Crim Law Outline

Basic Principles………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….2

8th Amendment…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………2

Lawful Use of Force…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..3

Actus Reus Princples…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………3

Mens Rea Principles………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….5

Causation………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….7

Concurrence (between actus reus and mens rea)……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..8

Homicide (Murder, Manslaughter, Abuse, Depraved heart murder, felony murder rule)………………………………………………….8

Theft (Larceny, Larceny by trick, Embezzlement, False pretenses, Robbery, Burglary)...…………………………………………………12

Defenses (self-defense, defense of others, defense of habitation, necessity, duress, intoxication, insanity)….……………….14

Attempt………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….18

Accomplice Liability…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………19

Conspiracy………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………20

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Basic Principles

1. Most crimes consist of 4 basic elements

a. Actus reus: a voluntary act (or omission when there is legal duty to act) that results in some kind of
social harm
b. Mens rea: prohibited mental state
c. Causation: chain of actions links D’s actions with social harm
d. Concurrence between mens rea and actus reus
2. No nationwide code
3. Common law crimes do not exist
4. MPC is not law
5. Presumption of innocent
6. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
a. Guards against conviction of innocent
b. Immense states involved in criminal case
i. Loss of liberty
ii. Imposed stigma of a convicti0on
7. Standard of review
a. Sufficiency of evidence – could a rational juror decide prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable
doubt
b. Jury instruction – was the instruction an erroneous statement of law? If so conviction reversed and
remanded
8. Reasons/justifications for punishment
a. Retribution
b. Deterrence
i. General – punishment deters potential offender in general community
ii. Specific – punishment deters individual offender
c. Incapacitation
d. Reform/rehab
9. Statutory Interpretation
a. Plain language
b. Avoid constitutional problems
c. Statutory construction (how bill was drafted)
d. Avoid absurd results from your holding
e. Legislative history (last)
f. Rule of lenity (really last) – doubts when reading a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of D
(recognizes liberty interests at stake and the presumption of innocence)
i. Dauray: Statute wording is ambiguous, can be read either way, therefore apply rule of lenity in
favor of D
ii. Due process --> Fair warning of crime --> rule of lenity

8th Amendment

1. Supreme Court holds that punishments out of proportion to the crime violate the cruel and unusual punishment
clause
2. Test: look to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society (Graham)
a. Look at characteristics of offender, nature of crime, and severity of sentence
b. When making categorical rule: is there national consensus on sentencing? Look at
i. Society’s standards as expressed in legislative enactments AND
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 ii. State practice (is this punishment unusual? Does it reflect community’s sense of what is fair?)
c. Under 18
i. Death penalty unconstitutional (also for low IQ offender)
ii. LWOP for non-homicide unconstitutional (Graham)
iii. Jackson v Hobbs & Miller v Alabama: mandatory sentencing of a juvenile to LWOP after being
convicted of homicide violates 8th amendment
3. Threshold culpability test
a. Instrumental rationality: capacity to form conscious purpose to do a thing
b. Capacity to understand difference between acting rightfully and wrongfully
c. Capacity to refrain from acting wrongfully (no duress)
4. To be held liable for crime, D must be able to understand
a. Fact of injury
b. Its permanence
c. Inflicting this loss is considered wrong
5. Sentencing schemes
a. Indeterminate: trial judges have broad sentencing discretion subject to minimum and maximum terms
set by legislature.
b. Determinate (like WA): legislature sets a specific sentence for each crimes which includes eliminating
parole, imposing mandatory minimum sentences set by legislation and sentencing guidelines set by an
administrative agency. May help with racial/economic inequity in sentences for same crimes.
6. Indigent defense
a. Right to counsel (Gideon v Wainwright)
b. Strickland two prong test of ineffective assistance of counsel
i. Performance prong – counsel’s performance feel below an objective standard of reasonableness
ii. Prejudice prong – reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different
c. Adequacy of plea bargain counsel
i. Padilla v Kentucky – attorney must provide client adequate immigration impact regarding plea
offer
ii. Lafler v Cooper – D must show but for ineffective advice there was reasonable probability that
plea offer would have been presented and accepted by court and conviction/sentence would
have been less severe
iii. Missouri v Frye – right to ineffective assistance of counsel extends to the consideration of plea
offers that lapse or are rejected and that right applies to all critical stages of criminal
proceedings

Lawful Use of Force

1. Deadly force may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to officer or others
(Tennessee v Garner)

Actus Reus Requirement

1. Principles
a. Person should not be convicted solely on thoughts but also must have done something that caused
some sort of social harm
b. Status crimes are unconstitutional: people should only be criminally punished for their conduct, not
simply for being a certain kind of person

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 c. A volitional act is a movement of the body willed by the actor
d. Habitual acts are generally considered volitional even if the actor is unaware of what she is doing as she
is doing it
2. Examples
a. Martin v State
i. No actus reus where D involuntarily taken to public highway where otherwise criminal acts
occurred
ii. MPC interpretation: D chose to drink voluntarily so MPC would not allow an actus reus defense.
b. State v Decina
i. While seizure was involuntary, D deliberately took a chance by making a conscious and
voluntary choice of getting in the car thus disregarding the consequences which D knew might
follow from his conscious act and which did ensue. This amounts to culpable negligence as
required under the statute. It would be different if he had no prior knowledge that a seizure
could happen but he did know
ii. MPC interpretation: Decision to drive the car was voluntary so MPC would not allow an actus
reus defense
c. Involuntary
i. Something that happens from stroke/heart attack
ii. Unconscious/asleep
iii. Hypnosis (somewhat controversial
3. Liability for omissions
a. Situations where the courts have recognized the legal duty to act
i. When there is a special relationship between D and victim
1. Spousal
2. Parent/child (Commonwealth v Howard upholding involuntary manslaughter conviction
for parent who failed to stop partner from beating her child to death)
3. Master/servant
4. Shipmaster/crew/passengers
5. Innkeeper/inebriated customers
6. People v Beardsley: No legal duty by D to victim since they were just lovers
ii. When D enters into K which requires him either explicitly or implicitly to act in a particular way
(Commonwealth v Pestinikas upholding conviction where persons in contractual charge of
elderly man neglected him and were determined to be direct cause of his death)
iii. statutory duty to act
iv. When D creates risk of harm to the victim
v. Voluntary assumption of care to seclusion of others
b. In order to be held criminally liable for an omission, D must have been physically capable of acting
c. Duty neglected must be a legal duty and not a mere moral obligation. Omission to perform the duty
must be the immediate and direct cause of death.
d. Good Samaritan Laws/No duty to rescue rule
i. It is not illegal in most states to witness a crime or accident and then fail to prevent it or fail to
report it.
ii. Those states that make it criminal not to offer aid also safeguard the person offering the aid
through general liability protections (not expected to render aid if it endangers oneself or cause
the person to neglect duty to others)
iii. Sherrice Iverson case: NV passed law requiring person who knows that violent or sexual offense
has been committed against a child to report it to law enforcement within 24 hours

