Foronda vs.

Guerrero

Facts:
The complainant [attorney-in-fact] alleged that his principals, Ramona and Concepcion Alcaraz, filed Civil Case for specific
performance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case involved a parcel of land which were sold to the
Alcarazes. Thereafter, while the case was pending, Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her husband Eleuterio Mabanag, and with the
respondent as their lawyer, intervened in the case. In their intervention, Spouses Mabanag questioned the eligibility of the Alcarazes to won
lands in the Philippines.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiffs Alcarazes. Mabanag, through the assistance of respondent Guerrero as her
counsel appealed the decision to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision. Unsatisfied with the decision of the CA, Mabanag and respondent
as counsel appeal the decision to the SC. The SC affirmed the decision of the court a qou.
However, the persistence of Mabang and respondent as counsel did not end there, since the filed multifarious suits and motions based on the
ground that Spouses Alcazares, being foreigners have no eligibility to own lands in the Philippines. The ground which these various
petitions and motions is based is already decided by the Court with finality when it decided the civil case concerning the sale of the
property.Respondent in trying to justify his acts contended that his action of questioning the eligibility of the Spouses Alcazares is necessary
in the validity of the decision and the determination of the validity of the sale. If the Spouses Alcazares are ineligible to own lands in the
Philippines then the sale is void.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of respondent constitutes forum shopping, thus warrant sanction.

Held:

Yes, explained the court- "it has, thus, been clearly established that in filing such numerous petitions in behalf of his client, the
respondent thereby engaged in forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a
result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining the
existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially
the same reliefs.

Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice,
and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. Such filing of multiple
petitions constitutes abuse of the Court’s processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of
justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which
obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing
any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as
appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.

We note that while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right,
they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

In filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same subject matter, the respondent violated Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. He also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate “to delay no man
for money or malice.”

Respondent is suspended for 1 year in the practice of law.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and MANSUETO J. HONRADA, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division;
HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, in his official capacity as Special
Prosecutor; HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, in his official
capacity as Ombudsman; and TEOFILO GELACIO, respondents.

