Full text Finals contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any

other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto. On

Republic of the Philippines June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest,
SUPREME COURT Junsay went to the Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's
Manila appointment on the same grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA.
In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission disposed as
EN BANC follows:

G.R. No. 96298 May 14, 1991 After a careful review of the records of the case, the
Commission finds the appeal meritorious. In the comparative
RENATO M. LAPINID, petitioner, evaluation sheets, the parties were evaluated according to the
vs. following criteria, namely: eligibility; education; work
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE PORTS experience; productivity/performance/ attendance; integrity;
AUTHORITY and JUANITO JUNSAY, respondents. initiative/leadership; and physical characteristics/personality
traits. The results of the evaluation are as follows:
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for petitioner.
Adolpho M. Guerzon for J. Junsay, Jr. JUNSAY, Juanito — 79.5
Evalyn L Fetalino, Rogelio C. Limare and Daisy B. Garcia-Tingzon
for Civil Service Commission. VILLEGAS, Benjamin — 79

LAPINID, Renato — 75

CRUZ, J.: DULFO, Antonio — 78

The issue raised in this case has been categorically resolved in a long MARIANO, Eleuterio — 79
line of cases that should have since guided the policies and actions of
the respondent Civil Service Commission. Disregard of our consistent FLORES, Nestor — 80
ruling on this matter has needlessly imposed on the valuable time of
the Court and indeed borders on disrespect for the highest tribunal. We DE GUZMAN, Alfonso — 80
state at the outset that this conduct can no longer be countenanced.
VER, Cesar — 80
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports
Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas
International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This (79) have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and
appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private Dulfo (78).
respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations
with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants
the decision of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as
 Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid
and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for
appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their
qualifications, and that the Commission be notified within ten
(10) days of the implementation hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Upon learning of the said resolution, Lapinid, 7who claimed he had
not been informed of the appeal and had not been heard thereon, filed
a motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1990. This was denied on
May 25, 1990. The Philippine Ports Authority also filed its own
motion for reconsideration on June 19, 1990, which was denied on
August 17, 1990. A second motion for reconsideration filed on
September 14, 1990, based on the re-appreciation of Lapinid's rating
from 75% to 84%, was also denied on October 19, 1990.
When the petitioner came to this Court on December 13, 1990, we
resolved to require Comments from the respondents and in the
meantime issued a temporary restraining order. The Solicitor General
took a stand against the Civil Service Commission which, at his
suggestion, was allowed to file its own Comment. The petitioner filed
a Reply. The private respondent's Comment was dispensed with when
it was not filed within the prescribed period.
We see no reason to deviate from our consistent ruling on the issue
before us.
In Luego v. Civil Service Commission,1 this Court declared:
The issue is starkly simple: Is the Civil Service Commission
authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement by the latter?
xxx xxx xxx
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide.
xxx xxx xxx
Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged
that both the petitioner and the private respondent were
qualified for the position in controversy. That recognition alone
rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from
acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the
petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to
revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the
private respondent was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in
the city mayor.
The same ruling has been affirmed, in practically the same language as
Luego, in Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744;
Santiago v. Civil Service Commission, 178 SCRA 733; Pintor v. Tan,
G.R. No. 84022 and G.R. No. 85804, March 9, 1989, En Banc, Minute
Resolution; Galura v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 85812, June
1, 1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Zulueta v. Mamangun, G.R. No.
85941, June 15, 1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Remigio v.
Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 86324, July 6, 1989,
En Banc, Minute Resolution; Aurora Macacua v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 91520, July 31, 1990, En Banc, Minute
Resolution; Abdulwahab A. Bayao v. Civil Service Commission, G.R.
No. 92388, September 11, 1990, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Orbos
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990;
Alicia D. Tagaro v. The Hon. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R.
No. 90477, September 13, 1990, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Elenito
Lim v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 87145, October 11,
1990, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Teologo v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 92103, November 8, 1990; Simpao v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 85976, November 15, 1990.
Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals2 this Court said:
The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of
this nature, according to Luego, is to review the appointment in
the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and
when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal
requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but
to attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that the
recognition by the Commission that both the appointee and the
protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders
it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further
thereon except to affirm the validity of the former's
appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment
simply because it considers another employee to be better
qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the
discretion vested in the appointing authority.
xxx xxx xxx
The determination of who among several candidates for a
vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the
sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing
authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every
particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal
qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of
academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may
be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team
spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the
future, and best interests, of the service. Given the demands of
a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the Head of
the Office concerned provided the legal requirements for the
office are satisfied. The Civil Service Commission cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office in this
regard.
It is therefore incomprehensible to the Court why, despite these
definitive pronouncements, the Civil Service Commission has seen fit
to ignore, if not defy, the clear mandate of the Court.
We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time, that the Civil
Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own
personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the
appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the
appointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination of
who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should
be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil
Service Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it
believes another person is better qualified and much less can it direct
the appointment of its own choice.
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot
compel.1âwphi1 While the act of appointment may in proper cases be
the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee—taking
into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract
qualities that define his personality—is the prerogative of the
appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion
of the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil
Service Commission has no power to review under the Constitution
and the applicable laws.
Commenting on the limits of the powers of the public respondent,
Luego declared:
It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the
language of Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil Service
Decree because it says the Commission has the power to
"approve" and "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provided
therein that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to:
9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service, except
those presidential appointees, members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and
jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees
 do not possess appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications. (Emphasis supplied)
However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the
underscored parts, will make it clear that all the Commission is
actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee
possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it
is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be
employed by the Commission when it acts on—or as the
Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves'—an appointment
made by the proper authorities.
The Court believes it has stated the foregoing doctrine clearly enough,
and often enough, for the Civil Service Commission not to understand
them. The bench does; the bar does; and we see no reason why the
Civil Service Commission does not. If it will not, then that is an
entirely different matter and shall be treated accordingly.
We note with stern disapproval that the Civil Service Commission has
once again directed the appointment of its own choice in the case at
bar. We must therefore make the following injunctions which the
Commission must note well and follow strictly.
Constitution. The Civil Service Commission should recognize that its
acts are subject to reversal by this Court, which expects full
compliance with its decisions even if the Commission may not agree
with them.
The Commission on Civil Service has been duly warned. Henceforth,
it disobeys at its peril.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
respondent Civil Service Commission dated February 14, 1990, May
25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19, 1990, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated December 13,
1990, is made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes

