In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City.

His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a

petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen
hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an
Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that
at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an
Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage
with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if
he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should
not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can
replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the
government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to
the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that
he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He
cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To
restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino
through an act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should
not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have,
even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had
they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he
should be declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained
the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency,
the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.

On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for
Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later,
on March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a
resident of the district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as
required by Art. VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the
COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution, dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding
private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan.
Issue: Whether “residency” in the respondent’s certificate of candidacy for governor actually
connotes “domicile” to warrant his disqualification from the position in the electoral district.
Ruling: No. As this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC: It is the fact of residence,
not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said
statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
There is substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent had been a
resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract from the
merit of this factual finding. The private respondent was actually a resident of the Third District
not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years
since July 1990
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
FACTS:
1. Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for elections on May 8, 1995.
2. Raul Lee prayed that he be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office by reason of not yet
being a Filipino citizen.
3. COMELEC granted Lee’s petition and declared Frivaldo disqualified to run for governor of Sorsogon for
not being a citizen of the Philippines, cancelling his certificate of candidacy.
4. Frivaldo’s candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections on held date, in which he
won
(May 11, 1995).
5. Lee petitioned praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
6. On, June 21, 1995, COMELEC directed Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to proclaim Lee to
have won.
7. Frivaldo filed with COMELEC the annulment of such and that he be proclaimed as the governor on the
following grounds:
a. He took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen on June 30, 1995, after his petition for
repatriation under PD 75 which was granted by Special Committee on Naturalization in Sept.
1994.
b. On June 30, Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance under PD 725 and there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation of him as governor.
c. As an alternative. He averred that pursuant to Labo v. COMELEC, the Vice Governor, not Lee,
should occupy said position of governor.
8. COMELEC promulgated Frivaldo as governor of Sorsogon.
9. Lee filed motion for reconsideration. Denied by COMELEC. Lee filed petition before the SC, praying for
a TRO.
ISSUE/s:
1. WON the repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal.
2. WON “judicially declared” disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship is a continuing
bar to his
eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the position.
HELD:
The citizenship requirement under the LGC is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest of the
 time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. Frivaldo’s
repatriation
have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the (1) remedial or
curative
nature of the law (PD 725) granting him a new right to resume his political status and the (2) legislative
intent
behind it, as well as his (3) unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political
aspiration as his means of escaping the Martial Law administration, his repatriation is to be given
retroactive
effect as of the date of his application, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given
up his
US nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship
as of
the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Moreover,
his
registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of the said date

Valles v. COMELEC
Vallez v. Comelec
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,
respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for
disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Contentions of the petitioner:
 Private respondent was not born in the Philippines; hence she is not a Filipino Citizen.
 If she is a citizen by jus sanguinis or by ipso jure, she had renounced her Filipino
Citizenship when she was issued an Alien Certificate, Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, and an Australian Passport by Australian Immigration on 1988
(Commonwealth Act. No. 63) and must go through the process of repatriation to be
eligible to run for governor.
 If she had dual citizenship that would disqualify her from running for governor. (Section
40 of the Republic Act – Local Government Code of 1991)
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and
came to settle in the Philippines and was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the
Malate Catholic Church in Manila on June 27, 1952.
It is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the
Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary
Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the
COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
 persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto.
Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship.
Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such
prior resolutions.

NATIONALITY THEORY
NGO BURCA VS RP DIGEST
FACTS:
Zita Ngo is a Chinese national married to Florencio Burca a Filipino citizen. She claims that she
possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization as a Filipino citizen , she applied for
cancellation of her
Alien Certificate of Registration.
This was opposed by the Solicitor General, but the trial court dismissed the opposition and declare that
Zita Ngo Burca
hass all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and that she being
married to a
Filipino citizen is hereby declared as a citizen of the Philippines.
Such judgment of the trial court was appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition of Zita Ngo Burca should be granted?
RULING : NO
The SC discussed here that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of the
Philippines unless there is
proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized.
An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by
filing a petition for
citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the
disqualifications under
Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law;
(2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year
immediately
preceding the filing of the petition; and
(3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other than the
judgment of a
competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a
Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.
As to the merits of the case:
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's
"present and former
places of residence.
