LEANDRO CRUZ, EMMANUEL MANAHAN, ALRIC
JERVOSO, Petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Ibis Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the July 20, 2012
Decision1 and March 27, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR. CR No. 32942. The CA affirmed the August 13, 2009
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 56 in
Criminal Case No. 04-2725 finding Leandro Cruz (Cruz), Emmanuel
Manahan (Manahan), and Alric Jervoso (Jervoso) guilty of Qualified
Theft, and imposing upon them the penalty of ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Factual Antecedents
In an Information4 dated May 17, 2004, Cruz, Manahan, Jervoso
(petitioners), and Alvin (Pardilla) were charged with Qualified Theft
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That in or about and sometime during the month of October, 2003, in
the City of Makati, Metro Manila Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the Warehouse Supervisor, Assistant Warehouse Supervisor,
Delivery Driver cum Warehouse Assistant and Warehouse cum
Delivery Assistant, respectively, and as such have access to the
Warehouse and enjoying the trust and confidence reposed upon them
by complainant, with grave abuse of confidence, intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal, and carry away
the stock products held in the warehouse in the total amount of
Phpl,122,205.00 belonging to PRESTIGE BRANDS PHIL., INC.,
herein represented by VAIBHAV TEMBULKAR y ATMARAM, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioners pleaded "'Not Guilty"5 to the charges
against them while Pardilla remained at large.6
After the termination of the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
To establish its case, the prosecution presented Vinod Dadlani
(Dadlani), the President of Prestige Brands Phils., Inc. (Prestige
Brands);7 Albert Ding (Ding), the former Finance Manager of the
Prestige Group of Companies in South East Asia;8 and Rebecca
Pascual (Pascual), the former Finance Manager of Prestige
Brands.9 These witnesses testified on the following facts:
Prestige Brands, a company engaged in the sale and distribution of
various products in the Philippines, through Dadlani, employed Cruz,
Manahan, Jervoso, and Pardilla10 as Warehouse Supervisor, Assistant
Warehouse Supervisor, Delivery Driver and Warehouse Assistant, and
Warehouse Assistant, respectively.11 Dadlani authorized only five
individuals - petitioners, Pardilla, and Prestige Brands' Vice President,
Vaibhav Tembµlkar (Tembulkar), - to have access to its warehouse
located at the 4th Floor of the ITC Building in Jupiter, Makati City.
Only Cruz and Tembulkar had keys to its locks. They would open it in
the morning, and in the evening, Cruz would turnover his keys to
Tembulkar. Authorized warehouse personnel were not subjected to
any checking when they leave the warehouse.12 On the other hand,
non-warehouse personnel, like Pascual, could enter the same only if
accompanied by a warehouse staff, and would be frisked when they
leave the premises.13
In October 2003, Tembulkar infonned Dadlani that he would conduct
an investigation since discrepancies in their record vis-a-vis the
physical count of the items stored in the warehouse were
noted.14 Based on the company's inventory updates for January 2003
to April 2003, and October 2003 conducted by Ding,15 about ₱1.2
million worth of Prestige Brands' products were unaccounted, which
included fragrance brands like Hugo Boss, Dolce and Gabbana,
Ferrari, and So You by Beverly Hills.16
On November 20, 2003, Tembulkar referred petitioners and Pardilla
to Dadlani. Thereafter, Cruz, Jervoso, and Pardilla admitted to
Dadlani that they stole and sold products of Prestige Brands, and
divided the proceeds among themselves. Cruz, Jervoso, and Pardilla
executed their written confession on the matter. However, Manahan
did not confess to anything.17 Subsequently, petitioners and Pardilla
no longer reported for work. Thus, on November 27, 2003, Prestige
Brands issued a Memorandum requiring them to conduct a physical
stock count and verify the missing products.18
Meanwhile, Cruz filed his resignation letter dated October 29, 2003
which Dadlani accepted but modified its e:ffectivity date.19 Later,
Prestige Brands twice wrote Cruz to report back to work and make a
stock count but to no avail.20
Version of the Defense
Petitioners denied the charges against them and averred as follows:
Prestige Brands employed petitioners and Pardilla as warehouse
personnel.21 In particular, they were tasked to prepare perfumes for
delivery to the clients of the company. After packing the items, the staff
of the Accounting Department would frisk petitioners and Pardilla.
Thereafter, they would deliver the perfumes to different stores.22Cruz
and Tembulkar kept the keys to the two locks of the first door leading
to the warehouse, where Prestige Brands stored all its products for
delivery.23 The first door of the warehouse had two locks; Cruz kept
the key to the first lock while Tembulkar had the key to the second
lock. And only Tembulkar had a key to the second door leading to the
warehouse.24
On November 15, 2003, Cruz filed his resignation letter but it was
agreed that his resignation would take effect only on November 29,
2003.25
On November 20, 2003, however, while Jervoso was in Robinsons
Department Store delivering perfumes, he received a call from Cruz
telling him to return to the office. Upon arriving in their office, Cruz
told Jervoso that Dadlani wanted Jervoso to drive for him
(Dadlani).26 Jervoso drove Dadlani to GMA 7. Thereafter, Jervoso,
Dadlani, and Dadlani's friend, Mayor Lito Atienza27 (Mayor Atienza),
went to Baywalk at Roxas Boulevard, Manila. There, Mayor Atienza
told Jervoso that his (Jervoso) boss had a problem as his employees
stole from him ₱10 million worth of perfumes. Jervoso replied that
nothing was lost because an inventory was conducted but Mayor
Atienza countered that petitioners were the only ones present during
the inventory. Mayor Atienza likewise told Jervoso to cooperate or else
he would be liable.28
On the same day, Dadlani and Ding met with petitioners and Pardilla
in Dadlani's office.29 Dadlani told Cruz about the missing items in the
warehouse but Cruz replied that he was unaware of it. Dadlani told
Cruz that he would disclose the incident to the media, and would
involve their family. Dadlani then told Cruz that if he would sign the
computer printout handed him, no complaint would be filed against
petitioners and Pardilla. Perforce, Cruz signed the document where he
admitted that he stole products of Prestige Brands.30
During his testimony, Cruz stated that he failed to reconcile the
discrepancies in the inventory because he had no access to the
computer-generated report related to it; also his office table was
forcibly opened and all documents material for the reconciliation of
the discrepancies were taken.31 Upon presentment of a letter dated
October-20, 2003, Cruz acknowledged that it was the same document
that Dadlani asked him to sign minus the jurat.32
On November 20, 2003, Dadlani also spoke with Jervoso. On the same
occasion, Dadlani handed Jervoso a letter dated October 20, 2003
which the latter signed without understanding that it contained an
accusation of theft against him, his co-petitioners, and Pardilla.33
Likewise, Dadlani handed Manahan a letter which stated that
petitioners and Pardilla stole several items from the company. Despite
Dadlani mentioning his friends in the media, particularly from GMA 7
and Manila Bulletin, and his connections in Manila, including Mayor
Atienza and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manahan
refosed to sign said letter.34 On November 21, 2003, Manahan
resigned from Prestige Brancls.35
On November 22, 2003, while Jervoso and Cruz were working in the
warehouse, Ernesto Lontoc (Lontoc) and Atty. Francisco Simon (Atty.
Simon), who were purportedly from the NBI, asked them to write a
letter admitting that they (Jervoso and Cruz) stole perfun1es. Jervoso
wrote a letter which, contrary to the request, stated that he, his co-
petitioners, and Pardilla did nothing wrong against the company.
Dadlani got mad when he received Jervoso's letter. Ultimately, despite
his initial protest, Jervoso was prevailed to prepare a letter attesting
that they stole from the company. After the incident, Jervoso no longer
reported for work.36 During the trial, Jervoso denied that the letter he
wrote contained ajurat.37
Meanwhile, on November 23, 2003, Cruz and Jervoso went to the
Makati Police Station and reported38 that at about 5:00 p.m. on
November 21, 2003, Dadlani, Ding, and an unidentified male person
forced. them to sign a confession letter, which alleged that they stole
products from the warehouse; that on November 22, 2003, Dadlani,
Lontoc, and Atty. Simon forced them to translate their confession into
their (Cruz and Jervoso) own handwriting; and that they were
intimidated into signing the letter and even detained at the company
premises up to 11: 15 p.m. and were allowed to leave only after affixing
their signature to the confession letter.
On November 24, 2003. Cruz and Jervoso filed with the. Makati
Prosecutor's Office a Complaint39 for grave coercion, grave threats,
and incriminating innocent persons against Prestige Brands. At the
time of the trial, the motion for reconsideration filed relative to the
denial of the petition for review (on the dismissal of the complaint)
was still pending with the Department of Justice.40
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 13, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision against
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, with all the foregoing consideration, the Court finds
that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
the accused Alric Jervoso, Leandro Cruz and Emmanuel Manahan as
having committed the crime of Qualified Theft, and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as minimum;
14 years, 8 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.
Said accused are ordered to pay solidarily the private complainant the
amount of ₱l,122,205.00.
The case against accused Alvin Pardilla, who is at large is archived.
SO ORDERED.41
The RTC held that the prosecution proved that petitioners committed
grave abuse of confidence when they stole items belonging to Prestige
Brands. It added that petitioners enjoyed trust and confidence of
Prestige Brands because they were given access to company stocks,
which they took out for delivery to clients.
It further decreed that the prosecution established the fact of loss of
Prestige Brands' personal properties, comprising of its inventories for
the periods ending on April 30, 2003 and October 2003 in the total
amount of ₱l,122,205.00. It ratiocinated that while no one witnessed
the actual taking of said items, the written admissions of Jervoso and
Cruz were admissible in evidence. These admissions, according to the
RTC, were part of res gestaebecause they were spontaneous reactions
to the confrontation, and were not mere afterthought. It added that
while Manahan did not submit any written confession, it appeared
that he shared in the proceeds of the stolen items, which was indicative
of conspiracy and connivance.
In sum, the RTC ruled that the chain of evidence led to the conclusion
that petitioners committed Qualified Theft because they had exclusive
access to the warehouse; their admission when confronted were
concrete and convincing; hence, they were guilty of theft of company
stocks.
Undaunted, petitioners appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 20, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
According to the CA, the prosecution established loss of Prestige
Brands' personal property as shown by its inventories for May 2003
and for October 2003. It ruled that petitioners had exclusive access to
the warehouse; they had the duties to safekeep the items and maintain
an inventory thereof; and when discrepancies were noted in the
inventory, petitioners failed to explain or account for such
loss/discrepancies. It also gave credence to the admission of
petitioners that they stole from Prestige Brands.
On March 27, 2013, the CA denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed this Petition for Review raising the
following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ISSUED ITS ASSAILED DECISION AND
RESOLUTION IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW BY
UPHOLDING PETITIONERS' CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF
QUALIFIED THEFT.
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' RELIANCE ON THE INVENTORIES
AND ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE 'ELEMENT OF LOSS' WAS
ESTABLISHED ARE BOTH CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT THE INVENTORIES DID
NOT PROVE ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED THEFT AND
NOT A MERE 'LOSS[.]'
B.
CONTRARY TO THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING; THE
WRITTEN CONFESSIONS PURPORTEDLY EXECUTED BY
PETITIONERS, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN EVIDENTIARY
WEIGHT SINCE THE SAME WERE INVOLUNTARILY EXECUTED
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
PETITIONERS, AND THEY WERE NOT CORROBORATED
WITH CORPUS DELICTI, AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF
COURT[.]
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF TAKING ALL THE ALLEGED
MISSING PERFUMES IN ONE INSTANCE ONLY THAT SHOULD
HAVE CREATED REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE GUILT OF THE
PETITIONERS.
D.
CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE TIIAT PETITIONERS'
POSITION INVOLVED CONFIDENCE REPOSED BY PRESTIGE
BRANDS SO AS TO QUALIFY THE CRIME OF THEFT
CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION MERELY PRESENTED
THE JOB DESCRIPTIONS, LETTERS OF APPOINTMENTS OF THE
PETITIONERS, AND A SKETCH OF THE WAREHOUSE.
E.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT UPHELD THE SUFFICIENCY OF TI-
IE PROSECUCTON'S CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
CONSIDERING THAT THE COMBINATION OF ALL THE
CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT ESTABLISH THAI A CRIME HAD
BEEN COMMITTED, NOR THAT THE PE11TIONERS WERE
GUILTY THEREOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.42
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners stress that apart from the shortage or loss of inventories,
the CA did not explain how the unlawful taking was committed in this
case. They also contend that the discrepancy in Prestige Brands'
inventory from January 2003 to April 30, 2003 did not prove that they
committed theft in October 2003. They further argue that there was
no showing that the lost items were indeed stored in the warehouse,
or were in their possession. As such, they posit that "the inventory
reports did not establish (1) the existence of the fragrances~ (2) the
possession thereof by [them] or (3) the alleged taking thereof, or (4)
that there was theft or (5) that [p]etitioners committed the same, ([6])
much less with grave abuse of trust and confidence."43 They further
claim that the written confessions they purportedly executed have no
evidentiary value because they did not voluntarily execute them, and
the same were not corroborated with corpus delicti. They insist that
they signed their confessions under duress.
In fine, petitioners posit that the circumstantial evidence against them
did not prove that a crime was committed and that they were guilty
thereof. As such, there is reasonable doubt that they committed theft
against Prestige Brands.
Respondent’s Arguments
For its part, respondent maintains that petitioners abused Prestige
Brand's confidence when they stole items for which they were hired to
safeguard and protect. It also asseverates that the notarized
confessions of petitioners must prevail over their defense of mere
denial.
Our Ruling
The Petition is with merit.
As a rule, only questions of law, not of facts, may be raised in a petition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions including such situation where the lower court had
ignored, overlooked, or misconstrued relevant facts, which if taken
into consideration will change the outcome of the case. Considering
said exception, and the fact that the liberty of petitioners is at stake
here, the Court sees it necessary to carefully review the records of this
case, and determine whether the CA properly affirmed the RTC
Decision convicting petitioners of Qualified Theft.44
Moreover, no less than our Constitution provides the presumption
that the accused is innocent until proven otherwise by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.45 Such proof requires moral certainty, or that
"degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind."46 Additionally, the prosecution has the burden to overcome the
presumption of innocence. And, in the discharge of its burden, the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence, and not on the
weakness of the defense.47
Here, petitioners with their co-accused Pardilla were charged with
Qualified Theft. Based on the foregoing precepts, they are presumed
innocent unless the prosecution established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that they are guilty as charged. In order to do so, the
prosecution must show that the following elements of Qualified Theft
are present here: (a) there must be taking of personal property, which
belongs to another; (b) such taking was done with intent to gain, and
without the owner's consent; (c) it was made with no violence or
intimidation against persons nor force upon things; and (d) it was
done under any of the circumstances under Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, which circumstances include grave abuse of confidence.48
Put in another way, in order for petitioners to be found guilty of
Qualified Theft, the prosecution must prove with moral certainty that
Prestige Brands lost its personal property by petitioners' felonious
taking49 thereof or by their acts of depriving Prestige Brands of its
control and possession without its consent.50
However, the prosecution miserably failed to discharge its burden.
First, the RTC confirmed that no one witnessed the actual taking of
items belonging to Prestige Brands. To establish unlawful taking, the
RTC merely relied on the assertion that there were discrepancies in
the inventories of Prestige Brands. Such reliance, however, is
misplaced because the inventories51 for January-April 2003, and
October 2003, contained only a list of items purportedly stored in
Prestige Brands' warehouse and nothing more. Similar to our ruling
in Manuel Huang Chua v. People,52 we can neither speculate on the
purpose of these inventories nor surmise on the stories behind them.
While the prosecution insists that the inventories evidenced the
discrepancies of the items stored in the warehouse and those that the
company lost, the inventories themselves did not indicate such fact.
Moreover, it is contrary to ordinary human experience that Prestige
Brands did not promptly investigate the supposed discrepancies in its
inventory for January-April 2003. It even waited for the subsequent
October 2003 inventory to verify the supposed shortage of items.
Indeed, prudent behavior would have prompted Prestige Brands to
immediately investigate and determine if it sustained any loss at the
earliest possible opportunity, and if it indeed sustained any loss,
whether petitioners were the perpetrators of the unlawful taking.53
Second, contrary to the finding of the RTC and the CA, petitioners and
Pardilla did not have exclusive access to the warehouse of Prestige
Brands.
Both prosecution and defense revealed that Dadlani authorized five
people - petitioners, Pardilla, and Tembulkar - to have access to its
warehouse. In fact, Tembulkar, along with Cruz, held its keys. Cruz
could not enter the warehouse if the second lock is not opened using
Tembulkar's keys. Moreover, petitioners were being frisked by the
accounting staff everytime they take out items for delivery. The
prosecution further confirmed that Cruz must turn over his keys to
Tembulkar in the evening. This only means that, aside from
petitioners, other individuals may have entered the warehouse and
may have had taken the alleged missing items. Indeed, in order to
justify the contention that petitioners took the items in the warehouse,
it is necessary to prove the impossibility that no other person has
committed the crime. However, given that petitioners were not the
only personnel who could enter the warehouse, the Court cannot
exclude the possibility that some other person may have had
committed the alleged theft against the company.54
In addition, the prosecution did not present Tembulkar as its witness.
To our view, such non-presentation weakens its case since
Tembulkar's testimony is crucial in establishing the charge against
petitioners.55 For one, and as stated above, he had access to the
warehouse, not just petitioners. For another, the Information revealed
that Tembulkar represented Prestige Brands in the filing of this case.
He was also the one who allegedly informed Dadlani of the
discrepancies in the inventories, and conducted the investigation on
the matter. Also, according to the prosecution, he was the one who
referred petitioners and Pardilla to Dadlani during the November 20,
2003 meeting. Hence, Tembulkar had personal knowledge of the
supposed loss sustained by Prestige Brands.
Third, the Court gives no credence to the supposed written confessions
made by Cruz, Jervoso and their co-accused Pardilla.
On this, the Court is not unmindful of the presumption of
voluntariness of a confession. However, the confessant may overcome
such presumption provided that he or she substantiates that one's
admission was not true and the confession was unwillingly given.
In People v. Enanoria,56 the Court held that there must be external
manifestations to prove that .the confession was not voluntary. These
external manifestations included institution of a criminal action
against the alleged intimidators for maltreatment, and evidence of
compulsion, duress or violence on the confessant. Undeniably, these
external manifestations are present here.
To note, a day after the execution of their confessions regarding the
supposed theft of Prestige Brands' personal properties, Cruz and
Jervoso promptly reported the matter to the Makati police. They even
filed a case for grave coercion, grave threats, and incriminating
innocent persons, against Prestige Brands.
Furthermore, petitioners also narrated the details on how they were
threatened and intimidated prior to and during the execution of said
confessions. In the case of Jervoso, he averred that Mayor Atienza
talked to him at Baywalk in Roxas Boulevard and asked him to
cooperate or else he (Jervoso) would be liable. On the other hand, Cruz
and Jervoso stated that NBI employees (Lontoc and Atty. Simon)
intimidated them into signing said confession. They narrated with
particularity that on November 22, 2003, they were forced to stay up
