'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent] and
[G.R. No. 139020. October 11, 2000] PAQUITO BUAYA, petitioner, vs.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO., Inc., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to
prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of
judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of
final and executory judgments. Moreover, the remand of a case does not nullify
the entire proceedings. It merely authorizes the trial court to receive additional
evidence, not to conduct a trial de novo.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the August 28, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52999, dismissing
Petitioner Paquito Buaya's appeal of the trial court's Order dated November
13, 1995, which denied his Petition for Relief. The assailed Decision disposed
as follows:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The
Order appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs against the Appellant."[2]
The Facts
The facts of this case are as follows:[3]
"On July 31, 1985, x x x Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., the [respondent]
in the present recourse, filed a complaint against Paquito B. Buaya, its
erstwhile [b]ranch [m]anager for Cebu and the [petitioner] in the present
recourse, for the collection of the principal amount of P678,076.83,
representing his unremitted premium collections owing to the
[respondent]. For failure of the [petitioner] and his counsel to appear at the
scheduled pre-trial, the [petitioner] was declared x x x in default, and the
[respondent] was allowed, by the [c]ourt, to adduce its evidence, ex parte. On
the basis of the evidence of the [respondent], the Court a quo promulgated a
Decision, dated September 17, 1987, in favor of the [respondent], the decretal
portion of which reads as follows:
against the [petitioner] ordering the latter to pay the former the sum
of P678,076.83 plus legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until
fully paid; the sum equivalent to 25% of [respondent's] claim as and for
attorney's fees plus the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.' (at page 135, Records).'
The [petitioner] appealed, from said Decision, to [the CA], entitled and
docketed 'Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., versus Paquito B. Buaya, CA-GR.
No. 17329.' On March 30, 1990, this [c]ourt promulgated a Decision in favor of
the [petitioner] annulling the Decision of the [c]ourt a quo and remanding the
case to the lower [c]ourt for further proceedings. (at page 154, Records). The
Decision of this [c]ourt became final and executory. Accordingly, the [c]ourt a
quo issued an Order setting the case for hearing on December 13, 1990 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning (at page 169, Records). The [petitioner] himself
filed a 'Motion for Postponement' of the hearing. [Petitioner's] motion was
granted by the [c]ourt a quo and the hearing was reset [to] February 15, 1991,
at 8:30 in the morning. However, the hearing was reset to March 14, 1991, at
the same time, on motion of the [respondent] (at page 180, Record). The
[petitioner] himself filed a 'Motion for Postponement' of the hearing set on
March 14, 1991 on the ground that his [c]ounsel, Atty. Bartolome A. Avancena,
had died and [petitioner] needed time to engage the services of new
counsel. The hearing was reset to May 16, 1991 at the same time (at page
187, Record). However, the [petitioner] filed another motion for the resetting of
said hearing on the ground that he needed [more] time to secure the services
of new counsel. The hearing was reset to July 26, 1991, at the same time. But
then, the [petitioner] filed another motion for the postponement of said hearing
on the ground that 'he was weak and sickly'. However, the [respondent]
opposed [petitioner's] motion. Nevertheless, the [c]ourt reset the hearing to
November 29, 1991, at the same time, but subject to the condition that if, for
any reason, the [petitioner] still failed to appear on said setting, such failure
shall be deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence (at page 250,
Records). On November 27, 1991, Atty. Manuel Maranga, the new counsel of
the [petitioner], filed a 'Motion to Postpone'. The [respondent] opposed
[petitioner's] motion. On December 19, 1991, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order
denying [petitioner's] motion and declaring the [petitioner] to have waived his
right to adduce evidence in his behalf (at page 222, Record).The [respondent]
forthwith filed a motion praying the [c]ourt to reinstate its Decision, dated
September 17, 1987. The [petitioner] filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of the
Order of the [c]ourt a quo, dated December 19, 1991. On March 18, 1992, the
[c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying [petitioner's] 'Motion for
Reconsideration' and granting [respondent's] motion for the reinstatement of
its Decision, dated September 17, 1987. The [petitioner] filed a 'Petition for
Certiorari' with [the CA], entitled and docketed as 'Paquito Buaya versus Hon.
Fernando Agdamag, et al.,['] CA-G.R. No. 27814 (SP), assailing the Orders of
the [c]ourt a quo, dated December 19, 1991 and March 18, 1992. On August
24, 1992, [the CA] promulgated a Decision dismissing [petitioner's] Petition for
lack of merit (at page 261, Record). The Decision of this [c]ourt became final
and executory on June 28, 1993 (at page 282).[4] On [m]otion of the
[respondent], the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order, dated October 29, 1993,
directing the issuance of a [W]rit of [E]xecution (at page 298, Record). The
[petitioner] filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of said Order, dated October
29, 1993. On March 16, 1995, the [c]ourt a quo issued an Order denying
motion (at pages 359-360, Record). On April 12, 1995, the [petitioner] filed a
'Notice of Appeal' from said Order. However, on May 11, 1995, the [c]ourt [a
quo] issued an Order declining to give due course to the appeal of the
[petitioner] considering that the Decision of the [c]ourt had already become
final and executory (at page 365, Record). On June 2, 1995, the [c]ourt a
quo issued a Writ of Execution. On July 27, 1995, the [petitioner] filed a
'Petition for Relief from Order'. On November 13, 1995, the [c]ourt a
quo issued an Order denying the Petitioner's 'Petition for Relief."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA denied petitioner's appeal which centered on these issues: (1)
whether the September 17, 1987 Decision of the trial court had become final
and executory, and (2) whether the failure of petitioner to inform his new
counsel of the status of the case before the trial court constituted "mistake and
excusable negligence."
In view of the amount involved in the collection suit, the CA disbelieved
petitioner's contention that he had failed to apprise his counsel of the status
and the particulars of the case in the trial court. Granting arguendo that he did
make such omission through sheer inadvertence, his counsel was duty-bound
to familiarize himself with the case before accepting the same, specially
because litigation had already commenced. Such omission did not constitute
"mistake or excusable negligence" that would have entitled him to relief from
the trial court's judgment. Thus, he deserved to suffer the consequences of his
own mistake or omission.
Noting that the validity of the March 18, 1992 Order of the trial court
reinstating its September 17, 1987 Decision had been affirmed by both the CA
and the Supreme Court, the CA also condemned the penchant of petitioner for
resurrecting the same issues. Hence, his appeal was solely designed to further
derail the execution of the lower court's Decision.
Besides, the present posture of petitioner is antithetical to his earlier
"Petition for Relief from Order," which was denied by the trial court. In filing
said action for relief, he was admitting that the Decision of the trial court had
become final and executory. Hence, he cannot claim the Decision's nullity.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
Petitioner interposes the following issues for resolution:[6]
"I - Petitioner is presenting in this petition a question of law which is
believed or which appears to be one of first impression,
namely: Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is
annulled by the Court of Appeals be reinstated by the trial court
which rendered the decision or any trial court for that matter and
thereafter order its execution?
"II - When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of
Appeals for having been rendered without notice to the
[petitioner] of the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings, does the jurisdiction
of the trial court merely require the presentation of evidence for
the [petitioner] and without anymore requiring the presentation of
[respondent's] evidence for cross-examination by the
[petitioner]?"
The Court's Ruling
This Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Annulled Decision
Petitioner persistently avers that no trial court can reinstate a decision
that has been annulled by the CA because such a decision is "dead" in legal
contemplation.
We disagree. We doubt the veracity of petitioner's claim that the
September 11, 1987 Decision of the trial court was annulled by the CA,
because his Appeal Brief stated that it had merely been set aside. He merely
alleged that "[t]he aforesaid judgment of September 11, 1987, was a judgment
by default x x x so that the Court of Appeals, on appeal by [petitioner], in its
decision rendered on March 30, 1990, SET ASIDE said judgment and ordered
the case to be REMANDED to the court of origin for FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS. x x x."[7] This allegation shows that the trial court's Decision
was reversed and set aside, not annulled, by the appellate court. Since it was
merely set aside to enable petitioner to present his evidence, then there was
nothing wrong with the Order of the trial court reinstating its original decision
after he had failed to take advantage of the ample opportunity given him to
present evidence.
Moreover, the failure of petitioner to attach a copy of the March 30, 1990
CA Decision, which he claims annulled the September 11, 1987 trial court
Decision, is an added reason why this Petition should be denied. True, said
CA Decision is not in question here. Nonetheless, an authentic copy thereof
should have been submitted to support his claim that the Decision of the trial
court had indeed been annulled by that of the CA.[8] Hence, a copy of the latter
is a "material portion of the record [that] would support the petition." Failure to
attach or submit it is sufficient ground for this Petition's dismissal. [9]
We also reject the assertion of petitioner that the CA Decision of August
24, 1992 did not affirm the reinstatement of the September 11, 1987 trial court
Decision, but only sustained the denial of his Motion for Postponement. This
is simply not true. The CA specifically resolved the issue of the legality of the
RTC Orders dated December 19, 1991 and March 18, 1992, which not only
denied petitioner's Motion for Postponement but also reinstated the September
17, 1987 trial court Decision.[10] The appellate court ruled that respondent
judge showed no arbitrariness or capriciousness that would warrant the grant
of that Petition.[11] Hence, there was no need for the CA to explicitly reinstate
the September 11, 1987 trial court Decision.Indeed, petitioner cannot be
allowed to prevent that RTC Decision from attaining finality by engaging in
useless hairsplitting distinctions. On this dilatory practice, the CA clearly and
cogently ruled:
"x x x. The [Petitioner] raised the same issue in his Petition for Certiorari in CA-
GR No. 27814 (SP) filed with this Court where he assailed the validity of the
Order of the Court a quo, dated March 18, 1992, ordering the reinstatement of
the Decision of the Court a quo, dated September 17, 1987, and this Court
dismissed [petitioner's] Petition for lack of merit, and, [i]n effe[c]t, affirmed the
aforesaid Order of the Court a quo. The [petitioner] filed a "Petition to Review"
with the Supreme Court, from said Decision of this Court and the Supreme
Court dismissed [petitioner's] Petition. Appellant's penchant [for] resurrecting
the same issue in the Court a quo x x x, in the present recourse, deserves the
severest condemnation as it was designed solely to further derail the execution
of the Decision of the Court a quo. x x x."[12]
Second Issue: Final and Executory Judgment
Petitioner condemns the unfairness of the trial court when it ruled that he
had waived his right to submit evidence, when it should have merely ordered
plaintiff to present its evidence first. He interprets the CA remand to mean that
both parties, subject to cross-examination, would again present their
respective sets of evidence.
We disagree. The CA remanded the case to the court of origin for further
hearing, not for retrial. A motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court, is a remedy separate and distinct from an appeal. Plaintiff (herein
respondent) had rested its case long before the September 11, 1987 Decision
was rendered. In fact, the evidence adduced by herein respondent became
the sole basis of the Default Judgment of September 11, 1987.
Finally, the Court holds that the September 11, 1987 Decision of the trial
court become final and executory on June 28, 1993. [13] A Writ of Execution of
the March 16, 1995 Order of the trial court reinstating the September 17, 1987
Decision was issued by the trial court on May 11, 1995. Once a judgment
becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a
matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial
duty of the court.[14] It is axiomatic that once a decision attains finality, it
becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is
erroneous.[15] Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting
within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of
occasional legal infirmities or errors it may contain.[16]
The February 24, 1993 Resolution of this Court in GR No. 108354 barred
not only a rehash of the same issues resolved in the Petition, but also any
other issues that might have been raised therein. An existing final judgment or
decree -- rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction acting upon a matter within its authority -- is conclusive
of the rights of the parties and their privies. This ruling holds in all other actions
or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction,
touching on the points or matters in issue in the first suit.[17]
Indeed, nothing decided on in the first appeal, between the same parties
and the same facts, can be reexamined in a second or subsequent
appeal. Right or wrong, the decision in the first appeal is binding on both the
trial and the appellate courts for the purpose of that case and for that case
only.
Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will not
allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a question, once it has
been considered and decided with finality. Litigations must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient administration of justice
requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should
not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same
issues filed by the same parties.
Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to
prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of
judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of
final and executory judgments.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129442. March 10, 1999] PALLADA vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF KALIBO, AKLAN
SYNOPSIS
In a case for recovery of possession and ownership of land with damages
filed by private respondents against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 1 of
Kalibo, Aklan and it declared the private respondents as the possessors and
lawful owners of the parcel of land in questioned. The petition for review filed
by the petitioners relative thereto was likewise denied by the Supreme Court
which disposition became final and executory on January 22, 1997. On May
13, 1997, the private respondents filed an Ex Parte Motion for Execution with
RTC-Aklan and it was granted by the said court. When the Writ was partially
satisfied, the petitioners come to this Court to question the issuance thereof.
Hence, this petition.
The Court ruled that the petition is obviously a dilatory move on the part
of petitioners, designed to prevent the final disposition of the case. In People
v. Leviste, it was held that: While it is true that any motion that does not comply
with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed,
is not entitled to judicial cognizance, this Court has likewise held that where a
rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the
case. Litigations should, as much as possible be decided on the merits and
not on technicalities. And in Nasser v. Court of Appeals, et a!.: Litigation must
at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors, for public
policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory
by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. x x x
The petition is DISMISSED.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP;
NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL BINDS THE CLIENT; APPLICABLE IN
CASE AT BAR. - The negligence of counsel binds the client just as the
latter is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. Besides, petitioners are not
entirely blameless for the dismissal of their petition. It was their duty as
litigants to keep in constant touch with their counsel so as to be posted
on the status of their case. As held in Ramones v. National Labor
Relations Commission, [a] prudent man would have taken steps to
ensure that, if and when his counsel would leave for abroad x x x, any
case that his counsel is handling would be handled by a collaborating
counsel or by a new counsel.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; MOTIONS; NOTICE TO THE ADVERSE PARTY IS
MANDATORY. - Notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and
shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion -- are
mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro
forma. A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Section 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which
the clerk of court has no right and which the court has no authority to act
upon.
3. ID.; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
THE WRIT THEREOF MUST CONTAIN NOTICE TO THE ADVERSE
PARTY. -- Under Supreme Court Circular No. 24-94, a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution must contain a notice to the adverse party
- Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment
or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of
the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. If
the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution
may forthwith be applied for in the lower court from which the action
originated, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or the final order or
orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party. The appellate court may, on motion in the same case,
when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue
the writ of execution. It bears stressing that a similar provision is found in
Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
4. ID.; ID.; PREVAILING PARTY SHOULD NOT BE DENIED OF THE
FRUITS OF HIS VICTORY BY MERE TECHNICALITIES. - The petition
is obviously a dilatory move on the part of petitioners, designed to prevent
the final disposition of the case. In People v. Leviste, it was held that:
While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements
of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to
judicial cognizance, this Court has likewise held that where a rigid
application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the
case. Litigations should, as much as possible be decided on the merits
and not on technicalities. And in Nasser v. Court of Appeals, et
al.: Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of
occasional errors, for public policy dictates that once a judgment
becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should
not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the
losing party. x x x
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction assailing the
validity, and seeking non-implementation of the Writ of Execution issued on
May 2, 1997 in Civil Case No. 2519 before Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court
in Kalibo, Aklan.
The facts that matter are as follows:
On September 29, 1976, private respondents commenced Civil Case No.
2519 for recovery of possession and ownership of land with damages before
Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court in Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Aklan).
On January 31, 1991, RTC-Aklan declared the defendants, petitioners
herein, as the absolute and lawful owners and possessors of subject land;
disposing, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring defendants the
absolute and lawful owners and possessors of the lot in question as against
the plaintiffs.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[1]
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals
which reversed and set aside the same; disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is GRANTED, the
judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new
decision rendered in favor of herein appellants declaring them as the
possessors and lawful owners of the remaining portion of the unsold land
(1,0391 hectares more or less) covered by Tax Declaration No. 10336 (Exh.
"G").
Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to restore possession of said land
to plaintiffs-appellants herein.
Defendants-appellees are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally
plaintiffs-appellants the value of the produce of the land, the same to be
computed from 1976, at the time of the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
Costs is charged against defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED."[2]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was to no avail. It was denied in
the Resolution[3] dated July 18, 1996 of the Court of Appeals.
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this court via the Petition for
Review on Certiorari under consideration, docketed as G.R. No. 126112. But
the same was denied in the Resolution[4] of November 18, 1996, which
disposition became final and executory[5] on January 22, 1997.
On May 13, 1997, the private respondents filed an Ex Parte Motion for
Execution[6] with RTC-Aklan, which granted the said motion.
The respondent court then issued the Writ of Execution[7] dated May 2,
1997 (private respondents claim that the same is erroneous as its date should
have been June 2, 1997) directing the Sheriff of the Province of Aklan or any
of his deputies to implement subject Decision, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, upon payment of your lawful fees, you are hereby
ordered to enforce, implement and/or execute the aforesaid decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on March 29, 1996, which REVERSED and SET
ASIDE the decision appealed from and a new decision rendered in favor of
herein plaintiffs-appellants having been DISMISSED by the Supreme Court in
its Resolution dated November 18, 1996.
You are further commanded to collect from the defendants jointly and
severally, the value of the produce of the land, the same to be computed from
1976, at the time of the filing of the complaint until fully paid, and tender the
same to the plaintiffs.
In case you fail to collect the amount in cash, then you may levy upon the
chattels and other personal properties of the defendants. But if sufficient
personal properties cannot be found to satisfy this execution, and your lawful
fees thereon, then you are commanded that of the lands and buildings of said
defendants, you make the said sum of money in the manner required by law
and the Rules of Court and return this writ unto this Court within SIXTY (60)
days from receipt with your corresponding report of the proceedings
undertaken thereon.
 Execution was partially satisfied, as shown in the Officers Return of
Service[8] of June 20, 1997.
With the issuance of the Writ of Execution under attack, petitioners have
come to this Court for relief, theorizing that:
I Anent the second error, there is tenability in petitioners contention that
PETITIONERS ARE NOT BOUND BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF
THEIR COUNSEL WHO LEFT THE COUNTRY WITHOUT
INFORMING THEM THEREOF, NOR BRIEFING THEM OF THE
STATUS OF THEIR CASE.
II
THE WRIT OF EXECUTION IS INVALID FOR PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS EX-PARTE MOTION FOR EXECUTION WAS
GRANTED WITHOUT NOTICE TO PETITIONERS.
III
THE PETITIONERS CASE IS MERITORIOUS.
On the first issue, petitioners maintain that before their petition for review
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 126112, was resolved by this Court, their
lawyer went abroad without informing them and without briefing them on the
status of the petition. According to petitioners, it was only on June 16, 1997
that they learned that their petition was dismissed. It is therefore petitioners
stance that they lost the said case before this Court due to the negligence of
their lawyer which should not bind them.
Petitioners contention is untenable. The negligence of counsel binds the
client[9] just as the latter is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer [10] Besides,
petitioners are not entirely blameless for the dismissal of their petition. It was
their duty as litigants to keep in constant touch with their counsel so as to be
posted on the status of their case. As held in Ramones v. National Labor
Relations Commission[11], [a] prudent man would have taken steps to ensure
that, if and when his counsel would leave for abroad xxx, any case that his
counsel is handling would be handled by a collaborating counsel or by a new
counsel.
Here, petitioners have no proof other than their bare allegation, that they
were unaware of the departure of their lawyer for abroad.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioners counsel was negligent, their
Petition in G.R. No. 126112 would fail just the same, for as held by the Court
in its Resolution of November 18, 1996, the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in its questioned judgment:
At any rate, even if the said requirement were complied with and the petition
were filed on time, the same would nevertheless be dismissed for failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error
in the questioned judgment.[12]
the Writ of Execution was irregularly issued insofar as the Ex-Parte Motion for
Execution of private respondents did not contain a notice of hearing to
petitioners. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, read:
SEC. 4. Notice. - Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all
parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together
with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying
it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice,
specially on matters which the court may dispose of on its own motion.
SEC. 5. Contents of notice. - The notice shall be directed to the parties
concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion.
The foregoing requirements -- that the notice shall be directed to the
parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the
motion -- are mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the motion
becomes pro forma.[13] A motion that does not comply with the requirements
of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of
paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has
no authority to act upon[14]
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 24-94, a Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Execution must contain a notice to the adverse party --
Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order
that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution may
forthwith be applied for in the lower court from which the action originated, on
motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of
the judgment or judgments or the final order or orders sought to be enforced
and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellatte court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of
justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of
execution. (italics supplied)
It bears stressing that a similar provision is found in Section 1 of Rule 39 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court.
The Court is not prepared, however, to invalidate the Writ of Execution
issued below. The petition is obviously a dilatory move on the part of
petitioners, designed to prevent the final disposition of the case. In People v.
Leviste[15], it was held that:

While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of
Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial
cognizance, this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the
rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may
be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as
possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.

And in Nasser v. Court of Appeals, et al.:[16]

Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional

errors, for public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory
and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his
victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. xxx

The Court need not rule on the third issue, the same having been resolved
with finality in G.R. No. 126112. A decision that has become final and
executory can no longer be disturbed.[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, for want of
merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
RELIANCE SURETY & G.R. No. 150994 Name of Date of Writs Amount of Name of Court
INSURANCE CO., INC., Accused & Orders Liability
Petitioner, Present: Crim. Case
No.
PUNO, J.,
Chairman, Rogelio Jan. 19, P10,000.00 RTC,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Andres, 1995 3rdJudicial
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., et al./3012 Region
TINGA, and (A.F.) Branch 23
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Cabanatuan
HON. ANDRES R. AMANTE, JR., City
in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Adelina Sept. 25, P20,000.00 - do -
Cabanatuan City, the Vidal/5822 1996
HON. CITY PROSECUTOR, (A.F.)
Cabanatuan City and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondents. Naldy Aug. 6, 1996 P10,000.00 - do -
June 30, 2005 Jimenez &
x------------------------------------------------------------------x Geminiano
Roxas/6035
DECISION (A.F.)

TINGA, J.: 2. . . ;Movant replied to the aforesaid letter dated June 11,
1997 of the Insurance Commission stating that the bailbonds
are false and spurious. . .;
This Petition for Review is the culmination of a wrong-headed approach by a
bonding company to acquit itself of liability on purportedly spurious bail bonds 3. Again, on July 22, 1997 and May 14, 1998, movant was
issued in its name. Even if we concede the basic premise the questioned bail surprised to receive letters from the Insurance Commission
bonds are indeed false, there are prescribed remedies under our procedural dated July 11, 1997 and May 7, 1998 enclosing copies of the
rules which the surety simply failed to avail of despite ample opportunity. Orders against the bailbonds allegedly issued by the movant
Hence, although the lower court decisions under review are not free of flaws as follows:
the Court is impelled to deny the petition.
Name of Date of Amount of Name of Court
Petitioner Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. (Reliance) is a duly organized Accused & Writs/ Liability
insurance firm. On 5 October 1998, it filed a Special Appearance And Motion Crim. Case No. Orders
to Set Aside Orders/Writs of Execution with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, presided over by Hon. Andres R. Amante, Jr. Dolores P. June 25, P13, 000.00 RTC,
Reliance pertinently alleged therein, thus: Posadas/6320 1997 3rdJudicial
AF Region
1. On June 18, 1997, movant Reliance Surety & Insurance Branch 23
Co., Inc. was surprised to receive a letter from the Insurance Cabanatuan
Commission dated June 11, 1997 enclosing copies of the City
Orders/Judgments and Writs of Execution against the
bailbonds allegedly issued by movant as follows: Melania Jan. 19, P8,000.00 - do -
Dagdagan 1998
 4. . . ; Movant replied to said letter dated July 11, 1997 and
May 7, 1998 of the Insurance Commission stating that the
bonds mentioned therein are false and spurious. . . ;[1]
Reliance entered its special appearance in each of the above-cited criminal
cases, at the same time seeking to set aside the cited writs of execution.
Reliance alleged that the bonds in question were issued by one Evelyn Tinio,
against whom it had since lodged a criminal case.[2]
Each of the criminal cases were prosecuted in behalf of the People of
the Philippines by the City Prosecutor, who did not interpose any objection to
Reliances motion. Respondent judge conducted a hearing on the matter, and
Reliance submitted documentary evidence in support of its motion.
On 21 April 1999, respondent judge issued an Order denying Reliances
motion. On the premise that the controversy revolved on the tri-sided (sic)
relationship of movant Reliance Surety; Alfredo Wy and Evelyn Tinio and the
Insurance Commission, the Order stressed that the controversy could only be
resolved with authority and finality by the Insurance Commission under its
Administrative and Adjudicatory Powers.[3]
As Reliance failed in its motion to reconsider the said Order, on 15 June 1999,
it seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal. However, on 15 July 1999, respondent
judge issued an Order disallowing the Notice of Appeal on the ground that
Reliance failed to pay the corresponding appeal fee, pursuant to the provisions
of Sec. 1 (c), Rule 50, in relation to Sec. 4, Rule 41.[4]
Reliance sought the reconsideration of the disallowance of the appeal,
stressing among others, that the rules cited by the RTC were inapplicable, as
they pertained to civil actions and not to criminal cases, and that there was
nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure that requires the payment of appeal
fees in criminal cases.[5] However, Reliances Motion for Reconsideration was
denied in an Order[6] dated 24 August 1999. Therein, the RTC characterized
the pending incident as having a civil nature, which has not been subsumed by
the criminal nature of the cases under which Reliances motion was captioned.[7]
Reliance then filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Court of Appeals, praying
that the orders disallowing the Notice of Appeal be declared null and void, and
that respondent Judge be ordered to immediately transmit the complete
records, together with the Notice of Appeal in accordance with Section 8, Rule
12 of the Rules of Court.[8]
Before the appellate court, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
representation of the People filed a Manifestation expressing concurrence with
Reliances position.[9] Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division
issued a Decision[10] dated 22 December 2000 dismissing the petition.
Casting the issue as whether docket fees should be paid in appealing
the order dismissing petitioners motion to set aside order/writ of execution, the
appellate court cited Section 7, Rule 5 of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which provides that appeals from orders of
confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds shall be treated as appeals in civil cases,
and Section 3, Rule 5 of the same Rules which ordains that no payment of
docketing and other legal fees shall be required in criminal cases except in
petitions for review of criminal cases and appeals from confiscation or forfeiture
of bail bond.[11] With these rules as anchor, the Court of Appeals concluded that
Reliance was obligated to pay the corresponding docket fees, and failure to do
so was ground to dismiss the appeal, as the RTC properly did.
Before this Court, Reliance points out that nothing in the Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires the payment of appeal fees in criminal cases. It
notes as obvious that respondent judge, petitioner, and the OSG were aware
of the provisions of the RIRCA cited by the Court of Appeals, and that the RTC
Clerk of Court had accepted the Notice of Appeal without being required to pay
the appeal fee. Moreover, arguing that the RIRCA could not supplant, amend
or modify the Rules of Court, Reliance asserts that the cited provisions of the
RIRCA, which operate towards that result, are clearly null and void. Finally,
Reliance submits that should the Court rule that an appeal fee is required even
in cases of the sort, it be allowed instead to pay such appeal fee.[12]
Interestingly, the OSG has reversed its earlier concurrence with
Reliances stance, seeking this time the dismissal of the present petition.
Holding forth that the Court of Appeals was within the bounds of its discretion
when it dismissed the petition, the government counsel endorses the validity
and enforceability of the challenged provisions of the RIRCA, as they were
approved by this Court.[13]
The facts as presented by Reliance manifest disconcerting aspects of
the dismissal of the appeal as decreed by the trial court. No disputation has
been made of Reliances claim that when it filed the Notice of Appeal, it inquired
with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Cashiers Office in the RTC whether an
appeal or docket fee should be paid and was informed that none was
required.[14] Moreover, the provisions cited by the RTC in its dismissal of
the Notice of Appeal, Sec. 1 (c), Rule 50, in relation to Sec. 4, Rule 41, plainly
apply only to civil cases since appeals in criminal cases are governed by Rules
122 to 125 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no provision in the
Rules of Court equivalent to that of the RIRCA providing that an appeal from
an order for the confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds should be treated as an
appeal in a civil case.
Nonetheless, a review of the available record reveals a more complex
factual milieu. Reliance proceeds from the premise that the twin denials of
Reliances Motion to Set Aside Orders/Writs of Execution and the
succeeding Notice of Appeal serve as the linchpin on which its attempt to
acquit itself of liability from the bonds should hinge. However, it is evident from
the record that Reliance, long before it filed its motion in October of 1998, was
already afforded the opportunity to timely challenge liability on these bonds, yet
failed to do so.
To best appreciate this case, it is essential to elaborate on the
procedure surrounding the confiscation or forfeiture of a bail bond by the trial
court, and the proper remedies which may be undertaken by the bondsmen
adversely affected.
Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in
accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail
by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation
duly authorized by its board of directors.[15] Once the obligation of bail is
assumed, the bondsman or surety becomes in law the jailer of the accused and
is subrogated to all the rights and means which the government possesses to
make his control of him effective.[16]
Section 21, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, in force
at the time of the subject incidents, provides for the procedure to be followed
before a bail bond may be forfeited, and judgment on the bond rendered
against the surety:
SEC. 21. Forfeiture of bailbond. When the presence
of the accused is required by the court, or these Rules, his
bondsman shall be notified to produce him before the court on
a given date. If the accused fails to appear in person as
required, the bond shall be declared forfeited and the
bondsman are given thirty (30) days within which to produce
their principal and to show cause why judgment should not be
rendered against them for the amount of their bond. Within the
said period, the bondsmen:
(a) must produce the body of their principal or give the reason
for his non-production; and
(b) must explain satisfactorily why the accused did not appear
before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be
rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the
amount of the bond, and the court shall not reduce or
otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, except when
the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.[17]
As evident in the provision, there are two occasions upon which the
trial court judge may rule adversely against the bondsmen in cases when the
accused fails to appear in court. First, the non-appearance by the accused is
cause for the judge to summarily declare the bond as forfeited. Second, the
bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given thirty (30) days
within which to produce the principal and to show cause why a judgment should
not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond. It is only after this
thirty (30)-day period, during which the bondsmen are afforded the opportunity
to be heard by the trial court, that the trial court may render a judgment on the
bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be
entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an
opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce
satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.[18]
The judgment against the bondsmen on the bond may be construed
as a final order, hence subject to appeal. There is no reason to disturb the
doctrine of long standing that characterizes such judgment as a final judgment
or order[19] or that such judgment may be subject to appeal.[20] A final order has
been defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates
a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been
determined.[21] Indeed, from a judgment on the bond, a writ of execution may
immediately issue,[22] and need not be effected through a separate
action.[23] Indeed, an appeal from a judgment on the bond is subsumed under
Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that
appeals in criminal cases avail only from a judgment or final order, [24] and
Section 6 of the same Rule which requires that the appeal be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the final order appealed from.[25]
Moreover, the special civil action of certiorari to assail a judgment of
forfeiture may be available under exceptional circumstances,[26]although the
availability of appeal as a remedy to such judgment greatly raises the bar for
