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  • John Broome 11. Rationality and Normativity

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    Carolina Navarro
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    Rationality

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    Rationality

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    10 tayangan7 halaman

    John Broome 11. Rationality and Normativity

    Diunggah oleh

    Carolina Navarro
    Rationality

    Hak Cipta:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Unduh sebagai PDF atau baca online dari Scribd
    Tandai sebagai konten tidak pantas
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    11.2 More on rationality and reasons 193 a Rationality and Normativity ? and impli in the writing of many. eis common to describe ys of eatonality using the normative term ought’. For example, ‘ought aot to have contradictory belies is a common way of the requirement not eo have contradictory bei. In the past this syle of expression; I was implicitly assuming Strong, cepe Nooatity of Rationality Bur not Song Norma you thatthe ressns fonrted by ratonaliy sometimes conf With that ove fom ocr sources of norma, suchas morality or But you wil probably Bele that conf of this sor are rae ey concerned wih coerce among your atitudes such 33 our ad intertins, whereas morality, praence and other sours of nor sv yor wh hn hg. Win om any i alone unchallenged. Examples of confer terween reson Betirieseimnsetin teecinel Reiter iia wae So according ro Normatviy of Rational wea ratonaliy omething of you wil normally Bethe eve hat you ght £0 tha hing rear cai 11.1 The Normative Question Wher bod sides IY Meaning is nor non ality actually i normative rationality! This chapter con ‘The Normative Question asks whether tis eve shat NWeak Normativity. Necesaiy, i rationality requires N to F, cere isa reason for N to F Normatvity of Rationale. Necessai ‘hat fac isa reason for N to ‘if atonaieyrequites N to Jing ro Weak Normativiy that rationality requires you to F entails hat havea reason to F, but the fact that rationality requires you t0 Fay not the the reason. Weak Normativiey will come up in this chapter, but ts a version of the claim tha rationality i normative Irassocatsearionality ‘normativiy, butt does not sy chat tational isa source of normative ‘shall conclode this chapter by confessing that, although I believe Norma: Of Rationality, Ihave no argument for it, Fortunately, my account of ing does not depend om i The reton meni weighed In thar wea scfm may be ro toma and t may be ot sae hr dai ow rh oy tat oy sain tlt wold be yh on, your hang «on tory beliefs. Nevertheless, rn (abet. Neves, raonay regu 19 this occasion, and mies fms and this is reason that counts againt soee Some philosophers o further and ade: Strong Normatvty, Necssai ought to Foca ce oan ony eis N Fen N 12. More on rationality and reasons 1 § and 6 started an exploration ofthe connection tween eon Tato, and ths chapter continues it Bele coming to Novae Raconaliy in ei secon I ave few racer misellancos rears bout the connection. only rare you oF tha fc ia nce Ths cli explicit the wrth —$ Ei Norinativity cna ah ed ‘toed Mtoe, sree Sa an ‘te wc tt epee fe Tat lt eetracaeiy apm antag th petal bea rational book in this senses ce tt tear mn inetd ty cnet eden Ter aos mac ena ‘the same Latin ros Hume ‘To lsat the dan bes wer, take a common reaction to David Hume’ famous Tis ot canary so reagon ace RY fa atm mcr he dearton fhe mle wold oh ‘Reason’ here is the mass noun, : in modern Engh “Comtrary to reason” may fairly be rendered ‘more shocked by Hume's remark than they need have fece coun et, ame sing noting about eave He racy ws the 4 Tse ey with et ae 11.2 More on rationality and reasons 195 is contary 9 morality and that you ought not to have it. There inconsistency in his also thinking tha Is ot contrary to reason, since aot think morality arises feom reason.” ing the destruction of the work to the scratching of your finger is "Ewell as immoral Hume makes i clear that he thinks prudence tne from reason than toralicy does. "Tis site contrary to reason ren ny own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater’ he says." Hume been willing to speak of normative reasons, assume he would i that morality and prudence give you normative teasons not to he destruction ofthe word to the scratching of your Ringer: He would the preference is contrary 1 these £easons : Normative Question make sense? 