V.

Trustees (Rule 98)

1. RTC to appoint a trustee

2. Trustee distinguished from executor/administrator
3. Conditions deemed written in the bond
4. Grounds for the removal and resignation of a trustee
5. Extent of authority of trustee
VI. Adoption (Rule 99, superseded by the Rule on Adoption per AM 02-6-02-SC)
1. Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-country adoption

A. Domestic adoption

1. Effects of adoption
2. Instances when adoption may be rescinded
3. Effects of rescission of adoption
B. Inter-country adoption

1. When allowed
2. Functions of the RTC
3. “Best interest of minor” standard
 Anonymous v. Curamen, AM P-08-2549, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 212
 DSWD v. Judge Belen, AM RTJ-96-1362, July 18, 1997
 In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim, GR 168992-93.
May 21, 2009, 588 SCRA 98
 In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, GR 148311. Mar.
31, 2005, 454 SCRA 541
 Lahom v. Sibulo, GR 143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135
 Landingin v. Republic, GR 164948. June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 415
 Republic v. Hernandez, GR 117209. Feb. 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509
VII. Rescission and revocation of adoption (Rule 100, superseded by the Rule on Adoption per
AM 02-6-02-SC)
VIII. Proceedings for Hospitalization of Insane Persons (Rule 101)

Adoption defined
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in
rem which creates between two (2) persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation.
The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of
paternity and filiation but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status (In the
Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, GR 148311. Mar. 31, 2005, 494 Phil.
515)
 Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-country adoption

DOMESTIC ADOPTION INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION

Governed by RA 8043, the Inter-Country

Governed by RA 8552, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1995; procedure governed by

Adoption Act of 1998; procedure governed the Amended Implementing Rules and

by AM No. 02-06-02-SC, Aug. 22, 2002. Regulations on ICAA.

Applies to domestic adoption of Filipino

children, where the entire adoption process Applies to adoption of a Filipino child in a foreign country,

beginning from the filing of the petition up where the petition for adoption is filed, the supervised trial

to the issuance of the adoption decree takes custody is undertaken and the decree of adoption is issued outside

place in the Philippines. of the Philippines.

Who may be adopted Who may be adopted

A child legally available for adoption. Only a legally free child may be adopted.

Requisites: Requisites:

a) Below 18 years of age; and a) Below 15 years of age; and

b) Judicially declared available for b) Has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the

adoption. DSWD in accordance with PD 603.

c) Exceptions:

d) Legitimate son/daughter of one spouse

by the other spouse;

e) Illegitimate son/daughter by a

qualified adopter;

f) Person of legal age if, prior to the

adoption said person has been consistently

considered and treated by the adopter/s as

his/her own child since minority.

Who may adopt Who may adopt

1. FILIPINO CITIZENS A. FILIPINO CITIZENS

1) Of legal age; 1) Permanent resident of a foreign country;

2) In possession of full civil capacity and 2) Has the capacity to act and assume all rights and

legal rights; responsibilities of parental authority under Philippine laws;

3) Of good moral character; 3) Has undergone the appropriate counseling from an

accredited counselor in country of domicile;

4) Has not been convicted of any crime

involving moral turpitude; 4) Has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

5) Emotionally and psychologically 5) Eligible to adopt under Philippine laws;

capable of caring for children;

6) In a position to provide the proper care and support and to

6) In a position to support and care for give the necessary moral values and example to all his children,

his/her children in keeping with the means including the child to be adopted;

of the family;
7) Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied

7) At least 16 years older than the under Philippine laws, the UN Convention on Rights of the Child,

adoptee but this latter requirement may be

waived if (a) the adopter is the biological and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the

parent of the adoptee; or (b) the adopter is provisions of the ICAA;

the spouse of the adoptee‘s parent; and

8) Residing in a country with whom the Philippines has

8) Permanent resident of the Philippines. diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a

similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is

allowed in that country;

1. ALIENS
9) Possesses all the qualifications and none of the

disqualifications provided in the ICAA and in other applicable

1) Same qualifications as above, and in
Philippine laws;
addition:

10) At least 27 years of age at the time of the application; and

2) His/her country has diplomatic

relations with the Republic of the 11) At least 16 years older than the child to be adopted at the

Philippines; time of application, unless (a) adopted is the parent by nature of

the child to be adopted; or (b) adopter is the spouse of the parent

by nature of the child to be adopted.

