1.) Penera. vs.
COMELEC RULING:
G.R No. 181613 Nov 25, 2009
(Definition of Candidate)
Petitioner- ROSALINDA A. PENERA
Respondent -COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Sta.
Monica, Surigao Del Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former filed her certificate
of candidacy on the day before the prescribed campaign period. When she went to the
COMELEC Office for filing her party mates accompanied her. Thereafter, they had a
motorcade, which was consist of two trucks and ten motorcycles running around the
municipality convincing the residents to vote for her and the other candidates of their
political party.
Respondent’s Contention:
Due to the early campaign, private respondent filed a petition against her alleging
premature campaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says:
“Election or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for
any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
campaign period.”
Petitioner’s contention:
She argued that she is not guilty since she was not yet a candidate at that time and the
campaign period has not yet started when the motorcade was conducted.
While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, she was voted as mayor and took her
office thereafter. The COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of the
complainant and found her guilty of premature campaigning. Likewise, when she
appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision was affirmed. Subsequently, she
filed with the Supreme Court, which decided against her. It held that the conduct of the
motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political
activity, falling under Section 79 (b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code which says: “holding
political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate[.]” Furthermore, it was held that she should vacate
the position. Now, she comes for a motion for reconsideration using the same arguments.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of premature campaigning?
No.
Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that Congress
stated that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the campaign period.” So, it is lawful if done before the start of the
campaign period.
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring
for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The
second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA
9369, provides that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period
for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The immediately succeeding proviso in the
same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate
shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period." These two
provisions determine the resolution of this case.
This plain language of the law need not be construed further. Moreover, on the day of the
motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As what was decided in the Lanot Case,
which says that prior to the campaign period, even if the candidate has filed his/her
certificate of candidacy, he/she is not yet considered as a candidate for purposes other
than the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in
the first place there is no candidate to talk about. What she did was an exercise of her
freedom of expression.
DISSENTING OPINIONS:
Chico-Nazario, J:
It is obvious that the motorcade was planned to gain more votes
f r o m t h e i r constituents. Even if she was not yet a candidate at that time,
she can he held guilty of premature campaigning as an ordinary citizen committing
the prohibited act.
Abad, J:
But the fact that Penera was not yet a candidate before she actually handed in
her certificate of candidacy to the designated COMELEC official does
not exempt her from the prohibition against engaging in premature
election campaign. Section 80, which imposes the ban, states “any person,”
even a non-candidate.

Pamatong v Comelec
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Parties Involved:
 Petitioner – Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong aspirant for the presidential elections
 Respondents – COMELEC
HOW THE CASE STARTED:
 The petitioner herein filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC not the game lol jk)
on December 17, 2003. However the respondent refused to give due course to
his COC.
 The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G.
Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he
had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
 Therefore on January 15, 2004 the Petitioner moved for a MR. But the MR was
denied and the petitioner was declared as one the 36 nuisance candidates who
could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or not nominated by a political party
or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Hence this petition.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
 The petitioner argues that the resolutions made by the respondent violated his
right to “equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution by limiting the number of qualified candidates
only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties.
 Moreover Petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the
constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the
sovereign people to choose their leaders.
 He also argues that he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for
the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he
has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the
validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC.
 Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines
for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the
candidate’s bio-data and his program of government.
ISSUES
 W/N THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE?
HELD:
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office
is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises
are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the
practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical
difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated
electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate
these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly
election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary
showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political
organization and its candidates on the ballot – the interest, if no other, in avoiding
confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process]
The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it
promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum
of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the COMELEC’s Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of
candidates for national positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if
those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would
have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the
Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For the official
ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount
to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (₱450,000,000.00).
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance
of "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various
entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in every polling place,13
watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral contributions.15
Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are
dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy
becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates
standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or
capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is
not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-
note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of
the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates.
It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the
State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their
trips to the moon on gossamer wings."
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of
the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising
impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the
larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of
elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that
will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest elections.17 Moreover, the
Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The determination of bona fide candidates
is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the
Omnibus Election Code.
FALLO:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby
remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its
findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch.
H. SOHRIA PASAGI DIAMBRANG VS. COMELEC [G.R. No. 201809. Oct. 11, 2016.]
TOPIC: Registration of Voters- Definition of a candidate
Petitioner: H. Sohria Pasagi Diambrang
Respondent: COMELEC and H. Hamim Sarip Patad
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for being moot and academic.
FACTS
1. Diambrang and Patad were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Kaludan,
Nunungan, Lanao del Norte in the 25 October 2010 Barangay Elections.
2. Despite Patag getting 183 votes while Diambrang with only 78 votes, the Barangay Board
of Canvassers (BBOC) proclaimed Diambrang as the duly elected Punong Barangay based
on the assumption that Patad was disqualified for being a fugitive from justice.
a. The BBOC's assumption was based on the recommendation of the Provincial
Election Supervisor that was not yet final and executory because the COMELEC
had not issued any ruling on the matter.
3. Patad filed a petition to annul Diambrang's proclamation.
a. Neither Diambrang nor any of the members of the BBOC filed their comment.
COMELEC 2nd Division: annulled Diambrang's proclamation; Diambrang, who only obtained the
second highest number of votes in the elections, could not be declared as the winning candidate
even if Patad was disqualified.
a. The BBOC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for
basing its proclamation solely on the recommendation of the Provincial Election
Supervisor.
b. The Provincial Election Supervisor merely conducted a preliminary investigation
of the case and his recommendation was subject to review by the COMELEC.
COMELEC En Banc: annulled the proclamation of Diambrang and ordered the first ranked Barangay
Kagawad to succeed as the new Punong Barangay.
 granted the Petition to Disqualify and/or Deny Due Course to the Certificate of Candidacy
of Patad on the ground that he is a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified from running
for public office.
 Despite Patad's disqualification, Diambrang, who garnered the next highest number of
votes, could not be proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay.
 Having lost the elections, Diambrang is not entitled to be declared elected.
 The vacant position should be filled by the first ranked Kagawad pursuant to Section 44 (b)
of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE: WON Diambrang can be proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay in view of Patad's
disqualification
RULING: NO, but the case was rendered moot and academic
Second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible
should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the
time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took effect, or
a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate
of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are
stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the
elections.
Whether the certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because
a cancellation on the ground that the candidate was ineligible or not qualified to run means he was
never a candidate from the very beginning.
When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
The electorate's awareness of the candidate's disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate.
The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Patad's disqualification arose from his being a fugitive from justice.
It does not matter that the disqualification case against him was decided on a later date. Patad's
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. However, due to supervening events, Diambrang, as the
2nd placer can no longer hold office.
This case has been rendered moot by the election of a new Punong Barangay of Barangay Kaludan,
Nunungan, Lanao del Norte during the Barangay Elections.
The case had been overtaken by events due to Patad's failure to file his comment on the petition as
well as the repeated failure of the Postmaster of Lanao del Norte to respond to the Court's query
whether Patad received the Resolution requiring him to file his comment.
G.R. No. 180088 January 19, 2009
MANUEL B. JAPZON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY
Topic: Certificate of Candidacy; Qualifications
FACTS:
1. Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty were
candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
2. Japzon filed before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation.
3. Japzon argued that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9
October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a
Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino)
4. Ty eventually migrated to the USA and became a citizen thereof.
5. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years.
6. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely
represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a
permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
7. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he
never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as
required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991.
8. Even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty
continued to make trips to the USA
9. Although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by
his travel records.
10. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003, or related laws.
11. Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of
Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the latter’s Certificate of
Candidacy.
12. Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work
and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen
13. Ty argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his
American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007
elections.
14. Pending the submission of their papers, the 14 May 2007 elections were already
held and Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar
15. COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of Ty and found that Ty complied with the
requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his
Philippine citizenship (Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification
is none other than to ensure that no alien shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereto)
16. COMELEC First Division also held that Ty did not commit material
misrepresentation holding that Although Ty has lost his domicile in the
Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of
his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a
resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least
one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his
certificate of candidacy
17. OSG is of the position that Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement
set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local
elections
ISSUE: WON Ty is qualified to run as the Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar
HELD: YES. Petition is DISMISSED
RATIO:
A. RESIDENCE
 The term ‘residence’ is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to ‘dwelling’ or ‘habitation,’ but rather to ‘domicile’ or legal residence,
that is, ‘the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi)
 A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice)
 Records showed that after taking an Oath of Allegiance before the Vice Consul
of the Philippine Consulate General on October 2, 2005, Ty applied and was
issued a Philippine passport on October 26, 2005; and secured a community tax
certificate from the Municipality of General Macarthur on March 8, 2006.
 Ty was already a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar for more than one (1) year before the elections on May 14, 2007
 Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had
no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile
 He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his
domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines
 Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new
domicile of choice  The length of his residence therein shall be determined
from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the
time of his birth
B. CITIZENSHIP
 There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino  He was born and raised
in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
 On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of
the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, in accordance
with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225 (DUAL CITIZENSHIP)
 RA 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or
 retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned
natural-born Filipino
 Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office
 Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
 For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must:
 (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws; and
 (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath
 On 19 March 2007, Ty personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
before a notary public  by the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28
March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship,
keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
C. FINDINGS OF THE COMELEC
 The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence
presently before this Court, found that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections
 factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have
acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court
 An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined to
instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial
denial of due process, considering that the COMELEC is presumed to be most
competent in matters falling within its domain
 factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of
justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence
in support of such findings, should be applied with greater force when it
concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
COMELEC—created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself—
on a level higher than statutory administrative organs
 The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in
the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not
only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence
 Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion
5. Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 186006 October 16, 2009
Petitioner: Norlainie Mitmug Limbona
Respondents: COMELEC, and Malik Bobby T. Alingan
RULING: Petition DENIED
FACTS
Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Limbona) and her husband, Mohammad
Exchan Limbona (husband), filed their Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pantar, Lanao
del Norte.
Respondent Malik Alingan (Respondent) filed disqualification cases against both
Limbona and her husband on the ground that they lacked the one-year residency
requirement and both were not registered voters of Pantar.
In line with the disqualification case, petitioner executed an Affidavit of
Withdrawal of her Certificate of Candidacy, which was subsequently approved by the
COMELEC. She also filed a MTD in the disqualification case for being moot and academic.
The election was suspended for the lack of a final list of voter. While it was
suspended, COMELEC 1st Division declared Limbona’s husband disqualified as candidate.
Petitioner then filed her own Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate. Respondent
then filed again a respective petition for disqualification for the same grounds.
COMELEC 2nd Div ruled that petitioner was disqualified from running for Mayor
of Pantay. It explained that petitioners domicile of origin was Maguing, Lanao del Norte,
her birthplace. Then she became a resident of Baranggay Rapasun, Marawi when she got
married where her husband was the Baranggay Captain. COMELEC also found that she
was not even a registered voter in Pantay.
Petitioner argues that she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her origin in
Marawi City two year prior to the elections but it was supported only with self-serving
affidavits and were not corroborated by independent and competent evidence.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the 2nd Division Resolution.
Petitioner also stresses that she was actually residing and was physically present
in that municipality for almost two years prior to the May 2007 elections. She associate
and mingled with residents there, giving her ample time to know the needs, difficulties,
aspirations, and economic potential to establish permanent residency there and her intent
to abandon her domicile in Marawi City.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not COMELEC gravely erred in holding that Limbona is disqualified
for failure to comply with the 1-year residency rule– NO
RULING: Petition DENIED.
RATIO
 The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile,
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest intent of the
law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted
with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community.
For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of
intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually
resides. Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence
or domicile somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is
acquired; and third, a man can have but one domicile at a time.
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention
to abandon the old domicile. A persons domicile once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with
the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Aside from her self-serving affidavits, the court finds no other act that would
indicate respondents intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing
of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she
has chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No.
07-611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said
municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.
6 MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C.
ELAMPARO
G.R. No. 221697; March 8, 2016
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
ANTONTIO P. CONTRERAS, AND AMADO D. VALDEZ
G.R. No. 221698-700; March 8, 2016
Vitug
FACTS:
Parties Involved:
 Bienvenido O. Marquez – A defeated candidate for the position of Governor in
the Province of Quezon in the May 11, 1992 elections.
 Eduardo T. Rodriguez – Proclaimed Governor-elect for the province of Quezon in
the May 11, 1992 elections.
How the Case Started: (Talambuhay ni Grace Poe)
 Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar
(Edgardo) on 3 September 1968.
 Parental care and custody over Grace Poe was passed on by Edgardo to his
relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife.
 Emiliano reported and registered Grace Poe as a foundling with the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo).
o In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, Grace Poe was
given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."
 When Grace Poe was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a
petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City.
o The petition was granted.
o The name of Grace Poe was then changed from "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."
 Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on Grace Poe’s foundling
certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, Grace Poe's adoptive mother
discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who
handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her
adoptive parents.
o Grace Poe’s mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's
omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo.
o A new certificate of live birth was issued.
 After reaching 18 years old in 1986, Grace Poe registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City.
 On 4 April 1988, Grace Poe was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287.
 Grace Poe initially studied Development Studies in the University of the
Philippines but later left for the United States where she graduated with a
degree in Political Studies at Boston College in Chestnuts Hill.
 On 27 July 1991, Grace Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de
San Jose Parish in San Juan City.
 With the desire of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the
couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July
1991.
 While in the U.S., the Grace Poe gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian)
on 16 April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa
Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004,
respectively.
 On 18 October 2001, Grace Poe became a naturalized American citizen. She
obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.
 On 8 April 2004, Grace Poe came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to
support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections.
o She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004.
 After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, Grace Poe rushed back to
the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition.
o Her father slipped into a coma and eventually died.
 o Grace Poe stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of
her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement
of his estate.
 According to Grace Poe, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to
her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, she and
her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines
sometime in the first quarter of 2005.
 Grace Poe came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. *TAKE NOTE* This
was used as the reckoning point for Grace Poe’s Residency for her CoC for her
candidacy as President
 On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise
the disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. She
travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
 In late March 2006, Grace Poe’s husband officially informed the U.S. Postal
Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S.
*TAKE NOTE* This was the reckoning point for Grace Poe’s Residency for her
CoC for the Senate Election
o Their family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.
 In early 2006, Grace Poe and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home and to this day,
is where the couple and their children have been residing.
 On 7 July 2006, Grace Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
 Again, Grace Poe registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on
31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport
bearing the No. XX4731999.
 On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Grace Poe as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).
o Before assuming her post, Grace Poe executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig
City on 20 October 2010.
 On 12 July 2011, Grace Poe executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy
in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United
States." On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S.
Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing
her American citizenship.
 On 2 October 2012, the Grace Poe filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6
years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013.
o She obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed as
Senator.
 On 15 October 2015, Grace Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. In her COC, the Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would
be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. Grace Poe
attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship"
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October
2015.
A DAY AFTER PETITIONER FILED HER COC FOR PRESIDENT, ESTRELLA ELAMPARO
(ELAMPARO) FILED A PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR CANCEL SAID COC (G.R. No.
221697)
 It was alleged that Grace Poe committed material misrepresentations when she
stated in her CoC:
o that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
o that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.
 It was also alleged that Grace Poe cannot be considered as a natural-born
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling.
o Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born
status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. Following this line of
reasoning, Grace Poe is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with.
o Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino,
she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized
American citizen.
 IMPORTANT: On the matter of Grace Poe’s residency, Elamparo pointed out
that Grace Poe was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC
for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only 6
years and 6 months as of May 2013 Elections. (Did not reach the required 10
years)
 COMELEC CANCELLED GRACE POE’S COC
THREE SEPARATE PETITIONS WERE FILED BY FRANCISCO TATAD, ANTONIO CONTRERAS,
AND AMADO VALDEZ WITH THE COMELEC FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION OF GRACE POE
(G.R. No. 221698-700)
 They averred that:
o The Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of
unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered
natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative
of natural-born status.
o Grace Poe cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born
citizens and Grace Poe was not as she was a foundling.
o Referring to Grace Poe’s COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did
not comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement. Tatad
opined that Grace Poe acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from
 the time she renounced her American citizenship which was
sometime in 2010 or 2011.
 SIMILARLY, THE COMELEC CANCELLED GRACE POE’S COC.
ISSUE:
WoN Grace Poe passed the requirement for the 10 year residency. – YES
 The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years'
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, Grace Poe must have
been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In
answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11
months" which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a
beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
 When Grace Poe immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original
domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a
new domicile:
o Residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
o an intention to remain there; and
o an intention to abandon the old domicile.
 The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
 Grace Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good.
 These pieces of evidence include:
o former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her
return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad
o e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September
2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their
household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the
Philippines;
o e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how
to ship their dog to the Philippines;
o school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine
schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years;
o tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for
condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their
corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006;
o receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the
U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family;
March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request
for change of address;
o final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company
showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-
up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner
indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005;
o affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with
affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from
petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided
to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in
the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).
 The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that Grace
Poe actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it
was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile
could be established only from Grace Poe’s repatriation under R.A. No.
9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality,
Grace Poe had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently,
on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
WoN Grace Poe is to be considered a natural-born citizen. – YES (Quick ruling
lang since ang topic ay residency)
 there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being
shown in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from
the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality
wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos,
consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are
Filipinos.
 The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born-
citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the
foundlings to be natural born citizens.
 Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born
citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered
and supported by the UN Convention Law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-
001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in
the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled
Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position
of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11
December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for
President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
7. CHUA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216607
PETITIONER: ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IMELDA E. FRAGATA, and KRYSTLE MARIE C.
BACANI,
TOPIC: QUALIFICATIONS of a CANDIDATE
DOCTRINE: Dual citizens are disqualified from running for any elective local position. They cannot
successfully run and assume office because their ineligibility is inherent in them, existing prior to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy. Their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio, and votes cast
for them will be disregarded. Consequently, whoever garners the next highest number of votes
among the eligible candidates is the person legally entitled to the position.
FACTS:
1. Action taken by the respondent to annul the resolution of COMELEC declaring CHUA as
councilor of the 4th district of Manila during the 2013 elections and subsequently asking
the court to declare private respondent BACANI as councilor for having garnered the next
higher number of votes.
2. On October 3, 2012, (Chua) filed her COC for Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila
during the 2013 National and Local Elections. The Fourth District of Manila is entitled to six
(6) seats in the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
3. After the conduct of elections, Chua garnered the sixth highest number of votes. She was
proclaimed by the Board of Canvasser.
ACTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION AGAINST CHUA was FILED BY FRAGATA:
4. On the date of Chua’s proclamation, however, Fragata filed a Petition captioned as a
"petition to declare Chua as a nuisance candidate” and "to deny due course and/or cancel
her Certificate of Candidacy."
5. Fragata was allegedly a registered voter in the Fourth District13 who claimed that Chua
was unqualified to run for Councilor on two grounds: Chua was not a Filipino citizen, and
she was a permanent resident of the United States of America. That prior to the filing of
her candidacy, [Chua] has been living in the United States of America (USA) for at least 33
years.
6. That she is an immigrant and was validly issued a Green Card by the Government of the
USA who resided and continues to reside in Georgia USA and practices as a Nurse in the
said state since 1990. She prays for Chua’s disqualification.
7. Answering the Petition, Chua contended that she was a natural-born Filipino, born to
Filipino parents in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. With respect to her residency, Chua
alleged that she had been residing in Sampaloc, Manila since 2008 and had more than
complied with the one-year period required to run for Councilor.
8. According to Chua, Fragata’s Petition was belatedly filed, whether it was treated as one
for declaration of a nuisance candidate or for denial of due course or cancellation of
certificate of candidacy. Fragata filed her Petition on May 15, 2013, which was beyond five
(5) days from October 5, 2012, the last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy. The
Petition was also filed beyond 25 days from October 3, 2012, the date Chua filed her
Certificate of Candidacy.
9. Chua stressed that she had already been proclaimed on May 15, 2013, the same date that
Fragata filed her Petition; hence, Fragata’s proper remedy was to file a petition for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Chua prayed that the
Commission dismiss Fragata’s Petition.
BACANI (respondent) INTERVENED, prays to be proclaimed should CHUA gets disqualified because
she ranked the next highest votes to CHUA.
10. Bacani intervened and alleged that she likewise ran for Councilor in the Fourth District of
Manila, and that after the canvassing of votes, she ranked seventh among all the
candidates, next to Chua.Should Chua be disqualified, Bacani claimed that she should be
proclaimed Councilor following this Court’s ruling in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections.
11. Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual citizen, was unqualified to run for Councilor.Based
on an Order of the Bureau of Immigration, Chua was allegedly naturalized as an American
citizen on December 7, 1977. She was issued an American passport34 on July 14, 2006.
12. Chua took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 21, 2011.
13. Nonetheless, Chua allegedly continued on using her American passport, specifically on 2
dates in 2012 and in 2013. Moreover, Chua did not execute an oath of renunciation of her
American citizenship.
CHUA’S ARGUMENTS:
14. Chua argued that the Motion was a belatedly filed petition to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, having been filed after the day of the elections.
15. According to Chua, the Motion should not even be considered since she was already
proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers. Thus, Chua prayed that the Motion to Intervene
be denied and expunged from the records of the case.
COMELEC’s 2ND DIVISION’S RULING:
 Found out that Chua was a dual citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy.
 Consequently, she was ineligible to run for Councilor and was correctly considered a non-
candidate.
 All the votes casted in Chua’s favor were correctly disregarded, resulting in Bacani
garnering the next highest number of votes.Following Maquiling, the Commission argues
that Bacani was validly proclaimed as Councilor, and, contrary to Chua’s claim, the rule on
succession under Section 45 of the Local Government Code did not apply, with the
disqualifying circumstance existing prior to the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy.
CHUA files an MR but it was denied. She further argues she was already proclaimed as a duly elected
Councilor. Assuming that she was ineligible to run for office, this created a permanent vacancy in the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, which was to be filled according to the rule on succession under Section 45
of the Local Government Code, and not by proclamation of the candidate who garnered the next
highest number of votes.
 Chua maintains that Fragata belatedly filed her Petition before the Commission on
Elections. Since Fragata filed a Petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of
candidacy, it should have been filed within five (5) days from the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy, but not later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy assailed. Fragata filed the Petition on May 15, 2013, more than 25
days after Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy on October 3, 2012. The Commission on
Elections, therefore, should have outright dismissed Fragata’s Petition.
 COMELEC DENIES the MR.
 Although Chua was already proclaimed, the Commission on Elections argues that "the will
of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified." Fragata, Bacani,
and the Commission on Elections pray that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition be
dismissed.
ISSUES:
I - WON the PETITION of FRAGATA was one for disqualification and if it was timely filed. (YES)
II- WON the annulment of Chua’s proclamation and the subsequent proclamation of BACALTOS
should be upheld (YES)
FIRST ISSUE:
In her Petition, private respondent Fragata did not argue that petitioner made a false material
representation in her Certificate of Candidacy; she asserted that petitioner was a permanent resident
disqualified to run for Councilor under Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Private respondent
Fragata’s Petition, therefore, was a petition for disqualification.
 Private respondent Fragata alleges in her Petition that petitioner is a permanent resident
in the United States, a green card holder who, prior to the filing of her Certificate of
Candidacy for Councilor, has resided in the State of Georgia for 33 years. She anchors her
Petition on Section 40 of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies permanent
residents of a foreign country from running for any elective local position
 SECTION 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position: (Local Government Code)
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
 It is true that under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, persons who file their
certificates of candidacy declare that they are not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country. Therefore, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy may likewise be filed against a permanent resident of a foreign country seeking
an elective post in the Philippines on the ground of material misrepresentation in the
certificate of candidacy.93
 What remedy to avail himself or herself of, however, depends on the petitioner. If the false
material representation in the certificate of candidacy relates to a ground for
disqualification, the petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to deny due course or
cancel a certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification, so long as the petition
filed complies with the requirements under the law.94
 Before the Commission on Elections, private respondent Fragata had a choice of filing
either a petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner’s certificate of candidacy or a
petition for disqualification.
 It follows that private respondent Fragata timely filed her Petition before the Commission
on Elections. Under Rule 25, Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, a
petition for disqualification "shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates
of candidacy, but not later that the date of proclamation."
 Private respondent Fragata filed her Petition on the date of petitioner’s proclamation on
May 15, 2013. In addition, the Commission on Elections correctly admitted private
respondent Bacani’s pleading-in-intervention
SECOND ISSUE:
CHUA was a dual citizen when she filed her COC. Moreover, her failure to renounce her foreign
citizenship disqualifies her from being elected into office. Oath of Allegiance and sworn personal
renunciation of foreign citizenship are both different documents.

