liARGE SYSTEMS
Power
Whys and wlierefares’ Of
power s)iskm blackouts
An examinatioti of the factors that increase the
likelihood and ihe frequency of system failure
Serious power interruptions or blackouts occur at the rate
of about 35 .per year in the United States, or about once
every ten days somewhere in the country. And about half
of these, on the average, exceed 100 MW and involve
45 Ooo customers at a time. In fact, the number of
reported outages appears to be increasing tit a rate of 6
percent per year. On the other hand, that rate is about
equal to the average growth in served load over the same
period. Further, despite all the publicity, and the damage
that has been caused by individual incidents, the major
rep.orted interruptions represent only about 100 GWh per
year of unserved energy. Compared with the 2 miltion
GWh generated in the U.S. during 1976, this loss amounts
to just 50 parts per million-a remarkable record.
What causes blackouts? In general, a combination of
circumstances that stresses the network beyond its
capability. Stressful events-including natural
phenomena (such as severe storms), human error and
associated equipment malfunction-combine with
predisposing factors such as inadequate design,
weaknesses in maintenace or testing procedures, and defi-
cient system-protection schemes to ieaken the bulk-
power system and lead to its eventual bteakdown. Uncon-
trolled cascading results and causes a failure that must be
contained in a portion of the.system so that it does not ex-
pand to unmanageable proportions. , over 1 300 000 customers.
Can blackouts be avoided? Probably not entirely. But it
is encouraging to note that New York City experienced an
initiating event on September 26, 1977, that may have
been more severe than the one that precipitated the July
13 blackout two months earlier, yet the system coped by
shedding only 200 MW of load for one hour. No uncon-
trolled cascading took place.
Careful analysis and reports of each interruption can
determine and correct, to’some extent, the root causes,
such as component or system desigri deficiencies, opera-
tion and maintenance deficiencies, or inadequate infor-
mation and display. Action can then be taken to assure
that these and similar generically related conditions are
corrected. Thus, once the contributing factors are iden-
tified and corrected, tomorrow’s power systems will be
even less subject to load interruptions than today’s
systems are.
Power interruptions
For the past several years, most power companies in the
United States have been required by the Federal Power
Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission) to report outages of 100 MW or greater that last
D. N. Ewart General Electric Company
0018-9200/78/0400-036$00.7501978
36
- -
15 minutes or longer and are caused by the outage of
facilities operated at 69 kV or more. Less severe outages
must be reported if they exceed half the annual peak load
of an affected system.
Table 1 summarizes these reported outages for the years
1971 through 1976, and Fig. 1 illustrates the increasing
number of reported outages. By grouping the data, it is
possible to gain further quantification of their severity.
Among the data shown are the amount of load inter-
rupted by each outage, and the length of time before all or
most service was restored. The least load interrupted was
2.4 MW and the most was 3632 MW.
If the 211 outages are plotted graphically, the data seem
to be distributed in a Gaussian or normal fashion (Fig. 2).
Finding a set of ccordinates that permits a straight line to
represent the data, as was done here, is helpful because
then it is possible to interpolate readily between points,
and to venture a modest degree of extrapolation. Based
on Fig. 2, the following statements can be made with
some certainty.
l Ten percent of the reported outages, between three
and four per year, exceeded 2900 MW. Each involved
over 300 000 customers.
l One percent of the reported outages, or one every
three years, exceeded 2900 MW. Each of these involved
l One-third percent of the reported interruptions, or one
every ten years, can, be expected to exceed 5500 MW and
involve over 2 500 000 customers.
The New York City blackout of July 13, 1977, which
occurred after the period covered by these statistics, inter-
rupted 6000 MW of load and involved about 2 725 000
customers. Note that New York City was also affected in
the 1965 blackout that involved much of the Northeast.
A similar analysis uses the length of time required to
restore service to customers. These data do not follow a
normal distribution, but rattier appear to be well fitted to
a compound exponential distribution (Fig. 2). Again us-
ing interpolation or extrapolation, the following
statements can be made.
l Ninety percent of the reported outages, or on average
31 per year, required more than one hour to restore all
service.
l Sixty percent of the reported outages, or on average 21
per year, required more than one hour to restore all ser-
vice.
l Ten percent of the reported outages, or between three
and four per year, required more than eight hours to
restore all service.
l One percent of the reported outages, or one every
three years, required more than a week to restore all ser-
vice.
