1. Aquino v.

People
2. People v. Gutierrez
3. People v. Tira
4. Rimorin, Sr. v. People
5. Villarin v. People
6. Factoran, Jr. v. CA
7. Chua v. CA
8. Paat v. CA
9. Angel Jose Realty corporation v. Galao
10. Weigall v. shuster
11. Chanco v. Madrilejos
12. Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA
13. People v. CFI of Quezon Branch VII
14. People v. Inting
15. Magno v. Comelec
16. Union Coconut Planters bank v. E. Ganzon Inc.
17. NWRB v. A.L. Ang Network, Inc.
---------------

Aquino v. People, GR 165448

People v. Gutierrez, GR 177777

FACTS: The RTC found accused-appellant Fernando Gutierrez guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs punishable under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

At around 4:45 p.m. on September 12, 2002, the police station of Ramos, Tarlac acting on a tip
regarding a shabu transaction (drug-pushing) taking place somewhere in Purok Jasmin, Poblacion
Norte, dispatched a three-man team composed of PO3 Romeo Credo, P/Insp. Napoleon Dumlao,
and SPO1 Restituto Fernandez to the place mentioned. Arriving at the target area, the three
noticed Fernando and one Dennis Cortez under a santol tree handing plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance to certain individuals. At the sight of the police officers, Fernando and
the others scampered in different directions. After a brief chase, however, one of the three police
operatives caught up with and apprehended Fernando, then carrying a bag.

When searched in the presence of the barangay captain of Poblacion Norte, the bag yielded the
following, among other items: plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance weighing 15
grams or less, one small plastic sachet/bag containing white powdered substance, one set of pipe
tooter tube glass, one laptop computer, one Motorola cell phone, one rolled aluminum foil, three
bundles of plastic used for repacking, one weighing scale, a Metrobank deposit slip in the name
of Dhen Bito, and cash amounting to PhP 1,500 in different denominations. Forthwith, Fernando
and the seized items were brought to the Ramos police station and the corresponding request for
examination was then prepared. The following day, the confiscated sachets were sent to and
received by the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory Field Office. When subjected to qualitative
examination, the substances in the plastic sachets and plastic bags were found positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.

For its part, the defense offered in evidence the sole testimony of Fernando. His defense relied
on denial and alleged fabrication of the charge by the police, thus:

At around 4:35 in the afternoon of September 12, 2002, while at home in Anao, Tarlac resting,
Fernando was asked by a neighbor, Cortez, to accompany him to Ramos, Tarlac to buy a duck.
At that time, Cortez had with him a backpack, the contents of which Fernando knew nothing about.
In Ramos, Tarlac, the two, after buying a duck, repaired to a house whose owner was not known
to Fernando. Cortez went inside the house with his backpack, leaving Fernando outside the front
yard. Not long thereafter, the police arrived, fired a warning shot, and went inside the house. After
a while, the policemen emerged from the house accompanied by two individuals who pointed to
Fernando as Cortezs companion, a fact Fernando readily admitted. The policemen then
proceeded to arrest Fernando on the pretext he and Cortez were earlier peddling shabu in the
town of Paniqui. As they were not able to apprehend Cortez, the arresting officers had Fernando
hold and admit ownership of Cortezs backpack earlier taken from inside the house. Fernando
denied ownership of the backpack that contained items belonging to Cortez, such as but not
limited to the cell phone, laptop computer, drivers license, and wallet. A bank book and Metrobank
deposit slip signed by Cortez were also inside the bag.

ISSUE: W/O Gutierrez is guilty.

RULING: Fernando was indicted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In the prosecution of
this offense, the ownership of the bag where the shabu and drug paraphernalia were found is
really inconsequential. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to
be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.

This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However,
the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the
drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under
the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control
over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused
cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with another.

Without a trace of equivocation, the RTC and later the CA held that the prosecution had discharged
the burden of proving all the elements of the crime charged. Since Fernando was caught carrying
the incriminating bag after the police had been tipped off of drug pushing in the target area, any
suggestion that he was not in actual possession or control of the prohibited drug hidden in the
area would be puny. Thus, ownership of the bag is truly inconsequential.
Fernando was caught in possession of 14.052 grams of shabu. Applying the law, the proper
penalty should be life imprisonment and a fine ranging from PhP 400,000 to PhP 500,000. Hence,
Fernando was correctly sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 400,000.
People v. Tira
NOTE: The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following: (a)
the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or
by duly constituted authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a
regulated drug. This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical
possession or control of the accused.[63] On the other hand, constructive possession exists when
the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found.[64] Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary.[65] The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion
over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
Rimorin, Sr. v. People
FACTS: In an Information docketed as CCC-VI-137 (79), petitioner and his co-accused Felicisimo
Rieta, Fidel Balita, Gonzalo Vargas, Robartolo Alincastre, Guillermo Ferrer and Ernesto Miaco
were charged in these words:
That on or about October 15, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another with the evident intent to defraud the
government of the Republic of the Philippines of the legitimate duties accruing to it from
merchandise imported into this country, did then and there [willfully,] unlawfully [and] fraudulently
import or bring into the Philippines or assist in so doing contrary to law, three hundred five (305)
cases of assorted brands of blue seal cigarettes which are foreign articles valued at P513,663.47
including duties and taxes, and/or buy, sell transport or assist and facilitate the buying, selling and
transporting of the above-named foreign articles after importation knowing the same to have been
imported contrary to law which was found in the possession of said accused and under their control
which articles said accused fully well knew have not been properly declared and that the duties
and specific taxes thereon have not been paid to the proper authorities in violation of said Sec.
3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
34, in relation to Sec. 3602 of said Code and Sec. 184 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

RULING: of blue seal cigarettes -- with the corpus delicti, he urges this Court to rule that the failure
to present it was fatal to respondent’s cause.
We disagree. The Court, on several occasions, has explained that corpus delicti refers to the fact
of the commission of the crime charged[1] or to the body or substance of the crime.[2] In its legal
sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom[3] or to the
body of the person murdered.[4] Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the
prosecution to be able show that (1) a certain fact has been proven -- say, a person has died or a
building has been burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for the act.[5]
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even
a single witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a
conviction therefor.[6] Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.[7]

Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established by
respondent’s evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody
Receipt[8] issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods.