to 11:15 p.m. in their office to translate into Filipino and into their
handwriting the typewritten confession they earlier executed. In the
case of Manahan, he also affrrmed that Dadlani intimidated him into
signing a confession by mentioning to him his (Dadlani) friends in the
media, and his connections to Mayor Atienza and the NBI. Although
Manahan refused to make a written admission, he confirmed the
intimidation made by Dadlani against him.
The Court also observes that although the aforesaid confessions were
individually executed by Cruz, Jervoso and Pardilla, they were in fact
similarly worded, except as to the name of the confessant, to wit:
October 20, 2003
Prestige Brands Phil., Inc.
Attn: Mr. Vinod Dadlani
Dear Sir,
I, [Cruz/Jervoso/Pardilla], hereby confirm and admit that I have
stolen products, namely fragrances from the warehouse of Prestige
Brands Phil., Inc. in my time working with the Company. I have sold
many of the stolen products and the proceeds were shared with my
colleagues in the warehouse, ie, [Leandro Cruz, Emmanuel Manahan,
Alvin Pardilla, and Alric Jervoso ].
I make this honest confession out of my own free will and without
compulsion.
Yours truly,
Sgd.
[Cruz/Jervoso/Pardilla]57
Even the translations of these confessions into Filipino executed by
Cruz and Jervoso were also similarly worded, except as to the names
and signatures of the persons executing them, viz.:
Nov. 22, 2003
Ako si [Leandro C. Cruz/Alric B. Jervoso] ay umaarnin na may kinuha
akong produkto sa warehouse ng Prestige Brands Phils., Inc. Ibinenta
namin ang produkto at pinaghati-hatian namin nina Alvin Pardilla,
[Alvie Jervoso, Leandro C. Cruz,] at Emmanuel Manahan.58
Sgd.
[Cruz/Jervoso/Pardilla]
Notably, these confessions did not contain specific details as regards
any item unlawfully taken. Indeed, an indication of voluntariness is
the disclosure of the details in the confession which details are only
known to the declarant. For lack of necessary details in their
statements, we hold that the same did not establish any unlawful
taking of the personal properties of Prestige Brands.59
To add, Cruz and Jervoso vehemently denied that their statements
contained a jurat. The prosecution did not, however, address this
matter. This is so even if it may conveniently present the Notary Public
before whom petitioners and Pardilla purportedly appeared and
voluntarily and intelligently sworn to the truth of their statements.
Such is the case if indeed petitioners presented these statements
before a Notary Public.60
Without the supposed confessions discussed above, there is no other
evidence that would establish that petitioners committed theft against
Prestige Brands. Verily, the Court cannot simply accept the theory of
the prosecution at face value, and ignore the basic rule that criminal
conviction must rest upon the strength of the prosecution's evidence,
and not on the weakness of the defense.61 Indeed, the -
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.1âwphi1 Moreover, when the circumstances are capable of
two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and
the [C]ourt must acquit.62
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The July 20,
2012 Decision and March 27, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CAGR. CR No. 32942 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners
Leandro Cruz, Emmanuel Manahan, and Alric Jervoso are hereby
ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Their immediate release from detention is
hereby ordered, unless other lawful and valid grounds for their further
detention exist.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
On July 9, 2007, Pablo Cayanan, a used car dealer, and Ronaldo F.
Perez, a fixer, were forcibly taken by a group of armed men led by
SPO2 Rolando Pascua. Perez was later released but Cayanan has not
been seen nor heard from since then.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed in behalf of Cayanan but later
converted to amparo proceedings. Perez executed a sworn affidavit
describing the abduction but later recanted his statement. SPO2
Pascua submitted a counter-affidavit in which he denied the
allegations and claimed that he was also abducted in the same incident
by unknown men.
The RTC issued the writ of amparo, ordering the CIDG Director to
conduct further investigations and for SPO2 Pascua to appear before
the proper forum. The CIDG however appeals the RTC’s judgment,
arguing that the applicant for the writ failed to prove by substantial
evidence the involvement of CIDG in the disappearance of Cayanan
because Perez recanted his affidavit; that the CIDG is only required to
exercise ordinary diligence and that it has already discharged its duty
under the Rules when it submitted its return with certifications that
CIDG was not detaining Cayanan. Lastly, the CIDG contends that the
issuance of the writ violated Pascua’s right to presumption of
innocence.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there is substantial evidence to justify the issuance
of the writ;
2. Whether only ordinary diligence is required from the CIDG;
3. Whether the CIDG complied with the requirements of the
Rules on the submission of return.
4. Whether the issuance of the writ violated Pascua’s right to be
presumed innocent
RULING:
1. Yes, substantial evidence existed.
In amparo petitions, the Court allows for flexibility in considering the
evidence presented, including hearsay evidence which may be
admitted as the circumstances of the case may require for the
protection of the precious rights to life, liberty, and security.
The recantation has no evidentiary value for being general and bereft
of details of what really happened if the abduction did not occur. Other
witnesses also identified Pascua as the person leading the abductors.
2. No, extraordinary diligence is required from the CIDG. The State
and its agencies, not just public officials and employees, are covered
by the Rule and may be impleaded.
3. No, the CIDG did not comply with Section 9 on the required
contents of the return of the Rule.
“In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by
its operating divisions to the effect that Pablo was not being detained
by any of them. Said certifications were severely inadequate. It is
almost needless to characterize the certifications as non-compliant
with the requirement for a detailed return. As such, the certifications
amounted to a general denial on the part of the CIDG. The quoted
rule requires the verified written return of the CIDG to be
accompanied by supporting affidavits. Such affidavits, which could
be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and other agencies like the
NBI and probably the Land Transportation Office (L TO) to
collaborate in the investigation of the abduction of Pablo, would have
specified and described the efforts expended in the search for Pablo,
if such search was really conducted, and would have reported the
progress of the investigation of the definite leads given in the Perez’s
sinumpaang salaysay on the abduction itself.
The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo
among its various operating divisions similarly constituted a general
denial because the CIDG did not thereby indicate who had conducted
the search, and how thoroughly the allegedly continuous searches
had been conducted. The CIDG pointed out in its return that the CIDG
had undertaken an administrative investigation against Pascua, and
submitted in that regard the certification on the pre-charge
evaluation and investigation of Pascua. The CIDG asserts that its
investigation of the disappearance of Pablo was conducted in tandem
with that of the NBI; that it had also formed its own investigating
team to conduct a “thorough investigation” of the abduction of Pablo;
and that it had meanwhile verified the vehicle used in the abduction
from the LT0. Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return
should spell out the details of the investigations conducted by the
CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable the RTC to
judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo’s
whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The return by the CIDG
was non-compliant in that regard. To be noted at this juncture is that
the CIDG should have exerted greater effort at complying with both
the letter and spirit of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in light of
Perez’s sinumpaang salaysay having fully placed the responsibility
for the abduction and disappearance of Pablo right at the very
doorsteps of the CIDG in Camp Crame. It is disheartening for us to
see the CIDG’s investigation having been limited to Pascua despite
the circumstances justifying a broader inquiry. There was also no
affirmative showing of any investigation of the area of the abduction
itself despite Regina having presented witnesses from the area.
Indeed, the CIDG did not seem to have itself investigated Perez on the
abduction.”
4. No, presumption of innocence of the respondent is not an issue in
amparo proceedings
“The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not
akin or similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the
guilt or innocence of the respondents is not determined, and no penal
sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the
aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual
threats to life, liberty or security.”
LT. SG. MARY NANCY P. GADIAN, Petitioner
vs.
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF
LT. GEN. VICTOR IBRADO; PHILIPPINE NAVY FLAG
OFFICER IN COMMAND VICE-ADMIRAL FERDINAND
GOLEZ; COL. JOEL IBAÑEZ - CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
WESTERN MINDANAO COMMAND; LT. COL. ANTONIO
DACANAY, MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL OFFICER OF
THE WESTERN MINDANAO COMMAND; RETIRED LT.
GEN. EUGENIO CEDO, FORMER COMMANDER OF THE
WESTERN MINDANAO COMMAND, Respondents
x-----------------------x
GEN. VICTORS. IBRADO, AFP; VICE ADMIRAL
FERDINAND S. GOLEZ, PN; COL. JOEL IBAÑEZ, PA; and
LTC ANTONIO DACANAY, PA, Petitioners
vs.
NEDINA GADIAN-DIAMANTE, Respondent
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For consideration are the consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari separately brought against the decision promulgated on
June 15, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00034
entitled Nedina Gadian-Diamante v. Armed Forces of the Philippines
Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Victor lbrado, Philippine Navy Flag Officer In
Command Vice Admiral Ferdinand Golez, Col. Joel Ibanez - Chief of
Staff of the Western Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM), Lt. Col.
Antonio Dacanay - Management and Financial Officer of the
WESTMINCOM, Retired Lt. Gen. Eugenio Cedo - Former
Commander of the WESTMINCOM, 1 whereby the CA disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and directs that-
(a) petitioner has established by substantial evidence that there is
threat to life, liberty and security to the aggrieved party, Lt. SG Mary
Nancy Gadian and thus, she is entitled to the benefits of a protection
order under A.M. No. 07-9-12 SC (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo).
The Secretary of National Defense is hereby directed to extend the
protection to the aggrieved party by adopting necessary measures and
employing such personnel to ensure no impairment of the right of the
aggrieved party, Lt. SG Mary Nancy P. Gadian to life, liberty and
security;
(b) for lack of basis, petitioner's prayer that respondents be directed
to refrain from issuing or carrying out any threat to life, liberty and
security of the aggrieved party, Lt. SG Mary Nancy P. Gadian, is
denied; and
(c) respondent General Ibrado shall comply strictly with his
undertaking to provide material facts of the investigation conducted
by the Flag Officer of the Philippine Navy and the Commander of the
WESTMINCOM pursuant to his directive issued on May 26, 2009
relative to the circumstances of the threats to the life, liberty and
security of the aggrieved party, Lt. SG Mary Nancy P. Gadian, and to
bring those responsible, including military personnel, if shown to have
participated or had complicity in the commission of the acts
complained of, to the courts of justice.
Within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, a report of the
results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Court.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally on the Secretary of
National Defense.
SO ORDERED.
Antecedents
On May 19, 2009, Nedina Gadian-Diamante, the respondent in G.R.
No. 188195, alleging herself as the older sister of Lt. SG Mary Nancy
P. Gadian (Lt. SG Gadian), brought in this Court a petition for the
issuance of a writ of amparoin behalf of the latter, impleading as
respondents various officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), including then AFP Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado (Gen.
Ibrado). The petition was docketed as G.R. 187652.2On May 21, 2009,
the Court issued the writ of amparo, and directed the CA to hear and
decide the petition.3
On May 22, 2009, the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the
Philippines (AMRSP) manifested to the Court their willingness to
provide sanctuary to Lt. SG Gadian.4
The case, meanwhile docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00034, was heard in
the CA. The initial hearing took place in the CA on May 28, 2009 but
Lt. SG Gadian asked for time to submit evidence to support her
allegations. The preliminary conference and summary hearing
actually proceeded on June 5, 2009. The parties stipulated on the
testimonies of psychologist Dr. Lopez, and Roy Lirazan and Armando
Matutina, Lt. SG Gadian's companions. After the issues were defined
and agreed upon, the evidence of the parties were respectively
received.
Lt. SG Gadian's Evidence
Lt. SG Gadian was a commissioned officer of the Philippine Navy. At
the time material to this case, she served as the Officer-In-Charge of
the Civil Military Operations (CMO) Fusion Cell for the RP-US
Balikatan Exercises 2007. As such, she was responsible for the
allocation of Balikatan funds and the planning and preparation of the
Civil Military Operations component of the RP-US Balikatan Exercises
2007. Balikatan CMO Task Group (BK CMOTG) was formed for this
purpose.5
For funding, Lt. SG Gadian asked for assistance from her immediate
supervisor Lt. Col. Bajunaid Abid who reported to the General
Headquarters (GHQ) through Lt. Col. Steve Crespillo (Lt. Col.
Crespillo). They learned that the Balikatan Exercises 2007 had an
approximate budget of ₱40 to ₱46 Million. They requested ₱4 Million
to support the requirements of BK CMOTG.6
Out of the ₱4 Million approved budget, Lt. Col. Crespillo secured only
P2.7 Million, and delivered ₱2.3 million thereof to BK CMOTG on two
separate occasions, specifically on February 25, 2008 and March 3,
2008. The funds were turned over to Ms. Tessie Beldad, the fund
custodian, but Lt. Col. Crespillo retained ₱400,000.00. Later, Ms.
Beldad told Lt. SG Gadian that only ₱1.3 Million were actually turned
over to her, for which she signed an acknowledgment report, pursuant
to Lt. Col. Crespillo's instructions, despite the original plan being for
him to distribute the funds personally to the participants. Lt. SG
Gadian then accompanied Lt. Col. Crespillo to the office of Col. Joel
Ibafiez (Col. Ibafiez) where they started to talk about funding
problems, to which Lt. Col. Crespillo replied: Meron akong dalang
konti, sir. Ms. Tessie Beldad was still required by Col. Buena of the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations to submit receipts
covering the disbursement of funds.7
On February 14, 2007, the CMO held the opening ceremony where the
funds for food allowance were distributed to the participants.
In May 2007, Lt. SG Gadian was asked about the status of the funds
during the staff conference presided by Col. Ibañez. When she
reported that the funds had been distributed to the recipients who
were grateful for the support, Col. Ibafiez shouted: You are not
authorized to distribute the funds! You should tell the people at GHQ
that they should follow the proper channel! She was then required to
submit a fund utilization report, but Lt. Col. Crespillo told her not to
submit the report to Col. Ibañez because only the Exercise Directorate
could require them to submit such report.8
Thereafter, at the behest of Retired Lt. General Eugenio Cedo (Gen.
Cedo) to the Office of the Inspector General, Lt. SG Gadian was
investigated for: (a) lavish spending; (b) misuse of funds; and (c)
willful disobedience. She was placed on floating status until her
transfer to the Philippine Navy in January 2008. The Philippine Navy
Efficiency and Separation Board took jurisdiction of her case upon the
recommendation of AFP Investigation General Lt. Gen. Bocobo. In
January 2009, Gadian was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charges. She was absolved from liability by prosecution witnesses. The
case was submitted for decision in April 2009.9
Lt. SG Gadian went on official ordinary leave from April 9 to May 21,
2009. On April 13, 2009, she received a message through text and
email requiring her to report to Manila. She flew to Manila on April
14, and attended the hearing on April 15. On April 16, 2009, she filed
her resignation from the AFP effective May 1, 2009.10
Fearing for her life after her resignation, Lt. SG Gadian went into
hiding. On May 11, 2009, her sister sought the help of Archbishop
Angel Lagdameo of Jaro, Iloilo City by delivering Lt. SG Gadian's letter
appealing for help from the church, media, and all sectors of society.
On May 13, 2009, Lt. SG Gadian and her sister were interviewed by
different media outlets on the alleged misuse of RP-US Balikatan
Exercises 2007 funds.11
Since then, Lt. SG Gadian received text messages from concerned
individuals warning her that people were conducting surveillance at
their house. Two attempts were even made to 'snatch' her en route to
the hearing in Manila. All these were testified to by her family
members and people who were with her throughout her struggle.12
An apprehension order was released for Lt. SG Gadian's arrest, along
with a "48 hour ultimatum" for her surrender. Again, concerned
individuals told her that there was a verbal shoot to kill order to silence
her. She was also not unaware of other unsolved cases similar to the
case of Ensign Philip Andrew Pestafio's death after giving information
of his superior's engagement in drugs, illegal logging and gun
running.13
The AFP's Evidence
For their part, respondents General Ibrado, Vice Admiral Ferdinand
Golez, Col. Ibafiez and Lt. Col. Antonio Dacanay admitted that Lt. SG
Gadian had been assigned to WESTMINCOM as its Deputy of the
CMO. They confirmed that she had taken charge of and supervised the
activities of BK CMOTG; that a total of ₱2.7 Million was turned over to
her but she did not inform General Cedo, then the Commander of
WESTMINCOM, of the receipt and utilization of the fund. According
to them, she acted on her own in disposing the fund.14 Gen. Cedo then
constituted a committee to investigate, but she did not appear and
instead questioned its jurisdiction because the fund had come from
General Headquarters. The committee concluded that she had utilized
the fund for its intended purpose, but without the approval of Gen.
Cedo, and that she had falsely declared the actual amount of her
accommodation based on the receipt (difference of ₱2,500.00).
The Office of the Inspector General recommended that Lt. SG Gadian
return the balance of ₱2,500.00 for her hotel stay; that she be
reprimanded by her Commander according to Article 105 of the
Articles of War for violation of Article 97 of the Articles of War, or
conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline; and that
she be reassigned to the Philippine Navy.15
The AFP Chief of Staff ordered a reinvestigation, however, to look into
the matter of technical malversation and insubordination.16 Pending
resolution of her case, Lt. SG Gadian filed an application for ordinary
leave, and later on tendered her resignation from the service effective
May 1, 2009.
Lt. SG Gadian's resignation was not processed due to lack of requisite
enclosures and justifications, and because of the pending
case.1âwphi1 As a consequence, the AFP declared her absent without
leave (AWOL), leading to her being dropped from the rolls as a
deserter on May 2, 2009. The apprehension order was issued against
her pursuant to standard procedures.17
Aggrieved, Lt. SG Gadian, through her sister, filed the petition for the
writ of amparo in this Court, alleging perceived threats to her life,
liberty and security from the AFP. As earlier stated, the petition was
referred to the CA for further proceedings.
In the CA, the parties stipulated on the following issues:
(a) whether or not there is [a] threat to aggrieved party's life, liberty
and security and sufficiency of proof thereof;
(b) in the affirmative, whether or not there is [a] link between the
threat to the life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party and, any
or all, of the respondents; and
(c) whether or not the aggrieved party is entitled to the reliefs prayed
[for] in the Petition.18
Lt. SG Gadian then made public appearances with media coverage
giving statements about the conduct of RP-US Balikatan Exercises
2007. She explained that she had resorted to the writ
of amparo because of perceived threats to her life, liberty and security.
She incorporated her claims of the threats in her affidavit, wherein she
detailed the text messages she had received about "people who were
tracking, conducting casing and surveillance" of her place, and the
presence of plain-clothes men at their house looking for her and her
children. Her statements were corroborated by witnesses, including
members of her family and friends who had accompanied her.19
The respondents denied knowledge of any existing threats against Lt.
SG Gadian's life, but did not present controverting evidence. On his
part, respondent Gen. Cedo averred that he had had no participation
in the issuance of the apprehension order and the shoot-to-kill order
against her; and that he had retired from the service in September
2007 and had not been interested in her whereabouts.20
Decision of the CA
The CA promulgated its assailed decision on June 15, 2009.21
In its decision, the CA observed that receiving messages through SMS
warning of a shoot-to-kill order against a person was not alarming;
that, however, the situation became different when the person
threatened was a junior officer of the AFP who had exposed anomalies
regarding the conduct of military exercises involving the country and
the United States of America, and the expose could involve senior
officers of the AFP; that the situation was complicated when
unidentified persons had knocked at the door of the house where Lt.
SG Gadian lived without expressing the purpose of their visit, and, in
addition, when there was an attempt to abduct; that such
