George Berkeley (/ˈbɑːrklɪ/;[1][2] 12 March 1685 – 14 January 1753) — known as Bishop

Berkeley (Bishop of Cloyne) — was an Irish philosopher whose primary achievement was the
advancement of a theory he called "immaterialism" (later referred to as "subjective idealism" by
others). This theory denies the existence of material substance and instead contends that familiar
objects like tables and chairs are only ideas in the minds of perceivers and, as a result, cannot
exist without being perceived. Berkeley is also known for his critique of abstraction, an
important premise in his argument for immaterialism.

The Berkeley portion of the Yale Campus is named after George Berkeley.

In 1709, Berkeley published his first major work, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, in
which he discussed the limitations of human vision and advanced the theory that the proper
objects of sight are not material objects, but light and colour.[3] This foreshadowed his chief
philosophical work, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in 1710, which,
after its poor reception, he rewrote in dialogue form and published under the title Three
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in 1713.[4]

In this book, Berkeley's views were represented by Philonous (Greek: "lover of mind"), while
Hylas (Greek: "matter") embodies the Irish thinker's opponents, in particular John Locke.
Berkeley argued against Sir Isaac Newton's doctrine of absolute space, time and motion in De
Motu[5] (On Motion), published 1721. His arguments were a precursor to the views of Mach and
Einstein.[citation needed] In 1732, he published Alciphron, a Christian apologetic against the free-
thinkers, and in 1734, he published The Analyst, a critique of the foundations of calculus, which
was influential in the development of mathematics.

His last major philosophical work, Siris (1744), begins by advocating the medicinal use of tar
water and then continues to discuss a wide range of topics, including science, philosophy, and
theology. Interest in Berkeley's work increased after World War II because he tackled many of
the issues of paramount interest to philosophy in the 20th century, such as the problems of
perception, the difference between primary and secondary qualities, and the importance of
language.[6]

His earliest publication was on mathematics, but the first that brought him notice was his An
Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, first published in 1709. In the essay, Berkeley examines
visual distance, magnitude, position and problems of sight and touch. While this work raised
much controversy at the time, its conclusions are now accepted as an established part of the
theory of optics.

The next publication to appear was the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
in 1710, which had great success and gave him a lasting reputation, though few accepted his
theory that nothing exists outside the mind. This was followed in 1713 by Three Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous, in which he propounded his system of philosophy, the leading
principle of which is that the world, as represented by our senses, depends for its existence on
being perceived.
For this theory, the Principles gives the exposition and the Dialogues the defence. One of his
main objectives was to combat the prevailing materialism of his time. The theory was largely
received with ridicule, while even those such as Samuel Clarke and William Whiston, who did
acknowledge his "extraordinary genius," were nevertheless convinced that his first principles
were false.

Subjective idealism, or empirical idealism, is the monistic metaphysical doctrine that only minds and
mental contents exist. It entails and is generally identified or associated with immaterialism, the
doctrine that material things do not exist. Subjective idealism rejects dualism, neutral monism, and
materialism; indeed, it is the contrary of eliminative materialism, the doctrine that only material things,
and no mental things, exist

Abstraction in its main sense is a conceptual process by which general rules and concepts are
derived from the usage and classification of specific examples, literal ("real" or "concrete")
signifiers, first principles, or other methods. "An abstraction" is the product of this process — a
concept that acts as a super-categorical noun for all subordinate concepts, and connects any
related concepts as a group, field, or category.[1]

Conceptual abstractions may be formed by filtering the information content of a concept or an

observable phenomenon, selecting only the aspects which are relevant for a particular purpose.
For example, abstracting a leather soccer ball to the more general idea of a ball selects only the
information on general ball attributes and behavior, eliminating the other characteristics of that
particular ball.[1] In a type–token distinction, a type (e.g., a 'ball') is more abstract than its tokens
(e.g., 'that leather soccer ball').

Abstraction in its secondary use is a material process,[2] discussed in the themes below.