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 4. MPC 2.01
a. “A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary
act.”
i. 2(a) – a reflex or convulsion is not voluntary

Mens Rea

1. Defintions
a. Common law systems
i. Describes mental state as needing to be “willful, malicious, corrupt, intentional, knowing,
reckless, or negligent”
1. Malice requires either
a. an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that was in fact done
(Regina v Cunningham where court found no malice by D who intended to cause
different kind of harm).
b. Recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (the accused has
foreseen the particular kind of harm might be done but had gone one to take
the risk of it anyways)
c. Neither limited to not does it require ill-will towards the injured person
ii. Specific intent crimes
1. When the definition refers to D’s intent to do some further act or achieve some
additional consequence.
2. Statute usually contains:
a. “with the intent”
b. “for the purpose of achieving…”
3. Difference from general intent crime is that you needed to intend to cause the resulting
harm.
4. However, mere omission of any mention of intent in a statute will not eliminate that
element from the crimes denounced (Morrissette v US) except in limited cases where
welfare and safety is at stake (Staples v US)
5. Examples of specific intent crimes
a. Burglary
b. Larceny
c. Possession of stolen property
iii. general intent crimes
1. When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act,
without reference to intend to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, then
just ask whether D intended to do the proscribed act.
2. Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible to negate existence of general criminal
intent
3. Examples of general intent crimes
a. Battery
b. Rape
b. MPC systems
i. Only recognizes 4 mental states
1. Purposely
2. Knowingly
3. Recklessly

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 4. Negligently
ii. All are precisely defined unlike in common law
iii. 2.02(3): if statute is silent as to mens rea, minimum requirement is recklessness
iv. 2.02(4): ifit does specify mens rea, it applies to all material elements, unless a contrary purpose
plainly appears
v. Does not distinguish between specific and general intent
2. Tests and rules
a. Element of intent may be and usually is determined from attendant circumstances
b. Intent dwells in the mind of the accused. It can never be proved by direct testimony of a third person
and it need not be
c. An intent to kill may be presumed where the natural and probable consequence of a wrongful act is to
produce death and such intent may be deduced from all the surrounding circumstances i.e. the
instrument used to produce death or the manner of inflicting the fatal wound (State v Fugate)
d. Traditionally, can’t dispense of mens rea when the penalty is severe such as imprisonment
e. Common issue in cases is whether the prosecutor has to prove mens rea on each element of a crime or
not (US v Yermian)
3. Willful blindness
a. Deliberately contriving lack of positive knowledge does not shield D from responsibility (US v Jewell)
b. To prove willful blindness
i. D subjectively believed there was a high probability that a fact existed AND
ii. Took deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact
c. MPC 2.07(7): Knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he
actually believes that it does not exist
4. Transferred intent
a. Common law doctrine: D who does something with intent to harm a certain person and instead hits a
bystander is subject to the same criminal liability that would have been imposed had the harm reached
the intended person.
b. Mens rea is satisfied since the requisite intent in murder just requires intent to kill a human being (not a
specific human being)
c. D can still be held liable for attempted murder on intended target after the intent was already
transferred to deceased bystander (People v Scott).
5. Mens rea defenses
a. Mistake and ignorance
i. Analysis
1. Is the mistake of fact or law relevant to the mens rea of the crime?
2. Is a mistake of law a defense under a statutory provision of the criminal code
(entrapment by estoppel)?
3. Due process
ii. Mistakes of fact and mistakes of law (MPC does not distinguish between these two)
1. Now valid defense unless the mistaken belief is based on an official statement of the
law. (United States v Clegg where D presented sufficient evidence that his mistake of
law was based on representations from officials acting in official capacity)
2. If not based on official interpretation and is D’s subjective view, the defense will not be
permitted (People v Marrero)
3. Not required that D knows the exact statute he/she is violating; jury just has to find that
D knew he/she was acting unlawfully in order to convict (Bryan v United States)
iii. Honest mistake

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 1. Specific intent: an honest mistakes that negates the specific intent required is a
complete defense. Need not be reasonable as long as it is in good faith. (People v
Navarro). A good faith misunderstanding of the law, even in if unreasonable, is a
defense to the statutory willfulness requirement (Cheek v United States).
2. General intent: a mistake of fact that negates an element of the crime must be both
honest AND reasonable to exculpate. Some jurisdictions also impose a moral or legal
wrong test. (Bell v State where mistake of age defense not available to D since he still
had intent to procure another for purposes of prostitution).
a. Moral wrong doctrine: the mistake defense is not available where if the facts
had been as the actor reasonably believed them to be his or her conduct would
still be immoral.
b. Legal wrong doctrine
i. The mistake defense is not available when the actor would be guilty of a
different albeit less serious crime if the situation was as he or she
reasonably supposed.
ii. Common law: D will be liable for more serious charge if prosecutor can
just prove the fact of having done the acts which he actually did
regardless of his belief (e.g. D thinks he stole $300 – 3rd degree criminal
mischief – but he actually stole $500 – 2nd degree criminal mischief.
Prosecutor just have to prove the goods were worth $500 to get 2nd
degree).
iii. MPC 2.04: in the above hypo under MPC instead, D only liable for 3rd
degree criminal mischief unless prosecutor could prove D knew how
much it was worth.
1. Provides partial defense where legal wrong doctrine wouldn’t.
iv. Ignorance of the law is no excuse
1. Applies under both common law and MPC
2. Three exceptions to general rule
a. Entrapment by estoppel: a person who reasonably relies on an official
interpretation of the law that turns out to be erroneous can be exonerated.
b. Ignorance of the law is a defense if knowledge that the prohibited conduct is
unlawful is an element of the crime.
c. Prosecution of a person who lacks fair notice of a legal duty imposed by law can
violate due process

