Powers of Administrative Agencies: Tests of Delegation (Applies To The Power To Promulgate Administrative Regulations)

Powers of Administrative Agencies
1. Quasi-legislative power / Power of subordinate legislation

2. Quasi-judicial power/Power of adjudication
3. Determinative powers (Note: Senator Neptali Gonzales calls them incidental powers)
Definition of “Quasi-legislative power”

It is the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and
regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a law and implement legislative policy.
Distinctions between Quasi-legislative power and legislative power

1. LEGISLATIVE power involves the discretion to determine what the law shall be. QUASI-legislative power
only involves the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced.
2. LEGISLATIVE power CANNOT be delegated. QUASI-legislative power CAN be delegated.
Tests of Delegation (applies to the power to promulgate administrative regulations )
1. COMPLETENESS test. This means that the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature so that when it reaches the delegate, it will have nothing to do but to enforce it.
2. SUFFICIENT STANDARD test. The law must offer a sufficient standard to specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and specify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
Definition of Quasi-Judicial Power

It is the power of administrative authorities to make determinations of facts in the performance of their
official duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the facts so found. The exercise of this power is
only incidental to the main function of administrative authorities, which is the enforcement of the law.
Determinative Powers
1. ENABLING powers
Those that PERMIT the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate and would be unlawful without
government approval.
Ex. Issuance of licenses to engage in a particular business.
2.DIRECTING powers
Those that involve the corrective powers of public utility commissions, powers of assessment under the
revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws, and awards under workmen’s compensation laws, and
powers of abstract determination such as definition-valuation, classification and fact finding
3. DISPENSING powers
Exemplified by the authority to exempt from or relax a general prohibition, or authority to relieve from an
affirmative duty. Its difference from licensing power is that dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a
standard.
4. SUMMARY powers
Those that apply compulsion or force against person or property to effectuate a legal purpose without a
judicial warrant to authorize such action. Usually without notice and hearing.
Ex. Abatement of nuisance, summary destraint, levy of property of delinquent tax payers
5. EQUITABLE powers
Those that pertain to the power to determine the law upon a particular state of facts. It refers to the right
to, and must, consider and make proper application of the rules of equity.
Ex. Power to appoint a receiver, power to issue injunctions
Kinds of Administrative Regulations

DISTINCTIONS LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATIVE
1. Capacity that
administrative agency is
acting in Legislative Judicial
It supplements the
2. What administrative statute by filling in the It says what the statute
agency is doing details means
Legislative regulations
have the force and effecr
of law immediately upon Merely
going into effect. Such is persuasive/Received by
accorded by the courts or the courts with much
by express provision of respect but not accorded
3. Force and effect statute. with finality
Requisites of a Valid Administrative Regulation

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
4. It must be reasonable
Need for Previous Notice and Hearing
1. General Rule: Administrative rules of GENERAL application do NOT require previous notice and hearing.
2. Exception: When the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on
certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.
3. If the regulation is in effect a settlement of a controversy between specific parties, it is considered an
administrative adjudication, requiring notice and hearing.
Prescribing of Rates
It can be either:
1. LEGISLATIVE
If the rules/rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country.
No prior notice and hearing is required.
2. QUASI-JUDICIAL
If the rules and rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact. Prior
notice and hearing is required.
Requirement of Publication
Administrative Regulations that MUST be published:
1. Administrative regulations of GENERAL application.
2. Administrative regulations which are PENAL in nature.
Administrative regulations that do NOT NEED to be PUBLISHED:
1. Interpretative regulations
2. Internal rules and regulations governing the personnel of the administrative agency.
1. Letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates. (Tanada v. Tuvera)
Special Requisites of a Valid Administrative Regulation with a PENAL sanction
1. The law itself must make violation of the administrative regulation punishable.
2. The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for the violation of the regulation.
3. The regulation must be published.
Requisites for Proper Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Power
1. Jurisdiction
2. Due process
Administrative Due Process : Requirements
1. Right to Notice, be it actual or constructive
2. Reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses
3. Impartial tribunal with competent jurisdiction
4. Finding or decision supported by substantial evidence
Exceptions to the Notice and Hearing Requirement
1. Urgency of immediate action
2. Tentativeness of the administrative action
3. Right was previously offered but not claimed
4. Summary abatement of a nuisance per se
5. Preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges
6. Padlocking of filthy restaurants/theaters showing obscene movies
7. Cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution
8. Summary distraint and levy of properties of a delinquent taxpayer
9. Replacement of a temporary or acting appointee
Questions Reviewable on Judicial Review:
1. Questions of FACT
The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of administrative agencies acting within the
parameters of their own competence so long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence. By
reason of their special knowledge, expertise, and experience, the courts ordinarily accord respect if not
finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals.
2. Question of LAW
Administrative decision may be appealed to the courts independently of legislative permission.

It may be appealed even against legislative prohibition because the judiciary cannot be deprived of its
inherent power to review all decisions on questions of law.
Doctrine of Finality
Courts are reluctant to interfere with action of an administrative agency prior to its completion or finality,
the reason being that absent a final order or decision, power has not been fully and finally exercised, and
there can usually be no irreparable harm.
EXCEPTIONS: Interlocutory order affecting the merits of a controversy; Preserve status quo pending further
action by the administrative agency; Essential to the protection of the rights asserted from the injury
threatened; Officer assumes to act in violation of the Constitution and other laws; Order not reviewable in
any other way; Order made in excess of power
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
1. This doctrine states that courts cannot or will not determine a controversy which requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters of
intricate questions of fact are involved.
2. Relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
court even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
Doctrine of Prior Resort
When a claim originally cognizable in the courts involves issues which, under a regulatory scheme are
within the special competence of an administrative agency, judicial proceedings will be suspended pending
the referral of these issues to the administrative body for its view.
Note: The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and prior resort have been considered to be interchangeable.
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. Under this doctrine, an administrative decision must first be appealed to the administrative superiors up
to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review.
1. Reasons :
1. to enable the administrative superiors to correct the errors committed by their subordinates.
2. courts should refrain from disturbing the findings of administrative.
bodies in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. courts should not be saddled with the review of administrative cases
4. judicial review of administrative cases is usually effected through special civil actions which are
available only if their is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
3. Exceptions
a. when the question raised is purely legal, involves constitutional questions

b. when the administrative body is in estopped
c. when act complained of is patently illegal
d. when there is urgent need for judicial intervention
e. when claim involved is small
f. when irreparable damage is involved
g. when there is no other plain, speedy , adequate remedy
h. when strong public interest is involved
I. when the subject of controversy is private land
1. in quo warranto proceedings
2. When the administrative remedy is permissive, concurrent
3. utter disregard of due process
4. long-continued and unreasonable delay
5. amount involved is relatively small
6. when no administrative review is provided
7. respondent is a department secretary (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY – ALTER EGO
DOCTRINE)
Substantial evidence – defined to mean not necessarily preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil
cases but such kind of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
BAR QUESTIONS
BAR QUESTIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM 1989-2003