According to Berkeley there are only two kinds of things: spirits and ideas. Spirits are simple,
active beings which produce and perceive ideas; ideas are passive beings which are produced and
perceived.[14]

The use of the concepts of "spirit" and "idea" is central in Berkeley's philosophy. As used by
him, these concepts are difficult to translate into modern terminology. His concept of "spirit" is
close to the concept of "conscious subject" or of "mind", and the concept of "idea" is close to the
concept of "sensation" or "state of mind" or "conscious experience".

Thus Berkeley denied the existence of matter as a metaphysical substance, but did not deny the
existence of physical objects such as apples or mountains. ("I do not argue against the existence
of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with
mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only
thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance.
And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never
miss it.", Principles #35) This basic claim of Berkeley's thought, his "idealism", is sometimes
and somewhat derisively called "immaterialism" or, occasionally, subjective idealism. In
Principles #3, he wrote, using a combination of Latin and English, esse is percipi (to be is to be
perceived), most often if slightly inaccurately attributed to Berkeley as the pure Latin phrase esse
est percipi.[15] The phrase appears associated with him in authoritative philosophical sources,
e.g., "Berkeley holds that there are no such mind-independent things, that, in the famous phrase,
esse est percipi (aut percipere) – to be is to be perceived (or to perceive)."[11]

Hence, human knowledge is reduced to two elements: that of spirits and of ideas (Principles
#86). In contrast to ideas, a spirit cannot be perceived. A person's spirit, which perceives ideas, is
to be comprehended intuitively by inward feeling or reflection (Principles #89). For Berkeley,
we have no direct 'idea' of spirits, albeit we have good reason to believe in the existence of other
spirits, for their existence explains the purposeful regularities we find in experience.[16] ("It is
plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the
ideas by them excited in us", Dialogues #145). This is the solution that Berkeley offers to the
problem of other minds. Finally, the order and purposefulness of the whole of our experience of
the world and especially of nature overwhelms us into believing in the existence of an extremely
powerful and intelligent spirit that causes that order. According to Berkeley, reflection on the
attributes of that external spirit leads us to identify it with God. Thus a material thing such as an
apple consists of a collection of ideas (shape, color, taste, physical properties, etc.) which are
caused in the spirits of humans by the spirit of God.

Theology

A convinced adherent of Christianity, Berkeley believed God to be present as an immediate

cause of all our experiences.

He did not evade the question of the external source of the diversity of the sense data at the
disposal of the human individual. He strove simply to show that the causes of sensations could
not be things, because what we called things, and considered without grounds to be something
different from our sensations, were built up wholly from sensations. There must consequently be
some other external source of the inexhaustible diversity of sensations. The source of our
sensations, Berkeley concluded, could only be God; He gave them to man, who had to see in
them signs and symbols that carried God's word.[17]

Here is Berkeley's proof of the existence of God:

Whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense
have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my
power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present
themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on
them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces
them. (Berkeley. Principles #29)

As T.I. Oizerman explained:

Berkeley's mystic idealism (as Kant aptly christened it) claimed that nothing separated man and
God (except materialist misconceptions, of course), since nature or matter did not exist as a
reality independent of consciousness. The revelation of God was directly accessible to man,
according to this doctrine; it was the sense-perceived world, the world of man's sensations,
which came to him from on high for him to decipher and so grasp the divine purpose.[17]

Berkeley believed that God is not the distant engineer of Newtonian machinery that in the
fullness of time led to the growth of a tree in the university quadrangle. Rather, the perception of
the tree is an idea that God's mind has produced in the mind, and the tree continues to exist in the
quadrangle when "nobody" is there, simply because God is an infinite mind that perceives all.

The philosophy of David Hume concerning causality and objectivity is an elaboration of another
aspect of Berkeley's philosophy. A.A. Luce, the most eminent Berkeley scholar of the 20th
century, constantly stressed the continuity of Berkeley's philosophy. The fact that Berkeley
returned to his major works throughout his life, issuing revised editions with only minor changes,
also counts against any theory that attributes to him a significant volte-face.[citation needed]

Relativity arguments

See also: Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

John Locke (Berkeley's predecessor) states that we define an object by its primary and secondary
qualities. He takes heat as an example of a secondary quality. If you put one hand in a bucket of
cold water, and the other hand in a bucket of warm water, then put both hands in a bucket of
lukewarm water, one of your hands is going to tell you that the water is cold and the other that
the water is hot. Locke says that since two different objects (both your hands) perceive the water
to be hot and cold, then the heat is not a quality of the water.