Causation

1. Third basic element – technically part of actus reus requirement

2. Stricter test than tort causation requiring a closer connection between D’s conduct and resulting harm
3. Elements
a. Actual/but-for cause
b. Proximate/legal cause - Was there an intervening cause? Do intervening cause analysis
i. Dependent/response
1. one that is dependent upon or responsive to the D’s voluntary act. D typically proximate
cause unless intervening cause is extremely unusual or bizarre
2. Commonwealth v Rementer where D was not immediate cause of death, car that hit
victim was, but D caused victim to try and escape by D’s voluntary acts and victim
attempting escape and her death was foreseeable. D created the situation.

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 3. State v Govan where victim died 5 years after D’s initial gunshot from pneumonia which
was a result of the paralysis which was caused by D’s gunshot. There were no
intervening events that were superseding. Some states have abrogated year and a day
rule including AZ.
4. Henderson v Kibbe where D held liable for murder when he left robbed victim and left
him in blizzard and was then hit and killed by another car. D acted recklessly by being
aware of and consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death
would occur.
ii. Independent/coincidental
1. one that is coincidental to D’s voluntary act. D generally relieved of responsibility unless
intervening cause is foreseeable.
2. An intervening cause that was a response will be a superseding cause only where it was
abnormal and unforeseeable.
4. Doctrines
a. Voluntary human intervention: in some jurisdictions if a voluntary and deliberate human intervention
like not seeking medical attention comes between D’s voluntary act and the social harm so D will be
relieved of criminal liability for the ultimate result
b. De minimus contribution: Did D’s act contribute minimally to the social harm? If so it might not be fair to
hold them criminally liable. Ex: D hurts victim who goes to hospital to get attention. On the way, victim is
held up by carjacker and killed. D in this case is but for cause but his contribution to social harm is
minimal so won’t be held criminally liable for murder.
c. Intended consequences doctrine: even if the way D meant for harm to happen didn’t happen that way
but the end is still achieved, D will be held liable just the same. Ex: mother intends to poison baby by
having nurse administer it. Nurse forgets and mother’s 5 year old son finds poison and gives it to baby
and baby dies. Mother still held liable.
d. Omissions: an omission will rarely serve as a superseding intervening cause. Ex: 911 dispatcher failing to
call for an ambulance.

Concurrence

1. Mandates a connection between mens rea and actus reus.

2. Two types of concurrence must be present
a. Temporal: D must possess the requisite mens rea at the same time she engages in the actus reus
b. Motivational: the mens rea must be the motivating force behind the actus reus
c. Example Thabo Meli v Reginam where Ds held liable for murder after making victim unconscious and
leaving him outside where he died of exposure. Original intention to kill did not cease when they placed
D outside.

Homicide

1. Murder
a. Under both common law and contemporary penal codes, broadly defined as the unlawful killing of a
human being by another human being with malice aforethought
b. Malice aforethought
i. Requires any one of the following to be present
1. An intent to kill (aka express malice – the following are all implied malice)
2. An intent to commit serious bodily injury
3. An abandoned and malignant heart or depraved heart
4. If the felony murder rule applies

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 ii. Inferences jury can make as to malice aforethought
1. Deadly weapon rule: permits jury to infer intent to kill when D has used a deadly
weapon aimed at vital part of the human body.
2. Natural and probable consequences doctrine.
c. Degrees
i. 1st degree:
1. Requires proof that
a. The act involved premeditation (D reflected upon and thought killing in advance
– can be as short as “wink of an eye”) and deliberation (refers to quality of
accused’s thought process – in general a killing that is deliberate is one that is
undertaken with a cool head) OR
b. Murder was committed using a means specified in relevant statute such as lying
in wait, poison or torture OR
c. Murder occurred during the commission or attempted commission of an
enumerated felony (namely rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or arson)
2. Sentence may not be reduced considering good faith motive of D if the murder was still
premeditated (Gilbert v State where court found D still liable for 1st degree despite D’s
good faith intentions to end his wife’s suffering)
ii. 2nd
1. State v Brown where D not liable for 1st degree murder in the case of child abuse of long
duration since D comes not to expect death of the child from his action. Needed for the
killing to be willful to support 1st degree murder charge. Not enough evidence here of
premeditation or deliberation.
2. State v Bingham where D not liable for 1st degree because evidence that it took 3-5
minutes to strangle victim to death is not enough circumstantial evidence that D
deliberated or reflected. Premeditation must involve more than a moment in time.
d. Beginning and end of life
i. Born alive rule: if child is born alive and dies of the potion, battery or some other cause, this is
murder but not if the child dies in the womb as a result of any reason
ii. Viability rule (Roe v Wade; Planned Parenthood v Casey): Court identifies the ability of a fetus to
live outside the womb as a fulcrum of this balance
1. Woman has a right to seek abortion before viability
2. State has power to restrict abortions after viability if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health
3. State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health
of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.
iii. End of life
1. Brain death: every jurisdiction now interprets death to include brain death where
respiration and heartbeat continue but there is no brain function
2. Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA): Person is legally dead if either
a. Irreversible cessation of all functions including the brain stem OR
b. Irreversible cessation of circulatory or respiratory functions
2. Manslaughter: the unlawful killing of a human being by another human being without malice aforethought.
a. Voluntary- provocation doctrine
i. An intentional killing that would normally qualify as second degree murder but which is reduced
through the application of a partial defense such as provocation (heat of passion), imperfect
self-defense, or diminished capacity. 3-11 year sentence typical.

