petitioner Reolandi
Diaz was charged with the crime of Falsification of Official Document committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of December 1972, in the Municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Reolandi M. DIAZ, then a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad Santos
High School and, therefore, a public employee, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit falsification of official
documents, to wit: by executing and filing in the office of the Civil Service Commission of said municipality a Personal Data Sheet,
CS Form No. 212(65), an official document, stating and malting it appear therein that he was a fourth year Bachelor of Arts student
in 1950-54 at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges which document is a requirement for his reappointment as School
Administrative Assistant I of the Jose Abad Santos High School and wherein the academic requirement to said Position is at least a
fourth year college undergraduate, when in truth and in fact, the said accused well knew that the statement is false and he did not
reach the fourth year in a Bachelor of Arts degree course, and consequently, by reason of said untruthful narration of facts, his
appointment to the said position was approved by the Civil Service Commission.

All contrary to law. (p. 44, Rollo)

After trial following a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, petitioner was found guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is as
follows:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Reolandi M. Diaz guilty as charged of the crime of
falsification of official document penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and he is therefore sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Costs against the accused. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)

Petitioner appealed the aforesaid judgment of conviction to the Intermediate Appellate Court, said appeal being docketed thereat as CA-G.R. No. 24580-
Cr.
In its Decision promulgated on April 7,1983, the respondent court modified the trial court's decision by increasing the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment in the event of non-payment of the fine due to insolvency, but affirmed the verdict of conviction in all other respects. The
pertinent and dispositive portions of respondent court's decision read:

The penalty for the offense of falsification of an official document committed under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code is (prision mayor) and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00. The correct penalty that should be imposed on the appellant applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is imprisonment of Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of (prison correctional) as
minimum to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of (prision mayor) as maximum In cam of non-payment of the fine of P1,000.00 due to
insolvency, the appellant should be subject to subsidiary imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty and the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
the decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects with costs against accused- appellant' (P. 68, Rollo)

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present recourse.

It is the contention of petitioner that he is entitled to an acquittal because—

1. The findings of the lower court adopted by the respondent intermediate Appellate Court that he was not a fourth year A-B. College student is contrary
to the evidence presented.

2. The respondent intermediate Appellate Court gravely commuted an error of law in convicting him as he did not have any legal obligation to state in CS
Form 212 that he was a fourth year college student.

3. The Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding that the transcript of records (Exhibit I) is spurious.

Upon the following facts, found by both the trial court and respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, to have been sufficiently and satisfactorily
established by the evidence on record, it appears that petitioner Reolandi Diaz was a senior clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School in San
Fernando, Pampanga.

In 1972 he sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant I of the same school and as one of the requirements for appointment to said position,
filled up the prescribed personal information sheet, Civil Service Form 212, and swore to the truth and veracity of the data and information therein
furnished by him before the proper administering officer. As one of the required informations, he indicated in Exh "A" that his highest educational
attainment was Fourth Year A.B. (Liberal Arts) allegedly pursued or obtained at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges, respectively, during the
years 1950 to 1954 inclusive. On the basis thereof, he was extended an appointment as School Administrative Assistant I (Exh. "B"). His personal
information sheet (Exh. "A") together with his appointment paper (Exh. "B"), the certification as to the availability of funds for the position (Exh. "C") and
the resolution of the Provincial Board of Pampanga creating the position (Exh. "D") were all forwarded to the Civil Service Commission for the approval
of petitioner's appointment.

But contrary to petitioner's claim that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B. which he allegedly took at the Cosmopolitan and
Harvardian Colleges during the years 1950 to 1954, he was never enrolled at the Cosmopolitan Colleges which later became the Abad Santos
Educational Institution and still later the Ortanez University-at any time during the period covering the years from 1950 to 1954, inclusive as certified to
by the Registrar of Ortanez University, Mr. Atilano D. Solomon. Likewise, petitioner was never a student at the Harvardian Colleges in Tondo, during the
first quarter of school year 1953-1954, inclusive, as certified to by the school's President, Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap.

Neither did petitioner ever enroll as a collegiate student at the Harvardian Colleges in San Fernando, Pampanga after he finished his secondary course
in the same school in June 1950, as certified to by its Executive Director, Atty. Arnulfo Garcia.

Also, the name of petitioner was not included in all the enrollment lists of college students submitted to the then Bureau of Private Schools of the
Department of Education by the Harvardian Colleges at San Fernando, Pampanga and at Tondo, Manila, during the period during which petitioner
claimed to have been enrolled. The same thing is true with the list submitted by the Cosmopolitan Colleges to the said bureau.

The petitioner did not take the witness stand. He only presented in evidence an alleged transcript of record (Exh. 1) purporting to show that he took up
collegiate courses at the Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning from the first quarter of the school year 1951-1952 up to the first
quarter of school year 1953-1954 which transcript of record was allegedly signed by Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap, for and in behalf of the then
President of the school, Ildefonso Yap. But Mrs. Virginia Yap, testifying for the prosecution disowned the said signature. Besides, at the bottom portion of
the transcript is a printed notation reading — this is only valid with the college seal and signature of Pres. Ildefonso D. Yap. Exhibit "I" lacks the imprint of
the college seal and the signature of President Ildefonso Yap himself. No other corroborating piece of evidence was presented by petitioner.

Contrary to petitioner's posture, there was ample, solid and conclusive evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove that he was not a fourth year A.B.
undergraduate.

It was clearly established that the statement made by the accused — that he reached fourth year A.B. and that he studied for this course (Liberal Arts) at
the Cosmopolitan Colleges and the Harvardian Colleges from the years 1950-1954, is devoid of truth. The records of these colleges do not at all reveal
that petitioner was even enrolled at any time from 1950 to 1954 in its College of Liberal Arts. His name does not appear and could not be found in the
enrollment lists submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools by these colleges.

While the petitioner in his defense presented an alleged transcript (Exh. purporting to show that he took up collegiate course at the Philippine Harvardian
College in Tondo, Manila, beginning from the first quarter of the school year 1951-1952 up to the first quarter of the school year 1953-1954, both the trial
court and the respondent court correctly disregarded said transcript as having emanated from a spurious source. The transcript presented lacks the
authenticating marks-the imprint of the college seal and the signature of the President of the college.

As correctly observed by the trial court —

It is also quite significant to note in this score that the accused in his defense failed to present any corroborating piece of evidence
which will show that he was indeed enrolled in the Philippine Harvardian Colleges from the first quarter of the school year 1953-
1954. If he had enrolled as a student during this period of time and he was positive that the transcript of records issued to him and in
his possession is genuine and valid, it could have been easy for him to introduce corroborating evidence, i.e., the testimony of any
of his classmates or teachers in the different subjects that he took to support his claim that he studied and passed these collegiate
courses at the said school. But this he failed to do despite all the opportunities open to him and in the face of damning evidence all
showing that he had not really enrolled in this school or in the other school mentioned by him the personal information sheet that he
filed up as requirement for his appointment. (p. 53, Rollo)

Following the doctrine laid down, however, in the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz, No. L-15132, May 25,1960,108 Phil. 255 and the earlier case of United
States v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, the crime committed under the foregoing facts, is perjury. This offense, as defined in Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. The said
article provides —

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and
not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and
the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer respective penalties provided therein.

In that case of People v. Cruz, supra, the accused Rufo B. Cruz failed up an application form (Civil Service Form No. 2) for the patrolman examination.
He stated therein that he had never been accused, indicted or tried for violation of any law, ordinance or regulation before any court, when in truth and in
fact, as the accused well knew, he had been prosecuted and tried before the Justice of the Peace of Cainta, Rizal, for different crimes. The application
was signed and sworn to by him before the municipal mayor of Cainta, Rizal.

This Court in that case held:

This article is similar to Section 3 of Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, which was formerly the law punishing perjury. Under
said section 3 of that Act, this Court, in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119), held that a person, who stated
under oath in his application to take police examination that he had never been convicted of any crime, when as a matter of fact he
has previous convictions, committed perjury. The facts in that case are almost exactly analogous to those in the present, and we find
no reason, either in law or in the arguments of the Solicitor General to modify or reverse the conclusion of this Court therein. More
so, because all the elements of the offense of perjury defined in Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code concur in the present case.

The elements of the crime of perjury are —

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.

(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.

All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar.

Perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code carries a lesser penalty. The penalty for this crime is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period. Since there is no mitigating and aggravating circumstance the penalty should be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty should be from four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day
of prision correccional as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is modified as follows:

(a) The accused Reolandi Diaz is found guilty of the crime of perjury defined and penalized under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code; and

(b) The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from four (4) months of arrests mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day
of prision correccional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
CRISTE B. VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 162187
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE and HORST-KESSLER Promulgated:
VON SPRENGEISEN,
Respondents. November 18, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 dismissing the petition

for certiorari assailing the finding of the Secretary of Justice that no probable cause exists against private respondent Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen for

perjury.

The Antecedents

On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) filed a protest before the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department

of Finance against certain importations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the

Philippines. The matter involved 151.070 tons of magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany. [2] The case was docketed as Anti-Dumping Case No.

I-98.

The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the Department of Trade and Industry, to determine if there was a prima facie case for

violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7843, the Anti-Dumping Law. Sometime in February 1997, the BIS submitted its report to the Tariff Commission,

declaring that a prima facie case existed and that continued importation of refractory bricks from Germany would harm the local industry. It adopted the

amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as the normal value of the imported goods.[3]

The HTC received a copy of the said report on February 14, 1997. However, before it could respond, the chairman of the Tariff Commission

prodded the parties to settle the matter amicably. A conference ensued between RCP Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager Criste

Villanueva and Jesus Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and General Manager Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen and Sales Manager Dennis

Gonzales, on the other. During the conference, the parties agreed that the refractory bricks were imported by the HTC at a price less than its normal

value of DM 1,200, and that such importation was likely to injure the local industry. The parties also agreed to settle the case to avoid expenses and

protracted litigation. HTC was required to reform its price policy/structure of its importation and sale of refractory bricks from Germany to conform to the
provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its rules and regulations. Jesus Borgonio thereafter prepared and signed a compromise agreement containing the terms

agreed upon which Villanueva and Borgonia signed.[4] Bienvenido Flores, an Office Clerk of RCP, delivered the agreement to HTC at the 9th Floor of

Ramon Magsaysay Center Building, 1680 Roxas Boulevard, Manila by Von Sprengeisens approval.[5]

However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement. Borgonia revised the agreement by inserting the phrase based on the findings of the

BIS in paragraph 1 thereof. Villanueva and Borgonia signed the agreement and had the same delivered to the office of HTC on April 22, 1997 by Lino M.

Gutierrez, a technical assistant of RCP. Gonzales received the agreement and delivered the same to Von Sprengeisen. After 20 minutes, Gonzales

returned, with the agreement already signed by Von Sprengeisen. [6] Gonzales, who had also signed, then gave it to Gutierrez. On the same day, Notary

Public Zenaida P. De Zuiga notarized the agreement.[7] Gonzales delivered a copy of the notarized Agreement to HTC.[8]

RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff Commission. During the May 9, 1997 hearing before the Commission for the approval

of the agreement, a representative of HTC appeared. He offered no objection to the Agreement. The Commission submitted its report to the Special

Committee which rendered a decision declaring that, based on the findings of the BIS, the normal value of the imported refractory bricks was DM 1,200

per metric ton. HTC received a copy of the decision on March 4, 1998. Neither RCP nor HTC appealed the decision to the Court of Tax Appeals.

In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks from Germany anew and noted that the normal value of the said importation under the

decision of the Special Committee based on the BIS report was DM 1,200 per metric ton. On July 28, 1998, the HTC filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside

and/or Vacate Judgment with the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping, praying that such decision be declared null and void on the following grounds:

1. THE FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PROTESTANT DURING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE PREPARATION OF
THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

2. THAT INSERTIONS AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE FACTS NOT AGREED UPON WAS DELIBERATELY AND
SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE BY THE PROTESTANT IN THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND
CONSENT OF THE PROTESTEE.[9]

The motion was verified by Von Sprengeisen. The HTC averred therein that Villanueva violated Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code when

he surreptitiously inserted the phrase based on the findings of the BIS in the agreement without the knowledge and consent of Von Sprengeisen and

despite their agreement to put behind them the findings of the BIS. Appended to the motion was an Affidavit of Merit executed by Von Sprengeisen in

which he alleged, inter alia, that sometime in February 1997, the BIS came out with its Report declaring that the normal value of the magnesite-based

refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton; before

HTC could respond to the report, Villanueva invited him to a conference for the purpose of finding the best solution to the pending case before the

Commission; he and Gonzales attended the meeting during which it was agreed, by way of a compromise, that the parties will accept the amount of DM

1,050 per metric ton as the normal value for all magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany; when he received the draft of the compromise

agreement prepared by Villanueva, he approved the same; subsequently, Villanueva transmitted a compromise agreement already signed by him to Von

Sprengeisen for his review, approval and signature; believing that the compromise agreement reproduced the contents of the first compromise
agreement, he signed the second agreement without reading it; when he received, on March 4, 1998, a copy of the decision of the Tariff Commission

based on the compromise agreement of the parties wherein the committee adopted the findings and recommendations of the BIS (that the normal value

of the shipment was DM 1,200 per metric ton), he was shocked because he never agreed to the use of such findings for the reformation of its price

policies; there was, in fact, an agreement between him and Villanueva to put behind them the findings of the BIS; he called up Villanueva at his office but

failed to contact him despite several attempts; suspecting that something amiss happened, he had the draft of the first compromise agreement retrieved

but his secretary failed to locate the same; it was only sometime later that his secretary found the folder-file containing the draft and was appalled to

discover that Villanueva had substantially altered the first draft of the compromise agreement; this made him conclude and confirm his suspicion that

Villanueva, thru deceit and fraud, induced him to sign the compromise agreement to the prejudice of the HTC. [10]

The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move, Villanueva, in his capacity as Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager of RCP, filed

a criminal complaint for perjury against Von Sprengeisen in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Appended thereto was a complaint-affidavit

executed by Villanueva wherein he declared, inter alia, that Von Sprengeisen made the following false statements in the Urgent Motion, thus:

a. [Complainant] was the one who called up his office, inviting him to a meeting for the purpose of finding the best and most
equitable solution to the case (p. 3, Urgent Motion);

b. RCP and Hamburg Trading agreed to put behind them the findings and recommendations of the Bureau of Import Services (BIS)
with respect to the anti-dumping protest filed by RCP (p. 3, Urgent Motion);

c. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to him was merely a draft (p. 3, Urgent Motion);

d. The phrase based on the findings of the Bureau of Import Services was inserted in paragraph 1 of the final Compromise
Agreement without his knowledge and consent (p. 3, Urgent Motion); and

e. [Complainant] was the one who surreptitiously inserted the aforesaid phrase (p. 3, Urgent Motion). [11]

Villanueva also alleged that Von Sprengeisen made the following false statements in his Affidavit of Merit:

a. [Complainant] invited him to a conference for the purpose of finding the best solution to the case;

b. [Complainant and he] agreed to put behind [them] the findings and recommendation of the BIS submitted to the Secretary of
Finance;

c. We agreed to the amount of DM 1,050/ton as the normal value for all magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany;

d. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to him was merely a draft; and

e. Through deceit and fraud, [complainant] induced [respondent] to sign the final Compromise Agreement. [12]

In his Counter-Affidavit, Von Sprengeisen averred that whoever called the other for a conference was not a material matter. Since the first draft of the

Compromise Agreement transmitted to him was by fax, he asked the complainant to send to him the hard copy of the Agreement for his signature. He

further narrated that when he received the hard copy of the compromise agreement, he did not bother to review since he assumed that it contained the

same provisions in the faxed copy. He did not suggest that the phrase based on the findings of the BIS be inserted in the hard copy of the agreement

because he and Villanueva were at odds on the BIS finding the normal price of the goods was DM 1,200 per metric ton. He insisted that it would have
been senseless of him to agree to such insertion; as such, he did not make any willful and deliberate assertion of any falsehood as to any material fact.

[13]

Investigating Prosecutor Francisco G. Supnet found no probable cause for perjury against the private respondent and recommended the

dismissal of the complaint. Second Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia Dimagiba reviewed the resolution of Prosecutor Supnet and found probable cause

for perjury against the private respondent for alleging in his Affidavit of Merit

that he was induced to sign the compromise agreement through fraud and deceit. According to the Second Assistant City Prosecutor, the allegation of

the private respondent thru deceit and fraud to sign the final Compromise Agreement was a deliberate assertion of a falsehood, designed as it was

merely to give the BIS the impression that private respondent was misled into agreeing to the compromise agreement. She further opined that the

allegation was perjurious, considering that the private respondent had sufficient time to pass upon the Compromise Agreement and could have availed

the services of legal minds who could review the terms and conditions thereof before signing the same; [14]hence, she recommended the reversal of

Prosecutor Supnets resolution and the filing of the information. The City Prosecutor approved the recommendation of the Second Assistant City

Prosecutor. Accordingly, an Information for perjury was filed against the private respondent with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.

The private respondent appealed the resolution to the Secretary of Justice, who reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor on September

20, 2002. According to the Justice Secretary, the complainant failed to establish the materiality of the alleged false assertions and that the said

assertions were willful and deliberate. Moreover, the allegations in the Affidavit of Merit are not altogether false since the intention of the parties in

executing the compromise agreement was precisely to put behind the ruling of the BIS, despite which the complainant inserted the condition that the

parties would be bound by such findings and recommendations.[15] The decretal portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila is hereby REVERSED. The City Prosecutor is directed to
withdraw the information for perjury against respondent Horst-Kessler von Sprengeisen and to report the action taken within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[16]

Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the resolution of the Justice Secretary, alleging therein that grave abuse of discretion,

amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, was committed in issuing the said resolution. [17] The private respondent, for his part, sought the dismissal of

the petition alleging that, as found by the Justice Secretary, there was no probable cause against him for perjury. [18]

On February 13, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of the Justice Secretary.[19]

The CA declared that, as posited by the Office of the Solicitor General in its comment on the petition, the parties had agreed to put behind

them the findings and recommendations of the BIS with respect to the anti-dumping protest. The appellate court stated that its finding is buttressed by

the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 was not mentioned in the first compromise agreement and that, under such agreement, the HTC obliged itself to

reform
its pricing policy and structure with respect to refractory products being imported to and sold in the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of R.A.