The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that
"information regarding
petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical
surrounding".
the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if
all the places of
residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal.
We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least
two credible
persons, "stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a
resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable, and that
said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines
and is not in any
way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and
post-office
addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case".
These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner.
Short of this,
the petition must fail.

Digest Author: Dodot

Angat vs. Republic, 314 SCRA 438
Petition: review on certiorari [decision of the RTC, Marikina]
Petitioner: Gerardo Angat
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Vitug
Date: 14 September 1999
Facts:
by naturalization in the United States of America.
his Status as a citizen of the Philippines [under CA 63, RA 965 and RA 2630]
1997 – copy received by the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG"), 10 May 1996.
Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171 – motion initially denied by the trial judge, but Angat just filed
another motion afterwards, and eventually the court consented.
Philippines [pursuant to RA 8171]
others, “… the petitioner is hereby repatriated and declared as citizen of the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.” [underlining provided]
the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special
Committee on Naturalization [pursuant to AO 285, dated 22 Aug 1996]
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General is hereby granted. The orders of this Court dated September 20,
1996 and October 04, 1996 are hereby set aside and the herein petition is ordered
DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its re-filing before
the Special Committee on Naturalization.”
decision by the trial court: he asserted that his petition was filed on 14 March 1996, months before
the Special Committee on Naturalization was supposedly constituted [pursuant to AO 285] – the
trial judge denied the motion for recon. on 29 Dec 1997.
Pertinent laws/provisions/concepts:
repatriation of Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, and
natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship.
constituted the Special Committee.
Issues:
[Type text] [Type text] [Type text]
1. At the time the petition [to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines] was filed, did the RTC
have jurisdiction over repatriation cases for natural-born Filipinos?
Ruling:
1. No. The law in effect at the time the petition was PD 703, and according to PD 703 the Special
Committee on Naturalization was the proper venue for such a petition, not the RTC.

Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December
28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines
with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1, Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC).
On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of
termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by
the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he
is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary for every year of service
plus other benefits (Rollo, p. 153).
Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter filed on
March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral
damages and attorney's fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC (Annex "C" of Petition for
Certiorari).
Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case
inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private respondent must first
secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for
separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained by the private respondent.
the Philippines?
agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social
and mainly non-political. Among the notable instances are the International Labor Organization, the
International Institute of Agriculture, the International Danube Commission. In so far as they are
autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality
independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading
authority "they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own."
against herein plaintiff Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the
shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive
rights to the then unissu ed original capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as
for an accounting and damages.
As a response, Gemperle filed an action against Schenker on the allegation that the latter had caused to
be published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant
and
immaterial to said case aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of
Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his" honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing
him
into public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman.
The action was denied by the court as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, an instant appeal.
been actually served with summons in the Philippines, although the summons address to him and Mrs.
Schenker had been served personally upon her in the Philippines. Gemperle maintained that due to the
voluntary appearance of Mr. Schenker, the same is considered a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
The SC hold that lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the
summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she
is the
representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband aforementioned civil case. In other
words, Mrs.
Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also,
empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar,
which is consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.
(3)
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. vs. MAGDALENA
C.
BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN
Facts: On April 24, 1950, the CFI Manila, Judge Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last will and
testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. Later in 1956, the executor
filed a project of partition.
Meanwhile, Magdalena, the wife of Bohanan and his two children question the validity of the
testamentary
provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived
of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them. The will has not given the wife any share in
the estate left by the testator.
Magdalena further argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured
by the testator from her, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in the court’s jurisdiction.
However, the court refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of
which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to
leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
On the part of the children, both received legacies in the amount of P6,000.00 only.
Issue: Whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the
legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid?
Ruling: Yes. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944,
expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of
the person whose succession is in question.
Article 10 of the old Civil Code provides that the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed
by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law
of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose
of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project
of
partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions.
(4)
G.R. No. L-3693 July 29, 1950
MARGARET QUERUBIN vs. SILVESTRE QUERUBIN
FACTS: (In 1934, Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino, married petitioner Margaret Querubin, in Albuquerque,
New Mexico. They had a daughter, Querubina. Margaret filed for divorce in 1948 alleging "mental
cruelty."