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ii. Three approaches to whether D charged with murder is entitled to a voluntary manslaughter
instruction
1. Early common law – only could claim provocation if killed in response to
a. Aggravated assault or battery
b. Observation of a serious crime against a close relative
c. An illegal arrest
d. Mutual combat OR
e. Catching one’s wife in the act of adultery
f. Mere words rule: mere words are not enough but exceptions include
i. Series of provoking statements, usually involving adultery (People v
Ambro). For adultery exception there must be a series of provoking
statements or circumstances such as
1. History of ongoing marital discord
2. Spouse who evidence an intent to permanently leave other
spouse
3. Insulting remarks concerning husband’s masculinity.
4. An announcement of adultery
ii. White man killing a slave
2. Modern “reasonable person” test. Jury must find:
a. Heat of passion
b. D reasonably provoked into heat of passion
c. Not enough cool off time between provocative act or event and the killing and
reasonable person in D’s shoes also would not have had sufficient time to cool
i. Cool off time can be as long as 20 hours if there is a long course of
provocatory conduct (People v Berry)
d. Causal connection between provocation, the passion, and the killing.
e. Misdirected retaliation rule (some jurisdictions): requiring that person killed
must be the provoker
f. Who is reasonable person? D’s characteristics are considered when
i. Determining whether D lost self-control
ii. Determining whether the gravity of the provocation would be sufficient
to cause the RP to lose self-control
iii. And to some extent in assessing the level of self-control to be expected
of the RP (objective standard with two exceptions –sex and age)
3. MPC’s extreme mental or emotional disturbance defense
a. Murder is manslaughter when it is committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation and
excuse.
b. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he
believes them to be. Requires jury to consider D’s characteristics (gender,
sexual preference, pregnancy etc)
c. Does not require the provocation to emanate from the victim
d. State v Dumlao where court gave manslaughter instruction since there was
evidence that D killed while under extreme emotional disturbance (jury had to
consider D’s diagnosed paranoid personality disorder). Order of analysis:
i. Was D under extreme emotional disturbance? (subjective)

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 ii. Is there a reasonable explanation or excuse for D’s extreme emotional
disturbance? Mixed subjective/objective
iii. Is extreme emotional disturbance reasonable?
1. MPC: reasonableness of EED shall be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in D’s situation under the circumstances
as he believes them to be
2. Whether the actor’s loss of self-control can be understood in
terms that arouse sympathy in the ordinary person
b. Involuntary: if D brought about the death of another through criminal negligence (aka gross negligence
or recklessness). Typically 2-5 years.
i. Two ways to secure an involuntary manslaughter conviction
1. Prove D had requisite manslaughter conviction
a. “criminal negligence” – more than civil negligence
b. Gross negligence/recklessness
i. Commonwealth v Welansky where nightclub owner D held liable for
involuntary manslaughter if it could be proven that D was wanton or
reckless in failing to maintain adequate fire safety in his establishment.
ii. What is wanton or reckless? That D in fact realized the grave danger to
others but chose to act or not anyway.
c. WA: simple negligence may be sufficient (State v Williams where D held liable
for involuntary manslaughter where D was only ordinarily negligent in failing to
seek medical attention for child).
2. Application of misdemeanor manslaughter rule which is sort of a mini-felony murder
rule
c. Vehicular (some states): often even lower penalties than involuntary (can be less than a year).
3. Homicide by abuse
a. Prosecution has to prove circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life and pattern
or practice of assault or torture on vulnerable person
b. Class A felony but no death penalty
4. Depraved heart murder
a. Definition: unintentional killing with implied malice
b. To prove malice in such a case, must show gross recklessness and that D acted with extreme
indifference to human life
c. If show, can proceed with 2nd degree murder, if not, involuntary manslaughter.
d. Points of comparison between the legal treatment of unintentional killings
i. Defree of risk
ii. Justification for the risk
iii. D’s awareness of the risk
e. Examples
i. Commonwealth v Monroe where D pointed gun at vital part of another’s body and pulled
triggered so must be presumed to know that death is likely to follow. Lack of motive does not
exculpate D.
ii. People v Knoller where D could be held liable for 2nd degree murder for her dog who mauled a
person to death if jury finds D acted with conscious disregard for human life.
5. Felony murder rule
a. Definition: a person who kills during the commission or attempted commission of a qualifying felony has
committed 2nd degree murder

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 b. Accomplices may also be convicted of 2nd degree murder
c. Some jurisdictions elevate by statute certain homicides to 1st degree murder (typically rape, robbery,
arson, burglary, and kidnapping)
d. Four limiting rules on the rule
i. The inherently dangerous felony limitation (didn’t cover in class)
ii. Res gestate requirement – two elements:
1. The felony and homicide must be close in time and distance (clearly can’t apply when
killing happens before the felony)
a. Liability continues until the felon reaches a place of temporary safety
b. Must be part of one continuous transaction (People v Bodely). The felony can be
“complete” but if someone killed in process of escape then felon still liable for
2nd degree murder
2. There must be a causal connection between the felony and the homicide
a. Some jurisdictions only require but-for causation (People v Stamp –where Ds
had to take victim as they found him even if they didn’t foresee his heart
disease)
b. Other jurisdictions require greater causal connection between felonious
conduct and death (King v Commonwealth where the act causing the death was
not found to have been directly calculated to further the felony or necessitated
by the commission of the felony even though it was a but-for cause)
iii. Merger doctrine (didn’t cover in class)
iv. The agency rule (third party killings)
1. Definition: if a third party (someone other than the felon or one of his agents) is
responsible for the killing, the felony murder rule does not apply and the prosecutor
seeking a murder conviction must prove malice aforethought using another theory
2. Act has to be committed by felon’s own hand or by someone acting in concert with him
or in furtherance of a common object or purpose.
3. Proximate cause: if robber sets in motion a chain of events which should have been
within his contemplation, he is liable for any death which results – central issue is
whether the killing, no matter by whose hand, was within the foreseeable risk of the
commission of the felony.
4. D generally can’t be charged with the murder of one of his cofelons when that cofelon is
killed by the victim during the commission of the felony (State v Canola).