2001 BAR EXAMINATION
I
TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION (Necessity for Notice and Hearing)
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) General Manager issued an
administrative order to the fact that all existing regular
appointments to harbor pilot positions shall remain valid only up to
December 31 of the current year and that henceforth all appointments
to harbor pilot positions shall be only for a term of one year from
date of effectivity, subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the
PPA after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance. Pilotage as
a profession may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals, who
have to pass five government professional examinations.
The Harbor Pilot Association challenged the validity of said
administrative order arguing that it violated the harbor pilots'
right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of
law and that the said administrative order was issued without prior
notice and hearing. The PPA countered that the administrative order
was valid as it was issued in the exercise of its administrative
control and supervision over harbor pilots under PPA's legislative
charter; and that in issuing the order as a rule or regulation, it
was performing its executive or legislative, and not a quasi-judicial
function.
Due process of law is classified into two kinds, namely, procedural
due process and substantive due process of law. Was there, or, was
there no violation of the harbor pilots' right to exercise their
profession and their right to due process of law?
Suggested Answer:
The right of the pilots to due process was violated. As held, in
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, 283
SCRA 31 (1997), pilotage as a profession is a property right
protected by the guarantee of due process. The pre-evaluation
cancellation of the licenses of the harbor pilots every year is
unreasonable and violated their right to substantive due process.
The renewal is dependent on the evaluation after the licenses have
been cancelled. The issuance of the administrative order also
violated procedural due process, since no prior public hearing was
conducted. As held in Commissioner r of Internal Revenue vs. Court
of Appeals, 261 SCRA 237 (199 , when a regulation is being issued

under the quasi-legislative authority of an administrative agency,
the requirements of notice, hearing and publication must be observed.
II
TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW
Give the two (2) requisites for the judicial review of administrative
decision/actions, that is, when is an administrative action ripe for
judicial review?
Suggested Answer:
1. The administrative action has already been fully completed
and, therefore, is a final agency action; and
2. All administrative remedies have been exhausted. (Gonzales,
Administrative Law, Rex Bookstore: Manila, p. 136 (1979).

I
TOPIC: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION (Necessity for Notice and Hearing)
The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued new rules and
regulations governing pilotage services and fees and the conduct of
pilots in Philippine ports. This it did without notice, hearing nor
consultation with harbor pilots or their associations whose rights
and activities are to be substantially affected. The harbor pilots
then filed suit to have the new MARINA rules and regulations declared
unconstitutional for having been issued without due process.
Suggested Answer:
The issuance of the new rules and regulations violated due process.
Under Section 9, Chapter II, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987, as far as practicable, before adopting proposed rules, an
administrative agency should publish or circulate notices of the
proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views; and in the fixing of rates, no rule shall be
valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two weeks before the first
hearing on them. In accordance with this provision, in Commissioner
of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236 (1996), it was
held that when an administrative rule substantially increases the
burden of those directly affected, they should be accorded the chance
to be heard before its issuance.
Alternative Answer:
Submission of the rule to the University of the Philippines Law
Center for publication is mandatory. Unless this requirement is
complied with, the rule cannot be enforced.
II
TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW (Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies)
A) Explain the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
B) Give at least three exceptions to its application.
Suggested Answer:
A) The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies means
that when an adequate remedy is available within the Executive
Department, a litigant must first exhaust this remedy before he can
resort to the courts. The purpose of the doctrine is to enable the
administrative agencies to correct themselves if they have committed
an error. (Rosales vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 (198 .

B) The following are the exceptions to the application of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
1. The question involved is purely legal;
2. The administrative body is in estoppel;
3. The act complained of is patently illegal;
4. There is an urgent need for judicial intervention;
5. The claim involved is small;
6. Grave and irreparable injury will be suffered;
7. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
8. Strong public interest is involved;
9. The subject of the controversy is private law;
10. The case involves a quo warranto proceeding (Sunville Timber
Products, Inc. vs. Abad, 206 SCRA 482 (1992);
11. The party was denied due process (Samahang Magbubukid ng
Kapdula, Inc. vs. Court Appeals, 305 SCRA 147 (1999);
12. The decision is that of a Department Secretary (Nazareno vs.
Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000);
13. Resort to administrative remedies would be futile (university
of the Philippines Board of Regents vs. Rasul, 200 SCRA 685 (1991)
14. There is unreasonable delay (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 301
SCRA 237 (1999)
15. The action involves recovery of physical possession of public
land (Gabrito vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 771 (198 ;

16. The party is poor (Sabello vs. Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, 180 SCRA 623 (1989); and
17. The law provides for immediate resort to the court (Rullan
vs. Valdez, 12 SCRA 501 (1964).