the allowance of the certiorari action. The writ of execution itself may, in theory,
be assailed through the special civil action for certiorari, though qualified again
by the limited circumstances under which certiorari may avail.
Clearly then, under the procedure just elaborated, the surety has
ample opportunities to defend itself before the trial court against the execution
against a bond in its name which it might not have actually issued. Assuming
that the provisions of Rule 122 were actually followed in this case, the matter
of the spuriousness of the subject bonds could have very well been raised even
before judgment on the bond was rendered. But was such procedure actually
observed before the trial court?
Admittedly, the record is bereft of details as to the particular
proceedings in the five criminal cases wherein the subject bonds were issued.
However, Reliance itself attached to its motion copies of the five writs of
execution issued against it respective to the five bonds issued in its name.
Presumably, these writs of execution were issued only after a judgment of
forfeiture had been rendered, which in turn was promulgated only after the
bondsmen had been afforded the opportunity to explain why it should not be
held liable on the bail bond on account of its failure to present the accused in
court.
It is plainly stated on all of these writs of execution that copies thereof
were furnished to the Manager of Reliance Surety and Insurance Company,
8th Floor Equitable Bank Bldg., 262 Juan Luna St., Manila,[27] which pertinently,
is the same business address used by Luisa Agat, the Manager of the Marine
and Bonds Department of Reliance, in her affidavit attached to Reliances
motion.[28] Such notices were served separately on those given to Evelyn Tinio,
whose authority to represent Reliance the latter had subsequently disputed.
Indeed, while Reliance purported to be surprised to have learned of these writs
of execution from the Insurance Commission,[29] there is no express disavowal
of receipt of the copies of the writs of execution directly furnished to its Manila
office by the Cabanatuan City RTC. The presumption is that official duty has
been regularly performed,[30] and that these writs of execution were indeed sent
to the Manila office of Reliance, as stated therein.
Crucially, these writs of execution were issued between 19 January
1995 and 19 January 1998. Reliances motion itself was filed only on 5 October
1998, or nine (9) months after the last of the writs of execution had been issued.
The first assumption of course is that Reliance, in each of the subject
criminal cases, had been served notice of the summary forfeiture of the bail
bond and required to show cause why it should not be held liable on the bond,
and later likewise served notice of the adverse judgment on the bond. Reliance
had the opportunity, prior to the rendition of judgment on the bond, to argue
before the RTC that the bond was spurious, and such argument could very well
have been deemed meritorious, considering the established rule of liberality in
acceptance of the bondsmens explanation.[31] Even if the trial court had refused
to admit such explanation and rendered judgment against Reliance, the
bonding company still had the opportunity to file an appeal within fifteen (15)
days from the judgment on the bond. This, Reliance failed to do. We certainly
cannot construe the notice of appeal which Reliance did file as that taken from
the five judgments on the bond, since such appeal was undertaken more than
a year after the last of the five judgments had been rendered and more than
four years after the first, and also since said notice was expressly made in
respect to the writs of execution.
Still, given the paucity of the available record, let us indulge the
presupposition that, Reliance somehow was unaware of the judgments
rendered on the bond. Considering the express statement on the writs of
execution attached by Reliance to its motion and to this petition, the
presumption arises that said writs of execution were served on Reliance at its
Manila office, and such assumption must be sustained due to the inability of
Reliance to dispute such presumption. Reliance then should have been
expected to do something within a reasonable period of time to challenge the
writs of execution if indeed there were good reasons to assail them. Instead,
upon receipt of these writs of execution, Reliance did nothing, and its failure to
immediately respond to these writs militates against their ultimate claim for
relief.
Finally, Reliance filed the Motion to Set Aside Orders/Writs of
Execution only nine months after receipt of the most recently dated writ of
execution, and four years after the first writ had been issued. Interestingly,
Reliance does not refer at all to the judgments on the bail bonds that would
have preceded the writs of execution, thus apparently conceding the validity of
these judgments.
 Certainly, courts have justifiable reason to view with distaste a
judgment obligor who begins to actively participate in litigation only after the
adverse judgment has long become final. The RTC in this case could not be
faulted for its aversion to indulge in Reliances sudden appearance in the
criminal cases, considering that the said criminal cases have apparently been
long terminated.[32] Nonetheless, Reliances motion, in itself, is not abjectly
bereft of merit, especially if it be construed as a motion to quash a writ of
execution. While the Rules of Court deliberately makes no express reference
to a motion to quash a writ of execution, the jurisdiction of courts to entertain
such motions has long been upheld, on the premise that every court has the
inherent power for the advancement of justice to correct errors of its ministerial
officers and to control its own process.[33]
There are grounds entrenched in jurisprudence for the quashal of a
writ of execution,[34] yet such quashal rests largely in the discretion of the court,
that will be exercised in the furtherance of justice.[35] In this case, had the RTC
been sufficiently convinced that the questioned bail bonds were indeed
spurious, there would be grounds in equity for the writs of execution to be set
aside. After all, the notion that an entity can be held liable for an obligation it
did not actually contract offends basic principles of justice.
However, the RTC was not sufficiently convinced, preferring instead to
await definitive word from the Insurance Commission on the revocation of
Reliances former agent. One can view the justification as a measure of
prudence, or disagree with it as an abdication of the judicial duty to decide. Yet
concededly, the RTCs discretion in deciding the matter is entitled to great
respect, not only due to the fact that the matter for consideration is the quashal
of writs of execution, but also because the trial court is normally deemed as the
most capable trier of facts under the circumstances.
Yet ultimately, this case does not pivot on whether the RTC correctly
refused to set aside the writs of execution. At this stage, despite the numerous
errors of procedure already committed by Reliance, there still was leeway for
the allowance of its prayer for discharge, since the quashal of writs of execution
was obtainable as a remedy against issuances of inequitable nature. However,
Reliance instead again committed another fundamental procedural error, one
that whisks away whatever sympathy it may have acquired owing to its basic
position.
Simply put, appeal does not lie as the remedy from an order denying a
motion to set aside a writ of execution. Appeal avails as a remedy only against
judgments or final orders, a general rule that holds true whether for civil or
criminal procedure.[36] Appeal may have been properly available from the five
judgments on the bail bonds in the five criminal cases, as such judgments
would have constituted as the final orders on the matter whether Reliance
should be held liable on these bonds. However, appeal cannot be undertaken
from the RTCs Order, arising as it did, at the execution stage.
Reliances motion to set aside the writs of execution cannot be deemed as
having submitted a new incident for resolution to the RTC. The motion had
segued from the earlier final judgments or orders which in turn were sought to
be satisfied through the challenged writs of execution. Indeed, there can be no
two independent final judgments or orders in the same incident, except in cases
where multiple appeals are allowed.[37]
Instead, from receipt of the Order denying its motion to set aside the
writs of execution, the only permissible mode of review for Reliance was a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals,
wherein it could have alleged that the RTC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying the said motion.[38] Ultimately, thus, the RTC could not
be faulted for refusing to give cognizance to the Notice of Appeal, as appeal
was unavailing as a remedy to Reliance in this case.
Similarly, the writ of mandamus which Reliance sought from the Court
of Appeals was not accessible from it in the first place. Since appeal is not the
proper remedy, the RTC could not be compelled to transmit the records to the
higher court for review on appeal, especially considering that the judgment on
the bail bonds had long lapsed into finality.
A brief comment on the remedy which Reliance did pursue before the
Court of Appeals, the special civil action of mandamus. The writ of mandamus
serves to compel a respondent who fails to perform a legal duty or unlawfully
excludes another from the enjoyment of an entitled right or office to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner.[39] As it was, Reliance
resorted to mandamus not as a direct mode of judicial review by the Court of
Appeals in respect to the assailed RTC Order, but merely to petition the
appellate court to give due course to the appeal. It utilized mandamus on the
erroneous notion that the RTC Order was appealable, or on the mistaken
premise that the RTC had the corresponding duty to elevate the records to the
appellate court. While Reliances availment of mandamus is consistent with its
premise that the RTC Order was appealable, its ultimate efficacy is
questionable. After all, the end result of Reliances mandamus petition is simply
the elevation of the records to the Court of Appeals, and not reversal of the
RTC Order on the merits.
There lies room for one more assumption in Reliances favor that we
can attempt to indulge in. Assuming for the nonce that despite all these lapses,
that the RTC Order may be considered as a final judgment or order reviewable
by appeal, Reliance still could not be deemed as having perfected the appeal,
as it did not pay the requisite docket fees.
 Reliance invests all its energy in the present petition to dispute the
holding that the Court of Appeals can, as it did, on the basis of the RIRCA,
refuse to take cognizance of its appeal for failure to pay the docket fee. Sadly
for Reliance, its arguments on this point lack merit.
The Court of Appeals is empowered to promulgate its own rules or
orders pertaining to its operations.[40] The RIRCA is the by-product of this
vested authority. The provisions which Reliance assails, Sections 3 and 7 of
Rule 5, were in place as early as 1994, when the RIRCA was amended, and
retained in the 1999 revision of the RIRCA.
Reliance cannot disavow knowledge of the provisions of the RIRCA.
That these rules are called internal does not mean that they are secret. In fact,
both the 1994 and 1999 editions of the RIRCA have been widely disseminated,
available upon demand from the Court of Appeals, and even replicated in
private collations or annotations of our laws.[41] Nor can Reliance validly assert
that the RIRCA provisions supplanted the Rules of Court. The RIRCA
necessitated the approval, which was obtained, of the Supreme Court prior to
its effectivity, the very Supreme Court which promulgated or amended our
Rules of Court. Certainly, the Court cannot be precluded from amending its
own issuances, or issuing supplementary or clarificatory procedural rules such
as the RIRCA. Indeed, the RIRCA, vested with the requisite imprimatur of the
Supreme Court, is effectively an issuance of this Court. Challenge of the
RIRCA is akin to challenging one of the Courts very own issuances.
these bail bonds but faced denial of its relief by the RTC, it failed to lodge the
correct mode of judicial review when it filed a notice of appeal instead of a
special civil action for certiorari. From the disallowance of the Notice of Appeal,
it responded with a woefully insufficient petition for mandamus. Even its
arguments against the validity of the questioned RIRCA provisions are
erroneous.
In a long-distance race, the crowd would be charitably disposed the
first time a runner trips and falls. Neither would the second fall exhaust the
commiseration of the spectators. However, if the runner stumbles every fifty
meters, observers have earned the right to heckle and jeer, or more kindly, to
question whether the racer is qualified to run in the first place. Indeed,
Reliances consecutive procedural missteps, all of which could have been
avoided by easy reference to the established rules and jurisprudence, have
deprived it of the right to seek relief before this Court.
Our final disposition is not the product of sheer pique, and we have
duly considered the fact that denial of the petition would condemn Reliance to
an obligation it might not have contracted. Yet ultimately, it should accept the
consequences of its negligence in failing to timely present its position, or in
utilizing the proper modes of judicial review. Equitable relief is not the
supremacy of pity but the entitlement of due process previously denied the
litigant. One who fails to avail of the prescribed legal steps despite repeated
opportunities has no reason to expect anything other than due condemnation.