No. 7843 and its implementing rules and requirements. The CA emphasized that it was inclined to believe that there was no meeting of the minds of the

parties when the petitioner inserted the phrase based on the findings of the BIS in the revised compromise agreement; hence, there could not have been

perjury when the private respondent executed the Affidavit of Merit and the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment. The CA also agreed

with the findings of the Secretary of Justice that the insertion of the condition in the compromise agreement that the parties would be bound by the BIS

findings and recommendation gave the private respondent reason to believe that he was deceived by the petitioner into signing the Agreement; as such,

the private respondents allegation in his Affidavit of Merit, that he was induced to signing the Compromise Agreement through fraud and deceit, was not

altogether false. Consequently, the CA ruled, the private respondent did not make any willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. [20] The appellate

court conformed to the disquisitions of the Secretary of Justice in the assailed resolution and concluded that the private respondent did not, in the

Affidavit of Merit, make a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. [21]

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court against private respondent Von Sprengeisen and the Secretary

of Justice, insisting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition and affirming

the assailed resolution.

The petitioner maintains that, during the preliminary investigation, he adduced substantial evidence to prove probable cause for perjury against the

private respondent. He maintains that probable cause does not mean actual and positive causes; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based

on opinion and reasonable belief. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. He avers that,

contrary to the claim of the private respondent in his Affidavit of Merit, the meeting between him and Jesus Borgonio, on the one hand, and the private

respondent and HTC Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other, was arranged by the latter and not by him. As gleaned from the draft and final

copies of the compromise agreement, the parties made express reference to the prima facie findings of the BIS that the actual export price of HTC was

below the fair market value. By agreeing that such findings of the BIS be included in the Compromise Agreement, the said private respondent impliedly

agreed to such findings as basis of the price for which HTC would sell the German-made magnesite-based refractory bricks in the Philippines. The

petitioner avers that the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton was not specifically mentioned in the compromise agreement was of no

importance, considering the parties acceptance of such findings is based on R.A. No. 7843. He points out that the private respondent could not have

failed to notice the difference between the first draft and the final copy of the agreement before signing it because, as alleged by Lino Gutierrez in his

reply affidavit, it took the private respondent twenty minutes or so after receiving the agreement to review the final draft before signing it. Moreover, the

Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment signed by the private respondent was filed more than 15 months from the execution of the

compromise agreement and after four months from the Tariff Commissions approval thereof.
 The petitioner argues that it is incredible that during the interregnum of 19 months, the private respondent failed to discover the

revisions/insertions in the final draft of the compromise agreement. Considering the premises, the petitioner submits, the private respondents filing of the

Urgent Motion for and in behalf of HTC was merely an afterthought, to enable the latter to escape compliance with the terms and conditions of the

Agreement.

The petitioner further insists that the insertion of the contested phrase in the final draft of the compromise agreement was necessary although it may not

be in the best interest of HTC. He posits that the falsehoods made by the private respondent in his Urgent Motion and Affidavit of Merit were material to

the proceedings in the Anti-Dumping Office of the Tariff Commission because these were used to set aside the compromise agreement executed by the

parties.

In his Comment on the petition, the private respondent avers that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual, hence, improper in a petition for

review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The determination of the existence of a probable cause is primarily an administrative sanction of

the Secretary of Justice. He insists that the findings of the Justice Secretary should be accorded great respect, especially since the same were upheld

by the CA. He asserts that the petitioner failed to establish in the CA and in this Court that the Justice Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in her resolution.

The petition has no merit.

The pivotal issue in this case is factual whether or not, based on the records, there was probable cause for the private respondents indictment

for perjury.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Findings of facts of a

quasi-judicial agency, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on the Court, unless cogent facts and circumstances of such a nature warranting

the modification or reversal of the assailed decision were ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted. Thus, the Court may delve into and resolve factual

issues in exceptional cases. The petitioner has failed to establish that any such circumstance is present in the case at bar. [22]

The Court finds that the public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing

the assailed resolution, and that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision and resolution. If at all the public respondent erred in

issuing the assailed resolution, such is merely an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, reversible by a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of

Court especially so where, as in this case, the issues before the CA were factual and not legal. The absence or existence of probable cause in a given

case involves a calibration and a reexamination of the evidence adduced by the parties before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the

probative weight thereof. The CA thus ruled correctly when it dismissed the petition before it.
 Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief

that a crime has been committed and that the private respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as

would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean

actual or positive cause; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause

does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission

complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. [23]

The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon

complaint of an offended party. [24] The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice declaring the absence or existence of a probable cause affirmed by the CA

is accorded high respect. However, such finding may be nullified where grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is

established.[25]

Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and
not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and
the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated

when the false statement is made.[26]

The seminal modern treatment of the history of perjury concludes that one consideration of policy overshadows all others the measures taken

against the offense must not be so severe as to discourage aggrieved parties from lodging complaints or testifying. [27] As quoted by Dean Wigmore, a

leading 19th Century Commentator, noted that English law, throws every fence round a person accused of perjury, for the obligation of protecting

witnesses from oppression or annoyance, by charges, or threats of charges, of having made false testimony is far paramount to that of giving even

perjury its deserts.[28]

Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. [29] The

elements of the felony are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.

(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. [30]
 A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. [31] Perjury being a felony

by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the accused.[32] Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the

alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to knowingly.

Deliberately implies meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. [33] It must appear that the accused knows his statement to be false or as

consciously ignorant of its truth.[34]

Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona

fide belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate defense.[35] A false statement which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not perjury.

There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be

proven that the defendant did not believe those statements to be true.[36]

Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. It may be proved by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence.

The state of mind of the accused may be determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a motive to lie and of the objective falsity itself, and

from other facts tending to show that the accused really knew the things he claimed not to know. [37]

A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove

which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by other evidence than the contradicting statement. [38] The rationale of this

principle is thus:

Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not be sufficient to establish the
falsity of testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not
appear that the testimony charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply
neutralize each other; there must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be
furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of the accused.[39]

The term material matter is the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which

tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the subject of the inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credence of any witness who

testified. In this case, a matter is material if it has a material effect or tendency to influence the Commission in resolving the motion of HTC one way or

the other. The effects of the statement are weighed in terms of potentiality rather than probability. [40] The prosecution need not prove that the false

testimony actually influenced the Commission.[41]

The private respondent did err when he declared, in the motion of the HTC and his affidavit, that it was the petitioner who invited him to a

conference. The truth of the matter is that it was Gonzales who did so. Nonetheless, the issue of who called for a conference is of de minimis importance

because, after all, the parties agreed to meet after having been prodded by the Chairman of the Commission to settle the case instead of going through
the tribulations and expenses of a protracted litigation. No adverse inference (related to the merits of their respective contention in this case) can be

ascribed as to whoever called the conference. After all, parties are even urged to settle cases amicably.

Besides, as correctly declared by the Second Assistant City Prosecutor in her resolution:

The allegation that it was complainant who invited respondent to the meeting may not be a deliberate lie. Respondent may not have
known who arranged the meeting, but as he was able to talk to complainant, he presumed that it was complainant who extended the
invitation. Moreover, the identity of the one who initiated the meeting is not material considering that there was a meeting of the
minds of the Parties.[42]

The Court also agrees with the contention of the private respondent that the copy of the first agreement transmitted to him was a fax copy of the draft,

and that, contrary to the allegations of the private respondent, such agreement was prepared by Borgonia and not by the petitioner. As gleaned from

page two of the agreement, the particulars of the residence certificates of the petitioner and the private respondent were not typewritten, hence, cannot

as yet be notarized. As claimed by the private respondent, a copy was transmitted to him for his personal review, and if he found it to be in order, the

petitioner and Borgonia would prepare and sign the agreement and give it back to him for review and signature, with the particulars of his community tax

certificate indicated in the final copy.

Undeniably, the identity of the person who prepared or caused to prepare the compromise agreement subsequently signed by the petitioner and the

private respondent was of prime importance because only such person should be charged for perjury. The private respondent erroneously stated in his

Affidavit of Merit and Urgent Motion that it was the petitioner who prepared the agreement that was signed by the parties. It turned out that it was

Borgonia who prepared the first and the second copies. However, the private respondent cannot be held liable for perjury since it was Borgonia who

prepared the agreement and not the petitioner. The Court agrees with the following contention of the private respondent in his counter-affidavit:

4.6 While complainant claims that it was not he but Mr. Borgonia who made the insertions, there is no doubt that, indeed, the
insertions were made into the document. Since complainant is the signatory to the Compromise Agreement, it is but natural
for one to presume that he had made the insertions. At the same time, I can not be expected to know that it was Mr. Borgonia,
as claimed by complainant, who made such insertions.[43]

Indeed, Borgonia was merely the Manager of the Management Information Group of RCP, whereas the petitioner was no less than its Senior

Vice President and Assistant General Manager, Borgonias superior. Unless and until approved by the petitioner, any agreement prepared by Borgonia

was merely a piece of paper, barren of any legal effect. In this case, the compromise agreement prepared by Borgonia had the petitioners

imprimatur. Borgonia was merely a witness to the agreement. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner had the compromise agreement prepared

under his supervision and control. It cannot thus be concluded that the private respondent made a deliberate falsehood when he alleged that the

agreement was prepared by the petitioner.

The Court is not persuaded by the petitioners claim that, during the conference, he and the private respondent agreed that, based on the BIS

report, the normal value of the imported refractory bricks per metric ton was DM 1,200, and that such report would be used as basis for the revision of

the price policy and structure of HTC.

 It bears stressing that, during the conference, the petitioner and the private respondent had agreed on three aspects of the case: (1) based on

the prima facie findings of the BIS, the normal value of the goods per meter ton was DM 1,200 and that the actual export price of HTC was below the fair

market value; (2) to terminate the case, HTC will have to adjust and revise its price policy and structure for imported refractory bricks to conform to R.A.

No. 7843 and rules and regulations implementing the law; and (3) if HTC fails or refuses to comply with its undertaking, RCP will be entitled to a writ of

execution without need of demand. However, the petitioner and the private respondent could not have agreed on such base price; the petitioner insisted

on the amount recommended by the BIS (DM 1,200) while the private respondent insisted on DM 950. There was an impasse. By way of a compromise,

the parties agreed to do away with the BIS recommended base

value and agreed for HTC to base the normal value of the importation per metric ton under R.A. No. 7843 and the rules issued implementing the law.

This is gleaned from the affidavit of Borgonia:

13. During the meeting, Mr. von Sprengeisen suggested that the value of DM 1,050/ton be applied as the price at which Hamburg
Trading would sell German-made magnesite-based refractory bricks in the Philippines. Mr. Villanueva did not agree to the
suggested value, as we considered it low. In the end, both parties decided to base the determination of the price on the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7843 and its implementing rules and regulations. [44]

Borgonia prepared the first compromise agreement and incorporated therein the agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent

arrived at during the conference, thus:

1. For the purpose of buying peace and by way of concession in order to end litigation, the SECOND PARTY undertakes and
commits to reform its pricing policy and structure with respect to refractory products being imported interest sold in the
Philippines in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 7843 and its implementing rules and regulations. [45]

If, as claimed by the petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint, he and the private respondent had agreed that HTC will use as basis for its price

policy and structural revision, the BIS report, for sure, Borgonia would have incorporated the said agreement in the first compromise agreement. He did

not, and Borgonia has not offered any explanation for such failure. The petitioner signed the draft of the agreement without any plaint or revision. It was

only in the second compromise agreement that was later signed by the petitioner and the private respondent that Borgonia incorporated the phrase

based on the findings of the BIS. Borgonia and the petitioner made the insertion on their own, without the a priori consent of the private respondent.

The Court is not convinced by the petitioners contention (and that of Borgonia in his Affidavit) that the petitioner and the private respondent

had agreed to leave the final determination of the base value or price of importation per metric ton to a third party (BIS). The private respondent could

not have agreed to the use of the BIS report because, as mentioned, he had strenuously objected to its use as basis for the revision of its price policy

and structure. For HTC to admit that the BIS finding of DM 1,200 per metric ton was the normal value of the refractory bricks from Germany for the

purpose of resolving the anti-dumping case is one thing; but for HTC to agree to be bound by the BIS recommendation for the purpose of revising its

price policy and structure is completely a different matter.

 With the petitioner and the private respondents admission of the prima facie findings of the BIS, the Commission can prepare its

recommendation to the Special Committee on the protest of the RCP to the HTC importation subject of the case. Thereafter:

D. The Special Committee shall, within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the report of the Commission, decide whether the article in
question is being imported in violation of this section and shall give due notice of such decision. In case the decision of dumping is in
the affirmative, the special committee shall direct the Commissioner of Customs to cause the dumping duty, to be levied, collected
and paid, as prescribed in this section, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on such article, and on the
articles of the same specific kind or class subsequently imported under similar circumstances coming from the specific country.

In the event that the Special Committee fails to decide within the period prescribed herein, the recommendation of the Commission
shall be deemed approved and shall be final and executory.[46]

On the matter of the revision or adjustment of the price policy and structure of HTC, the parties had agreed to accomplish the same in due

time. It goes without saying that the RCP retained the right to object to or protest to the price policy and structure revision of HTC.

The agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent not to be bound by the base value in the BIS report for the revision of its price

policy and structure is not unexpected because: (1) the findings of the BIS are only prima facie, meaning to say, not conclusive, and HTC was accorded

a chance to base its price policy and structure on evidence and informations other than those contained in the BIS report; (2) the normal value of the

imported refractory bricks may fluctuate from time to time, hence, the need for any importer to revise its price policy and structure from time to time; and

(3) the base value to be used by HTC in revising its price policy would be scrutinized and resolved initially by the Commission, by the Special Committee

and by the Court of Tax Appeals on appeal.

The process agreed upon by the petitioner and the private respondent was not only practical and fair, but in accord with law as well.

In fine, the private respondent did not commit any falsehood in the Urgent Motion and his Affidavit of Merit when he declared that he and the

petitioner put behind them the BIS report, and agreed to use R.A. No. 7843 and the rules and regulations implementing the same to determine the base

price for the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.

Admittedly, the respondent did not object to the offending phrase before and after signing the agreement and for a considerable stretch period

until HTC filed its motion. However, we do not agree with the contention of the petitioner that such failure of the respondent to object to the offending

phrase for such period of time amounted to an admission that, indeed, the private respondent was aware of the offending phrase in the Agreement, and

to his agreement thereto; and estopped the private respondent from alleging that he was deceived by the petitioner into signing the Compromise

Agreement. In his appeal to the DOJ, the private respondent declared that:

3.9 True, respondent-appellant may have been remiss and lacking in circumspect in failing to review the hard copy
Compromise Agreement and notice the insertion. Being in the trading business, respondent-appellant personally handles hundreds
of documents daily and is on the telephone for most of the day communicating with suppliers and customers. And he had no reason
to believe that either complainant-appellee or Mr. Borgonia would make such an insertion, especially after respondent-appellant had
accepted the fax Compromise Agreement wording and conveyed such acceptance to complainant-appellees office. Respondent-
appellant also had to reason to even think that such a surreptitious insertion would be made; after all, he had a very warm and
friendly meeting with complainant-appellee and Mr. Borgonia and came out of it with a feeling that he could trust complainant-
appellee (p. 4, Annex C).
 3.10 Hence, when respondent-appellant alleges that he was induced to sign the hard copy Compromise Agreement
through fraud and deceit, respondent-appellant honestly believes that he was misled into signing it. He was misled by the fact that
he had been sent the fax Compromise Agreement by complainant-appellee, that he had conveyed its acceptability to complainant-
appellee and now requested for the hard copy for execution, that he had been led to trust that the findings and recommendation of
the BIS were being put behind them and that complainant-appellee had agreed to such a compromise. The transmittal of the hard
copy Compromise Agreement, without any notice or mention by complainant-appellee or complainant-appellees office that it
contained
insertions or wording different from the fax Compromise Agreement, and on respondent-appellants understanding that the wording
of the hard copy Compromise Agreement would be exactly the same as the fax Compromise Agreement, constitutes the fraud or
deceit allegedly by respondent-appellant.[47]

In his rejoinder-affidavit, the private respondent explained that:

2. Again, contrary to the allegations in the Reply-Affidavits, I was unable to review the Compromise Agreement delivered by Mr.
Gutierrez on 22 April 1997 as I was busy with numerous calls and business at the time it was delivered. Also, I had been led to
believe in our meetings with Mr. Villanueva and Mr. Borgonia that I could trust them. So, after having seen the fax
Compromise Agreement and being amenable to it, I trusted that they would send a genuine hard copy. As it turned out, I was
mistaken.[48]

Moreover, even before filing the Urgent Motion and signing the Affidavit of Merit, the private respondent tried for several times to contact the

petitioner, but the latter failed to return his calls. This reinforced the suspicion of the private respondent that the insertion of the offending phrase was not,

after all, inadvertent but deliberate, calculated to deceive him to the prejudice of HTC. The private respondent may be blamed for putting too much trust

and confidence on the petitioner, but he certainly cannot be indicted for perjury for lack of probable cause.