IEEE IEFE spectrum APRlt 197R
 0 Extrapolating to l/3 of 1 percent of reported outages, During this stage, and depending upon its perceived
once every ten years an outage might require a full month degree of seriousness, operators would make judgments
to restore all service. by taking into account both the security of the network
The longest outage shown, which lasted I6 days and in- and economic factors. Two, three, or more levels of alert
volved an estimated 1500 MW, was due to a massive ice may be passed through in succession as increased weight is
storm. The integrity of the bulk-power system was main- given to security rather than economics. The probability
tained over this period. of avoiding an emergency diminishes sharply as each new
Thus, power interruptions do occur frequently, and alert level is entered. There is no doubt that the initial
probably more often than most people realize. They can alert states are the most difficult and demanding for
be severe when considered in terms of their duration, the human operators. In the face of limited and often conflic-
amount of power involved, and the number of customers ting data, operators must provide an appropriate measure
interrupted. Although the loss is infinitesimal when of response at all times. There are obvious hazards in
measured against the total load served, power interrup- underresponding, but overresponse also can be damaging.
tions-and blackouts in particular-are very significant Usually, progression is from the initial alert stage to a
when measured in terms of their social and political im- state of restoration, leading promptly back to a restora-
pact. Increased attention is being applied to ways of tion that quickly leads, in turn, back to a state of normali-
minimizing their frequency and severity. ty. Sometimes progression from the restoration state leads
back to an alert state when restorative steps do not suc-
Sequence of steps ceed. An unsuccessful attempt at resynchronization, for
Over the years, various authors have described the example, would lead back to a state of alert.
states that a power system passes through following a Progression to a state of emergency can occur when the
disturbance (see Mar. 1978, p. 48). Although there has operator has separated (islanded) the stressed parts from
not been a concerted effort to develop exact definitions of the rest of the system. Almost simultaneously, some load
these states, the formalism is helpful because it results in is shed under controlled conditions and all efforts are
more structured thinking. Under emergency conditions, a directed toward preventing a widespread blackout.
power system may experience a transition from the so- Economic operation has been abandoned; established and
called normal state into states of alert, emergency,
restoration, and, in a few cases, in extremis.
In general terms, a state of alert exists following an in- I. Summary of ower lnterru tlons reported to the
itiating event (a first lightning stroke, for example) when Federal Power c! ommlsslon 8urlng 1971- 1976
the system has been weakened by the loss of transmission
lines and/or generation plants. The system is thus exposed Total’
Number of Total Load Number of
and vulnerable to further stress, either in the form of in- Customers
Interruptlons Involved
dependent natural events (such as a second lightning Year Reported Involved
W4
stroke), or equipment malfunction-perhaps an
overstressed generating plant triping off after its response 1971 31 7 664 t
to the initial state of alert. 1972 26 4 206 1 450 000
1973 37 14 551 9 419 000
1974 32 9 455 2 694 000
1975 40 5 730 2 432 000
[l] Cumulatlve~probablllty function of magnltude 01 load 1976 35 9 632 3 602 000
dlsconnected In 211 reported Interruptions durlng the
years 1971-1978. The logarlthm of the magnltude Is used ‘A customer Is s bllllng center such 8s a residence or an lnduslrlal Complex.
as the ordlnate because of the wide range of magnltudes The number 01 lndivlduels effected Is ssvsral times larger than the number Of
Involved. The stralght line represents a log.normal pro. customers.
bablllty dlstrlbutlon. tNo( reoorled prior to 1072.

[2] Cumulative probablllty of tlme to restore nearly all ser.

vice for 211 reported lnterruptlons (Table I). The stralght
line representi a log+ompdund exponentlal probablllty
function.

100 ooo-

10 ooo-
B
2
E looO-
z-
9
i
g loo-
z
E!
I-2
f log
r=

l-
100 !

Percentage of occurrences greater than ordmate Percentage of occurrences greater than ordinate

Ewarl-Whys and wherclores of power syrtem blackouts

ad hoc procedures are being implemented to increase
generation, restore transmission, shed load if required,
and generally work toward relieving overloaded facilities
until more orderly restoration procedures can begin.
In a small percentage of cases, these measures are not
successful and uncontrolled separation and/or loss of
load occurs. The system can then be said to be in extremis.
If generation cannot be made equal to the load that re-
mains following automatic load shedding, the electrical
island will shut down.