It was on September 21, 2011 when petitioner took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, thus reacquiring her Filipino citizenship.

From September 21, 2011 up to the present, however, petitioner failed to execute a sworn
and personal renunciation of her foreign citizenship particularly required of those seeking
elective public office. Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003 provides:
SECTION 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath[.]
 Petitioner cannot claim that she has renounced her American citizenship by taking the
Oath of Allegiance. The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of
foreign citizenship are separate requirements, the latter being an additional requirement
for qualification to run for public office.
 With petitioner’s failure to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy
on October 3, 2012. Under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, she was disqualified
to run for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and Local
Elections.
The proclamation of Bacani was correct. The argument of Chua contending that section 45 of LGC, rule
on succession does not apply in the case;
The rule on succession under Section 45, however, would not apply if the permanent vacancy was
caused by one whose certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. Specifically with respect to dual
citizens, their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio because they possess "a substantive
[disqualifying circumstance] . . . [existing] prior to the filing of their certificate of
candidacy."103 Legally, they should not even be considered candidates. The votes casted for them
should be considered stray and should not be counted
SECTION 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. – (a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian
where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the
following manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities[.]
 The permanent vacancies referred to in Section 45 are those arising "when an elective
local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office."101 In these situations, the vacancies were caused by
those whose certificates of candidacy were valid at the time of the filing "but subsequently
had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment
that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy."
 In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab initio certificates of candidacy, the
person legally entitled to the vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the
next highest number of votes among those eligible.
 In this case, it is private respondent Bacani who is legally entitled to the position of
Councilor, having garnered the sixth highest number of votes among the eligible
candidates. The Commission on Elections correctly proclaimed private respondent Bacani
in lieu of petitioner.
Petitioner may have garnered more votes than private respondent Bacani. She may have already been
proclaimed. Nevertheless, elections are more than a numbers game. Hence, in Maquiling:
 The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates.
 When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain
disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate.
 When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number
of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
 To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election
laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed
worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
8. PAPANDAYAN v COMELEC
[GR No. 147909, 16 April 2002]
PETITIONER: Mauyag Papandayan Jr.
RESPODENT: COMELEC and Fahida Balt
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
 May 2001- 3 candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur -
Petitioner Mauyan Papandayan, Jr., Respondent Fahida Balt, the incumbent
mayor seeking reelection, and Maiko Hassan Bantuas.
 Respondent sought the disqualification of petitioner alleging that the latter was
not a resident of Brgy Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent
resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
RESPONDENT BALT’S CONTENTIONS
 Submitted the joint affidavits of Brgy Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga and 2
members of the Sangguniang Brgy of Tangcal, Tubaran, Hadji Taher Batawe and
Saadori Buat, stating that petitioner never resided in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran
as they personally knew all the registered voters of the said brgy
 Petitioner made misrepresentations in claiming that he filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Tubaran in the May 11, 1998 elections and that he was a
registered voter in the May 11, 1998 election
PETITIONER PAPANDAYAN’S CONTENTIONS
 He was a resident of No. 13 Brgy Tangcal in Tubaran
 In 1990, he transferred his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there
with his wife Raina Guina Dimaporo, whose family and relatives were residents
and natives of Tangcal, Tubaran;
RULING OF COMELEC 2ND DIV : IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT BALT
 Issued May 08 2001 resolution declaring petitioner to be disqualified and
ordered his name to be stricken off the list of candidates and all votes cast in his
favor not to be counted but considered as stray votes.
 It was the fact of petitioner’s residence, not the statement in his certificate of
candidacy, which determined whether or not he had satisfied the residency
requirement
 Petitioner was living in Marawi City where he was the private secretary of Mayor
Ampatua, thus he never intended to relinquish his former domicile in Bayang
THEREAFTER, THE MAY 2001 ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN TUBARAN AND PETITIONER WAS
AMONG THOSE VOTED BY THE ELECTORATE FOR THE POSITION OF MUNICIPAL MAYOR
 Petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC 1st Div to direct the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI) of Tubaran to count and tally the ballots cast in his
favor during the elections pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 which
provides:
o where the ground for the disqualification case is by reason of non-
residence, citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous
 cases and on the day of the election the resolution has not become final
and executory, the BEI shall tally and count the votes of such disqualified
candidate
 Respondent filed a pre-proclamation case in the COMELEC
RULING OF COMELEC 1ST DIV
 Issued an order suspending the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected
mayor of Tubaran
 Despite the said order, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tubaran proceeded
with the proclamation of petitioner.
 However, upon motion of respondent, it ordered to set aside the proclamation
of petitioner
RULING COMELEC EN BANC
 Issued a resolution sustaining the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner
 JUST IN CASE
ISSUE: WON petitioner failed to comply with the residency requirement for elective
positions and therefore is disqualified to run as an elective official
HELD: NO.
 Petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of the
Bayang, he later transferred residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran
as shown by his actual and physical presence for 10 years prior to the May 2001
elections.
 PROOF OF ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain)
o When petitioner and his wife got married in 1990, they resided in
Tangcal, Tubaran which petitioner deemed to be the place of his
conjugal abode with his wife.
o The fact that he and his wife transferred residence from Bayang to
Tubaran shows that petitioner was relinquishing his former place of
residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to be his place of
domicile.
o Although petitioner worked as a private secretary of the mayor of
Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work.
 (1) The continuous verification of household members in Tubaran showing that
petitioner and his wife were members of household No. 13 in Barangay Tangcal,
Tubaran, (2) petitioner co- owning an agricultural land in Tubaran; and (3) Hadji
Bashir Ayonga and Samoranao Sarip retracting their previous affidavits which
they had earlier executed bolsters petitioner’s claim that he was indeed a
resident of Tubaran since 1990
 affidavit as he did not understand the consequences of signing the said affidavit
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolution of the
COMELEC (Second Division), dated May 8, 2001, disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B.
Papandayan, Jr. as a candidate for municipal mayor in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, and the
resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued is made PERMANENT.
GOOD TO KNOW CONCEPTS
PRINCIPLE OF ANIMUS REVERTENDI (INTENT TO RETURN)
 Used to determine whether a candidate has an intention to return to the place
where he seeks to be elected and whether there has been an abandonment of
his former residence, which signifies an intention to depart therefrom
REQUSITES IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE A NEW DOMICILE BY CHOICE
1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality
2. An intention to remain there
3. An intention to abandon the old domicile
There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi
 The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at
the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
PROOFS PRESENTED BY PETITIONER
1. Affidavit of Municipal Election Officer stating that, based on the continuous
verification of household members in Tubaran, petitioner and his wife lived at
No. 13 Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran
2. Affidavit of Witness (Chairman of BEI) stating that he personally received the
Voter Registration Record of petitioner whom he knew to be a resident of
Tubaran
3. Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of petitioner stating that his place of birth
was Marawi City and that his length of residency in the Philippines was 36 years
and 10 months
4. Affidavit of Witness of brother of petitioner’s wife stating that his family and the
family of petitioner were residents of Tangcal, Tubaran
5. Affidavit of Witness of one Sobair Tagtal, stating that he was a farmer and one
of the share tenants of an agricultural land located in Tubaran, co-owned by
petitioner and the latters siblings
6. Certification by Election Officer in Bayang, Lanao del Sur, certifying that
petitioner was not registered as a voter of Bayang in the May 11, 1998 and May
14, 2001 elections
7. Affidavit of Desistance of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, stating that he was withdrawing
the joint affidavit as he did not understand the consequences of signing the said
affidavit and its contents had not been explained to him and that he did not
know that the affidavit would be used in a disqualification case against
petitioner
8. Affidavit of Desistance of Samoranao Sarip, stating that he was withdrawing the
and its contents had not been explained to him
TORAYNO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137329. August 9, 2000
Petitioners: ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M. SERIO
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, VICENTE Y. EMANO
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.

RULING: Petition DISMISSED
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec Resolutions AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
FACTS
 During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed
provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor
of the province. His Certificate of Candidacy declares his residence is in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental.
 While still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration
Record in Cagayan de Oro City (within the Province of Misamis Oriental), in which he
claimed 20 years of residence.
 March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating that
his residence for the preceding 2 years and 5 months was at 1409 San Jose Street,
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
 Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998 was Erasmo B. Damasing,
counsel of petitioners.
 Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno, Sr., Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serino, all
residents of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec, seeking the
disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly
failed to meet the 1-year residence requirement.
 Prior to this petition, Comelec proclaimed Emano as the duly elected mayor.
 Thus, petitioners filed another Petition for quo warrant, seeking the (1) the
annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2) the proclamation of Erasmo
B. Damasing, who had garnered the next highest number of votes, as the duly
elected mayor of the city.
 Comelec First Division: Denied the Petition for Disqualification
 Comelec En Banc: Upheld the findings of the First Division
 Records clearly show that the respondent is an actual resident of CDO City for
such a period of time necessary to qualify him to run for mayor
 Respondent has a house in the city which has been existing since 1973 and
where his family has been living since then
 Nothing in the law bars an elected provincial official from residing and/or
registering as a voter in a highly urbanized city whose residents are not given the
right to vote for and be elected to a position in the province embracing such
highly urbanized city as long as he has complied with the requirements
prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter.
Petitioners’ Contention
 Respondent maintains his domicile in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, not in CDO as he
had run and won as governor of the province of Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive
terms immediately preceding the 1998 elections.
 In discharging his duties as provincial governor, private respondent remained a
resident of the province.
 Residence is a continuing qualification that an elective official must possess
throughout his term.
 The ff. were not sufficient to constitute change in domicile: (1) Having a house in CDO
City (2) residing therein while exercising one’s office as governor (3) securing a
residence certificate and registering as voter.
Private Respondent Emano’s Contention
 He actually and physically resided in CDO City while serving as provincial governor for
three consecutive terms, since the seat of the provincial government was located at
the heart of that city.
 One’s choice of domicile is a matter of intention, and it is the person concerned who
would be in the best position to make a choice. He decided to adopt CDO as his place
of residence after the May 1995 elections. During 1997, (1) he secured his Community
Tax Certificate stating Gusa, CDO as his residence (2) he registered as voter in Gusa,
CDO City.
 Sanctity of the people’s will, as expressed in the election result, must be respected.
ISSUE
WON private respondent had duly established his residence in CDO at least 1 year prior
to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof?
YES. Respondent has satisfied the residency requirement and is qualified to run for
mayor of CDO City.
RATIO
Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides for the qualifications of local
elective officials as follows:
“SEC. 39. Qualifications. —(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino
or any other local language or dialect.”
Geographically, the provincial Office is in the heart of CDO City
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized
city whose voters cannot participate in the provincial elections. Such political subdivisions
and voting restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of parity in representation.
The classification of an area as a highly urbanized or independent component city, for that
matter, does not completely isolate its residents, politics, commerce and other businesses
from the entire province—and vice versa —especially when the city is located at the very
heart of the province itself, as in this case.
Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a
geographical part of the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more
important, it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, the
provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein;
much less, getting acquainted with its concerns and interests.
Respondent Emano satisfies the residency requirement
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually
been residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, CDO City, in a house he had bought in 1973.
Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis
Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was
located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. These facts indubitably
prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time
sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein.
Questioning Emano’s qualification as governor of Misamis Oriental
To petitioners’ argument that Emano could not have continued to qualify as provincial
governor if he was indeed a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue
before this Court is whether Emano’s residence in the city qualifies him to run for and be
elected as mayor, not whether he could have continued sitting as governor of the
province. There was no challenge to his eligibility to continue running the province; hence,
this Court cannot make any pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due process
prevent us from adjudging matters not properly brought to us.
Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate
There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the people
of Cagayan de Oro City. He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes. In any action involving
the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost
effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority,
for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are
the choice of the majority.
Alberto vs. Comelec provides “election cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.”
Perez vs COMELEC G.R. No. 133944. October 28, 1999
TOPIC: Disqualifications
Petitioner: MARCITA MAMBA PEREZ
Respondents: COMELEC and RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO
RULING: Petition is DISMISSED
FACTS
March 26, 1998: Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Third
District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Petitioner’s Allegations
March 30, 1998: Perez, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of Aguinaldo as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident
of the district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as required
by Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution.
Perez presented:
 Aguinaldo’s certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and
1995 elections
 Voter's affidavit which he used in the 1987, 1988, 1992, 1995, and 1997 elections; and
his voter registration record dated June 22, 1997
In all of which it is stated that Aguinaldo is a resident of Barangay Calaoagan Dackel,
Municipality of Gattaran, which is outside the Third District of Cagayan. She alleged that
Aguinaldo filed an application for the transfer of his registration as voter from Gattaran,
Cagayan (First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (Third District) only on December 17, 1997
and that said application was approved only on January 7, 1998. Perez prayed that in the
event the case was not finally decided before the elections and Aguinaldo obtained the
highest number of votes, the latter's proclamation be suspended.
Aguinaldo’s Answer
He claimed that while he had been a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan in 1990, he transferred
his residence to Tuguegarao, Cagayan by renting an apartment at No. 13-E Magallanes St.,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in order to hide his mistress from public view because, at that time,
his marriage to his former wife was still subsisting.
 He presented the affidavit of the owner of the apartment, Engineer Alfredo
Ablaza, in which it is stated that he had been his lessee since July 1990.
 He also presented the contract of lease of another residential apartment at
Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June
30, 1996, between him, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor;
 his marriage license dated January 7, 1997;
 the marriage certificate between him and his present wife, Lerma Dumaguit,
dated January 18, 1998;
 the birth certificate of their daughter, Geniah Laureen D. Aguinaldo;
 and various letters, all of which show that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan for at least one (1) year before the May 11, 1998 elections.
May 10, 1998: the First Division of the COMELEC dismissed the petition for
disqualification, finding Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District
of Cagayan.
May 11, 1998: Aguinaldo was elected Representative of the Third District of Cagayan, with
65,058 votes over his rival Manuel N. Mamba's 58,507 votes. Accordingly, on May 16,
1998, he was proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office.
May 22, 1998: Perez filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating her allegation that
Aguinaldo lacked the requisite residency in the Third District of Cagayan and arguing that
the proclamation of Aguinaldo was not a legal impediment to the continuation of the
hearing on her motion in view of R.A. No. 6646, §6.
June 11, 1998: motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc
Private Respondent’s Contentions
 The instant petition should be dismissed. After his proclamation on May 16, 1998 and
his assumption of office on June 30, 1998, the COMELEC lost jurisdiction to pass upon
his qualifications for the office of Representative.
 This case should have been filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Petitioner’s Contentions
 COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that private respondent
had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan since July 1990 when he rented an
apartment there in order to hide his mistress.
 Transfer of residence to the place where private respondent is keeping his mistress
cannot amount to a change of domicile because one's domicile is the place where
one and one's legitimate family resides.
 Aguinaldo could not have changed his residence to Tuguegarao in 1990 considering
that his certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and
1995 elections, as well as his voter registration records, the latest of which was
made on June 22, 1997, indicate that he is a resident of Gattaran, which is in the First
District of Cagayan.
 In the absence of clear and positive proof, one's domicile of origin should be deemed
to continue and that to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must prove an
actual change of domicile, a bonafide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and of establishing a new one, and unequivocal acts which correspond
with the intention.
 COMELEC retained jurisdiction over the case because she filed the petition for
disqualification on March 30, 1998, before the elections on May 11, 1998, and that
pursuant to R.A. No. 6646, §6, the COMELEC could continue the proceedings for the
determination of the disqualification of private respondent.
RA No. 6646, Section 6
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
(COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
ISSUE: W/N the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for certiorari and
eventually pass upon private respondent's eligibility for the office of Representative of
the Third District of Cagayan.
RULING: NO. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for
disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed.
The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation
of Aguinaldo barred further consideration of petitioner's action. Also, considering that at the
time of the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, Aguinaldo was already a member of the
House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the same.
RATIO
Pursuant to Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of Aguinaldo’s
ineligibility.
Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: The use of the word "sole"
emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred.
Petitioner's remedies should have been:
1. to reiterate her prayer in the petition for disqualification, and move for the
issuance of an order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private
respondent pending the hearing of the said petition and, in the event the motion
was denied before the proclamation of private respondent, file a petition
for certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin the
proclamation of private respondent; or
2. to file a petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal within ten (10) days after the proclamation of private respondent as
Representative-elect on May 16, 1998.
Obviously, neither of these remedies can be availed of now.
ASSUMING THAT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION: No merit in petitioner's allegation that
private respondent is ineligible for the office of Representative of the Third District of
Cagayan.
Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Aquino v. COMELEC
The place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law.
PURPOSE OF RESIDENY REQUIREMENT
Gallego vs. Vera: To exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain.
COMELEC found that private respondent changed his residence from Gattaran to
Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990. There is thus substantial evidence
supporting the finding that Aguinaldo had been a resident of the Third District of Cagayan
and there is nothing in the record to detract from the merit of this factual finding.
Also, the fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not
domiciled in another district. The registration of a voter in a place other than his residence
of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.
Under the law, what is required for the election of governor is residency in the province,
not in any district or municipality, one year before the election.
In this case, considering the purpose of the residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the
person elected is familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency, there can be
no doubt that Aguinaldo is qualified, having been governor of the entire province of
Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election as Representative of that province's
Third District.
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC: It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate
of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
In this case, although Aguinaldo declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to the May
11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was
actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11,
1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he had been
a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor
from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his
residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the province of Cagayan.
When the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive
and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be
thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be
respected.
ARNADO v COMELEC
J. Del Castillo
PARTIES INVOLVED
 ROMMEL ARNADO: natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine
citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of USA; mayoral candidate
of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte
 LINOG BALUA: Another mayoral candidate who file petition for
disqualification against Arnado.
HOW THE CASE STARTED
 In preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines,
Arnado applied for REPATRIATION UNDER RA 9225 before the Consul
General of Philippines in San Francisco, USA
 He took OATH OF ALLEGIANCE to the Republic of the Philippines on July
10, 2008.
 After which, an ORDER OF APPROVAL OF CITIZENSHIP RENTENTION
AND REACQUISITION was issued in his favor
 On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an AFFIDAVIT OF RENUNCIATION of
his foreign citizenship.
 After having executed an affidavit of renunciation, Arnado filed his
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte for May 10, 2010 elections
AFTER ARNADO FILED HIS COC, Balua filed a PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ARNADO
and/or to CANCEL HIS COC.
 Ground for disqualification: Arnado remained a US citizen because he
continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the
Philippines after executing an Affidavit of Renunciation
 (THOUGHT PROCESS: Apparently, once a person executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation, he or she is no longer allowed to use any passport
other than the Philippine passport. In this case, Balua alleged that
Arnado still used his US passport despite having executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation)
WHILE BALUA’S PETITION REMAINED PENDING, MAY 10, 2010 ELECTIONS
PROCEEDED WHERE ARNADO GARNERED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES
AND WAS PROCLAIMED THE WINNING CANDIDATE
MAIN ARGUMENT OF ARNADO
 Based on the notarial register of Atty. Thomas Quijano, it revealed that
he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on
November 30, 2009.
 With this, at the time he filed his COC on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen of
the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other country and,
therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013
elections