I
TOPIC: RIGHT TO HEARING AND NOTICE
A. Give examples of acts of the state which infringe the due
process clause:
1. In its substantive aspect; and
2. In its procedural aspect
B. On April 6, 1963. Police Officer Mario Gatdula was charged
by the Mayor with Grave Misconduct and Violation of Law before the
Municipal Board. The Board investigated Gatdula but before the case
could be decided, the City charter was approved. The City Fiscal,
citing Section 30 of the city charter, asserted that he was
authorized thereunder to investigate city officers and employees. The
case against Gatdula was then forwarded to him, and are-investigation
was conducted. The office of the Fiscal subsequently recommended
dismissal. On January 11, 1966, the City Mayor returned the records
of the case to the City Fiscal for the submission of an appropriate
resolution but no resolution was submitted. On March 3, 1968, the
City Fiscal transmitted the records to the City Mayor recommending
that final action thereon be made by the City Board of Investigators
(CBI). Although the CBI did not conduct an investigation, the records
show that both the Municipal Board and the Fiscal's Office
exhaustively heard the case with both parties afforded ample
opportunity to adduce their evidence and argue their cause. The
Police Commission found Gatdula guilty on the basis of the records
forwarded by the CBl. Gatdula challenged the adverse decision of the
Police Commission theorizing that he was deprived of due process.
Questions: Is the Police Commission bound by the findings of the City
Fiscal? Is Gatdula's protestation of lack or nonobservance of due
process well-grounded? Explain your answers.
C. On November 7, 1990, nine lawyers of the Legal Department of Y
Bank who were all under Fred Torre, sent a complaint to management
accusing Torre of abusive conduct and mismanagement. Furnished with a
copy of the complaint, Torre denied the charges. Two days later, the
lawyers and Torre were called to a conference in the office of the
Board Chairman to give their respective sides of the controversy.
However, no agreement was reached thereat. Bank Director Romulo Moret
was tasked to look further into the matter. He met with the lawyers
together with Torre several times but to no avail. Moret then
submitted a report sustaining the charges or the lawyers. The Board
Chairman wrote Torre to inform him that the bank had chosen the
compassionate option of "waiting" for Torre's resignation. Torre was
asked, without being dismissed, to turn over the documents of all
cases handled by him to another official of the bank but Torre
refused to resign and requested for a "full hearing", Days later, he
reiterated his request for a "full hearing", claiming that he had
been "constructively dismissed", Moret assured Torre that he is "free
to remain in the employ of the bank" even if he has no particular
work assignment. After another request for a "full hearing" was
ignored, Torre filed a complaint with the arbitration branch of NLRC
for illegal dismissal. Reacting thereto, the bank terminated the
services of Torre.
Questions: (a) Was Torre "constructively dismissed" before he filed
his complaint? (b) Given the multiple meetings held among the bank
officials, the lawyers and Torre, is it correct for him to say that
he was not given an opportunity to be heard? Explain your answers.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
1.) A law violates substantive due process when it is unreasonable
or unduly oppressive. For example, Presidential Decree No. 1717,
which cancelled all the mortgages and liens of a debtor, was
considered unconstitutional for being oppressive. Likewise, as stated
in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849, a law which is vague so that men of
common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application violates substantive due process. As held in Tañada v.
Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, due process requires that the law be published.
2.) In State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236 SCRA 505, it was held that the
dismissal of a case without the benefit of a hearing and without any
notice to the prosecution violated due process. Likewise, as held in
People v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 452, the lack of impartiality of
the judge who will decide a case violates procedural due process.
B.
The Police Commission is not bound by the findings of the City
Fiscal. In Mangubat v. de Castro, 163 SCRA 608, it was held that the
Police Commission is not prohibited from making its own findings on
the basis of its own evaluation of the records. Likewise, the
protestation of lack of due process is not well-grounded, since the
hearings before the Municipal Board and the City Fiscal offered
Gatdula the chance to be heard. There is no denial of due process if
the decision was rendered on the basis of evidence contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
C.
a) Torre was constructively dismissed, as held in Equitable Banking
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 273 SCRA 352.
Allowing an employee to report for work without being assigned any
work constitutes constructive dismissal.
b) Torre is correct in saying that he was not given the chance to be
heard. The meetings in the nature of consultations and conferences
cannot be considered as valid substitutes for the proper observance
of notice and hearing.