Whatever the reasons for its conduct, the Civil Service Commission is 1 143 SCRA 327.
ORDERED to desist from disregarding the doctrine announced in
Luego v. Civil Service Commission and the subsequent decisions 2 G.R. No. 90799, October 18, 1990.
reiterating such ruling. Up to this point, the Court has leniently
regarded the attitude of the public respondent on this matter as
imputable to a lack of comprehension and not to intentional
intransigence. But we are no longer disposed to indulge that fiction.
Henceforth, departure from the mandate of Luego by the Civil Service
Commission after the date of the promulgation of this decision shall be
considered contempt of this Court and shall be dealt with severely, in
view especially of the status of the contemner.

While we appreciate the fact that the Commission is a constitutional

body, we must stress, as a necessary reminder, that every department
and office in the Republic must know its place in the scheme of the
 Republic of the Philippines Assistant Civil Security Officer, Civil Intelligence and Security
SUPREME COURT Department of the Quezon City Government, assumed the
Manila Administrative Officer IV position on 2 December 1987.

EN BANC A day earlier, private respondent Florentina Eleria, Administrative

Officer III of the Health Department, Quezon City Government, filed a
G.R. No. 92573 June 3, 1991 protest with the Merit System Protection Board ("Board") in respect of
Abila's appointment. The Board indorsed the protest to the Quezon
ALEX A. ABILA, petitioner, City Officer-in-Charge, Reynaldo Bernardo, who rendered a decision
vs. dismissing the protest.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FLORENTINA E.
ELERIA, respondents. Private respondent Eleria appealed to the Board. On 27 October 1988,
the Board promulgated a decision revoking petitioner Abila's
G.R. No. 92867 June 3, 1991 appointment and directing the Quezon City Officer-in-Charge or
Mayor to appoint private respondent Eleria in lieu of petitioner Abila.
QUEZON CITY, represented by the Honorable Brigido R. Simon, The Board found that both petitioner Abila and private respondent
Jr., petitioner, Eleria met the minimum eligibility and education requirements for
vs. Administrative Officer IV, but ruled that respondent Eleria had the
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FLORENTINA E. edge in terms of rank and experience as an Administrative Officer. The
ELERIA, respondents. Board also held that respondent Eleria was holding a position next in
rank to that of the vacancy, which circumstance, according to the
Z.P. Reyes Law Office for petitioner Abila. Board, under Section 4 of the Civil Service Commission Resolution
The City Attorney for petitioner Quezon City. No. 83-343, gave her "promotional priority" over petitioner.
Pedro F. Martinez for private respondent.
Petitioner Abila appealed to the Civil Service Commission
("Commission"). The Commission affirmed in toto the Board's
decision and resolution dated 21 November 1989. Petitioner moved for
RESOLUTION reconsideration, without success.