RULING OF COMELEC 1st DIVISION ON DISQUALIFICATION OF ARNADO
 Arnado’s continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April
3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
 Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply
with the requirements of RA 9225.
 It likewise NULLIFIED Arnado’s proclamation
 Since Arnado is disqualified, the rule on succession should be followed
 NOTE: Arnado filed an MR to which Maquiling intervened.
RULING OF COMELEC EN BANC
 REVERSED the ruling of COMELEC 1st Division.
 Arnado’s use of his US passport did not operate to revert his status to
dual citizenship
 The COMELEC En Banc found merit in Arnado’s explanation that he
continued to use his US passport because he did not yet know that he
had been issued a Philippine passport at the time of the relevant foreign
trips.
 COMELEC likewise noted that after Arnado received his Philippine
passport, he use it for his subsequent trips.
ISSUES
 WON Balua’s petition for disqualification was seasonably filed.
 WON Arnado’s use of his US Passport after having executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation is tantamount to non-reversion of his status as Filipino
citizen.
 If in affirmative, WON Arnado is disqualified to run for mayoralty post on
the ground of citizenship.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
YES. THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WAS SEASONABLY FILED ON MAY
10, 2013.
 RULE: As provided in Section 3, Rule 25 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
a petition for disqualification should be filed “any day after the last day
for filing of COC but not later than the date of proclamation”
 IN THIS CASE: Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May
14, 2013. With this, any disqualification case against Arnado may be filed
until May 14, 2013. Since Balua file a petition for disqualification on May
10, 2013, such petition was seasonably filed.
SECOND ISSUE
YES. CONTINUED USE OF US PASSPORT IS TANTAMOUNT TO NULLITY OF
AFFIDAVIT OF RENUNCIATION. THUS, A NON- REVERSION ARNADO’S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP
 RULE: As provided in the novel case of Maquiling v COMELEC, the use of
a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of
renunciation
 IN THIS CASE: Arnado’s continued usage of his US Passport on his
foreign trips after he has executed an Affidavit of Renunciation is
tantamount to repudiation of such renunciation
THIRD ISSUE
YES. ARNADO IS DISQUALIFIED FOR HE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE SECOND
REQUIREMENT BEFORE A DUAL CITIZEN BE ALLOWED TO RUN FOR A PUBLIC
OFFICE
 RULE: A dual citizen may run for public office provided the following
requirements are met:
a. meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws; and
b. make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC
 IN THIS CASE: Arnado failed to comply with the second requirement of
RA 9225. At the time Arnado file his COC for purposes of May 13, 2013
elections, Arnado had yet to comply with the second requirement.
 After Arnado filed his Affidavit of Renunciation on April 3, 2009,
he still used his US Passport. As a result, his Affidavit of
Renunciation was negated and therefore, he fails to comply
with the citizenship requirement.
CONCURRING OPINION OF J. SERENO
 While citizenship is a continuing requirement, that must be possessed
not only at the time of election or assumption of office, but also during
the entire tenure of the official, it is not a continuing disqualification to
run for and hold public office
 Arnado subjected his citizenship to attack when he continued to use his
United States (US) passport to travel in and out of the country despite
previously renouncing his US citizenship
DISSENTING OPINION OF J. BRION
  While seemingly allowing dual citizenship for naturalborn Filipino
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens in a foreign country, carry the implicit effect of
renouncing their foreign citizenship and allegiance because of the
renewed allegiance that is accorded to the supreme authority of the
Republic
 Since the latest oath that the person takes is one of allegiance to the
Republic, whatever treatment the foreign country may have on his or
her status is a matter outside the concern and competence of the
Philippine government
 the oath of allegiance taken under RA 9225 entitles a person to enjoy full
civil and political rights that include the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the government
 By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship
 To be voted upon to an elective office, however, a natural-born Filipino
citizen who has implicitly renounced foreign allegiance when he or she
swears allegiance to the Republic under RA No. 9225 must still make his
or her previous implicit renunciation “express.” In the words of the law,
he must “make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship.”
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OF J. LEONEN
 The effect of reacquisition is the restoration of Philippine citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have been naturalized as citizens in a
foreign country. All that is required to retain their citizenship is to take
the oath of allegiance under the law.
 RA 9225 restores full civil and political rights to those who wish to
reacquire their citizenship, including the right to vote and be voted for
 the use of a foreign passport should not by itself cause the immediate
nullity of one’s affidavit of renunciation since the reason why Arnado
used his American passport because he had not yet been issued his
Philippine passport.
- Thus, his isolated use of his American passport when he did not yet
have his Philippine passport is not sufficient cause to negate his
Affidavit of Renunciation
 Election laws must be interpreted to give effect to the will of the people.
- Since Arnado garnered 84% of the total votes, it manifests that the
will of the voters are clearly reflected.
GOOD TO KNOW CONCEPTS
 Under Local Government Code, a person with “dual citizenship” is
disqualified from running for any elective local position
 However, in the case of Mercado v Manzano, it clarified that dual
citizenship refers to dual allegiance.
G.R. No. 105436. June 2, 1994.
ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and KRYSTLE
MARIE C. BACANI
Topic: Certificate of Candidacy; Qualifications
FACTS:
On October 3, 2012, Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua (Chua) filed her Certificate of
Candidacy6 for Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila during the May 13, 2013 National
and Local Elections. The Fourth District of Manila is entitled to six (6) seats in the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. Chua garnered the sixth highest number of votes.8 She was
proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers on May 15, 2013.
On the date of Chua’s proclamation, however, Imelda E. Fragata (Fragata) filed a
Petition10 captioned as a "petition to declare [Chua] as a nuisance candidate"11 and "to
deny due course and/or cancel [Chua’s] Certificate of Candidacy." Fragata was allegedly a
registered voter in the Fourth District13 who claimed that Chua was unqualified to run for
Councilor on two grounds: Chua was not a Filipino citizen, and she was a permanent
resident of the United States of America. Lastly, she prayed for Chua to be disqualified as
a candidate for the position of councilor in the Fourth District of the City of Manila.
Chua contended that she was a natural-born Filipino, born to Filipino parents in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.17 With respect to her residency, Chua alleged that she had
been residing in Sampaloc, Manila since 200818 and had more than complied with the one-
year period required to run for Councilor. Fragata’s Petition was belatedly filed, whether
it was treated as one for declaration of a nuisance candidate or for denial of due course or
cancellation of certificate of candidacy. Fragata filed her Petition on May 15, 2013, which
was beyond five (5) days from October 5, 2012, the last day of the filing of certificates of
candidacy.23 The Petition was also filed beyond 25 days from October 3, 2012,24 the date
Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy. Lastly, she argued that she was already been
proclaimed on May 15, 2013 and Fragrata’s petition be dismissed.
On June 19, 2013, Bacani filed a Motion to Intervene with Manifestation and Motion to
Annul Proclamation. Bacani alleged that she likewise ran for Councilor in the Fourth
District of Manila, and that after the canvassing of votes, she ranked seventh among all
the candidates, next to Chua. Should Chua be disqualified, Bacani claimed that she should
be proclaimed Councilor. Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual citizen, was unqualified to
run for Councilor. Based on an Order of the Bureau of Immigration, Chua was allegedly
naturalized as an American citizen on December 7, 1977. She was issued an American
passport on July 14, 2006. Lastly, she prayed that the Commission on Elections annul
Chua’s proclamation.
Chua argued that the Motion was a belatedly filed petition to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, having been filed after the day of the elections. According to
Chua, the Motion should not even be considered since she was already proclaimed by the
Board of Canvassers. Thus, Chua prayed that the Motion to Intervene be denied and
expunged from the records of the case.
COMELEC: Bacani had a legal interest in the matter in litigation, it allowed Bacani’s Motion
to Intervene. Should Fragata’s Petition be granted, the votes for Chua would not be
counted. In effect, Bacani would garner the sixth highest number of votes among the
qualified candidates, which would earn her a seat in the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila.
Fragata’s Petition, the Commission on Elections held that it was one for disqualification,
regardless of the caption stating that it was a petition to declare Chua a nuisance
candidate. The Petition alleged a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, specifically, that Chua was a permanent resident in the United States.
Rule 25, Section 3 of the Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure governed the period
for its filing. Under the Rules, a petition for disqualification should be filed "any day after
the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of the
proclamation." Fragata filed the Petition within this period, having filed it on the date of
Chua’s proclamation on May 15, 2013.
Considering that Chua is a dual citizen, Commission held that Chua was disqualified to run
for Councilor pursuant to Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Consequently, Chua’s
Certificate of Candidacy was void ab initio, and all votes casted for her were stray. Chua’s
proclamation was likewise voided, and per Maquiling, Bacani was declared to have
garnered the sixth highest number of votes.
ISSUE: WON Chua is should be disqualified
HELD: YES. Petition is DISMISSED
RATIO:
Fragata’s Petition before the Commission on Elections show that it was a timely filed
petition for disqualification. Moreover, the Commission on Elections did not gravely
abuse its discretion in disqualifying petitioner Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua, annulling
her proclamation, and subsequently proclaiming private respondent Krystle Marie C.
Bacani, the candidate who garnered the sixth highest number of votes among the
qualified candidates.
A person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required
qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run. The candidate must also
possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law. Under Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code, persons who file their certificates of candidacy declare that they
are not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country. Therefore, a petition to
deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy may likewise be filed against a
permanent resident of a foreign country seeking an elective post in the Philippines on the
ground of material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy. If the false material
representation in the certificate of candidacy relates to a ground for disqualification, the
petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate
of candidacy or a petition for disqualification, so long as the petition filed complies with
the requirements under the law.
Fragata did not argue that petitioner made a false material representation in her
Certificate of Candidacy; she asserted that petitioner was a permanent resident
disqualified to run for Councilor under Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Private
respondent Fragata’s Petition, therefore, was a petition for disqualification.
COMELEC correctly admitted private respondent Bacani’s pleading-in-intervention. An
adverse decision against petitioner would require a pronouncement as to who should
assume the position of Councilor. Hence, those who believe that they are entitled to the
position may prove their legal interest in the matter in litigation95 and may properly
intervene for a complete disposition of the case. Private respondent Bacani claims that
she is entitled to the position of Councilor. In her Motion to Intervene, she argues for
petitioner’s disqualification and alleges the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s dual
citizenship. She then cites Maquiling, arguing that she should be proclaimed in lieu of
petitioner because she obtained the sixth highest number of votes among the qualified
candidates. Private respondent Bacani’s intervention was, therefore, proper.
Petitioner was born to Filipino parents in 1967, which makes her a natural-born Filipino
under the 1935 Constitution. Ten years later, on December 7, 1977, petitioner became a
naturalized American. Hence, she lost her Filipino citizenship pursuant to Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63. It was on September 21, 2011 when petitioner took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, thus reacquiring her Filipino citizenship.98
From September 21, 2011 up to the present, however, petitioner failed to execute a sworn
and personal renunciation of her foreign citizenship particularly required of those seeking
elective public office. Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
200.
Chua cannot claim that she has renounced her American citizenship by taking the Oath
of Allegiance. The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign
citizenship are separate requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for
qualification to run for public office.
Oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is
substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said
oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as
candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign
citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek
elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more
than one citizenship.100
With petitioner’s failure to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy
on October 3, 2012. Under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, she was disqualified
to run for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and Local
Elections.
Regarding the grant of the position to Bacani. In cases of vacancies caused by those with
void ab initio certificates of candidacy, the person legally entitled to the vacant position
would be the candidate who garnered the next highest number of votes among those
eligible.105 In this case, it is private respondent Bacani who is legally entitled to the
position of Councilor, having garnered the sixth highest number of votes among the
eligible candidates. The Commission on Elections correctly proclaimed private respondent
Bacani in lieu of petitioner.
***might be asked provisions:
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code on the contents of a certificate of candidacy
states:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is
eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including
its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or section which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding,
a candidate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized,
or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of
the local civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or,
in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious
pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or more candidates for an office with the
same name and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware of such fact, shall state
his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use the
name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also
include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the
locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport
size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not
exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for grounds in filing a petition for
disqualification:
Sec. 68 Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism
to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Apart from the grounds provided in Section 68, any of the grounds in Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code as well as in Section 40 of the Local Government Code may
likewise be raised in a petition for disqualification. Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code states:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Disqualifications specifically applicable to those running for local elective positions are
found in Section 40 of the Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
SECTION 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
....
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath[.]
Agustin v. Comelec
FACTS:
In 1997, the petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America (USA).
In 2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte to be contested in the May 2013 local elections. As
the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he declared in his CoC that he was eligible
for the office he was seeking to be elected to; that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen;
and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years.
Respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate, filed in the COMELEC a Petition
To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin,
alleging that the petitioner had made a material misrepresentation in his CoC by stating
that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having
registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012. In his answer, the petitioner countered
that the one-year requirement referred to residency, not to voter registration; that
residency was not dependent on citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for business
purposes did not violate the residency requirement pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence;
and that as regards citizenship, he attached a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation of U.S.
American Citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division issued its omnibus resolution holding
that the requirement that a candidate must be a registered voter does not carry with it
the requirement that he must be so one year before the elections because this refers to
the residency qualification. As far as registration as a voter is concerned, it should suffice
that they are duly registered upon the filing of their COCs or within the period prescribed
by law for such registration. Pillos moved for the reconsideration with the COMELEC En
Banc. He alleged that the certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration reflected that
the petitioner had voluntarily declared in his travel documents that he was a citizen of the
USA; that when he travelled to Hawaii, USA on October 6, 2012, he still used his USA
passport despite his renunciation of his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing
his CoC on October 5, 2012, in which he declared that he was a resident of the Municipality
of Marcos, Ilocos Norte; and that the petitioner’s declaration of his eligibility in his CoC
constituted material misrepresentation because of his failure to meet the citizenship and
residency requirements. On April 23, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed
resolution cancelling and denying due course to the petitioner’s CoC, observing that while
Agustin presented a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation, he failed to furnish this
Commission a copy of his Oath of Allegiance. Noteworthy is the fact, that in Agustin’s
Affidavit of Renunciation, it was stated that his Oath of Allegiance is attached; however,
said attachment has not been made available for the perusal of this Commission. Having
failed to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225, Agustin’s COC
must be cancelled and/or denied due course. On election day, the name of the petitioner
remained in the ballot. He was later on proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte, the highest among the contending parties. The petitioner filed on an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of
Court. The petitioner then instituted this case, alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc arguing
that the assailed En Banc Resolution was promulgated in gross violation of Petitioner’s
guaranteed Constitutional Right to Due Process and to be informed of the facts and the
law on which the same was based.
ISSUES: 1. Does the COMELEC En Banc Resolution violated the Petitioner’s guaranteed
Constitutional Right to Due Process? 2. Is the petitioner eligible as a candidate for the
position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte? 3. Is Pillos’ claim that he is
the rightful occupant of the contested elective position correct?
HELD: 1. No. It is worthy to state that the observance of due process in administrative
proceedings does not always require or involve a trial-type proceeding, for the demand of
due process is also met whenever a person, being notified, is afforded the opportunity to
explain or defend himself. The petitioner’s citizenship came to the fore because he himself
asserted his Philippine citizenship in his answer to Pillos’ petition to cancel his CoC in order
to bolster his allegation of compliance with the one-year residency requirement. As such,
he could not credibly complain about being denied due process, especially considering
that he had been able to file an opposition to Pillos’ motion for reconsideration. Also, due
process is satisfied by giving the opportunity to seek the reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. The rule is the same in election cases.
2.No. The petitioner filed a valid CoC, but the use of his USA passport after his
renunciation of foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified from continuing as a
mayoralty candidate. There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a
candidate from running in an electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the
other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate of candidacy. A petition
for disqualification can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the
LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be
grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false.
The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section
68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is
cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if
he/she never filed a CoC. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If
the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. The petition of Pillos was in the nature of the Section 78 petition to deny due
course to or to cancel the CoC of the Yet, the COMELEC En Banc canceled the petitioner’s
CoC not because of his failure to meet the residency requirement but because of his
failure “to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225.” Such basis
for cancellation was unwarranted considering that he became eligible to run for public
office when he expressly renounced his USA citizenship, by which he fully complied with
the requirements stated in Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. His CoC was valid for all
intents and purposes of the election laws because he did not make therein any material
misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos
Norte. The Court uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner was
ineligible to run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is
not disputed that on October 6, 2012, after having renounced his USA citizenship and
having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby
representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his
subsequent travels abroad despite having been already issued his Philippine passport on
August 23, 2012. He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6,
2012, the first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on
October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only
for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012. The petitioner’s continued
exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after the
renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant
to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
3. Yes. The petitioner was declared disqualified by final judgment before election day;
hence, the votes cast for him should not be counted. His rival, respondent Pillos, should
be proclaimed duly elected Mayor for obtaining the highest number of votes in the
elections. The effect of the petitioner’s disqualification under the April 23, 2013 resolution
depended on when the disqualification attained finality. The distinction exists because of
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), which states: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Section 6 of the said law covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the
first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the
elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. The present
case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the
first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The effect was to render
the votes cast in his favor stray, resulting in Pillos being proclaimed the winning candidate.
It is crucial, therefore, to determine with certainty the time when the judgment declaring
the petitioner disqualified from running for the local elective position attained finality.
Pillos submits that the April 23, 2013 resolution was already deemed final and executory as
of May 4, 2013; hence, the writ of execution was issued on June 18, 2013; and that the
petitioner’s disqualification thus attained finality prior to the May 13, 2013 elections. Pillos’
submission is correct. Although the petitioner filed his Verified Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court, the April 23, 2013 resolution granting Pillos’ motion
for reconsideration, such filing did not impede the April 23, 2013 resolution from being
deemed final and executory because Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure expressly disallowed the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Within the
context of Section 13, Rule 18, and Section 3, Rule 37, both of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the April 23, 2013 resolution became final and executory as of May 4, 2013
upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation without a restraining order being issued
by the Supreme Court.
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE POE-
LLAMANZARES, Respondents.
Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for the
nullification of the assailed Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal. The
assailed Decision dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David, which sought to
unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not
being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to hold
such office under Article VI, Section 34 of the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS:
 Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose
biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo.
 Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant
was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar.Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling
Certificate
 Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the
Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan
Roces
 Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18,
2001. She was subsequently given a United States passport
 On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the
Philippines
 She has formally renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010.
 Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections
 David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August 6, 2015. He contested
the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and
residency requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
Senate Electoral Tribunal ruling: promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to
be a natural- born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.