3) His/her government allows the

adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her

B. ALIENS
adopted son/daughter;

4) Has been living in the Philippines for 1) At least 27 years of age at the time of the application;

at least 3 continuous years prior to the filing

2) At least 16 years older than the child to be adopted at
of the application for adoption and
the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by
maintains such residence until the adoption
nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such
decree is entered; and
parent;

5) Has been certified by his/her

3) Has the capacity to act and assume all rights and
diplomatic or consular office or any
responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws;
appropriate government agency that he/she

has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her 4) Has undergone the appropriate counseling from an

country. This requirement may be waived if accredited counselor in his/her country;

(a) a former Filipino citizens seeks to adopt

5) Has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
a relative within the 4th degree of
consanguinity or affinity; (b) one seeks to 6) Eligible to adopt under his/her national law;

adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her

7) In a position to provide the proper care and support and
Filipino spouse; (c) one who is married to a
to give the necessary moral values and example to all his
Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt a relative
children, including the child to be adopted;
within the 4th degree of consanguinity or

affinity of the Filipino spouse. 8) Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied

under Philippine laws, the UN Convention on the Rights of the

Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to

implement the provisions of the ICAA;

9) Comes from a country with whom the Philippines has

diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly

authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed

under his/her national laws; and

 10) Possesses all the qualifications and none of the

disqualifications provided in the ICAA and in other applicable

Philippine laws.

Requirement of Joint Adoption by

Spouses Requirement of Joint Adoption by Spouses

General rule: husband and wife shall jointly

adopt; otherwise, the adoption shall not be

allowed.

Exceptions:

1) If one spouse seeks to adopt the

legitimate son/daughter of the other;

2) If one spouse seeks to adopt his/her

own illegitimate son/daughter but the other

Rule: if the adopter is married, his/her spouse must
spouse must give his/her consent;
jointly file for the adoption.
3) If the spouses are legally separated

from each other.

Procedure Procedure

Where to file application: Either in (a) Family Court having

jurisdiction over the place where the child resides or may be

Where to file application: In the Family
found, or (b) Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) through
Court of the province or city where the
an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an
prospective parents reside.
authorized and accredited agency, in the country of the

prospective adoptive parents.

After filing: The petition shall not be set for

hearing without a case study report by a

After filing:
licensed social worker.

a) if filed in the FC, court determines sufficiency of petition

in respect to form and substance, after which, petition is

Supervised Trial Custody: transmitted to ICAB;

a) Temporary parental authority is vested b) if petition is already with ICAB, it conducts matching of

in prospective adopter; the applicant with an adoptive child;

b) Period is at least 6 months, but may be c) after matchmaking, the child is personally fetched by the

reduced by the court motu propio or upon applicant for the trial custody which takes place outside of the

motion; Philippines.

c) If adopter is alien, the law mandatorily

requires completion of the 6-month trial

Supervised Trial Custody:
custody and may not be reduced, except if:

a) This process takes place outside of the country and under

1) a former Filipino citizen seeks to
the supervision of the foreign adoption agency;
adopt a relative within 4th degree of

consanguinity or affinity; b) For a period of 6 months;

2) one seeks to adopt the legitimate c) If unsuccessful, ICAB shall look for another prospective

son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; applicant. Repatriation of the child is to be resorted only as a

last resort;
3) one who is married to a Filipino d) If successful, ICAB transmits a written consent for the

citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with adoption to be executed by the DSWD, and the applicant then

his/her spouse a relative within the 4th files a petition for adoption in his/her country.

degree of consanguinity or affinity of the

Decree of Adoption: Issued by a foreign court.
Filipino spouse.

Consent Required:

1) Written consent of biological or adopted children above 10

Decree of Adoption: Issued by Philippine
years of age, in the form of sworn statement is required to be
Family Court.
attached to the application to be filed with the FC or ICAB;

Consent Required: Written consent of the

2) If a satisfactory pre-adoptive relationship is formed between
following to the adoption is required, in the
the applicant and the child, the written consent to the adoption
form of affidavit:
executed by the DSWD is required.

