Pangasinan Transport Co. vs.

Public Service Commission

FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc
(Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting
passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939,
Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses.
PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing
business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was
denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission is unconstitutional and void
because it is without limitation- constitutes undue delegation of powers

HELD:

The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it
is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called Subordinate Legislation . It is a valid delegation
because of the growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All that has
been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to
carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public
interests in a proper and suitable manner.

The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property
rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC
has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate
issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard,
so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings. In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty
and property of the citizens should be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. When private property
is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only.

ANG TANG HO CASE

he Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and
leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also
says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn."
The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of
the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures
for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force
and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner
specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the
Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary
rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying
out the purposes of the Act.

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without
the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in
use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions,
when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of
the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law
in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the
Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale
of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a
crime, is unconstitutional and void.

BUKLOD VS. ZAMORA

it seems that the resolution of this case hinges on the question - Does the deactivation of EIIB constitute
abolition of an office? However, after coming to terms with the prevailing law and jurisprudence, we are
certain that the ultimate queries should be a) Does the President have the authority to reorganize the
executive department? and, b) How should the reorganization be carried out?

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature.[16] This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law.[17] Thus,
except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence.

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office,[19] or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.

We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the
President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive
structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760.[22] Under this law,
the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are
directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates, missions, objectives,
functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which are no
longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or
abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the streamlined organization and improved overall
performance of their respective agencies.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions
of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,[25] we ruled
that reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an alteration of the
existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance.[26] It falls
under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize.

Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656[28]provides for the circumstances which may be considered as
evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to
wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially
the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of
status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions
as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.
As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually
occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.