ISSUE:
WON SET erred in rendering its decision finding that Senator Poe is a Filipino Citizen.
HELD: We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
 Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "no
person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."
 Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and,
therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly on two (2)
grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown,
private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is, that she
failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the essence of
the Constitution's determination of who are natural-born citizens of the
Philippines.
 Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement
from birth means that private respondent never had to do anything to
consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently
naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the
requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office
as Senator of the Republic.
 Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:
o Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship.
 There are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and
naturalized: A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as one who is
a citizen of the Philippines "from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized
citizen is one who is not natural-born.
 Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred.
o Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to
be a citizen, either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino
citizen.
o That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree,
and ethnicity are not determinative of citizenship.
o Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino
citizens. It does not even require them to conform to traditional
conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both
parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.
o Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree:
parentage. The citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is
irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino
bloodline.
o Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino
citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in a proper
proceeding, which substantially proves that either or both of one's
parents is a Filipino citizen.
 Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish Church of
Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968. In 1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all—
Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population. Private
respondent is described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal
bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face." She stands at 5 feet and 2
inches tall.194 Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.
 These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that her
biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more
or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly
religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The absence of an
international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes the possibility of a foreigner
mother, along with a foreigner father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and
out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though proof
of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless attest to it.
 Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to
permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never
be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also
tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as professions and state
scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These
consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through
the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is
merely to exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that foundlings
are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to
suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.
ARTICLE XIII
 Social Justice and Human Rights
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good. The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee
that "persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike,
in terms of 'privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or oppression of
inequality.'
State Policies
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.
  Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively within the confines of
constitutional text, the presumption that foundlings are natural-born citizens of
the Philippines (unless substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of
the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a parallel consideration or
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution with acts of Congress,
international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive
organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of
the Philippines.
 Consistent with this statute is our ratification of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child. This specifically requires the states-parties' protection
of: first, children's rights to immediate registration and nationality after birth;
second, against statelessness; and third, against discrimination on account of
their birth status.
 The Philippines likewise ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. As with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this treaty
requires that children be allowed immediate registration after birth and to
acquire a nationality.
 Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object
of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be registered and granted
nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship,
and render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate them, and
undermine their development.
 Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children" covered by Republic Act
No. 8552:237
 SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the duty
of the Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody
of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If
such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be
the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned.
 of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of Renunciation of American
 As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to natural-
born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability to benefit from
Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino
citizen, re- acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following her
naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied with the requisites
of Republic Act No. 9225.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate
Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed
November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution.
POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC
Petitioner: MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES
Respondent: COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO
Facts:
o Petitioner was found abandoned as a newborn infant in Iloilo by Edgardo Militar,
who later passed on the parental care and custody over petitioner to Emiliano
wMilitar and his wife, she has been reported and registered as a foundling and
issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth given the name of
Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
o When the petitioner reached 5 years old, spouses Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan
Roces adopted her. RTC granted their petition and ordered that her name be
changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
o 1986: Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18.
o 1988: Petitioner applied and was issued Philippine Passport. She left for the US in
to continue her studies after enrolling and pursuing a degree in Development
Studies at UP.
o 1991: Petitioner graduated in from Boston College where she earned her
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.
o Later, she married Teodoro Llamanzares, a citizen of both Philippines and US,
and decided to fly back to US after their wedding. She gave birth to her eldest
child while in US and her 2 daughters in the Philippines.
o 2001: Petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 2004: Petitioner came
back to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for presidency
elections and gave birth to her youngest daughter.
o 2005: After her father’s death, petitioner and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in and immediately secured a TIN, then her
children followed; acquired property where she and her children resided.
o 2006: Petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to RA 9225 (Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003). She
filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship, together with petitions
for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children. She registered as a
voter; secured Philippine passport; appointed and took her oath as Chairperson
citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a Certificate of Loss
of Nationality of the USA in 2011.
o 2012: She filed with COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator for 2013
Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period
of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.
o 2015: Peitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections,
declaring that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months counted from 24 May 2005. Petitioner attached to her COC an
“Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of USA Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public.
o Petitions to deny or cancel her candidacy were filed before COMELEC on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of
them were Filipinos.
o COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she was
in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she
committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
o On certiorari, SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is
qualified as a candidate for Presidency. 3 justices, however, abstained
 to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION PETIONER’S CONTENTION
Petitioner’s blood relationship with a Filipino Citizen is obvious. Other circumstantial
COMELEC has jurisdiction No jurisdiction. Petition filed was quo evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents is the fact that she was abandoned in a
warranto. It could only be filed when Grace Roman Catholic Church and had typical Filipino features (height, flat nasal bridge, straight
Poe wins the election black hair, almond shaped eyes and oval face). Other proof that would support that
foundlings are natural-born citizens are the fact that DFA issues passports to foundlings
Poe committed material Did not state cause of action because it did and passports are by law, issued only to citizens.
misrepresentation not contain allegations which would make
false the statement in her COC that she is a
natural-born citizen nor was there any SolGen stated that to deny full Filipino Citizenship to all foundlings and render them
allegation that there was a willful or stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one or two of his parents are
deliberate intent to misrepresent on her foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational and unjust. Moreover, statistics show
part. that a 99.83% chance that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen,
denial of this right to foundlings is like denying them of their birthright.
International law does not confer 1934 constitutional convention consider
natural-born status and Filipino foundlings as citizens. Foundlings are
citizenship on foundlings. presumed born of citizens of the place
In the case of Bengson III vs. HRET, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
where they were found. She reacquired her
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored
natural-born Philippine citizenship under RA
to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
9225
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
once natural-born status, former status as a natural-born Filipino.
reacquisition only makes a person as
“naturalized”
16. Cardino v. COMELEC, G.R. No.216637, March 7, 2017
Burden to prove was on the Burden to prove was on respondent
petitioner The Facts
 Cardino and Jalosjos both ran for the position of Mayor of Dapitan City,
Issue: Zamboanga del Norte during the 2013 elections
W/N petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen. - YES  Jalosjos was proclaimed the winner
 Cardino immediately filed a petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC,
Held: which sought to nullify the candidacy of Jalosjos on the ground of ineligibility.
Petitioner may be considered a natural-born Filipino. A foundling is a natural-born citizen  Cardino alleged that
of the Philippines as there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude o Jalosjos was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who subsequently
foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized. There are also no provisions in the became a naturalized citizen of the USA;
Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings as the o that Jalosjos later applied for the reacquisition of her Filipino
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. Foundlings citizenship under Republic Act;
are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering to the o that on 2009, Jalosjos took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the the Philippines and an Order of Approval of citizenship retention and
foundling is found. reacquisition was issued in her favo
o That when Jalosjos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor
COMELEC cannot decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate. It is not of Dapitan City she attached therein an Affidavit of Renunciation of her
mentioned in ART. IX, C, Sec. 2. Poe admitted it all, that she was a foundling. COMELEC American citizenship that was subscribed and sworn before Judge
said that it cannot rule that she possesses Filipino blood because “it is certain that such Veronica C. De Guzman-Laput of the MTC of Manukan, Zamboanga del
relationship is indemonstrable.” COMELEC “she now has the burden to prove her natural Norte on July 16, 2012
filiation with a Filipino parent”. More so, RA No. 9225 shows that Congress saw it fit to o That Jalosjos left the Philippines for the USA on May 30, 2012 and she
decree that citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been lost. Therefore, it is not for presented her US passport to the immigration authorities.
the comelec to disagree with the congress’ determination.
 o Jalosjos then arrived back in the Philippines via Delta Airlines Flight No.
173 on July 17, 2012 at around 10:45 p.m. using her US passport.
 Cardino, therefore, argued that it was physically impossible for Jalosjos to have
personally appeared in Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte before Judge De
Guzman-Laput on July 16, 2012 to execute, sign and swear to her Affidavit of
Renunciation
 Cardino alleged that Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation was a falsified document
that had no legal effect and that when Jalosjos filed her COC for Mayor of
Dapitan City, she still possessed both Philippine and American citizenships and
was therefore disqualified from running for any elective local position.
 Cardino contends that given that Jalosjos' COC was void ab initio, she was never
a candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City. Cardino, thus, prayed for Jalosjos to be
declared ineligible to run for Mayor of Dapitan City, that her proclamation be set
aside, and that he be proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor of Dapitan City.
 Jalosjos’ defenst: the date of "16th day of July, 2012" was mistakenly indicated in
the Affidavit of Renunciation instead of its actual execution date of July 19, 2012.
Jalosjos claimed that it was on the latter date that she appeared before Judge
De Guzman-Laput to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship.
 Judge De Guzman-Laput testified by deposition before the Provincial Election
Supervisor in Dipolog City wherein she positively stated that it was on July 19,
2012 that Jalosjos personally appeared before her to subscribe to the Affidavit of
Renunciation.
 COMELEC 2nd DIVISION: dismissed Cardino’s petition holding that the
discrepancy on the date is only a clerical error: hence this petition
 Consolidated case ‘to but Pimentel lang daw eh so yun lang focus ko.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC erred in refusing to declare the ineligibility of Jalosjos : NO
RULING:
 The Court fails to find any action on the part of the COMELEC that constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 At the outset, the term of the contested office in this case already expired on
June 30, 2016. The issues regarding the eligibility of Jalosjos for the said position
and Cardino's supposed right to be declared the winner for said term had been
rendered moot and academic
 The present case arose from a petition for quo warranto filed by Cardino under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, which pertinently reads:
o Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election
of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
[COMELEC] within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election
 According to Cardino, the ineligibility of Jalosjos stemmed from the fact that she
was a dual citizen of the Philippines and the USA when she submitted her COC
for Mayor in the 2013 elections. This is proscribed by Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code, which reads:
o Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position: (d) Those with dual citizenship
 On the issue of falsification, this Office finds for respondent Judge. There was
really no reason why respondent Judge would have to falsify the date of the
notarization of the Affidavit of Renunciation when indicating the actual date of
notarization, 19 July 2012, would not have affected the validity of the affidavit.
 The facts surrounding this particular issue lead to the conclusion that the date
appearing in the Affidavit of Renunciation is the result of an honest mistake.
 Furthermore, respondent Judge could not have falsified the Affidavit of
Renunciation just to do Jalosjos a favor. Respondent Judge was correct in saying
that if there was anybody who benefited from her inadvertence, it was
complainant since the mistake gave him a ground to question the validity of the
election of Jalosjos as mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte.
 It must be noted that the subject notarized document was used by Jalosjos only
after several months after it was notarized, or in October 2012. Evidently, there
was no urgency for the said document to be notarized in July 2012, thereby
negating any probable impropriety with respect thereto.
 The Court affirms the findings of the COMELEC Second Division that Jalosjos'
Affidavit of Renunciation is not a falsified document. As such, Jalosjos complied
with the provisions of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. By virtue thereof,
Jalosjos was able to fully divest herself of her American citizenship, thus making
her eligible to run for the mayorship of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte.
Pimentel v. COMELEC
PARTIES INVOLVED:
 PETITIONER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL – Senator and a candidate for re-
election in the May 2004 elections.
 RESPONDENT COMELEC – passed a resolution prescribing new rules and
regulations for the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office.
HOW THE DISPUTE STARTED
 COMELEC issued Resolution 6486, pursuant to Sec 36(g) of RA 9165,
which prescribes a mandatory drug testing for all candidates for public
office. It also provided that if the candidate wins but has not complied
with the resolution will be prevented from sitting until he complies.
 Petitioner Pimentel challenged the resolution by filing a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition in the Supreme Court.
ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONERS:
 The resolution and the additional qualifications are unconstitutional.
Candidates only need to meet the qualifications under the Constitution,
 which are: (1) Citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and
(5) residency. FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition and declares Sec
 The Congress cannot implement a law which amend or modify these 36 (g) of RA9165 and COMELEC resolution 6486 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
qualifications.

ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT: 18. Albania v. COMELEC

 The resolution is valid because the provision does not expressly state G.R. No. 226792, 7 June 2017
that non-compliance with the drug test is a disqualifying factor. Topic: Disqualifications

Straight to SC. Petitioner: SOFRONIO B. ALBANIA
ISSUES: Respondents: COMELEC and EDGARDO A. TALLADO,
 WON the resolution is unconstitutional Ruling:
 WON the Congress or COMELEC is empowered to amend the
qualifications for elections. FACTS
1. Challenged in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule
YES. IT IS BASIC THAT IF A LAW VIOLATES ANY NORM OF THE CONSTITUTION, 65, is the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which upheld the
THAT ISSUANCE IS NULL AND VOID. Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dismissing the petition to
 The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform to. Any deny due course to or to cancel Edgardo A. Tallado's Certificate of
law or statute that would conflicts with the Constitution is not valid. Candidacy for being filed out time.
2. In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, Edgardo A. Tallado and
NO. THE CONGRESS OR COMELEC CANNOT VALIDLY IMPOSE AMENDMENTS OR Jesus 0. Typoco were both candidates for position of Governor in
ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS TO THAT WHICH IS PRESCRIBED BY THE Camarines Norte.
CONSTITUTION. 3. Typoco won so Tallada questioned Typoco's proclamation with the
 While Congress has a broad inherent legislative power, it has certain COMELEC.
limitations. These limitations were vaguely described by the Court in 4. The Petition was decided in his favor and the latter assumed the position
Government vs Springer. of Governor of Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010,
 “The powers of the legislative department of the Government … are the end of the 2007-2010 term.
limited by the four walls of the Constitution” 5. Tallada ran again for the same position in the 2010 and 2013 National and
 The power of the legislative department is always subject to substantive Elections where he won.
and constitutional limitations. The limitation on Congress enacting 6. On October 16, 2015, Tallada filed his CoC for Governor in the May 9, 2016
modifications to qualifications on candidates is an example of a National and Local Elections.
substantive limitation. 7. On November 13, 2015, Albania a registered voter .of Poblacion Sta.
Elena, Camarines Norte, filed a petition for Tallada’s disqualification
 If Congress does not have the power, the COMELEC also does not have
based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 95238 on two grounds:
such power.
 (1) he violated the three term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160
 Sec 36 (g) requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug (Local Government Code of 1991); and
clean as a qualification for election and proclamation.  (2) his suspension from office for one year without pay, together with its
accessory penalties, after he was found guilty of oppression and grave
THE ARGUMENT OF THE RESPONDENT WOULD HAVE HELD GROUND IF THE abuse of authority.
DRUG TEST WAS OPTIONAL 8. Tallada argued:
a. Since the petition was primarily based on his alleged violation of
 The law, however, made the drug test mandatory, and failure to comply
the three-term limit rule, the same should have been filed as a
therewith results to adverse consequences. Being related to candidacy,
petition to deny due course to or cancel CoC under Rule 23 of
it stands to reason the adverse effect also relates to election and
COMELEC Resolution 9523, in relation to Section 78 of the
proclamation.
 Omnibus Election Code, as the ground cited affected a
candidate's eligibility;
b. Based on Section 23, the petition should had been filed on
November 10, 2015, but the petition was filed only on November
13, 2015, hence, the same had already prescribed and must be
dismissed.
c. His suspension from office is also not a ground for a petition for
disqualification.
d. He denied violating the three-term limit rule as he did not fully
serve three consecutive terms since he only served as Governor
for the 2007 elections from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010.
9. COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for being filed out of
time.
a. A violation of the three-term limit rule and suspension from
office as a result of an administrative case are not grounds for
disqualification of a candidate under the law but a ground for
ineligibility which constituted false material representation
under Section 78 of the OEC.
b. Such must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the
CoC, which Albania failed to do.
10. MR with the COMELEC En Banc was denied.
a. Tallada did not serve the full 2007-2010 term as Governor of
Camarines Norte, thus, cannot be considered as one term for
purposes of counting the three-term threshold;
b. The ground for a candidate's disqualification referred to by
Section 40 (b) of the LGC is the actual removal from office as a
result of an administrative case, and not mere suspension as
imposed by the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: WON Tallada should be disqualified. NO.
RATIO
RULE: Grave abuse of discretion arises when a court or tribunal violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. As a matter of policy, SC will not
interfere with the resolutions of the COMELEC unless it is shown that it had
committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, in the absence of abuse of
discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper.
The grounds for disqualification of a candidate are found under Sections 12 and
68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended (Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines), as well as Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
COMELEC Second Division was correct when it found that the petition was not
based on any of the grounds for disqualification.
- The grounds does not include violation of the three-term limit rule and
suspension from office as a result of an administrative case.
- Section 40(b) speaks of removal from office as a result of an
administrative offense.
- The penalty of suspension cannot be a bar to the candidacy of the
respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications for the
office as provided under Section 66(b) of R.A. No. 7160.
But while the alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is not a ground for a
petition for disqualification, the COMELEC Second Division found that it is an
ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to or to
cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, hence considered the petition as such
(which is within its powers).
- Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy, such must be filed within 25 from the time of
filing of the COC, as provided under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
The three-term limit rule is embodied in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution,
restated in Section 43 of the Local Government Code which essentially provides
that after being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local
official cannot seek immediate re-election for the same office in the next regular
election because he is ineligible.
- The objective is to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office.
Section 74 of the OEC provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office.
A violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility which is a proper ground
for a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a COC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code (any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false).
- Tallada filed his on October 16, 2015. The petition should have been filed
on or before November 10, 2015. However, the petition was filed only on
November 13, 2015 which was already beyond period to file the same.
- Thus, find no grave abuse of discretion committed the COMELEC in
dismissing the petition for being filed out of time.
Albania insists that the petition filed with the COMELEC was based on Section 3,
Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 which provides that the Petition shall
be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not
later than the date of proclamation, is not meritorious.
- Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 refers to disqualification of
candidates and the grounds thereof.
- A violation of the three-term limit rule is not included among the
grounds for disqualification, but a ground for a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy,
- Thus, it is Section 2, Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 which
provides that Petition must be filed within 5 days from the last day for
filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later than 25 days from the time
of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the Petition
There is no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC En Banc when
it found that the petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC will not also
prosper as there was no violation of the three-term limit rule.
Two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a
candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: "term" is a period of time during which
an official has title to office and can serve.
Appari v. Court of Appeals: The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and
definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office.
Upon expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover,
his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the
law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public
officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was
elected or appointed.
Gaminde v. Commission on Audit: “term” means the time during which the officer
may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents succeed one another.
Since Tallada had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and therefore had not
been elected for three consecutive terms as Governor, there was no violation of
the three-term limit rule.
- While Tallada ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections,
he did not win as such.
- He assumed the post and served the unexpired term of his opponent
from March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010.
- He did not hold the office for the full term of three years to which he
was supposedly entitled to.
- The period when he was out of office involuntarily interrupted the
continuity of his service as Governor.
Petition DENIED.
19. Abundo, Sr vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 201716 January 8 2013
Petitioner-Abelardo Abundo, Sr.
Respondent-COMELEC
Private Respondent-Jose Torres
FACTS:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national
and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral
derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one
Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of
office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a
period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections
where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought for
Abundo’s disqualification predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. RTC declared
Abundo ineligible for position. Abundo, appealed to COMELEC, COMELEC dismissed the appeal.
Respondent’s contention:
COMELEC, found Abundo to have already served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to
wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth,
consecutive term.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mayor Abundo has served for full three consecutive terms and is barred
from running for another term
RULING:
No, Abundo did not serve the full three consecutive terms and is therefore not barred for
running another term. It cannot be said that Abundo has fully served 2004-2007 term. For
the reason that during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to
assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election
winner.
During the period of one year and ten months Abundo held the office and exercised the
functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as
duly elected candidate in the May 9, 2006 elections or for only a little over one year and
one month, which is less than the legally contemplated full term of local government
official.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the
aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Wherefore, petitioner Abundo, Sr. is declared eligible for the position of Mayor of Viga.
Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly
ordered immediately reinstated to said position.
20. Naval v Comelec
G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014
TOPIC: Disqualification
FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Angel G. Naval (Naval) had been elected and had
served as a member of the Sanggunian, second district of the Province of Camarines Sur
 On Oct 12, 2009, the President approved RA No. 9716 which re apportioned the
legislative districts in Camarines Sur in the following manner
 Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old 2 nd District to form the
present 3rd District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian
Third District and he served until 2013
 In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the
Sanggunian, 3rd District (This is his 4th consecutive term already 2004, 2007, 2010
and 2013)

Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Members candidate from the 3 rd District in the 2013
Elections
 On Oct 29, 2012: he invoked Sec 781 of the Omnibus Election Code and filed
before the COMELEC a verified petition to deny due course or to cancel the COC
of Naval.
 On the grounds that Naval had fully served the entire Province of CamSur for
three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the
district he had been elected from. Allowing Naval to run as Sanggunian member
for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three term limit rule enshrined in
the Constitution & the LGC, which must be strictly construed.
 In addition to this, Julia also posited that the three term limit rule’s application is
more with reference to the same local elective post, and not necessarily in
connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction.
RULING OF THE COMELEC 2ND DIVISION
Cancelled Naval’s COC in violation of Sec 78 of the OEC
1Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
  That when a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for
the elective posts he seeks while in reality he knowingly lacks the necessary
requirements for eligibility, he commits a false material misrepresentation
 More importantly, the 2nd division based its decision on the mere fact that the
territorial jurisdiction Naval seeks to serve for the term 2013-2016 is the same as
the territorial jurisdiction he previously served.
 The electorate who voted for him in 2004, 2007 & 2010 elections is the same
electorate who shall vote for him come May 13, 2013 elections.
RULING OF THE COMELEC en banc
 Denied the MR filed by NAVAL because NAVAL’s MR lacked verification required
under Sec 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
 NAVAL is clearly running for the 4th time for the same government post which is
a clear violation of the three term limit.
 1st: Territorial jurisdictions of the two districts are the same except for Gainza &
Milaor which were excluded by R.A. No. 9716.
 2nd: The inhabitants of the 3rd district are the same group of voters whom Naval
had served as member of the Sanggunian representing the 2nd district.
 Lastly, the enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert Naval’s post into a
different one from what he previously had and as correctly ruled by the 2nd
division, Naval had already been elected and had already served in the same
government post for three consecutive terms.
ARGUMENTS OF NAVAL
 Alleges that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Legislative districts of CamSur are not merely
renamed but are composed of new sets of municipalities.
 Voters from the Third District are no longer the same ones as those who had
elected him to office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
 Naval likewise cites Borja, Jr. vs Comelec, to point out that for the disqualification
on the ground of the three term limit to apply, it is not enough that an individual
has served 3 consecutive terms in an elective local office, but it is also required
that he or she had been elected to the same position for the same number of
times.
ISSUE: WON NAVAL HAS VIOLATED THE THREE TERM LIMIT?
WON THE VOTERS OF THE 2ND DISTRICT ARE EXACTLY THE SAME VOTERS IN
THE 3RD DISTRICT?
RULING: YES. Naval has violated the three term limit enshrined in the Constitution & the
LGC.
 The framers of the Constitution has decided that only three consecutive
elections to the same position would be allowed.
 Thereafter, the public official can once again vie for the same post provided
there be a gap of at least one term from his or her last election.
Purpose of the three limit rule: Prevent the consolidation of political power in the
hands of the few, while at the same time giving the people the freedom to call back
to public service those who are worthy to be called statesmen.
R.A. No. 9716 created a new 2nd District but it merely renamed the other four
 A complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that
the lawmakers intended the old 2nd District to be merely renamed as the current
third district.
 It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old
Second District from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10%
of the population of the latter.
 This numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not
literally, the same as the old Second District.
Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are elected by
district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and
fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
 Since the 2nd district was merely renamed as the current 3rd district, Naval clearly
violated the three term limit rule by running again for the 2013 elections.
 Further, sustaining Naval’s arguments would practically allow him to hold the
same office for 15 years. These are the circumstances the Constitution explicitly
intends to avert.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
Resolutions dated March 5, 2013 and June 5, 2013 of the Commission on Elections in SPA
No. 13-166 (DC) are AFFIRMED.
GOOD TO KNOW CONCEPTS:
In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive
elections.
 While serving his third term, his opponent led an election protest.
 Months before the expiration of the mayor's third term, he was ousted from
office.
 He ran again for the same post in the immediately succeeding election.
 A petition was thereafter led assailing his eligibility to run as mayor on the
ground of violation of the three-term limit rule.
 The Court ruled that the mayor could not be considered as having served a full
third term. An interruption for any length of time, if due to an involuntary
cause, is enough to break the elected official's continuity of service.
In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor.
 In the two immediately succeeding elections, the latter vied for and won the
mayoralty post.
 When he ran for the same position for the third time, his disqualification was
sought for alleged violation of the three-term limit rule.
 The Court ruled that when he assumed the position of mayor by virtue of
succession, his service should not be treated as one full term. For the
disqualification to apply, the candidate should have been thrice elected for and
had served the same post consecutively.
Pamatong v Comelec
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Parties Involved:
  Petitioner – Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, a candidate for the Governor’s
position in the 2013 elections.
 Respondents – COMELEC and Edgar “Egay” S. San Luis (The one who filed the
disqualification case against petitioner)
HOW THE CASE STARTED:
 In the case at hand private respondent filed a disqualification case against the
petitioner herein. The disqualification case is anchored on two grounds
 The first ground:
o Ejercito, during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to
the electorates of the province of Laguna the so-called "Orange Card" with
an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his favor.
Copy thereof is hereto attached and marked as Annex "C" and made as an
integral part hereof;
o In furtherance of his candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor of
Laguna, Ejercito and his cohorts claimed that the said "Orange Card" could
be used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for their
medical needs as declared by the statements of witnesses which are hereto
attached and marked as Annex "D" as integral part hereof;
o The so-called "Orange Card" is considered a material consideration in
convincing the voters to cast their votes for Ejercito’s favor in clear violation
of the provision of the Omnibus Election Code which provides and I quote:
 "Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or
found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;
 The second ground:
o Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna
has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. A certification issued by the
Provincial Election Supervisor is hereto attached and marked as Annex "E"
as an integral part hereof;
o In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615,
otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR
ELECTION ACT provides and I quote:
"Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties. –The aggregate
amount that a candidate or party may spent for election campaign
shall be as follows:
a. For candidates – Three pesos (₱3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate
of candidacy.
o On the other hand, the effect of disqualification is provided under Sec. 6 of
b. For other candidates without any political party and without any
support from any political party – Five pesos (₱5.00) for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy.
c. For Political Parties and party-list groups – Five pesos (₱5.00) for
every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates. (underscoring mine for emphasis)
o Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is
only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX
(₱4,576,566.00) PESOS.
o However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of
law, [Ejercito] exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the
2013 election. For television campaign commercials alone, [Ejercito] already
spent the sum of Ph₱23,730.784 based on our party’s official monitoring on
the following dates[:] April 28, May 4 & May 5, 2013.
o Even assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as prescribed under
the Fair Election Act, he still exceeded in the total allowable expenditures
for which he paid the sum of ₱16,611,549;
o In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that [Ejercito] committed
an election offense as provided for under Section 35 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615, which provides and I quote:
o "Election Offense. – Any violation of R.A. No. 9006 and these Rules shall
constitute an election offense punishable under the first and second
paragraph of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code in addition to
administrative liability, whenever applicable. x x x"
o Moreover, it is crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides and I quote:
 Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest
in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
Republic Act No. 6646, which states and I quote:
o "Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
 suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of [his] guilt is strong."
COMELEC RULING
• COMELEC 1ST DIVISION: Disqualified
Hence this petition.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
 The petitioner argues that the resolutions made by the respondent violated his
right to “equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution by limiting the number of qualified candidates
only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties.
 Moreover Petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the
constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the
sovereign people to choose their leaders.
 He also argues that he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for
the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he
has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the
validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC.
 Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines
for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the
candidate’s bio-data and his program of government.
ISSUES
 W/N PETITIONER SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED? YES
HELD:
The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or,
if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. A petition
to disqualifya candidate may be filed pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC, which states:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications.-- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign
an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
The prohibited acts covered by Section 68 (e) refer to election campaign or partisan
political activity outside the campaign period (Section 80); removal, destruction or
defacement of lawful election propaganda (Section 83); certain forms of election
propaganda (Section 85); violation of rules and regulations on election propaganda
through mass media; coercion of subordinates (Section 261 [d]); threats, intimidation,
terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion (Section 261 [e]); unlawful
electioneering (Section 261 [k]); release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds
(Section 261 [v]); solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the
election within the restricted areas (Section 261 [cc], sub-par.6). All the offenses
mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, not toviolations of
other penal laws. In other words, offenses that are punished in laws other than in the OEC
cannot be a ground for a Section 68 petition. Thus, We have held:
x x x [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to
those enumerated in Section 68 of the [OEC]. All other election offenses are
beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the [OEC], the
power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation
on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
"Section 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly authorized
legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of
all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to
act on any complaint within four months from its filing, the complainant may file
the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for
proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
Section 268. Jurisdiction. – The regional trial court shall have the exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action orproceeding for
violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register
or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other
criminal cases."
In the case at bar, the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that
the petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense
but for disqualification as well. Indeed, the following are clear indications:
1. The title of San Luis’ petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No.
9523.56 This expresses the objective of the action since Rule 25 is the specific
rule governing the disqualification of candidates.
2. The averments of San Luis’ petition rely on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC as
grounds for its causes of action. Section 68 of the OEC precisely enumerates the
grounds for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position and provides,
as penalty, that the candidate shall be disqualified from continuing as such, or if
he or she has been elected, from holding the office.
 3. Paragraph 2 of San Luis’ prayer in the petition states that "[in the event that
[Ejercito] will be ableto get a majority vote of the electorate of the Province of
Laguna on May 13, 2013, his proclamation be suspended until further order of the
Honorable Commission." San Luis reiterated this plea when he later filed a Very
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion toIssue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of
Respondent and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue
Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent. The relief sought is actually
pursuant to Section 657 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 5 Rule 2558 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, both of which pertain to the effect of a disqualification
case when the petition is unresolved by final judgment come election day.
4. San Luis’ Memorandum emphasized that the case is a "Special Action for
Disqualification," praying that "[t]he Petition BE GRANTED [and] x x x [Ejercito]
BE DISQUALIFIED, and PREVENTED from further holding office as Governor of
Laguna."
With the foregoing, Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San
Luis’ petition. This considering, it is unnecessary for Us to discuss the applicability of
Section 2,Rule 9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, there being no substantial
amendment to San Luis’ petition that constitutes a material deviation from his original
causes of action. Likewise, COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 and Section 265 of the OEC do
not apply since both refer solely to the prosecution of election offenses. Specifically,
COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 is an amendment to Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure on the prosecution of election offenses, while Section 265 of the OEC is found
under Article XXII of said law pertaining also to election offenses.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166118 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates
and political parties for election campaign, thus:
SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. – The aggregate amount
that a candidate or registered politicalparty may spend for election campaign shall be as
follows:
(a) For candidates – Ten pesos (₱10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other
candidates, Three pesos (₱3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency
where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any
political party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five
pesos (₱5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties - Five pesos (₱5.00) for every voter currently registered in the
constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind
to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly
reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.119
Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No. 7166.120 These
provisions, which are merely amended insofar as the allowable amount is concerned,
read:
SECTION 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates.– No candidate shall spend for his
election campaign an aggregate amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for every
voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his candidacy: Provided, That
the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused to be incurred by
the candidate, whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or
aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign:
Provided, further, That where the land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus
and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the
Commission is hereby empowered toassess the amount commensurate with the expenses
for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in
the total expenses incurred by the candidate.
SECTION 101. Limitations upon expenses of political parties.– A duly accredited political
party may spend for the election of its candidates in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates an aggregate amount not exceeding the equivalent of one
peso and fifty centavos for every voter currently registered therein. Expenses incurred by
branches, chapters, or committees of such political party shall be included in the
computation of the total expenditures of the political party.
Expenses incurred by other political parties shall be considered as expenses of their
respective individual candidates and subject to limitation under Section 100 of this Code.
SECTION 103. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures.– No person, except the
candidate, the treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by such candidate or
treasurer, shall make any expenditure in support of or in opposition to any candidate or
political party. Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate or the treasurer of the party
shall be considered as expenditures of such candidate or political party.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished
the Commission signed by the candidate or the treasurer of the party and showing the
expenditures so authorized, and shall state the full name and exact address of the person
so designated. (Emphasis supplied)
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 21, 2014 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which upheld the September 26, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, granting the petition for disqualification filed by private
respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis against petitioner Emilio Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
22. RISOS VIDAL V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, 21 January 2015
TOPIC: Registration of Voters- Definition of a candidate
Petitioner: ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM (Intervenor)
Respondent: COMELEC and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention are
DISMISSED.
FACTS
1. Sandiganbayan convicted former Pres. Estrada for the crime of plunder sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification with forfeiture in
favor of the government of the:
a. amounts deposited under Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (₱545,291,000.00)
and under Jose Velarde account (₱189,000,000.00).
 b. house and lot dubbed as "Boracay Mansion”
2. Former Pres. Arroyo (extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada.
 xxx
 WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a half
years,
 WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office,
 IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the
Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
xxx
 41 of the RPC
3. Oct. 26, 2007 (3:35 p.m.): Estrada "received and accepted" the pardon by affixing his
signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.
4. Nov. 30, 2009: Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President which
earned 3 oppositions, all dismissed by the COMELEC on the uniform grounds that:
a. the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting president; and
b. the pardon granted to Estrada by Arroyo restored the former’s right to vote and
be voted for a public office.
5. After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections, however, Estrada only
managed to garner the second highest number of votes. Petition filed against Estrada was
dismissed for being moot since he lost.
6. Oct.2012: Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of the City of Manila.
7. Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the
COMELEC: Estrada is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for
Plunder by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Sec. 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC):
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic; xxx
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgmentfor
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
8. COMELEC: DISMISSED; [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof
9. While case pending before SC, Estrada was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his
favor. The local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City
of Manila.
10. On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of Estrada’s opponents for Mayor, moved for leave to intervene
in this case.
a. Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon granted to
the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification.
b. Since Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes
obtained by the latter should be declared stray, and, being the second placer
with 313,764 votes to his name, Lim should be declared the rightful winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila.
11. Risos-Vidal:
a. the pardon granted to former President Estrada was conditional as evidenced
by the latter’s express acceptance: "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office."
b. Since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by Estrada
does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred
that Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore Estrada’s rights of suffrage
and to hold public office,
c. The filing of COC for President and Mayor was a breach to the condition of his
pardon.
d. Basis of disqualification: Sec. 40 of LGC and Sec. 12 of OEC; invoking Arts. 36 and
e. The constraints provided under Arts. 36 and 41 are mandatory requirements
that shun a general or implied restoration of civil and political rights in pardons.
12. OSG: there is no cogent reason to reverse its previous pronouncement and declare Estrada
disqualified to run and be voted as mayor in the absence of any new argument that would
warrant its reversal.
a. The subsequent grant of pardon to him effectively restored his right to run for
any public office
b. The restoration of his right to run for any public office is the exception to the
prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC, as provided under Section 12 of the
OEC.
13. Estrada: he "was granted an absolute pardon and thereby restored to his full civil and
political rights, including the right to seek public elective office such
a. His "expressed acceptance [of the pardon] is not proof that the pardon
extended to [him] is conditional and not absolut
ISSUE: WON Estrada, having been previously convicted and later on given pardon is disqualified to
run for public office
RULING: NO. The pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a
clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential
intent to grant a limited pardon.
Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified.
DOCTRINE OF NON-DIMINUTION/NON-IMPAIRMENT
The pardoning power of the President, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed
by legislative action. Any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Sec. 19 of Article VII and Sec. 5 of Article IX-
C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with
other acts of executive clemency.
The only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in:
(1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and
(3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC
Alleged requirement under Arts. 36 and 41 of RPC
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that Arts. 36 and 41 of RPC contain specific fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon. It does not have
textual commands which must be strictly followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential any legal or binding effect on the absolute nature of the pardon extended by former President
grace from the disqualifications specifically prescribed by them. Arroyo