circumstances only proved that there had really been an actual threat
to her life, liberty and security.22
Yet, the CA noted that Lt. SG Gadian had not established the
authorship of the threats against her; that her affidavit did not
implicate any of the respondents in the making of the threats; that
although her father and sister had testified about men who had been
making inquiries of her whereabouts, they had not attributed any
overt act to the men that would suffice to deduce the clear intent to
harm her; and that her two companions at the time the attempts to
snatch her occurred did not identify any person in particular to be
responsible.23
The CA concluded that Lt. SG Gadian had presented substantial
evidence to prove the existence of a threat on her life, liberty and
security but had not established the source of the threats; that then
Secretary of National Defense Gilbert C. Teodoro (Defense Secretary
Teodoro) should be deemed the appropriate person to extend
protection to her as the aggrieved party inasmuch as he had executive
supervision over the AFP even he did not engage in actual military
directional operations;24 and that respondent AFP Chief of Staff
General Ibrado (Ret.) had also undertaken to cause the investigation
of the alleged threats on her life, and the surrounding circumstances
involved in her allegations.25
The parties then respectively appealed. On her part, respondent filed
her petition for review on certiorari on June 22, 2009 (G.R.
188163),26 while Gen. lbrado, et al. filed their own petition for review
on certiorari on June 23, 2009 (G.R. 188195).27 The appeals were
consolidated.
Issues
Lt. SG Gadian assails the CA's ruling ordering then Secretary of
National Defense Teodoro to provide protection to her, insisting that
said official was biased in favor of the military hierarchy as borne out
by the statement he had made during the Navy's anniversary
celebration,28 to wit:
We are hoping the court will be careful in reviewing the petition and
the circumstances behind it as well as granting such relief as this could
affect the chain of command and the implementation of the
disciplinary system in the military.
Lt. SG Gadian argues that although the Department of National
Defense (DND) was civilian in character, the protection could only be
extended to her through DND's military personnel.29 Hence, she asks
that the AMR.SP be instead allowed to continue providing protection
and sanctuary to her; and that the Court provides all means necessary
to AMR.SP, specifically the accreditation of it as a private institution
or person capable of keeping and securing the aggrieved party under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
On their part, the AFP and Gen. Ibrado, et al. assail the CA for not
dismissing the petition for the writ of amparodespite the CA having
found no evidence showing that they were the authors of the alleged
threat.30
The following issues are to be dealt with, namely: (a) Was the issuance
of the writ of amparo warranted by the circumstance?; and (2)
Assuming that there had really been threats against Lt. SG Gadian,
who was in the best position to protect her - the Secretary of National
Defense or the AMRSP?
Ruling of the Court
The appeals have no merit.
A writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy to provide
immediate judicial relief for the protection of a person's constitutional
right to life and liberty.31 When a person is consumed by fear for her
life and liberty that it completely limits her movement, the writ may
be issued to secure her. Note, however, that the source of this fear
must be valid and substantiated by circumstances, and not mere
paranoia. Thus, in resolving the necessity of issuing a writ
of amparo and the corresponding protection order, the courts must
look at the overall circumstance surrounding the applicant and
respondents.
Moreover, the writ of amparo is both preventive and curative. It is
preventive when it seeks to stop the impunity in committing offenses
that violates a person's right to live and be free. It is curative when it
facilitates subsequent punishment of perpetrators through an
investigation and action.32 Thus, the writ of amparo either prevents a
threat from becoming an actual violation against a person, or cures the
violation of a person's right through investigation and punishment.
The CA has correctly determined the existence of the justification to
warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo in favor of Lt. SG Gadian,
stating:
In brief, prior to the filing of the present Petition, petitioner and
aggrieved party's evidence of threat to the latter's life, liberty and
security are their receipt of short messaging service or text messages
warning them of the giving of "shoot to kill order." Taken alone, such
messages may not lead a reasonable mind to consider seriously the
existence of threat to life, liberty and security but when receipt of such
messages come at a time when claims of anomalies in the holding of
military exercises participated in by a foreign country affecting several
individuals and involving significant amount of money are being
announced publicly, the situation differs, The aggrieved party is a
junior officer in the military, with the rank of the lieutenant senior
grade. The anomalies reported refer to the conduct of military
exercises involving the Philippines and United States of America. The
officers claimed to be involved are officers far more senior than the
aggrieved party. There is a claim of the aggrieved party that she has
resigned from her commission, an act which could be viewed,
rightfully or wrongfully, as intended to evade the restrictions of
military discipline.
Evidence was likewise presented that after public announcements
were made by aggrieved party about the said anomalies, unidentified
persons came to their house in Polomolok, South Cotabato asking for
information about the aggrieved party and her family. No mention was
made that the purpose of their visit was to serve a legal process, such
as arrest warrant.
After the present petition was filed, an attempt to abduct the aggrieved
party, to be attested to [sic] by Armando Matutina and Roy Lirazan,
was committed.
The Court finds these sufficient to establish for purposes of the present
proceedings, threat to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party.
Threat or intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of
the victim at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard
and fast rule.33
While it is conceded that Lt. SG Gadian's life was in actual danger, the
possibility of danger must be acknowledged to exist. The reason, as
she claims, was her expose of the Balikatan Funds anomaly.
Consequently, she has hereby sought a preventive writ of amparo.
Yet, as the CA also pointed out, Lt. SG Gadian did not exactly know
who had threatened her, and merely points towards the general
direction of the military as the source of the threats. The uncertainty
about the identities of the individuals who had knocked at her home,
or who had conducted surveillance in her neighborhood, or who had
even attempted to snatch her during her boat trip cannot be glossed
over in order to immediately hold the leadership of the AFP in
suspicion of complicity. Indeed, to do so would convert the
proceedings into an unwarranted witch-hunt that could unfairly
implicate many in the country's military service.
Moreover, we note that the AFP declared Lt. SG Gadian a deserter
because her resignation had not been accepted due to deficiencies that
she did not rectify or fill. Under the regulations of the AFP, the
declaration could most likely be not entirely unwarranted because she
had apparently opted to quit her post and go into hiding. Her being a
commissioned officer of the AFP called for the application of the
Articles of War against her.34 The military discipline that still applied
to her then treated her as a deserter who was subject to apprehension
even during a time of peace. Her going into hiding constituted
abandonment of her post regardless of her reasons for doing so.
The choice Lt. SG Gadian made was to leave the military service in
order to expose an irregularity. The AFP could justifiably consider her
leaving as an act of cowardice and insubordination. For this reason,
Defense Secretary Teodoro's observation that her conduct would
affect the chain of command in the AFP as an organization could not
be dismissed as unfounded.
It is noteworthy that the AFP already conducted its own investigation
of the misuse of the Balikatan Fund. Despite the grant of the petition
for the writ of amparo brought at her instance, Lt. SG Gadian still
opted not to participate in that investigation. Such attitude could only
reveal the lack of sincerity of her resort to the recourse of amparo.
Nonetheless, it becomes necessary for the Court to deal with the
willingness and ability of the AMRSP to provide protection and
sanctuary to persons like Lt. SG Gadian who seek protection after
filing their petitions for the writ of amparo.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the persons or agencies who
may provide protection to the aggrieved parties and any member of
the immediate family are limited to government agencies, and
accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and
securing their safety, but in respect of the latter, they should be
accredited in accordance with guidelines still to be
issued.35 Conformably with the rule, the CA observed that the only
official with the capacity to provide protection to Lt. SG Gadian at that
time was incumbent Defense Secretary Teodoro considering that the
AMRSP, despite being her personal choice, was not yet an accredited
agency in the context of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Although the CA did not err in its observation, the Court feels that the
AMRSP, which had manifested its willingness and readiness to give
sanctuary to Lt. SG Gadian, could have been a viable provider of
protection and sanctuary to her. The viability of the AMRSP, or of any
other private or religious organization or person so disposed into
taking a petitioner like Lt. SG Gadian under its protection, should not
be dismissed or ignored only because of the lack of accreditation, but
should have been fully determined by hearing the AMRSP thereon.
The lack of accreditation should not have hindered but instead invited
the holding of the hearing. Indeed, the matter of protection and
sanctuary should be of foremost consideration by the court because
the personal and immediate concern of the petitioner whose life and
liberty were under threat was exactly her temporary protection. The
CA as the court hearing her petition for the writ of amparo, if satisfied
by the qualifications of the AMRSP, could have effectively entrusted
her temporary protection to the still-to-be accredited AMRSP given
the latter's willingness and capability to provide her the sanctuary she
needed. To repeat, the lack of accreditation required by the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, which can follow, should be a lesser concern.
In this regard, we advert to the following insights provided by Justice
Leonen during the deliberations, to wit:
Liberty and security are ultimately personal. No amount of
admonition by another can undo a person's rational, well-founded
fear. In petitions for the issuance of writs of amparo, it is well-within
an aggrieved party's right to avail of protection through private
persons and organizations. Precisely because the writ of amparo is a
liberty-promoting mechanism, the aggrieved party's preferences must
be upheld, to the extent practicable. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo
imposes no compulsion or even an order of preference between public
and private entities. As far as the Rule is concerned, the only
requirement is that the private person or entity through whom the
aggrieved party seeks to be protected is accredited by this Court.
Uncertainty as to the identity of the persons responsible for threats
against the aggrieved party's liberty and security are not grounds for
curtailing the aggrieved party's liberty to choose.
The Court of Appeals then should not have undercut Lt. SG Gadian's
resort to the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the
Philippines or to another person or institution of her choosing. Even
as the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines may
have yet to secure accreditation, it was not for the Court of Appeals to
consummately foreclose Lt. SG Gadian's choice as to who shall be
protecting her. Certainly, the Court of Appeals could have been more
deferential to Lt. SG Gadian's liberty to choose. It could have extended
to the Association a reasonable period to obtain accreditation, and
enabled Lt. SG Gadian to identify an alternative in the interim. If the
Association is ultimately found wanting, the Court of Appeals could
have still enabled Lt. SG Gadian to name her preferred substitute. It
could have taken better, more enfranchising, precautions.
We recognize that as of today the danger to the life and security of Lt.
SG Gadian had already ceased, if not entirely disappeared. Although
summoned to appear at the AFP's investigation of her expose, she
voluntarily chose not to despite the institutional assurances for her
personal safety. The AFP then declared her on AWOL status as of April
22, 2009, and dropped her from the roster as a deserter on May 2,
2009 following her unexplained failure to report to her mother
unit.36 Worth noting, too, is that the individuals to whom she had
attributed the threats to her life and liberty had since retired from
active military service. These circumstances are supervening events
that have rendered the resolution on the merits of the consolidated
appeals moot and academic, that is, to still continue with the
resolution when no practical consequence will be achieved or ensured
is pointless and of no utility. Moot and academic cases cease to present
any justiciable controversies by virtue of supervening events.37 The
courts of law will not determine moot questions,38 because it is
unnecessary for the courts to indulge in academic declarations.39
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES these consolidated appeals
for being now moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Sobrepeña, Sr., et al. Case Digest
People of the Philippines vs. Dr. David A. Sobrepeña, Sr., et
al.
G.R. No. 204063. December 5, 2016
Facts
Respondents are officers and employees of Union College of Laguna,
an educational institution in Santa Cruz, Laguna. They were charged
in several informations for allegedly committing Estafa and Large
Scale Illegal Recruitment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santa Cruz, Laguna. By reason thereof, respondents were
incarcerated. Invoking the provisions of Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and in their
belief that the evidence of their guilt is not strong, respondents filed a
Petition for Bail.
In opposition to the Petition, the prosecution presented Adelfo
Carandang who testified that:
x xx [S]ometime in June 2008, he saw an advertisement with the
phrase "Work, Earn and Live in Canada" printed on a tarpaulin placed
on the walls of Union College. Thereafter .. after consulting with his
wife, he visited the said institution and inquired about the said
advertisement. He met private-respondent Deobela Fortes who
introduced herself as the Director for Career and Placement of Union
College. The latter told him that Union College is engaged in Careers
and Enhancement Progran1 and it is offering; seminars, trainings and
workshops and that through its Canadian partner known as Jnfoskills
Learning Incorporated of British Columbia (INFOSKILLS) it is
offering high-quality certification classes endorsed by the British
Columbia Ministry of Health and Tourism, Worksafe British Columbia
and the Canadian Red Cross. INFOSKILLS is delivery partner of
British Columbia Ministry of Health and Tourism, Canadian Red
Cross, Construction Safety Network, Enforrn and it is the training
agency of Worksafe British Columbia. Also, he was informed that GDX
Visa and Immigration Incorporated of British Columbia will be
providing work and immigration assessment program for all
participants. Fortes allegedly assured him that the graduates of the
program will be hired as restaurant host, hostess, food and beverage
service banquet server and a host of other jobs in food and beverage
industry in Canada with a monthly fee of 1,500.00 Canadian Dollars;
that he can soon become an immigrant of Canada and be able to bring
his family with him after becoming such; that the program is on a first
come first served basis. Thus, enticed with this promise of a bright
future, he immediately paid the fees and enrolled himself for the first
batch. These include the $2,500 USD for visa and placement fees plus
Php15,000.00 for English Language Proficiency (ELP) fee. Carandang
also testified that the other private-respondents were also very much
active in luring him to join the program. In fact, Dr. Dabao and Dr.
David Sobrepeña told him to wait for his employment contract. But
none was forthcoming, hence the filing of Estafa and Large Scale
Illegal Recruitment cases against the herein petitioners.
Upon cross-examination, Carandang testified that he is a college
graduate, having finished Bachelor of Science in Marketing and
Commerce. He confirmed that he knew Union College to be a school
in Santa Cruz for a long time and that its officers and employees never
had cases for illegal recruitment. He further attested that in the
particular flyer that he got the actual statement was not quoted in full.
The complete statement in the flyer being that: "INVEST IN YOUR
FUTURE GET THE SKILLS YOU NEED TO WORK EARN AND LIVE
IN CANADA." xx x
With respect to the registration form that he signed, Carandang
admitted that although in his judicial affidavit he stated that the
$2,500 USD he paid was for visa processing fees or job placement fees,
however, the registration form that he actually signed does not contain
words of such import. In fact, the $2,500 USD, as stated in the
registration form was for the courses in entry level in food and
hospitality which he admitted to have actually attended under the
tutelage of two Canadian instructors who served as their professors.
Furthermore, Carandang testified on cross that while he mentioned in
his judicial affidavit that the alleged victims paid 12 Million pesos,
such conclusion is his mere estimate and he has no personal
knowledge of the actual amount.
RTC Ruling
The RTC denied the Petition to Bail finding that there is evident proof
against all the accused. This Court holds that the evidence of guilt for
all the accused is STRONG.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents was denied
in an Order dated October 18, 2010.
CA Ruling
The CA was convinced that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering
the assailed Orders. According to the CA, there is doubt as to whether
there is strong evidence against respondents for the charge of estafa
or large scale illegal recruitment; that the evidence available on record
merely showed that Union College provided the venue and the English
language training course; that the trial court failed to appreciate the
fact that the prosecution purposely took out of context the statement
appearing in the flyer i.e., "INVEST IN YOUR FUTURE GET THE
SKILLS YOU NEED TO WORK, EARN, AND LIVE IN CANADA"; that
there were no statements to the effect that Union College is acting as
a job placement agency; that there is no direct evidence to show that
Carandang was illegally enticed by respondents to enroll at Union
College; that there is no direct evidence showing that respondents
overtly represented that they have the power to send the trainees
abroad for employment; and finally, there is no evidence that
respondents are flight risk.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied per Resolution
dated October 3, 2012. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari for the reversal and setting aside of the January 31, 2012 CA
Decision and its October 3, 2012 Resolution and likewise prayed that
the impugned Orders of the RTC be reinstated.
Issue: Whether the CA committed reversible error when it nullified
and set aside the Orders of the RTC.
SC Ruling
We rule in favor of the petitioner. Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court also states that no person
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
action.
Thus from the above-cited provisions and in cases involving non-
bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong which is a matter of judicial discretion
that remains with the judge. The judge is under legal obligation to
conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it
against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. xxx xxx On such
hearing, the Court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any
nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence
for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted.
The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross-
examination."
In the present case, the CA gave due course to the Petition imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying bail to
respondents. The CA held that based on the evidence thus far
presented by the prosecution in the bail hearing, the evidence of guilt
is not strong against Union College particularly its employees and
officers with respect to the charges filed against them.
From a perspective of the CA Decision, the issue therein resolved is
not so much on the bail application but already on the merits of the
case. The matters dealt therein involved the evaluation of evidence
which is not within the jurisdiction of the CA to resolve in a Petition
for Certiorari. The findings and assessment of the trial court during
the bail hearing were only a preliminary appraisal of the strength of
the prosecution's evidence for the limited purpose of determining
whether respondents are entitled to be released on bail during the
pendency of the trial.
We would like to stress that "a writ of certiorari may be issued only for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It
does not include correction of the trial court's evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings thereon. It does not go as far as to
examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the
probative value thereof"
Also, the guilt of Pang was based on the testimony of Cinco when she
caught Pang in flagrante delicto transporting shabu.
117. Ho Wai Pang vs People of the Philippines
GR No. 176229
Del Castillo, J.
October 19, 2011
Doctrine: Rights of Suspects; Infraction of the rights of an accused
during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made
during such investigation."The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded
by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course
of custodial investigation."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. Facts:

• 13 Hongkong nationals came to the Philippines via UAE Flight
HO WAI PANG V PEO which arrived at NAIA. The group leader, Sonny Wong,
FACTS: presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner
Cinco. In the first bag, she saw few personal belongings such
When Gilda Cinco search the bag of Ho Wai Pang in the Baggage as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes which she
Declaration at the arrival area, she found boxes of chocolate which pressed. In the second bag, Cinco noticed chocolate boxes
when she saw inside had white substance. They were then brought to which were almost of the same size as those in the first bag.
the PNP after the procedures in the airport. Becoming suspicious, she took out 4 of the chocolate boxes
and opened one of them. She saw a white crystalline substance
The RTC found Pang guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. inside contained in a white transparent plastic. She called the
The CA while affirming the RTC decision took note that their right to attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and
counsel during custodial investigation was violated. Customs Appraiser Sancho, who advised her to call the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. She guided
ISSUE: Whether the violation of the petitioner's right to counsel made the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while
the evidence taken from the petitioner inadmissible. bringing with her the 4 boxes earlier discovered.
• At the ICU, Cinco checked Pang's bag and only found personal
RULING: effects, but recalled that 2 of the chocolate boes discovered
earlier at the express lane belonged to him. Cinco called the
The SC held in the negative. The SC reiterated that infractions to the other tourists and examined their bags and found a total of 18
accused during the custodial investigation render only extrajudicial chocolate boxes.
confession or admissions of the suspect inadmissible as evidence. • NARCOM Agent de Castro corroborated the testimony of
Cinco. He conducted a test on the white crystalline substance
 using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test. The substance was found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The
chocolate boxes were bundled together with tape, placed
inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.
• The 13 tourists were brought to NBI for further questioning.
The confiscated substance were turned over to the Forensic
Chemist who weighed and examined them, and found them
positive as shabu. Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found
evidence for violation of RA 6425 only against petitioner Pang
and his 5 co-accused.
• Six separate informations were filed. Petitioner Pang filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation, which was granted by the trial
court. The reinvestigation gave way to a finding of conspiracy
among the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single
Amended Information. They plead guilty, and invoked denial
as their defense. They claimed to have no knowledge about the
transportation of illegal substance taken from their traveling
bags which provided by the travel agency.
• RTC found them guilty. All the accused appealed to the SC,
but later on, all accused except for petitioner Pang withdrew
their appeal. SC granted the withdrawal. Petitioner Pang's
appeal was referred to the CA for proper disposition and
determination.
• CA denied the appeal, and affirmed the RTC decision. While
conceding that petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel
during the custodial investigation was indeed violated, it
nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence
sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked
petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his constitutional
and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him. The
CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and quoted with favor the trial court’s ratiocination
regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
Petitioner:
• He was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer
during the custodial investigation. He was not duly informed
of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel
of his choice. CA should have excluded the evidence taken
during such investigation.
• He was deprived of his right to know and understand what the
witnesses testified to. Only a full understanding of what the
witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to
comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to
refute it by cross-examination or by his own countervailing
evidence
Respondent (OSG):
• Nothing mentioned in full text on contention regarding
violation of rights during custodial investigation (part in
outline)
• Petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers
and/or witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-
examined them. It is petitioner’s call to hire an interpreter to
understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do
so, he should have manifested it before the court. Petitioner
was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses and that such examination suffices as compliance
with petitioner’s right to confront the witnesses against him.
Issue:
Whether he was duly informed of his (constitutional) right to remain
silent and to have competent counsel during custodial investigation,
in accordance with Section 12, Article 3 of the Constitution
Held:
Constitutional right was violated, but substance discovered during
inspection at NAIA still admissible as evidence.
• Section 12, Article 3:
• Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
• Petitioner Pang was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial
questioning by the custom authorities and the NBI in violation
of his constitutional right. However, the Constitution only
 prohibits as evidence confession and admissions of the
accused as against himself.
• "Infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render
inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or admission
made during custodial investigation.’ The admissibility of
other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are
not otherwise excluded by law or rules, are not affected even
if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.” -
Aquino vs Paiste
• Petitioner Pang did not make any confession or admission
during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not
present any extrajudicial confession extracted from his as
evidence of his guilt. No statement was taken from him during
his detention and subsequently used in evidence against him.
The determination of his guilt was based on the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the
confiscated shabu.
• “Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which
an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction.” - People vs.
Buluran
• Petitioner's conviction was on the strength of his having been
caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the
country and not on the basis of any confession or admission.
Cinco's testimony was found to be direct, positive and credible
by the trial court; it need not be corroborated. She witnesses
the entire incident and provided direct evidence as eyewitness
to the very act of the commission of the crime.
Other issue:
Whether he was denied of his right to cross-examine
• SC agrees with OSG.
• Petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of
the prosecution's evidence, particularly on the testimony of
Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. It has not been
shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him.
Petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine
Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The
right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a
defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the
prosecution. Petitioner's constitutional right to confront
witnesses against him was not impaired.
Conspiracy among the accused was duly established
• Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony. It need
not entail a close personal association or at least an
acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime. It
need not be shown that the parties actually came together and
agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy
of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are
parts of some complete whole.
• It can be deduced from petitioner and his co-accused's
collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a
common design, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments in bringing about the crime committed.
Guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt
• Cinco's first testimony declared that she did not see any
chocolate boxes in petitioner's bag. But she clarified in her
succeeding testimony that she recalls taking 2 chocolate boxes
from his bag when they were still at the counter. This
sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate
boxes from petitioner’s bag when they were at the ICU. This
slight clash in Cinco’s statements neither dilute her credibility
nor the veracity of her testimony.
• Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a
witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety
instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a
testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor
a conclusion on the basis of said parts. “In ascertaining the
facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on
direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered.”
• There is nothing in the records which would show a motive or
reason on the part of the witness to falsely implicate the
accused. Petitioner presented no evidence or anything to
indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was
moved by any improper motive.
 • Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so restraining order assailing the Resolution[1] dated 18 August 2003 of
overwhelming that this Court is convinced that his guilt has the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan dismissing the Motion for
been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can Re-determination of Existence of Probable Cause of Gregorio Singian,
speak so eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable Jr. in Criminal Cases No. 26297-26314 and its Order dated 24 October
fact that he was caught red-handed in the very act of 2003 denying his motion for reconsideration.
transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu into the
country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense The facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows:
consists mainly of denials.
• GREGORIO G.R. Nos. 160577-94 Atty. Orlando L. Salvador was Presidential Commission On Good
SINGIAN, JR., Government Consultant on detail with the Presidential Ad Hoc
• P e t i t i o n e r, Present: Committee on Behest Loans (Committee).[2] He was also the
• coordinator of the Technical Working Group composed of officers and
• PUNO, employees of government financing institutions to examine and study
Chairman, the reports and recommendations of the Asset Privatization Trust
• - versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, relating to loan accounts in all government financing
•
CALLEJO, SR., institutions.[3] Among the accounts acted upon by the Committee were
• the loans granted to Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI) by the Philippine
TINGA, and
• THE HONORABLE CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. National Bank (PNB).[4]
SANDIGANBAYAN
(Third Division), Promulgated: It would appear that on 18 January 1972, ISI applied for a five-year
THE PEOPLE OF confirmed irrevocable deferred letter of credit amounting to
THE December 16, 2005 US$2,500,000.00 (P16,287,500.00) to finance its purchase of a
PHILIPPINES, and complete line of machinery and equipment. The letter of credit was
THE recommended to the PNB Board of Directors by then Senior Vice
PRESIDENTIAL President, Mr. Constantino Bautista.
COMMISSION ON
GOOD On 27 January 1972, the PNB approved the loan, subject to certain
GOVERNMENT, stipulations.[5] The said letter of credit was to be secured by the
• R e s p o n d e n t s. following collaterals: a) a second mortgage on 10,367-square meter lot
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218999 with improvements,
-x machinery and equipment; b) machinery and equipment to be
imported under the subject letter of credit; and c) assignment of
US$0.50 per pair of shoes of ISIs export sales. It was further subjected
DECISION to the following pertinent conditions: a) that the letter of credit be
subject to joint and several signatures of Mr. Francisco J. Teodoro,
Mrs. Leticia T. Teodoro, Marfina T. Singian, Tomas Teodoro, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Gregorio Singian, Jr.; b) that ISI, which has a paid-up capital
amounting to P1,098,750.00 as of January 1972, shall increase its
authorized capital to P5,000,000.00, and in the event that cash
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules receipts do not come up to the projections, or as may be required by
of Court, with a prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary the bank, ISI will further increase its capitalization and the present
stockholders will subscribe to their present holdings; and c) that ISI
shall submit other collaterals in case the appraised value of the new
machinery and equipment be insufficient.
ISI was further extended the following subsequent loan
accommodations:
1. P1,500,000.00 on 10 February 1972 for the purchase of
raw materials;
2. P1,000,000.00 on 18 January 1973 as export advance;
3. P1,500,000.00 on 21 March 1973 as export advance;
4. P600,000.00 on 06 March 1974 as credit line;
5. P2,500,000.00 renewed on 15 December 1976;
6. P5,000,000.00 on 19 November 1978 as export advance;
7. P1,500,000.00 on 04 August 1980 as export advance; and
8. P7,000,000.00 on 15 December 1980 also as an export
advance.[6]
The Committee found that the loans extended to ISI bore
characteristics of behest loans specifically for not having been secured
with sufficient collaterals and obtained with undue haste.[7]
As a result, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a sworn complaint dated 20 March 1996, for violation of
Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g), of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, against the following: Panfilo Domingo, former PNB
President, Constantino Bautista, former PNB Senior Vice President,
Domingo Ingco, former member of the PNB Board of Directors, John
Does, former members of the PNB Board of Directors, Francisco
Teodoro, President of ISI, Leticia Teodoro, Vice President of ISI,
Marfina Singian, Incorporator of ISI, Tomas Teodoro, General
Manager of ISI, and Gregorio Singian, Jr., Executive Vice President of
ISI. The complaint, docketed as OMB-0-96-0967, was assigned to
Graft Investigation Officer I Atty. Edgar R. Navales (Investigator
Navales) of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
(EPIB) for investigation.
In a Resolution dated 04 October 1999, Investigator Navales
recommended the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of
prescription and insufficiency of evidence. Director Angel C.
Mayoralgo of the EPIB recommended the approval of the findings and
conclusion of Investigator Navales. The resolution partly reads:[8]
Be that as it may, the present case may still be
dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
Perusal of the record shows that except for the
allegations that the public respondents herein have
illegally entered into a contract with ISI and that the
respondents have given unwarranted benefits to ISI
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, there is nothing on record
that would concretely show that, indeed, the
respondents have acted in such a manner, and that
the transactions entered by the respondent public
officers were illegal.
Further, the allegation of the complaint that the
subject five-year confirmed irrevocable, deferred L/C
for U.S.$2.5 million extended to ISI, through the
private respondents, was only secured by a piece of
land valued at P1,646,700.00 and, therefore,
undercollater[al]ized, was inaccurate.
A careful review of the record shows that aside from
the aforesaid collateral, ISI had likewise offered as
securities the joint and several signatures of Mr. and
Mrs. Francisco J. Teodoro, private respondents
herein; machinery and equipment to be imported
under said L/C; and assignment of US$0.50 per pair
of shoes to be exported by ISI (see Memorandum,
dated January 18, 1972, pp. 59-69, Record). These
collaterals were offered by private respondents aside
from the fact that the releases and disbursements of
the proceeds of the subject L/C were subject to the
rigid control of the PNB Board of Directors. These,
therefore, belied the contention of the complainant
that the subject L/C was without sufficient security.
It is worth stressing that the public respondents
herein were not the ones who entered the subject
transactions with ISI but the members of the PNB
Board of Directors who, incidentally, have in their
favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official duties and functions, of
which the complainant herein, as borne by the record,
 had failed to overcome or disprove by clear and solid WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
evidence. recommended that the OSP Review
Memorandum[9] dated May 2, 2000 be MODIFIED as
follows:

The recommendation of Investigator Navales was 1. That accused Panfilo O. Domingo,

disapproved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. Thereafter, the Domingo G. Ingco, Constantino Bautista,
case was assigned to Special Prosecution Officer I Florita S. Linco Leticia T. Teodoro, Gregorio Singian,
(Prosecutor Linco) for review. Tomas T. Teodoro and Marfina T.
In a Memorandum dated 02 May 2000, Prosecutor Linco found that Singian be EXONERATED from any
probable cause existed to indict petitioner, among other respondents, criminal liability in the following
and recommended that they be charged with violation of Section 3(e) Criminal Cases:
and (g) of Rep. Act No. 3019. Director Wendell Barreras-Sulit and
Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo approved Prosecutor Lincos (a) Criminal Cases Nos. 26298, 26301-
recommendation, while Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos 304 and 26306-26314 against all
disapproved the same and expressed his concurrence in the resolution the accused charged therein;
of Investigator Navales. Ombudsman Desierto approved Prosecutor (b) Criminal Case No. 26297 as against
Lincos recommendation on 13 October 2000. accused Panfilo Domingo and
Hence, the corresponding eighteen (18) Informations against Domingo Ingco;
petitioner and his co-accused for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of (c) Criminal Case No. 26299 as against
Rep. Act No. 3019, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 26297 to No. accused Constantino Bautista;
26314, were filed before the Sandiganbayan and were raffled to the
Third Division thereof. The eighteen (18) Informations correspond to (d) Criminal Cases Nos. 26300 and
the nine (9) loan accommodations granted to ISI, each loan being the 26305 as against Domingo Ingco
subject of two informations alleging violations of both paragraphs of and Constantino Bautista;
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 3019.
On 26 July 2001, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Consolidated Motions for Reinvestigation and Reduction of Bail on 2. That the Informations in Criminal Cases
the ground that he was not notified of the proceedings conducted in Nos. 26297, 26299-26300 and 26305 be
OMB-0-96-0967 and that the notices due him were sent to an correspondingly amended to conform
erroneous address. with the evidence on records.[10]
On 31 August 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an order granting
petitioners motion for reinvestigation. Pursuant thereto, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor conducted the reinvestigation of Criminal
Cases No. 26297 to No. 26314 through Special Prosecution Officer III The recommendations of Prosecutor Ferrer exonerating petitioner
Joselito R. Ferrer (Prosecutor Ferrer). and his co-accused of the charges were, however, disapproved by
In a memorandum dated 26 February 2003, Prosecutor Ferrer Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo.
resolved the reinvestigation setting forth the following From the adverse finding of the Ombudsman, petitioner filed before
recommendations: the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Re-determination of Existence of
Probable Cause which was denied by the latter in a resolution dated 18
August 2003. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan in a resolution dated 24
October 2003.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner ascribes to the Sandiganbayan grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolution dated 18 August 2003, and order dated 24 October 2003 on
the following grounds:
I RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN.
PETITIONER SINGIAN CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE
FOR VIOLATING SECTIONS 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A.
3019 BECAUSE NO PROOF WAS EVER ADDUCED
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE LOANS SUBJECT OF
CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 26297 TO 26314 NOW
PENDING WITH THE RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN WERE BEHEST LOANS.
A. THE CONTENTION OF THE PROSECUTION
THAT THE SUBJECT LOANS WERE
UNDERCOLLATERALIZED IS
COMPLETELY BELIED BY THE FACT
THAT OTHER SECURITIES WERE GIVEN
BY ISI IN ADDITION TO THE LAND THAT
IT PUT UP AS COLLATERAL.
B. THE PROSECUTIONS CLAIM THAT ISI
ALLEGEDLY SUFFERED FROM A VERY
LOW CAPITAL RATIO OF 6.75% IS BOTH
GRATUITOUS AND SELF-SERVING, IN
VIEW OF ITS FAILURE TO ADDUCE THE
BANKING STANDARD OF
ACCEPTABILITY.
II
THE RULING OF THE RESPONDENT COURT
THAT PETITIONER SINGIAN IS CRIMINALLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR ISIS PURPORTED FAILURE
TO PUT UP ADDITIONAL CAPITALIZATION AND
COLLATERALS IS MANIFESTLY INCONSISTENT
WITH ITS FINDING THAT SAID PETITIONER IS
NEITHER A STOCKHOLDER NOR A DIRECTOR OF
THE COMPANY.
III
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS
PART OF ANY CONSPIRACY RELATIVE TO THE
EVALUATION AND GRANT OF THE LOANS
SUBJECT OF THE CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE
In dealing with cases of this kind, we have invariably refused to
interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman. The act of the
Ombudsman in finding probable cause to indict petitioner is an
exercise of his powers based upon constitutional mandate and the
courts should not interfere with such exercise, unless clothed with
grave abuse of discretion.[11] The rule is based not only upon respect
for the investigatory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.[12] Otherwise, the
functions of the Court will be grievously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the findings by the Ombudsman with respect to
complaints filed before him.[13]
Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[14]
In the same manner, we cannot interfere with the discretion of the
Sandiganbayan in finding probable cause against petitioner, absent
grave abuse of discretion.
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to the
Ombudsman as well as the Sandiganbayan for the following reasons.
First. As to the first ground, it is petitioners stance that the primary
basis of the prosecution for considering the subject loan transactions
as behest loans, which are the subject matters of Criminal Cases No.
26297 to No. 26314, is the fact that the incorporators of the borrower
ISI are Francisco J. Teodoro and his clan who are known cronies of the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Since his indictment is being
essentially premised on the sole allegation that his co-accused
Francisco J. Teodoro and the latters clan were known cronies of
President Marcos, which assertion was not substantiated by any
evidence by the prosecution, the charges against him should have been
dismissed.
Petitioner is being indicted for nine (9) counts each for violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The elements[15] of the
offense defined under Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 are the
following:
1) that the accused are public officers or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the
discharge of the public officers official,
administrative or judicial, functions;
3) that they cause undue injury to any party,
whether Government or a private person;
4) that such injury is caused by giving any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such party; and
5) that the public officers acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
To be indicted of the offense under Section 3(g) of Rep. Act No. 3019,
the following elements[16] must be present:
1) that the accused is a public officer;
2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and
3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
Tested against the foregoing elements, it is readily apparent that being
a crony of the late President Marcos is neither an indispensable
criterion nor an element for the indictment and conviction of the said
offenses. In fact, the eighteen (18) Informations subject of the
controversy did not allege that petitioner and his co-accused were
cronies. The nine (9) indictments[17] for violation of Section 3(e), Rep.
Act No. 3019, are similarly worded as follows:
. . . [G]ive unwarranted benefits, advantage
and preference to ISI in the amount of (amount of
loan), purportedly for (purpose of loan), releasing
and disbursing the said sum of (amount of loan) to
ISI despite the knowledge that ISI lacked sufficient
corporate capitalization to secure the interest of the
Government in case of ISIs failure to pay, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforestated amount and detriment to public
service.
The nine (9) Informations[18] for violation of Section 3(g)
which are also similarly worded read:
. . . [W]illfully, unlawfully and criminally
enter, on behalf of the government, into a transaction
with ISI which is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, by
accommodating and granting a loan of (amount of
loan) in favor of ISI as (purpose of the loan) despite
its failure to put up additional collaterals and raise its
working capital, to secure the interest of the
Government in case ISI failed to pay the said loan, as
in fact ISI failed to pay, and thereafter released and
disbursed the said sum of (amount) to ISI to the
 damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforestated amount and detriment to public service.
Second. Petitioner argues that the loan amounting to U.S.
US$2,500,000.00 is not under collateralized because, in addition to
the piece of land valued at P1,646,700.00, ISI likewise offered as
securities the joint and several signatures of petitioner and his co-
accused, machinery and equipment to be imported under the subject
letter of credit, and the assignment of US$0.50 per pair of shoes to be
exported by ISI. Citing the ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[19] petitioner concluded that
because of the failure of complaining witness, Atty. Salvador, to
provide the proper valuation for the additional properties as collateral,
the prosecution committed a fatal error in asserting that ISI did not
have sufficient capital.
The case relied upon by petitioner arose from the investigation of the
Committee where it found that the borrower therein, Apparel, applied
for an Import Letter of Credit with the PNB in the amount of
DM15,000,000.00 (P40,660,114.86) for the importation of
machinery, equipment and accessories for a garment factory. The PNB
approved the loan less than a month from the filing of the application
and without collateral except for a joint and solidary agreement of
Francisco Teodoro and Leticia Teodoro and a chattel mortgage on the
machinery. The loan remained unpaid. Hence, a complaint was filed
with the Ombudsman against those involved in the transaction. The
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, among other reasons, for lack
of evidence.
The Committee then filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman in dismissing the complaint. We upheld the finding of
the Ombudsman that there was no probable cause to charge those
involved in the loan, and that his resolution was based on substantial
evidence, thus:
The Court cannot sustain petitioners contention that
the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he dismissed the charges against respondents
herein. The Ombudsman elaborated his reasons for
finding that there was no sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that respondents
violated R.A. No. 3019.
In 1974, when the loan was granted, Apparels paid up
capital was only P3,859,000.00. Thus, petitioners
claimed that Apparel was not entitled to the loan. The
Committee, however, failed to provide the proper
valuation of all the property and therefore committed
error in finding that the loan Apparel obtained did not
sufficiently have collateral and capital.
First, the notation of PNBs acting Senior Vice
President Jose B. Samson, mentioned in a
Memorandum dated May 26, 1982, indicated that the
appraised value of the machinery and equipment did
not include those still contained in crates. Second, the
Terminal Report of the Asset Privatization Trust,
dated July 15, 1992, indicated that Apparel had
remaining unsold assets, which were under litigation,
located in Epza, Bataan.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners reliance on Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto[21] is misplaced. In the case at hand,
petitioner, in his capacity as Executive Vice President of ISI, affixed
his signature and categorically bound himself to said terms and
conditions of the Deed of Undertaking imposed by PNB, i.e., to compel
the corporation to put up additional capital and collaterals. Despite
the failure of ISI to honor the undertaking in the first loan, eight
subsequent loan accommodations were granted to it by PNB. These
circumstances distinguish the instant case from that cited by
petitioner.
Besides, petitioners averment that the loan transaction in question
had sufficient collateral is a matter of defense which should be best
ventilated in a full-blown trial.
Third. Petitioner assails the prosecutions allegation that ISI suffered
from a very low capital ratio of 6.75% as gratuitous and self-serving.
Invoking this Courts ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loan v. Desierto,[22] he claims that such
allegation is not proven considering that the prosecution failed to
establish the existence of any acceptable banking standard obtaining
at the time the subject loans were evaluated.
Again, the facts obtaining in the case cited by petitioner are different
from the instant case because unlike the former case, petitioner herein
is being made liable for his participation in the loan transactions based
on his signature affixed in the undertaking.
Fourth. Petitioner argues that he cannot be made criminally liable for
ISIs failure to put up the additional capitalization and collaterals
required by the undertaking because it is not his responsibility, but
that of the board of directors of ISI, to comply with the same. As an
Executive Vice President of ISI, he has no power to legally compel and
cause it to comply with PNBs conditions stipulated in the undertaking.
He added that implicit in the Sandiganbayans finding is that there is
no probable cause that has been established against petitioner in
Criminal Cases No. 26297 to No. 26314 since the undertaking he
signed covers specifically the deferred Letter of Credit for
US$2,500,000.00 subject of Criminal Case No. 26297.
True, the powers to increase capitalization and to offer or give
collateral to secure indebtedness are lodged with the corporations
board of directors. However, this does not mean that the officers of the
corporation other than the board of directors cannot be made
criminally liable for their criminal acts if it can be proven that they
participated therein.[23] In the instant case, there is evidence that
petitioner participated in the loan transactions when he signed the
undertaking. As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan:[24]
. . . [T]he Court finds that although it is true
that accused Gregorio Singian, Jr. is not a stockholder
or director of Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI), the evidence
on record, however, shows that aside from the fact
that he was the Executive Vice President of Integrated
Shoe, Inc. (ISI) during the time material to this case,
he also executed a Deed of Undertaking and
Conformity to Bank Conditions jointly with Francisco
J. Teodoro, President of Integrated Shoe, Inc. and
other officers of the corporation namely: Marfina T.
Singian, Leticia T. Teodoro, Tomas T. Teodoro in
connection with the application and granting by the
PNB of a five year confirmed irrevocable, deferred
loan Letter of Credit for US $2,500,000.00
(P16,287,500.00) in favor of the Integrated Shoe, Inc.
(ISI), which loan remained unpaid by ISI.
A careful reading of the resolution of the respondent court reveals that
it never mentioned that the undertaking was the only evidence that led
it to its pronouncement that there exists probable cause against
petitioner. In fact, the circumstances surrounding the granting of the
first loan for US$2,500,000.00 which is subject matter of Criminal
Case No. 26297 and the subsequent loan transactions which are the
subject matters of Criminal Cases No. 26298 to No. 26314 appear at
first blush to be connected with each other and form part of the whole
design to prejudice the government.
Fifth. It is petitioners view that the prosecution failed to adduce
evidence that he took part in any conspiracy relative to the grant of the
loan transactions. Suffice it to state that the alleged absence of any
conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature and is a matter
of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits.[25]
In sum, the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan were far from being
abusive of their discretions. On the contrary, their findings were based
on evidence extant in the records. In finding probable cause against
petitioner, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed so as to
call for the exercise of our supervisory powers over them. This Court
is not a trier of facts.[26] As long as there are substantial evidence in
support of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayans decisions, these
decisions will not be overturned.[27]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CHUA VS PEOPLE GR 196853 dated July 13, 2015
TOPIC: Newly discovered evidence