Predisposing factors
When one looks for causes of power interruption and
blackouts, it is helpful to draw a parallel with the medical
profession, where the concept of “predisposing factors”
has found use. A history of high blood pressure, for ex-
ample, is considered to be a strong predisposing factor to
the occurrence of strokes. Heredity is a predisposing fac-
tor for diabetes. Cigarette smoking and obesity are con-
sidered to be predisposing factors for heart disease. Note
that there are some factors over which an individual has
little or no control, and others than can be changed.
A predisposing factor is not to be confused with an in-
itiating event, or to be interpreted as the cause of an
outage. Rather, adverse predisposing factors increase the
likelihood that the initiating event will lead to power inter-
ruptions and blackouts rather than to a normal sequence
of protective actions designed to contain the disturbance.
To the author’s knowledge, no formal studies have
been made to identify predisposing factors for power
blackouts, and we have to rely on our own observation
and conjecture at this point.
vulnerability. Pressure to locate transmission corridors on
terrain not suitable for other purposes (such as over rocky
ground or ravines) is another predisposing factor. In these
cases, exposure to lightning stroke increases; tower-
footing resistances may be higher than normal; the danger
of fires or rock slides is increased; and visual inspection is
more difficult. All these factors contribute to higher
outage rates.
Operator training
One area that has been receiving increased attention is
the state of operator training. An IEEE Power Engineer-
ing Society Task Force on Operator Training has found
that training practices and standards vary widely from
utility to utility and that management largely has to rely
on in-house and on-the-job training for its dispatchers
and operators, supplemented where possible by training
courses and materials available from the outside. There is
a dearth of formal, intensive training available, par-
[3j Sequence of events leading to a blackout. The se-
uence Is usually interru ted by automatic or manual ac-
t9 on before a complete b P ackout occurs. Upon separation
( s t e 4), a 12.percent imbalance between generatfon and
loaB will result In a frequency change of about 1 Hz. A
blackout occurs in an electrical Island only when the re-
malning generation Is not equal to at least the load re-
malnlng after all load-shedding steps have been com-
pleted.
initiating event

Geography
A power system bound by geographic features such as
water or mountains, and thus unable to interconnect with
neighbors on all sides, would tend to have less inherent
ability to withstand disturbances than a system not so
constrained. Peninsular Florida, for example, was in-
volved in 12 of the 211 interruptions summarized in Table
I. This portion of the Eastern Interconnection (which
links approximately the eastern two thirds of the U.S. and
Canada) contains about 3.3 percent of the installed
capacity in the United States, and, using total U.S. system
capacity as a measure, it turns out that seven out of I I is
the most likely number of reportable interruptions that
will occur within that six-year period. Statistically, there is
only a IO-percent chance that 12 or more would occur in
this geographical area.
The fact that interconnections can be made only into
northern Florida, Georgia, and Alabama must be con-
sidered a predisposing factor, even though compensating
measures have been taken in system design and operation.
Of course, other factors would also be active here, such as
a salty atmosphere, hurricanes, and a greater-than-
average frequency of lightning storms.

Demography
In densely populated areas transmission corridors often
have to be compressed, with several lines installed on the
same right-of-way, in order to maximize the power densi-
ty of the system. This practice, although unavoidable,
must be considered a predisposing factor. There are many
events, such as fires, tornadoes, and earthquakes, that
can remove all lines in a right-of-way for extended periods
and thus expose the remaining network to increased
Power-system structure
A bulk-power system consists of generating
sources, transmission substations, and a network
of high-voltage transmission lines integrating the
two. The illustration shows the way these elements
are interconnected, and their functional structure.
Generating sources consist mostly of individual
synchronous generators driven by steam, gas, or
hydro turbines. Most generating plants contain
more than one generating unit. At the generating
plants, energy is delivered directly to the transmis-
sion system through a step-up transformer.
The transmission system consists of several
separate successive networks servicing the same
geographical area; these networks operate at dif- - 1 --Tielinetoneighbor +-I Load bus
ferent voltages, and are tied together at substa-
tions. The voltage level of each successive network Generating plant Large drstribution network
is generally of the order of two times, and the
resulting capacity of transmission circuits of the (A) One-line diagram
order of four times, that of the underlying system.
Although generation and load substations may
connect to the transmission system at the highest
voltage level or at any of the lower levels, larger and
newer generating units are frequently tied to the
hlgher-voltage networks. The transmlsslon network
also serves to integrate neighboring power systems
with the underlying system by forming an intercon-
nection between them.