Theft

1. Consolidated theft statutes: most jurisdictions now have these to roll larceny, larceny by trick, embezzlement,
and false pretenses under one statute so prosecutors don’t have to worry about having charges getting
dismissed because they charged the wrong kind of theft.
2. Larceny
a. Elements
i. The trespassory taking (actus reus) and carrying away of personal property (asportation –
assertion of control over property and some movement of the item contrary to the possession
of the owner)
ii. From the possession of another
iii. With the intent to permanently deprive the owner of it (mens rea)
b. Mens rea - If the actor takes property believing it is his, even if that belief is unreasonable or mistaken,
not guilty of larceny

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 c. Concurrence: must be concurrence between actus reus and mens rea. If you borrow something without
intent to steal and then later to decide to keep it, that is not larceny.
d. Constructive possession
i. Employer or principal retains constructive possession of property when it is entrusted to an
employee or agent who only receives custody. So if agent achieves custody through deceit and
then takes property, it can be larceny (by trick). Exists in three situations
1. When a principal or employer delivers property to an agent or employee to use, keep,
make a delivery for the principal
2. When the owner of property loses it or misplaces it and someone else finds it
3. When a property owner delivers the property to another person as part of a transaction
to be completed in the owner’s presence
ii. Breaking bulk doctrine: when person in custody of property breaks it open in midst of carrying it
and takes contents (this constitutes larceny)
3. Embezzlement
a. Elements
i. Intentional conversion of
ii. The property of another
iii. By someone who is already in lawful possession of it (or by someone to whom it has been
entrusted)
b. Difference from larceny by trick is that D never had lawful possession in larceny by trick where in
embezzlement, D was in lawful possession initially.
4. False Pretenses
a. Elements
i. A false statement of fact that
ii. Causes the victim
iii. To pass title to D
iv. D must
1. Know the statement is false
2. And thereby intend to defraud the victim
b. Larceny by trick is just securing possession through fraud. False pretenses is securing possession AND
title through fraud
5. Burglary/Aggravated theft
a. Four walls rule
i. Burglary requires perp to be inside the four walls or under ceiling (United States v Eichman)
ii. Curtilage: expands rule to include an area in close proximity to dwelling but really includes
things like outbuildings and still did not do away with entry requirement.
b. Permission to enter traditionally is complete defense since trespassory entry required (State v Thibault)
but can still charge D with theft instead
c. Modern burglary statutes require only entry of a structure with intent to commit a crime so a consent
defense is not a recognized defense.
d. Key language: if statute includes words like “license” or “privilege” then this could mean that the statue
requires a trespassory entry.
6. Robbery
a. Elements
i. Felonious intent
ii. Force or putting in fear as a means of effectuating intent and

13
 iii. By that means taking and carrying away the property of another from his person or in his
presence
iv. The above must occur in point of time
b. Crocker v State where there was no evidence D used force against or caused fear in victim so can only
charge larceny.
c. D can obtain property peacefully but then can become robbery if D uses force to retain or escape with it
(Miller v Superior Court)
d. Immediate presence requirement: focuses on whether the stolen property was located in an area in
which the victim could have expected to take effective steps to retain control over his property

Criminal law defenses

1. Two categories
a. Case-in-chief defenses aka failure of proof/prima facie case defenses
b. Affirmative defenses
i. Correctness/justness of D’s actions – e.g. killing in self-defense
1. Can help get accomplices out of criminal liability
ii. Excuse defenses – focus on the moral blameworthiness of D e.g. insanity
1. Typically can’t get accomplices out of criminal liability since the excuse is personal to the
person claiming it
2. Self-defense
a. Perfect – prove all elements and D is acquitted
b. Imperfect – D fails to prove at least one element of a defense but helps D mitigate offense charged or
sentence
c. Elements: D must have had an honest and reasonable belief (taking into account D’s circumstances) that
i. D was threatened with an imminent threat of unlawful force
ii. The force he or she used was necessary to repel the threat
iii. And the force used was proportionate to the threatened force
d. Juries can consider D’s past experiences as part of “circumstances” to determine whether D’s belief was
reasonable (People v Goetz) including
i. D’s knowledge about the potential assailant
ii. Physical attributes of all persons involved
iii. Any prior experiences the D had which could provide a reasonable basis for a belief that another
person’s intentions were to injure or rob.
e. May not be able to assert the defense in the case of a D who was not in imminent danger but has been
the victim of a pattern of abuse at the hands of the victim since threat to life must be in close time to D’s
act of killing (State v Stewart)
f. First aggressor
i. Common law: an affirmative unlawful act reasonably calculated to produce an affray foreboding
injurious or fatal consequences is an aggression which, unless renounced, nullified the right of
homicidal self-defense
ii. MPC 3.04: the use of deadly force is not justifiable if the actor with the purpose of causing death
or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of forces against himself in the same encounter.
g. Duty to retreat
i. Some states impose a duty to retreat to the wall before using deadly force in general
1. A major exception in these states is if D is in D’s home where D is allowed to stand
his/her ground