Silvestre filed a countersuit for divorce alleging Marga¬ret's infidelity. In 1949, the Superior Court of Los
Angeles granted the divorce and awarded "joint custody" of the child. Querubina was to be kept in a
neutral home subject to reasonable visits by both parties. Both parents were restrained from taking
Querubina out of California without the permission of the Court.
On March that year, custody was granted to Silvestre under an interlocutory decree (although the child
was still kept in the neutral home) because at the time of the trial, Margaret was living with another man.
Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was modified. Since she had then married the man she
was living with and had a stable home, the Court granted custody to Margaret with reasonable limitations
on the part of the father.
Silvestre, together with Querubina, left San Francisco on November of the same year, went to the
Philippines and stayed in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, with the intent of protecting the child from the effects of
her
mother's scandalous conduct. He wanted the child tc be raised in a better environment. In
1950,
Margaret, through counsel, presented to the CFI a petition for habeas corpus for the
custody of
Querubina urlder the interlocutory decree of the California Court. She claims that under Art. 48 of Rule
39,
the decree of the Los Angeles Court, granting her the child's custody, must be complied within the
Philippines.]
RULING
"The decree is by no means final. It is subject to change with the circumstances. The first decree awarded
the custody of the child to the father, prohibiting the mother from taking the child to her (Margaret's)
home
because of her adulterous relationship with another man. The decree was amended when Margaret was
not in Los Angeles.
Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in the Philippines. Where the judgment is
merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the Court which rendered it did not settle and
adjudge finally the rights of the parties.
In general, a decree of divorce awarding custody of the child to one of the spouses is respected by the
Courts of other states "at the time and under the circumstances of its rendition" but such a decree has no
controlling effects in another state as to facts and conditions occurring subsequently to the date of the
decree; and the Court of another state may, in proper proceedings, award custody otherwise upon proof
of matters subsequent to the decree which justify the decree to the interest of the child.
In the case at bar, the circumstances have changed. Querubina is not in Los Angeles, she is in Cagayan,
Ilocos Sur, under her father's care. It is a long way from one place to the other. Neither can Margaret
prove that she can pay the cost of passage for the minor. She is not a packet of cigarettes one can send
by mail.
Neither can she answer for Querubina's support, care and education. In comparison, the father has
shown both interest in the child and capacity to provide for the needs of the child."
(5)
G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933
ALLISON G. GIBBS vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE REGISTER
OF
DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA
Facts: Gibbs and his wife were American nationals, domiciled in California. They acquired lands in the
Philippines. The wife died in California. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the intestate proceedings
instituted in Manila. Gibbs asked the court to adjudicate to him lands acquired in the Philippines not
under
our laws on succession but because in accordance with the law of California, the community property of
spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband,
belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration. CFI granted such to Gibbs upon
proof
of California law. The register of deeds refused to transfer such properties on the ground of non-payment
of inheritance tax. Gibbs argued that the conjugal right of a California wife in a community property is a
personal right and even if this was a case of succession, California law would still apply.
Issue: is Gibbs exempt from inheritance tax?
Held: NO. The court held that it is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the
land
is situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect
and construction of wills and other conveyances. This fundamental principle is stated in
the first
paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the
nation
of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife,
upon the
acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal
to that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the
husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a
descendible interest, equal to that of her husband and the descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in
the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls
within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies
a
tax on inheritances.
(6)
G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990
JOSE B. AZNAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA
Facts: Aznar filed a petition for certiorari to review COMELEC resolution proclaiming Osmena as the
Cebu Governor. He alleged that Osmena is an American thus disqualified to run in the 1988 election. He
presented evidence. Osmena claimed that he is a Filipino.
Issue: Whether or not Osmena is an American thus disqualified to run in the elections
Held: No . No substantial & convincing evidence was presented to prove Osmena is no longer a Filipino
citizen & disqualified from running. Filipino citizenship is lost by naturalization in a foreign country or
by
express renunciation of citizenship or by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support another country’s
constitution or laws (CA No. 63). No proof Osmena did any of those. Aznar assumed that the ACR &
permit to re-enter were proof of such. However, only RP courts are allowed to determine whether one is a
Filipino citizen or not, regardless of whether that person is considered an American under US laws. His
father is Filipino thus, without proof to the contrary, the presumption that he is a Filipino remains.