I
TOPIC: EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The Department of National Defense entered into contract with
Raintree Corporation for the supply of ponchos to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), stipulating that, in the event of breach,
action may be filed in the proper court in Manila.
Suppose the AFP fails to pay for delivered ponchos where must
Raintree Corporation file its claim? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Raintree Corporation must file its claim with the Commission on
Audit. Under Section 2(1) IX-D of the Constitution, the Commission on
Audit has the authority to settle all accounts pertaining to
expenditure of public funds. Raintree Corporation cannot file a case
in court. The Republic of the Philippines did not waive its immunity
from suit when it entered into the contract with Raintree Corporation
for the supply of ponchos for the use of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The contract involves the defense of the Philippines and
therefore relates to a sovereign function.
In-United States vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487,492, the Supreme Court held:
"The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the project are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and
the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order: they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commerce or
business purposes"
The provision for venue in the contract does not constitute a waiver
of the State immunity from suit, because the express waiver of this
immunity can only be made by a statute.
In Republic vs. Purisima. 78 SCRA 470 474, the Supreme Court ruled:
"Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract
between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant
Rice and Com Administration which, according to him, anticipated the
case of a breach of contract between the parties and the suits that
may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come
from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out
by Justice Bengzon in Mobil."
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, Raintree Corporation should first file a claim with the
Commission on Audit. If the claim is denied, it should file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
II
Topic: Administrative rulings subject to final determination of the
courts
Andres Ang was born of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on January 20, 1973. In 1988, his father was
naturalized as a Filipino citizen On May 11, 1998. Andres Ang was
elected Representative of the First District of Sorsogon. Juan Bonto
who received the second highest number of votes, filed a petition for
Quo Warranto against Ang. The petition was filed with the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Bonto contends that Ang is
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and therefore is
disqual1fied to be a member of the House.
The HRET ruled in favor of Ang. Bonto filed a petition for certiorari
in the Supreme Court. The following issues are raised:
1. Whether the case is justiciable considering that Article VI.
Section 17 of the Constitution declares the HRET to be the sole Judge-
of all contests relating to the election returns and
disqualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
2. Whether Ang is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
How should this case be decided?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. The case is justiciable. As stated in Lazatin vs.House Electoral
Tribunal. 168 SCRA 391, 404, since judicial power includes the duty
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Supreme Court
has the power to review the decisions of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal in case of grave abuse of discretion on its part.
2. Andres Ang should be considered a natural born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born of a Filipino mother on January 20, 1973.
This was after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January
17, 1973. Under Section (I), Article III of the 1973 Constitution,
those whose fathers or-mothers are citizens of the Philippines are
citizens of the Philippines. Andres Ang remained a citizen of the
Philippines after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. Section
1. Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution:"
III
TOPIC: SELF INCRIMINATION
Suppose Congress passed a law to implement the Constitutional
principle that a public office is a public trust, by providing as
follows:
"No employee of the Civil Service shall be excused from attending and
testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence,
documents or other evidence in any administrative investigation
concerning the office in which he is employed on the ground that his
testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him
or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture: but his testimony or any
evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in criminal
prosecution based on the transaction, matter or thing concerning
which is compelled, after invoking his privilege against self-
incrimination to testify or produce evidence. Provided, however, that
such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution
and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying nor shall he be
exempt from demotion or removal from office. Any employee who refuses
to testify or produce any documents under this Act shall be dismissed
from the service."
Suppose further, that Ong, a member of the Professional Regulatory
Board, is required to answer questions in an investigation regarding
a LEAKAGE in a medical examination.
1. Can Ong refuse to answer questions on the ground that he would
incriminate himself?
2. Suppose he refuses to answer, and for that reason, is dismissed
from the service; can he pausibly argue that the Civil Commission has
inferred his guilt from his refusal to answer in violation of the
Constitution?
3. Suppose on the other hand, he answers the question and on the
basis of his answers, he is found guilty and is dismissed. Can he
pausibly assert that his dismissa1 is based on coerced confession?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. No. Ong cannot refuse to answer the question on the ground that he
would incriminate himself, since the Jaw grants him immunity and
prohibits the use against him in a criminal prosecution of the
testimony or evidence produced by him. As stated by the United States
Supreme Court in Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S.591, 597, what the
constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination seeks to
prevent is the conviction of the witness on the basis of testimony
elicited from him. The rule is satisfied when he is granted immunity.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. In accordance with Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99, 107-108,
if Ong is being cited merely as a witness, he may not refuse to
answer. However, if the question tends to violate his right against
self-incrimination, he may object to it. On the other hand, under the
ruling in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals. 24 SCRA 663, 680, if be is a
respondent, Ong may refuse to answer any question because of his
right against self-incrimination.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2. No Ong cannot argue that the Civil Service Commission inferred
his guilt from his refusal to answer. Be was not dismissed because of
his involvement in the leakage in the medical examination but for his
refusal to answer. This is a violation of the law. He could be
compelled to answer the question on pain of being dismissed in case
of his refusal, because he was granted immunity.
In Lefkowitz vs. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,84, the United States Supreme
Court said:
"Furthermore, the accommodation between the interest of the State and
the Fifth Amendment requires that the State have means at its
disposal to secure testimony if immunity is supplied and testimony is
still refused. This is recognized by the power of courts to compel
testimony, after a grant of immunity, by use of civil contempt and
coerced imprisonment. Shilitani vs. United States, 384 US 364, 16 L
Ed 2d 622, 86 5 Ct 1531 (1966). Also, given adequate immunity the
State may plainly insist that employees either answer questions under
oath about the performance of their job or suffer the loss of
employment."
3. Yes, Ong can argue that his dismissal was based on coerced
confession. In Garrity vs. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500, the United
States Supreme Court held:
"We now hold the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth
Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent
criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal
from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen
or other members of the body politic."
IV
TOPIC: LIMITATIONS OF POWER
The police had suspicions that. Juan Samson, member of the subversive
New-Proletarian Army, was using the mail for propaganda purposes in
gaining new adherents to its cause. The Chief of Police of
Bantolan., Lanao del Sur ordered the Postmaster of the town to
intercept and open all mail addressed to and coming from Juan Samson
in the interest of the national security. Was the order of the Chief
of Police valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the order of the Chief of Police is not valid, because there is
no law which authorizes him to order the Postmaster to open the
letters addressed to and coming from Juan Samson. An official in the
Executive Department cannot interfere with the privacy of
correspondence and communication in the absence of a law authorizing
him to do so or a lawful order of the court.
Section 3(1), Article III of the Constitution provides:
"The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
IV
TOPIC: JURISDICITON
Suppose a Commissioner of the COMELEC is charged before the
Sandiganbayan for allegedly tolerating violation of the election laws
against proliferation of prohibited billboards and election
propaganda with the end in view of removing him from office. Will the
action prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the action will not prosper. Under Section 8 Article Xl of the
Constitution. the Commissioners of the Commission on Elections are
removable by impeachment. As held in the case of In re Gonzales, 160
SCRA 771,774-775, a public officer who is removable by impeachment
cannot be charged before the Sandiganbayan with an offense which
carries with it the penalty of removal from office unless he is first
impeached. Otherwise, he will be removed from office by a method
other than impeachment.

I
TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
Are the government-owned or controlled corporations within the scope
and meaning of the "Government of the Philippines"?
Suggested Answer:
Section 2 of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code
of 1987 defines the government of the Philippines as the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which political
authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to
the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions or other forms of local government.
Government-owned or controlled corporations are within the scope and
meaning of the Government of the Philippines if they are performing
governmental or political functions.
II
TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE CODE – FLAG CEREMONY
Section 28, Title VI, Chapter 9, of the Administrative Code of 1987
requires all educational institutions to observe a simple and
dignified flag ceremony, including the playing or singing of the
Philippine National Anthem, pursuant to rules to be promulgated by
the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports. The refusal of a
teacher, student or pupil to attend or participate in the flag
ceremony is a ground for dismissal after due investigation. The
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports issued a memorandum
implementing said provision of law. As ordered, the flag ceremony
would be held on Mondays at 7:30 a.m. during class days. A group of
teachers, students and pupils requested the Secretary that they be
exempted from attending the flag ceremony on the ground that
attendance thereto was against their religious belief. The Secretary
denied the request. The teachers, students and pupils concerned went
to the Court to have the memorandum circular declared null and void.
Decide the case.
Suggested Answer:
The teachers and the students should be exempted from the flag
ceremony. As held in Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools
of Cebu, 251 SCRA 569 , to compel them to participate in the flag
ceremony will violate their freedom of religion. Freedom of religion
cannot be impaired except upon the showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil which the State has a right to prevent.
The refusal of the teachers and the students to participate in the
flag ceremony does not pose a clear and present danger.

I
TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
1. Distinguish the doctrine of primary jurisdiction from the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
2. Does the failure to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing a case in court oust said court of jurisdiction to hear the
case? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
1. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies both deal with the proper
relationships between the courts and administrative agencies. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies where a
claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency
alone. Judicial interference is withheld until the administrative
process has been completed. As stated in Industrial Enterprises, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 426, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction applies where a case is within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the court and an administrative agency but the
determination of the case requires the technical expertise of the
administrative agency. In such a case, although the matter is within
the jurisdiction of the court, it must yield to the jurisdiction of
the administrative case.
2. No, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing a case in court does not oust the court of jurisdiction to
hear the case. As held in Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 384,
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court but results in the lack of a cause of
action, because a condition precedent that must be satisfied before
action can be filed was not fulfilled.