FACTS:
Chua and private complainant Philip See were long-time friends and
neighbors. On different dates from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued
several postdated PS Bank checks of varying amounts to See.
However, See claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were
dishonored either due to insufficient funds or closed account. Despite
demands, Chua failed to make good the checks. Hence, See filed a
Complaint for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 (BP 22).
The prosecution filed a Motion to Re-open Presentation of
Prosecution’s Evidence and Motion to Allow Prosecution to Submit
Additional Formal Offer of Evidence dated March 28, 2003, intending
to introduce the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as a newly
discovered evidence, stating that “despite diligent efforts to locate the
demand letter x x x, the same was not located until sometime in
February 2002, when I was having our old house/office cleaned and
ready to be rented out;”
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 qualifies
as a newly discovered evidence.
RULING:
NO. The demand letter dated November 30, 1993 deserves no weight
and credence not only because it does not qualify as a newly discovered
evidence within the purview of law but also because of its doubtful
character.
The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects:
a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a
predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is
to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We
have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be
properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is
essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first
sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge
of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering
party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such
evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether
the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the particular
circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the
phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid
prejudice to the defendant." In other words, the concept of due
diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The
movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in
gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably
and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the
defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in
light of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.
"Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered
evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted,
will probably change the judgment."
In this case, the Court holds that the demand letter dated November
30, 1993 does not qualify as a newly discovered evidence within the
purview of the law. Per See's statements in his affidavit, the said
evidence was already known to him at the time he filed his complaint
against Chua. It was also apparently available considering that it was
just kept in his house. Undeniably, had See exercised reasonable
diligence, he could have promptly located the said demand letter and
presented it during trial. However, the circumstances suggest
otherwise.
Curiously, while See claims that the demand letter dated November
30, 1993 was already existing at the time he filed the complaint, the
same was not mentioned therein. Only the demand letter dated
December 10, 1993 was referred to in the complaint, which per See's
own allegations, was also not actually received by Chua. In addition,
the prosecution failed to present the original copy of the demand letter
dated December 10, 1993 during trial. Clearly on the basis of the
demand letter dated December 10, 1993 alone, the prosecution cannot
possibly establish the existence of the second element of the offense.
Indeed, the surrounding circumstances and the doubtful character of
the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 make it susceptible to the
conclusion that its introduction was a mere afterthought - a belated
attempt to fill in a missing component necessary for the existence of
the second element of BP 22.
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MANZANILLA AND REMEDIOS
VELASCO, Petitioners,
vs.
WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, represented
by its President, ALIZA MA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the September 15,
2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60010.
Said Decision granted respondent Waterfields Industries
Corporation's (Waterfields) Petition for Review of the July 14, 2000
Decision2 of the Regional TriaJ Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 in
Civil Case No. 00-96228, which in tum affirmed the May 7, 1999
Decision3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch 4
in Civil Case No. 160443-CV granting petitioners spouses Alejandro
Manzanilla and Remedios Velasco's (spouses Manzanilla) Complaint
for Unlawful Detainer against Waterfields. Likewise questioned is the
CA April 12, 2007 Resolution4 denying the Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.
Factual Antecedents
The spouses Manzanilla are the owners of a 25,000-square meter
parcel of land in BarangaySan Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, covered
by Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-35205. On May 24, 1994, they
leased a 6,000-square meter portion of the above-mentioned property
to Waterfields, as represented by its President Aliza R. Ma (Ma).
Pertinent portions of their Contract of Lease5 provide, viz:
Section 2. TERM OF LEASE. The Lease shall be for a period of
TWENTY FIVE (25) YEARS from May 16, 1994 to May 15, 2019,
renewable upon the option of the LESSEE;
Section 3. MONTHLY RENTALAND ESCALATION. In consideration
of the lease herein constituted, LESSEE shall pay unto the LESSORS
a monthly rental in the gross amountof EIGHTEEN THOUSAND
(₱18,000.00) payable within the first TEN (10) days of each month x
x x.
Section 4. DEPOSIT. LESSORS hereby acknowledge receipt from
LESSEE a rental deposit in the amount ofTWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN
THOUSAND (₱216,000.00) PESOS, Philippine currency, to answer
for any unpaid rentals, damages, penalties and unpaid utility
charges.Such deposit or any balance thereof shall be refunded to the
LESSEE immediately upon the termination or expiration of this
contract.6
The parties executed on June 6, 1994 an Amendment to the Contract
of Lease.7 Save for the commencement of the lease which they
reckoned on the date of the execution of the amendment and the
undertaking of the spouses Manzanilla to register the agreements, the
parties agreed therein that all other terms and conditions in the
original Contract of Lease shall remainin full force and effect.
Beginning April 1997, however, Waterfields failed to pay the monthly
rental. Hence, Ma sent the spouses Manzanilla a letter8 dated July 7,
1997 which reads as follows:
Spouses Mr. & Mrs. Alejandro Manzanilla
Sto. Tomas, Batangas
I promise to pay the following rentals in arrears:
10 April 97 8,000.00
10 May 97 18,000.00
 ₱18,000.00 monthly rental for the past six months prior to the filing
10 June 97 18,000.00
of the Complaint, that is, from December 1997 to May 1998 or in the
10 July 97 18,000.00 total amount of ₱108,000.00. Demands upon Waterfields to pay the
accrued rentals and vacate the property were unheededso the spouses
check replacement 8,000.00 Manzanillaconsidered the contract terminated and/or
rescinded.12 And since Waterfields still failed to comply with their final
₱70,000.00 demand to pay and vacate,13 the spouses filed the Complaint and
prayed therein that the former be ordered to (1) vacate the subject
property and, (2) pay the accrued rentals of ₱108,000.00 as of May
by way of check payment dated July 15, 1997. 1998, the succeeding rentals of ₱18,000.00 a month until the property
is vacated, the interest due thereon, attorney’s fees, and cost of suit.
In addition to the aforementioned, I will give a check for the amount
of ₱18,000, representing advance rental for the month ofAugust 1997. In its Answer,14 Waterfields admitted paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
Complaint and alleged that: (1) when the lease agreement was
From hereon, notwithstanding the terms of the lease contract, I shall executed, the property subject thereof was just bare land; (2) it spent
substantial amounts of money in developing the land, i.e., building of
pay rentals (eve) on or before the 10th day of each month, (30-day)
representing advance rental. water dikes, putting up of a drainage system, land filling and levelling;
(3) it built thereon a processing plant for fruit juices, preserved
vegetables and other frozen goods for which it spent around
The deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively ₱7,000,000.00; and (4) it caused the installation in the said premises
for the payment of unpaid utilities,if any, and other incidental of an electrical system for ₱80,000.00 and water system for
expenses only and applied at the termination of the lease.
₱150,000.00. Waterfields further alleged that although the first two
years of its operation were fruitful, it later suffered from business
The lease contract dated 5/24/94 shall be amended according to the reverses due to the economic crisis that hit Asia. Be that as it may,
above provision. Waterfields claimed that it did not fail or refuse to pay the monthly
rentals but was just utilizing the rental deposit in the amount of
(Signed) ₱216,000.00 (equivalent to one year rentals) as rental payment in
ALIZA MA accordance with Section 4 of the original Contract of Lease. Hence,it
President argued that the spouses Manzanilla have no cause of action against it.
Waterfields Industries Corporation Waterfields also asserted that the precipitate filing of the Complaint
7/9/97 against it is tainted with bad faith and intended to cause it grave
Quezon City9 injustice considering that it already spent an enormous amount of
almost ₱10,000,000.00 in developing the property. By way of
On July 30, 1998, the spouses Manzanilla filed before the MTC a compulsory counterclaims, Waterfields sought that the spouses
Complaint10 for Ejectment against Waterfields. They alleged in Manzanilla be ordered to pay it moral damages and attorney’s fees.
paragraph 4 thereof that they entered into a Contract of Lease with
Waterfields on May 24, 1994, and in paragraph 5, that the same was Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
amended on June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997.11 However, Waterfields
had committedviolations of the lease agreement by not paying the
rentals on time. And in yet another violation, it failed to pay the
In its Decision15 of May 7, 1999, the MTC found Ma’s letter of July 9,
1997 to have amended the Contract of Lease. In particular, Section 4
of the Contract of Lease which provides that the rental deposit shall
answer for any unpaid rentals, damages, penalties and unpaid utility
charges was superseded by the portion in Ma’s July 9, 1997 letter
which states that "the deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be
used exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and other
incidental expenses only and applied at the termination of the
lease".Hence, the MTC found no merit in Waterfield’s claim that it did
not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals as it was applying the
rental deposit to its payment of the same. Consequently, the MTC
declared that Waterfields violated the lease agreement due to non-
payment of rentals and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of [the spouses Manzanilla] and against [Waterfields], ordering
the latter to –
1. vacate subject premises and surrender same peacefully to
[the spouses Manzanilla;
2. to pay [the spouses Manzanilla] the sum of ₱108,000.00
representing rental arrears from December, 1997 to May,
1998, and the sum of ₱18,000.00 a month thereafter, until it
has actually vacated and surrendered subject premises;
Toward this end, whatever rentaldeposit [Waterfields] may
have, shall be taken into account to answer for the latter’s
arrearages.
3. to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."16
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Before the RTC, Waterfields questioned the MTC’s ruling that Ma’s
letter of July 9, 1997 effectively amended the Contract of Lease. It
argued that the said letter is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds
since the same was merely in the handwriting of Ma, unsubscribed by
both parties, and unacknowledged before a notary public. Hence, the
rental deposit should havebeen applied as payment for monthly
rentals pursuant to the original Contract of Lease.
The RTC, however, was unimpressed. It noted in its Decision17 dated
July 14, 2000 that in its Answer, Waterfields admitted paragraph 5 of
the Complaint which states that the Contract of Lease was amended
on June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997. Further, the very existence of Ma’s
July 9, 1997 letter negated the applicability of the Statute of Frauds.
The RTC thus disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA, however, had a different take. In its Decision19 dated
September 15, 2006, it gave weight tothe spouses
Manzanilla’sallegation that they terminated the Contract of Lease.
Upon such termination, it held that the rental deposit should have
been applied as payment for unpaid utilities and other incidental
expenses, if any, in view of the following portion of the July 9, 1997
letter:
The deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively
for the payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and other incidental
expenses only and applied at the termination of the lease.20
And since the spouses Manzanilla did not allege that there were
unpaid utilities or incidental expenses for the account of Waterfields
as of the termination of the contract, the whole amount of
₱216,000.00 should have been returned by the former to the latter
when the contract was terminated. Not having done so, the spouses
Manzanilla therefore,became debtors of Waterfields insofar as the
said amount is concerned. And since Waterfields is also a debtor of the
spouses Manzanilla with respect to the unpaid rentals, compensation
should take place. It ratiocinated:
Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right,
are creditors and debtors of each other (Art. 1278, Civil Code). Asof
the filing of the action, [Waterfields] was indebted to [the spouses
Manzanilla] in the amount of ₱144,000.00 as unpaid rentals covering
the period December 1997 to July 1998, while [the
SpousesManzanilla] owed [Waterfields] the sum of ₱216,000.00
representing its rental deposit. Offsetting the ₱144,000.00 unpaid
rentals against the ₱216,000.00 rental deposit, [Waterfields] emerges
as the creditor to the tune of ₱72,000.00. In other words, as of the
filing of the action, respondents were even overpaid in the sum of
₱72,000.00.21
The CA thereafter concluded that the spouses Manzanilla haveno
cause of action against Waterfields, viz:
Consequently, [the spouses Manzanilla] had no cause of action against
[Waterfields] for alleged violation of the Contract, particularly non-
payment of rentals.22
Hence, the falloof the CA’s September 15, 2006 Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated May 7,
1999 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch 4), as affirmed
by the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 42), is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and judgment is rendered DISMISSING [the spouses
Manzanilla’s] action for unlawful detainer against [Waterfields]. Costs
against [the spouses Manzanilla].
SO ORDERED.23
The spouses Manzanilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration,24 which
was denied by the CA in a Resolution25 dated April 12, 2007.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issues
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITHLAWS AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1278 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE WAS [SIC] APPLICABLE AND THAT COMPENSATION
HAD TAKEN PLACE.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITHLAWS AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT
DISMISSED HEREIN PETITIONER[S’] ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER.26 The Parties’ Arguments
The spouses Manzanilla contend that there can be no issue as to the
due execution, effectivity and enforceability of Ma’s July 9, 1997 letter
since aside from the fact that Waterfieldsitself admitted in its Answer
that the Contract of Lease was amended on July9, 1997, the MTC and
the RTC had uniformly ruled that the said letter operates as an
amendment to the original contract. And as the rental deposit cannot
be applied as payment for the monthly rentals pursuant to the
amendment, Waterfields is considered in default in its payment
thereof. Conversely, Waterfields has committed a violation of the
Contract of Lease which gave rise to a cause of action for ejectment
against it.
The spouses Manzanilla likewise question the CA’sapplication of the
principle of compensation. To them, compensation cannot take place
in this case because (1) the parties are not principal creditors of each
other; (2) the ₱216,000.00 rental deposit cannot be considered as
debt; and (3) the said amount has not yet been liquidated.
Waterfields, for its part, continues to stress that Ma’s letter of July 9,
1997 was merely in the latter’s handwriting,unsigned by both parties,
and unsubscribed before a notary public. Being so, it could not have
the effect of amending Section 4 of the original contract. This therefore
negates the spouses Manzanilla’s claim that Waterfields was in default
in its payment of the monthly rentals since the rental deposit could
very well be utilizedfor the same per the said Section 4. Besides,
sustaining the rulings of the MTC and RTC will result in unjust
enrichment considering that Waterfields will be constrained to hand
over to the spouses Manzanilla the subject property for which it had
spent almost ₱10,000,000.00 in improvements. Waterfields surmises
that the CA must have seen this inequitable situation such that
itreversed the rulings of the trial courts. Further, it concurs with the
CA when itapplied the principle of compensation.
Our Ruling
There is merit in the Petition.
The CA has confused itself in resolving the basic issue involved in this
case.
It is quite unfortunate that the CAhas apparently confused itself in
resolving the basic issue involved in this case.
As may be recalled, the spouses Manzanilla, on account of Waterfields’
alleged violation of the contract of lease by non-payment of rentals,
considered the contract terminated and demanded for the latter to pay
its obligation and vacate the property. As demand proved futile, the
said spouses filed the Complaint for ejectment [unlawful detainer].
In Fideldia v. Sps. Mulato,27 the Court held that:
For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, two requisites
must concur: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the
conditions of the lease, and (2) there must be demand both to pay or
to comply and vacate. The first requisite refers tothe existence of the
cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the
jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action
may be pursued. Implied in the first requisite, which is needed to
establish the cause ofaction of the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer
suit, is the presentation of the contract of lease entered into by the
plaintiff and the defendant, the same being needed to establish the
lease conditions alleged to have been violated. Thus, in Bachrach
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the evidence
needed to establish the cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is
(1) a lease contract and(2) the violation of that lease by the
defendant.28
Here, there is no issue with respect to demand. What is in question is
the presence of a cause of action. As mentioned above, courts, in order
to ascertain whether there is cause of action for unlawful detainer,
must inquire into (a) the existence of the lease contract and, (b) the
violation of that lease by the lessee. Since in this case the existence of
a lease contract between the parties is undisputed, the focus is on the
supposed violation of the lease, that is, Waterfields’ alleged non-
payment of rent. The basic question that thus presents itself for
determination is: Did Waterfields fail to pay rent?The answer to this
is crucial as from the same will depend the existence ofthe cause of
action.However, since Waterfields denies that it failed to pay rent and
puts up the claim that it was utilizing the rental deposit as rental
payment, a preliminary question emerges, viz: May the rental deposit
be utilized as rental payment?
Accordingly, the MTC in resolving the case first determined if the July
9, 1997 letter operates as an amendment to the original contract.
Finding in the affirmative, it declared that the rental deposit cannot be
utilized as payment for the rentals in view of the saidamendment. As
things thusstood, the rental for the months of December 1997 to May
1998, as statedin the Complaint, remained unpaid. Clearly, there was
failure on the part of Waterfields to pay rent and, consequently, it
committed a violation of the lease. It is this violation which gave rise
to a cause of action for unlawful detainer against Waterfields as well
as to the right of the spouses Manzanilla to consider the contract
terminated. And as the two requisites of an unlawful detainer suit are
obtaining in this case, i.e.,cause of action and demand, the MTC
ultimatelysustained the spouses Manzanilla’s Complaint. Finding this
in order, the RTC affirmed in totothe MTC’s Decision.
Surprisingly, the CA in resolving the Petition for Review before it,
veered from the incisive approach by which the trial courts
determinedif there exists a cause of action. Itgave credit to the spouses
Manzanilla’s allegation in the Complaint that they terminated the
contract of lease, viz: Prior to the institution of the action, [the spouses
Manzanilla] terminated the Contract. Thus, par. 8 ofthe complaint
states that ‘(i)n view of [Waterfield’s] aforesaid violations, the lease
contract of the parties was terminated and/or rescinded’ per [the
spouses Manzanilla’s] ‘final letter terminating (the) subject lease
contract.’29
Without first finding for itself whether there is a violation of the
contract through non-payment of rent as to justify the alleged
termination, the CA impliedly considered the contract validly
terminated and based on this premise applied the following portion of
Ma’s July 9, 1997 letter:
The deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively
for the payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and other incidental
expenses only and applied at the terminationof the lease. Accordingly,
the CA ruled that the spouses Manzanilla should have returned the
whole amount of the rental deposit to Waterfields upon the
termination of the contract there being no allegation of unpaid utilities
and expenses in the Complaint. Not having done so, it considered the
spouses Manzanilla as debtors of Waterfields with respect to the rental
deposit, and Waterfields, in turn, as debtor of the spouses Manzanilla
anent the unpaid rentals for the months of December 1997 to July
1998.30 Applying the principle of compensation, it then declared that
the spouses Manzanilla haveno cause of action against Waterfields
since the rental deposit was sufficient to cover the unpaid rentals for
the said months.
The Court, however, finds the CA disquisition flawed.
First, the CA should not have immediately assumed as true the
spouses Manzanilla’s allegation that the contract was already
terminated. Aside from the fact that this termination was specifically
denied by Waterfields in its Answer,31 it is settled that a
mereassumption cannot be made the basis of a decision in a case or in
granting relief. A judgment must always be based on the court’s factual
findings.32
Second, it must be stressed that in this case, the violation of the lease
through non-payment of rent is whatconstitutes the cause of
action.33 Hence, once the failure to pay rent is established, a cause of
action for unlawful detainer arises. The CA should have therefore
limited itself to the determination of whether Waterfields failed to pay
rents for the months of December 1997 to May 1998 as complained of
by the spouses Manzanilla. Upon coming up with ananswer to this, the
CA should have stopped there since at that point, it can already
conclude whether there exists a cause of action for unlawful detainer,
which as mentioned is the only contentious issue involved in this case.
The problem, however, is that the CA acted on its mistaken notion as
to when a cause of action arises. It did not base its determination of
the existence of the cause of action from the fact thatWaterfields
failedto pay rents from December 1997 to May 1998. Toit, the cause of
action in this case only arose after the contract was terminated and the
rental deposit was found sufficient to cover the unpaid rentals. This is
erroneous since as already discussed, it is the failure to pay rent which
gives rise to the cause of action. Prescinding from this, the CA’s
acknowledgement that Waterfieldsfailed to pay rent, as shown by its
declaration that the latter is the debtor of the spouses Manzanilla with
respect to the unpaid rentals, is clearly inconsistent with the
conclusion that no cause of action for ejectment existsagainst
Waterfields.
Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of the contract due
to nonpayment of rent.1âwphi1 It therefore follows thatthe cause of
action for unlawful detainer in this case must necessarily arise
beforethe termination of the contract and not the other way around as
what the CA supposed. Indeed, in going beyond the termination of the
contract, the CA went a bit too far in its resolution of this case.
In view of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the parties’
arguments respecting the principle of compensation, the same having
been anchored by the CA on its mistaken premise as discussed above.
Be that as it may, this Court, in line with its bounden-duty, shall in the
following discussion put things in their proper light.
Waterfields cannot now contradict its judicial admission that the
Contract of Lease was amended on July 9, 1997; the doctrine of
estoppel likewise bars it from falsifying Ma’s July 9,1997 letter in this
litigation.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no suchadmission
was made. "A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings,
(b) during trial, either by verbal or written manifestations
orstipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding."34
Here, paragraph 5 of the Complaint alleges:
5. That, subsequently, the said Contract of Lease was amended on 06
June 1994 and on 09 July 1997x x x.35
Whereas, paragraph 2 of Waterfields’ Answer reads:
2. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Complaint are admitted.36
Clearly, Waterfields admitted in its Answer the truth of the material
allegation that the Contract of Lease was amended on July 9, 1997. "It
is wellsettled that judicialadmissions cannot be contradicted by the
admitter who is the party [itself] and binds the person who makes the
same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable
mistake (as in this case), no amount of rationalization can offset it."37
Moreover, "[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannotbe denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. A
party may not go back on his own acts and representationsto the
prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of
evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing [to be] true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission,be
permitted to falsify it."38
In view of these, any effort on the part of Waterfields to impugn the
July 9, 1997 letter is futile.
Even without the above-mentioned admission of Waterfields, the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties reveal their
intention to amend the original Contract of Lease.
Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that "to judge the intention of
the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequentacts
shall be principally considered." "[I]n doing so, the courts may
consider the relations existing between the parties and the purpose of
the contract."39
As aptly opined by the MTC, the intention of Waterfields in coming up
with the July 9, 1997 letter isto repress its violation of the contract
since at that time it was already in default in the payment of rent since
April 1997. Hence, aside from promising to pay its rental arrears from
April 1997to July 1997, Waterfields, in order to assuage the spouses
Manzanilla, likewise pledged to pay rent in advance starting August
1997. More significantly, it undertook to amend the original contract
by stating that the rental deposit shall be used exclusively for payment
of unpaid utilities and incidental expenses. Clearly, Waterfields
intended to give the spouses Manzanilla extra advantage by virtue of
the said letteramendment. This is considering that during those times,
the said spouses may at any time opt to enforce their right to eject
Waterfields from the premises since Waterfields was then admittedly
in default. Obviously, Waterfields got what it wanted as it was not
ejected from the premises and instead, its payment in arrears was
accepted by the spouses Manzanilla. On the other hand, the spouses
Manzanilla, by so doing, agreed to the amendment as contained in the
July 9, 1997 letter and was supposed to enjoy the advantage of
receiving advanced rental payment and of applying the rental deposit
only against the unpaid utilities and incidental expenses. Plainly, both
parties expected to benefit from the July 9, 1997 letter such that their
intention to give effect to the same, including the part that amends the
original contract which is the one in issue in this case, is evident.
Waterfields’ claim of unjust enrichment is unworthy of credence.
Waterfields avers that sustaining the trial courts’ ruling would amount
to unjust enrichment since it would be constrained to hand over to the
spouses Manzanilla, even before the expiration of the lease, the subject
premises for which it had already spent substantial amounts in terms DOES and PETER DOES,
of improvements. Petitioners, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
CORONA,*
"The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that BRION,
a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification,and (2) that - versus - DEL CASTILLO, and
such benefit is derived at the expense of another."40 It does not, PEREZ, JJ.
however, apply in this case since any benefit that the spouses
Manzanilla may obtain from the subject premises cannot be said to be PEOPLE OF Promulgated:
without any valid basis or justification. It is well to remind Waterfields THE PHILIPPINES,
that they violated the contract of lease and that they failed to vacate Respondent. February 1, 2010
the premises upon demand. Hence, the spouses Manzanilla are x--------------------------------------------------------
justified in recovering the physical possession thereof and -----------x
consequently, in making use of the property. Besides, in violating the
lease by failing to pay the rent, Waterfields took the risk of losing the
improvements it introduced thereon in favor of the spouses DECISION
Manzanilla. This is because despite the fact that the lease contract
provides that in case of termination of the lease agreement all
permanent improvements and structures found in the subject DEL CASTILLO, J.:
premises shall belong to the lessors,41 it still violated the lease.
A person is killed, either by reason or on occasion of the robbery. To
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove
All told, the Court sustains the RTC in affirming the MTC's grant of
the following elements: (1) taking of personal property belonging to another;
the spouses Manzanilla's Complaint for ejectment against Waterfields.
(2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires
September 15, 2006 and Resolution dated April 12, 2007 of the Court certitude that the robbery is the malefactors main purpose and objective, and
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60010 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
The Decision dated July 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during, or after the
Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 00-96228, which affinned the robbery.[1]
Decision dated May 7, 1999 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 160443-CV granting the Complaint, is In the instant case, the prosecution satisfactorily proved that the
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. crime committed by the petitioners was robbery with homicide.