Articles 36 and 41 only provide a procedural prescription. They are not concerned with areas where Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the 3rd
or the instances when the President may grant pardon. The provisions only prescribe that, if the preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon.
President wishes to include in the pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, or the remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, he or she should Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas Clause was one of the reasons
do so expressly. to grant the pardon, the pardon itself does not provide for the attendant consequence of the breach
thereof. This Court will be hard put to discern the resultant effect of an eventual infringement. Just
The provisions should be construed to give full effect to the executive clemency, instead of indulging like it will be hard put to determine which civil or political rights were restored if the Court were to
in an overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of the pardon. All take the road suggested by Risos-Vidal.
that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the
remission of the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in
G.R. No. 219603 January 26, 2016
the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency.
MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP
ARREZA PICHAY
Pardon extended to President Estrada
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
TOPIC: Certificate of Candidacy; petition for disqualification and petition for cancellation of COC
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was
FACTS:
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is
1. On 16 September 2008, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176,
the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment.
entitled "Tulfo v. People of the Philippines," convicting Pichay by final judgment of four
counts of libel.
Right to seek public elective office
2. In lieu of imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay a fine for each count of libel and moral
The right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a political right. The pardon
damages.
granted to Estrada admits no other interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the
3. The Decision became final and executory on 1 June 2009.
pardon granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and political rights – including the right to seek
4. On 17 February 2011, Pichay paid One Million Pesos (Pl,000,000.00) as moral damages and
elective office.
Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as fine for each count of libel.
5. On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of
The disqualification of Estrada under Sec. 40 of the LGC in relation to Sec. 12 of the OEC was removed
the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the 13
by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him. However, the subsequent absolute pardon
May 2013 elections.
granted to former President Estrada effectively restored his right to seek public elective office. This is
6. petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado (Ty-Delgado) filed a petition for disqualification
made possible by reading Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
moral turpitude
terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or
7. Delagado argued that when Pichay paid the fine, the 5-yr. period barring him to be a
amnesty. The latter provision allows any person granted with plenary pardon or amnesty after
candidate had yet to lapse
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
8. Pichay answered that the petition for disqualification was actually a petition to deny due
any public office, whether local or national position.
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of
the Omnibus Election Code, and it was filed out of time
Sec. 12 of the OEC is one of the legal remedies that may be availed of to disqualify a candidate in a
9. Pichay admitted his conviction by final judgment for four counts of libel, but claimed that
local election filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than
libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude arguing that he did not personally
the date of proclamation.
perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel was only because of his presumed
responsibility as president of the publishing company.
3rd preambular clause in Estrada’s pardon
10. Ty-Delgado filed a motion to suspend the proclamation of Pichay before the Comelec.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional:
11. Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur proclaimed Pichay as the duly elected
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur
office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former
12. Ty-Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before the HRET reiterating that
President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.
Pichay is ineligible to serve as Member of the House of Representatives because:
 (1) he was convicted by final judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
moral turpitude; and
operative language of the statute.
 (2) only two years have passed since he served his sentence or paid on 17
The whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not February 2011 the penalty imposed on him
by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the
 13. COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition for disqualification filed against Pichay
because of lack of jurisdiction
14. Ty-Delgado manifested her amenability to convert the ad cautelam petition into a regular
petition for quo warranto.
15. HRET held that it had jurisdiction over the present quo warranto petition since it involved
the eligibility of a Member of the House of Representatives due to a disqualification under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
16. HRET concluded that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel showed
that the crime did not involve moral turpitude and declared Pichay eligible to hold and
serve office
ISSUE: WON the COC of Pichay should have been cancelled on the ground that he was previously
convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude
HELD: YES. Petition is granted. the HRET decision is reversed and set aside.
RATIO:
 Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five, days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
 A proceeding under Section 78 is similar to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate
 Under Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of
candidacy is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office
 If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal
case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a
false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78
 Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of candidacy because he knew that he
had been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude  his
representation that he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
 A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or cancelled
under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his certificate of
candidacy is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and
necessarily to valid votes
 Since Pichay's ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was
never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the
votes cast for him were considered stray votes  the qualified candidate for the position
who received the highest number of valid votes is petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado
 OEC provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is
24. Joseph C. Dimapilis v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017
Petitioner: Joseph C. Dimapilis
Respondents: COMELEC
RULING: Petition DENIED
FACTS
Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay of Nrgy. Pulung Maragul in the
October 2010 Barangay Elections. He also ran for re-election for the same position in the
2013 Barangay Election, and filed his CoC declaring under oath that he is “eligible for the
office to be elected to.” He won in the said election and was proclaimed as the duly
elected.
On the same day, COMELEC Law Department filed a petition for Disqualification
against the petitioner pursuant to Section 40 of RA 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. It claimed that in an Ombudsman Consolidated Decision,
petitioner was barred from running in an election since he was suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office as a consequence of
his dismissal from service as then Kagawad of Brgy. Pulung Maragul, after being found
guilty, along with others, of administrative offense of Grave Misconduct.
Petitioners averred that the petition should be dismissed, considering that: (a)
while the petition prayed for his disqualification, it partakes the nature to deny due course
to or cancel CoC which should be a distinct and separate actions, (b) COMELEC Law
Department is not a proper party to a petition for disqualification, and cannot initiate such
case motu proprio, and (c) that the RTC Angeles City had permanently enjoined the
implementation of the aforesaid OMB decision, grounded on the condonation doctrine.
COMELEC 2nd Division granted the petition and cancelled petitioner’s CoC,
annulled his proclamation as the winner, and directed the Board of Canvassers to
reconvene and proclaim the qualified candidate who garnered the highest number of
votes as the duly elected Punong Barangay.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed 2nd Div ruling, observing that: (a) evident intent of
the CA decision was only to enjoin the implementation of the OMB Decision, while
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was pending, and not thereafter, and (b)
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution and vice
versa.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling petitioner’s
CoC – NO
RULING: Petition DENIED.
RATIO
Petitioner’s perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving
eligibility. A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the
eligible for the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best
of his knowledge. To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of
being elected to an office. Conversely, "ineligibility" has been defined as a
"disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to an office or appointed to a particular
position." In this relation, a person intending to run for public office must not only possess
the required qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run, but must
also possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law.
In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final
judgment, and punished with dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties,
including perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Verily, perpetual
disqualification to h d public office is a material fact involving eligibility which rendered
petitioner's CoC void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at
the time he filed the same.
The COMELEC has the duty to motu proprio bar from running for public office
those suffering from perpetual disqualification to hold public office. Under Section 2 (1),
Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to "[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x." The Court
had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone
suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office,
albeit, arising from a criminal conviction. Considering, however, that Section 52 (a), Rule
10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service similarly imposes the
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the
penalty of dismissal from service
Even without a petition under either x x x Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal
duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty
of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict
from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of
conviction.
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process by cancelling
his CoC without a separate and dedicated hearing beside from the disqualification case,
the court held that the act of cancellation in this case was merely administrative. Indeed,
the cancellation of one’s CoC generally necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC’s
quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sec12 or 78 of
the OEC (Omnibus Election Code), or Sec40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are
rendered conclusive on account of final and executory judgments, as in this case, such
exercise falls within the COMELEC’s administrative functions.
Petitioner's re-election as Punong Barangav of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the 2013
Barangay Elections cannot operate as a condonation of his alleged misconduct. In Carpio
Morales, the Court abandoned the "condonation doctrine," explaining that "[e]lection is
not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional
or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a
different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense
done during a prior term.
With the cancellation of his CoC, petitioner is deemed to have not been a
candidate in the 2013 Barangay Elections, and all his votes are to be considered stray
votes. A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate at
all because his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. The cancellation of the CoC essentially renders
the votes cast for him or her as stray votes, and are not considered in determining the
winner of an election. This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation and entitle the
qualified candidate receiving the highest number of votes to the position.
There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate
who was proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of
the ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot
apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer
takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as
contemplated in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de
jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the
position.
25 BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND EDUARDO T.
RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 112889; April 18, 1995
Vitug
FACTS:
Parties Involved:
 Bienvenido O. Marquez – A defeated candidate for the position of Governor in
the Province of Quezon in the May 11, 1992 elections.
 Eduardo T. Rodriguez – Proclaimed Governor-elect for the province of Quezon in
the May 11, 1992 elections.
How the Case Started:
 Eduardo T. Rodriguez and Bienvenido Marquez ran for the position of Governor
for the Province of Quezon in the May 11, 1992 elections.
Bienvenido Marquez filed a petition for the cancellation of Eduardo Rodriguez’s
Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC
 Bienvenido averred that at the time Eduardo filed his Certificate of Candidacy, a
criminal charge was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles for
10 counts of Insurance Fraud or Grand Theft of Personal Property against
Eduardo.
o A warrant of arrest was supposedly issued but was not served because
of Eduardo’s flight from Los Angeles.
 COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Bienvenido Marquez filed a petition for review to the SC
 During the pendency of the case, the election was finished and Eduardo won the
Governorial seat.
 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to the filing in due
time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding.
o The matter elevated to the Supreme Court was a pre-proclamation
controversy.
 o Since, Eduardo had already been proclaimed, the case ceases to be a
pre-proclamation controversy.
. private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and
Bienvenido Marquez then instituted a quo warranto proceedings against Eduardo
Rodriguez before the COMELEC
 The COMELEC 2nd division dismissed the petition.
 The COMELEC en Banc then denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE: WoN Eduardo Rodriguez, who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and
evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice"
contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified
from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local
office.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact,
applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the
COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule
73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court
itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC
for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission which is DIRECTED
to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conformably with the foregoing opinion.
No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.

HELD:
Leodegario A. Labao, Jr. v. COMELEC,
NO..
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided: G.R. No. 212615, July 19, 2016
Art. 73. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective
local position: CASE 1:
(a) ... PETITIONER: LEODEGARIO A. LABAO, JR.,
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND LUDOVICO L, MARTELINO,
refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. JR., Respondents.
 The law needs no further interpretation and construction (does not need the
article above defining fugitives). Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is
rather clear and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice". It includes not only those CASE 2:
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after PETITIONER: SHARON GRACE MARTINEZ-MARTELINO,
being charged flee to avoid prosecution. RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND VICE MAYOR JOSE O. ALBA, JR.,
o The Oversight Committee’s deliberation was mentioned:
 They were deliberating on the meaning of the word “fugitive
from justice”. HOW THE CASE STARTED:
 It was first defined as one who has been convicted by final Case 1: Move to disqualify the candidacy of Labao as Mayor of Mambusao Capiz as well as
judgement. nullifying his proclamation as Mayor. (Certiorari and Prohibition)
 There are, however, certain personalities who were not
satisfied with the definition made (Hon. De Pedro and Case 2: Certiorari and Mandamus filed by Petitioner to annul the resolutions of COMELEC
Senator Saguisag) as regards the application of the rules of succession in case of permanent vacancy and to
 In the deliberations, it was also mentioned that the there is a proclaim her as the Mayor of Mambusao Capiz
possible constitutional infirmity based on the definition made
for the word “fugitive”.  In may 2013 elections, Ludovico sought for the disqualification of LABAO as a
 The Court certainly agrees, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in candidate for mayor in the said municipality.
an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An
 He contends that LABAO is a fugitive of justice and there exists an outstanding
administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but
warrant for him for the alleged murder/assassination of then Vice Mayor
must remain congruent to it.
Martinez in front of his residence and 3 other people.
 Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
 A certain LOREDO made a confession and pointed that it was LABAO who was
Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to
the mastermind of the assassination.
refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment."
is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
  Probable cause was determined and the arrest was ordered, however, PNP
failed to apprehend LABAO as he was supposedly confined in a hospital in Iloilo.
 The second case happened when the first division of COMELEC declared the
disqualification of LABAO. The Daughter of the slain Vice Mayor filed a motion to
intervene.
 Development of the murder case: Warrant of arrest against LABAO was liften
and was temporarily suspended but eventually was reinstated but again
DISMISSED ALTOGETHER THE COMPLAINT.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER: (specify the name of the petitioner)
 LABAO claims that there were no charges against him when he filed his COC. He
was only implicated because of LOREDO’s extrajudicial confession.
 He argues further that he was in the hospital because of his heart ailment when
the judge ordered for his arrest and he cannot be a fugitive because he
submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by filing a motion for hospital arrest.
 However, upon filing the current judge handling the case was in Boracay and
when he came back, he inhibited himself.
 Since then, the SC has not assigned the murder case to another judge/court.
 He puts emphasis that the has already been proclaimed as a mayor on may 14,
2013.
 (Second case) She avers that she should be declared as the MAYOR since she
obtained the second highest votes for the Mayoralty elections because the
proclamation of LABAO is illegitimate given that he was declared disqualified.
 ON SC: Labao argues that the COMELEC should have dismissed the CASE
AGAINST HIM IN ACCOUNT OF HIS PROCLAMATION
 HE Further argues that the disqualification case has ceased to be a pre-
proclamation controversy
ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS:
 This argument for disqualification was anchored on Sec. 40 of the LGC par. E,
which states that fugitives of justice in criminal and non political cases are
disqualified from running in any local elective position.
RULING OF FIRST DIVISION OF COMELEC: Ruled for the disqualification of LABAO.
RULING OF COMELEC EN BANC: AFFIRMED FIRST DIVISIONS RULING.
 Ruled that LABAO was a fugitive of justice in the 2nd category cited in
RODRIGUEZ case; “Those who after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution”
ISSUE/S:
WON LEODEGARIO IS A FUGITIVE OF JUSTICE, HENCE SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED. (NO)
LABAO is NOT A FUGITIVE OF JUSTICE AT THE TIME HE FILED FOR CANDIDACY.
 Section 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad
 Based on settled jurisprudence, the term "fugitive from justice' includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who,
after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution
 Court held that: The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment
when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted
indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
 Such intent in these cases has not been established by the evidence on record.
 The COMELEC anchored its finding that Labao, Jr. was a fugitive from justice
from the fact that he was missed at the hospital when the warrant for his arrest
was being served. No other substantial evidence was presented to prove that
Labao, Jr, tried to hide from the authorities or that he left Mambusao, Capiz to
avoid being arrested and prosecuted.
o On the part of Labao, Jr., he was able to show his presence in
Mambusao, and his desire to participate in the proceedings before the
DOJ and the RTC, by citing the following circumstances:
o He took his Oath of Office as Municipal Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz, per
the Panunumpa sa Katungkulan dated 25 June 2013,34chanrobleslaw
o He assumed office as Municipal Mayor of Mambusao, Capiz per the
DILG Certification35 dated 30 June 2013.
o He served as Municipal Mayor and received his salary for the period
from 1-3 July 2013, per certification by the Administrative Officer of the
Request and Disbursement Voucher dated 3 October
2013.36chanrobleslaw
o He filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ which he verified on April
10, 2013, which led to the issuance of the "Baraan Resolution" dated 15
July 2013, resulting in the directive to exclude him in the criminal
Information for Murder.
o He participated in the proceedings before the RTC, Mambusao, Capiz
which led to the issuance of the Orders dated 4 November 2013 and 21
May 2014, for the lifting/suspension of the Warrant of Arrest against
him and finally, the dismissal of the Murder charge against him.
(Citations omitted)37
o Moreover, there was no proof to show the efforts exerted by the
police to locate Labao, Jr. and that despite such efforts, the warrant of
arrest against him could not be served. Although Labao, Jr, had
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of his wife
authorizing her "to appear in all stages of the proceedings, if required,
and if necessary, to testify and/or submit appropriate documentary
 evidence," again, it was not shown that the SPA was executed solely
for the purpose of evading arrest.
CARPIO-MORALES VS. CA
G.R. No. 217126-27. November 10, 2015
Petitioner: CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, in her capacity as Ombudsman
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
RULING: Petition PARTLY GRANTED
The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in
effect.
FACTS
July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato Bondal and Nicolas “Ching”
Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers
and employees of the City Government of Makati accusing them of Plunder and violation
of Republic Act No. 3019 or “The Anti­Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” in connection with
the 5 phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Bldg.
Findings of the 1st Special Panel
The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct investigations,
submit a report and file the necessary complaint, if warranted.
Upon the Ombudsman’s directive, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint against Binay, Jr.,
et al., charging them with 6 administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service, and 6 criminal cases
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 or Malversation of Public Funds, Falsification of
Public Documents.
Ombudsman Complaint allegations against Binay, Jr.
During Binay’s First Term (2010-2013), he issued Notice of Award for Phase III, IV and V of
Makati Parking Bldg. project to Hilmarc’s Construction and executed the corresponding
contract without the required publication and lack of architectural design and approved
the release of funds. (More than 1 Billion total)
During Binay’s Second Term (2013-2016), he approved the release of funds for the
remaining balance of the Phase V contract P 27M and approved release of funds for
remaining contract with MANA Architecture P429K.
Findings of the 2nd Special Panel
Ombudsman created a 2nd Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary
investigation and adjudication on the OBM Cases.
The Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued the subject
preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not
more than 6 months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.
CA Proceedings
Binay filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to nullify the preventive
suspension order and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation claiming that:
1. He could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any
of the 5 phases of the Makati Parking Bldg. project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his reelection as City Mayor of Makati for a
second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus
rendering the administrative cases against him moot.
2. The Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of
guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of
the purported irregularities.
3. In view of the condonation doctrine, his suspension from office would undeservedly
deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen
and voted into office.
DILG Secretary Roxas implemented the preventive suspension by posting a copy thereof
on the wall of Makati City Hall and points of entry to the same were closed. Asst. Makati
Vice Mayor Romulo Peña took his oath of office to assume as Acting Mayor.
However, at noon of the same day, the CA granted Binay’s prayer for a TRO,
notwithstanding Peña’s assumption of duties. However, the next day, the Ombudsman
manifested that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the
preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no
longer any act to restrain.
On the same day, Binay filed a petition for contempt accusing Secretary Roxas, et al of
deliberately refusing to obey the CA, also accusing the Ombudsman for willfully and
maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the preventive suspension order.
Present petition
The Ombudsman filed the present petition for certiorari before the SC, assailing the CA’s
granting of TRO.
ISSUE
WON respondent Binay’s reelection condoned his administrative liability?
NO. The Supreme Court abandoned the condonation doctrine.