Col. Panfilo Lacson’s testimony on the apprehension of petitioner and on the seizure of the blue
seal cigarettes was clear and straightforward.

We find no reason to depart from the oft repeated doctrine of giving credence to the narration of
prosecution witnesses, especially when they are public officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner.[9]

Moreover, it is well-settled that findings of fact of lower courts are binding on this Court, absent
any showing that they overlooked or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of weight and
substance.[10] This doctrine applies particularly to this case in which the RTC’s findings, as far as
petitioner is concerned, were affirmed by the appellate court.

Villarin v. People

Factoran, Jr. v. CA

FACTS:
On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-
wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along Marcos Highway.
They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its
cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division
(PIC/SAID) of DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID
investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber.

What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted
of narra lumber. In the documents, the plate numbers of the truck supposed to carry the cargo
bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-267, while the plate of the truck apprehended is
NVT-881. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been accompanied by
a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin.
The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the
Seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber
Hardware.

These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10 which requires
possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents:
Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his
absence, the Assistant District Forester;
Sales Invoice;
Delivery Receipt; and
Tally Sheets.

Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and
seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck.
On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck
Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the said order to the Office
of the President. Consequently, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of
the government and were later on advertised to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.
On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of the writs
of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the
confiscated items, and to enjoin the panned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.
On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist from proceeding
with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction on March 27, 1989.
On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for Release and Return of
Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and
Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court granted
the writ of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber,
original documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their
representatives x x x".
On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply
therewith. Sheriff David G. Brodett of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City, reported that the
petitioners prevented him from removing the subject properties from the DENR compound and
transferring them to the Mobile Unit compound of the Quezon City Police Force. He then agreed
to a constructive possession of the properties. On that same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation
stating their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the
execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial
court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the Manifestation on the private
respondents. Petitioners then made immediately the required service and tendered the cash
counterbond but it was refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on
March 30, 1989.
On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond but was also denied
for the same reason.
On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for
disobeying the writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners 24 hours to answer the motion.
Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.
On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and/or Mandamus to annul the orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a
temporary restraining order (TRO).
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary
injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.
On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the
petition. It declared that the complaint for replevin filed by the private respondents complied with
the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of
Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.
As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed that the same
were sufficiently based on a written charge by private respondents and the reports submitted by
the Sheriff.
On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but it was
subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 18, 1990. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and the Court of
Appeals in dismissing the petition and lifting the preliminary injunction.
RULING:
Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director are subject to review,
motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose
decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of 30 days from the receipt by the aggrieved
party of said decision unless appealed to the President. The decision of the Department Head
may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of the
petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity
and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have
first been resorted to and proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and
correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.
It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the enforcement of forestry laws,
rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest land fall within
the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. It held that assumption of the trial court of a
replevin suit constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's
prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit.
First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's filing of a bond
and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans
allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Section 2 Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of
Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the properties sought
in an action for replevin must be satisfactory established. If only mechanistic averment thereof is
offered, the writ should not be issued.
In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the administrative authority of the
Secretary as provided by Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Thus, it is not wrongful and does not
warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by the private respondents.
Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the subject properties of private
respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully
taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it
found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under SEction 68-A of P.D. No.
705 is distinct and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided
for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.
Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized forest products within
six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct
preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not
to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.
Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their right to due process
was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to confiscation of their properties.
Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court in grave abuse of
its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which
presupposes that the court order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order being
issued, no contempt of court could be committed.
The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and its
Resolution dated May 18, 1990 were set aside. Respondent presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon
City was permanently enjoined from enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22,
1989, or if said orders had already been issued, said respondent judge was directed to render
judgement of forfeiture of replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the said respondent
judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by
private respondents against petitioners.
ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY AND ALEX DE LEON, respondents.
Facts:
Judge Francisco issued a search warrant directing the immediate search of the premised of R.R
Construction and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck. Respondent Canoy seized the vehicle and
took custody of it.
a civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu dump
truck was filed by petitioner against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe" in the Regional Trial
Court presided by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares
Judge Cañares directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond in the amount
of P100,000.00. The writ of replevin was also issued on the same date, and the subject vehicle
was seized by Deputy Sheriff Galicano V. Fuentes.
Respondent Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint and for the quashal of the writ
of replevin. The motion was opposed by petitioner. The motion to dismiss and to quash the writ of
replevin was denied.
Issue: WON replevin applies to custodia legis?
Held:
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing
is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a
judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ. The reason posited for this
principle is that if it was otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the
function of the law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken.
Thus, a defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods in the possession of an
officer under a valid process, although after the levy is discharged, an action to recover possession
will lie.
Leonardo Paat v. CA
Facts:
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent
Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in
Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck.
etitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in
Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order... of confiscation of the truck and gave the
owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited.
Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989,[1]
Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree
No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
Private respondents filed a letter of... reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989
order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July
12, 1989.
ending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for... replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was
filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan[4]
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,[5] which issued a writ ordering the return of...
the truck to private respondents.
Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative... remedies.
petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck
was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended
by E.O. 277.
Issues:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin
prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture
proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
Hence, this present petition,[9] with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction, seeking to reverse the... decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
Ruling:
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter,
we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of
DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989.
In their... letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,[23] private respondents clearly recognize
the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the
resolution of their case.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations
and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
By the... very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial
intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck
because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts
under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit...
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second
paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705,... It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the
Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit
any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations.
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate,
not only 'conveyances,' but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest
products by the 'court' in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section
What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the
commission of the crime" is that it was not... used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence,
in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was
being used in the commission... of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D.705 as
amended by E.O. 277.
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes
a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture
proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is... hereby made
permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
Principles:
"SECTION 68. xxx... xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments,
implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest... products are
found."
Section 68-A
"SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized
Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may... order
the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and... policies on the
matter."
However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order
No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest
products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been... involved in the
cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee
or fare the same is therefor liable. xxx"
"SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. - Any
person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from... private lands, without any
authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring
ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277
"SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to read
as follows:
'Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. -
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from... private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx."
Angel Jose Realty Corporation v. Galao (FULL TEXT)
JARANILLA, J.:
This contempt proceeding arose from civil case No. A-47 of the Municipal Court of Manila and
G.R. No. L-30 (75 Phil., 109), of this court in a previous appeal. The appellants in the present case
were the defendants and appellants in that appeal. In the instant incident for contempt the Court
of First Instance of Manila in the civil case No. 70380 sentenced the appellants Bernardina Galao
and Fong Lay to be imprisoned for five days and each to pay a fine of P50.
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:
On April 25, 1945, the Municipal Court of Manila rendered a decision in civil case No. A-47
adjudging the appellants to pay the rent of the premises that they were occupying and ordering
them to vacate the same. They appealed said decision and perfected the appeal within the period
prescribed by law.
On May 16, 1945, the plaintiff and the appellee herein filed an ex parte petition praying for the
issuance of the writ of execution of the judgment, which was appealed, and the said Municipal
Court, without any notice to the appellants, granted the petition and issued the writ of execution.
On May 25, 1945, in view of the fact that the complainant filed in the case did not seek any other
damages than the payment of rent, the said execution was ordered suspended by the court of the
reason that the current rents is due from March to May 1945, inclusive, had already been
deposited with the court.
On May 29, after fifteen days since the appeal in the case had been perfected, the plaintiff and
appellee again filed a petition, without any previous notice to the defendants and appellants,
praying that an alias writ execution be issued by the Municipal Court, which prayer granted. The
Sheriff of Manila thereupon executed the judgment and ordered the appellants to vacate the
premises in question; so that the appellants were driven from the premises and did not have a
place where to sleep on that occasion.
At the bottom of the writ of execution it was noted that the appellants might stay the writ of
execution by filing a supersedeas bond of P200, but the Sheriff failed to give them the chance to
file said bond before proceeding to eject them from the premises.
About one hour after the said appellants had been ejected from the premises they returned to
occupy them again and took temporary possession thereof for lack of a place in which to stay and
sleep that night and in so doing they had to break the padlock of the door.
The following day, which was the 30th of May, being a legal holiday, the appellants could not make
the deposit in court of the supersedeas bond of P200 required in the writ of execution above
mentioned, which bond was only filed on May 31, 1945.
Before approving this supersedeas bond the court set the matter for hearing with due notice to
both parties and after having been informed that the appellants were not given the chance to
deposit the bond before entering the premises, the judge of the Municipal Court approved the
bond and declared untenable the claim of the plaintiff and appellee that the defendants and
appellants had committed contempt of court for breaking into the premises after they have been
ejected therefrom. The Municipal Court forwarded the case after the incident above referred to
had been submitted to said court without any action thereon. The plaintiff and appellee, however,
filed written charges in the Court of First Instance of Manila accusing the defendants and
appellants of contempt of court, as a result of which the latter were convicted by said court as
above related.
The appellants assign four errors allegedly committed by the court below, which reads:
1. The lower court incurred in error in trying the case at all for lack of original as well as the
appellate jurisdiction.
2. Having tried the case, the lower court incurred in error in not taking the failure of the Municipal
Court to act on the charge in writing, as either a dismissal of the charge or an acquittal of the
defendants.
3. The lower court incurred the error in, having tried the case, not acquitting the defendants on
their defense of double jeopardy.
4. The lower court incurred in error in not finding that there was no contempt.
After a perusal of the record we consider it expedient that these assignment be reduced to the
sole proposition of whether or not the defendants and appellants committed contempt of court in
view of the facts above stated.
It appears that the Municipal Court of Manila had already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the
perfection of the appeal by the defendants in the ejectment proceedings. But even if the question