The distribution system is similar in structure to
the transmission system but any one network
covers a much smaller geographlcal area. Distribu-
tion networks may be fed from the transmission
system. Network systems, in which the voltage is
stepped down in stages by several substations,
generally are used for all higher voltage levels. For industrial
the remaining levels, at two steps above the utiliza-
tion voltage, radial systems are common. In radial
systems, alternative sources may be available
through switching arrangements to provide in-
creased reliability. However, direct one-step reduc-
tion all the way down from the transmission voltage
L&L Transformer
to the low-voltage-utilization level is common in
large metropolitan areas.
The combination of multiple generating sources
and several layers of transmission and distribution (B) Functional structure
networks provides a high degree of engineered
structural redundancy that enables the system to
withstand single and most multiple contingencies
without loss of service to any user. Superimposed
on this physical structure Is a control and automa-
tion system that is also highly distributed, and
which is designed to provide redundancy in a man-
ner similar to that provided by the power system.
The primary function of the human operator,
whether in a power plant or the central system’s
control center, is one of managing resources,
monitoring performance and reliability, and ad-
justing control parameters to maintain the desired
quantity and quality of electrical supply over a long
term. He is thus an important and indispensable
link at various levels and key points in the system.
The human operator is particularly adept at respon-
ding to abnormal situations where information from
diverse but related sources must be integrated
quickly to form a corrective strategy and to move
toward a more secure operating condition.
Another important function of the human
operator is to provide a backup to some of the
automatrc control systems. Electric-energy supply
must be provided continuously 24 hours a day, 365
days a year. Automatic control systems require
periodic maintenance and sometimes fail, so the
human operator is trained to take over some of Distribution centers Generating units Generating units
these slower control functions and enhance overall
system reliability. (C) Automation and control hierarchy
Power interruptions: an outllne of case hlstorles
Case 1: One 345.kV line was out of service for
maintenance. A fault occurred on a parallel over-
loaded 345kV transmission line when It sagged In-
to a tree. Automatic reclosure was unsuccessful.
Elther the fault or the attempts at automatic
reclosure apparently created an electrlcal translent
that contributed to closure of a feed-water control
valve at a nearby generatlng unit. Thls unit trlpped
on low water level 20 seconds after the lnltlal fault,
causing a loss of 510 MW to the system. Over-
loadlng, c o m p o u n d e d b y a d d l t l o n a l f a u l t s o f
malfunctions, resulted In the formatlon of flve
Islands. A total of 1650 MW of load was lost, over 90
percent of which was restored wlthln 30 minutes of
the inltlal event. Automatic load sheddlng was
believed to be an Important factor In llmltlng the ex-
tent of thls disturbance.
Case 2: In thls case the power system was expor-
tlng power. Temporary connections were In place
on some 230.kV lines because of constructlon.
Mlcrowave clrcults normally used as part of the
relay protectlon system had been rerouted due to
nolsy transmlsslon.
A false transfer trlp slgnal developed In the
microwave system, which caused three 230.kV tines
t o t r i p simultaneously. T h r e e m o r e 230.kV lines
tripped 90 cycles later on receipt of another false
transfer trlp slgnal. All but one line were restored
automatically wlthln three seconds but one-half se-
cond later another false signal was received, which
agaln cleared SIX clrcults.
The clrcults falled to reclose successfully. An ex-
cess of generatlon over load In the area was now
flowing out over one 230.kV Ilne, which trlpped on
Inverse tlme overcurrent thus formlng an electrlcal
Island wlth generatlon exceeding load by 30 per-
cent. Frequency lmmedlately rose to 62.5 Hz, then
fell to 59 Hz because governors overreacted and
could not reopen the turblne valves fast enough to
recover. One plant trlpped off due to Inadvertent
clrcult-breaker operatlon. The rapld frequency
decline operated frequency trend relays that shed
load, resulting In a frequency overshoot to 62.2 Hz,
which was followed by an undershoot to 56.7 Hz
and finally stabilization to 60.8 Hz. About 40 per-
cent of the system load was shed durlng the violent
frequency swings. The frequency swlngs and
resulting rapld changes In generatlon also resulted
In coal pulverizer trlps and other mlnor problems,
which delayed restoratlon. The power system was
reconnected wlthln four minutes and most load
was restored within 40 mlnutes.
Case 3: This power system Is part of a small lnter-
connection that normally operates In Isolation. A
generatlng unit had tripped because of boiler pro-
blems, a 345/138-kV autotransformer trlpped on
dlfferentlal and a runback from 450 MW to IO MW
occurred on another unlt. At the tlme of the incl-
dent, the system was almost back to normal wlth
splnning reserves levels slightly low but not critical.