I
TOPIC: LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT VS. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
The Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal passed a resolution authorizing
the operation of an open garbage dumpsite in a 9-hectare land in the
Reyes Estate within the Municipality's territorial limits. Some
concerned residents of Binangonan filed a complaint with the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) to stop the operation of the
dumpsite due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents.
The LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring, testing and
water sampling and found that the dumpsite would contaminate Laguna
de Bay and the surrounding areas of the Municipality. The LLDA also
discovered that no environmental clearance was secured by the
Municipality from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and the LLDA as required by law. The LLDA therefore issued to
the Binangonan Municipal Government a cease and desist order to stop
the operation of the dumpsite. The Municipality of Binangonan filed a
case to annul the order issued by the LLDA.
1. Can the Municipality of Binangonan invoke police power to
prevent its residents and the LLDA from interfering with the
operation of the dumpsite by the Municipality? Explain.
2. Can the LLDA justify its order by asserting that the health
of the residents will be adversely affected? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
1. No, the Municipality of Binangonan cannot invoke its police
power. According to Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of
Appeals, 231 SCRA 292, under Republic Act No. 4850, the LLDA is
mandated to promote the development of the Laguna Lake area,
including the surrounding Province of Rizal, with due regard to the
prevention of pollution. The LLDA is mandated to pass upon and
approve or disapprove all projects proposed by local government
offices within the region.
2. Yes, the LLDA can justify its order. Since it has been
authorized by Executive Order No. 927 to make orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution, its power to issue the order can be
inferred from this. Otherwise, it will be a toothless agency.
Moreover, the LLDA is specifically authorized under its Charter to
issue cease and desist orders.
I
TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES OR AGENCY
On July 1991, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), in response to
public clamor, issued a resolution approving and adopting a schedule
for bringing down the prices of petroleum products over a period of
one (1) year starting 15 August 1991, over the objection of the oil
companies which claim that the period covered is too long to prejudge
and foresee.
Is the resolution valid?
Suggested Answer:
No, the resolution is not valid, since the Energy Regulatory Board
issued the resolution without a hearing. The resolution here is not a
provisional order and therefore it can only be issued after
appropriate notice and hearing to affected parties. The ruling in
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA
218, to the effect that an order provisionally reducing the rates
which a public utility could charge, could be issued without previous
notice and hearing, cannot apply.
I
TOPIC: EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS
Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
empowered it to sequester any property shown prima facie to be ill-
gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and
cronies. Executive Order No. 14 vests on the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction to try hidden wealth cases. On April 14, 1986, after an
investigation, the PCGG sequestered the assets of X Corporation, Inc.
(1) X Corporation, Inc, claimed that President Aquino as President,
could not lawfully issue Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14, which have
the force of law, on the ground that legislation is a function of
Congress. Decide.
(2) Said corporation also questioned the validity of the three
executive orders on the ground that they are bills of attainder and,
therefore, unconstitutional. Decide
Suggested Answer:
(1) The contention of X Corporation should be rejected. Executive
orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14 were issued in 1986. At that time President
Corazon Aquino exercised legislative power Section 1, Article II of
the Provisional Constitution established by Proclamation No. 3,
provided:
"Until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative
power."
In case of Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalan ng Pilipinas,
Inc. vs. Tan, 163 SCRA 371, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Provisional Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, both recognized
the power of the President to exercise legislative powers until the
first Congress created under the 1987 Constitution was convened on
June 27, 1987.
(2) Executive Orders Nos. 1,2 and 14 are not bill of attainder. A
bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without trial. On the contrary, the expressly provide that any
judgment that the property sequestered is ill-gotten wealth is to be
made by a court (the Sandiganbayan) only after trial.
II
TOPIC: LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
A. After 2 February 1987, the Philippine National bank (PNB) grants a
loan to congressman X. Is the loan violative of the Constitution?
Suppose the loan had instead been granted before 2 February 1987, but
was outstanding on that date with a remaining balance on the
principal in the amount of P50,000, can the PNB validly give
Congressman X an extension of time after said date to stele the
obligation?
B. For being notoriously undesirable and recidivist, Jose Tapulan, an
employee in the first level of the career service in the Office of
the Provincial Governor of Masbate, was dismissed by the Governor
without formal investigation pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil
Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) which authorizes summary proceedings in
such cases.
As a lawyer of Jose what steps, if any, would you take to protect his
rights?
Suggested Answer:
A. whether or not the loan is violative of the 1987 Constitution
depends upon its purpose, if it was obtained for a business purpose,
it is violative of the Constitution. If it was obtained for some
other purpose, e.g. for housing, it is not violative of the
Constitution because under Section 16, Article XI, Members of
Congress are prohibited from obtaining loans from government-owned
banks only if it is for a business purpose.
If the loan was granted before the effectivity of the Constitution on
February 2, 1987, the Philippine National Bank cannot extend its
maturity after February 2, 1987, if the loan was obtained for a
business purpose. In such case the extension is a financial
accommodation which is also prohibited by the Constitution.
B. Section 40 of the Civil Service Decree has been repealed by
republic Act No. 6654. As a lawyer of Jose Tapulan, I will file a
petition for mandamus to compel his reinstatement. In accordance with
the ruling in Mangubat vs. Osmeña, G.R. No. L-12837, April 30, 1959,
there is no need to exhaust all administrative remedies by appealing
to Civil Service Commission, since the act of the governor is
patently illegal.
I
An existing law grants government employees the option to retire upon
reaching the age of 57 years and completion of at least 30 years of
total, government service. As a fiscal retrenchment measure, the
Office of the President later issued a Memorandum Circular requiring
physical incapacity as an additional condition for optional
retirement age of 65 years. A government employee, whose application
for optional retirement was denied because he was below 65 years of
age and was not physically incapacitated, filed an action in court
questioning the disapproval of his application claiming that the
Memorandum Circular is void. Is the contention of the employee
correct? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the contention of the employee is correct. In Marasigan vs.
Cruz, SCRA , it was held that such memorandum circular is void. By
introducing physical capacity as additional condition for optional
retirement, the memorandum circular tried to amend the law. Such
power is lodged with the legislative branch and not with the
executive branch.
II
In 1986, F, then the officer-in-charge of Botolan, Zambales, was
accused of having violated the ANTI-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the Sandigan Bayan. Before he could be arraigned, he was
elected Governor of Zambales. After his arraignment, he put under
preventive suspension by the Sandiganbayan " for the duration of the
trial".
(1) Can F successfully challenge the legality of his preventive
suspension on the ground that the criminal case against him involved
acts committed during his term as officer-in-charge and not during
his term as Governor?
(2) Can F validly object to the aforestated duration of his
suspension?
Suggested Answer:
(1) No, F cannot successfully challenge the legality of his
preventive suspension on the ground that the criminal case against
him involve acts committed during his term as OIC and not during his
term as governor because suspension from office under Republic Act
3019 refers to any office that the respondent is presently holding
and not necessarily to the one which he hold when he committed the
crime with which he is charged. This was the ruling in Deloso vs.
Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409
(2) Yes, F Can validly object to the duration of the suspension. In
Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409, it was held that the
imposition of preventive suspension for an indefinite period of time
is unreasonable and violates the right of the accused to due process.
The people who elected the governor to office would be deprived of
his services for an indefinite period, and his right to hold office
would be nullified. Moreover, since under Section 42 of the Civil
Service Decree the duration of preventive suspension should be
limited to ninety (90) days, equal protection demands that the
duration of preventive suspension under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act be also limited to ninety (90) days only.
When is a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation deemed to be performing proprietary