While Locke used this argument to distinguish primary from secondary qualities, Berkeley
extends it to cover primary qualities in the same way. For example, he says that size is not a
quality of an object because the size of the object depends on the distance between the observer
and the object, or the size of the observer. Since an object is a different size to different
observers, then size is not a quality of the object. Berkeley rejects shape with a similar argument
and then asks: if neither primary qualities nor secondary qualities are of the object, then how can
we say that there is anything more than the qualities we observe?[clarification needed]

New theory of vision

In his Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, Berkeley frequently criticised the views of the
Optic Writers, a title that seems to include Molyneux, Wallis, Malebranche and Descartes.[18] In
sections 1–51, Berkeley argued against the classical scholars of optics by holding that: spatial
depth, as the distance that separates the perceiver from the perceived object is itself invisible;
namely, that space is perceived by experience instead of the senses per se.

Berkeley goes on to argue that visual cues, such as the perceived extension or 'confusion' of an
object, can only be used to indirectly judge distance, because the viewer learns to associate
visual cues with tactile sensations. Berkeley gives the following analogy regarding indirect
distance perception: one perceives distance indirectly just as one perceives a person's
embarrassment indirectly. When looking at an embarrassed person, we infer indirectly that the
person is embarrassed by observing the red color on the person's face. We know through
experience that a red face tends to signal embarrassment, as we've learned to associate the two.

The question concerning the visibility of space was central to the Renaissance perspective
tradition and its reliance on classical optics in the development of pictorial representations of
spatial depth. This matter was debated by scholars since the 11th-century Arab polymath and
mathematician Alhazen (al-Hasan Ibn al-Haytham) affirmed in experimental contexts the
visibility of space. This issue, which was raised in Berkeley's theory of vision, was treated at
length in the Phenomenology of Perception of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in the context of
confirming the visual perception of spatial depth (la profondeur), and by way of refuting
Berkeley's thesis.[19]

Berkeley wrote about the perception of size in addition to that of distance. He is frequently
misquoted as believing in size-distance invariance – a view held by the Optic Writers. This idea
is that we scale the image size according to distance in a geometrical manner. The error may
have become commonplace because the eminent historian and psychologist E. G. Boring
perpetuated it.[20] In fact, Berkeley argued that the same cues that evoke distance also evoke size,
and that we do not first see size and then calculate distance.[21] It is worth quoting Berkeley's
words on this issue (Section 53):

What inclines men to this mistake (beside the humour of making one see by geometry) is, that
the same perceptions or ideas which suggest distance, do also suggest magnitude... I say they do
not first suggest distance, and then leave it to the judgement to use that as a medium, whereby to
collect the magnitude; but they have as close and immediate a connexion with the magnitude as
with the distance; and suggest magnitude as independently of distance, as they do distance
independently of magnitude.

Philosophy of physics

See also: De Motu (Berkeley's essay)

"Berkeley's works display his keen interest in natural philosophy [...] from his earliest writings
(Arithmetica, 1707) to his latest (Siris, 1744). Moreover, much of his philosophy is shaped
fundamentally by his engagement with the science of his time."[22] The profundity of this interest
can be judged from numerous entries in Berkeley's Philosophical Commentaries (1707–1708),
e.g. "Mem. to Examine & accurately discuss the scholium of the 8th Definition of Mr Newton's
Principia." (#316)

Berkeley argued that forces and gravity, as defined by Newton, constituted "occult qualities" that
"expressed nothing distinctly". He held that those who posited "something unknown in a body of
which they have no idea and which they call the principle of motion, are in fact simply stating
that the principle of motion is unknown." Therefore, those who "affirm that active force, action,
and the principle of motion are really in bodies are adopting an opinion not based on
experience."[23] Forces and gravity existed nowhere in the phenomenal world. On the other hand,
if they resided in the category of "soul" or "incorporeal thing", they "do not properly belong to
physics" as a matter. Berkeley thus concluded that forces lay beyond any kind of empirical
observation and could not be a part of proper science.[24] He proposed his theory of signs as a
means to explain motion and matter without reference to the "occult qualities" of force and
gravity.

