INTRODUCTION

The word “evidence” is used in the Evidence Act in different phrases, i.e. best evidence,
direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, documentary evidence, substantive evidence,
corroborative evidence, derivative evidence, hearsay evidence, indirect evidence, oral
evidence, original evidence, presumptive evidence, real evidence, primary evidence and
secondary evidence. However, oral evidence and documentary evidence are the main two
kinds of evidence and they comprise direct evidence (which includes substantive and
corroborative evidence and documentary evidence (which includes substantive and
corroborative evidence).1

The evidence that is used to corroborate substantive evidence is known as ‘Corroborative

Evidence’. In the case there is no substantive evidence, the corroborative evidence loses its
significance and importance in any proceeding. To say otherwise, in the absence of
substantive evidence, the corroborative evidence is no evidence. Under the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872, the Sections 7, 27, 156 and 157 are concerned with the provisions for
Corroborative Evidence. However, the major role played in determining the effectivenessof
the corroborative evidence in any proceeding is determine by the application of Sections 156
and 157 of the Evidence Act. With a brief description of the Sections 7 and 27 in the concept
of Corroborative Evidence, this project is mainly going to concentrate upon these two
sections, and their varying aspects of applications, and the concepts propounded by the
Courts in their application.

Section 7 of the Indian Evidence Act states that “Facts which are the occasion, cause or
effect, immediate or otherwise, of relevant facts or facts in issue, or which constitute the state
of things under which they happened, or which afforded an opportunity for their occurrence
or transaction, are relevant.”2

The principle that emanates from this section states that the reason for the admission of facts
of this nature is that, it is desired to decide whether a fact occurred, almost the first natural
step is to ascertain whether there were facts at hand calculated to produce or afford
opportunity for its occurrence, or facts which its occurrence was calculated to produce.
Further, in order to the proper appreciation of a fact, it is necessary to know the state of things

1
K.D. Patil, “Evidence–Kinds Of”, (from-http://mja.gov.in/Site/Upload/GR/EVIDENCE__K_D_PATIL_.PDF.)
2
Section 7, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
under which it occurred.3 Per se, the section doesn’t ostensibly deal with corroborative
evidence. Rather, the section states that any fact that may be related to the causation of or the
opportunity for the certain event to take place may be admitted in a proceeding, and is to be
considered as relevant to the proceeding.

In essence, it is the Sections 156 and 157 that are responsible for the evolution of the concept
of Corroborative Evidence. Following is a detailed analysis of the Sections 156 and 157.

SECTION 156, INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872:

Section 156 reads as follows: “When a witness whom it is intended to corroborate gives
evidence of any relevant facts, he may be questioned as to any other circumstances which he
observed at or near to the time or place at which such relevant fact occurred, if the court is of
the opinion that such circumstances, of proved, would corroborate the testimony of the
witness as to the relevant fact which he testifies.”4

The frame of the sections is such that any questions being framed are to be asked during the
examination, so that contradictions, if any are there, may come up. However, if the cross-
examination proves to be unsuccessful, it will inevitably lead to corroboration.5
Corroboration for any evidence given by a witness may be found necessary when a court is
not inclined to reject the evidence of the witness as false, and is of the assumption that the
evidence of the witness is not sufficient alone to act upon. In such cases, to enable the court
to act, the court may seek corroboration from other independent evidence or circumstances.6

Where the evidence of the witness was corroborated by various circumstances including the
FIR, the same was held sufficient for conviction.7 This section provides for the admission of
evidence given for the purpose not of proving a directly relevant fact but of testing the
witness’ truthfulness. There is often no way of doing it other than by ascertaining the
accuracy of his evidence as to surrounding circumstances, though they are not so immediately
connected with the facts of the case so as to be themselves relevant to the case. While
important corroboration may be found in the case of an honest witness, there has to be a need
for cross-examination and exposure in the case of a false witness. In order to prepare the

3
Cunningham, Evidence, pp. 90, 91; Sir James Stephen, Introduction on Indian Evidence Act, CH.III.
4
Section 156, Indian Evidence Act.
5
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (Twenty-Fourth Edition, 2016), 1961.
6
Yudishtir v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1971 SCD 374.
7
Chandra Mohan Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1992 JLJ 129.
 8
ground for their corroboration, this sections makes the appropriate provision. This section,
in effect, declares the evidence of certain facts to be admissible. However, it is not incumbent
on a party to give corroborative evidence of a statement that has not been challenged by the
other party.

Corroboration, in order to be of value, must be on material particulars; and the fact relied on
for corroboration must be established by reliable and independent evidence. These facts must
be such as to lend assurance to the crucial issue that is in question.9 “Related is not equivalent
to interested,” it is trite law that a very close and cautious scrutiny of the evidence of such
witness though not discardable just on the ground of relationship becomes necessary and in
appropriate cases corroboration from independent source ought to be insisted upon so as to
lend assurance to the story. Also, multiplicity of witnesses is not necessary for corroboration.