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 2. If prosecutor can’t prove that you were able to retreat, then D qualifies for acquittal
(Jenkins v State)
3. Don’t have to retreat if it would put yourself in more danger
ii. Other states have stand-your-ground laws that allow D to use deadly force beyond the home
iii. MPC 3.04
1. Issue of retreat arises only if D resorts to deadly force
2. Not justifiable unless actor know he or she can avoid the necessity of using such force
with complete safety by retreating except if actor is in dwelling or workplace.
3. Have to look at 3.09 in MPC analysis as well – whether person was forming belief
recklessly or negligently
a. If formed recklessly- then guilty of manslaughter
b. Or murder (if extremely reckless)
c. If negligently – guilty of negligent homicide
3. Defense of others
a. Like self-defense, this defense requires
i. Imminence
ii. Necessity
iii. Proportionality
iv. Honest and reasonable belief in the need to use force to defense third person
b. Act-at-peril rule (which most jurisdiction have abandoned)
i. Permitted use of force in defense of a third person only if that third person could legally have
used force in self-defense
ii. Doesn’t matter if D’s mistaken belief was reasonable (People v Young)
c. MPC 3.05, subject to 3.09, multi-tiered approach to see if charge will be mitigated to less serious charge
4. Defense of habitation
a. Long recognized that deadly force is not permissible simply in defense of property but defense of
habitation is in a grey area.
b. Deadly force only allowed where
i. Occupant reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent imminent, unlawful entry
ii. And that the intruder intends to commit a felony or cause injury to any occupant of the dwelling
iii. Some jurisdictions additionally require that the intruder also have an intent to commit a forcible
felony or kill or cause grievous bodily injury to an occupant of the dwelling (People v Ceballos
where D not allowed defense of habitation instruction when he set up trap gun that
automatically shot intruder who did not intend a forcible felony).
c. Some jurisdictions give homeowner D a huge advantage by giving them a rebuttable presumption of the
necessity to use deadly force. But must be used to prevent an entry into the home.
d. D cannot use deadly force outside the home, including even the porch if it is not enclosed, as reasonable
person would not expect some protection from unauthorized intrusion into this area (People v Brown)
5. Necessity defense
a. Affirmative defense
b. Sometimes the greater good is served by breaking the law instead of following it
c. Common law elements
i. Balance of harms inquiry: Harm the D was seeking to avoid was greater than the harm D would
likely cause by breaking the law (Commonwealth v Hutchins where alleviation of D’s symptoms
did not outweigh the potential harm to the public were the court to rule D’s possession of
controlled substance as not punishable)
ii. D was seeking to avoid a clear and imminent danger

15
 iii. It was reasonable for the D to believe his illegal conduct would abate the threatened harm.
There is a causal connection between D’s illegal act and the harm D was seeking to avoid
iv. No effective legal alternatives available to D (In re Eichorn where D presented sufficient
evidence to raise a necessity defense that he slept outside contrary to law due to lack of legal
alternatives to sleep inside).
v. Legislature has not determined the matter in a way that goes against D
vi. D was not at fault for creating the dangerous situation
d. MPC 3.02
i. Focuses on balancing of harms
ii. No imminence requirement
iii. No explicit limitation against homicide unlike common law
e. Necessity defense may be allowed in direct civil disobedience case where a person breaks the law they
think is unjust in hopes of changing that law.
f. Necessity defense not allowed in case of indirect civil disobedience (United States v Schoon where there
was insufficient causal relationship because the act alone was unlikely to abate the evil precisely
because the act was indirect to the harm and because there was not an absence of legal alternatives
where the alleged evil is policy instituted by a legislature/government).
6. Duress
a. Affirmative defense in which D claims she was threatened by another person with physical force unless
she committed a specific crime.
b. Common law elements
i. D acted in response to an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury
1. Most jurisdictions allow a threat to kill or injure the D or any other person as satisfying
this element
2. United States v Contento-Pachon where immediacy element was satisfied since D was
watched by accomplice of threatening party during whole course of flight.
ii. D had a well-grounded or reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out unless she
committed a specified crime
iii. D had no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm
1. United States v Contento-Pachon where D presented evidence to get duress instruction
by claiming police in Colombia were corrupt and not reasonable to flee from drug
traffickers.
c. MPC 2.09
i. Not limited to situations involving threats of death or great bodily harm
ii. No explicit imminence requirement but imminence is relevant to the issue of whether a person
of reasonable firmness would have been able to resist it.
iii. Unlike common law, a duress defense to homicide is possible, even if the victim is innocent
d. Any limitation to the defense of duress typically confined to crimes of intentional killings and not to
killings done by another in the commission of some lesser felony (State v Hunter).
7. Intoxication
a. Voluntary intoxication
i. Turns on whether D is charged specific or general intent crime
ii. If general, then D will not be permitted to introduce evidence of her intoxication
iii. If specific, D must show that because of her intoxicated condition, she did not have the specific
intent required for the commission of the crime
1. Some states don’t allow D to introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication for the jury to
consider (Montana v Egelhoff)

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 b. Involuntary intoxication
i. In most jurisdictions, this can be the basis for a temporary insanity claim
ii. This defense is typically recognized in 4 situations
1. Intoxication was caused by the fault of another through force, duress, fraud or
contrivance
2. Where the intoxication was caused by an innocent mistake on the part of D
3. Where a D unknowingly suffers from a physiological or psychological condition that
renders him abnormally susceptible to a legal intoxicant
4. Where unexpected intoxication results from a medically prescribed drug.
iii. Might not be able to present the defense where a combination of voluntarily taken substances
combine to cause a higher level of intoxication than D expected (Commonwealth v Smith).
c. MPC
i. Not a defense unless it negates an element of offense
ii. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced
intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been if he had been sober, such
unawareness is immaterial
iii. Intoxication does not constitute a mental disease
iv. Intoxication that is not self-induced defense if it meets elements of insanity defense

Insanity/mental competency

1. Before trial – defense argue D incompetent to stand trial

2. During trial – D claims he should not be found by reason of insanity. Examines D’s mental capacity at time of act
a. M’Naghten rule
i. D found not guilty by reason of insanity if at time of act, D was laboring under such a defect or
reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing,
or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
ii. Does not recognize degrees of incapacity
iii. Deific Decree Exception: D might be able to know what he was doing was legally and morally
wrong and still claim insanity in a M’Naghten jurisdiction if D claims that God told him to do it
contrary to D’s own wishes (State v Crenshaw)
b. Irresistible impulse test
i. Doctrine which permits acquittal on grounds of lack of responsibility when a D is found to have
been driven by an irresistible impulse to commit his offense
ii. Adds a volitional element
c. NH product of mental defector disease test: closer to MPC but has causation issues and may usurp jury’s
role by almost completely relying on the classification made by psychiatrists.
d. MPC 4.01:
i. D not responsible if at time of act such conduct was a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
1. Cognition prong – appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness)
2. Volitional prong – conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law
ii. Does not require black or white analysis of M’Naghten (substantial vs. inability).
iii. MPC also uses “appreciate” vs. “know” in order to provide excuse to those who might know the
act was wrong but are unable to internalize the wrongfulness of the act
iv. Mental disease or defect does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal
or anti-social conduct (such as drug use)