(7)
G.R. No. L-29397 March 29, 1983
MODESTA DUGCOY JAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioner, allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, filed a
petition
for repatriation claiming that she is a Philippine citizen due to the invalid marriage of her parents. Trial
court issued an Order declaring the petitioner as judicially repatriated.
ISSUE: Whether or not repatriation through judicial proceeding is valid.
HELD: No, because there is no law requiring or authorizing such judicial repatriation. All that is required
for a female citizen of the Philippines who lost her citizenship to an alien to reacquire her Philippine
citizenship, is for her to take necessary oath in the proper civil registrar, upon the termination of her
marital status. Decision revoked and set aside.
(8)
WILLIAM B. BORTHWICK vs. HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME, Presiding Judge, Br.
XV,
Makati, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; JOSEPH E. SCALLON, and JEWELL C. SCALLON
G.R. No. L-57338 July 23, 1987
FACTS: William Borthwick, an American citizen living in the Philippines, owned real property interests
in
Hawaii. In his business dealings with private respondent, Joseph Scallon, Borthwick issued
the
promissory notes but failed to pay the sums owing upon maturity and despite demands. The promissory
notes provided that upon default, action may be brought for collection in Los Angeles, California, or at
Scallon's option, in Manila or Honolulu.
Borthwick was served with summons when he was in California, pursuant to Hawaiian law allowing
service of process on a person outside the territorial confines of the State. Because Borthwick ignored the
summons, a judgment by default was entered against him.
However, Scallon's attempt to have the judgment exe¬cuted in Hawaii and California failed because
Borthwick had no assets in those states. Scallon then came to the Philippines and brought suit against
Borthwick seeking enforcement of the default judgment of the Hawaii court. Again, after due
proceedings,
judgment by default was rendered against him, ordering Borthwick to pay Scallon the amount prayed for.
The court issued an amendatory order and upon receipt by Borthwick, he moved for a new trial, alleging
that the promissory notes did not arise from business dealings in Hawaii, nor did he own real estate
therein. He contended that the judgment of the court of Hawaii is unenforceable in the Philippines
because it was invalid for want of jurisdiction over the cause of action and over his person. The motion
was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE
May the judgment of the court of Hawaii be enforced here in the Philippines?
RULING
"It is true that a foreign judgment against a person is merely "presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties," and rejection thereof may be justified, among others, by "evidence of a want of jurisdiction"
of
the issuing authority, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court of Hawaii hinged entirely on the existence of either of two facts in accordance with its State laws,
i.e., either Borth¬wick owned real property in Hawaii, or the promissory notes' sued upon resulted from
his business transactions therein. Scallon's complaint clearly alleged both facts. Borthwick was accorded
opportunity to answer the complaint and impugn those facts, but he failed to appear and
was in
consequence declared in default. There thus exists no evidence in the record of the Hawaii case upon
which to lay a conclusion of lack of jurisdiction.
The opportunity to negate the foreign court's competence by proving the non-existence of
said
jurisdictional facts established in the original action, was again afforded to Borthwick in the Court of First
Instance of Makati, where enforcement of the Hawaii judgment was sought. This time it was the
summons
of the domestic court which Borthwick chose to ignore, but with the same result: he was declared in
default. And in the default judg¬ment subsequently promulgated, the Court a quo decreed en¬forcement
of die judgment affirming among others the juris-dictional facts, that Borthwick owned real property in
Hawaii and transacted business therein.
In the light of these antecedents, it is plain that what Borthwick seeks in essence is one more opportunity,
a third, to challenge the jurisdiction of the Hawaii Court and the merits of the cause of action which that
Court had adjudged to have been established against him. This he may obtain only if he succeeds in
showing that the declaration of his default was incorrect. He has unfortunately not been able to do that;
hence, the verdict must go against him."
(9)
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY
INC.
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
FACTS
In 1974, an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement was entered into by Northwest and Sharp,
through its Japan branch, whereby Northwest authorized Sharp to sell the former's airlines tickets. Sharp
failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales it made on behalf of Northwest under the agreement which
led the latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the unremitted amount, with claim for damages.