The petitioner failed to append to his petition records of the Commission that the private respondent appeared for HTC, on May 9, 1997,

before the Commission for the hearing on the Compromise Agreement; and showing that the private respondent did not object thereto.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 76999 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 142011. March 14, 2003]

ALFONSO C. CHOA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LENI CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Alfonso Chan Choa, petitioner, is a Chinese national. On April 25, 1989, he filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Bacolod City, a
verified petition for naturalization,[1]docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5395.

During the initial hearing of the case on August 27, 1990, petitioner testified on direct examination but he was not able to finish the same. On
August 29, 1990, he filed a motion to withdraw his petition for naturalization. [2] The trial court granted the motion in its Resolution dated September 28,
1990,[3] which partly reads:
The petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, has not yet finished testifying on direct-examination. Although the petitioner has not stated in his said Motion To
Withdraw Petition the reason why he is withdrawing his petition at this stage of the proceedings, the petitioner can not be compelled to continue with his
petition for naturalization.

In view thereof, the petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, is allowed to withdraw his petition for naturalization.

SO ORDERED.

Meanwhile, on August 5, 1992, State Prosecutor Pedro D. Delfin on detail at Bacolod City, acting upon the complaint of petitioners wife, Leni, filed
an Information[4] with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Bacolod City, charging petitioner with perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322. The Information reads:

That on or about 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly made untruthful statements or falsehoods upon material matters required by the Revised
Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473) in his verified Petition for Naturalization dated April 13, 1989 (sic),[5]subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public
Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer oath, which petition bears Doc. No. 140, Page No. 29, Book No. XXIII, series of 1989, in the
Notarial Register of said Notary Public, by stating therein the following, to wit:

5.) I am married to a Filipino. My wifes name is Leni Ong Choa and now resides at 46 Malaspina Street, Bacolod City. I have two (2) children whose
names, dates and places of birth, and residence are as follows:

Name Date of Birth Place of Birth Residence

ALBRYAN July 19, 1981 Bacolod City 46 Malaspina St.,

ONG CHOA Bacolod City

CHERYL May 5, 1983 Bacolod City 46 Malaspina St.,

LYNNE ONG Bacolod City

CHOA

xxxxxxxxx

10) I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have conducted myself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines in my relations with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which I am living.

xxxxxxxxx

when in truth and in fact, said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong Choa and their two (2) children were not then residing at said address at # 46
Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City, having left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and were then residing at Hervias
Subdivision, Bacolod City; that contrary to his aforesaid allegation in his verified Petition for Naturalization, accused, while residing at 211 106 Street,
Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship with one Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife
since 1984, and begetting two (2) children with her as a consequence, as he and his wife, the private offended party herein, have long been separated
from bed and board since 1984; which falsehoods and/or immoral and improper conduct are grounds for disqualification to become a citizen of the
Philippines.

Act contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued thereafter.

After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision[6] dated February 21, 1995 finding petitioner guilty of perjury, as charged, thus:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense which he is presently charged, and there being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances that may be considered, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional and to pay the costs.

Petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration, [7] contending, among others, that there is no basis to convict him of perjury because almost two
years prior to the filing of the Information, his motion to withdraw the petition for naturalization containing the alleged false statements was granted by
the MTCC, hence, the alleged false statements were no longer existing or had become functus officio.

The MTCC, in its Order[8] dated March 31, 1995, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Bacolod City, in a Decision dated September 12, 1996, affirmed the MTCC judgment. [9]
 Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 19968. In his comment, the Solicitor General
recommended the acquittal of petitioner, contending that the withdrawal of his petition for naturalization rendered the same functus officio, thus making
the questioned false statements inexistent.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated June 8, 1999,[10] affirmed the RTC Decision with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court to be in accordance with law and evidence, we AFFIRM the same with the
modification that petitioner-accused-appellant Alfonso Choa is sentenced to suffer imprisonment, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law without
any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, for a period of three (3) months of arresto mayor, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional.

SO ORDERED.

In convicting petitioner, the Appellate Court adopted as its own the RTCs findings as follows:

Evidence presented clearly proved that all the above-enumerated elements (of perjury) have been duly executed by the accused. His allegations in his
petition regarding his, his wifes and childrens residences and his positive averment of the fact that he is of good moral character and had conducted
himself in an irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines are material matters in connection with his petition for naturalization as they are
essential facts required by Sec. 7 of C.A. No. 473 for one to fulfill for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship. They are the very facts which would
be the subject of inquiry by the court hearing the petition and the same would be the basis of the courts ruling whether one is qualified and
granted Philippine citizenship.

Paragraph 2 of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the statement or affidavit is to be made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath. The information shows that the statement was duly subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., a
person competent and authorized by law to receive and administer oath and the same was entered in his notary register as Doc. No. 140, Page No. 29,
Book No. XXIII, Series of 1989.

That the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood could be gleaned from the discrepancies in his given addresses. In his petition for
naturalization he gave No. 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City as his and his wifes residence, while in the birth certificates and the affidavit of
admission of paternity of both Fonsella Kae Saludar and Steve Albert Saludar, he gave No. 211, 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City as
his address besides from the fact that while may have been residing in the above-stated addresses, his wife and children have been staying at Hervias
Subdivision, Bacolod City since the latter part of 1984. Furthermore, cohabiting openly with another woman not his wife and siring (2) children with the
same, in open defiance with the norm of morality of the community where monogamy is the accepted practice, is very inconsistent with his allegations of
a moral life, proper and irreproachable, considering that the accused, by his own admission is a graduate of the University of St. La Salle, a school
known for its high academic and moral standards. These assertions are not only willful and deliberate but a perversion of truth which the law is
mandated to punish.

Section 7 of C.A. 473 provides:

Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent Court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two (2) photographs of
the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and former residence, his occupation; the place and date of his birth, whether single or
married, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and each of the childrenx x x. (underscoring supplied)

The above-cited provisions are the pertinent law which specifically requires any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship to accomplish, thus
complying with the fourth element of the crime of perjury. (pp. 119-120, Original Records, Vol. II) [11]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated February 22, 2000.[12]

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.[13]

Both the petitioner and the Solicitor General in their respective pleadings contend that the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed because: (a) not all the elements of the crime of perjury are present; and (b) the withdrawal of the petition for naturalization which contains the
alleged untruthful statements bars the prosecution of petitioner forperjury.

Thus, the issue here is whether petitioner may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged false statements he stated in his petition for
naturalization withdrawn almost two years prior to the filing of the Information for perjury.

The petition is unmeritorious.

Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code under which petitioner has been charged and convicted, provides:

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next
preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding
articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.

The elements of perjury are:

1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter;
 2. The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath;

3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and

4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.[14]

All these elements are present in the instant case. Petitioner willfully and deliberately alleged false statements concerning his "residence" and
"moral character" in his petition for naturalization. This was sufficiently proven by the prosecution, as succinctly noted by the Court of Appeals in its
assailed Decision.

The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and sworn to by petitioner before Notary Public Filomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent and
authorized by law to receive and administer oath. Also, petitioner started testifying under oath on his false allegations before the trial court.

The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and "moral character" are material matters because they are among the very facts in issue or
the main facts which are the subject of inquiry [15] and are the bases for the determination of petitioner's qualifications and fitness as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. Thus, C.A. No. 473 provides:

SEC. 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization:

xxxxxxxxx

"Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living;

xxxxxxxxx

SEC. 7. Petition for citizenship. Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate,
accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation;
the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and if the father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of the
children; x x x; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for
naturalization under the provisions of this Act; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

The necessity of declaring a truthful and specific information on the "residence" and "moral character" in the petition for naturalization has been
underscored by this Court in Chua Kian Lai vs. Republic,[16] thus:

One qualification for Philippine citizenship is that the petitioner must be of good moral character. That circumstance should be specifically alleged in the
petition.

xxxxxxxxx

The law explicitly requires that the applicant should indicate in his petition his present and former places of residence (Sec. 7, Com. Act No.
473). That requirement is designed to facilitate the verification of petitioners activities which have a bearing on his petition for naturalization,
especially so as to his qualifications and moral character, either by private individuals or by investigative agencies of the government, by pointing to
them the localities or places wherein appropriate inquiries may be made (Keng Giok vs. Republic, 112 Phil. 896). Moreover, the suppression of that
information might constitute falsehood which signifies that the applicant lacks good moral character and is not, therefore, qualified to be
admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Fully cognizant of the truth surrounding his moral character and residence, petitioner instead declared falsely in his verified petition for
naturalization that "he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualification under C.A. No. 473." [17] Clearly, he willfully asserted falsehood under oath
on material matters required by law.

We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the Solicitor General that petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for perjury in view
of the withdrawal of the petition for naturalization containing his false material statements. In this jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the proceeding in
which the perjury is alleged to have been committed be first terminated before a prosecution for the said crime is commenced. [18] At the time he filed his
petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the elements of the crime were already present then. He knew all along that
he wilfully stated material falsities in his verified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without even stating any reason therefor. [19] But such
withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for perjury he already committed. Indeed,
the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of the Philippine naturalization law
but the judicial proceedings as well. And the petition for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be used as evidence of his unlawful act.

Petitioner then claims that since the petition for naturalization is a pleading, the allegations therein are absolutely privileged and cannot be used for
any criminal prosecution against him, citing Sison vs. David,[20] People vs. Aquino[21] and Flordelis vs. Himalaloan.[22]

The argument is unavailing. Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court categorically stressed that the term "absolute
privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an "established technical meaning, in connection with civil actions for libel and slander." The purpose of the
privilege is to ensure that "members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their
respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. It is granted in aid and for the
advantage of the administration of justice." [23] Certainly, in the present case, petitioner cannot seek refuge under the absolutely privileged
communication rule since the false statements he made in his petition for naturalization has instead made a mockery of the administration of justice.

The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with perjury for having alleged false statements in his verified
answer. This Court held that no perjury could be committed by Flordelis because "an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be
under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent that one element of the crime of perjury is absent x x x, namely, that the sworn statement complained
of must be required by law."[24]

Anent the alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection, suffice it to state that such right cannot be invoked to protect his
criminal act.

In People vs. Cainglet,[25] this Court emphatically stressed that "every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial
refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the administration of the laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings
and judgments be fair and free from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they do
not."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4634. September 24, 1997]

JESUS CABARRUS, JR., complainant, vs. JOSE ANTONIO BERNAS, respondents.

DECISION

TORRES, JR., J.:

On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed and administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged
violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code of professional Resposibility. In his complaint-affidavit [1] dated August 12, 1996,
complainant alleged as follows:

A.That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., subscribe under oath before Marie Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a notary public in Makati City,
wife of lawyer jose Antonio Bernas, a verification and certification of non-forum shopping which was appended to a complaint for reconveyance of
property and damages, denominated as Civil Case No. 65646, filed before the Regional Trial Court in National Capital Region, RTC, which case was
raffled to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. A photocopy of said complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annexex (sic) A, A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;

B.That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of public document, I am hereto quoting verbatim, the test (sic) of Annex A-6, the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping which states:

Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:

He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause the preparation of the foregoing pleading, the content of which are true to his personal knowledge
and that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency. If he should learn that a similar action of (sic) proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court or any other Tribunal agency, he undertake to report to (sic) that the fact within Five (5) days from the notice to this notice (sic) to this Honorable
Court. Underscoring supplied.

C.That the cause of action relied upon by the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is fraud, facilitated by forgery as gleaned from paragraph 15, 16, and
22;

D.That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing (sic) of the allegation under 1-B of the instant complaint, respondent and his counsel Jose Antonio
Bernas caused the preparation and filing of a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the filing of
the aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic) Ave., a xerox copy of said complaint is hereto attached
and marked as Annex B.

D-1.That as stated in Annex B, the gravaman of the affidavit complaint of the respondent is forgery, the same legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646;

D-2.That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent counsel, Jose Antonio Bernas filed a written complaint at the NBI for the same cause of action which
was reiterated in another letter submitting to the NBI standard specimen signitures dated October 1995, copies of said letter complaint are hereto
attached and marked as Annexes (sic) C.

E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis of Annexes A, B, C, D, inclusive of submarkings knowingly subverted and perverted the truth
when he falsify certified (sic) and verified under oath in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, that:

He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other Tribunal or agency. Where verification-certification was placed under oath and was conveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of
respondent in both cases at Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI, an agency within the ambis (sic) and purview of the circulus (sic) of the
Supreme Court prohibiting forum shopping.
F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is the same lawyer who instigated a criminal complaint
at the NBI for forgery and respondents themselves conspired and confabulated with each other in facilitating and insuring the open, blatant and
deliberate violation of Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code which states:

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents.- The penalty of prison correctional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine of not more than p 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of
exchange (sic) or any other kind of commercial documents; and

2. Any person who, to the damage of the third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage
, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article, or any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by
the penalty next lower in degree.

G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated abetted and facilitated the perversion and subversion of truth in the said
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the code of Professional
responsibility for Lawyers, the pertinent provisions of which are herein below quoted and a copy of said code is hereto attached and marked as Annex E;

CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in lawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful (sic) conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities simed (sic) at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 3 A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OF (sic) STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualified (sic) or legal services.

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

In his Comment, [2] respondents Jose Antonio Bernas avers that he has not committed forum shopping because the criminal action is not an action
that involves the same issue as those in the civil action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not
yet been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only exist when identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple
fora.

In his Supplemental Comment,[3] respondent further contends that neither he or his client Pascual has commenced any criminal action. Pascual
merely requested the NBI to assist in the investigation or prosecution, and left it to the NBI to determine whether the filing of an endorsement to the
prosecutor, who would determine probable caused, would be appropriate. It was only upon request of the NBI the he assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting
an affidavit-complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant. Likewise, respondent by counsel reiterates that the letter transmitted to
the NBI cannot constitute an action or proceeding because the NBIs functions are merely investigatory and informational in nature. NBI has no
prosecutorial functions or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting relief or remedy. The NBI cannot be an agency contemplated by the circular.

The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty. Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91, and
administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the administrative complaint bereft of merit and should be dismissed.

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another. Therefore, a party to a case resort to forum shopping because by filling another petition involving the same essential facts and
circumstances, xxx, respondents approached two different for a in order to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, [4] In this
case, there is no forum shopping to speak of Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr. Pascual, Jr., merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate the
the alleged fraud and forgery committed by Mr. Jesus Cabarrus. [5] The filing of the civil case for conveyance and damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City does not preclude respondent to institute a criminal action. The rule allows the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal
case without violating the circulars on forum shopping. It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and applied as to
achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert and legitimate objective or the
goal of all rules of procedure-which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. [6]

Adjunct to this, Act No. 157 [7], specifically section 1 hereof provides, viz:

Section 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice which shall have the following functions:

(a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its initiative and as public interest may require;

(b) To render assistance, whenever properly requested in the investigation or detection of crimes and other offenses;
(c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal and other infromations for the benefit and use of the prosecuting and law-enforcement entities of the
Philippines, identification records of all person without criminal convictions, records of identifying marks, characteristics, and ownership or
possession of all firearms as well as bullets fired therefrom;

(d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and law-enforcement officers and entities of the Government as well as the courts that may request its
services;

(e) To extend its services, whenever properly requested in the investigation of cases of administrative or civil nature in which the Government is
interested;

(f) To undertake the instruction and training of representative number of city and municipal peace officers at the request of their respective superiors
along effective methods of crime investigation and detection in order to insure greater efficiency in the discharge of their duties;

(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crime laboratory and to conduct researches inn furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal
investigation;

(h) To perform such other related function as the secretary of Justice may assign from time to time.

Explicitly, the function of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-
judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose findings
are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders assistance when
requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those person responsible for
defrauding his client.

The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those
vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to make
binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be
among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996]

ALFONSO C. CHOA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S. CHIONGSON, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The uncomplicated issues in this administrative complaint have been properly joined with the filing of the respondents comment as required in the
1st Indorsement of 18 August 1995 of Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis, Deputy Court Administrator. No further pleadings need be required from the parties.

In the complaint signed by Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz as counsel for the complainant and verified by the latter, the respondent is charged with
grave misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and having knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in Criminal Case No. 50322 entitled, People of
the Philippines vs. Alfonso C. Choa.

Criminal Case No. 50322 was for Perjury and initiated by the complainants wife, Leni L. Ong-Choa, through the filing of a letter-complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City. This complaint arose from the alleged untruthful statements or falsehoods in the complainants Petition for
Naturalization dated 30 March 1989 which was docketed as Case No. 5395, of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.

In due course, an Information was filed, in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City by the Office of the Prosecutor, charging the
complainant herein with perjury allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly made untruthful statements of [sic] falsehoods upon material matters required
by the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473) in his verified Petition for Naturalization dated April 13, 1989, subscribed and sworn to before Notary
Public Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer oath[s], which petition bears Doc. No. 140; Page No. 29; Book No. XXIII; and Series of 1989,
in the Notarial Register of said Notary Public, by stating therein the following, to wit:

5. 1 am married to a Filipino. My wifes name is Leni Ong Choa and now resides at 46 Malaspina Street, Bacolod City. I have two (2) children, whose
names, dates and places of birth, and residences are as follows:

NAME DATE OF PLACE RESIDENCE

BIRTH OF BIRTH
ALBRYAN July 19, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,
ONG CUQA 1981 City Bacolod City
 CHERYL LYNNE May 5, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,
ONG CHOA 1983 City Bacolod City

xxx xxx xxx

10. I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. I have conducted myself in a proper and
irreprQachable manner during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines in my relations with the constituted government as well as with

the community in which 1 am living.

xxx xxx xxx

When in truth and in fact said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong Choa and their two (2) children were not then residing at the said address at No. 46
Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City, having left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and were then residing at Hervias
Subdivision, Bacolod City, that contrary to his aforesaid allegations in his verified Petition for Naturalization, accused while residing at 211, 106 Street,
Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship with one Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife
since 1984, and begotting [sic] two (2) children with her as a consequence, as he and his wife, the private offended party herein, have long been
separated from bed and boards [sic] since 1984; which falsehoods and/ or immoral and improper conduct are grounds for disqualifications [sic] of [sic]
becoming a citizen of the Philippines.