5. ID.; ACTIONS; MERE FILING OF SEVERAL CASES BASED ON THE SAME INCIDENT, NOT FORUM-SHOPPING;
TEST. - The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping. The test is
whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT TRANSACTIONS, FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES,
NOT FORUM SHOPPING; CASE AT BAR. - Here, although several cases were filed by the same complainant against the same
defendant and the subject matter of the actions of two of the cases was the same incident (i.e., the application for free patent of
petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr.), the fact is that the several cases involve essentially different facts, circumstances and causes of action.
Thus, Criminal Case No. 1393, which was filed in the MCTC of San Francisco,. Agusan del Sur, was for perjury, based on false
statements allegedly made in 1975 by petitioner Paredes, Jr. in connection with his free patent application. Criminal Case No. 13800,
which was filed in the Sandiganbayan, although based on the filing of the same application for free patent, was for violation of the
Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the allegation that petitioner, as Provincial Attorney, had unduly influenced the Public Land
Inspector to secure the approval of his free patent application. On the other hand, as already stated, the present cases (Criminal Case
Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793) are for falsification of court records pertaining to Criminal Case No. 1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 is
an administrative case against petitioner Honrada based on the same incident and facts that are subject of the preceding criminal cases.
The rest are incidents of these cases, being the petition for review and motions for reconsideration ifl Criminal Case No. 13800 and
A.P. Case No. P-90-396. Thus the present cases involve substantially different transactions, facts and circumstances from those
involved in the other, though related, cases. Although they arose from the same incident, i.e., petitioners public land application, they
involve different issues. It is well settled that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law or that
the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability. As such, they may be prosecuted simultaneously or one after
another, so long as they do not place the accused in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, seeking to set aside the resolution dated December 9, 1992 of the Office of
the Ombudsman, denying petitioners motion for the reinvestigation of three cases of falsification of public documents which had been filed
against petitioners and to restrain the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan from hearing the cases.
The cases originated in a complaint filed on January 23, 1990 by Teofilo Gelacio, then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
Charged with petitioner Paredes, Jr., who was then the provincial governor, were petitioner Mansueto J. Honrada, clerk of court of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, and Atty. Generoso Sansaet, counsel of petitioner Paredes, Jr. in Criminal
Case No. 1393 of the MCTC.
In his complaint Gelacio alleged that MCTC clerk of court Honrada, in conspiracy with petitioner Paredes, Jr. and the latters counsel
Atty. Sansaet, certified as true a copy of a Notice of Arraignment dated July 1, 1985 and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes on July 9,
1985, showing that an arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 and issued a certification dated March 24, 1986 to that effect
when in truth no arraignment had been held in that case. In support of his allegation, Gelacio submitted a Certification issued by Judge
Ciriaco C. Ario of the MCTC to the effect that Criminal Case No. 1393 had never reached the arraignment stage before it was dismissed on
motion of the prosecution.1
A preliminary investigation of the complaint was conducted by Public Prosecutor Albert Axalan who had been deputized to assist the
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao. Petitioners and Atty. Sansaet, as respondents in the case, filed their respective counter-affidavits.
Paredes, Jr. denied the charges. He alleged that their filing was politically motivated and that the complainant, Teofilo Gelacio, was being
used by his political enemies to harass him. For his part, Honrada maintained that an arraignment had indeed been held in Criminal Case
No. 1393 as certified by him. His claim was corroborated by Atty. Generoso Sansaet, who stated in an affidavit that he was present during
the arraignment, being the counsel of Paredes, Jr. Sansaet called Judge Arios Certification, denying that there was an arraignment, the
product of a faltering mind.2
 Prosecutor Axalan submitted his resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, but before it could be acted upon, Atty. Sansaet,
one of the respondents, retracted his earlier statement to the effect that Paredes, Jr. had been arraigned before the case against him was
dismissed. In an Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications dated July 29, 1991, Sansaet claimed that there was really no arraignment held
in Criminal Case No. 1393 and that Honrada made false certifications which were used to support the dismissal (on the ground of double
jeopardy) of Criminal Case No. 13800 which was then pending against Paredes, Jr. in the Sandiganbayan.3
As a result of this development, Paredes, Jr. and Honrada, were required to comment. Paredes, Jr. claimed that the Sansaets aboutface
was the result of their political estrangement. 4For his part Honrada insisted that an arraignment in Criminal Case No. 1393 had indeed been
held and that in making the certifications in question he stated the truth.
On the basis of the evidence of the parties, Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman, recommended on February 24, 1992 that petitioners and Atty. Sansaet be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Her
recommendation was indorsed by Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, Who, upon the recommendation
of Erdulfo Querubin of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, approved the filing of three informations for falsification of public documents
against Paredes, Jr., Honrada and Sansaet with the Sandiganbayan. 5 The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and
17793.
On July 9, 1992, petitioners moved to quash the informations. Their motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its resolution
of August 25, 1992, as was the motion for reconsideration they subsequently filed.
Petitioners next moved for a reinvestigation of the cases. They complained (1) that the resolution, recommending the filing of the
cases, was not prepared by Public Prosecutor Axalan, who had conducted the preliminary investigation, but by GIO II Gay Maggie
Balajadia-Violan, who allegedly had no hand in the investigation; (2) that Violan relied solely on the retraction of Atty. Generoso Sansaet
and the Certification of Judge Ciriaco C. Ario and disregarded evidence in favor of petitioners; and (3) that Prosecutor Erdulfo Q. Querubin,
who reviewed Violans recommendation, could not be expected to act fairly because he was the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 13800 in
connection with which the allegedly falsified records were used and in fact appealed the dismissal of the case to this Court. 6
Although these grounds were the same ones invoked by petitioners in their motion to quash, which the Sandiganbayan had denied, the
Sandiganbayan nonetheless directed the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the cases. Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman
required complainant, the herein respondent Teofilo Gelacio, to comment on petitioners Motion for Reinvestigation.
In a resolution dated December 9, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer Carlos D. Montemayor recommended denial of petitioners
motion. He noted that the matters raised in the motion were the same ones contained in petitioners motion to quash which had already been
denied and that in fact a cursory examination of the resolution of GIO II Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan shows that the existence of a prima
facie case has been duly established and the same was reviewed by SPO III Erdulfo Querubin and also the approval of Honorable Conrado
M. Vasquez. He held that as no newly-discovered evidence or denial of due process had been shown, there was no basis for petitioners
request for a reinvestigation.
Montemayors recommendation was approved by Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto and Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez. Accordingly
the Sandiganbayan set the cases for trial.
The present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction was then filed to enjoin the trial of the criminal cases. Petitioners pray
that:

(1) Upon the filing of this petition and before its final resolution, to issue a temporary restraining order immediately ordering the
Sandiganbayan, Second Division, to cease and desist from proceeding with the scheduled hearing of this case;

(2) After due hearing, to adjudge that respondents Honorable Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto and Honorable Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez have committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing and approving the questioned resolution
dated December 9, 1992 and ordering said resolution denying petitioners motion for reinvestigation be annulled and set aside;

(3) To adjudge that the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, is without jurisdiction to try Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793 all of
which are apparently intended as political harassments against the herein petitioners, particularly as against Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., and
prohibiting the said court from proceeding (with) the hearing of the said cases on January 15, 1993, and likewise ordering the said court to
dismiss the said cases, with costs against respondents and Teofilo Gelacio; and

(4) To issue a writ of injunction, thereby making the restraining order permanent, and prohibiting the respondents and complainant Teofilo
Gelacio from committing any act or acts tending to harass and to inflict further damage and injury to petitioners, such as but not limited to
the continuation and further prosecution of said Criminal Cases Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793.
 Petitioners contend (1) that their constitutional right to due process was violated at various stages of the preliminary investigation; (2)
that the prosecutors closed their eyes to the fact that in filing the cases private respondent Teofilo Gelacio engaged in forum-shopping; and
(3) that the cases were filed for political harassment and there is in fact no prima facie evidence to hold them answerable for falsification of
public documents.7

I.