SO ORDERED. Factual Antecedents

It was early evening of April 30, 2001, when army officer, Sgt. Julio D.
ARMANDO VIDAR @ Ricky, G.R. No. 177361 Dioneda (Dioneda), was brutally murdered and valuables taken from his
NORBERTO house located at Sitio Burabod, Barangay Poblacion, Bacon
BUTALON,() SONNY District, Sorsogon City.
MARBELLA @ Spike and Present:
JOHN
Consequently, a criminal charge for Robbery with Homicide against herein
petitioners Armando Vidar @ Ricky (Vidar), Norberto Butalon (Butalon),
Sonny Marbella @ Spike (Marbella), and several Does was filed under an
Information[2] which reads:
The undersigned accuses ARMANDO VIDAR @ Ricky of
Sto. Domingo, Pto. Diaz, Sorsogon, NORBERTO
BUTALON, of Maslog, Legaspi City, and SONNY
MARBELLA @ Spike of Lungib, Pilar, Sorsogon and
several other JOHN DOES and PETER DOES, of the crime
of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, defined and penalized
under Article 294 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of April 2001, at about 7:00
oclock in the evening at Sitio Burabod, Barangay
Poblacion, Bacon District, Sorsogon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another, armed with firearms, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with
intent to gain, enter the dwelling of one Sgt. Julio D.
Dioneda and once inside, took therefrom at gunpoint a Cal.
45 pistol, a wallet containing P1,000.00 cash, a crash
helmet and a motorcycle all belonging to the said Sgt. Julio
D. Dioneda; that on the occasion of the said robbery and
for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry
away the items above mentioned with ease, herein
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery
and taking advantage of their superior number and
strength and with intent to kill, attack, assault and
repeatedly shot the said Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda, inflicting
upon him multiple gunshot wounds that caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his
legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Sorsogon City, Sorsogon, July 8, 2002.
Petitioners, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
of Robbery with Homicide as charged in the Information. After pre-trial was
terminated, trial on the merits followed.
The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the prosecution witnesses
Florecita Dioneda (Florecita) and Nia Dioneda Elemanco (Nia) that led to the
conviction of the petitioners are as follows:
At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of April 30, 2001, Florecita, wife of the
victim, and her sister-in-law Nia, were inside the formers house at Burabod,
Poblacion, Bacon District, Sorsogon City. They were watching television
when three armed men suddenly barged inside. One of them, later identified
as Marbella, poked a gun at Florecita while the other two ransacked the house
taking a wallet, crash helmet and a .45 caliber firearm with its
magazine. These items belong to Dioneda who was then taking a bath outside
the house. Florecita and Nia followed the three men when the latter went
out. At the yard, they saw the three men together with more or less 10 other
persons surrounding Dioneda who was lying facing the ground. Despite
Florecitas pleas not to kill her husband, Marbella and Vidar still fired a volley
of shots causing Dionedas instantaneous death. The three then boarded
Dionedas motorcylcle and fled the area.
Nia corroborated the material details of the robbery and the killing and
testified further that she could not forget the faces of the three malefactors as
she was very sure that they were the ones who barged inside the house and
later killed her brother.
Petitioners vehemently denied the accusations against
them. Marbella averred that he does not know Dioneda and that he was in
his house in Lungib, Pilar, Sorsogon on April 30, 2001 while Vidar asserted
that he has no knowledge of the killing of Dioneda. Butalon, on the other
hand, professed his innocence, claiming that he also does not know Dioneda
and that he was in his house at Omoroy, Legaspi City on April 30,
2001. Collectively, they alleged that the possible motive behind the charge
against them is that they were known members of the New Peoples Army
(NPA).
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, relying on the credible and
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, rejected the defense
interposed by the petitioners and accordingly rendered a
Decision[3] on September 2, 2004 finding all of them guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE-, premises considered, the Court
finds accused Armando Vidar @ Ricky, Norberto Butalon,
and Sonny Marbella @ Spike guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with
the aggravating circumstance of treachery, and applying
the provision of Art. 63, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 294 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the
Court hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and
severally, the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and the further sum of P5,500.00 as
actual damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
the amount of P3,336,768.00 as unearned income and the
amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit
the records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court
for automatic review, and to prepare the Mittimus
immediately.
The Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP) Sorsogon City and/or Legaspi City is
hereby ordered to deliver the accused to the National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, with proper escort and
security immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioners raised the following errors:
I exemplary damages, P5,500.00 as actual damages
The Honorable Court a quo erred in finding the
accused-appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide despite the insufficiency of evidence for the
prosecution to support the same.
II
The Honorable Court a quo erred in not finding
that robbery and homicide were committed in furtherance
of rebellion as admitted both by the prosecution and the
defense witnesses that the victim was killed by reason of his
being a member of the Philippine Army and in the
performance of his duty and the assailants are members of
the New Peoples Army (NPA) of which the accused-
appellants are also members even up to the time of their
arrest.
On December 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered its
Decision[4] finding the appeal to be unmeritorious. The appellate court gave
credence to the eyewitnesses account of the victims death and the identity of
herein petitioners.
Accordingly, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the
penalty imposed from Death to reclusion perpetua. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52,
dated September 2, 2004 convicting the accused-
appellants ARMANDO VIDAR alias RICKY, NORBERTO
BUTALON, SONNY MARBELLA alias SPIKE of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide is AFFIRMED. Considering,
however, the repeal of R.A 7659 with the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, in lieu of the trial courts
imposition of the death penalty, each of the accused-
appellants is hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua. They are further directed to indemnify the heirs
of the victim the amount of P50, 000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
and P2,224,512.00 for the victims loss of earning capacity.

SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, this petition.
On August 8, 2007, we issued a Resolution[6] treating the instant petition as
petitioners Supplemental Brief and notified the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) that it may file a supplemental brief within 30 days from notice
thereof, if it so desires. The OSG filed a Manifestation[7] (in lieu of
Supplemental Brief) that it had already exhaustively argued all the issues
relevant to the case in its Appellees Brief[8] dated October 17, 2005.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of
the trial court despite the absence of proof adduced before the court below
establishing beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of
robbery with homicide. They maintain that the delay of almost a year in filing
formal charges against them cast serious doubt on the intention and motive
of the complainant. They aver that while the incident took place on April 30,
2001, formal charges against them were filed only in February 2002.
Respondents Arguments
In refuting petitioners contention, the OSG representing the respondent,
reiterated the ruling of the court a quo and sought the affirmation of the
assailed decision.
Our Ruling
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit. The delay did not greatly weaken
the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In the light of
the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we believe that the delay in
reporting to the police authorities the attendant facts of the crime for which
the petitioners have been charged is consistent with normal human behavior
considering that after a tragic incident, the last thing that the bereaved would
want is to provoke further reprisals from the perpetrators of the felonious
act. Although there is a natural tendency to seek the ends of justice for the
treacherous killing of a dearly departed, personal safety takes priority as
dictated by our culture. Moreover, considering private complainants honest
belief that petitioners are known to be members of the NPA, the fear of
reprisal from them was ever present which caused her momentary
silence. After all, delay in reporting the occurrence of a crime or other unusual
event in rural areas is well known.[9] Others reveal the perpetrator of the
crime only after the lapse of one year or so to make sure that the possibility of
a threat to his life or to his loved ones is already diminished if not totally
avoided. In People v. Gornes[10] we held that:
It is true that the charge against the appellant was initiated
only three and a half years after the commission of the
crime. However, the fact of delay alone does not work
against the witness.
Thus, the fact of delay attributed to the prosecution witnesses cannot be taken
against them.[11] What is important is that their testimonies regarding the
incident bear the earmarks of truth and dependability.
One thing which bolsters the prosecution witnesses credibility is the fact that
they had no motive to prevaricate against the petitioners. They were not
actuated by improper motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious
offense against them. Where there is no evidence, as in this case, to indicate
that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that they were not so actuated and that their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.[12] For personal motive on the part of a witness
to testify against the accused to be appreciated as showing bias, its presence
should be supported by satisfactory proof.[13] Aside from their bare allegation,
petitioners miserably failed in this regard. On the contrary, we are not
prepared to disbelieve the prosecution witnesses testimonies on their vital
points substantiating the circumstances of time and place of the offense
charged against petitioners.
Petitioners likewise contend that their identification by the prosecution
witnesses was attended with irregularity considering that they were identified
merely from among the four photographs presented at Camp Escudero. They
posit that this manner of identification provides an incredible suggestive
procedure.
We beg to disagree.
In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or
derivative, the Court has adopted the totality of circumstances test wherein
the following factors are taken into consideration: 1) the witnesss opportunity
to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 2) the witnesss degree of
attention at that time; 3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; 5) the length of time between the crime and the identification;
and 6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.[14]
We have scrutinized with great caution the witnesses manner of identifying
petitioners vis-a-vis the foregoing factors and we discern nothing irregular
that would result in an erroneous identification.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses had an
unobstructed view of the petitioners appearance who were not donning
masks to hide their faces when the latter barged inside the house. There is no
indication that darkness prevailed inside the house so as to have an obscure
view at the time. They even testified that one of the petitioners even poked a
gun at them while the others were ransacking the house. Thus even for a
while, there was a frontal confrontation between petitioners and the
witnesses, giving the latter an opportunity to take a good look at
petitioners. Nothing in the records allows the presence of any distraction that
would have disrupted the witnesses attention during the occurrence of the
incident. Nia even described to the policemen the physical appearance of
petitioners though no cartographic sketch was presented.[15] Experience
dictates, precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right
before witnesses eyes, that they remember with a high degree of reliability the
identity of criminals.[16]Though a considerable length of time had elapsed, the
witnesses never wavered in their identification of petitioners. They cannot
forget their faces.
It is worth mentioning also that the identification of petitioners was
effectively admitted when petitioners failed to dispute the same before the
lower courts. The in-court identification of the petitioners later on dispels any
doubt as to the correctness of their identities.As we held in People v.
Rivera:[17]
Even assuming arguendo that the appellant Alfonso
Riveras out-of-court identification was tainted with
irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured
any flaw that may have attended it. Without hesitation, the
two prosecution witnesses, Renato Losaria and Juanito
Baylon identified the appellant as one of the
assailants. In People v. Timon, the accused were identified
through a show-up. The accused assailed the process of
identification because no other suspect was presented in a
police line-up. We ruled that a police line-up is not essential
in identification and upheld the identification of the
accused through a show-up. We also held that even
assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification
was defective, the defect was cured by the subsequent
positive identification in court for the inadmissibility of a
police line-up identification x x x should not necessarily
foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court
identification.
Moreover, the burden is on petitioners to prove that their mug shot
identification was unduly suggestive. There is no evidence that the authorities
had supplied or even suggested to the witnesses that petitioners were the
suspected gunmen. We, therefore, fail to see any flaw that would invalidate
the eyewitnesses identification. As aptly observed by the CA:
Both Florecita Dioneda and Nia Elemanco gave a credible
eyewitness account of the victims x x x death [by gunshots]
in the hands of accused-appellant. Their testimony [sic]
giving details of a startling and shocking incident that
cannot easily be fabricated deserves credence and full
probative weight for it indicates sincerity and truthfulness
in the narration of events. Both of these witnesses had a
good look at the victims assailants, who did not at any time
during the incident attempt to conceal their faces. Accused-
appellant MARBELLA even stood less [than] a meter from
Florecita Dioneda as he pointed a gun at her while another
accused-appellant even [etched] upon her a distinct
impression of his baldness as repeatedly mentioned by her
during her testimony. As there is nothing to indicate that
these two principal witnesses were moved by improper
motives, their positive declarations on the witness stand
deserve full faith and credit.[18]
The fact that the prosecution witnesses are related to the victim will not
necessarily taint their testimonies. The weight of testimony of witnesses is
neither impaired nor in any way affected by their relationship to the victim
when there is no showing of improper motive on their
part.[19] Relationship per se of a witness with the victim of the crime does not
necessarily mean that the witness is biased.[20]These prosecution witnesses
are the most aggrieved parties, being the victims widow and sister. Thus, their
motive of putting the killers behind bars cannot be considered improper.[21] It
would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in avenging the crime to
implicate persons other than the real culprit lest the guilty go unpunished.[22]
Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of
his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the
witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts and when his findings
have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court.[23]
Significantly, in the pleadings filed before the trial court and in the appellate
court, petitioners were steadfast in their position that the crime was
committed in furtherance of rebellion, obviously to escape criminal liability
for the present charge. This is judicial admission that they indeed committed
the crime. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He
cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with his
pleading. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be
contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[24]Moreover, when a
party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he is not allowed to change
his theory on appeal, for to allow him to do so would not only be unfair to the
other party but would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process.[25]
Treachery was also duly proven. The deadly and successive actions of the
petitioners did not allow the victim any opportunity to defend himself. The
victim was innocently taking a bath totally unaware of the planned attack
against him. Or while he may have realized a possible danger to his person,
the attack was executed in such a manner as to make defense, not to say
counter attack, impossible. The suddenness of the assault, without the
slightest provocation from him who was unarmed and with nary an
opportunity to repel the aggression or defend himself, ineluctably qualified
the crime with alevosia.[26]
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by petitioners must necessarily
fail in view of the positive identification made by the prosecution
witnesses. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be
brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively
ascertained the identity of the accused.[27] And it is only axiomatic that
positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.[28]
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond
reasonable doubt the elements of robbery with homicide, namely: 1) the
taking of personal property was committed with violence or intimidation
against persons; 2) the property taken belongs to another; 3) the taking was
done with animo lucrandi; and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion
thereof, the crime of homicide which is therein used in a generic sense, was
committed.[29]
As to damages, we find the amounts awarded by the trial court as modified
by the CA with respect to the amount of the loss of earning capacity to have
been duly substantiated and warranted. We see no cogent reason to reverse
the same.
Finally, we take note that petitioner Butalon died before final
judgment. According to the written report of the Penal
Superintendent,[30] Butalon died at
the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on October 21, 2004. Thus, consistent with
our ruling in People v. Bayotas[31]that the death of an accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon, we declare the dismissal of the petition of the late
Norberto Butalon.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The challenged
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00554
dated December 18, 2006 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
petition of Norberto Butalon is dismissed, his criminal and civil liability
having been extinguished by reason of his death.
SO ORDERED.
MARINA PORT SERVICES, INC.*, Petitioner, v. AMERICAN
HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the more discovered substantial shortages. Thus, MSC filed another claim
Rules of Court assails the December 29, 2011 Decision2 and May 8, with MPSI.
2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR. CV No.
88321, which granted the appeal filed therein by respondent American Per MSC, the total number of the missing bags of flour was 1,650 with
Home Assurance Corporation (AHAC) and reversed and set aside the a value of £257,083.00.
October 17, 2006 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig
City, Branch 271 dismissing AHAC's Complaint5 for Damages against MPSI denied both claims of MSC. As a result, MSC sought insurance
petitioner Marina Port Services, Inc. (MPSI). indemnity for the lost cargoes from AHAC. AHAC paid MSC the value
of the missing bags of flour after finding the tetter's claim in order. In
Factual Antecedents turn, MSC issued a subrogation receipt in favor of AHAC.