ADMISSIBILITY OF FIRST INFORMATION REPORT:

The first information report is the statement of the maker of the report at the police station,
before the police officer, recorded in the manner provided by the Code of Criminal
Procedure. That statement must be admissible in evidence under the provisions of the
Evidence Act to be of use at the trial. The last portion in the first information report, the
statement of the witness is admissible under this section for as corroborating the testimony of
that witness.

SECTION 157, INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

The Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as follows: “In order to corroborate the
testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact,
at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to
investigate the fact may be proved.”10

The force of any corroboration (where it is assumed that there is some fact to be
corroborated), by means of previous consistent statements, depends upon the truth of the
proposition that he who is consistent deserves to be believed. The corroborative value,
however, of such statements is of a very varying character, depending upon the circumstance

8
Cunningham, Evidence, p. 156.
9
Sarla Devi v. Birendra Singh, AIR 1961 MP 127.
10
Section 157, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
so each case, and a person may equally persistently adhere to falsehood once uttered, if there
be a motive for it.11

It must be noted that in Bogilal Pandya v. The State of Bombay12, it has been held that
communication to another person is not an essential condition for the use of a former
statement for corroboration under this section. The term ‘statement’ has to be construed as
meaning only something which is stated and the element of communication to another person
is not essential. All that is need is that it must be recorded at or about the time when the
incident took place. Also, there is not bar to use different parts of a former statement for the
purpose of corroboration under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act in the same
proceedings.13

It is often said that a witness cannot corroborate himself.14 However, this section proves to be
an exception to that rule. Though admissible, a former statement can only be used for
corroborative and not as substantive evidence of the fact in issue. Even as corroboration, the
value of such a statement must depend always on the peculiar circumstances of each case.15

Under Section 157, IEA 1872, the testimony of a witness may be corroborated by any former
statement made by such witness relating to the same matter, at or about the time when the
fact took place or before any authority legally competent to investigate fact. The Section
cannot be invoked to let in statements made by somebody else as evidence for the purpose of
corroboration of witness examined in a case.16 This Section is not in accordance with the
English Practice, according to which the evidence of prior statements is not generally
admissible to corroborate witnesses.17 Former statements are no proof that entirely different
statements may not have been made at other times and are therefore no evidence of
consistency, that, if the sworn statements are of doubtful credibility, those made without the
sanction of an oath or its equivalent, cannot corroborate them.18 The Section, however,
proceeds upon the principle that consistency is a ground for belief in the witness’ veracity.19

11
R v. Malappabin, (1874) 11 Bom HCR 196, 198.
12
1959 Supp (1) SCR 310.
13
Raj Karan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1984) 2 Crimes 521, p.524 (All).
14
R v. Christie, [1914] Ac 545, 557.
15
GaurangaCharanMohanty v. State of Orissa, 1968 CLT 246 (SC) 252-53.
16
AmbicaCharan v. Kumed Mohan, AIR 1928 Cal. 893.
17
Wharton, Evidence, p. 570.
18
Id.
19
T Starkie, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, Seventh Edn., London, William Benning, 1829, p.253.
The Section 157, IEA 1872 works as an exception to the general rule of hearsay evidence.20
The spirit behind this provision is that if a person seeing a particular fact taking place
immediately utters something in that regard without taking time or narrates the same to some
other person before him about what has happened, the version of the person so narrating
assumes importance. In other words, if a person without coaching or tutoring by someone, or
without having much time to ponder over the matter, gives a version before another, the
statement of that person may be taken into consideration as a piece of corroboration to what
the maker of the statement has said.21

There are only two things that are essential for the Section 157 to apply in any situation.

a. First, a witness should have given testimony with respect to some fact.
b. Second, he should have made a statement earlier with respect to some fact at or about
the time when the fact took place before any authority, legally competent to
investigate the fact.

If these two essentials are satisfied, the former statement may be used to corroborate the
testimony of the witness. The former statement may be in writing, or may be made orally to
some person at or about the time when the fact took place.

Section 157, IEA 1872 allows proof of any former statement made by a witness relating to
the same fact before ‘any authority legally competent to investigate the fact’, but its use is
limited to the corroboration of the testimony of such witness. However, there are still
exceptions to this. Though a police officer is an authority legally competent to investigate any
fact related to the case, yet any statement made before the police officer during any
investigation cannot be used to corroborate the testimony of the witness because of the clear
prohibition made in the Section 162 of the Code.

There can be identified 5 principle essentials of the Section in the words the section has been
stated in the Act: Former statements, Statement, Fact, ‘At or about the Time’ and ‘Legally
Competent Authority’.

These five essentials have been discussed in detail below.