Philosophy of mathematics

In addition to his contributions to philosophy, Berkeley was also very influential in the
development of mathematics, although in a rather indirect sense. "Berkeley was concerned with
mathematics and its philosophical interpretation from the earliest stages of his intellectual
life."[25] Berkeley's "Philosophical Commentaries" (1707–1708) witness to his interest in
mathematics:

Axiom. No reasoning about things whereof we have no idea. Therefore no reasoning about
Infinitesimals. (#354)

Take away the signs from Arithmetic & Algebra, & pray what remains? (#767)

These are sciences purely Verbal, & entirely useless but for Practise in Societys of Men. No
speculative knowledge, no comparison of Ideas in them. (#768)

In 1707, Berkeley published two treatises on mathematics. In 1734, he published The Analyst,
subtitled A DISCOURSE Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician, a critique of the Calculus.
Florian Cajori called this treatise "the most spectacular event of the century in the history of
British mathematics."[26] However, a recent study suggests that Berkeley misunderstood
Leibnizian calculus.[27] The mathematician in question is believed to have been either Edmond
Halley, or Isaac Newton himself—though if to the latter, then the discourse was posthumously
addressed, as Newton died in 1727. The Analyst represented a direct attack on the foundations
and principles of calculus and, in particular, the notion of fluxion or infinitesimal change, which
Newton and Leibniz used to develop the calculus. Berkeley coined the phrase ghosts of departed
quantities, familiar to students of calculus. Ian Stewart's book From Here to Infinity, (chapter 6),
captures the gist of his criticism.

Berkeley regarded his criticism of calculus as part of his broader campaign against the religious
implications of Newtonian mechanics – as a defence of traditional Christianity against deism,
which tends to distance God from His worshipers. Specifically, he observed that both Newtonian
and Leibnizian calculus employed infinitesimals sometimes as positive, nonzero quantities and
other times as a number explicitly equal to zero. Berkeley's key point in "The Analyst" was that
Newton's calculus (and the laws of motion based in calculus) lacked rigorous theoretical
foundations. He claimed that

In every other Science Men prove their Conclusions by their Principles, and not their Principles
by the Conclusions. But if in yours you should allow your selves this unnatural way of
proceeding, the Consequence would be that you must take up with Induction, and bid adieu to
Demonstration. And if you submit to this, your Authority will no longer lead the way in Points of
Reason and Science.[28]
Berkeley did not doubt that calculus produced real world truth; simple physics experiments could
verify that Newton's method did what it claimed to do. "The cause of Fluxions cannot be
defended by reason",[29] but the results could be defended by empirical observation, Berkeley's
preferred method of acquiring knowledge at any rate. Berkeley, however, found it paradoxical
that "Mathematicians should deduce true Propositions from false Principles, be right in
Conclusion, and yet err in the Premises." In "The Analyst" he endeavoured to show "how Error
may bring forth Truth, though it cannot bring forth Science."[30] Newton's science, therefore,
could not on purely scientific grounds justify its conclusions, and the mechanical, deistic model
of the universe could not be rationally justified.[31]

The difficulties raised by Berkeley were still present in the work of Cauchy whose approach to
calculus was a combination of infinitesimals and a notion of limit, and were eventually
sidestepped by Weierstrass by means of his (ε, δ) approach, which eliminated infinitesimals
altogether. More recently, Abraham Robinson restored infinitesimal methods in his 1966 book
Non-standard analysis by showing that they can be used rigorously.

Moral philosophy

See also: Passive obedience

The tract A Discource on Passive Obedience (1712) is "Berkeley's main contribution to moral
and political philosophy. [...]

In A Discourse on Passive Obedience, Berkeley defends the thesis that people have “a moral
duty to observe the negative precepts (prohibitions) of the law, including the duty not to resist
the execution of punishment.”[32] However, Berkeley does make exceptions to this sweeping
moral statement, stating that we need not observe precepts of “usurpers or even madmen”[33] and
that people can obey different supreme authorities if there are more than one claims to the
highest authority.