1) adoptee, if 10 years of age or over;

2) biological parent/s of the child, if

known, or the legal guardian, or the proper

government instrumentality which has legal

custody of the child;

3) legitimate and adopted sons or

daughters, 10 years of age or over, of the

adopter/s and adoptee, if any;

4) illegitimate sons/daughters, 10 years

of age of over, of the adopter if living with

said adopter and the latter‘s spouse, if any;

5) spouse, if any, of the person adopting

or to be adopted.
 A. DOMESTIC ADOPTION
Effects of adoption
Transfer of parental authority – except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of
the adopter, the parental authority of the biological parents shall terminate and the same shall be
vested in the adopters.
Legitimacy – the adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all
intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to
legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind.
Successional rights
1. In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal
rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation;
2. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern;
3. The adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Issuance of new certificate and first name and surname of adoptee
1. The adoption decree shall state the name by which the child is to be known. An
amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry attesting to the fact that the
adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname;
2. The original certificate of birth shall be stamped “cancelled” with the annotation of
the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place and shall be sealed in the civil
registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the adoptee shall not bear any
notation that it is an amended issue;
3. All records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court,
the DSWD, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall
be kept strictly confidential and the court may order its release under the following
conditions only: (1) the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for
purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption; (2) the disclosure will be for the best
interest of the adoptee; and (3) the court may restrict the purposes for which it may be used.

Instances when adoption may be rescinded

Grounds for rescission:
1. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counselling;
2. Attempt on the life of the adoptee;
3. Sexual assault or violence; or
4. Abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Prescriptive period:
1. If incapacitated – within five (5) years after he reaches the age of majority;
2. If incompetent at the time of the adoption – within five (5) years after recovery from
such incompetency.

Effects of rescission of adoption

 Parental authority of the adoptee‘s biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody
of the DSWD shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated;
 Reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall
be extinguished;
 Cancellation of the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and restoration of
his/her original birth certificate; and
 Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of
judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be
respected.

B. Inter-country adoption

Inter-country adoption; when allowed

Inter-country adoption; when allowed

 Inter-country adoptions are allowed when the same shall prove beneficial to the
child‘s best interests, and shall serve and protect his/her fundamental rights.
 It is allowed when all the requirements and standards set forth under RA 8043 are
complied with.

Functions of the RTC in inter-country adoption

Functions of the RTC in inter-country adoption
An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed either with the Philippine Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board, through an intermediate agency,
whether governmental or an authorized and accredited agency, in the country of the prospective
adoptive parents, which application shall be in accordance with the requirements as set forth in
the implementing rules and regulations.

“Best interest of minor” standard

In case of custody cases of minor children, the court after hearing and bearing in mind the best
interest of the minor, shall award the custody as will be for the minor‘s best interests.

“Best interests of the child” – means the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are
most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the child and most
encouraging to his physical, psychological, and emotional development. It also means the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the child.
1. Department of Social Welfare & Development vs. Judge Antonio M. Belen, A.M. No.
RTJ-96-1362, July 18, 1997 Doctrine: The error on the part of both respondent judge and
social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that
respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the
commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study
could have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the
necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to
make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely
presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD
regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it
that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the
other requirements of the law. By respondent’s failure to do so, he may well have
wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose
adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device
by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea
in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer
concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained
exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation
and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and
recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act. Facts: A social welfare
officer of the DSWD filed an administrative complaint against Judge Antonio Belen for
rendering an erroneous decree of adoption in violation of Article 33 of PD 603 (The
Child and Youth Welfare Code), and SC Circular No. 12. Elma Vedana, a social welfare
officer, was also charged with disregarding the provisions of the same Circular No. 12.
Spouses Soriano filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea. Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that the spouses were highly
qualified to adopt the child as their own. Judge Belen based his decision on the findings
and recommendation of the DSWD, which, as respondent judge asserted in his judgment,
are contained in the “Adoptive Home Study Report” and “Child Study Report” prepared
by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña. However, when
the minor Zhedell sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order
to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the department uncovered what it
considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the
DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was
never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a “Home and Child
Study Report” in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for
the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter
of the required reports for said minor’s adoption. Respondent judge, in compliance
therewith, claimed that he directed respondent Vedaña to conduct the home and case
study, and thereafter submit the required reports thereon, precisely because the same are
among her duties under the Manual for Clerks of Court. Since these functions were so
provided to be performed by her, there was no need for him to order said respondent
social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD as he assumed that it was routine
procedure for her to do so. Issue: Whether the judge and the social welfare officer
violated Article 33 of PD 603 and Circular No. 12?
YES. Held: Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain
terms that: “No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social
Welfare, or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as
well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and
recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of
Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that
the petition should be denied.” Circular No. 12, on the other hand, definitively directs the
RTC hearing adoption cases: 1. to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and
Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency
thereof with respect to those cases already filed; 2. to strictly COMPLY with the
requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree x x x The Staff Assistant V (Social
Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social
Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case
study. The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too
evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have
taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special
Proceeding so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted
by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that
possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation.
Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for
the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption
proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was
observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.
The social welfare officer concerned arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained
exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation
and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and
recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act. Although both violated
their duties, the court found lack of bad faith or gross negligence. The respondent judge
was censured for violating Art. 33 of PD 603 and Circular No. 12; and the social welfare
officer was reprimanded for violating Circular No. 12.