Act contrary to law.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned to Branch III thereof where the respondent is the presiding Judge.

After trial, the respondent Judge rendered judgment on 21 February 1995 and found the complainant herein guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of perjury. The respondent Judge accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional and to pay the
costs.

The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment alleging that: (1) there is no basis for the conviction since his petition for
naturalization had been withdrawn and therefore had become functus officio; (2) the petition for naturalization is a pleading, hence its allegations are
privileged; and (3) his prosecution violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The last ground is founded on an admission made by a
representative of the Office of the Solicitor General of her lack of knowledge of any perjury case filed based on a withdrawn or dismissed petition for
naturalization.

The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an order dated 31 March 1995.

The complainant filed the instant complaint on 14 July. 1995 and prayed for the removal of the respondent fudge from office. As grounds therefor,
he alleges that:

(1) The respondent Judge is guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Bias and Partiality, and Knowingly Rendering An Unjust Judgment when he
intentionally failed to divulge the next-door-neighbor relationship between him and the family of Leni Ong Choa and to disqualify himself
from sitting in the criminal case on such ground as part of the grand design and preconceived intention to unjustly convict the
complainant of the crime charged without due process.

(2) The allegations in the Information do not constitute the offense of perjury.

(3) The petition having been withdrawn with finality, it has become functus oficio and it is as if the Petition was not filed at all so that
whatever false statemeuts were contained therein were no longer requiredby law and had ceased to be on a material matter.

(4) The respondent Judge admitted for prosecution Exhibit P (handwritten list of properties) even if this was self-serving as it was undated
and unsigned; and Exhibit Q (letter of Leni Ong Choas counsel to the complainant) even if it was also self-serving as there was no
showing that he received the letter.

(5) The respondent Judge has sentenced the complainant to suffer a penalty higher than that provided by law, without applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The respondent Judge refutes the charge in his Comment dated 12 September 1995, thus:

He denies being the next-door-neighbor of Leni Ong Choa there being a house, belonging to the Sia family, separating his house and that of Leni Choa;
he and the rest of the members of his family are not acquainted with Leni Choa or any member of her family and had not exchanged greetings nor is he
even a nodding acquaintance of Leni Choa or any member of her family.

He asserts that if the allegations in the Information do not constitute an offense, the complainant should have filed a Motion to Quash but he did not. Just
the same, when the complainant stated in the Petition that he together with his wife and children lived at 46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City, he committed a
falsehood under oath because the truth is two (2) years before the filing of the Petition, his wife and two (2) children were not living with him anymore,
making him liable for perjury.

Respondent also avers that the complainant is not of good moral character contrary to what he stated in the Petition for Naturalization since he is
conducting an extra-marital relationship with Stella Flores Saludar, his former employee, with whom he has begotten two (2) children. As a matter of fact,
a case for concubinage against complainant was filed and is now pending in Court.

According to the respondent, a reading of the Order granting the Motion to Withdraw the Petition will show that the Prosecutor representing the Office of
the Solicitor General opposed the Motion to Withdraw the Petition for the reason that the complainant had abandoned his wife and two (2) children, is
not giving them support and is now living with his paramour.
On the claim of the complainant that his petition for naturalization has became functus officio in view of its withdrawal, hence no longer existent, the
respondent Judge maintains that the withdrawal reduced the petition to functus officio only for the purpose of the Special Proceedings. but not when it is
used as evidence in other cases.

On the issue of the admissibility of the Exhibits P. Q and R, the respondent Judge contends that Exhibits P. Q and R were duly identified by Leni Ong
Choa and her testimonies on these were found to be credible by the Court.

Finally, respondent Judge asserts that the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable in the perjury case as the penalty imposed by the court did not
exceed one (1) year.

The respondent Judge then prays for the dismissal of the complaint for being patently without merit and for the censure and reprimand of the
complainants counsel with a warning to refrain from filing similar harassment suits.

In the Evaluation contained in a Memorandum dated 17 November 1995 and duly approved by the Court Mministrator, Hon. Zenaida N. Elepao,
Deputy Court Administrator, makes the following findings and conclusions:

EVALUATION: A careful study of the records shows that the allegations of the complainant are devoid of any merit.

The charge that respondent Judge and Leni Choa are neighbors [sic] appears to be petty under the circumstances. Granting that they are indeed next-
door neighbors does not necessarily mean that respondent Judge has violated Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for Disqualification of Judges. Nowhere in
said Rule is it ordained that being the neighbor of a party-litigant is reason enough for the Judge to disqualify himself from hearing the formers case.

With respect to the complainants claim that the allegations in the information do not constitute the offense of perjury, an administrative proceeding is not
the forum to decide whether the judge has erred or not, especially as complainant has appealed his conviction.

Even if the matter can be examined, we do not find any error in the Courts decision.

The elements of perjury as enumerated in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Bautista (C.A., 40 O.G. 2491) are as follows:

(a) Statement in the affidavit upon material matter made under oath;

(b) The affiant swears to the truthfulness of the statements in his affidavit before a competent officer authorized to administer oath;

(c) There is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood; and

(d) Sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law.

It cannot be denied that the petition for naturalization filed by Alfonso C. Choa was made under oath and before a competent officer authorized to
administer oath as shown by the records (p. 4, APPENDIX A). This petition for naturalization is required by law as a condition precedent for the grant of
Philippine citizenship (Section 7 Corn. Act No. 473).

The question now boils down to whether there is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.

As shown by the records (p. 1, APPENDIX A), Alfonso C. Choa declared in his petition dated 30 March 1989 that his wife Leni Ong Choa resides at 46
Ma!aspina St. Bacolod City while in the administrative complaint he filed against respondent Judge, he stated that his wife Leni Ong Choa left their
family residence (46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City) in the latter part of 1984 (p. 6, par. 2 of Adrn. Complaint). This simply means that when he filed his
petition for naturalization, Leni Ong Choa was not residing at the abovementioned address anymore.

It was also proven that Alfonso C. Choa had a child with a woman not his wife and he himself signed the birth certificate as the father of that child (p. 4,
APPENDIX E). This is contrary to what he declared in his petition that he is of good moral character which is required under the Naturalization Law (par.
3, Sec. 2 Corn. Act No. 473).

There wa therefore a deliberate assertion of falsehood by Alfonso C.. Choa to warrant conviction for perjury as found by Judge Chiongson.

As to the complainants claim that the withdrawal of the petitiorr makes it functus officio, we sustain the respondent Judges view that the Petition can be
used as evidence in another case. In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Cainglet (16 SCRA 748) the Court held that every interest of public policy
demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws
(Jay vs. State, [1916] 15 Ala. App. 255, 43 So. 137). It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgment shall be fair and free from fraud,
Sand that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth and that they be punished if they do not (People vs. Niles, 300 III., 458, 133 N.E. 252,37
A.R.L. 1284, 1289).

On whether the judge erred in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to the case, we cite Section 2 of R.A. No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence
Law) which provides in part that This Act shall not apply to x x x those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, x x x Since the
penalty for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its maximum period which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months toprision correccional in its minimum period which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months, the respondent Judge
was correct in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

As earlier stated, the foregoing discussion is in no way the final appreciation of the Courts decision which is on appeal, but is made only to illustrate the
utter lack of merit of this charge. Counsel for the complainant must be reprimanded for assisting in the filing of this complaint.
 Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo then recommends:

Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson be DISMISSED for lack of merit. It is
further recommended that Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz be REPRIMANDED for assisting in the filing of a patently unmeritorious complaint.

We fully agree with Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo that the allegations in the complaint are utterly devoid of merit. Good faith and good motive did
not seem to have inspired the filing of the complaint.

Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the respondent, if the complainant and his counsel honestly believed that the allegations in the Information in
the perjury case did not constitute an offense, they should have filed a motion to quash. Under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the accused
may move to quash the complaint or information on this ground.

The complainant never did; he was arraigned and entered intp trial. Although his failure to do so did not operate as a waiver of the said ground
pursuant to Section 8 of the same Rule, it showed, nevertheless, his admission of the weakness of the ground. If he had perceived it to be strong, he
would not have wasted an opportunity to put an early end to the ordeal of a prolonged litigation. Besides, this ground had not at all been invoked by him,
as shown in the order of 31 March 1995 denying the complainants motion for the reconsideration.

The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not and cannot amount to a recall of the questioned untruthful statements. Neither could it
extinguish any offense which may have been committed by reason of such untruthful statements.

As to the respondent Judges being a next-door neighbor of the complainants wife - the complainant in the perjury case - it must be stressed that
that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory disqualification under the first paragraph or for a voluntary disqualification under the second paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the complainant has failed to disclose in his complaint that he had raised this matter at any
time before the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary of the grounds of his motion for reconsideration in the respondents order denying the said
motion does not include this matter. If indeed the complainant honestly believed in the justness of this grievance, he would have raised it in an
appropriate pleading before the trial court.

Finally, the nature and character of the complainants grievances relative to the respondents judgment finding the former guilty of perjury. May only
be properly ventilated in an appropriate judicial proceeding, such as an appeal from the judgment.

This kind of recourse, whether made in addition to a regular appeal from the judgment, or in lieu thereof, if none had been made, is clearly without
any basis and cannot be tolerated for it robs Judges of precious time which they could otherwise devote to the cases in their courts or to the unclogging
of their dockets.

Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must have been aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the respondent. As
a Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly or willingly, promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give
aid nor consent to the same; (2) by Section 20(c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain such action or proceedings only as appear to
him to be just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was incumbent upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits
and probable results of the complainants case (Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of Professional Responsibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for
the law and legal processes (Canon 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
his apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.

WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.

For the reasons above stated, Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz is hereby directed to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his apparent failure to comply with his duties and responsibilities above stated.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-94-1081 October 25, 1995

VIRGINIA E. BURGOS, complainant,

vs.
JOSEFINA R. AQUINO, Court Stenographer, RTC, Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

This administrative matter refers to the charge of immorality brought by complainant against respondent, for maintaining illicit relations with
complainant's husband which eventually begot them a child, a daughter named Jocelyn A. Burgos.

The letter-complaint of complainant states:

Sir:

Ito po ay may kinalaman sa isang empleyado ninyo sa Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan na si Josefina R. Aquino, court stenographer.

Nais ko pong paimbistigahan siya sa pagkaimmoral dahil siya po ay may-anak sa aking asawa.

Nito nga pong mga nagdaan panahon ay hindi ko na pinapansin pero grabe na po ang mga gawain. Nuon pong isang taon, April
1993, napagalaman ko na nagbababad sa office ng asawa ko, kasama ang kanyang anak. Nakikialam sa mga gawain sa office at
nagpapanggap pang Mrs. siya ng asawa ko. Maluag siyang nakaaalis sa office niya nuong panahon na iyon na walang pumupuna.
Sa katunayan po ay kalakip nito ang papeles na nilalakad niya kahit office hour. Hindi siya mapigil sa pagpunta sa office ng asawa
 ko, sa dahilan mag-iiskandalo raw siya. Tumagal po iyon ng mahabang panahon sapagkat hindi ko po ugali ang pumunta sa office
ng asawa ko.

Napagalaman ko lang po ito nang umuwi ang anak ko na sumama sa office ng asawa ko. Hindi po tumigil ng kapupunta ruon kahit
na nanduon ang anak ko. Hindi naman po kilala ng anak ko. Hindi na po matiis ng mga tao sa office kaya sinabi sa anak ko.
Isinumbong sa akin ng anak ko.

Kinabukasan po ay isinumbong ko sa judge ng Branch 19. Pinagsabihan siya. Nangako na hihiwalay na raw siya. Hindi na raw kami
guguluhin. Hindi po tumupad. Ang pagpunta lang po sa office ang sinunod pero patuloy pa rin po ang paghahabol sa asawa ko.
Ayaw pong tumigil. Matalas po at walang kahihiyan.

Nito pong nakaraang linggo May 26 at 28, 1994 nagbantay na naman po ang anak sa harapan ng office ng asawa ko. Hindi po
tumigil. Alam po ito ng buong compound ng kapitolyo. Kilalang-kilala po siya sa gawain nga immoral. Hindi po ako nagsisinungaling.
Totoong lahat ito. Siguro po ay nauunawaan ninyo ako, dahil may ina rin po kayo na katulad ko na napakasakit kapag niloko. Dapat
na pong masugpo itong gawain ng ganitong mga babae, kung hindi po natin papansinin ay marami pang pamilya na masisira.
Masyado na po akong nasasaktan.

Kalakip po rito ang mga papeles na siya ay may anak.

Gumagala
ng,

(Sgd.) Gng. Virginia

E. Burgos 1

We asked the respondent to file her Comment. In her Comment, she admitted that she had an illicit relation with complainant's husband. The illicit
relation allegedly happened prior to her employment in the judiciary. She claimed that the affair occurred in 1979 and their love child, Jocelyn, was born
on March 19, 1980.2 She joined the judiciary only on July 9, 1981 as Court Clerk Interpreter I at the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan and was
promoted to Stenographic Reporter. She later transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, in 1983. She now avers that she
had severed her relation with Atty. Burgos arising from their disagreement over support.

In her Reply, complainant maintained that her husband and respondent are still "on." She had also demanded the respondent to disallow her daughter
from using the family name Burgos.

We referred the letter-complaint to Executive Judge Natividad C. Dizon, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, for investigation. In her
report and recommendation, dated March 17, 1995, Judge Dizon found the following:

xxx xxx xxx

The parties, through counsel, agreed that they will just submit their respective position papers relative to their respective
contentions. No testimonial evidence was presented but only documentary.

xxx xxx xxx

It appears from the Personal Data Sheet submitted by the respondent to the Supreme Court, under Column No. 20 that: in 1974 to
September 30, 1979, she was employed as Clerk Stenographer in the Fiscal's Office which is a clear indication that when she got
pregnant with her child she was in the government service. Also in Item No. 27 of said Personal Data Sheet, under references, it can
be noted that she named Atty. Francisco Burgos as one of her references.

It is a given fact, as the records clearly show, that when respondent had an affair with the husband of the complainant which
resulted in the birth of the love child, respondent was in the government service. The admission in the Answer (Exh. "B") of the
respondent that she was a victim of amorous advances of complainant's husband sometime in 1979 and out of that relationship a
child was born confirmed the fact that respondent, while in the government service committed a disgraceful and immoral act for
which respondent may be subjected to disciplinary action. Now, whether the relationship with the husband of the complainant is still
subsisting, complainant submitted documents typed by the respondent at the office of complainant's husband showing that in the
said pleadings typewritten below are the initials "fcb\jo" and also complainant claims that respondent brags about her being a
mistress and introduces herself as the legal wife and goes to the office of her paramour almost everyday during office hours (Letter
to the undersigned attached as Annex "4"). Complainant also claims that her husband supports respondent and the child. However,
she did not present evidence to prove such. Therefore, except for the fact that there was admission on the part of the respondent
that complainant's husband is the father of respondent's child and the relationship was during the time she was an employee of the
Fiscal's Office, no sufficient evidence was presented that the relationship is subsisting while respondent was in the judiciary. 3

Judge Dizon recommended respondent's suspension from service.

We then referred the report to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation. In its Memorandum, dated June 19, 1995, it held:

This Office finds merit on the conclusion of the investigating Judge that indeed the respondent committed an immoral act while in
the government service, regardless of whether or not it was committed when employed in the Judiciary. At the time she gave birth to
her child, the respondent may not be in the government service. However, the child was conceived when she was still in the Fiscal's
 Office where the complainant's husband likewise worked. It could be presumed undisputably that the reason for her resignation is
because of her conception and eventually giving birth to her child.

This Office went deeper in its evaluation inquiring further on the personal record of herein respondent. Her personal record reveals
that respondent was employed as Clerk-Typist in the Office of the Governor of Malolos, Bulacan from August 1, 1974 to April 22,
1976, and from April 23, 1976 to September 30, 1979 as Clerk Stenographer in the Fiscal's Office on the same province. She
resigned from the Fiscal's Office and subsequently got herself employed as Court Interpreter in MTC, Guiguinto, Bulacan on July 9,
1981. While it is true that in all her personal record from the time she assumed office in the Judiciary, she declares her status as
single with a child named Jocelyn Aquino born on March 19, 1980, however, in one of her personal data sheets dated October 26,
1982, respondent did not declare her child. Moreover, it is worthy to note that in her Statement of Assets and Liabilities dated July
11, 1984, April 30, 1990, May 14, 1992, April 5, 1993, and April 13, 1994, her only child, though declared, already carries the name
Jocelyn A. Burgos. The reason for the change in her child's surname was not explained.

It is to be emphasized that the offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by DISMISSAL from the service. Whether
or not the immoral relationship still subsist is no longer material. Documents submitted by a government employee to form part of
his/her personal file are official documents. Any alteration or material changes in the content thereof without a valid justification is
tantamount to falsification which is likewise penalized by DISMISSAL from the service. It could be added that in these official
documents, the employee declares under the penalty of perjury that all statements given in the document are true and correct to the
best of his knowledge and belief. It appears from these documents and in the record of the case that no doubt, herein respondent is
guilty of immorality and committed an act of falsifying her own records and therefore, guilty of perjury, which merit a severe
punishment.4

We agree with the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator.

Respondent has admitted her illicit relationship with Atty. Francisco C. Burgos, complainant's husband in 1979 which gave life to their love child, Jocelyn,
in 1980. She, however, denies the charge of complainant that she continues to carry on her dalliance with Atty. Burgos.