Anent the first ground, petitioners contend that the filing of charges against them was not recommended by the prosecutor who
conducted the preliminary investigation, but by another one who, it is alleged, had no part at all in the investigation.
Petitioners contention has no basis in fact. It appears that the preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by Teofilo Gelacio was
initially conducted by Public Prosecutor Albert Axalan who had been deputized to assist the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao in the
investigation of graft cases. Axalan prepared a resolution. The records do not show what his recommendation was. What is clear, however,
is that no action had been taken on his recommendation in view of the fact that Atty. Generoso Sansaet, one of the respondents in the cases,
retracted an earlier statement he had given to the effect that petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 1393
before the case was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet now claimed that no arraignment had been held after all. This new development required the
reopening of the investigation (in fact Paredes, Jr. and Honrada were required to comment on the retraction), the reevaluation of the
evidence, and the preparation of a new resolution. Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, was designated to conduct the investigation and prepare a report, which she did.
Violans recommendation was indorsed by Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, who then referred
the matter to Special Prosecution Officer Ill Erdulfo Querubin for review. Querubin concurred in the recommendation of Violan but
suggested that, instead of one, three separate informations for falsification of public documents be filed against respondents (Paredes, Jr.,
Honrada and Sansaet), considering that three documents were involved.
On June 26, 1992, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the recommendations of Violan and Querubin. Accordingly three cases
were filed against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan, where they were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793.
There is thus no basis for petitioners claim that the resolution was prepared by one who did not take any part in the investigation. What
happened here is similar to the trial of a case by one judge who, without being able to finish the hearing, ceases from office for one reason
or another and by necessity the decision is rendered by another judge who has taken over the conduct of the case. Such an arrangement has
never been thought to raise any question of due process. For what is important is that the judge who decides does so on the basis of the
evidence in record. It does not matter that he did not conduct the hearing of that case from the beginning.
Petitioners nonetheless charge that GIO II Violan and Prosecutor Querubin did not have such cold neutrality of an impartial judge to be
trusted to conduct a fair investigation. According to petitioners, Violan gave credence to the Certification issued by Judge Ciriaco C. Ario
when the fact is that Judge Ario subsequently executed an affidavit, dated November 5, 1990, in which he explained that he issued the said
certificate without expectation that the same would be used as evidence in any case and that the use of said certificate . . . is against [his]
conscience. Worse, it is contended, Violan considered the Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications executed by Atty. Sansaet, which she
should have disregarded because it was made in violation of the confidentiality of attorney-client communication under Rule 130, 24 (b) of
the Rules of Court. As for Prosecutor Querubin, they claim that he is the same prosecutor who had handled the prosecution of Criminal Case
No. 13800 against petitioner Paredes, Jr. in the Sandiganbayan and after its dismissal, sought review in this Court and, therefore, he was
biased against petitioners.
That Violan gave credence to the Certification of Judge Ario in concluding that no arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No.
1393 is not proof that Violan was biased against petitioners. Although Judge Ario subsequently gave an Affidavit, he never in that Affidavit
repudiated what he had earlier stated. In his Affidavit he merely stated:
1. That I am the incumbent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge in the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco-
Rosario-Bunawan, Agusan del Sur;
2. That I am the same Ciriaco C. Ario who issued a certificate in Criminal Case No. 1393 entitled Pp. vs. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.
which certificate was used as evidence in administrative complaint against Mansueto J. Honrada, in the Administrative
Complaint No. A.M. P-90-396 and Criminal Complaint against Mansueto J. Honrada, incumbent Governor Ceferino S.
Paredes, Jr. and Atty. Generoso S. Sansaet before the Ombudsman under Criminal Case No. OBM-MIN-90-0053 (sic) entitled
Teofilo Gelacio vs. Mansueto J. Honrada, et. al.;
3. That honestly, the said certificate was issued without my expectation that the same be used as evidence in any case and I be a
witness;
 4. That the use of said certificate as evidence in the above-mentioned cases is against my conscience, more so upon discovery
that the cases aforesaid are known to me to be politically motivated and involves [sic] big time politicians in Agusan del Sur
about whom I am not at liberty to name names for security reason;
5. That in view of all the foregoing, I am not interested to testify in any investigation to be conducted in connection thereof,
either in the administrative or criminal proceedings.
Thus, Judge Ario never denied his earlier Certification that Criminal Case No. 1393 never reached the arraignment stage, because
having learned that Paredes, Jr. had petitioned the Ministry of Justice for a review of the fiscals resolution, Judge Ario suspended action
until March 17, 1986 and in fact the fiscal later moved for the dismissal of the case.
The fact that Judge Ario did not anticipate that his certificate might be used in evidence, much less in the criminal cases now pending
in the Sandiganbayan, is not a reason to disregard it. The fact is that Judge Ario did not retract his previous Certification that there was no
arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393. If that is the truth, then the fact that he now says he did not anticipate that his certificate would
be used in evidence in any case would not diminish a whit the value of the certificate.
Nor was consideration of the retraction of Atty. Sansaet proof that GIO II Violan was biased against petitioners. Petitioners contend
that Sansaets confession was privileged and that Violan herself acknowledged that the affidavit of retraction might be inadmissible in court.
In the first place, there is nothing in the resolution of Violan which shows that she based her conclusion (that petitioners were probably
guilty of falsification of public documents) on Atty. Sansaets retraction. In her resolution, all that she stated is that the confession of Atty.
Sansaet has important bearing in this case. Otherwise she did not cite the confession as proof of the falsification of public documents. To the
contrary, Violan thought that the retraction was made in violation of attorney-client privilege and therefore, would be inadmissible in
evidence. Violan could not, therefore, have relied on the affidavit of retraction.
Moreover, the admissibility of this piece of evidence is a question for the Sandiganbayan to determine in the event it is used by the
prosecution. It is untenable to ascribe bias and partiality to the investigator because she considered this retraction in her resolution of the
case. Even if she relied on it mere divergence of opinions between a judge and a partys counsel as to applicable laws and jurisprudence is
not sufficient ground for disqualifying the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and partiality.8
As for Prosecutor Querubin, simply because he was the one who handled the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 13800, in connection
with which the documents allegedly falsified were used by petitioners, is not a reason for supposing he could not act fairly. As any other
counsel in a case, it was his duty to act with full devotion to [his clients] genuine interests, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. 9 It cannot be casually assumed that because of his engagement in that case he had
lost his objectivity to such an extent that he forsook his duty to see to it that justice was done and not to act out of vindictiveness.
Indeed, Querubin is a public prosecutor, not a private attorney. In the familiar terminology, he is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done. 10 It may therefore be assumed
that he was merely performing an official duty and that nothing personal was involved in his recommendation to prosecute the cases.
Above all, it should be stressed that the decision to charge petitioners in the Sandiganbayan was the decision not only of one person
but of all those who in one way or another were called upon to act in the cases, namely: Graft Investigation Officer Gay Maggie Balajadia-
Violan, Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto. Indeed, Querubins
only contribution to the process was to suggest the filing of three separate informations of falsification of public documents against
petitioners.

II.