Moreover, the assailed provisions of the RIRCA are ultimately correct WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
in characterizing the appeal from a judgment on the bail bond as inherently civil
in nature. The RTC correctly picked up on this point,[42] and it is a SO ORDERED.
characterization that we can affirm. The liability of the bondsmen on the bail
bond arises not from the violation of, or an obligation to comply with, a penal
provision of law. It emerges instead from a contract, the bond subscribed jointly
by the accused and the surety or bondsmen. The obligation of the accused on
the bond is different from that of the surety in that the former can be made to
suffer a criminal penalty for failure to comply with the obligations on the bail
bond. However, the surety is not under a similar pain of punishment, as its
liability on the bail bond would merely be civil in character. Nothing in the Rules
of Court authorizes the imprisonment of the surety for the failure to produce the
accused when called for in court, his obligation being contractual in source and
character. In keeping with the civil nature of the appeal from the judgment on
the bail bonds, the Court of Appeals acted properly in prescribing the payment
of docket fee for such appeal as in appeal in civil cases.

Reliance apparently failed to show cause to the RTC why it should not
be held liable on the subject bail bonds, to timely appeal the judgment rendered
on the bail bonds, or to move within a reasonable time to set aside the writs of
execution. When Reliance finally undertook steps to acquit itself of liability on
[G.R. No. 128349. September 25, 1998]
BACHRACH CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Bachrach Corporation (Bachrach), in its petition for review
on certiorari, questions the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
38763, promulgated on 12 November 1996, the dispositive part of which
reading -
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed RTC orders are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and public respondent is ordered to dismiss the
subject action before him under Civil Case No. 95-73399. No pronouncement
as to costs.[1] on several counts; viz:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING
CA-G.R. SP NO. 38673 DESPITE THE FACT THAT A SIMILAR
PETITION EARLIER FILED BY PPA WAS DISMISSED FOR BEING
INSUFFICIENT NOT ONLY IN FORM BUT ALSO IN SUBSTANCE
WHICH DISMISSAL CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA INSOFAR AS
THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN ARE CONCERNED.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE DECISION IN THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE
CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA WHICH BARS THE SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE CASE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE FILING OF THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CASE VIOLATES
THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL
COURT CONSTITUTES INTERFERENCE WITH ITS JUDGMENT IN
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE
DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 95-73399 THEREBY RULING ON
THE MERITS OF THE CASE WHEN IN FACT, THE ONLY ISSUES
FOR ITS RESOLUTION WERE THE PROPRIETY OF THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND
THE DENIAL OF PPAS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING ON
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.[2]
It would appear that petitioner corporation entered into two lease
contracts with the Philippine government covering two specified areas, Block
180 and Block 185, located at the Manila Port Area, then under the control and
management of the Director of Lands, for a term of ninety-nine years each, the
first lease to expire on 19 June 2017 and the other on 14 February
2018. During her tenure, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 321 transferring the management and administration of the entire Port
Area to herein respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). Shortly after its
take-over, PPA issued a Memorandum increasing the rental rates of Bachrach
by 1,500%. Bachrach refused to pay the substantial increased rates
demanded by PPA.
On 23 March 1992, PPA initiated unlawful detainer proceedings,
docketed Civil Case No. 138838 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila, against Bachrach for non-payment of rent. On 27 April 1993, MeTC
rendered a decision ordering the eviction of Bachrach from the leased
premises. Bachrach appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
which, on 21 September 1993, affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto.[3]
Bachrach elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for review. On 29 July 1994, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the
RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Bachrach; however, the
resolution of the motion was put on hold pending submission of a compromise
agreement.[4] When the parties failed to submit the promised compromise
agreement, the Court of Appeals, on 15 May 1995, denied Bachrachs motion
for reconsideration. The decision of the appellate court in the ejectment suit
became final and executory on 20 May 1995.[5]
Meanwhile on 28 March 1995, while the motion for reconsideration was
yet pending with the appellate court, Bachrach filed a complaint against PPA
with the Manila RTC, docketed Civil Case No. 95-73399 (hereinafter referred
to also as the specific performance case), for refusing to honor a compromise
agreement said to have been perfected between Bachrach and PPA during
their 04 February 1994 conference that superseded the ejectment case. In its
complaint, Bachrach prayed for specific performance.
On 08 June 1995, PPA filed a motion for a writ of execution/garnishment
in the ejectment case. The next day, 09 June 1995, Bachrach filed an
application in the specific performance case for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the MeTC from
issuing the writ of execution/garnishment. PPA countered by filing a motion for
preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses along the same grounds
mentioned in its motion to dismiss the specific performance case, to wit: (a)
the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause;
(b) the violation of the anti-forum-shopping rule; (c) the complaints lack of
cause of action; and (d) the unenforceable character of the compromise
agreement invoked by Bachrach. On 13 July 1995, the trial court issued an
omnibus order, granting the application of Bachrach for a writ of preliminary
injunction, in this tenor -
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so holds (1) that
plaintiff (Bachrach) is entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for and upon the
posting of a bond in the amount of P300,000.00, let a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining the defendant (PPA), the Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 from issuing a writ of
execution/garnishment in Civil Case No. 238838-CV entitled `Philippine Ports
Authority vs. Bachrach Corporation; (2) lifting/setting aside the order dated
June 5, 1995 and (3) denying defendants motion for a preliminary hearing on
affirmative defenses.[6]
PPA moved for reconsideration of the above order but the trial court denied
the plea in its order of 29 August 1995.
On 25 September 1995, PPA filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 38508, before the Court of
Appeals. The petition was dismissed by resolution, dated 28 September 1995,
of the appellate court for being insufficient in form and substance, i.e., the
failure of PPA to properly attach a certified true copy each of the assailed order
of 13 July 1995 and 29 August 1995 of the trial court. PPA received on 05
October 1995[7] a copy of the resolution, dated 28 September 1995, of the
appellate court. Undaunted, PPA filed a new petition on 11 October 1995, now
evidently in proper form, asseverating that since it had received a copy of the
assailed resolution of the trial court only on 07 September 1995, the refiling of
the petition with the Court of Appeals within a period of less than two months
from the date of such receipt was well within the reasonable time requirement
under the Rules for a special civil action for certiorari.[8] In the meantime, the
resolution, dated 28 September 1995, of the Court of Appeals which dismissed
CA-G.R. No. 38508 became final on 21 October 1995.[9]
In its newly filed petition, docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 38673, PPA invoked
the following grounds for its allowance:
I. That respondent Judge acted without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction against
the final and executory resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals (Annex
`I) inspite of the well-established rule that courts are not allowed to
interfere with each others judgment or decrees by injunction, and worse, in this
case, against the execution of the judgment of a superior or collegiate court
which had already become final and executory.
II. That respondent Judge acted without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion when it also denied petitioners motion for a
preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses or in failing to have the case
below outrightly dismissed on the grounds stated in its affirmative defenses,
when respondent Judge pronounced there is no identity as to the causes of
action between the case decided by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No.
32630) and the case below (Civil Case No. 95-73399) when clearly the causes
of action in both cases revolve on the same issue of possession of the subject
leased premises.
III. That respondent Judge acted without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance (of), abide (by) and
acknowledge the final judgment of the Court of Appeals which, on said ground
alone, is enough justification for the dismissal of the case grounded on res
judicata. Moreover private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping and the
penalty therefor is the dismissal of its case.[10]
On 12 November 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
nullifying and setting aside the orders of the RTC and ordering the latter to
dismiss the specific performance case.
The Court finds merit in the instant appeal interposed by petitioner.
Verily, the decisive issue raised by the parties before the Court in the
instant petition is whether or not the specific performance case (Civil Case No.
73399) should be held barred by the unlawful detainer case on the ground
of res judicata. There are four (4) essential conditions which must concur in
order that res judicata may effectively apply, viz: (1) The judgment sought to
bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there
must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of
subject matter, and identity of causes of action.[11] There is no question about
the fact that all the first three elements of res judicata are here extant; it is the
final condition requiring an identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes
of action, particularly the last two, i.e., subject matter and cause of action, that
presents a problem.
A cause of action, broadly defined, is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right of the other.[12] The subject matter, on the other hand,
is the item with respect to which the controversy has arisen, or concerning
which the wrong has been done, and it is ordinarily the right, the thing, or the
contract under dispute.[13] In a breach of contract, the contract violated is the
subject matter while the breach thereof by the obligor is the cause of action. It
would appear quite plain then that the RTC did act aptly in taking cognizance
of the specific performance case. In Civil Case No. 138838 of the MeTC, the
unlawful detainer case, the subject matter is the contract of lease between the
parties while the breach thereof, arising from petitioners non-payment of Having reached the above conclusions, other incidental issues raised by
rentals, constitutes the suits cause of action. In Civil Case No. 73399 of the petitioner no longer need to be passed upon.
RTC, the specific performance case, the subject matter is the compromise
agreement allegedly perfected between the same parties while the cause of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
action emanates from the averred refusal of PPA to comply therewith. The Appeals is reversed and set aside; Civil Case No. 73399 along with the
ultimate test in ascertaining the identity of causes of action is said to be to look assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court, aforedated, are hereby
into whether or not the same evidence fully supports and establishes both the reinstated. No costs.
present cause of action and the former cause of action. In the affirmative, the SO ORDERED.
former judgment would be a bar; if otherwise, then that prior judgment would
not serve as such a bar to the second.[14] The evidence needed to establish
the cause of action in the unlawful detainer case would be the lease contract
and the violation of that lease by Bachrach. In the specific performance case,
what would be consequential is evidence of the alleged compromise
agreement and its breach by PPA.
The next thing to ask, of course, would be the question of whether or not
the issuance by the trial court of the writ of preliminary injunction was an
improper interference with the judgment in the unlawful detainer suit. It could
be argued that, instead of filing a separate action for specific performance,
Bachrach should just have presented the alleged compromise agreement in
the unlawful detainer case. Unfortunately, the refusal of PPA to honor the
agreement after its alleged perfection effectively prevented Bachrach from
seeking the coercive power of the court to enforce the compromise in the
unlawful detainer case. The situation virtually left Bachrach with but the
remedy of independently initiating the specific performance case in a court of
competent jurisdiction. In its challenged decision, the Court of Appeals, on its
part, has said that respondent PPAs prayer for the issuance of a writ of
execution and garnishment is but the necessary and legal consequence of its
affirmance of the lower courts decision in the unlawful detainer case which has
by then become final and executory.[15] The rule indeed is, and has almost
invariably been, that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the court to order its execution.[16] No court, perforce, should
interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule,
however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and
circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or
unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or
prevent its enforcement.[17] So, also, a change in the situation of the parties
can warrant an injunctive relief.[18] Evidently, in issuing its orders of 13 July
1995 and 29 August 1995 assailed by PPA in the latters petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, the trial court in the
case at bar would want to preserve status quo pending its disposition of the
specific performance case and to prevent the case from being mooted by an
early implementation of the ejectment writ. In holding differently and ascribing
to the trial court grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the appellate court, in our considered view, has committed
reversible error.
[G.R. No. 138869. August 29, 2002]
DAVID SO, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and People of the
Philippines, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are the Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary
Supervening Event[1] dated February 7, 2002, and Motion for Suspension of
Execution and Modification of Judgment[2]dated February 14, 2002, filed by
petitioner David So, as well as the Consolidated Comment filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General.
On August 21, 2001, we affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR SP No. 49680 denying the petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction seeking to restrain the execution of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 8345 and 8346 finding petitioner
guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
On September 25, 2001, petitioner So filed a Motion for New Hearing
relying on the promulgation of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-
2001 which establish a rule of preference in the imposition of the penalties
under B.P. Blg. 22, wherein a fine instead of imprisonment may be imposed
upon the discretion of the judge. Thereafter, petitioner So filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Courts decision alleging basically the same
arguments. In a Resolution dated January 16, 2002, both motions were
denied.
On February 11, 2002, petitioner So filed an Urgent Manifestation of an
Extraordinary Supervening Event alleging that he underwent a serious triple
heart bypass at the Makati Medical Center on January 21, 2002, and that to
impose imprisonment upon him is a sentence of death. He seeks a retroactive
application of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 in his favor and prays that,
for humanitarian grounds, a fine instead of imprisonment be imposed.
Petitioner also filed a Motion for Suspension of Execution and
Modification of Judgment, contending that his having undergone open heart
surgery warrants, for humanitarian reasons and in the higher interest of justice,
the suspension of the execution of the judgment of conviction and the
modification of the sentence from imprisonment to a fine in double the amount
of the checks subject of this petition.
In its Consolidated Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General averred
that in the cases of Vaca vs. Court of Appeals[3] and Rosa Lim vs. People
of the Philippines,[4] this Court deleted the penalty of imprisonment and
imposed only a fine equivalent to double the amount of the checks involved. It
held that it would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty
within the range of discretion allowed by Section 1, paragraph 1 of B.P. Blg.
22, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due
regard to the protection of the social order. It submits the resolution of the
foregoing motions to the sound discretion of this Court in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001.
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 8345 and
8346 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the two
above-entitled cases, the Court hereby sentences the accused as follows:
In Crim. Case No. 8345: To suffer imprisonment of one (1) year; to indemnify
the offended party, Faustino Puzon, the sum of P6,000.00, Philippine
Currency; and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 8346: To suffer imprisonment of one (1) year; to indemnify
the offended party, Faustino Puzon, the sum of P28,600.00, Philippine
Currency; and to pay the costs.[5]
In the cited case of Vaca vs. Court of Appeals,[6] the petitioners were
convicted of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and were sentenced to one year
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00. The Court, however, took into
consideration the advanced age of one of the accused and the fact that all the
accused were first offenders, and deleted the sentence of imprisonment and
ordered the payment of double the amount of the checks involved. It
rationalized, viz:
x x x Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who
presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this
appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not
committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have
accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a
prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the
penalty within the range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection
of the social order. In this case we believe that fine in an amount equal to
double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose
on each of the petitioners.