20
Sir John Woodroffe& Syed Amir Ali, Law of Evidence, Dr. V Kesava Rao (ed.), Vol. IV, 18thEdtn. 2009, 6466.
21
Rameshwar Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1984 Cr. LJ (Raj.) 650, 664.
 1. FORMER STATEMENTS

The former statements referred to in this section mean a previous statement of the witness
who is to be corroborated made on other occasion i.e. on occasion other than that which
the subsequent statement requiring corroboration was made.22 The statement, which may
be proved under this section in order to corroborate, may be statement made either on
oath or otherwise, and either in ordinary conversation or before some person who had
authority to question the person who made it. It may also be in verbal or in writing.23

2. STATEMENT

A ‘statement’ under this section means ‘something that is stated’. The word, however, has
not been defined in the act, and the other provisions do not provide a clue to its exact
connotation. That is to say, a statement is nonetheless so, even if it not be communicated
to anyone. Even the ‘notes’ prepared by a solicitor, that were the documentation of the
conversation, when produced before the court, can be considered by the Court as
evidence, and be admitted for corroboration, as had been held by the Supreme Court.24

3. FACTS

The word ‘fact’ in the section is not used in the limited sense of the ‘event, and includes a
continuing fact such as possession.25

4. ‘AT OR ABOUT THE TIME’

It must be kept in mind that the section provides an exception to the general rule
excluding hearsay evidence, and in order to bring a statement within the exception, the
duty is cast upon the prosecution to establish by clear and unequivocal evidence the
proximity of time between the taking place of the fact and the making of the statement.26
There cannot be any hard and fats rule in regards to this. The main test here is, whether
the statement was made as early as can reasonably be expected in the circumstances of
the case, and before there was any opportunity for tutoring or concoction.27

22
Harendra Kumar v. Emperor, AIR 1938 Cal 125.
23
Sheikh Ketabuddin v. Nafar Chandra, AIR 1927 Cal 230.
24
BogilalChunilal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 356.
25
Muthalagiri Reddy v. PappiNaicken, AIR 1915 Mad, 249.
26
MangatRai v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 647.
27
Supra note 21.
 5. ‘OR BEFORE ANY AUTHORITY LEGALLY COMPETENT TO INVESTIGATE THE FACT’

If the former statement was not made at or about the time when the fact took place, it
must be shown to have been made before any authority legally competent to investigate
the fact in question. These words as have been used in the Section are ‘in general’ and
‘should not be restricted to police officers’ and to ‘investigations’ in the technical sense in
which the word is used in CrPC. The words that have been used are ‘competent to
investigate’, not a case, but the ‘fact’. The words ‘legally competent’ do not mean only
competent under the express provisions of the law.28 In order that a person be legally
competent to investigate the fact, he must have power under some law, statutory or
otherwise.29 The word ‘investigation’ used in this section has no definition in the
Evidence Act, nor in the General Clauses Act, and thus its definition is not to be confined
to the definition that has been given in the Criminal Procedure Code. Rather, it must carry
its ordinary dictionary meaning in the sense of ascertainment of facts, sifting of materials,
and search for relevant data.30

CORROBORATION IN CASE OF DYING DECLARATION:

The evidence in the form of dying declaration forms a class in itself and is subjected to only
few limitations and exceptions. For a comprehensive list of salutary principles relating to
‘Dying declaration’ kindly refer to the Annual Survey for year 2014.31 It is a salutary
principle of law that the dying declaration is true and reliable,32when it has been recorded by
a person at a time when the deceased was physically and mentally fit to make such dying
declaration and it has not been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting; and it can be the
sole basis for recording conviction.33

(i) There is no reason to doubt the veracity of the dying declaration especially, since
there is consistency between them.34

28
King-Emperor v. Nilakantha, (1912) ILR 35 Mad. 247 (FB).
29
State v. PareswarGhasi, AIR 1960 Ori 20, 24.
30
Id.
31
K.S. Chauhan, “Evidence Law” XLX ASIL 603, 61
32
In such an eventuality, no corroboration is required.
33
Sandeep v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 154.
34
DasinBai v. State of Chhattisgarh (2015) 4 SCC 186.
(ii) If the truthfulness or otherwise of the dying declaration cannot be doubted, the same
alone can form the basis of conviction of an accused and the same does not require
any corroboration, whatsoever in law.35
(iii) If the dying declarations are recorded by independent witnesses and the same give a
true version of the occurrence as stated by the deceased. The dying declarations are
themselves sufficient to hold the accused guilty.36

In DasinBai v. State of Chhattisgarh,37 the Supreme Court held that merely because the
deceased suffered 70 per cent burns, this does not raise an assumption that he could not have
given the oral dying declaration. It further rejected the contention that the deceased could not
give a dying declaration and termed the same as ‘devoid of merit’. In the absence of any kind
of infirmity or inherent contradictions or inconsistency or any facet that would create a
serious doubt on the dying declaration, the court is not inclined to discard it.38

MULTIPLE DYING DECLARATIONS

In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the
dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a magistrate can be relied upon,
provided that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness.39

PERSON MAKING DYING DECLARATION SURVIVES

Where a person has made a statement, maybe in the expectation of death, but does not die,
generally it is not a dying declaration, and is not admissible under the Section 32 of the IEA
1872. However, his statement is admissible under the Section 157 of the IEA 1872, as former
statement made by him in order to corroborate his testimony in the court.40

35
Ravi v State of T.N., (2004) 10 SCC 776.
36
MafatbhaiNagarbhaiRaval v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 4 SCC 69.
37
(2015) 4 SCC 186.
38
VutukuruLakshmaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2015) 11 SCC 102.
39
Lakhan v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 154.
40
Maqsoodan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1983) 1 SCC 218, 223.