The Tokyo District Court of Japan issued a writ of sum¬mons against Sharp at its office in Yokohama,
Japan but the bailiff failed twice to serve the writs. Finally, the Tokyo District Court decided to have the
writs of summons served at Sharp's head office in Manila. Sharp accepted the writs but despite such
receipt, it failed to appear at the hearings. The District Court proceeded to hear the complaint and
rendered judgment ordering Sharp to pay Northwest the sum of 83,158,195 Yen plus damages. Sharp
failed to appeal and the judgment became final and executory.
Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan, hence, it filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Sharp filed its answer averring that the judgment of the
Japanese court is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due
and proper notice to Sharp.
RULING
"A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the
contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due
notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judg¬ment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a
foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is pre¬sumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may,
however, be
assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys
the presump¬tion that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its
official duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity. Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty
to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the
extraterritorial service of sum¬mons effected as its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual
but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural
law
of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service'of
process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial
notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated
copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that
Japanese
procedural law is and to show taat under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not.
Accord¬ingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision
thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof re¬garding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or
similar¬ity or the so-called processual presumpcion may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the
matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign
corporation doing business ir, the Philippines. Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the
defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: 1) on its
resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or 2) if there is no such resident agent,
on the government official designated by law to that effect, or 3) on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to re¬ceive summons, the designation is exclusive,
and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him.
(10)
EMILIE ELMIRA RENEE BOUDARD, RAYMOND ANTONIN BOUDARD, GINETTE ROSE
ADELAIDE
BOUDARD and MONIQUE VICTOIRE BOUDARD vs. STEWART EDDIE TAIT
G.R. No. L-45193 April 5, 1939
FACTS
Emilie Renee Boudard, as widow of Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard and as guardian of their children,
obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China, for the sum
of 40,000 piastras, against Stewart Eddie Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at
the trial. Said judgment was based on the fact that Mr. Boudard, who was an employee of Tait, was killed
in Hanoi by co-employees although outside the fulfill¬ment of a duty.
Emilie Boudard filed a petition with the CFI of Manila for the execution of the Hanoi judgment but the
court
dis¬missed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Hanoi Court, Tait not being a
resident
of that country.
ISSUE
How is jurisdiction over the person of the defendant who is not a resident acquired?
RULING
"The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam, over nonresidents, so as to sustain a money
judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment.
The evidence of record shows that the appellee was not in Hanoi during the time mentioned in the
complaint of the appellants, nor were his employees or representatives. The rule in matters of this nature
is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country, regarding payment of money, are only effective against a
party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings.
(11)
In the matter of estate of Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller. ANA M. RAMIREZ vs. OTTO GMUR, as
guardian
of the minors Esther Renate Mory, Carmen Maria Mory, and Leontina Elizabeth
G.R. No. L-11796 August 5, 1918
FACTS
Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a native of Switzerland, and for many years a resident of the Philippines,
died in Iloilo on June 29, 1913, leaving a valuable estate which he disposed by will. The first clause of the
will contains a statement to the effect that inasmuch as the testator had no children from his marriage, he
had no forced heirs. In making this statement, the testator ignored the possible claims of two sets of
children, born to his natural daughter Leona Castro.
It was shown that in 1895, Castro was married to Frederick Von Kauffman, a British subject. Three
children were born of this marriage, namely, Elena, Federico and Ernesto. In 1904, Kauffman went to
Paris, France for the purpose of obtaining a divorce from Castro under French law. On January 5, 1905, a
decree of divorce was issued. On May 5, 1905, Castro married Dr. Ernest Emil Mory, in Westminster,
England. Two children were born of that marriage, namely Carmen and Esther, and Leontina who was
born before they were married.
On October 6, 1910, Castro died. Both sets of children claim that Leona Castro was the recognized
natural daughter of Bischoff and as such would have been his forced heir had she been alive at the time
of her father's death.
ISSUE: May all of Castro’s children inherit?
RULING
No. With reference to the rights of the von Kauffman children, it is enough to say that they are legitimate
children, born to their parents in lawful wedlock; and they are therefore entitled to participate in the
inheritance which would have devolved upon their mother, if she had survived the testator.