The doctrine enunciated in the Vaca case, and reiterated in Rosa Lim
vs. People of the Philippines,[7] was eventually adopted by this Court as a
policy on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22,
under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 issued on November 12, 2000.
In accord with this policy, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 issued on
February 14, 2001 vests in the courts the discretion to determine, taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, whether the imposition
of fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to
impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of
justice.
In the case at bar, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Froilan L.
Navarro[8] states that as a consequence of the coronary artery triple bypass
operation of petitioner So, the patient is still weak, depressed, recuperating
from the surgical procedure. He could not stand stressful situation and
physical activities. He needs coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under
direct supervision of a coronary care therapist. It is our considered opinion that
the present physical condition of petitioner So presents a compelling reason
to modify the decision of the trial court and impose, in lieu of imprisonment, a
fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the checks involved.
Admittedly, the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 8345 and 8346 has
become final. Nevertheless, the rule that it is the ministerial duty of the court
to order the execution of a final judgment admits of certain exceptions. Thus,
in the case of People vs. Gallo,[9] we held that the court has the authority to
suspend the execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof
as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.
WHEREFORE, the motion for suspension of execution and modification
of judgment is GRANTED and the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 8345 and
8346 is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the sentence of imprisonment and
ordering petitioner David So to pay a fine equivalent to double the amount of
the checks involved.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 102965. January 21, 1999]
JAMES REBURIANO and URBANO REBURIANO, petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and PEPSI COLA
BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
In Civil Case No. Q-35598, entitled Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Urbano (Ben) Reburiano and James Reburiano, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 103 rendered on June 1, 1987 a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Pepsi Cola
Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc.
1. Ordering the defendants Urbano (Ben) Reburiano and James Reburiano to
pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of P55,000.00, less whatever
empties (cases and bottles) may be returned by said defendants valued at the
rate of P55.00 per empty case with bottles.
2. Costs against the defendants in case of execution.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc.
appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking the modification of the portion of the
decision, which stated the value of the cases with empty bottles as P55.00 per
case, and obtained a favorable decision. On June 26, 1990, judgment was
rendered as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one is
rendered, ordering the defendant-appellees to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiff-appellant the sum of P55,000.00 with interest at the legal rate from
January 1982. With costs against defendants-appellees.
After the case had been remanded to it and the judgment had become
final and executory, the trial court issued on February 5, 1991 a writ of
execution.
It appears that prior to the promulgation of the decision of the trial court,
private respondent amended its articles of incorporation to shorten its term of
existence to July 8, 1983. The amended articles of incorporation was approved
by the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 1984. The trial court
was not notified of this fact.
On February 13, 1991, petitioners moved to quash the writ of execution
alleging -
3. That when the trial of this case was conducted, when the decision was
rendered by this Honorable Court, when the said decision was appealed to the
Court of Appeals, and when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the
private respondent was no longer in existence and had no more juridical
personality and so, as such, it no longer had the capacity to sue and be sued;
4. That after the [private respondent], as a corporation, lost its existence and
juridical personality, Atty. Romualdo M. Jubay had no more client in this case
and so his appearance in this case was no longer possible and tenable;
5. That in view of the foregoing premises, therefore, the decision rendered by
this Honorable Court and by the Honorable Court of Appeals are patent nullity,
for lack of jurisdiction and lack of capacity to sue and be sued on the part of
the [private respondent];
6. That the above-stated change in the situation of parties, whereby the
[private respondent] ceased to exist since 8 July 1983, renders the execution
of the decision inequitable or impossible.[1]
Private respondent opposed petitioners motion. It argued that the
jurisdiction of the court as well as the respective parties capacity to sue had
already been established during the initial stages of the case; and that when
the complaint was filed in 1982, private respondent was still an existing
corporation so that the mere fact that it was dissolved at the time the case was
yet to be resolved did not warrant the dismissal of the case or oust the trial
court of its jurisdiction. Private respondent further claimed that its dissolution
was effected in order to transfer its assets to a new firm of almost the same
name and was thus only for convenience.[2]
On February 28, 1991, the trial court issued an order[3] denying petitioners
motion to quash. Petitioners then filed a notice of appeal, but private
respondent moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the trial courts
order of February 28, 1991 denying petitioners motion to quash writ of
execution was not appealable.[4] The trial court, however, denied private
respondents motion and allowed petitioners to pursue their appeal.
 In its resolution[5] of September 3, 1991, the appellate court dismissed
petitioners appeal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, but their motion
was denied by the appellate court in its resolution, dated November 26, 1991.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners pray that the
resolutions, dated September 3, 1991 and November 26, 1991, of the Court of
Appeals be set aside and that a new decision be rendered declaring the order
of the trial court denying the motion to quash to be appealable and ordering
the Court of Appeals to give due course to the appeal.[6]
On the other hand, private respondent argues that petitioners knew that
it had ceased to exist during the course of the trial of the case but did not act
upon this information until the judgment was about to be enforced against
them; hence, the filing of a Motion to Quash and the present petition are mere
dilatory tactics resorted to by petitioners. Private respondent likewise cites the
ruling of this Court in Gelano v. Court of Appeals[7] that the counsel of a
dissolved corporation is deemed a trustee of the same for purposes of
continuing such action or actions as may be pending at the time of the
dissolution to counter petitioners contention that private respondent lost its
capacity to sue and be sued long before the trial court rendered judgment and
hence execution of such judgment could not be complied with as the judgment
creditor has ceased to exist.[8]
First. The question is whether the order of the trial court denying
petitioners Motion to Quash Writ of Execution is appealable. As a general rule,
no appeal lies from such an order, otherwise litigation will become
interminable. There are exceptions, but this case does not fall within any of
such exceptions.
In Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held:[9]
Certain, it is, . . . that execution of final and executory judgments may no longer
be contested and prevented, and no appeal should lie therefrom; otherwise,
cases would be interminable, and there would be negation of the
overmastering need to end litigations.
There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the
course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These
instances, rare though they may be, do call for correction by a superior court,
as where -
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution
inequitable or unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment
of the court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
interpretation thereof; or,
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that
it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the
judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued
without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity
dictate that there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating
the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal
(writ of error or certiorari) or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus.
In this case, petitioners anchored their Motion to Quash on the claim that
there was a change in the situation of the parties. However, a perusal of the
cases which have recognized such a ground as an exception to the general
rule shows that the change contemplated by such exception is one which
occurred subsequent to the judgment of the trial court. Here, the change in the
status of private respondent took place in 1983, when it was dissolved, during
the pendency of its case in the trial court. The change occurred prior to the
rendition of judgment by the trial court.
It is true that private respondent did not inform the trial court of the
approval of the amended articles of incorporation which shortened its term of
existence. However, it is incredible that petitioners did not know about the
dissolution of private respondent considering the time it took the trial court to
decide the case and the fact that petitioner Urbano Reburiano was a former
employee of private respondent.As private respondent says,[10] since
petitioner Reburiano was a former sales manager of the company, it could be
reasonably presumed that petitioners knew of the changes occurring in
respondent company.Clearly, the present case does not fall under the
exception relied upon by petitioners and, the Court of Appeals correctly denied
due course to the appeal. As has been noted, there are in fact cases which
hold that while parties are given a remedy from a denial of a motion to quash
or recall writ of execution, it is equally settled that the writ will not be recalled
by reason of any defense which could have been made at the time of the trial
of the case.[11]
Second. The Court of Appeals also held that in any event petitioners
cannot raise the question of capacity of a dissolved corporation to maintain or
defend actions previously filed by or against it because the matter had not
been raised by petitioners before the trial court nor in their appeal from the
decision of the said court. The appellate court stated:
It appears that said motion to quash writ of execution is anchored on the
ground that plaintiff-appellee Pepsi Bottling Company of the Philippines had
been dissolved as a corporation in 1983, after the filing of this case before the
lower court, hence, it had lost its capacity to sue. However, this was never
raised as an issue before the lower court and the Court of Appeals when the
same was elevated on appeal. The decision of this Court, through its Fourth
Division, dated June 26, 1990, in CA-G.R. CV No. 16070 which, in effect,
modified the appealed decision, consequently did not touch on the issue of
lack of capacity to sue, and has since become final and executory on July 16,
1990, and has been remanded to the court a quo for execution. It is readily
apparent that the same can no longer be made the basis for this appeal
regarding the denial of the motion to quash writ of execution. It should have
been made in the earlier appeal as the same was already obtaining at that
time.[12]
We agree with this ruling. Rules of fair play, justice, and due process
dictate that parties cannot raise for the first time on appeal from a denial of a
Motion to Quash a Writ of Execution issues which they could have raised but
never did during the trial and even on appeal from the decision of the trial
court.[13]
Third. In any event, if the question of private respondents capacity to sue
can be raised for the first time in this case, we think petitioners are in error in
contending that a dissolved and non-existing corporation could no longer be
represented by a lawyer and concomitantly a lawyer could not appear as
counsel for a non-existing judicial person.[14]
Section 122 of the Corporation Code provides in part:
122. Corporate Liquidation. - Every Corporation whose charter expires by its
own limitation or is annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate
existence for other purposes is terminated in any other manner, shall
nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the
time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to
dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the
purpose of continuing the business for which it was established.
At any time during said three (3) years, said corporation is authorized and
empowered to convey all of its property to trustees for the benefit of
stockholders, members, creditors, and other persons in interest.From and after
any such conveyance by the corporation of its property in trust for the benefit
of its stockholders, members, creditors and others in interests, all interests
which the corporation had in the property terminates, the legal interest vests
in the trustees, and the beneficial interest in the stockholders, members,
creditors or other persons in interest.
Petitioners argue that while private respondent Pepsi Cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines, Inc. undertook a voluntary dissolution on July 3,
1983 and the process of liquidation for three (3) years thereafter, there is no
showing that a trustee or receiver was ever appointed. They contend that 122
of the Corporation Code does not authorize a corporation, after the three-year
liquidation period, to continue actions instituted by it within said period of three
years. Petitioners cite the case of National Abaca and Other Fibers
Corporation v. Pore[15] wherein this Court stated:
It is generally held, that where a statute continues the existence of a
corporation for a certain period after its dissolution for the purpose of
prosecuting and defending suits, etc., the corporation becomes defunct upon
the expiration of such period, at least in the absence of a provision to the
contrary, so that no action can afterwards be brought by or against it, and must
be dismissed. Actions pending by or against the corporation when the period
allowed by the statute expires, ordinarily abate.[16]
This ruling, however, has been modified by subsequent cases. In Board
of Liquidators v. Kalaw,[17] this Court stated:
. . .The legal interest became vested in the trustee the Board of
Liquidators. The beneficial interest remained with the sole stockholder the
government. At no time had the government withdrawn the property, or the
authority to continue the present suit, from the Board of Liquidators. If for this
reason alone, we cannot stay the hand of the Board of Liquidators from
prosecuting this case to its final conclusion. The provision of Section 78 (now
Section 122) of the Corporation Law the third method of winding up corporate
affairs finds application.[18]
Indeed, in Gelano vs. Court of Appeals,[19] a case having substantially
similar facts as the instant case, this Court held:
However, a corporation that has a pending action and which cannot be
terminated within the three-year period after its dissolution is authorized under
Sec. 78 [now 122] of the Corporation Law to convey all its property to trustees
to enable it to prosecute and defend suits by or against the corporation beyond
the three-year period. Although private respondent did not appoint any trustee,
yet the counsel who prosecuted and defended the interest of the corporation
in the instant case and who in fact appeared in behalf of the corporation may
be considered a trustee of the corporation at least with respect to the matter
in litigation only. Said counsel had been handling the case when the same was
pending before the trial court until it was appealed before the Court of Appeals
and finally to this Court. We therefore hold that there was substantial
compliance with Sec. 78 [now 122] of the Corporation Law and such private
respondent Insular Sawmill, Inc. could still continue prosecuting the present
case even beyond the period of three (3) years from the time of dissolution.
...[T]he trustee may commence a suit which can proceed to final judgment
even beyond the three-year period. No reason can be conceived why a suit
already commenced by the corporation itself during its existence, not by a
mere trustee who, by fiction, merely continues the legal personality of the
dissolved corporation should not be accorded similar treatment allowed to
proceed to final judgment and execution thereof.[20]
There is, therefore, no reason why the suit filed by private respondent
should not be allowed to proceed to execution. It is conceded by petitioners
that the judgment against them and in favor of private respondent in C.A. G.R.
No. 16070 had become final and executory. The only reason for their refusal
to execute the same is that there is no existing corporation to which they are
indebted. Such argument is fallacious. As previously mentioned, the law
specifically allows a trustee to manage the affairs of the corporation in
liquidation. Consequently, any supervening fact, such as the dissolution of the
corporation, repeal of a law, or any other fact of similar nature would not serve
as an effective bar to the enforcement of such right.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions, dated September 3, 1991 and November
26, 1991, of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

In the Gelano case, the counsel of the dissolved corporation was SO ORDERED.
considered a trustee. In the later case of Clemente v. Court of Appeals,[21] we
held that the board of directors may be permitted to complete the corporate
liquidation by continuing as trustees by legal implication. For, indeed, as early
as 1939, in the case of Sumera v. Valencia,[22] this Court held:

It is to be noted that the time during which the corporation, through its own
officers, may conduct the liquidation of its assets and sue and be sued as a
corporation is limited to three years from the time the period of dissolution
commences; but there is no time limit within which the trustees must complete
a liquidation placed in their hands. It is provided only (Corp. Law, Sec. 78 [now
Sec. 122]) that the conveyance to the trustees must be made within the three-
year period. It may be found impossible to complete the work of liquidation
within the three-year period or to reduce disputed claims to judgment.The
authorities are to the effect that suits by or against a corporation abate when it
ceased to be an entity capable of suing or being sued (7 R.C.L., Corps., par.
750); but trustees to whom the corporate assets have been conveyed pursuant
to the authority of Sec. 78 [now Sec. 122] may sue and be sued as such in all
matters connected with the liquidation. . . .[23]

Furthermore, the Corporation Law provides:

145. Amendment or repeal. - No right or remedy in favor of or against any

corporation, its stockholders, members, directors, trustees, or officers, nor any
liability incurred by any such corporation, stockholders, members, directors,
trustees, or officers, shall be removed or impaired either by the subsequent
dissolution of said corporation or by any subsequent amendment or repeal of
this Code or of any part thereof.