The second ground for the petition is that the Office of the Ombudsman closed its eyes to the fact that in filing these cases,
complainant Teofilo Gelacio is guilty of forum-shopping and that his purpose for the filing of the cases is simply political harassment. To
buttress their contention, petitioners call attention to the factual background of the cases. 11
According to petitioners, way back in 1984 private respondent Teofilo Gelacio charged petitioner Paredes, Jr. with perjury on the
ground that in 1975 Paredes, Jr. made false statements in an affidavit which he used in support of his application for a free patent. As
already noted, the case which was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, and docketed there as Criminal
Case No. 1393, was dismissed on March 24, 1986 upon motion of the prosecution.
On October 28, 1986, Teofilo Gelacio filed another complaint against petitioner Paredes, Jr., then the acting governor of the province.
The complaint was for violation of 3 (a) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, in 1976
petitioner Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, unduly persuaded, induced and influenced the Public Land Inspector
to approve his (Paredes, Jrs) application for a free patent. According to petitioners, this case involved the same application for a free patent
of petitioner Paredes, Jr., which was the subject of Criminal Case No. 1393.
The information was filed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin in the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as Criminal Case No.
13800. Petitioner Paredes, Jr. moved to quash the information, but the court denied his motion. He then filed a motion for reconsideration. It
was in connection with this motion that the procurement of allegedly falsified documents, now the subject of prosecution, was made by
petitioner Paredes, Jr. The documents were used to support his motion for reconsideration.
On August 1, 1991, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its previous resolution and dismissed Criminal Case No. 13800, although on the
ground of prescription. The Office of the Ombudsman sought a review of the action of the Sandiganbayan, but its petition was dismissed by
this Court on July 3, 1992 in G.R. No. 101724. The motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution was likewise denied.
As an offshoot of the execution of these documents, two cases were filed by Teofilo Gelacio: (1) an administrative complaint (A.P.
Case No. P-90-3 96) for falsification of public documents which was filed with this Court against Mansueto Honrada, the clerk of the
MCTC who made certifications and (2) a complaint for falsification of public documents, initially filed as OMB-MIN-90-0053 with the
Office of the Ombudsman and eventually as Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793 in the Sandiganbayan, against the petitioners and
Atty. Generoso Sansaet.
The first case was dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence. But with respect to the second complaint, Graft Investigation Officer
Violan found probable cause to proceed against petitioners and against Atty. Sansaet and so recommended the filing of a case against them.
Her recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman on June 26, 1992, although upon the recommendation of Special Prosecutor
Querubin three separate informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Earlier on July 29, 1991, Atty. Sansaet, one of the respondents,
executed an Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications in which he stated that, contrary to his previous affidavit, there was no arraignment
held in Criminal Case No. 1393.
A. Petitioners contend that these cases should be dismissed, being merely the latest in a series of cases which arose out of the same
alleged incident - i.e. that of allegedly having induced the land inspector to approve his (Paredes, Jr.s) land application, 12 for having been
filed in violation of the rules on forum-shopping. Petitioners cite the following statement in Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange
Commission:13

There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending as
in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court
ruling. . . A violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for summary dismissal of both petitions, without
prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or the party concerned.