As regards the Mory claimants, it is evident that their rights principally depend upon the effect to be given
by this court to the decree of divorce granted to Von Kauffman by the Court of First Instance of the City
of
inquire whether in the other event the Alien Property Custo¬dian was authorized by the statute to use or
did use in fact words purporting to have that effect, or what the effect, if any, would be."
(13)
ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX,
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United
States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and
begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has
re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner’s business in Manila is their
conjugal
property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be
declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the
cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial
now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
(14)
POLLY CAYETANO, vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita
Paguia,
Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is Hermogenes,
he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire estate of Adoracion.
Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that Adoracion
was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in Manila while
temporarily residing in Malate.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the
executrix. Hence, this case.
ISSUEs:
•Whether or not the will was valid
•Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings
HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the court has declared that
the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.
In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law which
governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national law of the
decedent must apply.
As to the issue of jurisdiction --
The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had
an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition
for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief,
against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
(15)
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO vs. ANDRE BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance.
Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s
estates.
HELD:
Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as
impossible
conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as
those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to
include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
(16)
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the
City
Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING
FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and Erich Geiling were
married at
Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling
initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983.
Pilapil, petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before RTC of Manila on January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January
15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to
respondent, petitioner “had an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet another
man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the
filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both
criminal
cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely
reset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the suspension of
proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also directed the
arraignment of both accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt
and fined.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper.
RULING:
The petition entered dismissing the complaint in criminal case was upheld for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case was made permanent. The law provides
that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, is admitted.
Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the posture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
(17)
G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA,
Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan
FACTS:
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao.
Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and
Emilio
Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay filed a criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation,
Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance a complaint for legal separation against his
wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children
who
were living with their mother.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void and of no
effect as between the parties for finding that the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia is
considered to be a ground for annulling the marriage under Art. 95 of the Civil Code.
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is
respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.
Five years later respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late
grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. She alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate
grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of the estate. Petitioner
filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the decedent, that he has been managing
the conjugal properties even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect the
integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have been alienated from the
decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration
be issued instead to him.
Almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the special proceeding case
alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedent's
estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child
has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or
mother.
Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of
respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor
interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother — the decedent.
On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 9, 1998,
petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.
THE ISSUE:
Whether Isabel is an illegitimate child because of the declared “null and void” marriage of her parents?
THE RULING:
No. Petitioner strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has categorically declared
that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void" and that the legal effect of such
declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children born out of said marriage are
illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 of the New Civil Code
classify
what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled.
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed
never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the
spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are
called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged
natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in
good
faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set
aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a
marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born
in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate;
and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged
natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. (Emphasis supplied).
Stated otherwise, the annulment of "the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society
formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union
produced during its continuance."
Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal connotations and implications, Annul
means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do
away with whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is
annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through a
court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition which already
exists from the very beginning.
(18)
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF
APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
FACTS:
Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline
tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New York
to
Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a notice of
reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea
and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were
placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who checked in before tem had already taken
all the seats available on the flight.
Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los
Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, being ranked lower than 22, were
not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket were given first priority among the wait-listed
passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the
plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in
the next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated
because it was full booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two
tickets from American Airlines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages based on breach of
contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their favor ordering the
TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from American Airlines together with moral damages and
attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated
upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it is
a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United
States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board,
neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US
Code of Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA ?
HELD:
The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs.
Zalamea
and her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or
regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied
with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy
or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his
office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that the
Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside from said
statement,
no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to
board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or
regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not
prove
themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in
her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics
Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented
as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations has no basis in fact."
"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case
at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where
the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets
were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law."
(19)
AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and legal guardian, Augusto Benedicto
Santos, vs. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES and COURT OF APPEAL
G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest Orient Airlines
(NOA)
is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business
and
maintain a branch office in the Philippines. The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San
Francisco, U.S.A. In December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in the at the NOA counter in the San
Francisco airport for his departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he
was
informed that he had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.
On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiff’s destination was Manila?
HELD
The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the
contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the
carrier.
Examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the
date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was
bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered
merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.
Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping place." It is the
"destination" and not an "agreed stopping place" that controls for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction
under the Convention.
The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the
ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties
to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination.