The evidence proves the charge of complainant. Complainant submitted pleadings in various courts filed by her husband, Atty. Burgos and typed by
respondent. These pleadings are: (1) Motion for Extension to File Brief filed in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 13785, dated April 1, 1993; 5 (2)
Motion to Reset, dated April 12, 1993, and filed in Civil Case No. 423 in the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan; 6 and (3) Position Paper, dated May
12, 1993, filed also in the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 423. 7 All these pleadings bear the initials "fcb/jo" and which were
typed by the respondent in the office of Atty. Burgos. As the legitimate wife of Atty. Burgos, it is not difficult for complainant to obtain copies of these
pleadings. It is not also far fetched for respondent to type them for she is a court stenographer. Given these circumstances, it behooved the respondent
to disprove the charge that her relationship with complainant's husband has not ceased. She did nothing to meet this burden. We hold that the evidence
on record is substantial enough to conclude that respondent did not stop her illicit relationship with complainant's husband. Proceedings in administrative
investigation are not strictly governed by the technical rules of evidence. They are summary in nature.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in
the judicial branch but also to his behavior outside the court as a private individual.8 There is no dichotomy of morality; a court employee is also judged
by his private morals.9 The exacting standards of morality and decency have been strictly adhered to and laid down by the Court to those in the service
of the judiciary. 10 Respondent, as a court stenographer, did not live up to her commitment to lead a moral life. Her act of maintaining relation with Atty.
Burgos speaks for itself.

Likewise, the records reveal that when respondent applied in the judiciary she filled up the prescribed personal information sheet, Civil Service Form
212, dated October 26, 1982 and did not disclose the existence of her daughter. The form itself gives this warning: "I declare under penalties of perjury
that the answers given above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief." Despite the warning, she professed that her statements were
true.11Under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, perjury is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The required Civil Service Form 212 submitted by respondent
to form part of her personal file is an official document. Her deliberate omission to disclose her child without a valid justification makes her liable for
perjury.12

IN VIEW HEREOF, respondent Josefina R. Aquino is meted the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months for immorality and perjury. Let a
copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record.

SO ORDERED.

RA 9165- COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002

[G.R. No. 149878. July 1, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. TIU WON CHUA a.k.a. Timothy Tiu and QUI YALING y CHUA a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y
Chua, accusedappellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, convicting appellants Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu
(Tiu Won) and Qui Yaling y Chua a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua (Qui Yaling) for violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

Appellants were charged with the crime of illegal possession of a regulated drug, i.e., methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu, in an information which reads:

The undersigned accuses TIU WON CHUA aka Timothy Tiu and QUI YALING Y CHUA aka Sun Tee Sy Y Chua of violation of Section 16, Article III in
relation to Section 2 (e-2), Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and as further amended by Republic Act No.
7659, committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of October 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being authorized by law to possess or use any
regulated drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, knowingly and jointly have in their possession and under their custody and control the following, to
wit:

A sealed plastic bag containing two three four point five (234.5) grams of white crystalline substance;

Four (4) separate sealed plastic bags containing six point two two four three (6.2243) grams of white crystalline substance;

Sixteen (16) separate sealed plastic bags containing twenty point three six seven three (20.3673) grams of white crystalline substance; or a total of
261.0916 grams, and;

An improvised tooter with traces of crystalline substance

known as SHABU containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.

Contrary to law.[1]

During arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered. Appellants, with the assistance of counsel, and the prosecution stipulated on the following
facts:

1. The authenticity of the following documents:

a. The letter of Police Senior Inspector Angelo Martin of WPD, District Intelligence Division, United Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila, dated
October 12, 1998, to the Director of the NBI requesting the latter to conduct a laboratory examination of the specimen mentioned
therein;

b. The Certification issued by Forensic Chemist Loreto Bravo of the NBI, dated October 13, 1998, to the effect that the specimen mentioned
and enumerated therein gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride, Exhibit B; and

c. Dangerous Drug Report No. 98-1200 issued by Forensic Chemist Bravo, dated October 13, 1998, to the effect that the specimen
mentioned therein gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride;

2. The existence of one plastic bag containing 234.5 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, Exhibit D; four (4) plastic sachets also
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total net weight of 6.2243 grams, Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3; additional 16 plastic
sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride with a total net weight of 20.3673 grams, Exhibits F, F-1 to F-15, and one
improvised tooter with a length of 8 inches more or less and with a red plastic band, Exhibit G;

3. Forensic Chemist Loreto Bravo has no personal knowledge as to the source of the regulated drug in question; and

4. Tiu Won Chua and Qui Yaling y Chua as stated in the information are the true and correct names of the two accused. [2]

The witnesses presented by the prosecution were SPO1 Anthony de Leon, PO2 Artemio Santillan and PO3 Albert Amurao. Their testimonies show
that the police authorities, acting on an information that drug-related activities were going on at the HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila,
surveyed the place on October 2, 3, 4 and 5, 1998. At about 10 p.m. of October 6, they conducted a test-buy operation, together with a Chinese-
speaking asset. They were able to buy P2,000.00 worth of substance from appellants, which, upon examination by the PNP crime laboratory, proved
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[3] Nonetheless, they did not immediately arrest the suspects but applied for a warrant to search Unit 4-B of
HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Their application to search the unit supposedly owned by Timothy Tiu was granted by Judge
Ramon Makasiar of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila on October 9. [4] Armed with the warrant, they proceeded to the place and learned that Tiu Won was
not inside the building. They waited outside but Tiu Won did not come. After several stakeouts, they were able to implement the warrant on October 12.
Failing to get the cooperation of the barangay officials, they requested the presence of the building coordinator, Noel Olarte, and his wife, Joji, who acted
as witnesses.

During the enforcement of the warrant, there were three (3) persons inside the apartment, namely, appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling, and a
housemaid. The search was conducted on the sala and in the three (3) bedrooms of Unit 4-B. On top of a table inside the masters bedroom, one (1) big
pack, containing 234.5 grams of shabu, was found inside a black leather mans handbag supposedly owned by Tiu Won, while sixteen (16) small packs
of shabu weighing 20.3673 grams were found inside a ladys handbag allegedly owned by Qui Yaling. Also contained in the inventory were the following
items: an improvised tooter, a weighing scale, an improvised burner and one rolled tissue paper. [5] The authorities also searched a Honda Civic car
bearing Plate No. WCP 157, parked along Masangkay Street, registered in the name of the wife of Tiu Won and found four (4) plastic bags containing
6.2243 grams of shabu, which were likewise confiscated. A gun in the possession of Tiu Won was also seized and made subject of a separate criminal
case.

The defense presented appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. They denied that Timothy Tiu and Tiu Won Chua are one and the same person. They
presented papers and documents to prove that appellant is Tiu Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu, as stated in the search warrant. Tiu Won also claimed
that he does not live in the apartment subject of the search warrant, alleging that he is married to a certain Emily Tan and is a resident of No. 864
Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila. Nonetheless, he admitted that his co-appellant, Qui Yaling, is his mistress with whom he has two children. Qui Yaling
admitted being the occupant of the apartment, but alleged that she only occupied one room, while two other persons, a certain Lim and a certain Uy,
occupied the other rooms. Both appellants denied that they were engaged in the sale or possession of shabu. They asserted that they are in the jewelry
business and that at the time the search and arrest were made, the third person, whom the prosecution identified as a housemaid, was actually a certain
Chin, who was there to look at some of the pieces of jewelry sold by Tiu Won. They also denied that a gun was found in the possession of Tiu Won.

Qui Yaling recalled that upon asking who was it knocking at the door of her apartment on October 12, the police authorities represented that they
were electric bill collectors. She let them in. She was surprised when upon opening the door, around ten (10) policemen barged inside her unit. She,
together with Tiu Won and Chin, was asked to remain seated in the sofa while the men searched each room. Tiu Won alleged that after a fruitless
search, some of the policemen went out, but came back a few minutes later with another person. Afterwards, he was made to sign a piece of paper.
Appellants also claimed that the policemen took their bags which contained money, the pieces of jewelry they were selling and even Qui Yalings cell
phone. They both denied that shabu was discovered in the apartment during the search. Appellants were arrested and brought to the police station.

In a decision, dated August 15, 2001, the RTC found proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellants and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00 each.[6]

Thus, appellants interpose this appeal raising the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE LEGAL DEFECTS OF THE SEARCH WARRANT USED BY THE POLICE OPERATIVES
AGAINST BOTH ACCUSED.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION EVIDENCES (sic) WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AND DISREGARDED
WHICH RESULTED IN THE ERRONEOUS CONVICTION OF BOTH ACCUSED.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF BOTH ACCUSED WERE SERIOUSLY
VIOLATED BY THE POLICE OPERATIVES.[7]

These issues can be trimmed down to two i.e., the legality of the search warrant and the search and arrest conducted pursuant thereto, and the
correctness of the judgment of conviction imposed by the RTC.

As regards the propriety of the search warrant issued in the name of Timothy Tiu, which did not include appellant Qui Yaling, appellants contend
that because of this defect, the search conducted and consequently, the arrest, are illegal. Being fruits of an illegal search, the evidence presented
cannot serve as basis for their conviction.

We beg to disagree. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4)
the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [8] As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, a
mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant, [9] especially since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge
of the drug-related activities of the accused. In fact, a John Doe warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio personaesuch as
will enable the officer to identify the accused. [10] We have also held that a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the
warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described. [11]

Thus, even if the search warrant used by the police authorities did not contain the correct name of Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling, that defect
did not invalidate it because the place to be searched was described properly. Besides, the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation
before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing it. They can therefore be presumed to have personal knowledge of the identity of
the persons and the place to be searched although they may not have specifically known the names of the accused. Armed with the warrant, a valid
search of Unit 4-B was conducted.

We affirm, however, the illegality of the search conducted on the car, on the ground that it was not part of the description of the place to be
searched mentioned in the warrant. It is mandatory that for the search to be valid, it must be directed at the place particularly described in the warrant.
[12]
Moreover, the search of the car was not incidental to a lawful arrest. To be valid, such warrantless search must be limited to that point within the reach
or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. [13] In this case, appellants were
arrested inside the apartment, whereas the car was parked a few meters away from the building.

In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) appellants were in possession of an item or an object
identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the appellants were freely and consciously aware of
being in possession of the drug.[14] We also note that the crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does
not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. [15]
 In the case at bar, the prosecution has sufficiently proved that the packs of shabu were found inside Unit 4-B, HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St.,
Binondo, Manila. Surveillance was previously conducted. Though no arrest was made after the successful test-buy operation, this does not destroy the
fact that in a subsequent search, appellants were found in possession of shabu. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are consistent in that after
the test-buy operation, they obtained a search warrant from Judge Makasiar, pursuant to which, they were able to confiscate, among others, several
packs of shabu from a mans handbag and a ladies handbag inside a room in the unit subject of the warrant. Furthermore, the seizure of the regulated
drug from Unit 4-B is proven by the Receipt for Property Seized [16] signed by SPO1 de Leon, the seizing officer, Noel, the building administrator, and Joji
Olarte, his wife, who were also present. De Leon attested to the truth and genuineness of the receipt which was not contradicted by the defense.

Be that as it may, we cannot sustain the trial courts decision attributing to both appellants the illegal possession of the same amount of shabu. We
note that nowhere in the information is conspiracy alleged. Neither had it been proven during the trial. As such, we need to look at the individual amounts
possessed by each appellant.

In his testimony, Tiu Won admitted ownership of the mans handbag where 234.5 grams of shabu were found, viz:

Q: During those ten to 20 minutes, what were those policemen doing inside that unit?
A: They went inside the rooms and started ransacking the drawers and everything. As a matter of fact, even handbags were searched by
them.

Q: Whose handbags were searched?

A: My bag, the one I was carrying that day, with jewelry and checks and others were taken by them.[17] (emphasis supplied)

Qui Yaling, in her appellants brief, denied owning the handbag where 20.3673 grams of shabu were discovered. However, during her testimony,
she admitted its ownership, viz:

Q: Now, the police testified before this court that you has (sic) a bag and when they searched this bag, it yielded some sachets of shabu(.)
(W)hat can you say about that?
A: That is an absolute lie, sir. What they saw in my bag were my cosmetics.[18] (emphasis supplied)

An admission is an act or declaration of a party as to the existence of a relevant fact which may be used in evidence against him. [19] These
admissions, provided they are voluntary, can be used against appellants because it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is their
fault if they do not.[20]

Qui Yaling likewise argues that the lower court erred in attributing ownership of the handbag to her considering that there was another girl present
at the apartment during the search. She contends that since the prosecution was not able to establish the ownership of the bag, then such could have
also been owned by Chin.

We do not subscribe to this argument. The defense failed to bring Chin to court, although during the course of the presentation of their evidence,
they manifested their intention to present her testimony. Furthermore, a visitor does not normally leave her bag lying anywhere, much more in the
masters bedroom. Being the occupant of the apartment, it is more logical to presume that the handbag belongs to Qui Yaling. The failure of the
prosecution to present the bags and proofs that the bags belong to the appellants is immaterial because the bags, the license of Tiu Won found inside
the mans handbag and the passport of Qui Yaling found inside the ladies handbag are not illegal. Having no relation to the use or possession of shabu,
the authorities could not confiscate them for they did not have the authority to do so since the warrant authorized them to seize only articles in relation to
the illegal possession of shabu.[21] Not within their control, they could not have been presented in court.

We now come to the penalties of the appellants. R. A. No. 6425, as amended by R. A. No. 7659, applies. Thus, since 234.5 grams of shabu were
found inside the mans handbag, deemed to be owned by Tiu Won, he is guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, while Qui Yaling,
whose handbag contained only 20.3673 grams of shabu is guilty of violating Section 20 thereof. Section 16, in connection with Section 20
(1st paragraph), provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos where the
amount of shabu involved is 200 grams or more. Where the amount is less than 200 grams, Section 20 punishes the offender with the penalty ranging
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of RTC Br. 27, Manila as to the penalty of appellant Tiu Won is affirmed, while that of appellant Qui Yaling is
modified. Tiu Won Chua is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) in accordance with
Section 16 and Section 20 (1 st paragraph) of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Qui Yaling y Chua is sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179940

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
NORBERTO DEL MONTE y GAPAY @ OBET,
Accused-Appellant. April 23, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 Assailed before Us is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007 which affirmed with

modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, finding accused-appellant

Norberto del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, guilty of violation of Section 5, [3] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous

Drugs Act of 2002.

On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 10th day of December 2002, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one
(1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride weighing 0.290 gram. [4]

The case was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02.

When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded Not Guilty to the charge. [5] On 17 February 2003, the

pre-trial conference was concluded.[6] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr., the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against

appellant, and a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office

3/Special Enforcement Unit (SEU) stationed at the Field Office, Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan.

The version of the prosecution is as follows:

On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, a confidential informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in Barangay

Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan and reported that appellant was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said information, a briefing on a buy-bust operation against

appellant was conducted. The team was composed of SPO2 Hashim S. Maung, as team leader, PO1 Gaudencio Tolentino, Jr. as the poseur-buyer, and

PO1 Antonio Barreras as back-up operative. After the briefing, the team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to Poblacion Dike for the

execution of the buy-bust operation.

When the team arrived at appellants place, they saw the appellant standing alone in front of the gate. The informant and PO1 Tolentino

approached appellant. The informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to appellant as his friend, saying Barkada ko, user. PO1 Tolentino gave

appellant P300.00 consisting of three marked P100 bills.[7] The bills were marked with GT JR, PO1 Tolentinos initials. Upon receiving the P300.00,

appellant took out a plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it over to PO1 Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying

that the sale had been consummated. PO1 Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and recovered from the latter the marked money.

The white crystalline substance[8] in the plastic sachet which was sold to PO1 Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory

Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of the any dangerous drug. The request for laboratory examination was

signed by SPO2 Maung.[9] Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002,[10] the substance bought from appellant was positive for methamphetamine

hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

 The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer who examined the substance bought from appellant, was dispensed after

both prosecution and defense stipulated that the witness will merely testify on the fact that the drugs subject matter of this case was forwarded to their

office for laboratory examination and that laboratory examination was indeed conducted and the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
[11]

For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together with his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza; and nephew, Alejandro Lim.

From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like this:

On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sisters house in Poblacion Dike when a commotion woke him up. His nephew, Alejandro

Lim, was shouting because the latter, together with appellants common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and a niece, was being punched and kicked by

several police officers. When appellant tried to pacify the policemen and ask them why they were beating up his common-law wife and other relatives,

the policemen arrested him, mauled him, punched him on the chest, slapped him and hit him with a palo-palo. He sustained swollen face, lips and

tooth. His common-law wife was likewise hit on the chest with the palo-palo.

The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a house located in the middle of a field where the former

demanded P15,000.00 for their liberty. The next day, appellant was brought to the police station.

Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as the police officers who manhandled them and who demanded P15,000.00 so

that she and appellant could go home. The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her child and cousin arrived with the P15,000.00. She was released but

appellant was detained. She does not know why the police officers filed this case against appellant. What she knows is that they were asking money

from them.

Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant and Amelia Mendoza.

On 8 March 2004, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and

sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00. The dispostive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds accused Norberto del Monte y Gapay @ Obet GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P5,000,000.00. With cost.

The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government. The Branch of this Court is directed to
turn over the same to the Dangerous Drugs Board within ten (10) days from receipt hereof for proper disposal thereof. [12]

The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr. to be credible and straightforward. It established the fact that

appellant was caught selling shabu during an entrapment operation conducted on 10 December 2002. Appellant was identified as the person from whom

PO1 Tolentino bought P300.00 worth of shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002. On the other hand, the trial court was not convinced

by appellants defense of frame-up and denial. Appellant failed to substantiate his claims that he was merely sleeping and was awakened by the screams

of his relatives who were being mauled by the police officers.

 Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004.[13] With the filing thereof, the trial court directed the immediate transmittal of the entire

records of the case to us.[14] However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[15] the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action

and disposition.[16]

On 28 May 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision but reduced the fine imposed on appellant to P500,000.00. It disposed

of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision dated March 8, 2004 of the RTC, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, finding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
is AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine imposed upon him is reduced from P5,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.[17]

A Notice of Appeal having been timely filed by appellant, the Court of Appeals forwarded the records of the case to us for further review. [18]

In our Resolution[19] dated 10 December 2007, the parties were notified that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so

desired, within 30 days from notice. Both appellant and appellee opted not to file a supplemental brief on the ground they had exhaustively argued all the

relevant issues in their respective briefs and the filing of a supplemental brief would only contain a repetition of the arguments already discussed therein.

Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM FOR FAILURE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS TO
COMPLY WITH SECTION 21 OF R.A. 9165.[20]

Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemens failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures of

him together with the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon his arrest as shown by the testimony of the lone prosecution

witness. He adds that PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police officers who had initial custody of the drug allegedly seized and confiscated,

did not conduct a physical inventory of the same in his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest. Their failure to abide by said section casts

doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence adduced against him.

At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers alleged non-compliance with Section 21 [21] of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first

time on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do so. In People v. Sta. Maria[22] in which the very same issue was raised, we ruled:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police
officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did
not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21
and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In
no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that
affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. (Emphases supplied.)

In People v. Pringas,[23] we explained that non-compliance with Section 21 will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from

him inadmissible.What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be

utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case at bar, appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of the

drug that was taken from him. In fact, he stipulated that the drug subject matter of this case was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3,
Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory examination which examination gave positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We thus

find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug seized from appellant not to have been compromised.

We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs

confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible

when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids

its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. One

example is that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court wherein a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and

appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the

document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the rules.

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due

to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but

of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the

circumstances obtaining in each case.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and

consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. [24] What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is

the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[25]

All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that

the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer positively identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per

Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by

PO1 Tolentino from appellant in consideration of P300.00, was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, together with the dangerous drug taken from appellant, more than sufficient

to prove the crime charged.Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon

the assessment of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during trial. It is a

fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors,

gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that

the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of

testifying during the trial.[26]

The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. [27] Finding no compelling reason

to depart from the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we affirm their findings.

Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting that he was framed, the evidence against him being planted, and that the police

officers were exacting P15,000.00 from him.

In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the subject of a buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto,

his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the

offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail. [28] Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by
this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of

the Dangerous Drugs Act.[29] For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that

government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner. [30] This, appellant failed to do. The presumption remained unrebutted

because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired

by an improper motive.

The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his nephew, Alejandro Lim, to support his claims fails to sway. We find both

witnesses not to be credible.Their testimonies are suspect and cannot be given credence without clear and convincing evidence. Their claims, as well as

that of appellant, that they were maltreated and suffered injuries remain unsubstantiated. As found by the trial court:

The accused, on the other hand, in an effort to exculpate himself from liability raised the defense of frame-up. He alleged
that at the time of the alleged buy bust he was merely sleeping at the house of his sister. That he was awakened by the yells and
screams of his relatives as they were being mauled by the police officers. However, this Court is not convinced. Accused failed to
substantiate these claims of maltreatment even in the face of his wifes and nephews testimony. No evidence was presented to
prove the same other than their self-serving claims.[31]

Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that the witnesses for the defense cannot even agree on what time the

arresting policemen allegedly arrived in their house. It explained:

To elaborate, appellant testified that it was 3 oclock in the afternoon of December 10, 2002 when he was roused from his sleep by
the policemen who barged into the house of his sister (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 2). His common-law wife, however, testified that it was
10-11 oclock in the morning when the policemen came to the house (TSN, Oct. 13, 2003, p. 6). On the other hand, Alejandro Lim
testified that he went to sleep at 11 oclock in the morning and it was 10 oclock in the morning when the policemen arrived (TSN,
Feb.2, 2004, p. 6). He thus tried to depict an absurd situation that the policemen arrived first before he went to sleep with appellant.
[32]

Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the illegal sale of drugs, we are constrained to uphold appellants

conviction.

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Said section reads:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous
drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions.

Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine

of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram of shabu to PO1 Tolentino, and there being no modifying circumstance alleged in the

information, the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment in accordance with Article 63(2) [33] of

the Revised Penal Code.

As regards the fine to be imposed on appellant, the trial court pegged the fine at P5,000,000.00 which the Court of Appeals reduced

to P500,000.00. Both amounts are within the range provided for by law but the amount imposed by the Court of Appeals, considering the quantity of the

drugs involved, is more appropriate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070

dated 28 May 2007, sustaining the conviction of appellant Norberto Del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,

is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

 SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 141532. April 14, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GATUDAN BALAG-EY and EDWIN ALIONG y SUNGOT, appellants.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Those who engage in the illicit trade of dangerous drugs and who prey on misguided members of society must be caught and put behind bars. To
do this, however, the prosecution must prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Without such proof, acquittal is the only recourse.

The Case

Gatudan Balag-ey and Edwin Aliong appeal the October 20, 1999 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City (Branch 6) in
Criminal Case No. 16100-R, in which they were found guilty of illegal possession and attempted sale of prohibited drugs. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads:

"Wherefore, the Court finds accused Gatudan Balag-ey and Edwin Aliong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of and
attempt to sell marijuana with a total weight of 18,352.82 grams in violation of Section 21, Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659 as charged in the Information which is included in the offense of sale or delivery of marijuana proved and
hereby sentences each of them to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the fine of P500,000.00 each, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The accused Gatudan Balag-ey and Edwin Aliong, being both detention prisoners, are entitled to be credited 4/5 of their preventive imprisonment in the
service of their sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

The 18,352.82 grams of bricks of marijuana contained in the cigarette box with the marking Philip Morris are forfeited in favor of the State to be
destroyed immediately in accordance with law.[2] (Citations omitted)

Appellants were charged in an Amended Information[3] dated December 9, 1998, as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding x x x each other, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession and attempt to sell twenty (20) bricks of dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, weighing about
18,352.82 grams (actual weight) more or less, to SPO1 DANILO P. NATIVIDAD, a member of the Philippine National Police, 14 th Narcotics Regional
Office, who acted as poseur buyer, for P1,000.00 per kilo, in violation of the aforecited provision of law. [4]

During their respective arraignments on December 21, 1998[5] and January 21, 1999,[6] appellants, with the assistance of their counsels de parte,
[7]
pleaded not guilty to the charge.After trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision. It also denied appellants Motion for
Reconsideration.[8]

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:

About 10:30 in the morning of September 28, 1998, the 14th Narcotics Regional Office (NARCOM) with office at DPS Compound, Baguio City, received a
confidential information from Roger Imasa that a certain Gatudan of La Trinidad, Benguet, was engaged in the sale of marijuana. He was allegedly
looking for buyers. Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Castel formed a team for the possible arrest of Gatudan.SPO1 Danilo Natividad was designated as
poseur buyer with SPO1 Pedro Rabago and PO2 Emerson Lingbawan as back-up. SPO1 Natividad was given the boodle money.

Later in the morning of the same day, SPO1 Natividad and Imasa were able to locate Gatudan at the Universal Martial Arts Gym along Zandueta Street,
Baguio City. Imasa introduced SPO1 Natividad to Gatudan as a friend and a drug user. After a brief conversation, Gatudan agreed to sell to SPO1
Natividad all of his available marijuana, about 20 kilos in all, at P1,000.00 per kilo. They agreed to meet at five in the afternoon in front of Jollibee at the
Session Road. The buy-bust team was alerted and briefed.

About 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Imasa, SPO1 Natividad, SPO1 Rabago and PO2 Lingbawan proceeded to Jollibee Session Road on board
a taxi. SPO1 Rabago and PO2 Lingbawan positioned themselves in the vicinity while SPO1 Natividad proceeded to wait in front of Jollibee.

Not long after, Gatudan alighted from a Tamaraw FX Taxi. His companion, co-accused Aliong, remained inside the taxi with the cigarette box marked
Philip Morris at the back compartment of the taxi. After seeing Gatudan, SPO1 Natividad approached him and inquired about the deal. Gatudan told him
that the stuff was ready and opened the [back] compartment of the taxi. He noticed the plastic straw and opened the cigarette box containing the
marijuana bricks. After confirming the contents, SPO1 Natividad gave the pre-arranged signal by removing his bull cap.

SPO1 Rabago and PO2 Lingbawan rushed to the scene. After identifying themselves as police officers, they arrested Balag-ey and Aliong. They (Balag-
ey and Aliong) were informed of their constitutional rights. The box was confiscated and SPO1 Natividad put his initials on it for identification. They were
brought to the NARCOM office in the same Tamaraw FX taxi driven by Vicente Garbo.

At the NARCOM office, they issued a receipt of the property seized, prepared the booking sheet and arrest report of Gatudan. SPO1 Natividad executed
his Affidavit regarding the buy-bust and arrest of Gatudan and Aliong as well as the Joint Affidavit of the back-up team.

Preliminary findings of Alma Margarita Villaseor, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, found the
bricks to be positive for marijuana. A more detailed laboratory examination embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-011-98 confirmed the findings about the
20 bricks of marijuana with a total weight of 18,352.82 grams.[9] (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Vehemently denying that he was arrested during the alleged buy-bust operation, Appellant Balag-ey states his version of the facts in this manner:

x x x [Balag-ey] was surprised when policemen in civilian [clothes] suddenly arrested him at around 5:00 p.m. of September 28, 1998, at the Universal
Martial Arts Gym. The policemen immediately handcuffed him, and brought him to the NARCOM office. Upon [his] arrival at the NARCOM office, he saw
Roger Imasa and accused-appellant Edwin Aliong in handcuffs.

The NARCOM agents interrogated him and insisted that he divulge the name of the supplier of marijuana from Sagada. Accused Balag-ey retorted that
he had no knowledge of the matters being asked of him and that he was merely a student at the Universal Martial Arts Gym. However, the NARCOM
agents persisted and continued to inquire for the identity of the alleged supplier of the marijuana. He was even threatened that he will rot in jail, if he
failed to disclose the identity of the marijuana supplier. During his custody, accused Balag-ey was never informed of his constitutional rights and he was
not provided with any counsel.[10]

For his part, Appellant Aliong narrates the facts in this wise:

1. [Aliong] is a martial arts instructor teaching kick boxing, combat aikido, boxing, among others at his gym at No. 49-B, Zandueta Street, Baguio
City. His gym is known as the Universal Martial Arts Organization;

2. He knows one Roger Imasa, a known asset of the x x x NARCOM, his kumpadre and one of the Martial Arts instructors at the Universal Martial Arts
Organization;

3. Likewise, he knows his co-accused, Gatudan Balag-ey. Gatudan Balag-ey is his friend way back during the 1980s;

4. Sometime in 1997 and again in 1998, Gatudan Balag-ey visited him at his gym. Considering that they are friends, he allowed Gatudan to practice in
his gym;

5. One time, x x x Gatudan Balag-ey asked him if he would like to have money. He asked how and Gatudan said that he knew of somebody who was
looking for a buyer of marijuana.

6. He then told Gatudan that he hates that kind of job. He even advised Gatudan to avoid that kind of job because that is difficult;

7. He mentioned his conversation to his friend, Roger Imasa, the NARCOM asset. Roger then told him that if he likes, they would cause the arrest of
Gatudan;

8. Roger Imasa then told him to introduce him to Gatudan. Roger told him that he introduced him as someone who knows a buyer. Thereafter, he
introduced Roger Imasa to Gatudan Balag-ey and when the two were introduced, they talked to each other;

9. In the afternoon of September 28, 1998, Roger Imasa, the NARCOM [a]sset, convinced him to tell Gatudan to go somewhere. Gatudan refused. He
and Roger Imasa then went to the Hangar Market. Roger then went out and when he came back, he was carrying one [carton box]. He never saw the
contents of the [carton];
10. Roger then loaded the [carton] in an [FX] Taxi. [Thereafter,] Roger told the taxi driver to bring them to the DPS Compound. However, they dropped by
at the Jollibee Session Road. Roger then went out of the taxi and then told him to wait. Thus, he just sat down inside the F[X] Taxi. After 5 minutes, a
man who introduced himself as a police officer went inside and sat down. He was told to sit at the front seat.About 4 men who introduced themselves as
police officers went near the taxi;

11. After the men who introduced themselves as police officers came inside the taxi, Roger Imasa was nowhere to be found. Then they proceeded to the
NARCOM Office at DPS Compound, where someone -- later to be identified as Police Officer Lingbawan -- asked his companions[:] Kumusta? (How is
it?), to which one of his companions answered. Palpak (It was a failure). The one who answered it was a failure was the alleged poseur buyer, Police
Officer Natividad;

12. He was thereafter told to just relax. Police officer Lingbawan then convinced him to testify that Gatudan Balag-ey was with him inside the
taxi. Thereafter, Officer Lingbawan convinced him that if he would cooperate, he will become an asset and that if he refuses to cooperate, he will be
implicated just the same. Thus, he agreed to become an asset and [he said] that Gatudan Balag-ey was with him inside the taxi. For this reason, he was
made to sign [an] Affidavit. Incidentally, it was the NARCOM officers who prepared the said affidavit and they merely told him to sign the same;

13. For the record, he never saw the contents of the box and it was only at the NARCOM Office that he was informed of its contents;

14. He was then made to stay at the NARCOM Office. The next day, September 29, 1998, he was released. And he was released because he was
totally innocent of the transaction between Gatudan Balag-ey, the CI Roger Imasa and the alleged poseur buyer, Police Officer Danilo Natividad.
[11]
(Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

Disregarding the defenses proffered by appellants, the trial court ruled that they had been caught, in flagrante delicto, selling or delivering 20
bricks of marijuana weighing 18,352.82grams to the poseur-buyer -- SPO1 Natividad.

In the case of Balag-ey, the court a quo found it difficult to believe that police operatives would plant evidence against him. It also discredited his
claim that he had been arrested at the Universal Martial Arts Gym along Zandueta Street, rather than at a Jollibee fast-food restaurant chain along
Session Road (Jollibee-Session Road).

With regard to Aliong, the RTC held that he, together with Balag-ey, had loaded a cigarette box containing marijuana in a taxi, brought it to
Jollibee-Session Road, and delivered it to the poseur-buyer. Thus, the trial court brushed aside the claim of Aliong that he had no knowledge of Balag-
eys marijuana transaction.

Hence, this appeal.[12]

The Issues

Appellant Balag-ey raises the following supposed errors for our consideration:

The trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers despite glaring inconsistencies and improbabilities.

II

The trial court erred in finding that the guilt of Accused-appellant Gatudan Balag-ey for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. [13]

Appellant Aliong, on the other hand, alleges the following errors:

Whether or not the honorable trial court was correct in convicting the accused despite the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The
police officers testified that accused and Gatudan Balag-ey rode together in the FX taxi while the alleged driver testified that it was herein Accused-
appellant Aliong and another person who rode in the said FX Taxi.

II

Whether or not the honorable trial court is correct in convicting the accused despite the testimonies of the police officers that herein accused-appellant
has no knowledge of the alleged buy-bust operation. The testimonies of the police officers [show] that it was the accused, Gatudan Balag-ey, who owned
the marijuana delivered to the alleged poseur-buyer, Danilo Natividad. Thus, it is incorrect for the honorable trial court to hold herein Accused-appellant
Aliong in conspiracy with Gatudan Balag-ey.

III
Considering the peculiar facts obtaining in the case at bar, whether or not the honorable trial court is correct in convicting the accused appellant despite
the fact that the alleged cooperating individual (CI), Roger Imasa, was not presented as a witness.

IV

Whether or not the honorable trial court is correct in convicting the accused despite clear and hard evidence that no buy-bust operation was actually
conducted as shown by the fact that no money changed hands between the alleged poseur buyer and the accused, Gatudan Balag-ey. This is further
shown by the fact that no marked money was produced and marked in court as evidence.[14]

In short, appellants question (1) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, (2) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) the existence
of the buy-bust operation.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

First Issue:
Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant Balag-ey impugns the veracity of the testimonies of the arresting officers that he was caught in the act of selling marijuana at Jollibee-
Session Road. He maintains that he was arrested at the Universal Martial Arts Gym located on Zandueta Street.

As a rule, the trial courts findings of fact and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are accorded high respect [15] and due weight,[16] unless it
has overlooked material and relevant points that would have led it to rule otherwise. In the present case, however, the RTC committed glaring factual
oversights that impel us to depart from this general doctrine.[17]

The witnesses of Balag-ey -- Diosdado Mapala [18] and Angie Liza Ladiwan[19] -- testified that on the afternoon of September 28, 1998, they saw
appellant in handcuffs, being led by police officers downstairs at the Universal Martial Arts Gym. Hence, they had the impression that he was arrested
there. Nonetheless, the trial court ruled that their testimonies were consistent with the fact that the arresting officers had brought appellant to the gym
after his arrest in this wise:

Seventh, the testimonies of Diosdado Mapala and Angie Liza Ladiwan cannot be given weight by the court to show that Gatudan was arrested at the
Universal Martial Arts Gym at Zandueta Street.

Diosdado Mapala was not inside the Universal Martial Arts Gym at that time and so he could not say what happened inside the said Gym [or] if Gatudan
was really arrested there. Mapala himself said that he was outside the Gym in front of a certain grocery and was crossing the road when he noticed
Gatudan in handcuffs being accompanied by male persons coming from the direction of Universal Martial Arts Gym.

This does not establish [with] certainty that Gatudan was arrested inside the Universal Martial Arts Gym, [b]ecause it could happen that Gatudan was
arrested in Jollibee Session Road and then brought back to the Universal Martial Arts by the police and when he was coming out that was the time and
occasion when Diosdado Mapala saw Gatudan in handcuffs.[20] (Italics supplied)

There is no evidence on record, however, that the arresting officers did bring Balag-ey to the gym after his arrest. Quite the contrary, SPO1
Natividad categorically averred that Gatudan had not been brought to the Universal Martial Arts Gym at any time after his alleged arrest. The police
officer testified on direct examination as follows:

Prosecutor Vergara [to SPO1 Natividad]:

Q Aside from physical examination, did you bring him anywhere else?