of jurisdiction is not considered here, it is uncontroverted that when said Municipal Court issued
the writ of execution on the 29th of May 1945 the rents pertaining to the said month of May had
already been deposited with the court by the appellants. For that reason the Municipal Court could
not legally issue the writ of execution in question, ejecting the appellants from the premises during
the month of May 1945. (Section 8, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) Moreover, according to said section
8 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, before a writ of execution could be issued, upon motion of the
plaintiff, the defendant should have notice thereof — which was not complied with in this case.
Before contempt could be committed, it is a prerequisite that the order issued by the court which
was violated be a valid and legal one. Without a lawful order having been issued, no contempt of
court could be committed. So has it been held by this court in the following cases:
For disobedience or resistance of a lawful order of court a person may be punished for contempt,
but a court has no authority to punish anyone for disobedience or resistance of an order made
without authority. (Chanco vs. Madrilejos, 9 Phil., 356.)
That an order, void for want of jurisdiction may be disobeyed without incurring contempt, appears
to be settled by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: ". . . But if the command was
in whole or in part beyond the power of the court, the writ, or so much as was in excess of
jurisdiction, was void, and the court had no right in law to punish for any contempt of its
unauthorized requirements." (Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil., 340, 345.)
Pursuant to said section 8 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, we repeat the writ of execution may
only be issued by the court in ejectment cases after notice to the adverse party and if the rents
have not been paid or deposited by him. These, however, are not the facts in the instant case,
where the express provisions of the law were utterly disregarded, and therefore the said order of
execution, which originated this contempt proceeding, was not validly and legally issued.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendants and appellants are acquitted
of the charges with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Weigall v. Shuster
FACTS: On March 4, 1903, the defendant, who was collector of the port of Manila, and also
Collector of Customs of the Philippine Archipelago, officially imposed a fine of $200 United States
money, upon the plaintiff, the captain of the British steamer Loonsang, for a violation of the
Chinese Exclusion Law, in permitting the escape of an immigrant from his ship, and asserted a
lien upon her, refusing clearance papers unless the master paid the fine. Instead of paying it, the
plaintiff brought this action on March 5, and presented to Judge Ambler his complaint, together
with other papers, upon which an injunction was issued, ordering the defendant to "absolutely
desist and refrain from further proceeding in anyway to levy upon or collect from the plaintiff the
fine of $200 mentioned in the plaintiff's complaint." This order having been duly served, the
defendant released the vessel, entering at the time, however, into agreement with her owners,
Smith, Bell and Co., to pay the fine if sustained, the Collector apparently accepting this undertaking
to do so in substitution for the vessel seized. He did not appear in this action, but was in default
therein on April 1, on which day an order was entered making the injunction permanent, and
ordering that a writ issue carrying it into effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
On May 1, 1903, the United Sates, at the instance of the defendant, began an action in the Court
of Customs Appeals against G.S. Weigall, Smith, Bell and Co., Limited, and the steamer
Loonsang, setting up the facts as to the importation and escaped of the Chinaman from the
Loonsang, and relating the action of the defendant.
RULING: Upon this testimony, and all the proceedings in the case of Judge Sweeney, of the Court
of First Instance made an order on May 18, 1903, adjudging the defendant in contempt of court,
fining him the sum of 500 Mexican dollars, and directing him to dismiss the aforesaid two suits
pending in the court of Customs Appeals, or in the event of noncompliance, to be committed to
prison until the order should be fulfilled.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant challenges the validity of the order imposing the fine, claiming it to be wholly void
for lack of power in the Court of First Instance over the subject matter, so that he can not be
punished for refusing to obey it. That an order, void for want of jurisdiction may be disobeyed
without incurring contempt, appears to be settled by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. In Ex parte Rowland (104 U.S., 604), a case of disobedience of County commissioners to
a mandamus of the United States Circuit Court, a matter which lay within it general cognizance,
Chief Justice Waite said, at page 612:
. . . But if the command was in whole or in part beyond the power of the court, the writ, or so much
as was in excess of jurisdiction, was void, and the court had no right in law to punish for any
contempt of its unauthorized requirements.
Chanco v. Madrilejos
FACTS: From the record in this case it appears that some time on or about the day of , the plaintiff
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Romblon against the
defendant, asking for the following remedy:
"First. The partition of all the property which appears in the inventory, made up and subscribed by
the defendant herself, between the plaintiff and the defendant.
"Second. That an accounting be rendered by the defendant with regard to the other property
existing, or which has existed, in her possession belonging exclusively to the married couple
Maximo Madrilejos and Agustina Rutor, and which does not appear in the inventory made up and
signed by the aforesaid Anacleta Madrilejos.
"Third. An equitable indemnity for damages suffered on account of the retention of said property,
inasmuch as the same had been claimed several times, the computation thereof to be made from
the date of the first claim.
"Fourth. Such costs as may accrue in the present proceedings."
To this complaint the defendant filed an answer, after having presented a demurrer, which
contained a general and special denial and prayed for affirmative relief against the plaintiff.
RULING: After the filing of this said answer on the part of the defendant, and on the same day,
the attorney for the plaintiff, C. W. Ney, filed a complaint against the defendant in said cause,
accusing her of the offense of contempt of court, in which complaint the said attorney stated:
First. That he is attorney for the plaintiff in said cause.
Second. That the defendant, Anacleta Madrilejos, has in her possession various books,
documents, and papers belonging to the above-mentioned estate.
Third. That on the 23d day of April, 1903, the court ordered the said defendant to immediately
deliver to the plaintiff all said documents, books, and papers.
Fourth. That the said defendant had not complied with the said order and falsely denied that she
had any of the said books, documents, or papers to deliver and requested that the court proceed
against the said defendant for contempt.
Upon this complaint, the lower court, on the same day, ordered the said defendant to appear
before the court on the 24th day of August, 1906, at 8 o'clock a. m., to show why she should not
be proceeded against for said offense. On the day named in said order, to wit, the 24th day of
August, 1906, at 8 o'clock a. m., the defendant appeared before the said judge and made the
statement that she did not have in her possession any of the property of said estate and that
therefore she could not render an accounting concerning the same; whereupon the said attorney,
C. W. Ney, presented another complaint against the defendant, asking that she be proceeded
against for her failure to comply with the above order of the 17th day of August, 1906, and on the
same day the Hon. Jose C. Abreu ordered the defendant to appear immediately before him and
show why she should not be punished for contempt.
These two complaints were duly heard by the lower court, each party presenting proof. After
hearing the evidence adduced by the respective parties, the court upon the 29th day of August
rendered a decision upon each complaint, under the provisions of section 232 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, ordering that the defendant be detained in prison until she was willing to comply with
the two orders of the court, the first made by the Hon. Henry C. Bates, dated the 23d of April,
1903, and the other made by the Hon. Jose C. Abreu on the 17th of August, 1906. From these
decisions of the .lower court the' defendant appealed to this court and the question presented is,
Was the defendant guilty of the offense of desacato (contempt) in view of all the facts presented
in the record?
Section 232 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides as follows:
"A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for contempt:
"(1) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a
court, or injunction granted by a court or judge."
It will be noted that this section contains the provision that the disobedience or resistance must be
to a lawful order; in other words, the order must be in accordance with law. The court has no
authority to punish for disobedience or resistance of an order which was made without authority.
(People vs. O'Neil, 47 Cal., 109; Ex Parte William Hollis, 59 Cal., 405; Brown vs. Moore, 61 Cal.,
432; Ex Parte W. A, Brown, 97 Cal., 83.)
It will be remembered that the original action in this case was an ordinary action by the plaintiff as
administrator against the defendant, and therefore the procedure applicable thereto is the