This provision safeguards the rights of a corporation which is dissolved

pending litigation.
[G.R. No. 118339. March 19, 1998]
AURORA B. CAMACHO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LEONCIA
DIZON, RICARDO VALERA, DELFIN MANLAPID, JACOBE
QUINTOS and SPOUSES GASPAR and ELENA
QUINTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The issue here is not new; it is simply, whether a judgment may still be
executed by mere motion after the lapse of five (5) years from its finality.
Before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Balanga, Bataan, respondents Leoncia Dizon, Ricardo Valera, Delfin
Manlapid, Jacobe Quintos and spouses Gaspar and Elena Quintos instituted
an action for specific performance against petitioner Aurora B. Camacho
concerning certain portions of Lot No. 26108 covered by TCT No. T-29799.
Their claim was anchored on the respective deeds of sale in their favor.
On 20 December 1974 the trial court ruled for respondents. Petitioner
was ordered, among other things, to segregate the definite portions sold to
respondents and to deliver to them their corresponding titles.[1] On 30 January
1981 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with modification. On
4 June 1982 the appellate court granted reconsideration by deleting the
modification. On 21 March 1983 this Court denied the petition for review
on certiorari which denial became final and executory on 23 May 1983. On 6
June 1983 the records were remanded to the Balanga trial court.
On respondents' motion, the writ of execution was issued on 26 August
1983. On 28 September 1983 petitioner moved to defer the execution on the
ground that the directive of the judgment could not be carried out in the
absence of an approved subdivision plan. Besides, the boundaries and exact
locations of the subject lots could not be determined. On 18 January 1984 the
trial court denied the motion and ordered the Provincial Sheriff to enforce the
writ. Thereafter petitioner filed a notice of appeal while respondents moved for
its dismissal. On 22 March 1985 the trial court ruled that its order was not
appealable and directed the issuance of a new writ of execution. Undaunted,
petitioner resorted anew to respondent court by way of a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus which was however denied. On 26 February 1986
the petition before us met the same fate.
On 26 September 1986 a new writ of execution was issued. Nonetheless
the judgment remained unenforced due to the alleged failure of petitioner to
surrender her copy of the title.Upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds of
Bataan, respondents discovered that titles to the subject lots were transferred
in 1984 to petitioner's daughter Aurora Fe B. Camacho. Thus on 14 April 1987
respondents moved that petitioner and/or her daughter surrender the copies
of the present titles to the trial court.
On 11 August 1987 the trial court granted the motion insofar as it was
directed against petitioner but not as against her daughter. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration on 4 September 1987 while respondents moved for
modification which petitioner opposed. Subsequently, another incident
concerning the authority of a new counsel for respondents to replace their
original counsel was submitted. The trial court considered the new counsel as
co-counsel but the ruling was assailed by petitioner. Consequently on 25
September 1990 it ordered respondents' counsel to comment thereon without
resolving the previous motions of the parties.
In a letter dated 24 January 1992 respondents invited the attention of this
Court to the vacancy in the branch of the trial court where their case was
pending. On 15 June 1992 they moved again for implementation of the writ of
execution. On 10 September 1992 petitioner countered by moving to dismiss
the proceedings on the contention that the trial court had no more jurisdiction
because more than five (5) years had elapsed from the date of entry of
judgment.
The trial court sustained petitioner and explained that although
respondents' motion was for implementation of the writ of execution, in effect
they were seeking the issuance of an alias writ which should have been done
within the period 26 February 1986 and 25 February
1991 and therefore their motion was denied. In the order of 19 November
1992,[2] the trial court dismissed the proceedings and in view thereof found it
unnecessary to dwell on the other pending motions.
Respondent appellate court assessed the situation differently. According
to it -
x x x x The period during which defendant's motion to defer execution (dated
September 28, 1983), which was finally resolved only upon the promulgation
of the Supreme Court's resolution dated February 26, 1986 (about 2 1/2 years)
should be considered as having stayed or suspended the five-year period. It
is noted that the Court of Appeals categorically ruled that defendant's motion
to defer execution is "a purely dilatory action to stave off the execution of a
long final judgment of the trial court," and rejected defendant's contention that
the portions of Lot No. 261-B which she sold to the plaintiffs are unidentifiable
xxxx
x x x x The five-year period should be deemed extended by the delay due to
causes not of plaintiffs' making, as that due to a vacancy in the sala. We also
see no reason why the period of the pendency of plaintiffs' Motion to Surrender
Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title as well as the other unresolved incidents
spawned by defendant's determined efforts to resist execution of a final
judgment should not be considered as having tolled the five-year period when
no fault can be attributed to plaintiffs for the court's failure to resolve these
pending incidents. Reasons of equity which have been justifiably invoked in
the computation of the five-year prescriptive period for execution on motion
argue against a contrary ruling.[3]
Thus on 15 December 1994 respondent court set aside the order of the
trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.[4]
Petitioner[5] asserts that her motion to defer execution as well as the
petitions before the appellate courts could not have possibly suspended the
five-year reglementary periodinasmuch as no writ of injunction was
issued. She adds that it is immaterial that there was a vacancy in the sala of
the Presiding Judge and that there were unresolved motions since the problem
lies in the failure of respondents to apply for an alias writ of execution within
the reglementary period.
We find no reversible error committed by respondent court. Pursuant to
Sec. 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court a judgment may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final
and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. Resolving the
same issue in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals[6] the Court emphasized -
On several instances, this Court has invoked the principle of equity in
computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by motion. We have ruled
that if the delays were through no fault of the prevailing party, the same should
not be included in computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by
motion x x x x
Along the same line, the Court elucidated in Republic v. Court of
Appeals[7]-
To be sure, there had been many instances where this Court allowed
execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious
grounds.[8] These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the
delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage.
In the case under consideration, the judgment sought to be executed
became final and executory on 23 May 1983. The writ of
execution was issued on 25 July 1983 but on 28September 1983 petitioner
moved to defer execution. She even elevated the matter to respondent court
and this Court until it was settled unfavorably on 26 February 1986. By then
petitioner has consumed almost two and a half (2 1/2) years or almost half of
the period alloted to respondents within which to move to execute the
judgment. On 26 September 1986 a new writ of execution was issued but
unfortunately did not serve its purpose due to the alleged failure of petitioner
to surrender her copy of the title. Then it turned out according to respondents
that the original title was cancelled and two (2) new titles were issued in the
name of petitioner's daughter, Aurora Fe. Respondents were prompted to file
on 14 April 1987 a motion requiring petitioner and/or her daughter to surrender
their copies of the new titles. This motion was granted on 11 August 1987 but
only against petitioner. The latter moved for reconsideration on 4 September
1987 while respondents moved for modification which petitioner
opposed. Another incident regarding the representation of respondents by
new counsel arose. As of 25 September 1990 when the trial court issued its
order regarding the representation the foregoing motions remained
unresolved.
Furthermore, a vacancy in the trial court was created when the then
Presiding Judge retired on 14 November 1990. Another Judge assumed office
on 22 October 1991 but retired barely two (2) months thereafter. A second
vacancy thus existed until the present Presiding Judge was appointed on 9
March 1992. On 15 June 1992 respondents filed a motion to implement the
writ of execution. Going back to the date when respondents moved to require
petitioner and/or her daughter to surrender their copies of the new titles almost
five (5) years and two (2) months had passed. Under the peculiar
circumstances of the present case where the delays were occasioned by
petitioner's own initiatives and for her advantage as well asbeyond
respondents' control, we hold that the five-year period allowed for enforcement
of the judgment by motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted or
suspended. Once again we rely upon basic notions of equity and justice in so
ruling.
The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing
judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Far
from sleeping on their rights, respondents persistently pursued their rights of
action. It is revolting to the conscience to allow petitioner to further avert the
satisfaction of her obligation because of sheer literal adherence to
technicality. After all, the Rules of Court mandates that a liberal construction
of the Rules be adopted in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.[9] This rule of construction is especially useful in the present
case where adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and
manifest injustice.[10]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of
respondent Court of Appeals dated 15 December 1994 which ordered that the
case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 Sometime in 1996, petitioner provided Midas a credit line of about
BANGKOK BANK PUBLIC COMPANY G.R. No. 159806 $2,000,000. When Midas refused to pay its outstanding obligation, petitioner,
LIMITED, on May 7, 1998, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 141,
an Amended Complaint for Sum of Money with an Urgent Application for
Petitioner, Present: Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment[6] docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
Quisumbing, J., 628 against respondents.

(Chairman), After respondents filed an Answer,[7] petitioner filed a Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment.[8] The motion was
Carpio, denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for a partial
judgment.
Carpio Morales, and
- versus - Tinga, JJ. The trial court found that a partial judgment can be rendered. The only
remaining factual issues would be: (1) petitioners entitlement to the writ of
preliminary attachment; and (2) the parties claim for damages against each
other. In a Partial Decision[9] dated March 23, 2000, the trial court ruled:
THELMA U. LEE, MAYBELLE L. LIM, DANIEL Promulgated:
U. LEE, SAMUEL U. LEE and MIDAS WHEREFORE, partial decision is hereby rendered
DIVERSIFIED EXPORT CORPORATION, ordering defendants Midas Diversified Export Corporation and
January 20, 2006 individual defendants Thelma Lee, Maybelle L. Lim, Daniel U.
Respondents.
[Lee] and Samuel U. Lee, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff
x--------------------------------------------------x the sum of US$1,998,554.60 plus legal rate of interest at 12%
per annum effective upon the filing of the complaint on 12
March 1998 until fully paid; and ordering the same individual
defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the sum of
DECISION
US$800,000.00 representing the account of MHI plus legal
rate of interest at 12% per annum effective upon the filing of
QUISUMBING, J.: the amended complaint on 7 May 1998 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.[10]
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated July 4, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76078, which nullified the February 12,
2003 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141. However, in its Resolution[11] dated June 19, 2000, the trial court
The said RTC Order directed the execution of the Decision[3] dated May 31, amended the afore-quoted fallo, to wit:
2002 and the Partial Decision[4] dated March 23, 2000, as amended
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
by Resolution[5] of June 19, 2000.
Resolution is hereby issued:
The facts, as borne by the records, are as follows:
1. Denying defendants motion for reconsideration of
the partial decision.
Petitioner Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited is a foreign
corporation engaged in the banking business in the Philippines.
2. Amending the dispositive portion of the partial
decision to read as follows:
Respondent Midas Diversified Export Corporation (Midas for brevity)
is a corporation organized under Philippine laws. Individual respondents
WHEREFORE, partial decision is
Thelma U. Lee, Maybelle L. Lim, Daniel U. Lee, and Samuel U. Lee are the
hereby rendered ordering defendant Midas
owners, directors, and managers of Midas.
Diversified Export Corporation and individual
 defendants Thelma Lee, Maybelle L. Lim,
Daniel U. Lee and Samuel U. Lee, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of
US$1,998,554.60 plus legal rate of interest at
12% per annum effective on 28 January 1998
when the account became due and payable
until fully paid, and liquidated damages
equivalent to 24% of the principal amount
due, per annum, effective from said due date
until fully [paid]; ordering the same individual
defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the
sum of US$800,000.00 representing the
account of MHI plus legal rate of interest of
12% per annum effective on 27 February
1999 when the account became due and
demandable until fully paid, and liquidated
damages equivalent to 24% of the principal
amount per annum effective from said due
date until fully paid.
3. Granting plaintiffs motion for execution pending
appeal perforce ordering the immediate execution of the
partial decision.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Not content, respondents filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.[13]
The appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court. However, it
ruled that a partial decision cannot be the subject of execution until after
judgment is rendered on the entire case. In a Decision promulgated on
February 28, 2001, the portion ordering the immediate execution of the partial
decision was annulled and set aside.[14]
Subsequently, on May 31, 2002, the trial court issued a
Decision[15] upholding the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment and
dismissing defendants claim for damages for lack of evidence.[16]
On July 11, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. The next day, July 12, 2002, respondents filed with the trial court a
Notice of Appeal of its May 31, 2002 decision.
Meanwhile, on February 12, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed
Order[17] granting the motion for execution pending appeal. A Writ of
Execution[18] of the partial decision as amended and of the decision on the
remaining issues was promptly issued on February 20, 2003.
However, respondents filed anew before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining
Order[19] impugning the February 12, 2003 Order of the trial court. The
appellate court granted the petition. It held that the assailed Order failed to
state good reasons to justify immediate execution.
Hence, the instant petition for review anchored on the following
grounds:
I.
Whether or not the Partial Decision is subject to
judicial review, and whether or not Respondents liability to pay
the Bank is now the law of the case.
II.
Assuming that the Partial Decision could still be
appealed, whether or not Respondents had appealed the
Partial Decision.
III.
Assuming that the Partial Decision is not final and
executory, whether or not there are nonetheless good
reasons justifying its execution pending appeal.[20]
Petitioner contends that respondents Notice of Appeal clearly
indicated that they were only appealing the subsequent decision on the
remaining factual issues. Petitioner claims the partial decision was never
appealed and has therefore become final and executory.
Further, petitioner posits that since the RTC has ruled on the
remaining factual issues, the partial decision is no longer an interlocutory but
a final order that may already be the subject of execution.
However, respondents counter that the appeal from the trial courts
decision on the remaining issues necessarily included appeal of its partial
decision. They insist that the partial decision has been integrated in the
decision on the remaining issues. Further, they argue that the remaining issues
are intimately related to the matters contained in the partial decision.
Lastly, respondents argue that the February 12, 2003 Order of the trial
court granting execution pending appeal did not state good reasons to justify
the same; and that in fact, no good reason exists to warrant execution pending
appeal.
We find no merit in the petition.
The Notice of Appeal filed by respondents stated that they were
appealing the subsequent decision dated May 31, 2002, which disposed of the
remaining factual issues. To our mind, the said appeal must be deemed to
include the prior partial judgment as amended. The decision on the remaining
factual issues is not the final and appealable judgment that finally disposes of
the case on the merits. It must, therefore, only be appealed together with the
amended partial judgment.[21]
Having settled the first and second issues, we come to the third. We
note that when the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution, judgment
had already been rendered on the remaining factual issues such that the
partial judgment had become a complete judgment. Thus, a writ of execution
could already issue.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
(Underscoring ours.)
...
Unfortunately, the assailed Order of the trial court failed to state good
reasons for the issuance of the writ. The trial court deemed that execution
should issue as a matter of right because it mistakenly held that the partial
decision had become final and executory. As discussed above, the latter
proposition is without legal basis.
Clearly, the assailed Order of the trial court, which granted the motion
for execution pending appeal, fell short of the requirements of Section 2, Rule
39. Where the order of execution is not in conformity with the rules, the same
is null and void.[22] Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring the
said Order nullified.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated July 4, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76078, which nullified the February 12, 2003
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 141, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

However, since appeal had been duly perfected, though not yet finally SO ORDERED.
resolved, execution was not a matter of right, but of discretion provided good
reasons therefor existed. The compelling grounds for the issuance of the writ
must be stated in a special order after due hearing.

Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.

(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order

pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice
to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has
jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the
original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be,
at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even
before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for
execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
[G.R. No. 135630. September 26, 2000]
INTRAMUROS TENNIS CLUB, INC. (ITC), PHILIPPINE TENNIS
ASSOCIATION (PHILTA) and ITC TENNIS PLAYERS, petitioners,
vs. PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (PTA), CLUB
INTRAMUROS, and COURT OF APPEALS, Second
Division, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails two resolutions of the Second Division
of the Court of Appeals which granted private respondents motion for
execution pending appeal and ordered the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 50 to issue the corresponding writ of execution. The antecedent facts
are as follows:
Private respondent Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) owns the Victoria
Tennis Courts located in Intramuros, Manila by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 1763. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed on June 11, 1987,
the PTA transferred the management, operation, administration and
development of the Victoria Tennis Courts to petitioner Philippine Tennis
Association (PHILTA) for a period of ten (10) years[1]commencing on June 15,
1987.[2] Petitioner Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. (ITC) is an affiliate of PHILTA
and has for its members tennis players and enthusiasts who regularly use the
facilities of the Victoria Tennis Courts.
On June 26, 1995, and during the effectivity of the MOA, PTA wrote a
letter to PHILTA enumerating alleged violations by PHILTA of the terms and
conditions of the MOA and demanding the surrender of the possession of the
Victoria tennis courts on or before July 25, 1995.[3] On April 11, 1996, PTA
wrote a second letter to PHILTA requesting the latter to vacate the premises
of said tennis courts to give way to PTAs golf course expansion program with
private respondent Club Intramuros.[4]
On May 7, 1996, petitioners instituted a case for preliminary injunction,
damages, and prayer for temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-78248. The petition
alleged that PTAs demand to vacate was a unilateral pre-termination of the
MOA, under the terms of which PHILTA was allowed the management of the
tennis courts until June 15, 1997. It also alleged that by complying with PTAs
demand to vacate, petitioner ITC stands to sustain liability because it had prior
commitments to use the Victoria Tennis Courts for two activities, namely, the
International Wheelchair Tennis Clinic on May 14-16, 1996 and the Philippine
National Games on May 20-25, 1996. The other grounds cited by petitioners
were: the Victoria Tennis Courts are the oldest in the country, and form part of
Philippine history and cultural heritage; the Victoria Tennis Courts are one of
the few remaining public tennis courts in Metro Manila open to the less affluent;
petitioners are maintaining the tennis courts at high cost, and unless the
demolition is restrained, they will be unable to recoup their investments; the
demolition will result in the displacement of the workers in the tennis courts;
and, as players and aficionados of tennis, petitioners stand to lose the
camaraderie that playing in Victoria Tennis Courts helped foster among them.
The temporary restraining order was granted on May 22, 1996, and
petitioners were allowed to retain possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts.
Thereafter, or on June 17, 1996, the RTC also granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners, based upon a finding that PTA
in pursuing the golf course expansion program was in effect unilaterally pre-
terminating the MOA. In the same order, it declared that petitioner ITC is an
affiliate of PHILTA that has a right to be protected.[5]
On June 16, 1997, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss, stating
that in view of the expiration of the MOA petitioners cause of action was
rendered moot and academic.However, petitioners maintained that their
petition was also an action for damages; hence, there are other issues for
resolution despite the termination of the MOA.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, finding that based on the
allegations of the petition in relation to the reliefs demanded, petitioners only
purpose was to stop PTA from pursuing the golf course expansion program on
account of the tennis activities that will utilize Victoria Tennis Courts as
venue. It also found that the evidence submitted by the parties at the trial
revolved around the issue of whether the preliminary injunction should be
declared permanent or lifted. This issue has resolved itself when the MOA
expired. The RTC noted that by the terms of the MOA the contract between
PTA and PHILTA was actually one of lease --- and under the law on leases,
upon the expiration of the period of lease the lessor is entitled to be restored
to the possession of the property.
Moreover, the RTC declared, the petition before it cannot be considered
an action for damages because based on standing case law the amount of
damages must be stated in the complaint for purposes of determining
jurisdiction and the appropriate amount of docket fees.[6] The court did not take
cognizance of petitioners claim for damages considering that the amount
thereof was nowhere mentioned in the petition, whether in the prayer or in the
body of said pleading.
Hence, the RTC ruled to lift the writ of preliminary injunction and to
declare private respondent PTA entitled to the possession of Victoria Tennis
Courts. It further declared that petitioners action has become moot and
academic by reason of the expiration of the MOA upon which petitioners rights
were based.
Petitioners appealed to respondent court. While the case was pending
therewith, private respondents filed a motion for execution of judgment
pending appeal invoking that under Section 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court judgments in actions for injunction are not stayed by appeals
taken therefrom. Thus:
Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. --- Judgments in actions for
injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such other
judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately
executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be
stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the
trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellee court in its discretion may
make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the
injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support. (Underscoring
supplied)
The motion alleged that there was an urgent necessity on the part of
private respondents to immediately take possession of the Victoria Tennis
Courts by reason of its being heavily deteriorated and unsanitized because of
[petitioners] failure to maintain its good condition. It appended a letter by a
group of tennis players, addressed to Tourism Secretary Mina T. Gabor,
complaining about the state of the facilities and general uncleanliness of the
tennis courts and appealing that the depredations committed by PHILTA and
its concessionaires be corrected.[7]The motion also alleged that the appeal
taken by petitioners was frivolous and intended merely to delay the immediate
execution of the judgment of the RTC.
In their comment to the above motion, petitioners stated that private
respondents reliance on Section 4, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court was
erroneous because that provision contemplates an instance where an action
for injunction was granted, not a situation as the one herein where the
judgment was for the lifting of an injunction earlier issued. Rather, petitioners
maintain that the applicable provision is Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which accords the appellate court discretionary power to order
execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal, upon good reasons to
be stated in a special order after due hearing.
Petitioners further contended that the deterioration and unsanitary
conditions of Victoria Tennis Courts alleged by private respondents were
unsubstantiated and do not constitute good reasons for the wielding by
respondent court of its power of discretionary execution. They maintained that
their appeal is not merely dilatory, but poses several justiciable issues
including the claim for damages which was aborted by the RTCs premature
dismissal of the petition. Thus, respondent court should, in the exercise of its
discretion whether or not to allow execution pending appeal, lean towards the
preservation of petitioners right to appeal.
In a resolution dated July 9, 1998, the Second Division of respondent
court[8] took into consideration the ground advanced by private
respondents, i.e., that the Victoria Tennis Courts are ill-maintained by
PHILTA. It granted the motion for execution pending appeal, declaring that
since the lease agreement under the MOA had already expired and private
respondents had made it clear that there will be no renewal of the said
agreement, PTA as lessor is entitled to exercise all its rights of ownership and
possession over the Victoria Tennis Courts. It also observed that the
petitioners appeal from the order of the RTC was merely dilatory, and that the
outcome of the appeal will not in any way alter the fact of private respondents
entitlement to the possession and administration of the Victoria Tennis
Courts.[9] Thus, the dispositive portion of respondent courts resolution
provides:
WHEREFORE, for the special reasons set forth above, the motion for
execution pending appeal is hereby GRANTED upon payment and approval
of this court of a bond in the amount of P800,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[10]
In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners argued that under Section
2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court respondent court should have
conducted hearings to ascertain whether there were good reasons to issue the
writ of execution pending appeal. Respondent court denied their motion for
lack of merit,[11] and declared that contrary to petitioners asseverations, the
determination of good reasons for allowing execution pending appeal does not
strictly require a formal or trial-type hearing; instead, the parties may be heard
by way of pleadings. In the case of petitioners, their arguments against private
respondents motion for execution pending appeal were heard when they filed
their comment thereto. Moreover, under Rule 8 of the Revised Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals ---
Section 1. Oral Argument. --- The necessity or propriety of oral argument shall
be determined by the Justice assigned to study and report on the case and the
oral argument shall be confined to those matters which he may
specify. However, in lieu of oral arguments, said Justice may allow the parties
to file their respective memoranda within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Petitioners also contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction to rule
on PTAs possessory rights over the tennis courts, because the appropriate
action to determine those rights is unlawful detainer which is under the
jurisdiction of MTCs. Respondent court dismissed the argument stating that it
was inconsistent of petitioners to now question the RTCs jurisdiction,
considering that it was they who instituted the injunction case before the RTC;
thus, it appears that they were raising this argument merely because they
failed to secure the affirmative reliefs that they sought from that court.
Thus, the September 23, 1998 resolution of respondent court reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 is hereby ordered to issue a Writ of
Execution pursuant to this courts resolution dated July 9, 1998 granting the
execution pending appeal.[12]
From the above resolutions of respondent court, petitioners filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari. The petition, filed on November 17,
1998, alleged that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
in the following:
a. In granting private respondents Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal pursuant to an erroneous or incorrect provision of the
Rules of Court;
b. In entertaining a special reason interposed by private
respondents, which was not even inceptually offered in evidence;
c. In considering - with unfounded bias, petitioners pending appeal
with said respondent court - as merely intended to delay;
d. In reasoning that the revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals can supersede the Rules of Court;
e. In assuming that possessory reliefs automatically vest upon
private respondents due to the dismissal of the injunction case;
and
f. In directing the RTC Manila, Branch 50, to issue a Writ of
Execution pursuant to the July 9, 1998 Resolution.[13]
Anent the first ground, petitioners allege that respondent court wrongly
quoted the provisions of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court,[14] and that the pertinent provisions are the second and third paragraphs
which declare that after the trial court has lost jurisdiction, it is the appellate
court in the exercise of its discretion and upon good reasons that may issue
the motion for execution pending appeal. They maintained that the special
reason interposed by private respondents, i.e., that the Victoria Tennis Courts
were ill-maintained, was a bare allegation that was not properly substantiated,
because the letter of the tennis players to Secretary Gabor was not formally
submitted in evidence in the trial court.[15] Moreover, they declared, there was
no judgment or final order to speak of in the instant case because the RTC
order dated August 5, 1997 was still the subject of an appeal that is pending
with respondent court. They also assailed the conclusion of respondent court
that the appeal was dilatory considering that petitioners had several causes of
action which transcend the lease relationship in the MOA. The fourth
assignment of error, meanwhile, asserts that petitioners were entitled to a
hearing under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court and
respondent court erroneously dispensed thereof in favor of the provisions of
the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that memoranda may be required of
the parties in lieu of a hearing. Finally, petitioners argued that respondent court
acted hastily and prematurely in ordering the trial court to issue a writ of
execution for private respondents to gain possession over the tennis courts,
when the dispositive portion of the RTC order lifting the preliminary injunction
made no mention of giving possession to private respondents. As declared by
petitioners, the dispositive portion of the RTC order dated August 5, 1997
merely reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by PTA is
hereby granted. The bond posted by plaintiff is hereby declared released.[16]
In response to petitioners arguments, private respondents declared that
no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to respondent court for allowing
execution pending appeal to prosper. The matter of good reasons as basis of
an execution pending appeal is a question that lies within the sound discretion
of respondent court, and its finding in the herein case as to the existence of
such good reasons should be given respect and credence in the absence of
evident bad faith.[17] Moreover, execution pending appeal is only a provisional
remedy that respondent court allowed private respondents to avail of and
should not be interpreted as an adjudication on the merits of the main case still
pending before respondent court.[18]
Shortly after the filing of the instant petition, or on October 21, 1998,
private respondents filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution with the
RTC of Manila, Branch 50, pursuant to the resolutions of respondent court
dated July 9, 1998 and September 23, 1998. This motion, however, was not
granted by the RTC which, in an order penned by then presiding judge Urbano
C. Victorio, Sr., suspended or held in abeyance the issuance of the writ of
execution because the records of Civil Case No. 96-78248 are still with
respondent court and also in deference to the Supreme Court where the
instant petition is pending.[19] In a second order which denied private
respondents motion for reconsideration, Judge Victorio additionally noted that
since the principal cause of action in Civil Case No. 96-78248 was for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the same has been cancelled
or revoked by the RTC on August 5, 1997, there was nothing more for the RTC
to execute.
Undaunted by these developments, private respondents filed with the
RTC a Second Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution With Leave of Court
on November 11, 1999. Private respondents reasoned that the mere
pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a
case pending execution before a lower court, cannot prevent the said lower
court from effecting execution in the absence of a writ of injunction from a
higher court restraining it from doing so, and in the absence of a final
determination from the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in ordering the RTC to issue the writ of execution.[20] This
motion was granted on February 4, 2000 by Judge Concepcion S. Alarcon-
Vergara, who assumed office as presiding judge of RTC Manila, Branch 50
after the retirement of Judge Victorio.[21] Thus, a writ of execution was issued
on February 17, 2000 ordering the Sheriff of RTC Manila, Branch 50 to cause
petitioners to vacate the premises of Victoria Tennis Courts and to place
private respondents in possession of the same.[22]
Petitioners attempted to secure before this Court a restraining order
against the implementation of the above writ of execution, arguing that such
implementation would render the instant petition moot and academic. The
Court, however, denied their motion in a resolution dated March 15, 2000.
In their memorandum dated May 27, 2000, private respondents informed
the Court that on March 1, 2000 they had gained actual control and possession
of the Victoria Tennis Courts.[23] Thus, they submit that the instant petition is
now moot and academic.
Preliminarily, we find that the petition was not rendered moot or illusory
by the fact that execution was effected and possession of the tennis courts
restored to private respondents. The resolution of the instant petition requires
a determination of whether respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretionary power to order execution pending appeal as prescribed in
Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, and where such grave
abuse of discretion is established the execution pending appeal pursuant to
the resolutions of respondent court may be voided. Thus, the Court finds that
the petition presents a live and justiciable controversy.
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads ---
Discretionary execution. ---
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. --- On motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it
has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record
or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such
motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final
order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing.
Based on the foregoing provisions, respondent court may order execution
pending appeal subject to the following conditions: (1) there must be a
judgment or final order; (2) the trial court must have lost jurisdiction over the
case; (3) there must be good reasons to allow execution; and (4) such good