Petitioner is now before this Court on certiorari. He contends that the

FELICIANO, J.:
On 1 September 1987, Amado Villafuerte retired from his position as
Administrative Officer IV in the Health Department of the City
Government of Quezon City. Then Quezon City Officer-in-Charge
Brigido Simon, Jr. appointed petitioner Alex Abila as Villafuerte's
successor. Petitioner Abila who had theretofore been the Acting
respondent Commission, having verified that both petitioner and
private respondent were legally qualified to fill the vacancy, should
not have proceeded to comparing the parties' qualifications and
choosing the person that it believed to be the appropriate appointee.
Those functions, petitioner urges, belong to the City Mayor as part of
his appointing power and cannot be appropriated for itself by the
respondent Commission.
In a Resolution dated 19 April 1990, the Court granted a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent Commission from
implementing its resolutions.
The Quezon City Government, represented by its elected Mayor,
Brigido Simon, Jr., filed an identical Petition with this Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 92867, seeking annulment of respondent Commission's
resolution and upholding the validity of the appointment of petitioner
Abila on substantially the same grounds pleaded by the latter.
In a resolution dated 26 July 1990, the Court ordered consolidation of
the two (2) cases for their more convenient disposition.
The recurring issue posed in this case is whether the respondent
Commission has authority to substitute its own judgment for that of
the official authorized by law to make an appointment to the
government service, in the matter of weighing an appointee's
qualifications and fitness for a position, after it has been shown that
the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed for the
position.
In a long line of cases,1 the Court has held that respondent
Commission has no such authority, the power of appointment, which is
essentially discretionary, being vested by law in the head of the office
concerned. The head of the office is the person on the spot. He
occupies the ideal vantage point from which to identify and designate
the individual who can best fill the post and discharge its functions in
the government agency he heads. The choice of an appointee from
among those who possess the required qualifications is a political and
administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom,
convenience, utility and the interests of service which can best be
made by the head of the office concerned, the person most familiar
with the organizational structure and environmental circumstances
within which the appointee must function.
In Lapinid vs. Civil Service Commission (supra), the Court through
Mr. Justice Cruz, stressed:
We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time, that
the Civil Service Commission has no power of appointment
except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the
authority to review the appointments made by other offices
except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with
the minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred
belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service
Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it
believes another person is better qualified and much less can it
direct the appointment of its own choice.
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court
cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper
cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the
appointee –– taking into account the totality of his
qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
personality –– is the prerogative of the appointing authority.
This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the
appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil
Service Commission has no power to review under the
Constitution and the applicable laws.2
The Commission, the Court said in Chang v. Civil Service
Commission,3 "is not a co-manager or surrogate administrator of
government offices and agencies."
In the case at bar, the respondent Commission itself acknowledged that
both petitioner Abila and respondent Eleria are legally qualified for the
position in question.4 Having made the determination, the
Commission had exhausted its powers and may not act any further
except to affirm the validity of petitioner's appointment. More
specifically, the Commission had no authority to revoke petitioner's
appointment because the Commission believed that private respondent
Eleria was better qualified for the position involved; the Commission's
acts in this respect constituted an encroachment upon a discretionary
authority vested by law in the Quezon City Mayor and not in the
Commission.
The Court notes that a vacant position in the Civil Service may be
filled by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement and
re-employment or appointment of outsiders who have the necessary
eligibility.5 The next-in-rank rule invoked by respondent Commission
to justify its choice of respondent Eleria over petitioner Abila, applies
only where a vacancy is filled by promotion, a process which denotes
a scalar ascent of an officer to another position higher either in rank or
salary. A promotion involves a situation quite different from the
situation in the case at bar where the appointment of petitioner Abila
was effected through lateral transfer from a position in one department
of the city government to a position of greater responsibility in another
department of the same government.6 In Medenilla v. Civil Service
Commission,7 the Court very recently stressed that:
. . . We have already held in cases subsequent to Millares that
the next-in-rank rule is not absolute; it only applies in cases of
promotion (see Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 34 [1969]). And
even in promotions, it can be disregarded for sound reasons
made known to the next-in-rank. The appointing authority,
under the Civil Service Law, is allowed to fill vacancies by
promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement,