procedure marked out by the code in ordinary actions. The proceedings were not in accordance
with section 709 and section 710 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions. If the plaintiff desired
to obtain possession of documents which were supposed to be in the possession of the defendant,
it was his duty to proceed by the proper form of subpoena and not by the method followed in this
particular case.
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that there is no justification in law, under the form of action
which the plaintiff brought against the defendant, to sustain the orders which the lower court made
and for the violation of which the defendant was punished for contempt, and therefore the orders
of the lower court in both of the contempt proceedings, ordering that the defendant be confined in
prison until such orders should be complied with, are hereby revoked, and, without any finding as
to costs, it is so ordered.
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development. The
Special Actions and Investigation Division of the DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of
narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner. The SAID
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance. In the course
thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with
lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce
the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo
and impounded them at the DENR compound. The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner. The team was able to secure a search warrant. By
virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of
narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately
200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. On 4
April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard and placed under
administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total
volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts
from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and
origin. Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by
the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders.
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to the Chief of SAID Robles requesting
an extension of fifteen days to produce the required documents covering the seized articles
because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province
of Quirino. Robles denied the petition. Subsequently, the Sec. of DENR Factoran issued an order
confiscating the woods seized in the truck of the petitioner as well as those found in their
lumberyard.
Issue:
Whether or not that a lumber cannot be considered a timber and that petitioner should not be held
for illegal logging.
Held:
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a
crime. On the contrary, the SC rules that such possession is penalized in the said section because
lumber is included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either
timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of
Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing
plant," which reads: Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wall bond, block board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products. This
simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code
uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without
the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber.
RULING:
The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the information against petitioners, although not
mentioned in express terms as among the prohibited articles under Section 68 of P.D. No.
705(Revised Forestry Code) must be understood in its ordinary and common usage. Lumber is to
be understood as a processed log or timber. The court said that since the law makes no distinction
between raw or processed timber, neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus. The court
held that the petitioners were then correctly charged with the offense of violating Sec68 of PD No
705 as alleged by the facts in the information.
The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done lawfully as
it falls under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of the exceptions to
the general rule that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore, such search and seizure
was a valid exercise of the power vested upon the forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.
Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court held
that Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to seize the
Lumber since petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended. Thus, petitioner was
in illegal possession of the seized articles.
The Court ruled against petitioner in all three consolidated cases.
People v. CFI of Quezon Branch VII, GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES
Doctrine:
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the
question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of
the offense defined in the law.
***The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered,
collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber of other forest products
cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3)
that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement,
lease, license, or permit granted by the state.
Facts:
This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the CFI of Quezon dismissing the
information filed therein.
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined
and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which read:
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two
(2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. The Trial court dismissed the
information on the grounds invoked and the reconsideration sought was denied.
Hence this petition.
Issue: WoN the information charged an offense.
Held:
YES. The Court agree with the petitioner that the information substantially alleged all
the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it
was admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question
was "without the consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the
accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said
owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, sixty (60)
logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement
or permit for utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information
that the asportation of the logs was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease,
license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the logs was without the consent of
the state.
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information
hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential
elements of the offense defined in the law.
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is
not fatal. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not
make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including
those produced in private woodlands. While it is only the state which can grant a license or
authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products
belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private
lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything
found on its surface.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D.
No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not
material, it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from
the government.
Dispositive Portion:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the
information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1591 is reinstated.
People v. Inting
FACTS: On February 6, 1988, A Permanent Nursing Attendant filed a complaint against OIC-
Mayor with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her to a very remote barangay and without
prior permission or clearance from the COMELEC.
After a preliminary investigation by the Provincial Election Supervisor, a prima facie case was
found.
On September 26, 1988, a criminal case against the OIC-Mayor was filed with the respondent
court for violation of Sec. 261 Par. (h) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed a bail at five thousand pesos (P 5, 000) as
recomended by the Provincial Election Supervisor.
However, before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its decision on the ground
that the Provincial Election Supervisor is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to
Sec. 2 Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
In another order dated November 22, 1988, the court gave Provincial Election Supervisor fifteen
(15) days from receipt to file another information charging the same offense with the written
approval of the Provincial Fiscal. Upon failure to comply with the order, the information was
quashed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving
election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor,
before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether
or not probable cause exists?
RULING: The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial
Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge
alone makes this determination.
The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to
make the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's
certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper
which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries
are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about
the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge.
The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to
the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor. The former, which
is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.
The latter is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. It is in this context that we
address the issue raised in the instant petition so as to give meaning to the constitutional power