2.) Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209, February 9, 1996 Doctrines: A petition for
adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in
substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being
respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both
reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the given or proper name
of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the
substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family
Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of
the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must
correspondingly be complied with. A petition for change of name grounded on the fact
that one was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he
used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. For, in
truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name. Neither does the fact
that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute
proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. A name given to a
person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community -
when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be
recognized as his real name. While the right of a natural parent to name the child is
recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive
parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for
the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and
consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of
the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully
extend to or include the proper or given name. Facts: Private respondent spouses, Van
Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petitionto adopt the minor
Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be
adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption
of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents
prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same
being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by
which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993
when he arrived at private respondents’ residence. At the hearing, petitioner opposed the
inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal
opposition, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption
and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions
should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. It should be noted that no
challenge has been raised by petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents
to be adopting parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor.
The records show that the latter have commendably established their qualifications under
the law to be adopters, and have amply complied with the procedural requirements for the
petition for adoption. The trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents. Issues:
1. Whether the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered
proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and 2.
Whether there was lawful ground for the change of name
Held: 1. Yes. It is the position of the private respondents that the petition was predicated
upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the
joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes
of action in a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of
action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met.
Art. 189 of the Family Code[footnoteRef:1] enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal
effects of adoption. Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and
obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural
and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in
the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. [1: “(1) For civil
purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;(2) The
parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested
in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the
adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses;
and(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood
relatives.”] However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in
the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the
adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the
purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted. The name of the adoptee as recorded
in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until
the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in
the civil register is a substantial change in one’s official or legal name and cannot be
authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a
change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in
keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should
normally make its decree recording such change. The official name of a person whose
birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein, If a change in one’s
name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the
substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds
therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for change of name
being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is
indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of
rules. The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition
insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together cannot
but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for
change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally
erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of
the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law. Neither can the allowance of the
subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule
allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. While joinder of causes of action is
largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows
causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites:
(a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the
causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties,
or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character. While the rule
allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should
nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and
fact involved. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. Turning now to the present petition,
while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for
 adoption and for change of name, there is no relation between these two petitions, nor are
they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of
fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not
rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder
under our Rules. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and
rules. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed
adopter’s fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly. On the
other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected
for what is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the
proposed change of name. Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately
assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the other. An action for
adoption and an action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each
other and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. Fitness to adopt is not
determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly, a
change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter
was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a
common ground, thus the joinder would be improper. It furthermore cannot be said that
the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete determination of all
matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee
in one petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form
and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee. The policy
of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of
causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present
interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively
settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject
matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up
individually.