reemployment, and appointment of outsiders who have
appropriate civil service eligibility, not necessarily in that
order (see Pineda v. Claudio, supra; Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327 [1986]). There is no legal fiat
that a vacancy must be filled only by promotion; the appointing
authority is given wide discretion to fill a vacancy from among
the several alternatives provided for by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court further notes that even if the vacancy here had been filled
by promotion rather than by lateral transfer, the concept of "next in
rank" does not import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that
the person next in rank must be appointed to the vacancy. What
Section 19 (3) of P.D. No. 807, the Civil Service Law, provides is that
if a vacancy is filled by a promotion, the person holding the position
next in rank thereto "shall be considered for promotion."8
In Taduran v. Civil Service Commission,9 the Court construed that
phrase to mean that the person next in rank "would be among the first
to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified.10 In Santiago, Jr. v.
Civil Service Commission,11 the Court elaborated the import of the
rule in the following manner:
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration
for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily
follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule
neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a
ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such
person to the next higher position. . . .12
It appears to the Court that Section 4 of respondent Commission's
Resolution No. 83-343 which provided that:
Rule on Promotion
xxx xxx xxx
Section 4. An employee who holds a next in rank position who
is competent and qualified, possesses an appropriate civil
service eligibility and meets the other conditions for promotion
shall be promoted to the higher position, when it becomes
vacant. (Emphasis supplied)
has been superseded by Section 2 of Rule 3 of the respondent
Commission's subsequent Resolution No. 89-779 which reads as
follows:
B. Rules on Protest Cases
xxx xxx xxx
Rule III. Procedure in Filling Vacancies
xxx xxx xxx
 Section 2. Positions in the Second Level. — When a vacancy
occurs in the second level of the career service as herein
defined, the employees in the department who occupy the next
lower positions in the occupational group under which the
vacant position is classified, and in other functionally related
occupational groups, who are competent and qualified and with
appropriate civil service eligibility shall be considered for
appointment to the vacancy. (Emphasis supplied)
When, in the exercise of its rule-making power, it promulgated Section
4 of its earlier Resolution No. 83-343, the Commission clearly
exceeded the scope of its statutory authority since the Civil Service
law itself, in Section 19 (3) of P.D. No. 807, had simply provided that
persons next in rank who are qualified "shall be considered for
promotion." The current regulation found in Section 2 of Rule III of
the Commission's Resolution No. 89-779 is, fortunately, more
consistent with the Commission's enabling statute.
Finally, respondent Commission will find no comfort in Meram v.
Edralin13 which it cites. In that case, the Court affirmed the
appointment of the next in rank "because the original appointee's
appointment was made in consideration of the political, ethnic,
religious or blood ties totally against the very purpose behind the
establishment of professionalism in the civil service."14 In the case at
bar, respondents have not asserted the existence of any circumstances,
such as those in Meram, which would have warranted intervention by
the Commission to correct an arbitrary and merely capricious exercise
of power by the appointing authority.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to TREAT respondents'
Comments as their Answers, to GRANT due course to the Petition for
Certiorari and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Resolutions of the
respondent Civil Service Commission Nos. 89-869 (21 November
1989) and 90-240 (5 March 1990), respectively. The Temporary
Restraining Order dated 19 April 1990 is hereby MADE
PERMANENT.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 The Court, in Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,
G.R. No. 96298, 14 May 1991, collected most of these cases.
Additional cases include: Cortez v. Civil Service Commission,
et al., G.R. No. 92673, 13 March 1991; Lopez v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 92140,19 February 1991, p. 9; G.R. No.
94465, 27 November 1990, p. 2; Chang v. Civil Service
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 86791, 26 November 1990, p. 5;
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 140 SCRA 32, 35 (1985); Ocampo v. Subido, 72
SCRA 443, 451 (1976); Torres v. Borja, 56 SCRA 47, 55
(1974); Reyes v. Abeleda, 22 SCRA 825, 830 (1968).
2 Because the precipitating events in the case at bar occurred
before the promulgation of Lapinid, the Court refrains from
taking any action against respondent Commission.
3 G.R. No. 86791, 26 November 1990, p. 5.
4 Rollo of G.R. No. 92573, p. 26.
5 Section 19 (5), P.D. No. 807. See also Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, 333 (1986); Patagoc v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 90229, 14 May 1990, p. 5.
6 Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 34, 48 (1969).
7 G.R. No. 93868, 19 February 1991.
8 The applicable provision reads:
"No. 1-Article VIII.

Personnel Policies and Standards

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 19. Recruitment and Selection of Employees.

—....

xxx xxx xxx

(3) When a vacancy occurs in a position in the second

level of the Career Service as defined in Section 7, the
employees in the government service who occupy the
next lower positions in the occupational group under
which the vacant position is classified, and in other
functionally related occupational groups and who are
competent, qualified and with the appropriate civil
service eligibility shall be considered for promotion.
(Emphasis supplied)