reasons must be stated in a special order after due hearing.
Undoubtedly, the RTC order dated August 5, 1997 which granted private
respondents motion to dismiss and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction is a
final order within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Petitioners maintain that the said RTC order could not be the proper
subject of execution because it was still appealed to respondent court, but this
merely confuses the concept of a final judgment or order from one which has
become final (or to use the more established term, final and executory) --- a
distinction that is definite and settled.
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto --- such as an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground of res judicata or prescription, for instance.[24] It is to be
distinguished from an order that is interlocutory, or one that does not finally
dispose of the case, such as an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule
16 of the Rules of Court, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading. As such, only final judgments or orders (as opposed to interlocutory
orders) are appealable. Now, a final judgment or order in the sense just
described becomes final and executory upon expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom where no appeal has been duly perfected or, an appeal therefrom
having been taken, the judgment of the appellant court in turn becomes final. It
is called a final and executory judgment because execution at such point
issues as a matter of right.[25]
By its provisional nature, the remedy of execution pending appeal
requires only a final judgment or order (as distinguished from an interlocutory
order) and not a final and executory judgment or order. In the instant case, the
RTC order dated August 5, 1997 which granted private respondents motion to
dismiss, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and held private respondents
entitled to possess the Victoria Tennis Courts is a final order within the
contemplation of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, inasmuch
as it makes an adjudication on the merits of the case and dismisses petitioners
action. Petitioners, in fact, impliedly recognized the finality of this RTC order
when they filed an ordinary appeal (and not a petition for certiorari) therefrom
with respondent court.
 Addressing petitioners argument that the dispositive portion of the RTC
order dated August 5, 1997 only provides that private respondents motion to
dismiss is granted and does not order private respondents to regain
possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts, suffice it to say that although as a
rule, execution must conform to the dispositive portion of a decision, the other
parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio
decidendi of the court.[26] In fact, a closer look at the RTC order shows that the
dispositive portion consists of two paragraphs, thus ---
Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction is hereby lifted and defendant is
entitled to possess the Victoria Tennis Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by PTA is
hereby granted. The bond posted by plaintiff is hereby declared
released. (Underscoring supplied)[27]
Thus, petitioners representation that the RTC order did not intend to award
possession to private respondents of the disputed property as a result of the
lifting of the preliminary injunction is blatantly without basis.
It is also not contested that at the time the motion for execution pending
appeal was filed, the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case as
petitioners appeal had already been perfected and the records of the case
transmitted to respondent court.
On the matter of hearing, we uphold respondents position that respondent
court did not gravely abuse its discretion in granting the motion for execution
pending appeal without a full-blown or trial-type hearing. We have interminably
declared that due process basically entails the opportunity to be heard, and
we hold that the same principle underlies the provision on hearing in Section
2 of the abovecited Rule 39. The records of the instant case clearly disclose
that petitioners have filed their comment[28] to private respondents motion for
execution pending appeal, and their arguments as embodied in said comment
did in fact form part of the discussion of respondent court in its assailed
resolution of July 9, 1998.
Thus, the only issue remaining is whether respondent court gravely
abused its discretion in finding good reasons to grant private respondents
motion for execution pending appeal.
Execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general
rule that only a final judgment may be executed.[29] Thus, the existence of good
reasons is essential for it is what confers discretionary power on a court to
issue a writ of execution pending appeal. [30] These reasons must be stated in
a special order --- for unless they are divulged, it would be difficult to determine
whether judicial discretion has been properly exercised in the case.[31]
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate
execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party after the
lapse of time be unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party
who may have apparently no case but to delay. [32] There must be superior
circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment.[33] Were it otherwise,
execution pending appeal may well become a tool of oppression and inequity
instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice.[34]
In light of these considerations, the Court has been very discriminating in
the allowance of such exceptional execution. Thus, mere allegations that the
appeal is dilatory,[35] or that the bond for the early execution has been duly
paid,[36] or that the corporation seeking execution is in financial distress [37] ---
were held insufficient grounds to merit execution pending appeal.On the other
hand, where the goods subject of the judgment stand to perish or deteriorate
during the pendency of the appeal,[38] or the award of actual damages is for an
amount which is fixed and certain,[39] the Court found that good reasons
existed for execution pending appeal to prosper.
At the same time, it must also be remembered that the determination of
the existence of good reasons is also a discretionary power, and the reviewing
court will not interfere with the exercise of this discretion absent a showing of
grave abuse thereof.[40] In the present case, we find that respondent court was
well within its discretion in issuing its questioned resolutions, which clearly set
out the reasons for granting private respondents motion for execution pending
appeal. The observation on the deteriorating and unsanitary conditions of the
Victoria Tennis Courts came from tennis players who regularly use the said
courts, and there is no indication that the letter was contrived or fabricated
simply to procure for private respondents the restoration of possession of the
Victoria Tennis Courts. We find no merit to petitioners contention that the letter
is inadmissible because it was not among those formally offered in evidence
during trial at the RTC --- the letter was dated November 10, 1997 and it could
not have formed part of the evidence in trial at the time the parties formally
rested their cases on June 11, 1996.[41] Verily, it could only have been
submitted in evidence before respondent court, while the case was on appeal
therewith.
More importantly, PHILTA no longer had any legal right to the possession
and management of the Victoria Tennis Courts because the lease agreement
between PTA and PHILTA had already expired on June 15, 1997. Obviously,
PTA as the lessor and owner of the tennis courts had every right to regain
possession thereof --- and it also had every reason to be alarmed at the
complaint filed by the tennis players with the Department of Tourism because
it would be held accountable as owner and administrator of the tennis courts
for the ill conditions of the said tennis courts. As also observed by respondent
court, after all, upon the expiration of the lease agreement, the plaintiffs-
appellants (petitioners herein) were no longer obliged to properly maintain the
property.[42]
 Clearly, the restoration of PTA into the possession and management of
Victoria Tennis Courts is in order, being a necessary consequence of the lifting
of the preliminary injunction and the termination of the MOA or lease
agreement, and does not prejudice in any way the resolution of the other
issues in petitioners pending appeal with respondent court such as their claim
for damages from PTA which petitioners admit to be independent of the terms
of the MOA. Thus, we find that respondent court did not gravely abuse its
discretion in finding good reasons for allowing private respondents motion for
execution pending appeal.
Moreover, judgments in actions for injunction are not stayed by the
pendency of an appeal taken therefrom.[43] This rule has been held to extend
to judgments decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction, which
are immediately executory.[44]
However, we modify respondent courts findings to the extent that it held
petitioners appeal pending therewith to be clearly dilatory, and cited this as
one of the reasons for allowing execution pending appeal. This assumption
prematurely judges the merits of the main case on appeal,[45] and except in
cases where the appeal is patently or unquestionably intended to delay it must
not be made the basis of execution pending appeal if only to protect and
preserve a duly exercised right to appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The validity of the writ
of execution issued and implemented pursuant to the resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated July 9, 1998 and September 23, 1998 is SUSTAINED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127851. October 18, 2000]
CORONA INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and THE PHILIPPINE COCONUT
AUTHORITY, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May funds of the Philippine Coconut Authority, a public corporation, be
garnished on account of an execution pending appeal?
This is the pivotal issue raised in the instant petition for review which
assails the January 22, 1997 Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 42829[1] holding that such funds are public funds exempt from
garnishment.
The facts are simple:
On September 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
99, rendered a Decision[2] in Civil Case No. Q-93-14581, entitled "Corona
International, Inc., Plaintiff versus Philippine Coconut Authority, Defendant",
disposing of the case as follows -
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered -
1. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the total sum of P9,082,068.00
representing the balance of the contract price for Phase III of the project, the
10% retention for Phases I, II and III of the project, and the contract price for
Phase IV of the project;
2. Ordering the defendant to indemnify plaintiff the sum equal to two (2%) per
centum of P9,082,068.00 monthly from date of the filing of the complaint up to
March 30, 1995, as actual and for damages;
3. Ordering the defendant to indemnify plaintiff the sum equal to 1 and % per
cent of P9,082.068.00 monthly from March 30, 1995 up to the time the full
amount is fully paid, as and by way of actual damages;
4. The sum of P1,000,000.00 as and for attorney's fee; plus the costs of the
suit.
The counterclaim interposed by the defendant is hereby dismissed for lack of
evidence to sustain it.
SO ORDERED."[3]
On September 25, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of
Judgment Pending Appeal to which private respondent filed an
Opposition. After hearing, the trial court granted the motion for execution
pending appeal "if only to prevent the irreparable collapse of" petitioner's
business operations. It also considered the appeal taken by private
respondent as "patently unmeritorious and would only result in the delay of the
final disposition of the case." It, however, required petitioner to post a Twenty
Million (P20,000,000.00) bond to protect private respondent in the event its
decision is reversed on appeal.
With the filing by petitioner of the required bond, a writ of execution was
issued, on the strength of which funds of private respondent with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, in the amount of Seventeen Million Five Hundred
Twenty Nine Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Three Pesos and Seventy Six
Centavos (P17,529,363.76), was garnished. The bank, however, refused to
release the said amount, prompting petitioner to file a Motion to Require
Release of Bank Deposit.
Meanwhile, on December 5, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion to
Quash Writ of Execution Pending Appeal and Notice of Garnishment alleging
that it had not yet received a copy of the Order granting petitioner's Motion for
Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal which allowed the garnishment of its
funds with the Land Bank of the Philippines. It further contended that the bond
filed by petitioner did not bear the court's approval. Finally, it expressed its
readiness to file a supersedeas bond to stay execution of the court's
judgment. Petitioner filed its Opposition on December 10, 1996.
On December 11, 1996, the trial court issued an Order [4] denying private
respondent's Motion to Quash and ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines
to release and turn over to the court sheriff the garnished fund of private
respondent immediately upon its receipt of said Order.
Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with respondent
Court of Appeals. On January 22, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision, nullifying and setting aside the Order of the trial court
granting the execution pending appeal. It also issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the court sheriff from enforcing both the Writ of Execution
and Notice of Garnishment against private respondent.
Hence, the instant petition for review anchored upon the following
grounds -
"I
 THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ORDER (ANNEX "F") ALLOWING
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, AND ORDER (ANNEX "I")
ORDERING THE GARNISHEE TO RELEASE AND TURN OVER THE
FUNDS OF RESPONDENT PCA TO DEPUTY SHERIFF JOSE G.
MARTINEZ.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN
ENTERTAINING ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT TO
SUPPORT ITS DECISION REVERSING THE CHALLENGED ORDERS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN
HOLDING THAT THE PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY IS AN
AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND IN HOLDING THAT
ITS FUNDS ARE EXEMPT FROM LEVY ON EXECUTION AND/OR
GARNISHMENT.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN
ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION."[5]
It is apparent from the challenged Decision that the rationale for setting
aside the execution pending appeal was its finding that the funds of private
respondent, being public in nature, cannot be garnished.
As argued by petitioner, however, the issue of whether or not the funds
garnished were public in nature was not raised in the trial court and was merely
entertained for the first time in the certiorari proceedings before the Court of
Appeals. We agree with petitioner on this ground and so rule that not having
been raised below, such an issue could no longer be considered in the Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.[6]
This leaves us with the question of whether or not there is basis to sustain
execution pending appeal ordered by the trial court.
Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure lays down the
rule for execution pending appeal, categorized as discretionary execution, to
wit -
"SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. -
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. - On motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it
has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record
or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such
motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final
order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing."
It is evident from the foregoing that a primary consideration for allowing
execution pending appeal would be the existence of good reasons. In turn,
"good reasons" has been held to consist of compelling circumstances justifying
the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory. Such reasons must
constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the
injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. [7]
We note that the reason of the trial court in granting execution pending
appeal was to prevent the irreparable collapse of petitioner's business
operation and that private respondent's appeal is patently unmeritorious and
would only result in the delay of the final disposition of the case.
Does this constitute good reason to order execution pending appeal? Will
this outweigh the injury or damage caused private respondent should the latter
secure a reversal of the judgment against it?
We find that it does not.
To begin with, it would appear that the irreparable collapse of petitioner's
business operation, as feared by the trial court, is illusory. As manifested by
private respondent, petitioner has an application for the expansion of its
operations with the National Telecommunications Commission.[8] Evidently,
such an application would not have been filed had petitioner truly been in the
brink of financial bankruptcy. Moreover, the latest financial report submitted by
petitioner to the Securities and Exchange Commission, on the records, would
readily show that its assets exceed its liabilities.[9]
We also note that the property bond offered by petitioner and accepted
by the trial court has already been conveyed to Natas-ya Enterprises, Inc. via a
Deed of Exchange dated January 30, 1996 and registered on July 25,
1997. Said Natas-ya Enterprises is now the registered owner of the subject
property under Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-179573 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. The same property is further the subject of a case
pending before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. Clearly, then, this
property bond can no longer serve its purpose as security for damages that
may be obtained by private respondent on account of execution pending
appeal.
In upholding the disallowance of the execution pending appeal ordered
by the trial court, albeit on different grounds, we are guided by the rule that
execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the
general rule.[10] So, too, execution pending appeal is not to be availed of and
applied routinely, but only in extraordinary circumstances. [11] Here, with the
alleged collapse of petitioner's business operations rendered doubtful, we find
no good reason to order execution pending appeal.
Finally, it is not difficult to see the injury or damage execution pending
appeal would cause private respondent which is a public corporation tasked to
implement the national policy of the State to promote the rapid integrated
development and growth of the coconut and palm oil industry and to ensure
that the coconut farmers become direct participants of such development and
growth.[12] Among the funds held by private respondent which would be subject
to execution pending appeal would be coconut levy funds vital both to the
coconut industry and to coconut farmers, which being vested with public
interest, we are duty bound to protect. Weighed against these considerations,
execution pending appeal further proves unwise.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforementioned, the Petition for Review
is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.