2. No. Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the grant
of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new identification and
designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name given to him during the baptismal
rites. Allowing the change of his first name as prayed for in the petition, so they claim,
merely confirms the designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives. This largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child
Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents,
have as much right as the natural parents to freely select the first name of their adopted
child. There is no legal or jurisprudential basis for this ruling. A person’s name is a word
or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from
others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must
have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname
or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. The official name of a
person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And
once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, no person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on
the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed
legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. As
earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as
it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest
the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a
nullity. It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a
matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Before a person can be
authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in
his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable
cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change. Jurisprudence has
recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of
name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or
adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by
another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied
inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a
condition sine qua non to a change of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has
been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable
cause to legally authorize a change of name. A name given to a person in the church
records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community - when at variance with
that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
The only grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted
child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private
respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and known by his
family, relatives and friends from the time he came to live with private respondents. The
legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as
unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to use his
baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be to
countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon. The trial Judge failed
to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being named for the first time by his
natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by his
natural parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and changed by
the adoptive parents. In the first case, there is no dispute that natural parents have the
right to freely select and give the child’s first name for every person, including juridical
persons, must have a name. In the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private
respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor
 adoptee after such right to name the child had already been exercised by the natural
parent. Adopting parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right
asserted by private respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot
be claimed as a right. It is merely a privilege necessitating judicial consent upon
compelling grounds. While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-
name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble
intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be
favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of
the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include
the proper or given name. Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely
foreclose and is without prejudice to, private respondents’ privilege to legally change the
proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this
time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned
on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the
compelling reasons advanced therefor. Thus, the legally adopted child of private
respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless
a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle
and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in
the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental
authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to
be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to
adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely
just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and
well-being.

3.) In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michael Jude P. Lim, GR No. 168992-93, May 21,
2009 Doctrines: Adoption; Husband and Wife; Husband and wife must jointly adopt.—It
is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario.
We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions
for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552
reads: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt: x x x Husband and wife
shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: x x x The use of the word “shall” in the
above quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the
child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses. The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adop tion were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without
joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children
of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are no legally separated from each
other. Same; Same; Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8552); A
foreigner adopting together with his or her Philippine spouse must meet the qualifications
set forth in Republic Act No. 8552, and the requirements on residency and certification of
the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot be waived.—The fact that Olario gave his
consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet
the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is
allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These requirements on residency
and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant
to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate
children of petitioner. Same; Effects; Even if emancipation terminates parental authority,
the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a
legitimate child.—Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3)
give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the
name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal
and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother;
(2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other
successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights. Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; While the Court is
not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the
welfare of the children, regrettably, the law is clear and it cannot be modified without
violating the proscription against judicial legislation.—We are mindful of the fact that
adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child
to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys
of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. But,
as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara (270 SCRA 206 [1997]): We are not unmindful
of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain
rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes,
love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the
law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot
sustain the respondent spouses’ petition for adoption. Petitioner, being married at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her
husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner. Same; Husband and
Wife; Dissolution of Marriage; The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage
between the spouses is of no moment—it is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of
marriage; Since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, the petitioner was
married, joint adoption with the husband is mandatory.—Petitioner, in her Memorandum,
insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible
because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los
Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the
case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling
above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married
to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

Facts: Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently, two minor
children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia
Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of their own, Monina and Primo registered the
children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named
Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children
as if they were their own. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000,
Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen. Monina decided to adopt the children
by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth
of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael
was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband, Michael and Olario gave
their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. On 15
September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial
court ruled that since Monina had remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly
with her new husband. Monina appealed contending that the rule on joint adoption must
be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim
“dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental
authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle
was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age.
Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having
attained the age of majority.

Issues: 1. Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

2. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children
have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.