function? When is it deemed to be performing governmental function?
Held: Government-owned or controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions or both,
depending on the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits
or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement
of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as
“proprietary” are those intended for private advantage and benefit. (Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366, 425,
Sept. 11, 1998, En Banc [Purisima])
The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an
original charter under R.A. No. 95, as amended. Its charter, however, was amended to vest in it the
authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges,
etc. With the amendnt of its charter, has it been “impliedly converted to a private corporation”?
Held: The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is
simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general
corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The PNRC was not “impliedly converted to a
private corporation” simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be
exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges, etc. (Camporedondo v. NLRC, G.R. No.
129049, Aug. 6, 1999, 1st Div. [Pardo])
When may the Government not validly invoke the rule that prescription does not run against the
State? Illustrative Case.
Held: While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the
government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace may have
belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez’s title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-
361, the same no longer holds true today.
Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Base Conversion and Development Act of 1992, created the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority. X x x
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or interest to
protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor
may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the government is a
party in interest. x x x. Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710
issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled.
Nonetheless, it has been posited that the transfer of military reservations and their extensions to the BCDA is
basically for the purpose of accelerating the sound and balanced conversion of these military reservations into
alternative productive uses and to enhance the benefits to be derived from such property as a measure of
promoting the economic and social development, particularly of Central Luzon and, in general, the country’s goal for
enhancement (Section 2, Republic Act No. 7227). It is contended that the transfer of these military reservations to
the Conversion Authority does not amount to an abdication on the part of the Republic of its interests, but simply a
recognition of the need to create a body corporate which will act as its agent for the realization of its program. It is
consequently asserted that the Republic remains to be the real party in interest and the Conversion Authority
merely its agent.
We, however, must not lose sight of the fact that the BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate and
distinct from the government. X x x
It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been classified into governmental
or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. While public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of
the economic and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is
certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic
and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal for enhancement, in general, do not
make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations have been created by government to act as its
agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court
has ruled that these entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare,
are not government-function corporations invested with governmental attributes. It may thus be said that the
BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.
Having the capacity to sue or be sued, it should thus be the BCDA which may file an action to cancel petitioner’s
title, not the Republic, the former being the real party in interest. One having no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action. A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the
defendant is not a real party in interest. x x x
However, E.B. Marcha Transport Co., Inc. v. IAC is cited as authority that the Republic is the proper party to sue for
the recovery of possession of property which at the time of the installation of the suit was no longer held by the
national government body but by the Philippine Ports Authrotiy. In E.B. Marcha, the Court ruled:
It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the Republic of the Philippines, acted as principal of the
Philippine Ports Authority, directly exercising the commission it had earlier conferred on the latter as its agent. We
may presume that, by doing so, the Republic of the Philippines did not intend to retain the said rentals for its own
use, considering that by its voluntary act it had transferred the land in question to the Philippine Ports Authority
effective July 11, 1974. The Republic of the Philippines had simply sought to assist, not supplant, the Philippine
Ports Authority, whose title to the disputed property it continues to recognize. We may expect the that the said
rentals, once collected by the Republic of the Philippines, shall be turned over by it to the Philippine Ports Authority
conformably to the purposes of P.D. No. 857.
E.B. Marcha is, however, not on all fours with the case at bar. In the former, the Court considered the Republic a
proper party to sue since the claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports Authority against the petitioner therein
were the same. To dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha would have brought needless delay in the settlement of
the matter since the PPA would have to refile the case on the same claim already litigated upon. Such is not the
case here since to allow the government to sue herein enables it to raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim
which is not available to the BCDA. The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to
corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it being said that when the title of the
Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as
ordinary persons. By raising the claim of imprescriptibility, a claim which cannot be raised by the BCDA, the
Government not only assists the BCDA, as it did in E.B. Marcha, it even supplants the latter, a course of action
proscribed by said case.
Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it would
allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which
have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription
does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of government programs.
It should also be noted that petitioner is unquestionably a buyer in good faith and for value, having acquired the
property in 1963, or 5 years after the issuance of the original certificate of title, as a third transferee. If only not to
do violence and to give some measure of respect to the Torrens System, petitioner must be afforded some measure
of protection. (Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 334, Feb. 20, 2001, 3rd Div. [Melo])
Discuss the nature and functions of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and analyze
its powers and authority as well as the laws, rules and regulations that govern its existence and
operations.
Held: The NTC was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 546 x x x. It assumed the functions
formerly assigned to the Board of Communications and the Communications Control Bureau, which were both
abolished under the said Executive Order. Previously, the NTC’s function were merely those of the defunct Public
Service Commission (PSC), created under Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public
Service Act, considering that the Board of Communications was the successor-in-interest of the PSC. Under
Executive Order No. 125-A, issued in April 1987, the NTC became an attached agency of the Department of
Transportation and Communications.
In the regulatory communications industry, the NTC has the sole authority to issue Certificates of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and maintenance of communications facilities and
services, radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph systems. Such power includes the authority to
determine the areas of operations of applicants for telecommunications services. Specifically, Section 16 of the
Public Service Act authorizes the then PSC, upon notice and hearing, to issue Certificates of Public Convenience for
the operation of public services within the Philippines “whenever the Commission finds that the operation of the
public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and
suitable manner.” (Commonwealth Act No. 146, Section 16[a]) The procedure governing the issuance of such
authorizations is set forth in Section 29 of the said Act x x x. (Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.,
373 SCRA 316, Jan. 15, 2002, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
Is the filing of the administrative rules and regulations with the UP Law Center the operative act that
gives the rules force and effect?
Held: In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a CMTS, the NTC applied Rule 15,
Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. – Upon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter, the
Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief prayed for, based on the pleading,
together with the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto, without prejudice to a final decision after
completion of the hearing which shall be called within thirty (30) days from grant of authority asked for.
Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which
were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. These Revised Rules deleted
the phrase “on its own initiative”; accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper
motion before the Commission.
In answer to this argument, the NTC, through the Secretary of the Commission, issued a certification to
the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation,
the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that
the NTC was still governed by the 1987 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at
the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with
the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987
which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and
effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof merely states:
Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of
every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3)
months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section
under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.
The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the
Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the
Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution
costs (Administrative Code of 1987, Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 7). In a similar case, we held:
This does not imply, however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative
power. The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their
applications for importations, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The
questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code,
which reads:
“Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. X x x”
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the
UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the
Administrative Order.
This Court, in Tanada v. Tuvera stated, thus:

“We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by
the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative power or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative Rules and Regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws.”
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity,
since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in
relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua
non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. This is explicit from Executive Order No. 200, which
repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and which states that:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided (E.O. 200, Section 1).
The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act,
fall squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera.
Our pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exception
are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance
of their duties (PHILSA International Placement & Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 103144, April 4,
2001, 356 SCRA 174).
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect
only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation (Section 20 thereof). In the absence of such
publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that govern. (Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.,
373 SCRA 316, Jan. 15, 2002, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
May a person be held liable for violation of an administrative regulation which was not published?
Held: Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum
Circular No. II, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void
for lack of publication.
There is merit in the argument.
In Tanada v. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows:

“We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter
of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.”
Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the following
administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and
Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; b)
Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining
companies to the national government; c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the recruitment of
domestic helpers to Hong Kong; d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine
International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People’s Republic of China; and e)
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the
payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees. In all these cited cases,
the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with
the National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987.
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was
never published or filed with the National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and
documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum
amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was
apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Labor Code x x x.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should
be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or
filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. (Philsa
International Placement and Services Corporation v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 356 SCRA 174,
April 4, 2001, 3rd Div., [Gonzaga-Reyes])
Does the publication requirement apply as well to administrative regulations addressed only to a
specific group and not to the general public?
Held: The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circular is
not among those requiring publication contemplated by Tanada v. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific group
of persons and not to the general public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment
agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Tanada v. Tuvera. In the case
of Phil. Association of Service Exporters v. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to
an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong
Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or
implemented.
Our pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only
exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of
these exceptions.
In this regard, the Solicitor General’s reliance on the case of Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs is misplaced. In
the said case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orders were upheld despite their lack of publication as
they were addressed to a particular class of persons, the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the
exceptions to the publication requirement, namely those dealing with instructions from an administrative superior to
a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which does not obtain in the case at bench.
Xxx
To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of exaction as POEA Administrative Circular
No. 2, Series of 1983 could not be the basis of administrative sanctions against petitioner for lack of
publication. (Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, 356 SCRA 174, April 4, 2001, 3rd Div., [Gonzaga-Reyes])
May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwithstanding
that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?
Held: Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” (Sec. 29[1], Article VI of the 1987
Constitution) Thus, in the execution of government contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is
to require the various agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal
year.
It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of appropriations and the availability
of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the execution of government
contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed
contract. Using this as our premise, we cannot accede to PHOTOKINA’s contention that there is already a perfected
contract. While we held in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Jancom Environmental Corporation that
“the effect of an unqualified acceptance of the offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon notice of
the award to the bidder,” however, such statement would be inconsequential in a government where the acceptance
referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a binding
contract that would obligate the government in an amount in excess of the appropriations for the purpose for which
the contract was attempted to be made. This is a dangerous precedent.
In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as the bidding
stage. The first step of a Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to determine whether the bids comply with the
requirements. The BAC shall rate a bid “passed” only if it complies with all the requirements and the submitted
price does not exceed the approved budget for the contract.” (Implementing Rules and Regulations [IRR] for
Executive Order No. 262, supra.)
Extant on the record is the fact that the VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on account of its bid in
the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos. However, under Republic Act No. 8760 (General Appropriations Act, FY 2000, p.
1018, supra.), the only fund appropriated for the project was P1 Billion Pesos and under the Certification of
Available Funds (CAF) only P1.2 Billion Pesos was available. Clearly, the amount appropriated is insufficient to
cover the cost of the entire VRIS Project. There is no way that the COMELEC could enter into a contract with
PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by law for the project. This being the
case, the BAC should have rejected the bid for being excessive or should have withdrawn the Notice of Award on the
ground that in the eyes of the law, the same is null and void.
Even the draft contract submitted by Commissioner Sadain that provides for a contract price in the
amount of P1.2 Billion Pesos is unacceptable. x x x While the contract price under the draft contract is only P1.2
Billion and, thus, within the certified available funds, the same covers only Phase I of the VRIS Project, i.e., the
issuance of identification cards for only 1,000,000 voters in specified areas. In effect, the implementation of the
VRIS Project will be “segmented” or “chopped” into several phases. Not only is such arrangement disallowed by our
budgetary laws and practices, it is also disadvantageous to the COMELEC because of the uncertainty that will loom
over its modernization project for an indefinite period of time. Should Congress fail to appropriate the amount
necessary for the completion of the entire project, what good will the accomplished Phase I serve? As expected, the
project failed “to sell” with the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, Secretary Benjamin Diokno, per his
letter of December 1, 2000, declined the COMELEC’s request for the issuance of the Notice of Cash Availability (NCA)
and a multi-year obligatory authority to assume payment of the total VRIS Project for lack of legal basis. Corollarily,
under Section 33 of R.A. No. 8760, no agency shall enter into a multi-year contract without a multi-year obligational
authority, thus:
“SECTION 33. Contracting Multi-Year Projects. – In the implementation of multi-year projects, no agency shall
enter into a multi-year contract without a multi-year Obligational Authority issued by the Department of Budget and
Management for the purpose. Notwithstanding the issuance of the multi-year Obligational Authority, the obligation
to be incurred in any given calendar year, shall in no case exceed the amount programmed for implementation
during said calendar year.”
Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them not to enter
into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a
futile exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer the vice of nullity. x x x
Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio (Article 1409 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines). This is to say that the proposed contract is without force and effect from the very