17
 3. After conviction – execution of an insane person is cruel and unusual in violation of 8th amendment (Ford v
Wainwright)
4. As an alternative to presenting an affirmative insanity defense (clear and convincing standard D must prove that
at time of commissions of act he was afflicted with a mental disease or defect that he did not know the act was
wrong), D can try and rebut prosecution’s evidence of the requisite mens rea that D acted intentionally or
knowingly (Clark v Arizona)

Attempt

1) Common law
a) Elements
i) An intent to commit a crime
ii) The execution of an overt act in furtherance of the intention
iii) A failure to consummate the crime
b) Most attempted felonies are felonies themselves (but less serious than target crime)
c) Actus reus
i) when do D’s acts go beyond mere preparation and become sufficient for an attempt?
(1) D must be “dangerously near” completing the crime (People v Rizzo where Ds had not found victim and
were not close to him so were not dangerously near completing the crime)
(2) Starting drilling in floor down to bank vault is “unequivocal and direct step” towards completion of
burglary (People v Staples)
ii) Where to draw the line?
(1) Intent
(2) Opportunity for repentance
(3) Law enforcement’s ability to arrest and convict before a crime has occurred.
iii) Common law tests
(1) So near
(2) Very near
(3) Dangerous proximity to success
(4) An overt act as would naturally effect that result unless prevented by some extraneous cause
d) Mens rea
i) The specific intent to commit the target offense
ii) Mental state required for commission of an attempt can be narrower than the mental state required for
commission of the target offense (People v Harris)
2) MPC 5.01
a) Actus reus
i) Requires “substantial step” towards the culmination of the commission of the targeted offense
(1) State v Latraverse where D did take substantial step towards commission of crime by parking bear
contemplated victim’s house with fire making materials and a threatening note addressed to
contemplated victim
ii) What constitutes substantial step? 5.01(2) This below conduct must also be strongly corroborative of the
actor’s criminal purpose
(1) (a) lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime
(2) Enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim to go to the place contemplated for its
commission
(3) Reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime
(4) Unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime will be
committed

18
 (5) Possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for
such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances
(6) Possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime at or
near the place contemplated for its commission where such possession collection or fabrication serves
no lawful purpose under the circumstances
(7) Soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime
b) Focuses on what has been done rather than what remains to be done
c) Test: Are D’s acts or omissions strongly corroborative of his criminal purpose?
3) Defenses specific to attempt
a) Impossibility
b) Abandonment (aka renunciation)
i) MPC 5.01(4)
(1) Affirmative defense
(2) Requires voluntary and complete renunciation of D’s criminal purpose
(3) Does not affect the criminal liability of an accomplice who did not renounce
(4) Can’t be motivated by the belief that D is about to be apprehended (State v LaTraverse)
4) Attempted murder
a) To convict for attempted murder, nothing less than a criminal intent to kill must be shown (People v Harris)
b) Mens rea requirements
i) Murder
(1) Intent/knowledge to kill OR
(2) Intent to cause grievous bodily injury OR
(3) Abandoned and malignant heart OR
(4) Intent to commit any felony
ii) Attempted murder
(1) Intent to kill (that’s it)
c) Attempted murder conviction can be sustained where D knew he was HIV+, failed to disclose this to his partners,
had unprotected sex with them, and acknowledged to another that this was murder (State v Hinkhouse)

Accomplice liability

1) Most modern statutes distinguish between

a. Accomplice liability: a theory of liability (assistance before and/or during the crime)
b. Rendering criminal assistance: a crime of assistance after the crime
2) Theory of derivative liability: the accomplice is charged with the crime committed by the principal to which
accomplice contributed so receive same punishment
3) Common law – divided into
a. Principals – prosecuted where crime occurred
i. 1st degree – person who actually commits the acts constituting the offense or uses an innocent
instrumentality to commit the crime (e.g. non—culpable person or trained animal)
ii. 2nd degree
1. Person who intentionally assists the principal in the 1st degree and is present during
commission of the crime
2. Presence requirement is satisfied by
a. Actual presence
b. Constructive presence: if accomplice is close enough to render assistance to the
principal in the 1st degree during the commission of the crime
b. Accessories – prosecuted where they gave assistance

19
 i. Before the fact: person who intentionally assists the commission of the crime but is not present
when the crime is being committed
ii. After the fact
1. Person who helps the principal in the 1st degree and his or her accomplices avoid arrest,
trial, or conviction
2. Accomplices generally held liable for the same crime as the principal in the first degree
but an accessory after the fact is treated less harshly than a principal in the 2nd degree
and an accessory before the fact
c. Older common law rules
i. Had to indict person under correct designation the first time
ii. Timing
1. Accessory could not be tried before the principal in the 1st degree
2. Accessory could not be convicted unless the principal in the 1st degree was convicted
first
d. Actus reus
i. Satisfied by assisting the principal in the 1st degree in the commission of a crime
1. Requires some affirmative act by D. Not enough that D was present and likely knew a
crime was occurring (Pace v State)
2. Assistance can be minimal and need not by physical aid but can be psychological
encouragement
3. Assistance can be omission if D had legal duty to act
ii. Mere presence is ordinarily not sufficient for accomplice liability
e. Mens rea: (requires dual intent)
i. D must have intent to do the acts that assist the principal in the 1st degree in the commission of
a crime AND
1. D can be held liable as an accessory for unintended crimes that occur in commission of
intended crime (State v Foster)
2. This includes criminally negligent homicide since D failed to perceive a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that death could occur and that such death did occur (State v Foster)
3. D who is a feigned accomplice cannot be held liable as accessory because D is missing
malicious determination – must have felonious intent (Wilson v People)
ii. D must have intent that the principal in the 1st degree commit that crime
4) MPC 2.06
a. Accomplice is guilty of an offense by the conduct of another for which he is “legally accountable”
b. A person is legally accountable for conduct of another when
i. Acting with culpability that is sufficient for commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or
irresponsible person to engage in such conduct OR
ii. He is made accountable by statute or other law OR
iii. He is an accomplice of another person in commission of offense
c. Actus reus 2.06(3)(a)
i. Solicits such other person to commit it OR
ii. Aids or agrees to attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it OR
iii. Having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and failing to make proper effort
d. Mens rea: purpose of promoting of facilitating the commission of the offense