An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."
(20)
G.R. No. L-22795 January 31, 1977
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. (DANGWA BUS COMPANY), and JAMES G. GAYOT
vs. HON.
MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and LAWRENCE HELLER,
Facts: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6,
1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He went to the United States, where,
from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California. In April of the
same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15,
1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and
took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution. He finished this
course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951.
Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as used in the
aforesaid
provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by
physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be
domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that
time, being, merely to study therein.
Issue: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several
months after the first date set for the hearing thereof.
Held: While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing,
residence
combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed permanently
for
a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing all
the while, to return to the true domicile.
Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for naturalization and
did
not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his explicit
promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines “from the date of the filing of
his
petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship”, he has not complied
with the
requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment
in
his favor.
(21)
LAURETO A. TALAROC vs. ALEJANDRO D. UY
G.R. No. L-5397; September 26, 1952
Facts: Alejandro D. Uy was elected as municipal mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental on November 13,
1951. Laureto Talaroc, one of the defeated candidates filed a petition for quo warranto against Uy on the
ground that Uy was a Chinese citizen and therefore ineligible. The lower court found the petition well-
founded and declared the position in question vacant. Respondent Uy’s contentions were that his father
was a subject of Spain and that his mother ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon the death of
her husband. He thus followed his mother’s citizenship and is a citizen of the Philippines by the mere fact
of his birth.
Issue: Is the acquisition of citizenship under the jus soli doctrine nullified by the
subsequent
abandonment of aforesaid doctrine in favor of jus sanguinis doctrine.
Held: No. Par. 1, Article 17 of the Civil Code affirms and recognizes the principle of nationality by place
of
birth, jus soli. The decided weight of authority was to the effect that the marriage of an American woman
with an alien conferred his nationality upon her during coverture; that upon the dissolution of the
marriage
by death of the husband, the wife reverted, ipso facto, to her former status, unless her conduct or acts
showed that she elected to retain the nationality of her husband, and that the widowed mother herself
thus reacquired her former nationality, her children, she being their natural guardian, should follow her
nationality with the proviso that they may elect for themselves upon reaching majority.
On the strength of the Roa doctrine, Alejandro Uy undoubtedly was considered a full- fledged Philippine
citizen on the date of the adoption of the constitution, when jus soli had been the prevailing doctrine, i.e.,
a Filipino woman married to a Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship upon her husband’s
demise and that thereafter her minor children’s nationality automatically followed that of the mother’s.
This
rule was not changed by the adoption of the jus sanguinis doctrine, and was in force until C.A. No. 63
went into effect in 1936, by which the legislature, for the first time, provided a method for regaining
Philippine citizenship by Filipino women in such cases. It is to be noted that when C.A. No. 63 was
passed, Ursula Diabo, mother of respondent Uy, had been a widow for 19 years and Alejandro D. Uy had
been of age three years, and that the new law carries no provision giving it retroactive effect.
(22)
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of
1,767
NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL
MUNDO vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL
BUILDERS CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-104776, Dec. 5, 1994
FACTS:
Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited
foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at
various projects in several countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and
Malaysia. The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were terminated even before their
expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of the complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period
for
claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year.
ISSUE:
•Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a
Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law
HELD:
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as
service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by teh
laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed
either
as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when
the country of the forum has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to
apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it.
Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also
barred in the Philippine Islands.”
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore insofar as
it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To
enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in
question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
(23)
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
JOSE
ONG, JR.,
Facts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second
district of
NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of
Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural
born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from
China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private
respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984,
the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose
Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under
the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien
father
were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private
respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to
establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented
house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires
that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
(24)
G.R. No. L-27429 August 27, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.
OH HEK HOW vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a motion alleging
that
he had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take
his
oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. The Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the taking of said oath. On
that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him. The Government
seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of February9, 1966 and filed its record
on appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment having been final and executory.
Issue:
Is the oath valid
Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the Minister of the Interior of
Nationalist China.
Held:
First issue:
The order of February 9, 1966 (oath-taking) had not — and up to the present has not become final and
executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government.
2nd Issue:
It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an alien, as a
citizen of the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by any foreign
law.
However, the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed
—
pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of China, not by those of the Philippines.