beginning or from its incipiency, as if it had never been entered into, and hence, cannot be validated either by lapse
of time or ratification.
In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the
contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the
proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void x x x. (Commission on Elections v.
Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla, G.R. No. 151992, Sept. 18, 2002, En Banc [Sandoval-
Gutierrez])
What is the remedy available to a party who contracts with the government contrary to the
requirements of the law and, therefore, void ab initio?
Held: Of course, we are not saying that the party who contracts with the government has no other recourse in
law. The law itself affords him the remedy. Section 48 of E.O. No. 292 explicitly provides that any contract entered
into contrary to the above-mentioned requirements shall be void, and “the officers entering into the contract shall
be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same as if the transaction
had been wholly between private parties.” So when the contracting officer transcends his lawful and legitimate
powers by acting in excess of or beyond the limits of his contracting authority, the Government is not bound under
the contract. It would be as if the contract in such case were a private one, whereupon, he binds himself, and thus,
assumes personal liability thereunder. Otherwise stated, the proposed contract is unenforceable as to the
Government.
While this is not the proceeding to determine where the culpability lies, however, the constitutional
mandate cited above constrains us to remind all public officers that public office is a public trust and all public
officers must at all times be accountable to the people. The authority of public officers to enter into government
contracts is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. In the exercise of their contracting prerogative,
they should be the first judges of the legality, propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must
exercise a high degree of caution so that the Government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident
action. (Commission on Elections v. Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla, G.R. No. 151992, Sept. 18, 2002,
En Banc [Sandoval-Gutierrez])
Does the Commission on Human Rights have the power to adjudicate?
Held: In its Order x x x denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of
the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. This view, however, has not
heretofore been shared by this Court. In Carino v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court x x x has observed that
it is “only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication of
adjudgment,” but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court
explained:
“x x x [T]he Commission on Human Rights x x x was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
“The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have. (Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, 125, Jan. 5, 1994, En
Banc [Vitug, J.])
Does the Commission on Human Rights have jurisdiction to issue TRO or writ of preliminary injunction?
Held: In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court x x x explained:
“The constitutional provision directing the CHR to ‘provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection’ may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. ‘Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law.’ It is never
derived by implication.”
“Evidently, the ‘preventive measures and legal aid services’ mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on
behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to
issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued ‘by the judge of any court in which the action
is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. x x x. A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation
or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.”
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to
any appropriate agency of government. (Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, 134-
135, Jan. 5, 1994, En Banc [Vitug, J.])
Does the petition for annulment of proclamation of a candidate merely involve the exercise by the
COMELEC of its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of
canvassers and, therefore, justifies non-observance of procedural due process, or does it involve the
exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial function?
Held: Taking cognizance of private respondent’s petitions for annulment of petitioner’s proclamation, COMELEC
was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include the
power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct
registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and governmental instrumentalities to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or coalition, accredit citizen’s
arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition
of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its
directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel
involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and
petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the
COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their
allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for
the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or
discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is
conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as
quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by
private respondent. (Federico S. Sandoval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000 [Puno])
Discuss the contempt power of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). When may it be validly
exercised.
Held: On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational guidelines
and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court.” Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power “to cite or hold
any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure
and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood
to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse
to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons,
and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The “order to desist” (a semantic interplay for a restraining order)
in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that
it does not possess. x x x (Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, 134, Jan. 5, 1994,
En Banc [Vitug, J.])
Discuss the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Prior Resort).
Held: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand
the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It
applies “where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence
of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.”
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. (Villaflor v. CA, 280 SCRA 297, Oct. 9, 1992, 3rd Div. [Panganiban])
Discuss the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. What are the exceptions thereto?
Held: 1. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s jurisdiction is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing,
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give
the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
This doctrine is disregarded:
when there is a violation of due process;

when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
when there is irreparable injury;
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter;
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding;
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
(Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 167 [1997])

2. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the action
premature, i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no
cause of action to ventilate in court. (Carale v. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132, March 3, 1997, 3rd Div. [Davide])

Powers of Administrative Agencies: Tests of Delegation (Applies To The Power To Promulgate Administrative Regulations)

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Powers of Administrative Agencies: Tests of Delegation (Applies To The Power To Promulgate Administrative Regulations)

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Powers of Administrative Agencies

1. Quasi-legislative power / Power of subordinate legislation

Definition of “Quasi-legislative power”

Distinctions between Quasi-legislative power and legislative power

Definition of Quasi-Judicial Power

Ex. Issuance of licenses to engage in a particular business.

Ex. Power to appoint a receiver, power to issue injunctions

Kinds of Administrative Regulations

Requisites of a Valid Administrative Regulation

No prior notice and hearing is required.

Administrative decision may be appealed to the courts independently of legislative permission.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

a. when the question raised is purely legal, involves constitutional questions

BAR QUESTIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM 1989-2003

of Appeals, 261 SCRA 237 (199 , when a regulation is being issued

2000 BAR EXAMINATION

an error. (Rosales vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 (198 .

land (Gabrito vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 771 (198 ;

1999 BAR EXAMINATION

1998 BAR EXAMINATION

1997 BAR EXAMINATION

1996 BAR EXAMINATION

1995 BAR EXAMINATION

When is a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation deemed to be performing proprietary

This Court, in Tanada v. Tuvera stated, thus:

In Tanada v. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows:

when there is a violation of due process;

when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

when there is irreparable injury;

when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;

when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding;

when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

(Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 167 [1997])

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