Conspiracy

1) Common law

20
 a. Early approach: a conspiracy was committed as soon as two persons formed an agreement to commit a
crime or immoral act
b. Modern approach: most jurisdictions today require –
i. An agreement to commit a crime
ii. Proof of some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy in order to demonstrate the existence
of the conspiracy (act need not be illegal or central to accomplishing the ultimate goal)
iii. Unlike law of attempt, there is no need to prove that D ever came close to actually committing
the target crime
iv. D can be convicted of both the target crime and the conspiracy to commit that crime
v. Bilateral approach requiring actual agreement to commit a crime between D and at least one
other
1. No genuine agreement where sole co-conspirator was an undercover agent (State v
Pacheco)
c. Mens rea
i. Usually considered a specific intent crime.
ii. Two elements
1. Intent to enter into an agreement AND
2. The intent to commit or aid in the commission of the act or acts constituting the target
crime
2) MPC 5.03
a. D cannot be convicted of completed crime and conspiracy as in common law approach
b. Unilateral approach regarding co-conspirators not requiring genuine agreement between parties
c. Mens rea: to be convicted of conspiracy, the actor must have the purpose to promote or facilitate the
target offense, or to aid others in committing, attempting, or soliciting action that constitutes the crime
3) Conspiracy to commit murder (People v Swain)
a. Intent to kill is a required element of crime of conspiracy to commit express malice murder
b. Conspiracy to commit implied malice murder is not a cognizable crime
4) Intent (People v Lauria where there was insufficient evidence that D intended to further the criminal activities of
the prostitutes that used his message answering service)
a. May be inferred from knowledge when
i. The purveyor of legal goods for illegal use has acquired a stake in the venture
ii. No legitimate use for the goods or services exists
iii. The volume of business with the buyer is grossly disproportionate to any legitimate demand or
when sales for illegal use amount to a high proportion of the seller’s total business
b. Intent of a supplier who knows of the criminal use to which his supplies are put to participate in the
criminal activity connected with the use of his supplies may be established by
i. Direct evidence that he intends to participate OR
ii. Through an inference that he intends to participate based on
1. His special interest in the activity OR
2. The aggravated nature of the crime itself
5) Pinkerton rule
a. A conspirator may be held liable for a crime committed by another member of the conspiracy even if
that other crime was not part of the original agreement as long as the unintended crime was
i. In furtherance of the conspiracy
ii. Within the scope of the conspiracy AND
iii. A reasonably foreseeable consequence of the original agreement
b. MPC rejects this rule

21
 c. Pinkerton co-conspirator liability applies in two situations (US V Mothersill where the pipe bomb that
killed the trooper was a reasonably foreseeable conseuqnce of the ongoing conspiracy given the
frequency with which weapons and violence were used to further the interests of the conspiracy)
i. Where the substantive crime is also a goal of the conspiracy
ii. Where the substantive offense differs from the precise nature of the ongoing conspiracy but
facilitates the implementation of its goals
6) Wharton’s Rule
a. Prohibits the prosecution of two persons for conspiracy to commit a particular offense when the offense
in question can only be committed by at least two persons (e.g. adultery, bigamy, incest, and dueling)
b. Third party exception: Rule does not apply if more than the minimum number of persons necessary to
commit the offense agree to commit the crime (e.g. a matchmaker that encourages the commission of
adultery)
7) Scope of the crime of conspiracy
a. Kotteakos v US where even if there is a single person who is central and most central to commission of a
conspiracy, if the other people involved do not work with each other or are even aware of the others
connected to the central person, they cannot all be tried together as a single conspiracy. There are
several conspiracies of smaller groups which must be each tried separately.
b. US v Bruno
i. Where one group of alleged co-conspirators has no contact with another group of alleged co-
conspirators, the presence of a common conspiracy is still possible insomuch as the one group
can have foreseen the participation of the other group for the criminal enterprise to be
successful
ii. Not necessary that everyone have contact with each other as long as it is reasonably foreseeable
that others would be in the same conspiracy
8) Special defense to conspiracy
a. MPC 5.03
i. Abandonment (aka renunciation or withdrawal)
1. D must have voluntarily and completely renounced his criminal purpose
2. 5.03(6): D must thwart the success of the conspiracy
ii. Rejects impossibility defense
b. Common law
i. Rejects abandonment defense
ii. Withdrawal, however, can still be beneficial to D because SoL starts running from time of
withdrawal from conspiracy. Must have withdrawal and past the SoL to form a complete
defense.
iii. Most jurisdictions reject impossibility defense
c. Withdrawal/abandonment/renunciation (US v Read)
i. How does one withdraw from a conspiracy?
1. Either by
a. Notifying co-conspirators that he will no longer participate in the undertaking
b. By engaging in acts inconsistent with the objects of the conspiracy
2. Either must be done in a way reasonably calculated to reach *some* of the co-
conspirators
3. Must completely abandon the conspiracy
4. Must be in good faith
5. No need to
a. Inform authorities

22
 b. Try and convince co-conspirators to abandon
c. Try and prevent object of conspiracy or conspiracy itself from happening.
ii. Burden of proof
1. The burden of going forward with evidence of withdrawal and with evidence that he
withdrew prior to the SoL is with D
2. Once D advances sufficient evidence, the burden of persuasion is on the prosecution to
disprove defense of withdrawal beyond a reasonable doubt.
d. Impossibility
i. Conspiracy does not automatically terminate when the object of the conspiracy becomes
impossible to achieve (US v Recio)
ii. Where police have frustrated a conspiracy’s specific objective but conspirators (unaware of that
fact) have neither abandoned the conspiracy nor withdrawn, these special conspiracy-related
dangers remain (US v Recio)

23