Trouble started when an airplane cut the static
ground wires on a transmission rlght-of-way
resulting In the loss of five 138.kV and two 69.kV
Ilnes. The loss of the transmission circuits resulted
in 160 MW of load being cut off. Frequency rose
from 59.98 to 60.2 Hz. However, the Increased
loading on the 138-kV transmlsslon lines and an
autotransformer resulted In the
of two generating units to hold the generation
plcked up under governor actlon. One generatlng
unit was backed off manually to relieve a condition
of low boiler pressure; the second had gone above
Its operating range and was also backed off
manually. No further transmlsslon disturbances oc-
curred and no addltlonal load was lost. Frequency
was back to normal within approximately 13
minutes of the disturbance.
Case 4: This case Involved the western part of the
U.S., which was operatlng under normal condltlons.
While deenerglzlng a section of 230.kV transmis-
s l o n Ilne, a protective r o d - g a p f l a s h e d o v e r t o
ground.
Clearlng the fault resulted In the loss of the hlgh-
voltage dc transmlsslon line llnklng the Pacific
Northwest to the Paclflc Southwest. Despite
automatic lnsertlon of series capacitors on the ac
system, the power surge caused a swlng sufficient
to cause loss of the 500-kV ac Ilnes, which also con
nect the Paclflc Northwest to the Southwest. Due
to an error In connecting generators to a generatlon
dropplng scheme In the Paclflc Northwest, 600 MW
less generatlon than antlclpated was dropped.
Also, because of an error, the Four Corners Islan-
dlng scheme dld not work as planned and separa-
tlon was accomplished on a backup rate-of-change-
of-power relay.
Three Islands were formed around the western
loop. In the Northwest, where generatlon exceeded
load, load frequency rose to 61.25 Hz Large voltage
swlngs were experienced In Idaho durlng the period
of hlgh frequency and a high-voltage dc tie to Van-
couver Island was lost. About 475 MW of load was
lost In the Northwest. In the generatlon-deflclent
Southwest, frequency dropped to 59 Hz and about
650 MW of load was automatlcally shed. In the
eastern Island, 140 MW of load was lost.
Case 5: In this case the high-voltage ac and dc
lines between the Paclflc Northwest and Southwest
were relatively heavlly loaded at the time. An In-
* advertent relay operatlon tripped both 500.kV ac
lines. The dc line remalned In service.
Generatlon dropplng In the Northwest failed to
operate because two relays had been Inadvertently
Interchanged. Presumably also because of the in-
t e r c h a n g e d r e l a y s , t h e F o u r C o r n e r s lslandlng
scheme was not automatlcally lnltlated and separa-
tlon In the Four Corners area was accomplished by
a backup rate-of-change-of-power relay.
An out-of-step relay In Utah Initiated separation
between Utah and Montana. A number of other
related trlpplngs resulted In the formation of three
electrical Islands. In the Northwest, where genera-
tlon exceededd load, frequency rose to 61.75 Hz, ac-
companled by severe voltage swings In Idaho and
Montana. In the generatlon-deflclent Southwest,
frequency dropped to 59.4 Hz. In the eastern island,
frequency oscillated between 59.8 and 60.13 Hz and
then settled out to 60.3 Hz.
In summary, sudden loss of the balance between
generation (electrlcal supply) and load (electrical
demand) leads to sudden frequency variations
( s w i n g s ) a n d s u b s e q u e n t g e n e r a t o r u n i t shut-
downs. Breaker tripping results in the formation of
electrical Islands and the isolation of entire sec-
tions from the overall system. The system operator
tisulai-ly simulator training that can be used 10 indoc-
trinate new personnel and maintain the skills of experi-
enced operators. It is fair to say that operator training
deserves and will receive a great deal of attention in the
future.
Other factors
Other predisposing factors fall into such categories as
maintenance procedures, substation design practices, the
quality of power-plant control and performance, the
degree to which protective systems can accommodate
growth and change over the years, the aggressiveness of
testing programs, the state of operator training, the
thoroughness and accuracy of design studies, and rhe
political and economic environment.
The identification of specific predisposing factors
leading to power blackouts is a fruitful area for study at
this time. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is
currently sponsoring research on a broad range of sub-
jects, including long-term power-system dynamics, the
dynamic behavior of loads under conditions of off-
nominal voltage and frequency, advanced techniques in
stability analysis, and the analysis of low-frequency
oscillations. The Department of Energy is sponsoring
Emergency State Control research that can be expected to
bear fruit in future years.