Held: 1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in the
following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other;
or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses
are legally separated from each other, which was not present in the case at bar. The use of
the word “shall” means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory.
This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is
the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child,
it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the
petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three
exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally
separated from each other. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown
in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario
must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at
least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to
adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as
the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner. 2. Petitioner's contention is
untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. Even the remarriage of the
surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court
appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. It is
true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the
age of majority or 18 years of age — emancipation terminates parental authority over the
person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts
of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such
as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to
which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights. 4.)
Anonymous vs. Emma Curamen, A.M. No. P-08-2549, June 18, 2010 Facts: The
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous complaint charging
Emma Curamen(Respondent), a court interpreter in MTC Rizal in Nueva Ecija, with
falsification of a public document and simulation of birth. Allegedly, Respondent
registered the birth of a child supposedly named Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen in the
local civil registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and misrepresented that she was the child’s
biological mother and her husband was the biological father. When in truth, the
Respondent was the child’s maternal grandmother. The Complainant also submitted the
original birth certificate of respondent to show that the child’s real name was Rinea Mae
Curamen Aquino and that her parents were spouses Olga Mae Curamen Aquino and Jun
Aquino. Upon investigation, the Executive Judge of RTC Rizal verified that Rinea and
Rica Mae were the same child and was, in fact, Respondent’s granddaughter. Further, the
the Executive Judge verified that Respondent executed an affidavit for delayed
registration of the alleged birth of her child. Respondent’s application was given due
course and the supposed birth of Rica Mae was registered in the Civil Registry. In her
Comment, respondent admitted that the real parents of the child were her daughter and
son-in-law. Respondent claimed that the child’s parents, being unemployed, were unable
to support themselves let alone their child. She asserted that the child’s parents actually
depended on her and her husband for support. According to respondent, it was the child’s
parents themselves who proposed to register the birth of the child anew. Respondent
insisted she had no intention to conceal the true identity of the child. Respondent justified
her act as an example of a common practice among Filipinos to extend help to family
members.

Held: A birth certificate, being a public document, serves as prima facie evidence of
filiation. The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification
of a public document. When public documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third
person need not be present because the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth the document proclaims. Thus, Respondent
cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to conceal the
identity of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s true filiation to the
child’s prejudice. Moreover, Respondent’s justification for her act – that the true parents
of the child are unable to support the child as they are fully dependent on respondent for
their own support – is an affront to common sense. It taxes one’s imagination how
concealment of the child’s true parents, through falsification of the child’s birth
certificate, will make it easier for respondent to support the child. Respondent can very
well continue supporting the child as her own, as is the practice in Filipino families,
without having to tamper with the child’s birth certificate. Fallo: Respondent is
found GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of a public document
and SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

5.) In the Matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia Honorato B.
Catindig, GR No. 148311, March 31, 2005 Doctrine: Being a legitimate child by virtue of
her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father. Facts: Honorato B. Catindig (petitioner) filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie was born
on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been
using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be
changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to
“Catindig,” his surname. TC granted the petition and held that pursuant to Article 189 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG. Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her
middle name. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name. Issue: W/N an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father. Held: YES, there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, (and there is
no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.) As correctly submitted by both
parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as “An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,” is silent as to
what middle name a child may use. The middle name or the mother’s surname is only
considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and
surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mother’s surname shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle
name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that “an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Also, Article 189 of the Family
Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including theright of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters; x x x” However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the
Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father. In the case of an adopted child, the law
provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters. Again, it is silent
whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right
and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
decree of adoption. Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related
or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a
juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is
to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This was,
indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of
the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that
adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
“Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,” secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living
together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them “Mama” and “Papa”. Indeed, they are one normal
happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle
name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 6.) Isabelita Lahom vs Jose
Melvin Sibulo, GR No. 143989, July 14, 2003 Doctrine: Republic Act No. 8552 affirmed
the legitimate status of the adopted child not only in his new family but also in the society
as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and
gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. Facts:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972,
the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change
the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition
to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that
of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use
Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA
No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to
rescind a decree of adoption. These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference,
ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in
December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5,
1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption,
specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March
22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall
not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19). Issue: W/N
the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed. –
NO & YES. Held: Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light
of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after
the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the
adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had
come into force, could no longer be pursued. Besides, even before the passage of
RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule
100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period
is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a
"vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
"right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it
may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be
taken away at any time before it has been exercised. But an adopter, while barred from
severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his
legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in
the disposable portion of his estate. 7.) Diwata Ramos Landingin vs. Republic of the
Philippines, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006 Doctrines: The general requirement of
consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity
to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The
written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption.— Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must
be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in
the care of others is not such an abandonment.— To dispense with the requirement of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
Abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of
love and support. Even assuming that the minor children were abandoned by their
biological parents, Section 9 of R.A. 8552 applies. It provides that if the written consent
of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of
the minors will suffice. Facts: On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US
citizen, of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the
adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos; Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon
Ramos. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and
Amelia Ramos. Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on
May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos;
their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children
by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos
nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the
minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives
abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the
children; the minors have given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to
adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who
are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives
alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her
children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment
to support the minors while in petitioner’s custody. Since her petition was unopposed,
petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. The petitioner testified in her
behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the
written consent executed by her and her siblings. The petitioner marked in evidence the
Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel
Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as
proof of said consent. In her Child Study Report, DSWD Social Welfare Officer II
Elizabeth Pagbilao recommended the grant of the petition. She alleged that the mother of
minors came home together with her son John Mario, in May 2002, for 3 week-vacation,
to enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children.
The mother allegedly voluntarily consented to the adoption. Petitioner failed to present
Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that
Amelia assents to the adoption. RTC Tarlac grated the petition. CA reversed. Issues: 1.
Whether or not the written consent of the biological parents to the adoption is
indispensable? YES. 2. Whether or not Amelia abandoned her children by going to Italy
and leaving the children to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother, hence her
written consent is not required? NO. 3. Whether or not the joint written consent of the
petitioner’s legitimate children notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA duly
authenticated and therefore admissible? NO. 4. Whether or not petitioner is financially
capable? NO. Held: 1. See Doctrine 1. We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that
she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son,
John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was
able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to
execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the
petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition. 2. See
Doctrine 2. When Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or
to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave
the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or
relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased
mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for
serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the
children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide. 3.
Petitioner failed to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103 for its authentication. Section
2 has something to do with acknowledgment before ambassador, minister, etc.; that
person taking acknowledgment certifies that he knows the person acknowledging the
instrument before him, etc. (Please see original for this.) 4. Petitioner’s financial
capability is doubtful. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old,
employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around
$1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter
to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is
still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a
hindrance to the adoption proceedings. Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful
whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the
three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While
petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and
siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal
to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter.
Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that her siblings
 and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors
herein.