Berkeley defends this thesis with a deductive proof stemming from the laws of nature. First, he
establishes that because God is perfectly good, the end to which he commands humans must also
be good, and that end must not benefit just one person, but the entire human race. Because these
commands—or ‘laws—if practiced, would lead to the general fitness of humankind, it follows
that they can be discovered by the right reason—for example, the law to never resist supreme
power can be derived from reason because this law is “the only thing that stands between us and
total disorder”.[32] Thus, these laws can be called the laws of nature, because they are derived
from God—the creator of nature himself. “These laws of nature include duties never to resist the
supreme power, lie under oath…or do evil so that good may come of it.”[32]

One may view Berkeley’s doctrine on Passive Obedience as a kind of ‘Theological

Utilitarianism’, insofar as it states that we have a duty to uphold a moral code which presumably
is working towards the ends of promoting the good of humankind. However, the concept of
‘ordinary’ Utilitarianism is fundamentally different in that it “makes utility the one and only
ground of obligation”[34]—that is, Utilitarianism is concerned with whether particular actions are
morally permissible in specific situations, while Berkeley’s doctrine is concerned with whether
or not we should follow moral rules in any and all circumstances. Whereas Utilitarianism might,
for example, justify a morally impermissible act in light of the specific situation, Berkeley’s
doctrine of Passive Obedience holds that it is never morally permissible to not follow a moral
rule, even when it seems like breaking that moral rule might achieve the happiest ends. Berkeley
holds that even though sometimes, the consequences of an action in a specific situation might be
bad, the general tendencies of that action benefits humanity.

Other important sources for Berkeley's views on morality are Alciphron (1732), especially
dialogues I–III, and the Discourse to Magistrates (1738)."[35] Passive Obedience is notable partly
for containing one of the earliest statements of rule utilitarianism.[36]

owards the end of The Analyst, Berkeley addresses possible justifications for the foundations of
calculus that mathematicians may put forward. In response to the idea fluxions could be defined
using ultimate ratios of vanishing quantities (Boyer 1991), Berkeley wrote:

It must, indeed, be acknowledged, that [Newton] used Fluxions, like the Scaffold of a building,
as things to be laid aside or got rid of, as soon as finite Lines were found proportional to them.
But then these finite Exponents are found by the help of Fluxions. Whatever therefore is got by
such Exponents and Proportions is to be ascribed to Fluxions: which must therefore be
previously understood. And what are these Fluxions? The Velocities of evanescent Increments?
And what are these same evanescent Increments? They are neither finite Quantities nor
Quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing. May we not call them the Ghosts of departed
Quantities?[6]

Edwards describes this as the most memorable point of the book (Edwards 1994). Katz and
Sherry argue that the expression was intended to address both infinitesimals and Newton's theory
of fluxions. (Katz & Sherry 2012)

Today the phrase "ghosts of departed quantities" is also used when discussing Berkeley's attacks
on other possible foundations of Calculus. In particular it is used when discussing infinitesimals
(Arkeryd 2005), but it is also used when discussing differentials (Leader 1986), and adequality
(Kleiner & Movshovitz-Hadar 1994).

Deism (/ˈdiː.ɪzəm/ DEE-iz-əm [1][2] or /ˈdeɪ.ɪzəm/ DAY-iz-əm) (derived from Latin "deus"

meaning "god") is a philosophical position which posits that a god does not interfere directly
with the world. It also rejects revelation as a source of religious knowledge with the conclusion
that reason and observation of the natural world are sufficient to determine the existence of a
single creator of the universe.[3][4][5][6][7] [8]

Deism gained prominence among intellectuals during the Age of Enlightenment, especially in
Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Typically, these had been raised as Christians
and believed in one God, but they had became disenchanted with organized religion and
orthodox teachings such as the Trinity, Biblical inerrancy, and the supernatural interpretation of
events, such as miracles.[9] Included in those influenced by its ideas were leaders of the
American and French Revolutions.[10]
Today, deism is considered to exist in the classical and modern forms,[11] where the classical
view takes what is called a "cold" approach by asserting the non-intervention of deity in the
natural behavior of the created universe, while the modern deist formulation can be either
"warm" (citing an involved deity) or "cold" (citing an uninvolved deity). These lead to many
subdivisions of modern deism which tends, therefore, to serve as an overall category of belief.[