vested in the COMELEC regarding election offenses.
Article IX C Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate
but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the
purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This
power is exclusive with COMELEC.
The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the
free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the
true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute
offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the
clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or
employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation
to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of
the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same
rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of
elections. (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987]).
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If
the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation
of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under
the sole authority of his office. (People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989).
In the instant case, there is no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the
Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's
preliminary investigation.
It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was already in effect) the
President issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11
thereof provides:
Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in
the preceding section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the
Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may
file the complaint with the Office of the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its
deputies that section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when the
application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed with the court, the judge will
then determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
It is apparant that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it
quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. The order to get the approval
of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.
The instant petition is GRANTED.
Magno v. Comelec
Facts: Carlos Montes filed a petition for the disqualification of Nestor Magno as mayoralty
candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that the
latter was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery.
COMELEC granted the petition and declared Magno disqualified from running for the position of
mayor since direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, citing Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides as follows:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen (18) months, or
for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.
According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as Magno completed the service of his sentence on March
5, 1998 when was discharged from probation, his five-year disqualification will end only on March
5, 2003. COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Magno argued that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he claims that
Section 40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is the law
applicable to the case, not the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC. Said
provision reads:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
xxx
Magno insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was
discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-year disqualification period imposed by
Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, he was qualified to
run in the 2001 elections.
Issue: Whether or not direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude
Held: Moral turpitude is defined as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.”
However, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It frequently depends on the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the law. In this case, by applying for probation, Magno
in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view
to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute
a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to
do; and
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept
a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty
in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on
the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.
Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and
duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Issue: What law should apply in the case?
Held: The Local Government Code.
The Omnibus Election Code was enacted in 1985 while the Local Government Code became a
law in 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two
laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to
have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.
Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of the Local Government Code states that: (f)
All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. In accordance therewith, Section 40 of the
LGC is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of the OEC.
Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter
of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed. The intent of the legislature to reduce the
disqualification period of candidates for local positions from five to two years is evident. The
cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law.
The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is the manifest intent.
Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless
could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Petitioner’s
disqualification ceased as of March 2000. (G.R. No. 147904, October 4, 2002)
Union Coconut Planters bank v. E. Ganzon Inc.
FACTS: Beginning 1995 to 1998, EGI availed itself of credit facilities from UCPB to finance its
business expansion. To secure said credit facilities, EGI mortgaged to UCPB its condominium unit
inventories in EGI Rufino Plaza, located at the intersection of Buendia and Taft Avenues, Manila.
Initially, EGI was able to make periodic amortization payments of its loans to UCPB. When the
negative effects of the Asian economic crisis on the property development sector finally caught up
with the corporation in the middle of 1998, EGI started defaulting in its payment of amortizations,
thus, making all of its obligations due and demandable. Subsequently, EGI was declared in default
by UCPB in its letters dated 2 October 19985 and 16 February 1999.6 Thereafter, UCPB stopped
sending EGI monthly statements of its accounts.
In 1999, EGI and UCPB explored the possibility of using the mortgaged condominium unit
inventories of EGI in EGI Rufino Plaza as payment for the loans of EGI to UCPB. Upon agreeing
on the valuation of said mortgaged properties, EGI and UCPB entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA)7 on 28 December 1998 in settlement of the loans of EGI from UCPB. Based
on this MOA, the outstanding loan obligations of EGI with UCPB amounted to P915,838,822.50,
inclusive of all interest, charges and fees. UCPB, through its corporate officers, assured EGI that
the said amount already represented the total loan obligations of EGI to UCPB.
On 18 January 2000, EGI and UCPB executed an Amendment of Agreement8 to reflect the true
and correct valuation of the properties of EGI listed in the MOA that would be transferred to UCPB
in settlement of the total loan obligations of the former with the latter. The properties of EGI to be
used in paying for its debt with UCPB were valued at P904,491,052.00.
According to the MOA and its amendments, titles to the properties of EGI shall be transferred to
UCPB by the following modes: (1) foreclosure of mortgage; (2) dacion en pago; (3) creation of a
holding company; and (4) use of other alternatives as may be deemed appropriate by UCPB.
UCPB proceeded to foreclose some of the properties of EGI listed in the MOA. Per the Certificate
of Sale9 dated 13 April 2000, the foreclosure proceeds of said properties amounted only to
P723,592,000.00, less than the value of the properties of EGI stipulated in its amended MOA with
UCPB.
UCPB applied the entire foreclosure proceeds of P723,592,000.00 to the principal amount of the
loan obligations of EGI, pursuant to BSP Circular No. 239,10 which provided that partial property
payments shall first be applied to the principal. After deducting the said amount from the total loan
obligations of EGI, there was still an unpaid balance of P192,246,822.50.
On 8 May 2001, some of the other properties of EGI at EGI Rufino Plaza, valued at
P166,127,369.50, were transferred by way of dacion en pago to UCPB. However, during the
signing of the transaction papers for the dacion en pago, EGI Senior Vice-President, Architect
Grace S. Layug (Layug), noticed that said papers stated that the remaining loan balance of EGI
in the amount of P192,246,822.50 had increased to P226,963,905.50. The increase was allegedly
due to the addition of the transaction costs amounting to P34,717,083.00. EGI complained to
UCPB about the increase, yet UCPB did not take any action on the matter.
This prompted EGI President Engineer Eulalio Ganzon (Ganzon) and Senior Vice-President
Layug to review their files to verify the figures on the loan obligations of EGI as computed by
UCPB. In the process, they discovered the UCPB Internal Memorandum dated 22 February
2001,11 signed by UCPB corporate officers. The said Internal Memorandum presented two
columns, one with the heading "ACTUAL" and the other "DISCLOSED TO EGI." The figures in the
two columns were conflicting. The figures in the "DISCLOSED TO EGI" column computed the
unpaid balance of the loan obligations of EGI to be P226,967,194.80, the amount which UCPB
actually made known to and demanded from EGI. The figures in the "ACTUAL" column calculated