The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping. The test is whether the
several actions filed involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances. 14 Here, although several cases were filed by the same
complainant against the same defendant and the subject matter of the actions of two of the cases was the same incident (i.e., the application
for free patent of petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr.), the fact is that the several cases involve essentially different facts, circumstances and
causes of action.
Thus, Criminal Case No. 1393, which was filed in the MCTC of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, was for perjury, based on false
statements allegedly made in 1975 by petitioner Paredes, Jr. in connection with his free patent application. Criminal Case No. 13800, which
was filed in the Sandiganbayan, although based on the filing of the same application for free patent, was for violation of the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, on the allegation that petitioner, as Provincial Attorney, had unduly influenced the Public Land Inspector to secure the
approval of his free patent application. On the other hand, as already stated, the present cases (Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793)
are for falsification of court records pertaining to Criminal Case No. 1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 is an administrative case against
petitioner Honrada based on the same incident and facts that are subject of the preceding criminal cases. The rest are incidents of these
cases, being the petition for review and motions for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 13800 and A.P. Case No. P-90-396.
Thus the present cases involve substantially different transactions, facts and circumstances from those involved in the other, though
related, cases. Although they arose from the same incident, i.e., petitioners public land application, they involve different issues. It is well
settled that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law 15 or that the same act may give rise to criminal
as well as administrative liability. 16 As such, they may be prosecuted simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not place the
accused in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.
Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner Honrada was dismissed. They invoke our ruling
in Maceda v. Vasquez17 that only this Court has the power to oversee court personnels compliance with laws and take the appropriate
administrative action against them for their failure to do so and that no other branch of the government may exercise this power without
running afoul of the principle of separation of powers.
 But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our determination of the
administrative liability for falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan
v. Comelec,18 the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts
which were the subject of the administrative complaint.
Petitioners assertion that private respondent Alterado has resorted to forum-shopping is unacceptable. The investigation then being
conducted by the Ombudsman on the criminal case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the one
hand, and the inquiry into the administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely independent proceedings. Neither
would the results in one conclude the other. Thus an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution (Office
of the Court administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1) or vice versa.19
B. As final argument, petitioners allege that the complaint in Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793 was filed by political
enemies of petitioner Paredes, Jr. merely to harass him and that there is in fact no probable cause to support the prosecution of these cases.
Petitioners cite the following which allegedly indicate that the charges below have merely been trumped up:
(1) The affidavit of Agusan del Sur District Citizens Attorney Lou Nueva, stating that then Congressman Democrito O. Plaza
instructed Atty. Leonardo Cadiz to secure a certification from Judge Ciriaco C. Ario that no arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No.
1393, threatening that if the judge refused to give the certification, he (Congressman Plaza) would do everything against
Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, including reviving certain cases against Judge Ario; 20 and (2) The affidavit, dated November 5, 1990, of Judge
Ario in which he stated that he did not expect that the certificate which he had previously issued would be used in evidence and that the use
of the certificate in the cases below was against his conscience, because the cases were politically motivated and he was not going to testify
in any investigation concerning such certificate. 21 At the same time petitioners seek to minimize the retraction of Atty. Sansaet by ascribing
political motivation for its execution. Petitioner Ceferino Paredes, Jr. claims that Sansaets obsession has been to win in an election and that
his loss to petitioner Paredes, Jr. in the May 11, 1992 congressional elections was Sansaets sixth defeat. As for private respondent Teofilo
Gelacio, petitioners say he is a political leader of Democrito Plaza. They claim that in 1991 Atty. Sansaet changed political affiliation and
allied himself with Democrito Plaza and Teofilo Gelacio.
Petitioners argue that the certifications made by the clerk of court with respect to an arraignment allegedly held on July 9, 1985 in
Criminal Case No. 1393 is conclusive and cannot be altered by Atty. Sansaets claim to the contrary. They cite what is now Rule 132, 23 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, which provides that public instruments are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise
to their execution and of the date of the latter.
We find the foregoing averments to be unpersuasive. First of all, that the filing of the charges is politically motivated cannot justify the
prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support them. Here a preliminary investigation of the complaint
against petitioners was held during which petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well as that of private respondent Gelacio, was
considered in great detail in the resolution of GIO II Violan. Violans resolution was reviewed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin who
made his own detailed resolution concurring in the finding of Violn. We cannot say that, in approving the resolutions of two investigators,
the respondent Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor committed an abuse of their discretion.
Indeed, this Court is loath to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman unless such discretion is clearly shown to have been
abused. As explained in Young v. Office of the Ombudsman:22

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.

There are instances, constituting exceptions to the general rule, when this Court will intervene in the prosecution of cases. Some of
these instances were enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile,23 as follows:
a. Where injunction is justified by the necessity to afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (Hernandez vs.
Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95)
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (Dimayuga, et
al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al. L-38383, May 27 1981, 104 SCRA
607)
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;. (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202)
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil 62)
 e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil 556; Yu Co Eng
vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389)
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140)
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616).
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960)
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in
Ranoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; cf Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128
SCRA 577).
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and motion to quash on that ground has been denied;
(Salonga vs. Pano, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.
(Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953) (cited in Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, p. 188 1988 Ed).
But none of these instances is present here.
What petitioners raise are questions which go to the weight to be given to the affidavits by Atty. Nueva and Judge Ario. These are
matters for the trial courts appreciation. A preliminary investigation is not a trial. The function of the government prosecutor during the
preliminary investigation is merely to determine the existence of probable cause. 24 As we explained in Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan,25 this
function involves only the following:

Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
(Words and Phrases, Probable Cause v. 34, p. 12) The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

Secondly, to warrant a finding of political harassment so as to justify the grant of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition,
it must be shown that the complainant possesses the power and the influence to control the prosecution of cases. Here, the prosecution is
handled by the Office of the Ombudsman. Although it is intimated that Petitioner Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. is the subject of persecution by his
political enemies in Agusan del Sur, it has not been alleged, much less shown, that his enemies have influence and power over the national
prosecution service.
To show political harassment petitioners must prove that public prosecutor, and not just the private complainant, is acting in bad faith
in prosecuting the case26 or has lent himself to a scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the accused in contempt and
disrepute.27 For it is only if he does so may the prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary investigation, be said to have deserted the
performance of his office to determine objectively and impartially the existence of probable cause and thus justify judicial intervention in
what is essentially his province.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOP RATE CONSTRUCTION & GENERAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs.
PAXTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND BAIKAL REALTY
CORPORATION, respondents.
RE SOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FORUM SHOPPING is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a partys chances of obtaining a favorable decision or
action.[1] It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and adds to the
already congested court dockets.[2] What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different
courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues, regardless of whether the court in which one of the suits was
brought has no jurisdiction over the action.[3]
In the instant case, we probe what is perceived to be a blatant demonstration of forum shopping, outrageous abuse of judicial process
and gross disrespect for the authority of this Court.
For a flashback on the factual backdrop of this case: Five (5) civil actions involving the ownership of Lots Nos. 5763 and 5765 -New
situated in Salawag, Dasmarias, Cavite, were jointly tried by RTC-Br. 21, Imus, Cavite. [4] One of the complaints was filed by respondent
Paxton Development Corporation against petitioner Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., and against respondent Baikal Realty
Corporation and the Register of Deeds of Cavite, for declaration of nullity of the Torrens Title for Lots Nos. 5763-A and 5763-B as part and
parcel of Lot No. 5763, docketed as Civil Case No. 1124-95, with prayer for damages. TOP RATE was represented in this civil case by
the Gana Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and/or Elmer E. Manlangit.
On 13 March 1998 the trial court rendered a Joint Decision on the five (5) civil actions, which included Civil Case No. 1124-95 -

x x x declaring Paxton Development Corporations TCT No. T-557274 which covers and describes Lot No. 5763 (5763-A and 5763-B) and
TCT No. T-559147 which covers and describes Lot No. 5765-New as the lawful and valid certificates of title evidencing the lawful
ownership of Paxton Development Corporation over said lots and improvements thereon x x x x declaring Top Rate Construction and
General Services, Inc.s TCT No. T-147755 for Lot 5763-A and TCT No. T-147756 for Lot 5763-B as null and void and of no force and
effect x x x x directing Top Rate x x x to peacefully surrender possession of these lots to Paxton, in the event that they are in possession of
said lots x x x x directing the Register of Deeds for the province of Cavite to cancel the aforementioned titles of Top Rate x x x x [5]

TOP RATE and the other parties in the five (5) civil cases, Baikal Realty Corporation and Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation, filed their
respective notices of appeal from the Joint Decision,[6] docketed as CA-G.R. No. CV-60656. TOP RATE was represented in the appeal by
the Gana Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and/or Elmer E. Manlangit.
On 21 May 2001 the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on the various appeals affirming in toto the Joint Decision of the trial
court.[7]
On 28 June 2001 TOP RATE moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision where it was represented by the Gana Law Office
through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.[8] In due time, the other party-appellants followed suit. [9] Despite notice
PAXTON did not file its Comment,[10] while BAIKAL as one of the appellants moved on 27 November 2001 for the early resolution of the
pending motions for reconsideration.[11]
On 14 December 2001 the appellate court promulgated a Resolution denying all motions for reconsideration.[12]
On 26 December 2001 TOP RATE through a Manifestation informed the Court of Appeals that it filed on 21 December 2001 by
registered mail a Manifestation and Motion of even date which was attached as annex thereof.[13] The Manifestation and Motion prayed -

x x x x 2. That due to compelling reasons, the Resolution dated December 14, 2001 be RECALLED and SET ASIDE x x x x 4. That
thereafter, this Honorable Court squarely resolve on the merits the issues raised by Toprate, Baikal and Hi-Tone in their separate Motions
for Reconsideration; and 5. That the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Toprate and the reliefs prayed for therein be granted.