5, have already considered and reed one more developed tate opposed to an unestatng sseiaton = tha connects aonaly Jerson This isthe ies tht atonal conse n responding corey sr ou ik tis en you wl acre Wesk Norma you wl aronlny would not reqiesomethino you ules there was reon to achewe tat Bing, Howenes you il nox ace Normatiy of ny, bere you wll nor thik the fat tha ronal ree tou iol treason o achieve tat hing. You wil at thik Boy wascusfoomaine seamen 2 7A ea tonality consis sponding oreo reasons Fads hicnoper to tink the Normative Queston shout tina nt Iie quoion to ask. The Normarie Queton aboot moray at ri de qucon of wheter you have eon 0 ati the equ Mf monty, Thr ia sensible qon. Bo if ronlty cons ng covey to reaznn the Nonmative Question abou atonal to fe mre thn akg wheter you ave 2 eas to do what you reason do. Tha hot x ena qistion. nly a rough gear at an anu: ns pper‘Hemean doubs’, Dec develops lng and crf segment along those lines He cs There mo sense all to be made ofthe question of whether We re any reason to fellow the les of atonal” Fcanor do all see MDrciers argument here but | shall sch version of 1 shall mod the exert of making it indeendet of he claim ej that ional isin sponding corey estos Instead, hall make est on 2 Take w betes tat responding correct bei abou reson uo analy. Chap 6 expla ti claim in more detail ‘She docs not saisty many require tational: Among ater rationality, she dow aot spond ca Iie ato reasons. Sun abe as why she shoul ety ‘mens of rational. The only anrwer anyone could pve her beatrio for eto sain thn fquce The ae ter she must believe it If she does, she wll then Blew she ss Bat this person docs or respond correctly to her bees abe vin her this reason would not motivate her w do what tha ee ‘which sto satisfy the requirements of rational “a Dreier next assumes tha any reason thei for «peron 0 do somey Imus be ale ro motivate the person to do that th the doctrine known as ‘internals about sons Since surat could ot Be motivated y a eon wo satay the requcment of ace todos0, Aa, [atonal has the answer No" Howewey Dice draws dfcoe NO \ from the argument: ee il ‘you ca dea the pact inferences. hen nothing counts 2 «reson for you Tha i why fs resurenent of exoaliy aaa offend Dir’ hiking coms to be that io anower canbe give och question of why one shouldbe rtonal, itis unguestoneharone shoal Sc atonal hasan unguesionbl grouniee omnes rcs be hls ne minor qr wht we haves es onl es ifwedo, no anonercan be gen ws In any case he drawn cco tek the Nomatve Question makes no seme stun Heconsason In eter cae ~ whether the conlsion is that the Normative Quest makes no sense, or that the answer tothe Normative Quaion es the arumet wre sound would lave th chp ith macho i would be slo spend much space on tying to anesthe Neon Question, tas bet nls Butt argument is nosound is astm of rong itrala is st because our ication subj woud nt be motivated by eos fs "atonal does not allo se has no season ob rao Ts Bok 5 ‘aunt of motion, andi ges no por to that sor afin Tie Normative Quexiont worth pursing. may hae Noor naa, bo iso il cern take some work to cua ing This sone version of al person i implies that nothing could even be a reason fo oS Ie seems we should conclude that out iational subject has no reason {ath the requirments of rationality Foe her the Nomatve Queces see 11,3 ls rationality dervaively normative? 197 "Is rationality derivatively normative? stare to look for an answer to the Normative Question itt I ration- tive? In this section I shall consider wheter eationality is der normative. saya source of requirement is derivatively normative when rive and when there i an explanation of why ti normative that from some different source of normative requirements. In other words, dervatively normative when its made normative by some diferent 2 source Sis normative, That means the requirements it isues are ive: whenever S requires you to F the fact that i fequites you to F is for you to. We may ask why this fat isa reason. If there is an tha stems from some diferent source of normative requirements, then vatvely normative. instance, i is plausible that che lw is derivatively normative (This i illustration; Ido not mean to take a stand on the normativity ofl.) the law requires you to F, tha fact isa eason for you to Fy and the ation of why isa reason plausibly tems fom some other source, The tion might be that you rik punishment if you break the law, and requires you not to risk punishment. Orit might be chat toclity you to keep the law. Ether was, the law is drivatvely normative Is ity derives from morality or prudence, which are plausibly non tively normative. the face of it, it i also plausible that rationalcy is desivatively tive. Rationality scems a good way of coming to satisfy motmatve ements that issue from sources of normativity other than rationality are some things you ough ro do, some things you ought to hope for, things you ought ro believe, somethings you ought age to do, nor hope believe, and so on. Thee are some Fs sch that you ought eo F. These derive from prudence, morality and no dou other sources, Rationality plausibly « good means of your coming to F in many instances when, Jought to F~of achieving much of what you ough to achieves | pat ps rationality s normative for this derivative reason, This section consid are some big obstacles in the way of turning this plausible though nto + argument for Normaivtyof Rationality. The sis that, often when lity requires you to F, Fig achieves nothing you have any reason ‘198 Rationality and Normativity Achieve, stemming fom any source apart fom rational. For ‘topes you believe you ough to sl your car bur your bat ee dct ou have no reson to sl. You can stay Eee sion ying to el you xe you do, ares you wil ro it, Bat you have no reason to sell it. Satisfying enkrasia ‘on this oceny ‘chive moching you have any reason vo cher, Beyond econ “This iat problem ithe mos serous. fi were coulda es say that, whenever analy requires, ‘eason to F That isthe pipe of Weak Normatiy se ut oa For some purposes we might be content with Weak Normativiy: we mig net the wrongs ie Noma of Rasa. Bt Th roblem stad the may of defending even Weak Norma on de rtm ne yon deriatng “Thesecond problem are even when using Jen sang eqirement fain dx hte tng ohare no ce seming source other than etal. The problem that we sll arma conde thr she qusemene i normrtve Evens we mere some seo nee the fis roblem and s demonstrate Wesk Normative second pros ‘woud preven os fom demonsrsting Normatvity of Ravens. shal we Bayesian xampl ofthe end problem, sine Bayesian en supa thermo dane rom oor tee of inet, ws asume tha the Boyesian Reremet on page 15 caret ‘epeat it here. e ae ! 2 Bayesian requirement. When p,q and rare mutually contrary : tually contrary propos ‘ons such that (p or gor} is necesarily rue, rationality equites of N thar NS depres of bli i p,q andr respectively add up to one. Bayesian point ot that, if ou do oe sai hs equirement, you kn ‘xpoted. Someone euid ake a Duch book agaist you. Sk ‘A Duch book is group of fee that are afer to You. Is designe | such a way hat you wll acsepe each ini be he group ut tht doing so will certainly oe you money. The deals donot mater here. & Dc took canbe made agit anyone who docs ot sat the Bayes Re sent. The conclusion emere tht you have «pret reason to sts ‘auiement If you do nt, ou sk kxng mney. “The Dutch book arguments ope to question, but I shall noe question tere en if sucrfa dots no show that te Bayesian Regen! Storm shows you ave a praental ron to ae dee of le! that ad po one Te doesnot show thatthe fat atonal rere ou have dere of bet that ad apo ome cots reason fr you to 3° stemming from any sous ‘not for this problem, ye 111.3 Is rationality devivatively normarive? 199° + you prensa reason for having degrees of tlie that ad wp J ndcpendonly of whacrer atonal rege. Even ifrationality di rato ta have degre belt tha ad upto one, you woud sil jt ume pda reno 9 do xe pace sonality fers from law. Te Iw requires you to pay Se ere panhment if you beak the law. Therfore, You Ok nf you do nt pay tax, That a pradentl reason for yu to eat mich spall tthe cae of atonal you have a prod on to have derces of bf that add wp 10 One and you have 4 I non to pay anes, The ference is that, whereas in the se alc ou have the penta son independeny of wha ational rex the legal case you have the prea reason only cae the + Youto pay taxes Ite lw did ot require you to pay tax, You ave no prea eason ro do. Consequently the fat that he aw sou to pay taxes sa ean for you to pay taxes. Prdence makes it ithe egurement to pay exes normative, and prudence explains But the fact rationality requires You to have degrees of bel tha add foe snot reason to have degrees of eli ha add upto one. Areas Durch book argument dos 108 show itr be one: onseyuenc of the to probe ave metoned i that we cannot eth cach requerent of rationality deivatvely normative. locks a drecedemonstnton that raonalty i derivatively normative Indtectstratgy through «rational disposition perhaps we might take an indirect approach. We might tart with rational Gs whole, rather than individual requirements of rationality. We might eto show that rationality a+ whole sin some way derivaively norma rom that, we ight be able to infer that is inividal requirements are he end I shall argue that this indiec strategy falls. This meas 1 can lop it ina generous spirit. I shall make ce best case for it that 1 can, ‘ysl to assumpeions that Leannotjussfy propery, and using a that are fankly sketchy. Even after such a generous treatment, the tus out to fail ace two diferent ways of implementing it Each has a diferent mverpreta “ofthat vague expression ‘rationality as a whole. One interpees tas the rey of rationality, which 1 defined on page 117. Ii the propery vou ‘rien you satisfy all the requirements of rationality. This is the property ationaliy as an attainment rather than the capacity of rasionalcy men ‘on page 110, 200 Rationality and Normativity: ‘The othe implementation interpret a2 rational spoon. By thay ‘mean. posi that cases yout acy many eto quer a ‘only a ugh deintion bcao of the vague tm may be a formy purpose includes the capac ofatinaliny sed cee ‘0 exer tha capacity. The comesion betwen tron a ‘ating invidateatonal equrements sess 1 shall rt with the rtnal dipontion snd ome wo the pop og ‘ational: Possesing a rational dapoton play actor sens of aching mich of what ou ong to ache Bye Tose yt than ote means that are pychologcalyposuble for you. npn net ‘night he an alternative dposton that could frm part ofan ee he tears of achieving much of what ou ought to aciee: On seme rear 4 rational dapstion wll ter you wrong The arseling name Tcn how i wil sometimes cause yu to fl to achieve something You oie achieve it might aus you to sella car when you ought nor. The ses tive poston would be ike the fationaldposon, but alee ick comet some of those itches. But the nceaary aeration: wold oie

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