the remaining loan obligations of EGI to be only P146,849,412.58.
Consequently, EGI wrote UCPB a letter dated 21 May 2001,12 which included, among other
demands, the refund by UCPB to EGI of the over-payment of P83,000,000.00;13 return to EGI of
all the remaining Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)/Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) in
the possession of UCPB; and cost of damage to EGI for the delay in the release of its certificates
of title.
In response, UCPB explained14 that the "ACTUAL" column in its Internal Memorandum dated 22
February 2001 contained the same amounts reflected or recorded in its financial statements, in
accordance with the Manual of Accounts for Banks, Manual of Regulations for Banks15 and BSP
Circular No. 202,16 Series of 1999. In contrast, the "DISCLOSED TO EGI" column showed the
total amount still due from EGI, including the total principal, interests, transaction and other costs
after the foreclosure, whether reflected in the financial books of UCPB or not. Further, UCPB
maintained that the difference in the figures in the two columns was because BSP Circular No.
202 and Section X305.4 of the Manual of Regulations for Bank disallowed banks from accruing in
its books interest on loans which had become non-performing.
Despite the explanation of UCPB, EGI insisted that the figures appearing in the "ACTUAL" column
of the former's Internal Memorandum dated 22 February 2001 revealed the true and actual amount
of its loan obligations to UCPB, P146,849,412.58.
EGI Senior Vice-President Layug met with UCPB Vice-President, Jaime W. Jacinto (Jacinto) to
discuss the demand of EGI for the return of its overpayment. UCPB Vice-President Jacinto,
however, refused to concede that UCPB had any obligation to make a refund to EGI and, instead,
insisted that EGI Senior Vice-President Layug disclose who gave her a copy of the UCPB Internal
Memorandum dated 22 February 2001.
Based on the possession by EGI of the UCPB Internal Memorandum dated 22 February 2001,
UCPB filed a criminal case for theft and/or discovery of secrets against EGI President Ganzon
and Senior Vice-President Layug, but the said case was dismissed.17
On 5 November 2002, EGI, also on the basis of the UCPB Internal Memorandum dated 22
February 2001, EGI filed with the BSP an administrative complaint18 against UCPB, et al., for
violation of Sections 3619 and 37,20 Article IV of Republic Act No. 7653,21 in relation to Section
55.1(a)22 of Republic Act No. 8791;23 and for the commission of irregularities and conducting
business in an unsafe or unsound manner.
In a letter-decision24 dated 16 September 2003, the BSP Monetary Board dismissed the
administrative complaint of EGI, holding as follows:
Please be informed that the Monetary Board decided to dismiss the complaint based on the
evaluation conducted by the Supervision and Examination Department I and the Office of the
General Counsel and Legal Services to the effect that:
1. UCPB computed interest on the loans based on BSP rules and regulations which prohibit banks
from accruing interest on loans that have become non-performing (BSP Circular No. 202). This is
different from interest which may have run and accrued based on the promissory notes/loan
documents from the date of default up to settlement date.
2. Fair market value of assets to be foreclosed is different from the bid price submitted during
foreclosure and there is no statutory obligation for the latter to be equivalent to the former.
3. Regarding the alleged P145,163,000.00 fabricated loan, the documents showed that there were
the EGI Board Resolution to borrow, promissory note signed by Mr. Eulalio Ganzon, and Loan
Agreement stating that the proceeds shall be used to pay outstanding availments and interest
servicing.
4. There is no finding by Supervision and Examination Department I on the alleged double
charging and/or padding of transaction costs.25
EGI filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforequoted letter-decision of the BSP Monetary Board. The BSP Monetary Board denied both
motions in its letter26 dated 8 December 2003 as there was no sufficient basis to grant the same.
EGI then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
with the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of "whether the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas erred
in dismissing the administrative complaint filed by EGI against UCPB, et al." The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81385.
On 14 October 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision granting the Petition for
Review of EGI, thus, setting aside the BSP letter-decision dated 16 September 2003 and
remanding the case to the BSP Monetary Board for further proceedings.
UCPB, et al., moved for the reconsideration of the 14 October 2004 Decision of the appellate
court, praying for a new judgment dismissing the appeal of EGI for lack of jurisdiction and/or lack
of merit. EGI also filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the same Court of Appeals Decision,
with the prayer that the appellate court, instead of still remanding the case to the BSP Monetary
Board for further proceedings, already direct the latter to impose the applicable administrative
sanctions upon UCPB, et al.,.
In a Resolution dated 7 July 2005, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit both the Motion
for Reconsideration of UCPB, et al. and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of EGI.
RULING: UCPB, et al., aver that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions,
orders and/or resolutions of the BSP Monetary Board on administrative matters. The BSP
Monetary Board is not among the quasi-judicial agencies enumerated under Rule 43 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, over which the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction.
Further, there is nothing in Republic Act No. 7653 or in Republic Act No. 8791 which explicitly
allows an appeal of the decisions or orders of the BSP Monetary Board to the Court of Appeals.
Resultantly, the Court of Appeals has no power to review, much less set aside, the findings of fact
of the BSP Monetary Board as contained in its letter-decision dated 16 September 2003.
A perusal of Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and Section 1, Rule 43 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure reveals that the BSP Monetary Board is not included
among the quasi-judicial agencies explicitly named therein, whose final judgments, orders,
resolutions or awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals. Such omission, however, does not
necessarily mean that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over the judgments,
orders, resolutions or awards of the BSP Monetary Board.
It bears stressing that Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, on the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, generally refers to quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards, or commissions. The use of the word "including" in the said provision, prior to the naming
of several quasi-judicial agencies, necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the
enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other
circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, or where the
enumeration is by way of example only.28
Similarly, Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions
several quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in its phraseology.29 The enumeration of the
agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive.30 The introductory phrase "[a]mong these agencies
are" preceding the enumeration of specific quasi-judicial agencies only highlights the fact that the
list is not meant to be exclusive or conclusive. Further, the overture stresses and acknowledges
the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies not included in the enumeration but should be
deemed included.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari of United Coconut
Planters Bank, Jeronimo U. Kilayko, Lorenzo V. Tan, Enrique L. Gana, Jaime W. Jacinto and
Emily R. Lazaro, in G.R. No. 168859; as well as the Petition for Review on Certiorari of E. Ganzon,
Inc. in G.R. No. 168897, are hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 14 October 2004 and Resolution
dated 7 July 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81385 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. No costs.
NWRB v. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. (FULL TEXT)
In issue is whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over appeals from decisions, resolutions
or orders of the National Water Resources Board (petitioner).
A.L. Ang Network (respondent) filed on January 23, 2003 an application for a Certificate of Public
Convenience (CPC) with petitioner to operate and maintain a water service system in Alijis,
Bacolod City.
Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) opposed respondent's application on the ground that it is
the only government agency authorized to operate a water service system within the
city.1cräläwvirtualibräry
By Decision of August 20, 2003, petitioner granted respondent's CPC application. BACIWA moved
to have the decision reconsidered, contending that its right to due process was violated when it
was not allowed to present evidence in support of its opposition.2cЃa
Petitioner reconsidered its Decision and allowed BACIWA to present evidence,3cЃa drawing
respondent to file a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City
against petitioner and BACIWA. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the proper
recourse of respondent was to the Court of Appeals, citing Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC, by Order of April 15, 2005,4cЃa dismissed respondent's petition for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that it is the Court of Appeals which has "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, order[s] or awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commission[s] . . . except those within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court . . . ." Thus the RTC explained:
Art. 89 of P.D. 1067 having been long repealed by BP 129, as amended, which has effectively
and explicitly removed the Regional Trial Courts' appellate jurisdiction over the decisions,
resolutions, order[s] or awards of quasi-judicial agencies such as [petitioner] NWRB, and vested
with the Court of Appeals, very clearly now, this Court has no jurisdiction over this instant petition.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari at the
Court of Appeals, which, by Decision of January 25, 2008,5 annulled and set aside the RTC April
15, 2005, holding that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over appeals from petitioner's decisions.
Thus the appellate court discoursed.
In the analogous case of BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court[,] the Supreme Court . . . categorically pronounced the RTC's jurisdiction over appeals from
the decisions of the NWRB consistent with Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and ratiocinated in this
wise:
x x x x.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that jurisdiction over actions for annulment of NWRC decisions
lies with the Regional Trial Courts, particularly, when we take note of the fact that the appellate
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over NWRC decisions covers such broad and all embracing
grounds as grave abuse of discretion, questions of law, and questions of fact and law (Art. 89,
P.D. No. 1067). This conclusion is also in keeping with the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
which vests Regional Trial Courts with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, etc. (Sec. 21 [1], B.P. Blg. 129) relating to acts or omissions of an inferior court (Sec.
4, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
x x x x.
Similarly, in Tanjay Water District vs. Pedro Gabaton, the Supreme Court conformably ruled, viz:
"Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 8144 involves the appropriation, utilization and control of water, We
hold that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute in the first instance, pertains to the Water
Resources Council as provided in PD No. 1067 which is the special law on the subject. The Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has only appellate jurisdiction over the case."
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, there is no doubt that [petitioner] NWRB is mistaken in its
assertion. As no repeal is expressly made, Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 is certainly meant to be an
exception to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals or petitions for certiorari of the
decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. This finds harmony with Paragraph 2, Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court wherein it is stated that, "If it involves the acts of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals." Evidently, not all petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 involving the decisions
of quasi-judicial agencies must be filed with the Court of Appeals. The rule admits of some
exceptions as plainly provided by the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law or these rules"
and Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 is verily an example of these exceptions. (italics and emphasis
partly in the original; underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution of
February 9, 2009,6cЃa petitioner filed the present petition for review, contending that:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OVER THE
[PETITIONER] SINCE SECTION 89, PD NO. 1067, REGARDING APPEALS, HAS BEEN
SUPERSEDED AND REPEALED BY [BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG] 129 AND THE RULES OF
COURT. FURTHERMORE, PD 1067 ITSELF DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OVER THE
[PETITIONER].7cЃa (underscoring supplied)
Petitioner maintains that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to annul or modify its acts or omissions as a quasi-judicial agency. Citing Section 4 of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner contends that there is no law or rule which requires the
filing of a petition for certiorari over its acts or omissions in any other court or tribunal other than
the Court of Appeals.8cЃa
Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in holding that Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129)
or the Judiciary Reorganization Act did not expressly repeal Article 89 of Presidential Decree No.
1067 (PD 1067) otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines.9cЃa
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains the correctness of the assailed decision of the appellate
court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 9 (1) of BP 129 granted the Court of Appeals (then known as the Intermediate Appellate
Court) original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and
quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.10cЃa
Since the appellate court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies under
Rule 4311cЃa of the Rules of Court, petitions for writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
against the acts and omissions of quasi-judicial agencies, like petitioner, should be filed with it.
This is what Rule 65 of the Rules imposes for procedural uniformity. The only exception to this
instruction is when the law or the Rules itself directs otherwise, as cited in Section 4, Rule
65.12cЃa The appellate court's construction that Article 89 of PD 1067, which reads:
ART. 89. The decisions of the [NWRB] on water rights controversies may be appealed to the [RTC]
of the province where the subject matter of the controversy is situated within fifteen (15) days from
the date the party appealing receives a copy of the decision, on any of the following grounds: (1)
grave abuse of discretion; (2) question of law; and (3) questions of fact and law (emphasis and
underscoring supplied), is such an exception, is erroneous.
Article 89 of PD 1067 had long been rendered inoperative by the passage of BP 129. Aside from
delineating the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals and the RTCs, Section 47 of BP 129 repealed
or modified:
x x x. [t]he provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended, of the Rules of Court, and of all other statutes,
letters of instructions and general orders or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The general repealing clause under Section 47 "predicates the intended repeal under the condition
that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts."13cЃa
In enacting BP 129, the Batasang Pambansa was presumed to have knowledge of the provision
of Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and to have intended to change it.14cЃa The legislative intent to
repeal Article 89 is clear and manifest given the scope and purpose of BP 129, one of which is to
provide a homogeneous procedure for the review of adjudications of quasi-judicial entities to the
Court of Appeals.
More importantly, what Article 89 of PD 1067 conferred to the RTC was the power of review on
appeal the decisions of petitioner. It appears that the appellate court gave significant consideration
to the ground of "grave abuse of discretion" to thus hold that the RTC has certiorari jurisdiction
over petitioner's decisions. A reading of said Article 89 shows, however, that it only made "grave
abuse of discretion" as another ground to invoke in an ordinary appeal to the RTC. Indeed, the
provision was unique to the Water Code at the time of its application in 1976.
The issuance of BP 129, specifically Section 9 (Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, then known
as Intermediate Appellate Court), and the subsequent formulation of the Rules, clarified and
delineated the appellate and certiorari jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals over adjudications of
quasi-judicial bodies. Grave abuse of discretion may be invoked before the appellate court as a
ground for an error of jurisdiction.
It bears noting that, in the present case, respondent assailed petitioner's order via certiorari before
the RTC, invoking grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as ground-
basis thereof. In other words, it invoked such ground not for an error of judgment.
While Section 9 (3) of BP 12915cЃa and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court16cЃa does
not list petitioner as "among" the quasi-judicial agencies whose final judgments, orders,
resolutions or awards are appealable to the appellate court, it is non sequitur to hold that the Court
of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over petitioner's judgments, orders, resolutions or awards.
It is settled that the list of quasi-judicial agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to
be exclusive.17cЃa The employment of the word "among" clearly instructs so.
BF Northwest Homeowners Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court,18cЃa a 1987 case cited
by the appellate court to support its ruling that RTCs have jurisdiction over judgments, orders,
resolutions or awards of petitioner, is no longer controlling in light of the definitive instruction of
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton19cЃa is not in point either as the issue raised therein was which
between the RTC and the then National Water Resources Council had jurisdiction over disputes
in the appropriation, utilization and control of water.
In fine, certiorari and appellate jurisdiction over adjudications of petitioner properly belongs to the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The April 15, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City dismissing
petitioner's petition for lack of jurisdiction is UPHELD.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.