A No more, sir.

Q He was not brought back to the gymnasium, Mr. Witness.

A No sir.[21] (Italics supplied)

Moreover, Garbo, the taxi driver, categorically said that when his taxi was hailed on the afternoon of September 28, 1998, Balag-ey was not
Aliongs companion. Garbo likewise testified that the police officers had not gone to the Universal Martial Arts Gym after that incident. Pertinent portions
of his testimony are herein quoted:

[Atty. Molintas:]

Q You mean you do not know the identity of the person who was with Aliong at that time he was arrested?

A No sir.

Q You cannot describe him to be a short person who is with dark complexion?

A Somewhat dark and short, sir.

Q When Edwin Aliong was arrested in Session [R]oad, was this companion of his not brought to the NARCOM office?

A No sir.

Q Do you know where he went after Aliong was arrested?

A No sir.

Q Aside from the NARCOM officers and Edwin Aliong whom they brought to the NARCOM office, were there other companions of the
NARCOM officers who followed you in another vehicle towards the NARCOM office?

A None, sir.

Q You said you went to Hilltop with the NARCOM officers. From the Hilltop where you went, have you seen this Universal Martial Arts Gym?

A No x x x, sir.

Q Anyway, the NARCOM officers told you to wait and after some time, they came back, is that your testimony?

A Yes sir.

Q When they came back and boarded your vehicle, they have another person or they arrested another person, is that correct?

A I did not notice, sir.

Q This person you mentioned a while ago who identified himself as Gatudan Balag-ey, you said that you saw him at the Fiscals Office when
you were investigated, would that be correct?

A Yes sir.

Q That was the first time you saw him, would that be correct?

A Yes sir.

Q You did not see him at that time of the arrest of Edwin Aliong?

A Inside the taxi sir, no sir.

Q You mean when Edwin Aliong was arrested, Gatudan Balag-ey was not inside the taxicab?

A No x x x, sir.

Q And in fact, Gatudan Balag-ey could not be the companion of Edwin Aliong because Gatudan Balag-ey is quite tall and fair in complexion
while the companion of Edwin Aliong was quite dark and short, would that be correct?

A Yes sir.

COURT:

The court would like to be clear on that. You are telling this court then that the two persons who boarded that box in your taxi, one of whom
was Aliong but the other is not Balag-ey, is that what you are telling the Court?

A No, sir. But his features, it is not like him.

COURT:

Continue

Atty. Molintas:

Q In fact, you testified on this matter before Fiscal Vergara when you were investigated in his office, would that be correct?

A Yes sir.

Q Could you tell the Court who prepared that Affidavit which you identified earlier as your Affidavit?

A It was prepared at the NARCOM office.

Q After they prepared that, they released you on the same date on September 28, 1998, would that be correct?

A Yes sir.

Q In other words, you were made to sleep at the NARCOM office on September 28, 1998?

A I did not sleep there, sir.

Q So where did you sleep on the night of September 28, 1998?

A In our house, sir.

Q At the NARCOM office, you said earlier that you never met Gatudan Balag-ey, would that be correct?

A Yes sir.

Q In your Affidavit, a name Gatudan Balag-ey was indicated, do you know who included this name Gatudan in your Affidavit?

A The person who investigated me whose name I do not know wrote that, sir.
 Q Because the truth is, you never knew Gatudan Balag-ey and you never met him on September 28, 1998, correct?

A Yes sir.[22]

xxxxxxxxx

[Atty. Dumawing:]

Q So the 6th paragraph of your Affidavit which states and I quote, That when we arrived in front of Jollibee, one male alighted from the taxi
and proceeded inside the Jollibee and when they returned he has already one male companion and they went near my taxi and his
(Gatudan) male companion checked the contents of the box and later announced that he is a Narcotics agent until other members of
the Narcotics agents arrived and arrested my passengers and proceeded to Narcotics Office at DPS Compound, Baguio City x x x is
not entirely correct, is it not, Mr. Witness?

A Yes sir because when I was relating, they were typing it.

COURT:

Q Now, the Court wants to be very clear on that, so that there will be no mistakes about it. You are telling us then that it was not Gatudan
Balag-ey who alighted from your taxi, then came back with another companion to check the contents of the box in the taxi?

A No sir.[23]

Even Aliong said in his testimony that for fear of being implicated, he was forced to declare that Balag-ey had been arrested with him at Jollibee-
Session Road. He testified thus:

[Atty. Dumawing:]

Q So, after you arrived at the NARCOM Office at the DPS Compound, what happened, if any?

A They told me, Edwin, just relax. Then they talked to each other.

Q Do you know what they were talking about?

A No, sir, because I went out.

Q What happened after that?

A After they talked, Li[ng]bawan called me.

Q Do you remember for how long they were talking?

A About more than 5 minutes, sir.

Q And where were you during all these 5 minutes that they were talking?

A I was outside, sir.

Q Outside of?

A Outside of the NARCOM office, sir.

Q So, when this Li[ng]bawan finally called you, what did he tell you, if any?

A Li[ng]bawan was convincing me to testify that Gatudan Balag-ey was with me inside the taxi.

Q What did you say to his proposal, Mr. Witness?

A I refused because I told him Gatudan Balag-ey was not my companion.

Q What was the response of Li[ng]bawan when you refused?

A He talked to me and even hit my conscience. He told me to think it over because I should think of the number of persons who could be
destroyed by that box of marijuana, that it might include my children or even my relatives. And he told me that it was already
confirmed that Gatudan Balag-ey is a pusher and he asked me to cooperate.

Q What else did he tell you, if any, in order to convince you?

A He told me that if I cooperate, I will be officially included as an asset.

Q What else?

A No more, sir.

Q He did not threaten you?

A He told me that if I dont cooperate, I will be implicated just the same.

Q So, what was your response to Li[ng]bawan when he said that?

A I told him that Gatudan Balag-ey might take revenge against me.

Q When you told that to Li[ng]bawan, what did he say, if any?

A He told me not to worry because they will take care of me.

Q So, what followed next, Mr. Witness?

A When he told me that, I agreed to be an asset [and] to say that Gatudan Balag-ey was with me inside the taxi.

Q Why did you finally agree to testify falsely against Gatudan Balag-ey?

PROS. VERGARA:

Already answered.

COURT:

May answer.

WITNESS:

A Because Li[ng]bawan told me that Gatudan Balag-ey is a confirmed pusher. So, because as I said I hate that kind of activity, I agreed.

Q Mr. Witness, you executed an [a]ffidavit earlier marked by the prosecution as Exhibit H. Who prepared this [A]ffidavit?

A The NARCOM officers, sir.

Q Who particularly among the NARCOM officers?

A What I know is it was Li[ng]bawan who prepared it because he was the one talking to me and he was the one who showed it to me.

Q Did you understand all the contents of this [A]ffidavit of yours?

A No sir, only the first part.

Q What particular part of this [A]ffidavit did you understand, Mr. Witness?

A Only that portion which says that Gatudan Balag-ey was with me inside the taxi. And when I saw that, I did not mind the rest anymore.

Q By the way, what is your highest educational attainment, Mr. Witness?

A Second year high school, sir.

Q Now, Mr. Witness, are the contents of this [A]ffidavit true as far as you know?

A No, sir.

Q Now, Mr. Witness, despite knowing that the contents of this [A]ffidavit are not true, why did you sign it?

A Because the NARCOM officer told me that if I will not sign it, I will be implicated.

COURT: (to witness)

Q Did you realize that by your testimony now you have actually implicated yourself because in your testimony you are the one who brought
the box of marijuana to Jollibee Restaurant in that taxi?

A What I agreed with Roger Imasa was to bring that carton of marijuana to the NARCOM office, sir.

COURT:

Continue.

ATTY. DUMAWING:

Q Mr. Witness, have you seen the contents of that box?

A No, sir.

Q Did you ever personally hold that box?

A No, sir.

Q Now, Mr. Witness, you finally agreed to testify against Gatudan Balag-ey. What did Li[ng]bawan do, if any, after that?

A He told me to call up the gym and inform them that a NARCOM officer will go to the gym and that they should show that officer who
Gatudan is.

Q What did you do after that?

A I called my wife by phone and relayed to her what Li[ng]bawan told me, that when they arrive at the gym they will point Gatudan to them.

Q So, after you called your gym, as instructed by Li[ng]bawan, what did the NARCOM people do, if any?

A I told Lingbawan that I made a call. After that, they talked for a while and then they left.

Q Do you know where they proceeded to?

A What I know is they proceeded to the gym because that is where they asked me to make a call.

Q So, what happened after they left?

A After 30 minutes, they came back with Gatudan Balag-ey, sir.[24] (Italics supplied)
 Because of the vacillating statements of Aliong, the trial court regarded his testimony as dubious and highly suspect. Still, it should not have been
dismissed outright, as he had been able to give an adequate explanation for his testimonial change. Besides, he had nothing to gain from testifying that
Balag-ey had not been with him during the alleged buy-bust operation.

The foregoing points show the lack of credibility of the prosecutions claim that Balag-ey was arrested while in the act of selling marijuana at
Jollibee-Session Road.

Balag-ey also protests the denial of his right to counsel during his custodial investigation. Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution provides that
any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense should have a right to independent and competent counsel at every phase of
the investigation -- from its inception to its end.[25]

Both PO1 Natividad and PO3 Emerson Lingbawan affirmed that Balag-ey had not been assisted by counsel at any stage of the
investigation. During cross-examination, they testified as follows:

Atty. Molintas [to PO1 Natividad]:

Q How about Gatudan, did you provide him [with] a lawyer at that time?

A We did not provide him because he did not give his affidavit or any confessional statement?

Q Is that your procedure? You only get a lawyer to assist him if you intend to get his confession?

A Yes sir.

Q You do not provide him a counsel so that

A We apprised [him of] his constitutional rights but

Q Yes. The question is -- you do not find it necessary or you do not know that the law require[s] that you provide him a lawyer?

A But he did not require any lawyer.

Q Maybe you did not ask him to give any but do you know that the law requires you as a detaining officer to provide him a lawyer?

A Yes, your Honor, we told him but

Q The question is, do you know that you are required to provide him a lawyer immediately after his arrest?

A Yes sir.

Q And despite that, you did not provide him any lawyer?

A No more sir.

Q In fact you have a very big Memorandum in your office regarding Republic Act 7438?

A Yes sir.

Q And you allowed Garbo to get in touch with a lawyer and submit an affidavit and in fact you did not recommend that he be prosecuted?

A Because he gave a voluntary affidavit that is why when the investigator took it after reading the affidavit he conferred with his own lawyer.

Q And that affidavit was prepared by your investigator?

A Yes sir.

Q And likewise you did not recommend the prosecution of Aliong because he also gave his affidavit?

A Yes sir.[26]

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Dumawing [to PO3 Lingbawan]:

Q Between 5:00, a little past 5:00 and until the afternoon of September 29, 1998, these two accused were under your custody?

A Yes sir.

Q And while they were under your custody they were not assisted by counsel?

A None sir.

Q Notwithstanding the fact that you informed them of their constitutional rights?

A We only informed their relatives sir.[27]

The violation of Balag-eys right to counsel during his custodial investigation excludes, from the ambit of the trial courts evidence, his alleged
extrajudicial admission that he was the owner of the seized marijuana.[28]

Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
 Balag-ey and Aliong were charged with violation of Section 4 in relation to Section 21 of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659 [29] -- an offense they
allegedly committed by conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, without any authority of law, [and by] hav[ing] in their possession and
attempt[ing] to sell twenty (20) bricks of dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops, a prohibited drug x x x.

The aforementioned Section 4 penalizes any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. This provision is violated by the commission of
any of the acts specified therein or a combination thereof. [30] Moreover, the prevailing doctrine is that possession of prohibited drugs is a necessary
element in the offense of selling them, except where the seller is also found in possession of another quantity of prohibited drugs not covered by or
included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. [31]

On the other hand, the aforecited Section 21 punishes an attempt or a conspiracy, among others, in the [s]ale, administration, delivery, distribution
and transportation of dangerous drugs. This is one of the few instances when the law specifically punishes mere conspiracy.[32]

Having charged the accused with conspiracy, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that Balag-ey and Aliong had come to an agreement
concerning the possession and the sale of marijuana and had decided to execute the agreement. [33]

Furthermore, in a prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, it is material and indispensable (1) to prove that the accused sold and delivered the
prohibited drug to another, as well as to present in court the corpus delicti as evidence; and (2) to prove that the accused knew that what was sold and
delivered was a dangerous drug.[34] The attempt to sell the drugs may be established by overt acts showing that the accused knowingly commenced the
commission of the crime.[35]

The flaws and the insufficiency of the evidence against Balag-ey have been discussed earlier. We shall now take up the sufficiency of the evidence
against Aliong.

Aliong was not identified by the entrapping police officers as one of those who had offered to sell marijuana to SPO1 Natividad. It was neither
alleged nor established that the two had been in contact prior to the supposed buy-bust operation. It was not shown that the former had, at any time,
known that the contents of the Philip Morris cigarette box were prohibited drugs.It was not he, but his companion, who loaded the box into the baggage
compartment of the taxi,[36] according to the testimony of Garbo, the taxi driver. As to who the companion of Aliong had been was not adequately
proven. When the testimonies of the latter and of Prosecution Witness Garbo are taken together, it becomes reasonably doubtful that the companion
referred to was Balag-ey.

Hence, except for the fact that Aliong was on board the taxi from where the box of marijuana was seized, and that he was the one who paid extra
fare to the driver while they waited for the return of the formers companion, there is no evidence that Aliong conspired with Balag-ey and attempted to
sell the prohibited drugs. The rule is settled that, without any other evidence, mere presence at the scene of the crime is not by itself sufficient to
establish conspiracy.[37]

After questioning Aliong, even the entrapping police officers initially cleared him of complicity. Indeed, they found no reason to indict him together
with Balag-ey in the original Information.[38] SPO1 Natividad, in particular, testified as follows:

Atty. Molintas (to PO1 Natividad):

Q About Aliong, when was he released?

A He spent the night in our office and then he was released after the investigator said that he has no knowledge of the marijuana.

Q Your investigator says that he has no knowledge but this time you are the poseur-buyer. What was the participation of Aliong when the
negotiation was being made?

A According to Aliong, he only accompanied the suspect Gatudan sir.

Q The question is, during the negotiation the first time you went to the Universal Martial Arts [Gym], the truth is, he was not there?

A He was not there sir.

Q You only saw him at Session Road?

A Yes sir.

Q Inside the taxicab?

A Inside the taxicab sir.

Q When you met Gatudan at Session Road, did Aliong alight from the taxicab?

A No sir.

Q Did you ask the taxi driver who paid the taxi fare at that time?

A No sir.

Q Until now you do not know?

A Yes sir.

Q So, what we are made to understand is, after doing your part as poseur-buyer, you did not participate anymore in the investigation of the
case?

A I assisted the investigator when we inventoried the marijuana sir.

Q Thats it[?] Nothing more?

A Nothing more sir. The investigation and the documentation, I did not participate [therein] anymore.
 Q [Do you] suggest, Mr. Witness that the person you actually met at the Universal Martial Arts Gym and [with whom you] negotiated about
the [sale] of marijuana was a certain Edwin Aliong?

A No sir, Gatudan.

Q [Do you] also suggest that Gatudan was not there in the morning?

A He was there sir. The only [one] I knew is Gatudan.

Q [Do you] also suggest, Mr. Witness, that at Session Road, in front of the Jollibee, the persons riding the taxicab were Roger [I]masa,
Edwin Aliong and Gatudan was not there?

A No sir, Gatudan and Aliong.[39]

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Dumawing [to SPO1 Natividad]:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that before you conduct a buy-bust operation you subject the person or a suspect to surveillance?

A Yes, sir.

Q And in this particular case, Mr. Witness, you never subjected accused Edwin Aliong to surveillance?

A No, sir.

Q You also know what they call an Order of Battle. Will you tell the Honorable Court what that is?

A It is a NARCOM watch list of persons who are engaged in the traffic of drugs.

Q And is it not a fact that the name of Edwin Aliong does not appear in your Order of Battle?

A Yes, sir.

Q Mr. Witness, when this case was filed by your office with the Prosecutors Office, you only charged Gatudan Balag-ey?

A Yes, sir.

Q You did not initially includ[e] Edwin Aliong?

A Yes, sir, because to our knowledge, after the investigation was finished in our office, Roger Imasa revealed to us that Edwin Aliong is his
sub-agent.

Q So that is the reason why you did not include him initially in the charge, is it not?

A That is one reason, sir.[40] (Italics supplied)

The above admissions, taken together with the acts of Aliong -- prior to, contemporaneous with, and subsequent to his arrest -- fail to establish any
conspiracy.

Even the charge of illegal possession of prohibited drugs was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of this offense are the
following: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.[41] Admittedly, the third requisite was not convincingly established by the prosecution.

In view of the lapses in the prosecutions case, the quantum of evidence needed to convict Aliong and Balag-ey -- proof beyond reasonable doubt
-- has not been adequately established by the prosecution. Our minds cannot rest easy on their supposed guilt. We reiterate the conventional wisdom
that it is better to free ten guilty persons than to convict an innocent one.[42]

Third Issue:
Buy-Bust Operation

Both appellants argue that no buy-bust operation took place on September 28, 1998, as shown by the inability of the prosecution to present in
court the alleged police informant and the marked money. Likewise, they point out that even the prosecutions witnesses testified that money had not
changed hands during the alleged transaction.