Learning from history
By examining each interruption in detail valuable infor-
mation can be gained about conditions prior to the event
so that it may be possible to determine why the system as
designed failed to prevent loss of load. The resulting in-
formation can be applied to reduce the likelihood of
future outages. Brief descriptions of typical interruptions
are included in the following (and in box on p.40) to il-
lustrate how complex and varied cascading failures are,
and how difficult their prevention will be. (These descrip-
tions are based on research on the mechanisms of power
failures sponsored by EPRI under Projects RP90-7 and
RP 764, “Long-Term Power System Dynamics.“)
Each case shows a progression from an initiating event
through various stages ultimately leading to an interrup-
tion of customer load (see Fig. 3). III several, if not most,
of the cases described, load interruptions resulted from
the failure of the system to cope, rather than from the
failure of the components. Apparently the rate of occur-
rencr of major power interruptions would not approach
zero even if component failures were to be eliminated en-
tirely. Each of the complex systems that make up a bulk-
power supply-including power-plant control and aux-
iliaries, protective relay, communications, and data col-
lection and display systems-can be stressed beyond its
design limit. Such stress can come from unusually severe
events, alone or accompanied by an unfortunate com-
bination of unfavorable circumstances.
These systems usually have many variables, so their
modes of operation under conditions of extreme stress
may be difficult to predict. Further, it is seldom feasible
to carry design studies far enough to explore all of the
consequences of a severe disturbance-even if these con-
sequeuces could be predicted. The human operator is
relied upon, perhaps too heavily, to intercede when these
systems fait to respond correctly. The operator may have
too little information or too little knowledge to act always
in the most effective way.
The following account provides a realistic example of
the ~ypr and sequence of events that might lead to and
develop during a severe power interruption.
Prolonged short circuit
Although there was a violent lightning storm in pro-
gress, lightning did not initiate this interruption. A crane
boom made contact with a 138-kV transmission line. The
line opened normally under protective relay action but an
erroneous indication on a supervisory control panel led an
operator to reclose the line manually. The crane boom
was still in contact with the line and, due to a faulty con-
trol, the breaker closed into the tine three times before
locking out.
Low voltage resulting from the severity and duration of
the repeated short circuits caused two generating units
carrying 750 MW to trip off. The balance between genera-
tion and load was then lost when these two generating
units wer-e taken out of service. Power swings then
resulted in the formation of an electrical island having
more load than generation. Frequency dropped to 58.2
Hz and more than 2000 MW of load was shed. This
amont of shedding caused the frequency to rise to 62 Hz
and remain over 60 Hz for five minutes. The resulting
high frequency caused six generating units to go to zero
load, and trip.
An unsuccessful attempt was made to iesynchronize the
island during this time, with the result that two more sec-
tions were isolated accidentally. In one, frequency rose to
62.2 Hz, and at the other, frequency declined to 59 Hz.
The two islands were tied back to the interconnection two
minutes later, but in another minute a large unit ex-
perienced a frequency fluctuation, thereby causing yet
another separation. Frequency in this new island dropped
to 58.95 Hz. In a series of successive steps, the generation-
load balance within this new island was restored and the
island was reconnected to the system. Within 25 minutes
of the initial incident with the crane all systems were final-
ly reconnected.
When a severe fault condition develops in the system,
the subsequent electrical stresses lead to intolerable devia-
tions from the standard 60-Hz synchronous frequency. In
addition, the imbalance between the reduced available
generation at 60 Hz and the system load and power de-
mand leads to consecutive generator shutdowns and in-
evitable interruptions in service. A 12-percent imbalance
between generation and toad results in a frequency change
of about 1 Hz. Resumption of service occurs when the fre-,
quency finally is restabilized at 60 Hz, generation is
restored to its previous operating level, and the balance is
reestablished between power supply and demand. +
Donald N. Ewart (F), manager, System Performance
Engineering, Electric Utility Systems Engineering
Department, General Electric Company, Schenec-
tady, N.Y., holds a B.E.E. degree from Cornell
University and an M.S.E. from Union College. He
has been involved in studies of power system
dynamics and control and in the application of pro-
cess control computers for improving the security
and economics of power system and power pool
operation. He is currently responsible for conduc-
ting advanced analysis and research on power
system performance, encompassing power flow
and stability of large-scale high-voltage ac and dc
networks, and for studies of generator and excita-
tion system dynamics and power system tran-
sients.