On September 21, 1989, Countercorp Trading PTE., Ltd. shipped from Thereafter, AHAC filed a Complaint6 for damages against MPSI before
Singapore to the Philippines 10 container vans of soft wheat flour with the RTC.
seals intact on board the vessel M/V Uni Fortune. The shipment was
insured against all risks by AHAC and consigned to MSC Distributor Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
(MSC).
AHAC averred in its Complaint that the partial loss of the bags of flour
Upon arrival at the Manila South Harbor on September 25, 1989, the was due to the fault or negligence of MPSI since the loss happened
shipment was discharged in good and complete order condition and while the shipment was still in MPSI's custody.
with safety seals in place to the custody of the arrastre operator, MPSI.
After unloading and prior to hauling, agents of the Bureau of Customs MPSL, on the other hand, disclaimed any liability. It essentally
officially broke the seals, opened the container vans, and examined the maintained in its Answer7 that the bags of flour were inside sealed
shipment for tax evaluation in the presence of MSC's broker and container vans when it received the same; that it handled the subject
checker. Thereafter, the customs inspector closed the container vans shipment with the diligence required of it; and, mat the container vans
and refastened them with safety wire seals while MSC's broker were turned over by it to MSC in the same condition that they were in
padlocked the same. MPSI then placed the said container vans in a at the time of their discharge from the vessel. MPSI likewise countered
back-to-back arrangement at the delivery area of the harbor's that the failure of MSC to request for a bad order survey belied the
container yard where they were watched over by the security guards of latter's claim for loss.
MPSI and of the Philippine Ports Authority.
Trial then ensued.
On October 10, 1989, MSC's representative, AD's Customs Services
(ACS), took out five container vans for delivery to MSC. At the On October 17, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing
compound's exit, MPSI issued to ACS the corresponding gate passes AHAC's Complaint. It held that while there was indeed a shortage of
for the vans indicating its turnover of the subject shipment to MSC. 1,650 sacks of soft wheat flour, AHAC's evidence failed to clearly show
However, upon receipt of the container vans at its warehouse, MSC that the loss happened while the subject shipment was still under
discovered substantial shortages in the number of bags of flour MPSI's responsibility. Hence, the dispositive portion of the RTC
delivered. Hence, it filed a formal claim for loss with MPSI. Decision:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

From October 12 to 14, 1989 and pursuant to the gate passes issued by WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is hereby
MPSI, ACS took out the remaining five container vans from the DISMISSED.
container yard and delivered them to MSC. Upon receipt, MSC once
SO ORDERED.9 In view of the same, the said court disposed of the appeal in this
wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Aggrieved, AHAC appealed to the CA. Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 271 dated 17
October 2006 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellee Marina Port
In its Decision10 dated December 29, 2011, the CA stressed that in a Services, Inc. is ORDERED to pay appellant, American Home
claim for loss filed by a consignee, the burden of proof to show due Assurance Corporation, the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Seven
compliance with the obligation to deliver the goods to the appropriate Thousand and Eighty Three Pesos (PhP257,083.00) with interest
party devolves upon the arrastre operator. In consonance with this, a thereon at Six percent (6%) [per annum] from the filing of this
presumption of fault or negligence for the loss of the goods arises complaint on 24 September 1990 until the decision becomes final and
against the arrastre operator pursuant to Articles 126511 and 198112 of executory, and thereafter, at the rate of twelve (12) percent [per
the Civil Code. In this case, the CA found that MPSI failed to discharge annum] until fully paid, and additionally, to pay the x x x sum of Fifty
such burden and to rebut the aforementioned presumption. Thus, it Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00) as attorney's fees.
was held liable to AHAC for the value of the missing bags of
flour, viz.:LawlibraryofCRAlaw SO ORDERED.14

We conclude that x x x MPSI was negligent in the handling and MPSI moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its
safekeeping of the subject shipment. It did not create and implement Resolution15 dated May 8, 2012.
a more defined, concrete and effective measure to detect, curb and
prevent the loss or pilferage of cargoes in its custody. This is Hence, the present recourse.
manifested by the fact that [MPSI] never took any action to address
such complaint even after it received the formal claim of loss in the Issue
first five (5) vans. As a consequence, more bags of flour were
eventually lost or pilfered in the remaining container vans that were The core issue to be resolved in this case is whether MPSI is liable for
still in [MPSI's] custody at that time. Case law tells us that negligence the loss of the bags of flour.
is that conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure
to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the Our Ruling
circumstance[s] justly demand, whereby that other person suffers
injury. Clearly, [MPSI] breached its arrastre obligations to the There is merit in the Petition.
consignee for it failed to deliver said bags in good and complete
condition. Albeit involving factual questions, the
Court shall proceed to resolve this case
In view of MPSI's failure to exercise that degree of diligence, since it falls under several exceptions to
precaution and care the law [requires] of arrastre operators in the the rule that only questions of law are
performance of their duties to the consignee, [MPSI] is legally bound proper in a petition for review on
to reimburse [AHAC] for the value of the missing bags of flour that it certiorari.
paid to MSC pursuant to the insurance policy.13
At the outset, it is evident that the resolution of the instant case
requires the scrutiny of factual issues which are, however, outside the
scope of the present petition filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of the shipment discharged from the vessel, the arrastre operator must
Court. However, the Court held in Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Philam take good care of the same and turn it over to the party entitled to its
Insurance Co., Inc.16 that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw possession.22redarclaw

But while it is not our duty to review, examine and evaluate or weigh In case of claim for loss filed by a consignee or the insurer as
all over again the probative value of the evidence presented, the Court subrogee,23 it is the arrastre operator that carries the burden of
may nonetheless resolve questions of fact when the case falls under proving compliance with the obligation to deliver the goods to the
any of the following exceptions:LawlibraryofCRAlaw appropriate party.24 It must show that the losses were not due to its
negligence or that of its employees.25 It must establish that it observed
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, the required diligence in handling the shipment.26 Otherwise, it shall
or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, be presumed that the loss was due to its fault.27 In the same manner,
absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) an arrastre operator shall be liable for damages if the seal and lock of
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the goods deposited and delivered to it as closed and sealed, be broken
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the through its fault.28 Such fault on the part of the arrastre operator is
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are likewise presumed unless there is proof to the contrary.29redarclaw
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the MPSI was able to prove delivery of the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which shipment to MSC in good and complete
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in condition and with locks and seals intact.
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the It is significant to note that MPSI, in order to prove that it properly
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on delivered the subject shipment consigned to MSC, presented 10 gate
record.17 passes marked as Exhibits 4 to 13.30 Each of these gate passes bore the
duly identified signature31 of MSC's representative which serves,
among others, as an acknowledgement that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The Court finds that the instant case falls under the aforementioned
second, fourth, fifth, and seventh exceptions. Hence, it shall proceed
Issuance of [the] Gate Pass constitutes delivery to and receipt by
to delve into factual matters essential to the proper determination of
consignee of the goods as described above in good order and
the merits of this case.
condition, unless an accompanying B.O. certificate duly issued and
noted on the face of [the] Gate Pass appears.32
Several well-entrenched legal principles
As held in International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v.
govern the relationship of an arrastre
Prudential Guarantee & Assurance Co., Inc.,33 the signature of the
operator and a consignee.
consignee's representative on the gate pass is evidence of receipt of the
shipment in good order and condition.34redarclaw
The relationship between an arrastre operator and a consignee is
similar to that between a warehouseman and a depositor, or to that
Also, that MPSI delivered the subject shipment to MSC's
between a common carrier and the consignee and/or the owner of the
representative in good and complete condition and with lock and seals
shipped goods.18 Thus, an arrastre operator should adhere to the same
intact is established by the testimonies of MPSFs employees who were
degree of diligence as that legally expected of a warehouseman or a
directly involved in the processing of the subject shipment. Mr.
common carrier19 as set forth in Section 3[b] of the Warehouse
Ponciano De Leon testified that as MPSI's delivery checker, he
Receipts [Act]20 and Article 1733 of the Civil Code.21 As custodian of
personally examined the subject container vans and issued the
corresponding gate passes that were, in turn, countersigned by the
consignee's representative. MPSI's other witness, Chief Claims Officer
Sergio Icasiano (Icasiano), testified that the broker, as the consignee's
representative, neither registered any complaints nor requested for an
inspection, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Atty. Laurente
xxxx
Q [A]fter receipt by the broker of the container van containing
the cargo, do you require the broker to issue you a report or
certification as to the appearance of the container van?
A [W]e only rely on the gate pass.
Q [A]nd you don't place there "the padlock is still intact or the
wirings still intact"?
A [I]t is stated in the gate pass, your Honor.
xxxx
Q [A]nd the findings [are counter-signed] by the representative
of the broker also on the same date?
A [Y]es, your honor.35
xxxx
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
Atty. Laino
q [B]ut did you not say that in the gate pass it is stated there as
to the external appearance of the container van?
a [I]here was no indication of any inspection of the container van
x x x container vans is indeed not allowed at the pier area, it is hard to
meaning the container vans were all in good condition, sir.
q [Y]ou said a [while] ago that you did not receive any complaint
for broken seals, is it not?
a [Y]es, sir.
q [B]ut the complaint that you received indicates that there were
losses,
a [W]e did not receive any complaint from the broker, sir.
q [I]f the broker will complain they have to file a request for
inspection of the cargo so that they will know if there [are]
shortages x x x.
a [Y]es, sir.
[C]ourt
q [A]nd if the broker would notice or detect [something]
peculiar, the way the door of the container van appears
whether close[d] or not, they have to request for an
inspection[?]
a [Y]es, your honor.
q [O]r in the absence of the padlock or wirings, the broker will
request for an inspection[?]
a [Y]es,your honor[;] they can require for the examination of the
cargo.
q [B]ut there was no request at all by the broker?
a [T]here was none, your Honor.36
Verily, the testimonies of the aforementioned employees of MPSI
confirm that the container vans, together with their padlocks and
wirings, were in order at the time the gate passes were issued up to the
time the said container vans were turned over to ACS.
AHAC justifies the failure of ACS to immediately protest the alleged
loss or pilferage upon initial pick-up of the first batch of container
vans. According to it, ACS could not have discovered the loss at that
moment since the stripping of container vans in the pier area is not
allowed. The Court cannot, however, accept such excuse. For one,
AHAC's claim that stripping of the container vans is not allowed in the
pier area is a mere allegation without proof. It is settled that "[m]ere
allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof."37 For another, even assuming that stripping of the
believe that MSC or its representative ACS has no precautionary
measures to protect itself from any eventuality of loss or pilferage. To
recall, ACS's representative signed the gate passes without any
qualifications. This is despite the fact that such signature serves as an
acknowledgment of ACS's receipt of the goods in good order and
condition. If MSC was keen enough in protecting its interest, it
(through ACS) should have at least qualified the receipt of the goods
as subject to inspection, and thereafter arrange for such an inspection
in an area where the same is allowed to be done. However, no such
action or other similar measure was shown to have been undertaken
by MSC. What is clear is that ACS accepted the container vans on its
behalf without any qualification. As aptly observed by the
RTC:LawlibraryofCRAlaw the depositary, should there be no proof to the contrary. However, the
courts may pass upon the credibility of the depositor with respect to
During [the] period of tum-over of goods from the arrastre to [ACS], the value claimed by him.
there had been no protest on anything on the part of consignee's
representative x x x. Otherwise, the complaint would have been shown When the seal or lock is broken, with or without the depositary's fault,
[on] the gate passes. In fact, each gate pass showed the date of he shall keep the secret of the deposit.
delivery, the location of delivery, the truck number of the truck used
in the delivery, the actual quantity of goods delivered, the numbers of However, no such presumption arises in this case considering that it
the safety wires and padlocks of the vans and the signatures of the was not sufficiently shown that the container vans were re-opened or
receiver. More importantly, the gate passes bared the fact that the that their locks and seals were broken for the second time. As may be
shipments were turned-over by [MPSI] to [ACS] on the same dates of recalled, the container vans were opened by a customs official for
customs inspections and turnovers.38 examination of the subject shipment and were thereafter resealed with
There being no exception as to bad order, the subject shipment, safety wires. While this fact is not disputed by both parties, AHAC
therefore, appears to have been accepted by MSC, through ACS, in alleges that the container vans were re-opened and this gave way to
good order.39 "It logically follows [then] that the case at bar presents the alleged pilferage. The Court notes, however, that AHAC based such
no occasion for the necessity of discussing the diligence required of an allegation solely on the survey report of the Manila Adjuster &
[arrastre operator] or of the theory of [its] prima facie liability x x x, Surveyors Company (MASCO). As observed by the
for from all indications, the shipment did not suffer loss or damage RTC:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
while it was under the care x x x of the arrastre operator x x
x."40redarclaw AHAC x x x claim[s] that there were two instances when the seals were
broken. [First], when the customs officer examined the shipment and
Even in the light of Article 1981, no had it resealed with safety wires. [Second], when the surveyor and
presumption of fault on the part of MPSI consignee's broker visually inspected the shipment and allegedly
arises since it was not sufficiently shown found the safety wires of the customs officer to have been detached
that the container vans were re-opened and missing which they then replaced. This second instance is only
or that their locks and seals were broken upon their say so as there is no x x x documentary or testimonial proof
for the second time. on the matter [other] than the [MASCO] survey report.41

Indeed, Article 1981 of the Civil Code also mandates a presumption of

However, the person who prepared the said report was not presented
fault on the part of the arrastre operator as
in court to testify on the same. Thus, the said survey report has no
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
probative value for being hearsay. "It is a basic rule that evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay, if its probative value is not
Article 1981. When the thing deposited is delivered closed and sealed,
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge
the depositary must return it in the same condition, and he shall be
of another person who is not on the witness stand."42 Moreover, "an
liable for damages should the seal or lock be broken through his fault.
unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded
probative value. It is precluded because the party against whom it is
Fault on the part of the depositary is presumed, unless there is proof
presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine
to the contrary.
the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its
executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the
As regards the value of the thing deposited, the statement of the
other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents.
depositor shall be accepted, when the forcible opening is imputable to
Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter
renders its contents suspect and of no probative value."43redarclaw SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

There being no other competent evidence that the container vans were JOSE ESPINELI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
reopened or that their locks and seals were broken for the second time, G.R. No.179535 June 9, 2014
MPSI cannot be held liable for damages due to the alleged loss of the
bags of flour pursuant to Article 1981 of the Civil Code.
Facts:
At any rate, the goods were shipped
under "Shipper's Load and Count" − Espinelli was murder was filed before the RTC
arrangement. Thus, protection against − RTC found petitioner guilty.
pilferage of the subject shipment was − CA affirmed with modification the findings of the trial court.
the consignees lookout. It ratiocinated that since none of the prosecution witnesses
saw how the killing of the victim was perpetrated, the
At any rate, MPSI cannot just the same be held liable for the missing qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot
bags of flour since the consigned goods were shipped under "Shipper's be appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating
Load and Count" arrangement. "This means that the shipper was circumstance as the time of the commission of the crime was
solely responsible for the loading of the container, while the carrier not even alleged in the Information. In view thereof, the CA
was oblivious to the contents of the shipment. Protection against found petitioner guilty only of homicide instead of murder.
pilferage of the shipment was the consignee's lookout. The arrastre The decretal portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
operator was, like any ordinary depositary, duty-bound to take good
care of the goods received from the vessel and to turn the same over to Issue:
the party entitled to their possession, subject to such qualifications as
may have validly been imposed in the contract between the parties.
− Is circumstantial evidence enough to rule for the conviction of
The arrastre operator was not required to verify the contents of the
the accused?
container received and to compare them with those declared by the
shipper because, as earlier stated, the cargo was at the shipper's load
and count. The arrastre operator was expected to deliver to the Ruling:
consignee only the container received from the carrier."44redarclaw
− Yes. Truly, "direct evidence of the commission of a crime is
All told, the Court holds that MPSI is not liable for the loss of the bags not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of
of flour. guilt." The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly
December 29, 2011 and Resolution dated May 8, 2012 of the Court of proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-
Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 88321 are REVERSED AND SET finder draws from the evidence established."Under Section 4,
ASIDE. The Decision dated October 17, 2006 of the Regional Trial Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would
Court, Branch 271, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 90-54517 be sufficient to convict the offender "if i)there is more than
is REINSTATED and the Complaint in the said case one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is
is DISMISSED. derived are proven; and iii) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt." All the circumstances must be consistent
with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.

In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an

unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion
that petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty
person.

The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual

killing of Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to render
their verdict of conviction on circumstantial evidence as
sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
The central issue now confronting this Court is whether the
prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial evidence
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Court of

Appeals sufficiently support petitioner’s conviction.