Well-established is the rule that the presentation of a confidential informant in a buy-bust operation is not always required, [43] especially when the
sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by other prosecution witnesses. [44] This rule admits of exceptions, however, as when the appellant
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs; and when there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers. [45]

For like reason, the presentation of the buy-bust money[46] and proof of its actual payment[47] -- pieces of evidence that are otherwise not
indispensable -- become necessary if the constitutional presumption of innocence is to be overcome. In the present case, the material inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witness and the non-presentation of the buy-bust money raise reasonable doubts about the occurrence of a buy-bust
operation.

The unrelenting drive against illegal drugs is indeed commendable. Those who engage in the illicit trade of marijuana and who prey on the
misguided members of society must be caught and prosecuted properly. While courts are committed to assist the government in its campaign against
illegal drugs, a conviction under the Dangerous Drugs Law will prosper only after the prosecution discharges its constitutional burden to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, this Court is likewise duty-bound to uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence.
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Appellants Gatudan Balag-ey and Edwin Aliong y Sungot are
hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

Let them be immediately released from their place of confinement, unless there is any other legal or valid cause to detain them further. The
director of the Bureau of Corrections shall report to this Court, within ten (10) days from notice of this judgment, on his action in obedience to this
directive. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 191366

PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
- versus -

ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y
ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON
Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Promulgated:
Y CAROLINO, and RAFAEL December 13, 2010
GONZALES Y CUNANAN,
Accused-Appellants.

X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269, which affirmed the February 13, 2008

Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2006-0525-D, finding the accused guilty of violating Section

13, in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.

The Facts

The Information indicting the accused reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ARNOLD MARTINEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ y
CAROLINO, ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN, without authority of law, confederating together,
acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, sniff and possess dangerous drugs
(shabu residues) contained in empty plastic sachets and rolled aluminum foil, during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or
in the proximate company of at least two (2) person[s].

Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165.[3]

Version of the Prosecution

As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard Azardon (PO1 Azardon), one of the apprehending officers,

and Police Inspector Lady Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical officer, it appears that on September 2, 2006, at around 12:45

oclock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen

entered the precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision,

Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons and

Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located.
 As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria (Doria) coming out of the side door and immediately

arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a

room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used

aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.

The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the room were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan

Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic

sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The

accused were subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Version of the Defense

The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez, claimed that in the morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them

were along Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who

was to give the materials for the painting of said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his

house and asked him if he noticed a person pass by. While they were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven policemen emerged and

apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to the police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and charged with

sniffing shabu.

The Ruling of the RTC

The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.

On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles,
EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y Carolino, and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined and penalized under Section 13
in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, and each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay the fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of suit.

The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of in accordance with the law.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1 Azardon, without any showing of ill-motive on his part,

prevailed over the defenses of denial and alibi put up by the accused. The accused were held to have been in constructive possession of the subject

items. A conspiracy was also found present as there was a common purpose to possess the dangerous drug.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as to the constructive possession of the dangerous drugs

by the accused. It further held that although the procedure regarding the custody and disposition of evidence prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
was not strictly complied with, the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence were nonetheless safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the

presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was not sufficiently controverted by the accused.

Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying for the reversal of the subject decision, presenting the

following

Assignment of Errors

For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez

1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants

to be having a pot session at the time of their arrest;

2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the police to plant the shabu paraphernalia to justify the
arrest of the accused-appellants without warrant;

3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti has not been sufficiently established;

4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Azardon insufficient to convict the
accused-appellants of the crime charged;

5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellants.

For accused Rafael Gonzales

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.

After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The

principal reasons are 1] that the evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has

not been duly established.

Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure

Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue before arraignment. [5] However, this

waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal

warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. [6]

Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused, it has been held that this Court has the power to correct

any error, even if unassigned, if such is necessary in arriving at a just decision, [7] especially when the transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake.
[8]
While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, they nevertheless must not be met at the

expense of substantial justice. Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the

attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities should never be used to defeat substantive rights. [9]Thus, despite the procedural lapses of the

accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in the case at bench. The clear infringement of the accuseds right to be protected

against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.

 The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses,

papers and effects.[10] Sec. 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in

the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant (i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; [11] (ii) search of evidence in "plain

view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency

circumstances.[12]

This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a

lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for

the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were confiscated as an incident thereof. According

to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit [13] with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused Gonzales based

solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house, to wit:

Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not tell you how many persons were actually conducting the
pot session?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not armed with a search warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.

Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you did not know personally Rafael Gonzales?
A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.

Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an] ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales, was this
report to you placed in the police blotter before you proceeded to the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.

Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or identity of the person who told you that he was allegedly
informed that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he does not want to be identified because he was afraid, sir.

Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: No more, sir.

Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group and went to the place of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.

xxx
 Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you could not see what is happening inside the house of
Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic sachet of shabu on the table while you were outside the
premises of the property of Rafael Gonzales?

xxx

Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?

COURT: Answer.

A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them, sir.

Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who told you that he was informed by another person that there
was an ongoing pot session going on inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael Gonzales and you arrested the persons you saw?
A: Yes, sir.[14]

Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both require

probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion

supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with

which he is charged.[15]

Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases [16] that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless

search,[17] such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically,

circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without

warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on an informers tip. The case ofPeople v. Bolasa[18] is informative on this matter.

In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house.
The police immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects. They walked towards the house accompanied by their informer. When they reached the
house, they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man and woman repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced
themselves as police officers, confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:

The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated
categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest,
accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants
committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed,
accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not
inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the
activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency
circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.

On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the
identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid
arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained
during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the
fundamental law.[19]

It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual

belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of

guilt of the person to be arrested. [20]

As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just

committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to

arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that the

accused had just committed an offense. As admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no

personal knowledge of the information that was reported to the police:

Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the accused was based on a tip-off by an informant?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?

A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of one of the accused Rafael Gonzales,
sir.

Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the information originated but from somebody else?
A: That was what he told me, sir.

Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was going on? [No Answer]

Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged pot session was going on?
A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.

Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was going on somewhere in Arellano but you dont know
the exact place where the pot session was going on?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to the veracity of the alleged pot session because he claimed that he
derived that information from somebody else?
A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session, sir.

Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?

A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.

xxx

Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the alleged pot session?
A: No, sir.

Q: That was, because your informant dont [sic] know physically what was really happening there?
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session there, sir.[21] [Emphasis supplied]

Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of plainview are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the

valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the

police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence

without further search.[22]

The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally entered the house with no prior surveillance or investigation

before they discovered the accused with the subject items. If the prior peeking of the police officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to constitute

plain view, then more so should the warrantless search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a search of a moving

vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under exigent and emergency circumstances.

The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and address of one of the accused were

already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have been

secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the

occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. [23] The
subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous

drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges have glossed over illegal searches and seizures in cases

where law enforcers are able to present the alleged evidence of the crime, regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This attitude

tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed rights in the name of law enforcement. It is ironic that such enforcement of the law fosters the breakdown of our

system of justice and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and

to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the

Constitution and the law.[24]

Chain of Custody

Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the accused would still be in order for failure of the apprehending officers

to comply with the chain of custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.

The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with moral certainty as the chain of custody appears to be

questionable, the authorities having failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03,

Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990. They argue that there was no prior coordination with the Philippine Drug

Enforcement Agency (PDEA), no inventory of the confiscated items conducted at the crime scene, no photograph of the items taken, no compliance with

the rule requiring the accused to sign the inventory and to give them copies thereof, and no showing of how the items were handled from the time of

confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime laboratory for testing. Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby producing reasonable

doubt as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in their favor was not overcome by the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty.

The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such

possession is not authorized by law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug. [25] Additionally, this being a case for

violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous drug must have occurred during a

party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons.

The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition sine qua

non for conviction. In order to establish the existence of the drug, its chain of custody must be sufficiently established. The chain of custody

requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements

of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court. [26] Malillin v. People was the first in a growing number

of cases to explain the importance of chain of custody in dangerous drugs cases, to wit:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.[27]

Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,[28] defines chain of custody as follows:
 b. Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition;

Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs

seized, to wit:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of seized or confiscated items in dangerous drugs cases in order

to ensure their identity and integrity, as follows:

Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer, who would then send
it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it is unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand a
number of times, it is imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the suspect to place his marking on its plastic
container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic
container. At the trial, the officer can then identify the seized substance and the procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until
it reaches the crime laboratory.

If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal the same. In this way the substance
would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician
tests and verifies the nature of the substance in the container, he should put his own mark on the plastic container and seal it again
with a new seal since the police officers seal has been broken. At the trial, the technician can then describe the sealed condition of
the plastic container when it was handed to him and testify on the procedure he took afterwards to preserve its integrity.

If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would have to present every police officer,
messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly ones possession has
been. Each of them has to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or substituted while in his
care.[29]

Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further elaborates, and provides for, the possibility of non-

compliance with the prescribed procedure:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]

Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and

invalid, provided that (i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly

preserved. In this case, however, no justifiable ground is found availing, and it is apparent that there was a failure to properly preserve the integrity and

evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation in court. A review of

the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary records of the case reveals irreparably broken links in the chain of custody.
According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the following were confiscated from the accused, to wit:

a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu residues.

b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2) pcs colored yellow, one (1) pc colored green & one (1)
pc colored white ).

c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.

d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.

e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.[30]

[Emphases supplied]

At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items were indorsed to Duty Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro

Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 Urbano) for proper disposition.[31] A letter-request for laboratory examination was prepared by Police Superintendent Edgar Orduna

Basbag for the following items:

a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu residues marked DC&A-1.

b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked DC&A-2.

c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked DC&A-3.[32]
[Emphases supplied]

The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/Insp. Maranion by SPO3 Froilan Esteban (SPO3 Esteban). Final

Chemistry Report No. D-042-06L listed the specimens which were submitted for testing, to wit:

SPECIMENS SUBMITTED:

A A1 to A115 One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic sachet with tag each containing suspected shabu
residue without markings.

B B1 to B11 Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each containing suspected shabu residue without markings.

C C1 to C49 Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing suspected shabu residue without markings.[33]
[Emphases supplied]

Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a Confiscation Receipt was issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela

Cruz, which reads:

DCPS AID SOTG 05 September 2006

CONFISCATION RECEIPT

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about 12:45 noon of September 4, 2006, we together with our precinct supervisor, SPO4
Pedro Belen Jr., and SWAT members composed of SPO1 Marlon Decano, PO3 Manuel Garcia, PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and PO1
Aldrin Guarin apprehended the following names of persons of ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, 37 yrs old, married, jobless, a
resident of Lucao Dist., this city; EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs old, single, tricycle driver, a resident of 471 Lucao Dist., this city.
REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, 44 yrs old, married, jitney driver, a resident of Lucao Disttrict this city; ROLAND DORIA Y DIAZ,
39 yrs old, married, businessman, resident of Cabeldatan, Malasiqui, Pangasinan and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, 49 yrs
old, separated, jobless and a resident of Trinidad Subd., Arellano-Bani this city.

Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and were brought to Dagupan City Police
Station, Perez Market Site Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty Desk Officer to record the incident and the sachet of suspected
Shabu Paraphernalias were brought to PNP Crime Laboratory, Lingayen, Pangasinan for Laboratory Examination.

Seizing Officer:

(sgd.) (sgd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
 Affiant Affiant

Remarks:

Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed[34]
[Emphases supplied]

The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 (of the 49) pieces of used aluminum foil, all containing shabu

residue, as identified in the Final Chemistry Report, were presented in court and marked as Exhibits H and series, I and series, and J and series,

respectively. Said items were identified by PO1 Azardon and P/Insp. Maranion at the witness stand.[35]

The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved as there was sufficient evidence to prove that the

items seized from the accused were the same ones forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination, as shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the

letter-request for laboratory examination.

A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is mistaken.

First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. After seizure and confiscation of the subject items, no physical inventory

was conducted in the presence of the accused, or their representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public

official. Thus, no inventory was prepared, signed, and provided to the accused in the manner required by law. PO1 Azardon, in his testimony,[36] admitted

that no photographs were taken. The only discernable reason proffered by him for the failure to comply with the prescribed procedure was that the

situation happened so suddenly. Thus:

Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group and went to the place of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.

Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures taken, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[37]
[Emphasis supplied]

The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-compliance. The suddenness of the situation cannot justify non-

compliance with the requirements. The police officers were not prevented from preparing an inventory and taking photographs. In fact, Section 21(a) of

the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides specifically that in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and photographs shall be done at the nearest police

station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness of the situation may have had should have dissipated

by the time they reached the police station, as the suspects had already been arrested and the items seized.Moreover, it has been held that in case of

warrantless seizures nothing prevents the apprehending officer from immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography of the items at their

place of seizure, as it is more in keeping with the laws intent to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. [38]

This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly

preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Some cases are People v. Garcia,[39] People v. Dela Cruz, [40] People v. Dela Cruz,
[41]
People v. Santos, Jr.,[42] People v. Nazareno,[43]People v. Orteza,[44] Zarraga v. People,[45] and People v. Kimura.[46]

Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez is instructive on the requirement of marking, to wit:

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the
seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to
inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency
 with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under
Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.

For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the item/s seized. x x x Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type
and quantity of the seized items require a different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall
accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain of custody.[47] [Emphasis in the original]

Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela Cruz does it appear that the subject items were at all marked.

It was only in the letter-request for laboratory examination that the subject items were indicated to have been marked with DC&A-1, DC&A-2 and DC&A-

3. There is no showing, however, as to who made those markings and when they were made. Moreover, those purported markings were never

mentioned when the subject items were identified by the prosecution witnesses when they took the stand.

The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic sachets, rolled and cut aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do

not specifically pertain to any individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was only in the Chemistry Report [48] that the precise number of each type of

item was indicated and enumerated. The Court notes that in all documents prior to said report, the subject items were never accurately quantified but

only described as pieces,[49] several pcs,[50] and shabu paraphernallas.[51]Strangely, the Chemistry Report indicates that all the subject items had no

markings, although each item was reported to have been marked by P/Insp. Maranion in the course of processing the subject items during laboratory

examination and testing.[52] Doubt, therefore, arises as to the identity of the subject items. It cannot be determined with moral certainty that the subject

items seized from the accused were the same ones subjected to the laboratory examination and presented in court.

This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the marking of seized items in dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga

v. People,[53] People v. Kimura,[54] and People v. Laxa.[55]

Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts below gives rise to more uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on the day

of the seizure of the items, it was prepared only three days after. More important, the receipt did not even indicate exactly what items were confiscated

and their quantity. These are basic information that a confiscation receipt should provide. The only information contained in the Confiscation Receipt was

the fact of arrest of the accused and the general description of the subject items as the sachet of suspected Shabu paraphernallas were brought to the

PNP Crime Laboratory. The receipt is made even more dubious by PO1 Azardons admission in his testimony [56] that he did not personally prepare the

Confiscation Receipt and he did not know exactly who did so.

Fourth, according to the Certification [57] issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the subject items were indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator

SPO1 Urbano for proper disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp. Maranion. There is, however, no showing of how and

when the subject items were transferred from SPO1 Urbano to SPO3 Esteban.

Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No witness testified on how the subject items were kept after they were

tested prior to their presentation in court. This Court has highlighted similar shortcomings in People v. Cervantes,[58] People v. Garcia,[59] People v.

Sanchez,[60] and Malillin v. People.[61]

More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the accused. Contrary to PO1 Azardons testimony[62] that they were tipped off by a

concerned citizen while at the police station, the Letter [63] to the Executive Director of the DDB states that the apprehending officers were tipped off while

conducting monitoring/surveillance. Said letter also indicates, as does the Confiscation Receipt, that the arrest and seizure occurred on September 4,

2006, and not September 2, 2006, as alleged in the Information. It was also mentioned in the aforementioned Certification of the Dagupan Police and
Joint Affidavit of the police officers that a glass tube suspected to contain shabu residue was also confiscated from the accused. Interestingly, no glass

tube was submitted for laboratory examination.

In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the prosecutions position that the integrity and evidentiary value of the

subject items were properly preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by the CA, the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory

examination, have been shown to be grossly insufficient in proving the identity of the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases

constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential before the accused can be

found guilty.[64]

Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165, in People v. Sta. Maria,[65] this Court held that

said section was silent as to the consequences of such failure, and said silence could not be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without

the participation of PDEA illegal, nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall

be the lead agency in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform

similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter.

Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not affect the admissibility of the evidence but only its weight.
[66]
Thus, had the subject items in this case been admissible, their evidentiary merit and probative value would be insufficient to warrant conviction.

It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police officers, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty

should prevail. However, such presumption obtains only when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty. [67] Where the official act in

question is irregular on its face, the presumption of regularity cannot stand.

In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to be irregular. When challenged by the evidence of a flawed

chain of custody, the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence of the accused. [68]

This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous drugs cases due to the failure of law enforcers to observe

the proper arrest, search and seizure procedure under the law. [69] Some bona fide arrests and seizures in dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal

of the accused because drug enforcement operatives compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized items. It behooves this Court to

remind law enforcement agencies to exert greater effort to apply the rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of seized drugs.

It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible. Thus, as earlier stated, non-

compliance therewith is not necessarily fatal. However, the lapses in procedure must be recognized, addressed and explained in terms of their justifiable

grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved. [70]
 On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 [71] (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 [72] (Use of

Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing

charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being

subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15

instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15. The

minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under

Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of

residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at

life.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found

positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law

enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have

been charged under Sec. 14[73] (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social

Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12 [74] (Possession of Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus

and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other

paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact, under the same

section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and

shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15.

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous

drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the

confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the

filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than

mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.

WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment

entered ACQUITTING the accused and ordering their immediate release from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director

of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be

furnished the Director-General, Philippine National Police, and the Director-General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information and

guidance.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the seized items to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in

accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.