RULE 101. PROCEEDINGS FOR HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE PERSONS

Posted on November 9, 2016 by ALVIN CLARIDADES

1 Vote

RULE 101. PROCEEDINGS FOR HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE PERSONS

SECTION 1, RULE 101. VENUE, PETITION FOR COMMITMENT
Venue
A petition for the commitment of a person to a hospital or other place for the insane may be filed
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the person alleged to be insane is found
(Sec. 1, Rule 101, RoC).
Who shall file the petition; grounds
The petition shall be filed by the Director of Health in all cases where, in his opinion, such
commitment is:

1. for the public welfare; or

2. for the welfare of said person who, in his judgment, is insane and such person or the
one having charge of him is opposed to his being taken to a hospital or other place for the
insane ( 1, Rule 101, RoC).
SECTION 2, RULE 101. ORDER FOR HEARING
Court to fix date of hearing
If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court shall, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, fix a date for the hearing thereof and copy of such order shall be served:

1. on the person alleged to be insane and to the one having charge him; or
2. on such of his relatives residing in the province or city as the judge may deem proper.
The court shall also order the sheriff to produce the alleged insane person, if possible, on the date
of the hearing (Sec. 2, Rule 101, RoC).
SECTION 3, RULE 101. HEARING AND JUDGMENT
Court to order commitment of insane to hospital
The court shall order the commitment of the insane person to such hospital or other place for the
insane as may be recommended by the Director of Health upon satisfactory proof during the
hearing:

1. that the commitment applied for is for the public welfare or for the welfare of the
insane person; and
2. that his relatives are unable for any reason to take proper custody and care of him
The court shall make proper provisions for the custody of property or money belonging to the
insane until a guardian is properly appointed (Sec. 3, Rule 101, RoC).
SECTION 4, RULE 101. DISCHARGE OF INSANE
Petition for release of insane
The Director of Health may file the proper petition with the Regional Trial Court which ordered
the commitment when, in his opinion, the person ordered to be committed to a hospital or other
place for the insane:

1. is temporarily or permanently cured; or

2. may be released without danger ( 4, Rule 101, RoC).
SECTION 5, RULE 101. ASSISTANCE OF FISCAL IN THE PROCEEDING
Prosecutor to prepare petition and represent the Director of Health in court
The provincial or city prosecutor concerned shall have the duty of preparing the petition for the
Director of Health and of representing him in court in all proceedings arising under the
provisions of Rule 101 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 5, Rule 101, RoC)