RATIO
Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as “[a] victim’s express or implied
forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no
offense.” The condonation doctrine — which connotes this same sense of complete
extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon — is not based on statutory
law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
In Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, the Court clarified that the condonation doctrine
would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to
disenfranchise.
Doctrine of condonation is bereft of legal basis
Section 52(a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office: Section 52.
Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.—a. The penalty of dismissal shall
carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service
examinations. In contrast, Section 66(b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension
shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his
candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note,
however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on
the official’s candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor is
extinguished by the fact of reelection.
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision.—x x x. x x x x (b) The penalty of suspension shall
not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent
so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Reading the
1987 Constitution together with the above cited legal provisions now leads this Court to
the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
Administrative liability not extinguished by reelection
At best, Section 66(b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension
beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official’s prior term, and likewise allows
said official to still run for reelection. This treatment is similar to People ex rel. Bagshaw v.
Thompson and Montgomery v. Nowell, both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an
officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However,
as previously stated, nothing in Section 66(b) states that the elective local official’s
administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of reelection. Thus, at all events, no legal
provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
Abandonment of condonation doctrine is prospective in application
This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class
of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from — and now rendered obsolete
by — the curren legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following
the same, which were all relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and
all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar
Council: Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them,
but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.
SC duty to uphold the Constitution
The continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the
auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a
public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.
The condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a
defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the
legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of
exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine
has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the
multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount
public interest is involved.
Cerafica v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014
Topic: Duty to Receive Certificates of Candidacy
Petitioner: OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA
Respondent: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
RULING/FALLO: “WHEREFORE, premises considered, with the cautionary counsel that
cancellation of certificate of candidacy is a quasi-judicial process, and accordingly is heard
by theCommission on Elections in Division and En Banc on appeal, we DISMISS the present
petition for being moot and academic.”
FACTS
1 October 2012: Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections.
Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20)
years of age on the day of the elections, in contravention of the requirement that one
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on the day of the elections as set out in
Sec. 9 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8487 (Charter of the City of Taguig). As such, Kimberly
was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification.
Instead of attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of
Withdrawal of COC on 17 December 2012. Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a
substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarificatory hearing no longer pushed
through.
December 18, 2012 Memorandum: Director Amora-Ladra of the Comelec Law Department
recommended the cancellation of Kimberly's COC, and consequently, the denial of the
substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. It is as if no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot
be substituted.
Comelec adopted the recommendation of Director Amora-Ladra, cancelled Kimberly's
COC, and denied the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the cancellation of
Kimberly's COC.
Olivia then filed the present petition for certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, Status Quo Ante Order, and/or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction
COMELEC’s COMMENT
Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter was never an official candidate because she
was not eligible for the post by reason of her age, and that, moreover, the COC that
Kimberly filed was invalid because it contained a material misrepresentation relating to
her eligibility for the office she seeks to be elected to. It can cancel Kimberly's COC motu
proprio as it may look into patent defects in the COCs, such as Kimberly's failure to comply
with the age requirement.
OLIVIA’S REPLY
Although Kimberly may not be qualified to run for election because of her age, it cannot
be denied that she still filed a valid COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be
substituted. There was no ground to cancel or deny Kimberly's COC on the ground of lack
of qualification and material misrepresentation because she did not misrepresent her
birth date to qualify for the position of councilor, and as there was no deliberate attempt
to mislead the electorate, which is precisely why she withdrew her COC upon learning that
she was not qualified.
ISSUE: W/N the cancellation of Olivia’s COC is proper
RULING: NO. Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due
course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has
the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs.
RATIO
Olivia was not among the official candidates for the 2013 Elections and, thus, was not voted
for. As such, a ruling on the present petition would no longer be of practical use or value.
Even if we were to resolve the petition for the purpose of determining Olivia's legal status as
a legitimate and qualified candidate for public office, such purpose has been rendered
inconsequential as a result of the proclamation of the winning councilors for the
2013 elections.
Be that as it may, the Court deems it opportune to address the merits of the case, if only
to caution the Comelec against the precipitate cancellation of COCs. It is necessary to
resolve the issues raised in the petition in order to prevent a repetition thereof and, thus,
enhance free, orderly, and peaceful elections.
VALID SUBSTITUTION
Comelec gravely abused its discretion in declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could
not be considered to have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by
Olivia.
Cipriano v. Comelec: Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due course to COCs.
The duty of the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in
character, and that while the Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not
go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec.
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides for the procedure of
substitution of candidates
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. — If after the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of
the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board
of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can be
validly substituted.
OLIVIA COMPLIED WITH ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID SUBSTITUTION
1. There was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly's COC after the last day for the filing of
COCs
2. Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly
belongs
3. Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day.
Luna vs Comelec: where the candidate, who was also under age, withdrew his COC before
election day and was substituted by a qualified candidate, such substitution was valid.
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. Omnibus Election Code
provides:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. — The
Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated
by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding
section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the
certificate of candidacy.
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. —
If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate
of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party
may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in
accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of
the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the
day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed
with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is
candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.
The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC.
Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall
state, among others, the date of birth of the person filing the certificate. Section
78 of the Election Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate of
candidacy has committed false material representation, a verified petition to deny
due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed at
any time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the certificate of
candidacy.
LACK OF DUE PROCESS
In simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora-Ladra in cancelling Kimberly's
COC and denying the latter's substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due
course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the Comelec once more gravely abused
its discretion.
In the exercise of Comelec’s adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the
Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the En Banc. Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it
is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge,
or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. As
cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec, the
Comelec in Division should have first decided this case.
The Comelec En Banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a
prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the
denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due
notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-
judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide.
The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves
a determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of
their contentions. SC cautions the Comelec against its practice of impetuous cancellation
of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the recommendations of its Law Department
when the situation properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for summary hearing.
MARTINEZ III v COMELEC
J. Villarama
FACTS:
PARTIES INVOLVED:
 CELESTINO MARTINEZ, BENHUR SALIMBANGON, and EDILITO
MARTINEZ: candidates for Representative in 4th Legislative District of
Cebu Province
 NOTE: Take note of Celestino Martinez and Edilito Martinez since they
are the main focus of this case. I will just use Celestino and Edilito to
avoid any confusion.
HOW THE CASE STARTED
 Celestino filed PETITION TO DECLARE EDILITO A NUISANCE CANDIDATE
 COMELEC 2nd Division: declared Edilito a nuisance candidate only on
June 12, 2007 or almost 1 month AFTER the elections
 After the canvassing of votes, stated below is the result of the election:
- Salimbangon: 67,277 votes
- Celestino: 67, 173 votes
- Obviously, Salimbangon was declared as winner with just a
difference of 104 votes against Celestino
 Celestino filed an ELECTION PROTEST AD CAUTELAM
- BASIS OF HIS ELECTION PROTEST:
a. 300 ballots more or less with only “MARTINEZ” of “C.
MARTINEZ” written on the line for Representative which the
Board of Inspectors did not count in favor of Celestino on the
ground that Edilito also had the same surname
b. Celestino likewise alleged that he lost several thousand of votes
as a result of incorrect appreciation of ballots not counted in his
favor
c. claimed that the votes reflected in the election returns were
unlawfully increased in favor of Salimbangon while votes in his
favor were unlawfully decreased
  Salimbangon filed his ANSWER WITH COUNTER-PROTEST. Argued that:
- The Minutes of Voting inside the ballot boxes in all the protested
precincts contain no recorded objections regarding straying of votes
claimed by Martinez.
- It is very seldom that there were ballots with only “MARTINEZ” or
“C. MARTINEZ” written on the line for Representatives
RULING OF HRET
 DISMISSED the election protest and affirmed the proclamation of
Salimbangon as the winner
 The ballots containing only “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” shall be
considered as STRAY BALLOTS since according to Section 211 of
Omnibus Election Code, “where only the first name of the candidate or
only his surname is written, the vote for such candidate is valid, if there is
no other candidate with the same first name or surname for the same
office”
 IN THIS CASE: since the name of Edilito was still included in the official
list of candidates on election day, HRET held that 5,401 ballots with
“MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” only written in the line for
Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no
way of determining the real intention of the voter.
 THOUGHT PROCESS: Since COMELEC failed to act on time with the
petition to declare Edilito as nuisance before the May 14, 2007, some of
the votes intended for Celestino were considered STRAY. As a result,
thousands of votes were taken out from him.
ARGUMENTS OF CELESTINO REGARDING THE RULING OF HRET
 HRET in GAD when it failed to credit the “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ”
votes in his favor despite the finality of the COMELEC resolution
declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate.
 the Decision disenfranchised 5,401 voters when it ruled that said votes
cannot be counted as votes for him since “there is no way of
determining the real intention of the voter,”
 Clearly, it is claimed that there is no clear and good reason to justify the
rejection of those 5,401 on his favor
ARGUMENTS OF SALIMBANGON
 Not a single voter in the district knew of any nuisance congressional
candidate on election day.
 Thus, it would be illogical and unfair to count the said ballots in favor of
Celestino as it is erroneous to base the voter’s intent on the supervening
circumstance which was inexistent on the date the ballot was
accomplished and cast
ISSUES
 WON Edilito is a nuisance candidate
 WON COMELEC promptly decided on the petition for disqualification
filed before its Office.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
YES. EDILITO IS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE AND SHALL BE CONSIDERED
DISQUALIFIED
 RULE: A nuisance thus defined as one who, based on the attendant
circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which
the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the
reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that
ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray
and not counted for either of them.
 IN THIS CASE: The COMELEC had found out that Edilito clearly lacks
serious intent to run for the position for which he filed his COC, and yet,
COMELEC did not promptly declare him as such
GROUNDS USED BY SC TO CLASSIFY EDILITO AS NUISANCE CANDIDATE
 Edilito did not even bother to file an answer to the disqualification case
filed against him.
 He simply disappeared after filing his COC
 He was unknown in politics within the district as he did not even
campaign nor formally launch his candidacy
 He is a “habal- habal driver who had neither the financial resources nor
political support to sustain his candidacy.
 Thus, the similarity of his surname with that of petitioner was meant to
cause confusion among the voters and spoil petitioner’s chances of
winning the congressional race for the Fourth Legislative District of
Cebu.
SECOND ISSUE
NO. COMELEC DID NOT RESOLVE THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION ON
TIME AS MANDATED BY COMELEC RESOLUTION No, 4116.
 RULE: According to COMELEC Resolution 4116, “the decision or
resolution of DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the
nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall
be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion
 for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall
not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona
fide candidate.”
 IN THIS CASE: The decision or resolution of the COMELEC regarding the
disqualification case was executed AFTER the election day. Thus, the
electoral process became a mockery for it creates confusion among the
voters.
COURT BLAMED COMELEC FOR BELATEDLY RESOLVING THE PETITION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION IN A PROMPT MANNER
 Had the Commission timely resolved the petition to declare Edilito as
nuisance candidate, all the ballots with “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ”
would have been counted in favor of Celestino and not considered stray
CONCLUSION:
 The ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for
the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the
bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other
candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the
elections
 Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” should
be credited to Celestino giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against
67,108 total votes of Salimbangon.
 Thus, Celestino is the real winner in the election
G.R. No. 105436. June 2, 1994.
EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO NAZAL, REY MEDINA, MELENCIO
CASTELO and GODOFREDO LIBAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANTONIO V.
HERNANDEZ
Topic: Certificate of Candidacy; Disqualifications and Cancellation
FACTS:
On March 23, 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission on
Elections his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats for councilors in the
Second District of Quezon City. In Item No. 6 of his certificate he gave as his address “B 26
L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City.” However, he did not indicate in the space provided
in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct Number and the particular Barangay where he was a
registered voter. His biodata submitted together with his certificate of candidacy gave his
address as “Acacia Street, Mariana, Quezon City,” which is a part of the Fourth District of
Quezon City. In other words, his certificate of candidacy and his biodata filed with the
COMELEC did not expressly state that he was a registered voter of Quezon City or that he
was a resident of the Second District thereof within the purview of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
Petitioners challenged his qualification due to such deficeincy before COMELEC explaining
that since they became aware of the grounds for private respondent's qualification only
after the elections, they chose to file their petition under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure authorizing the filing of such petition at any day after the last day for filing
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
COMELEC: denied petition for disqualification being filed outside reglemetary period
under Sec. 5 of RA 6646 – petitions for nuisance candidates.
ISSUE: WON failure of a candidate to indicate his Precinct Number and the particular
Barangay where he was a registered voter invalidates his certificate of candidacy.
HELD: NO. Petition is DISMISSED
RATIO:
The provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, earlier quoted,
that the law does not specifically require that the candidate must state in his certificate of
candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it is
enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct where he intends to vote,
which should be within the district where he is running for office.
Private Respndent’s failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is
satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet
assigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon City. He was
formerly a registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the
elections he was already a resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates," admittedly within
the Second District of Quezon City; which was confirmed by Brgy. Captain Laxina that
Hernandez was a resident for 2 years and his petition to be among the voters was also
granted by MTC.
As a registered voter of Precinct Number 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Quezon City, as
judicially confirmed, the COMELEC had no other recourse but to declare that he was
eligible, hence qualified, to run for the position in question. COMELEC referred to the
action taken by petitioners herein as one to declare private respondent a "nuisance
candidate" and intimating that they should have instead petitioned COMELEC to refuse to
give due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of private respondent, citing Sec.
69 of BP Blg. 881.
Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. — The Commission may, motu proprio or
upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has
been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that
the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate. ||| (Jurilla v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 105436, [June 2, 1994], 302 PHIL 801-807)
SC: COMELEC erred in declaring Hernandez as a nuisance candidate tested against the
provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way by which we can categorize him as a "nuisance
candidate," hence, the procedure therein provided could not have been properly invoked
by petitioners herein. Neither could they apply Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which would require such petition to be filed at any day after the last day for
filing certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
Munder
Luis R. Villafuerte v. COMELEC & Miguel R. Villafuerte G.R. No. 206698,
February 25, 2014
FACTS:
 Luis & Miguel were both candidates for Governor of Camarines
Sur in the May 2013 elections. In October 2012, Luis filed a petition
to cancel Miguel’s COC.
o Luis alleged that Miguel, by putting as his nickname “L-
Ray Jr.-Migz,” was acting falsely and deceptively.
 L-Ray Villafuerte Jr., Miguel’s father, was the
incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur.
o Miguel , in his answer, alleged that he had been using the
nickname “LRay Jr. Migz,” and not only “Migz,” and that
the choice of name to appear on the ballot was solely his
choice or preference. He also alleged that the claim that
voters would be confused was presumptive.
 The COMELEC First Division denied Luis’ petition, finding no
compelling reason to cancel Miguel’s COC on the ground of an
alleged irregularity in his nickname/name.
o COMELEC ratiocinated that “material misrepresentation”
in the context of COCs pertained only to the candidate’s
qualifications, not the name he used.
o The COMELEC En Banc upheld the decision of the First
Division, holding that the use of a supposedly erroneous
nickname was a non-material fact
 Hence the instant petition for certiorari.
 ISSUE: The main issue for resolution is whether respondent
committed a material misrepresentation under Section 732 and
Section 783 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the
cancellation of his COC.
HELD:
 Luis claims that Miguel, in using “LRay Jr.-Migz” on the ballot,
rather than his birth name, “Miguel-Migz,” committed material
2Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to
a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved
proceeding, a certificate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which
he has been baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the
name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any other name allowed
under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim, his Hadji name
after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there
are two or more candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each
candidate, upon being made aware or such fact, shall state his paternal and
maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use the name and
surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also
include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known
in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph,
passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio–data and program of
government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
3Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.– A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty–five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
 misrepresentation in reference to his eligibility to be validly voted
for.
 This is erroneous. In all jurisprudence, the SC has consistently held
that the use of a name is not a material misrepresentation, which,
as stated earlier, must refer to qualifications for elective office.
One’s name is unrelated to one’s qualifications.
 Neither did Luis show intent to defraud or mislead voters by use
of such name. In fact, it is of public knowledge that Miguel’s
father is the incumbent, as their relationship is shown in posters,
streamers, and billboards displaying both of them.
o Miguel’s use of the nickname LRay Jr.-Migz is also
uncontested, and may in fact serve to distinguish Miguel
from the incumbent, his father.
 Luis relies on the SC’s ruling in Villarosa v. HRET, where a
candidate sought to have votes for “JTV,” (her husband, the
incumbent mayor’s, initials) counted in her favor. In this case, the
SC refused on the ground that she was not known by that name,
but by another, and in addition that the idem sonans rule cannot
apply, since the Omnibus Election Code only allows for one
nickname or stagename per candidate.
o This case is inapplicable, since Miguel purposefully used
“LRay Jr. Migz” as his appellation, distinguished from his
father.
o In addition, Luis cannot claim that Miguel is asking for
votes for “LRay Jr.” to be counted in his favor, as in the
Villarosa case.
o Luis should have filed an election protest instead, praying
for the declaration of votes for “LRay Jr.” to be declared
as stray votes.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, 22 April 2014
PERALTA, J.:
Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 under Rule 65, which petitioner Gamal S.
Hayudini (Hayudini) filed to set aside and annul the assailed Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), dated June 20, 20132 and July 10, 2013,3 which cancelled his Certificate of
Candidacy for the mayoralty seat in the 2013 local elections in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner: MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J. OMAR
Facts:
• On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy4 (CoC) for the
position of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi.
• Ten days after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition
to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC docketed as SPA No. 13-106(THIS
IS REFERENCED IN THE ISSUE). Omar asserted that Hayudini should be
disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence. He
claimed that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the
Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.
• November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List
of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC).
• Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki (opposed the PETITION for
INCLUSION), MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition on January 31, 2013. On that
same day, the COMELEC’s First Division dismissed Omar’s earlier petition to
cancel Hayudini’s CoC for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed
false representation as to his residency.
• Baki, subsequently RTC.
• The RTCReversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s name
permanent list of voters.
• In view of said decision (PERTAINING TO THE PETITION FOR INCLUSION), Omar
filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
Gamal S. Hayudini (SECOND PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE) by Virtue of a
Supervening Event on March 26, 2013.
• On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He
was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.
On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution11 granting
Omar’s second petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC. The dispositive portion of the
COMELEC Resolution reads:
o WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Gamal S.
Hayudini as Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, in the 13 May 2013
elections, is hereby CANCELLED. The Office of the Deputy Executive
Director for Operations is hereby directed to constitute a Special
Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the lawful winner
for mayoralty position in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi during the 13 May
2013 elections.
• Hayudini filed an MR with the COMELEC en Banc but such was dismissed and
further declared petitioner’s proclamation to be null and void. The court
further proclaimed Respondent OMAR as the duly-elected Mayor for South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, being the qualified candidate obtaining the highest number
of votes, considering the doctrine laid down by the case Aratea v. Comelec13
that a cancelled CoC cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less, to a
valid vote.
 • Hayudini then filed this present petition.
ISSUE:
I. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it failed to outrightly dismiss the instant petition to cancel
certificate of candidacy due to supervening event (spa. no. 13-249(dc)(f), despite the
failure of respondent omar to comply with the mandatory requirements of sections 2
and 4 of the comelec resolution no. 9532 — NO
II. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it revisited and modified the final and executory resolution
issued by the first division in the spa no. 13-106(dc)(f). — NO
III. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to cancel petitioner hayudini’s certificate of
candidacy and declare his proclamation as null and void. — NO
IV. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it decreed the proclamation of salma a. omar as the duly-
elected mayor for south ubian, tawi-tawi
HELD:
I & II
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action based on
thespecific grounds and available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It will only prosper if grave abuse of
discretion is alleged and is actually proved to exist.
A. RELEVANT PROVISION: Section 2. Period to File Petition. — The Petition must be
filed within five (5) days from the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy;
but not later than twenty five (25) days from the time of filing of the certificate
of candidacy subject of the Petition. In case of a substitute candidate, the
Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the time the substitute candidate
filed his certificate of candidacy.
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in
office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is
imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner
but for the sake of public interest.
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction.1âwphi1 The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend
its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of
all matters pending before it.
Omar had previously filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s
CoC on October 15, 2012, docketed as SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F). This was dismissed on
January 31, 2013, or the same day the MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition to be included in
the list of voters. However, on March 8, 2013, the RTC reversed the MCTC ruling and,
consequently, ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s name in Barangay Bintawlan’s
permanent list of voters. Said deletion was already final and executory under the law.
Given the finality of the RTC decision, the same should be considered a valid
supervening event. A supervening event refers to facts and events transpiring after the
judgment or order had become executory. These circumstances affect or change the
substance of the judgment and render its execution inequitable. the RTC’s March 8, 2013
decision, ordering the deletion of Hayudini’s name in the list of voters, which came after
the dismissal of Omar’s first petition, is indubitably a supervening event which would
render the execution of the ruling in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) iniquitous and unjust. Thus, it
is not far-fetched to say that had this final RTC finding been existent before, the COMELEC
First Division could have taken judicial notice of it and issued a substantially different
ruling in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F)
Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a
candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material
representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
RELEVANT PROVISION: Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy
for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member
of the Batasang Pambansa, the prov ince, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the
political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his
post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
sup port and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a per manent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his
oath is assumed voluntarly, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that
the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
xxxx
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. –
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election.
The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact,
not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if
he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for
violation of the election laws.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for
said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality
where he intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a
false material representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78.
III.
The nullification of his proclamation as a winning candidate is also a legitimate outcome −
a necessary legal consequence − of the cancellation of his CoC pursuant to Section 78. A
CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case.35
The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes.36 If the disqualification or CoC
cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the election day, the proceedings shall
continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner. Meanwhile, the
candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner, but the COMELEC's
jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise
applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has already taken his oath of office.37
The only exception to this rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial candidates
where the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken
the proper oath, and also assumed office.
IV.
As held in Aratea v. COMELEC,40 which is a case for cancellation of CoC under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, a cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot
give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Whether a certificate of
candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial, because the cancellation
on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate
of candidacy being void ab initio. We then found that since the winning mayoralty
candidate's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all and
all his votes were considered stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the second placer, the only
qualified candidate, who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position
of Mayor.
LESSONS LEARNED:
II. Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction.
III. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of
procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it.
IV. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of its objectives − ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the COMELEC.
V. A supervening event affects or changes the substance of the judgment and render its
execution inequitable.
VI. A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not
actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he
intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that
he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material
representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78
VII. The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes.
VIII. A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
TY-DELGADO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Petitioner: Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado
Respondent: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Philip Arreza Picha
 Sept. 2008: In a separate case (Tulfo v. People), Pichay was convicted for four
counts of libel.
 Oct. 2012: Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of
house of representatives for the 1st district of Surigao del Sur for the May 2013
elections.
 Feb. 2013: Ty-Delgado filed a petition for disqualification against Pichay before
COMELEC on the ground of the libel conviction, a crime of moral turpitude; and
that the 5-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse.
 March 2013: Pichay answered that the petition for disqualification was actually a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under Sec. 78, in
relation to Sec. 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Futher, he argued that libel
does not necessarily involve moral turpitude because his conviction was based
only on his presumed responsibility as the president of the publishing company.
 May 2013: Pichay was proclaimed as duly elected member of the House of
Representatives. Ty-Delgado then filed an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto
before HRET reiterating that Pichay is ineligible.
o COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of
jurisdiction.
o HRET ruled that that it had jurisdiction over the present quo warranto
petition but concluded that Pichay's libel conviction did not involve
moral turpitude.
Issue: W/N HRET gravely abused its discretion in failing to declare that respondent falsely
represented in his Coc that he is eligible to run for congressman– YES
Held:
Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Sec.12, which became final,
Pichay made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate
of candidafor the 2013 elections. Pichay’s disqualification under Sec. 12 is a material fact
involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sec. 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.· The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is
eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
 component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent;
the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy
are true to the best of his knowledge.
 petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.· A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
In Fermin v. Comelec we likened a proceeding under Sec. 78 to a quo warranto proceeding
under Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code since they both deal with the
eligibility/qualification of a candidate, with the distinction in the fact that a Sec.78 petition
is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation
of winning candidate. This is also similar to a quo warranto petition contesting the election
of a Member of the HoR on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines filed before the HRET.
Under Sec. 78, a proceeding to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy
is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required
for the elective office. This is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. In Jalosjos v. Commission on
Elections, SC held that if a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final
judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in
his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate
clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Sec. 78.
In this case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of candidacy because he
knew that he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Thus, his representation that he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false
material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or cancelled
under Sec. 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his certificate of
candidacy is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and
necessarily to valid votes. In both Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections and Aratea v.
Commission on Elections, we proclaimed the 2nd placer, the only qualified candidate who
actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor. We found that
since the certificate of candidacy of the candidate with the highest number of votes was
void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all, and all his votes were considered stray
votes.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET
35. Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, 16, November 2006
FACTS:
 Lanot, Obispo, and Eusebio were candidates for Pasig City Mayor, while Peralta,
dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz were candidates for Pasig City Councilor; they filed a
Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC.
 Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various
forms on various occasions outside of the designated campaign period, such as
(1) addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by
the Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory statements against Lanot;
(3) causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing
billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across
Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to
induce their parents to vote for him.
 Eusebio in his answer denied petitioners allegations and branded the petition as
a harassment case. Eusebio further stated that petitioners evidence are merely
fabricated.
 Ruling of the Regional Director: respectfully recommends that the instant
petition be GRANTED. Consequently, pursuant to Section 68 (a) and (e) of the
Omnibus Election Code, respondent VICENTE P. EUSEBIO shall be DISQUALIFIED
to run for the position of Mayor, Pasig City for violation of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
 The Ruling of the COMELEC: Ordered the disqualificaiotn of Eusebio
 On Election Day itself, Chairman Abalos issued the first of the three questioned
COMELEC issuances. In a memorandum, Chairman Abalos enjoined Director
Ladra from implementing the COMELECs resolution due to Eusebios motion for
reconsideration.
 The day after the elections, petitioners Lanot, Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a motion to suspend the counting and
canvassing of votes and the proclamation of the winning mayoral candidate for
Pasig City. Without waiting for Eusebios opposition, the COMELEC En Banc
partially denied the motion on the same day.
 On 12 May 2004, Eusebio filed his opposition to petitioners motion.
 COMELEC En Banc issued the second questioned issuance: to expedite the
canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates to ease the post
election tension and without prejudice to its action and resolved to declare
Eusebio as Pasig City Mayor
 Lanot filed a motion to annul Eusebios proclamation and to order his
proclamation instead.
 COMELEC En Banc promulgated the third questioned issuance: justifying the
annulment of the order to disqualify Eusebio and the referral of the case to the
Law Department for preliminary investigation.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
Lanot alleged that as the COMELECs issuances are not supported by substantial evidence
and are contrary to law and settled jurisprudence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. Lanot raised the following
issues before this Court
1. Whether public respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion or
lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued its resolutions: NO
a. by setting aside the Resolution of Disqualification promulgated by its
First Division
b. lifting and setting aside the Order of suspension of proclamation by
winning candidate
c. justifying the annulment of the order to disqualify Eusebio and the
referral of the case to the Law Department for preliminary
investigation
2. Whether respondent Eusebuo should be deemed disqualified pursuant to Sec.
68(a) and (e)
3. In case of disqualification of respondent Eusebio, WON petitioner Lanot can be
proclaimed and allowed to sit as mayor-elect
RULING:
RULING ON RESOLUTIONS ISSUED BY THE COMELEC:
1. Suspension of these proceedings is tantamount to an implementation of the
Resolution of the FIRST DIVISION which had not yet become final and executory
by reason of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. A
disposition -that has not yet attained finality cannot be implemented even
through indirect means.
a. Eusebio filed a motion for reconsideration and there was not enough
time to resolve the motion for reconsideration before the elections.
Therefore, Eusebio was not yet disqualified by final judgment at the
time of the elections.
b. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 provides that [a]
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
2. COMELEC En Banc ordered the suspension of Eusebio’s proclamation in the
event he would receive the winning number of votes. Ten days later, the
COMELEC En Banc set aside the order and directed the Pasig City Board of
Canvassers to proclaim Eusebio as the winning candidate for Pasig City Mayor.
The COMELEC relied on Resolutions 7128 and 7129[32] to justify the counting of
Eusebios votes and quoted from the Resolutions as follows:
Resolution No. 7128 - Resolution No. 7129
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to NOW THEREFORE, the Commission on
adopt certain policies and to direct all Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in
Board of Canvassers, as follows: it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code and other elections laws, has
1. to speed up its canvass and proclamation RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
of all winning candidates except under the refrain from granting motions and petitions
following circumstances: seeking to postpone proclamations by the
Board of Canvassers and other pleadings
a. issuance of an order or resolution with similar purpose unless they are
suspending the proclamation; grounded on compelling reasons,
supported by convincing evidence and/or
b. valid appeal[s] from the rulings of the violative of the canvassing procedure
board in cases where appeal is allowed and outlined in Resolution No. 6669.
the subject appeal will affect the results of
the elections;
The COMELEC has the discretion to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate
during the pendency of a disqualification case when evidence of his guilt is strong.
However, an order suspending the proclamation of a winning candidate against whom a
disqualification case is filed is merely provisional in nature and can be lifted when
warranted by the evidence.
PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR
POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
1. The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code x x x may be filed any day after the last day [of] filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
2. The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies with the concerned office mentioned in Sec. 3
personally or through a duly authorized representative by any citizen of voting age, or
duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties against any
candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision
of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of:
 2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; or
 2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Elections Code; or
 2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v
and cc sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
ON DISQUALIFICATION
 There is no basis to disqualify Eusebio.
  Director Ladra recommended the disqualification of Eusebio for violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC First Division approved
Director Ladras recommendation and disqualified Eusebio. Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides:
o SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside
campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a
voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to
engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except
during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold
political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates
within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign period
and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.
(Emphasis supplied)
What Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits is an election campaign or
partisan political activity by a candidate outside of the campaign period. Section 79 of the
same Code defines candidate, election campaign and partisan political activity as follows:
SECTION 79. Definitions. As used in this Code:
(a) The term candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public
office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political
party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties;
(b) The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office
which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of
persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for
or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews
for or against the election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to
support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a
candidate.
The essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the
act is done outside the campaign period. The second element requires the existence of a
candidate. Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who has filed a certificate of candidacy
to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a
candidate. The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the
election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the
last day, which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start
of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts
done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no particular candidate or
candidates to campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing,
the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only
acts done outside the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may
only apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period
and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the
reason why those running for elective public office usually file their certificates of
candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election campaigning or partisan political
activities were committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether
Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a candidate
when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.
EFFECT OF EUSEBIOS POSSIBLE DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained
the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated because of the
disqualification. Votes cast in favor of a candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes, against whom a petition for disqualification was filed before the election, are
presumed to have been cast in the belief that he was qualified. For this reason, the second
placer cannot be declared elected.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We find no grave abuse of discretion in the 10
May 2004 Advisory of Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos and in the 21 May 2004 Order of the
Commission on Elections En Banc. We SET ASIDE the 20 August 2004 Resolution of the
Commission En Banc since respondent Vicente P. Eusebio did not commit any act which
would disqualify him as a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Dimapilis v. COMELEC
PARTIES INVOLVED:
 PETITIONER JOSEPH DIMAPILIS – elected as Punong Barangay of Brgy.
Pulung Maragul, Angeles City.
 COMELEC – challenged the proclamation of petitioner
HOW THE DISPUTE STARTED
 Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in
Oct. 2010. He also won in the 2013 election. In his CoC, he declared under
oath that he is “eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to.”
  COMELEC Law Department filed a Petition for Disqualification with the
COMELEC 2nd Div against petitioner pursuant to Sec 40 (b) of RA 7160 or
the Local Gov’t Code. COMELEC claimed that the petitioner is barred
from running in an election since he was suffering from the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification. He was found guilty of the admin
offense of Grave Misconduct.
COMELEC 2nd DIV:
 Petitioner averred that the petition should be dismissed, considering
that: (a) while the petition prayed for his disqualification, it partakes he
nature of a petition to deny or to cancel CoC. (b) COMELEC Law Dept is
not a proper party and (c) RTC Angeles already enjoined the
implementation of the Ombudsman decision on the ground of
condonation doctrine (Aguinaldo doctrine).
 Ombudsman averred that the ruling had become final and rendered him
disqualified.
 2nd Div granted the petition and cancelled the petitioner’s CoC, annulled
his proclamation as the winner.
 It treated the petition as one for the cancellation of CoC. It ruled that the
petitioner committed material misrepresentation in solemnly avowing
that he was eligible to run, when he was actually suffering from
perpetual disqualification in view of the Ombudsman decision.
 Rejected the petitioner’s invocation of the condonation doctrine since it
has already been abandoned. Also, since he was suffering from
perpetual disqualification, the votes cast in his favor should not be
counted.
COMELEC EN BANC
 MR denied
ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONERS:
 while the petition prayed for his disqualification, it partakes he nature of
a petition to deny or to cancel CoC. (b) COMELEC Law Dept is not a
proper party and (c) RTC Angeles already enjoined the implementation
of the Ombudsman decision on the ground of condonation doctrine
(Aguinaldo doctrine).
ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT:
 COMELEC 2nd Div against petitioner pursuant to Sec 40 (b) of RA 7160 or
the Local Gov’t Code. COMELEC claimed that the petitioner is barred
from running in an election since he was suffering from the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification. He was found guilty of the admin
offense of Grave Misconduct.
ISSUES:
 WON the petitioner is disqualified to run and to hold public office
YES. A PERSON INTENDING TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE MUST NOT ONLY
POSSS THE REQUIRED QUIALIFICATIONS BUT MUST ALSO POSSESS NONE OF
THE GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION UNDER THE LAW.
 In this case, the petitioner had been previously found guilty of Grave
Misconduct by a FINAL JUDGMENT, which carries with it an accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
 The perpetual disqualification rendered the petitioner’s CoC void from
the start since he was not eligible to run for public office.
 A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to run for public office.
ALSO, THE COMELEC HAS THE DUTY TO BAR CANDIDATES SUFFERING FROM
PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATIONS FROM RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE.
 The Court previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to
cancel CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty. This ruling
may be for criminal convictions, but the Court does not see any reason
not to apply such ratiocination should also apply in administrative
penalties with such accessory penalty.
THE RE-ELECTION AS PUNONG BARANGAY CANNOT OPERATE AS A
CONDONATION OF HIS MISCONDUCT
 In the Carpio-Morales case, the condonation doctrine was abandoned
because, as the court said, election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is no constitutional or statutory basis
for such.
 Prior to this, the Court in Reyes v COMELEC, illumined that the rationale
in the Aguinaldo case (condonation doctrine) was hinged on the
expiration of the term of office during which misconduct was
committed before a decision was rendered. Therefore, a re-election bars
removal for such misconduct.
 In this case, the Ombudsman ruling had already attained finality even
before his first election. Therefore, the perpetual disqualification had
already rendered him ineligible to run for any public office. This ruling
was still effective during the 2013 elections which invalidates his re-
election, which means that the condonation doctrine was not
successfully invoked.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is Dismissed. Petitioner is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Punong Barangay.

37. Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr.
G.R. No. 211140. January 12, 2016.*
Topic: Petition for disqualification and petition for cancellation of certificate of
candidacy
Petitioner: LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO (WINNER!)
Respondents: HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR. SECRETARY
GENERAL MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
FACTS
1. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC for Mandamus filed by Velasco seeking
the following reliefs:
I. WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SPEAKER BELMONTE, JR. ordering him
to administer the proper OATH in favor of Velasco for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; and to allow the
latter to assume the position and exercise the powers and prerogatives
of said position;
II. WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL BARUA-YAP
ordering her to REMOVE the name of Reyes in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives and to REGISTER his name in her stead;
and
III. TRO be issued to RESTRAIN, PREVENT and PROHIBIT Reyes from
usurping the position of Member of the House of Representatives for
the Lone District of Marinduque and from further exercising the
prerogatives of said position and performing the duties pertaining
thereto, and DIRECTING her to IMMEDIATELY VACATE.
2. Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality
of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Reyes alleging that she made several material
misrepresentations therein, i.e.,
 (i) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque;
 (ii) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen;
 (iii) that she is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign
country;
 (iv) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964;
 (v) that her civil status is single; and finally
 (vi) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to be elected to.
3. March 27, 2013: COMELEC First Division granted the petition; hence,
Reyes’s CoC was cancelled.
4. Reyes filed a MR but while said motion was pending resolution, the
synchronized local and national elections were held on May 13, 2013.
5. May 14, 2013: COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC
First Division on the ground that she lacked the Filipino citizenship and
residency requirements.
6. PROCLAMATION; May 18, 2013: Despite its receipt of the Resolution, the
Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes
as the winner.
7. May 31, 2013: Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam and a
Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the HRET.
8. June 5, 2013: COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality of its May
14 Resolution since more than 21 days have lapsed from the date of
promulgation with no Order issued by the SC restraining its execution.
9. OATH; June 7, 2013: Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of
office to Reyes.
10. June 10, 2013: Reyes filed before the SC a Petition for Certiorari against
the COMELEC and Tan, assailing the May 14 Resolution of the COMELEC
En Banc and the June 5 Certificate of Finality. Dismissed.
11. Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC against the
new members/old members of the Marinduque PBOC and Reyes,
assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as
null and void. Denied.
12. June 28, 2013: Tan filed a Motion for Execution of the March 27
Resolution and the May 14 Resolution and cause Velasco’s proclamation.
13. ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE; June 30, 2013: Reyes assumed office and
started discharging its functions.
14. July 9, 2013: COMELEC En Banc reversed the denial of Velasco’s petition
and declared null and void and w/o legal effect the proclamation of
Reyes.
15. July 10, 2013: COMELEC En Banc granted Tan’s motion for execution and
directed the reconstitution of a new PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the
proclamation by said new Board of Velasco.
16. July 16, 2013: the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed
herein Velasco.
17. July 22, 2013: the 16th Congress formally convened in a joint session and
on the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for
Marinduque, along with the rest of the Members of the HoR, took their
oaths in open session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
18. Velasco sent letters to Reyes demanding that she vacate the office and
to relinquish the same in his favor. Still, she continued to discharge the
duties of said position.
19. Velasco requested Speaker Belmonte, Jr. to allow him assume the
position of Representative of Marinduque through letters and a copy of
the writ of execution of the orders and resolutions recognizing him as
the winner of the elections but to no avail
 20. Velasco also wrote Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap requesting her to delete the
name of Reyes from the Roll of Members and register his name in her
place. However, his efforts proved futile.
VELASCO’S CONTENTION:
1. As to the first and second issues, the final and executory decisions of the
COMELEC and the SC, as well as the nullification of Reyes’s proclamation
and his subsequent proclamation, collectively give him the legal right to
claim the congressional seat.
a. Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully
neglecting the performance of their ministerial duties by
illegally excluding him from the enjoyment of his right as the
duly elected Representative of Marinduque.
2. With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the “continued
usurpation and unlawful holding of such position by Reyes has worked
injustice and serious prejudice to him in that she has already received the
salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the
position since June 30, 2013 up to the present.”
REYES’ CONTENTION:
1. The petition is actually one for quo warranto and not mandamus. Being
a collateral attack on a title to public office, the petition must be
dismissed.
2. Even if the Petition for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it
is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal right
on the part of Velasco.
3. HRET has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the HoR.
4. COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon her proclamation as the
winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction
over quo warranto cases filed against Reyes by several individuals.
5. Even granting that the proclamation was validly nullified, Velasco as
second-placer cannot be declared the winner as he was not the choice
of the people.
6. Velasco is estopped from asserting the jurisdiction of the SC over her
election because he filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET on
May 31, 2014.
The OSG, arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, opposed
Velasco’s petition:
1. Upon Reyes’ proclamation, exclusive jurisdiction to resolve election
contests involving her, including the validity of her proclamation and her
eligibility for office, vested in the HRET.
2. Until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election
protest filed against Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions
become final and executory, Reyes may not be restrained from
exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque Representative, and Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus.
3. Codilla vs. Comelec is not applicable to this case. Velasco, being merely
the second-placer, cannot validly assume the post of Marinduque
Representative and Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not
be compelled by mandamus.
4. There is a need for the SC to revisit its twin Resolutions, given that (i) it
was “divided” when it issued the same; and (ii) there were strong
dissents to the majority opinion.
5. Despite the finality of the Resolutions upholding the cancellation of
Reyes’s CoC, there has been no compelling reason for the House to
withdraw its recognition of Reyes for there was nothing in the
disposition in Reyes v. COMELEC that required any action from the
House and neither Velasco nor Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-
Yap were parties therein.
6. If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the
assumption of office of the winner (noon on the 30 th day of June next
following the election), then there would be a clash of jurisdiction
between the HRET and the COMELEC, given that the 2011 HRET Rules
provide that the appropriate cases should be filed before it within 15
days from the date of proclamation of the winner.

TRIBUNAL’S JURISDICTION
1. The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is “the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
House Members.”
2. Such power or authority of the Tribunal is echoed in its 2011 Rules of the
HRET: “The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.”
3. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives (Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution).
4. To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) a valid proclamation,
(2) a proper oath, and
(3) assumption of office.
5. COMELEC’s cancelled Reyes’ CoC, resulting in the nullification of her
proclamation. Without the proclamation, Reyes’ oath of office is
 likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be
no valid and effective assumption of office.
6. In view of the foregoing, the Tribunal, cannot assume jurisdiction over
the present petitions.
ISSUE: WON it is proper to issue a writ of mandamus.
RATIO
This special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case.
- A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a
person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has
forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
- Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is
entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right
to the undisturbed possession of the office.
- In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and
executory resolutions of SC;
 (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC cancelling
Reyes’s CoC; and
 (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC declaring null and
void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning
candidate
—it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the
determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.
- What is prayed for is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and
not to try disputed title.
 present petition for mandamus for he is the rightful Representative of the Lone
Section 3, Rule 65 of the RoC, as amended, provides that any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus when…
- any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
- unlawfully
o neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
o excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and
- there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a
ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board,
officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof.
Ministerial Discretionary
One which an officer or tribunal If the law imposes a duty upon a
performs in a given state of facts, public officer and gives him the
in a prescribed manner, in right to decide how or when the
obedience to the mandate of a duty shall be performed.
legal authority, without regard to
or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether or
not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter’s name
in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively.
The confluence of the three acts — Reyes’ proclamation, oath and assumption
of office — has not altered the legal situation between Velasco and Reyes.
- The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC
finally decided to cancel the CoC of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013.
- Without a valid CoC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the
election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner.
- That particular decision of the COMELEC was promulgated even before
Reyes’s proclamation, and which was affirmed by this Court’s final and
executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.
- The proclamation of Reyes was made in clear defiance of the COMELEC
En Banc Resolution.
Velasco has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the
District of the Province of Marinduque.
Contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the HRET is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available remedy to
any party, specially to Velasco, who should be the sitting Member of the HoR.
Petition GRANTED.