The Manifestation and Motion was signed and filed in behalf of TOP RATE by the same counsel of record Gana & Manlangit Law
Office through lawyers Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.[14] Incidentally, on 14 January 2002 the Court of Appeals
received the Manifestation and Motion from the postal service.[15]
On 7 January 2002, despite the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 pending with the Court of Appeals, TOP RATE filed
with this Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review from the adverse CA Decision and Resolution. The motion was
signed by TOP RATEs counsel of record Gana & Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E.
Manlangit.[16] Furthermore, the motion contained a Verification/Certification under oath executed by one Alfredo S. Hocson, President of
TOP RATE, that -

x x x x I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; to the best of my knowledge no such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if I should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency, I undertake to report this fact to this Honorable Court within five days from notice thereof.

It may be observed that the Verification/Certification did not mention the pending Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001
filed with the Court of Appeals.
Earlier, the other appellants BAIKAL and HI-TONE filed before this Court their respective motions for extension of time to file a
petition for review of the adverse CA Decision and Resolution.[17]
On 30 January 2002 this Court denied TOP RATEs motion for extension of time to file petition for review for lack of service of a copy
of the motion on the Court of Appeals x x x. [18] Also in separate Resolutions of even date, this Court denied the motions for extension of
time to file petition for review separately filed by BAIKAL and HI-TONE on the identical ground - for lack of showing that petitioner has
not lost the fifteen (15) - day reglementary period to appeal x x x it appearing that the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration of the
assailed judgment is not stated in the motion.[19]
On 4 February 2002, regardless of the denial of its motion for extension of time to file petition for review, and the Manifestation and
Motion of 21 December 2001 still to be resolved by the Court of Appeals, TOP RATE filed with this Court its Petition for Review assailing
the CA Decision of 21 May 2001 and Resolution of 14 December 2001, and praying that

x x x the Decision dated May 21, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 60656 be set aside and a new one issued x x x
confirming TOP RATEs lawful ownership of Lots 5763-A and 5763-B, Imus Estate, as well as the validity and authenticity of its TCT Nos.
T-147755 (Lot 5763-A) & T-147756 (Lot 5763-B), both issued by the Cavite Register of Deeds x x x x Declaring as absolutely null and
void and no force and effect Paxtons TCT No. 557274 (Lot 5763), Serapio Cuencas 1995 TCT 541994 (Lot 5763), and Baikals TCT 542566
(Lot 5763-B) x x x x Awarding TOP RATE the damages as prayed for in the Answer.[20]

The Petition for Review dated 4 February 2002 was signed by the same law office of Gana & Manlangit through Attys. Luis Ma.
Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.[21] The petition included a Secretarys Certificate executed by TOP RATE Corporate Secretary Luis
Ma. Gil L. Gana stating thus -

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Corporation elevate to the Supreme Court the adverse resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 60656 entitled Paxton Development Corporation v. Top Rate Const. & General Services, Inc., et al., and Hi-Tone
Marketing Corp. v. The Estate and/or Heirs of Serapio Cuenca, et al. and that its President, Arch. Alfredo S. Hocson be authorized to
represent the Corporation and sign the Petition for Review on Certiorari and all the pleadings to be filed therein. [22]

The petition also contained a Verification/Certification signed under oath by TOP RATE President Alfredo S. Hocson declaring in
relevant parts

x x x x I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; to the best of my knowledge no such action or proceeding is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if I should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency, I undertake to report this fact to this Honorable Court within five days from notice thereof. [23]

For the second time, TOP RATEs Verification/Certification did not state that its Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001
was then still pending with the Court of Appeals.
On 18 February 2002 BAIKAL filed with this Court a Manifestation and Motion alleging that it opts to wait for whatever decision the
x x x Court of Appeals may render in the x x x Manifestation and Motion filed [with the Court of Appeals] by Top Rate Construction and
General Services, without prejudice, however, to such remedies as may be available to [Baikal Realty Corporation] in case of an adverse
decision of the Court of Appeals.
On 6 March 2002 this Court resolved to deny TOP RATEs Petition for Review for petitioners failure to take the appeal within the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 (a), Rule 56, in view of the denial of
petitioners motion for extension of time to file petition in the resolution of 30 January 2002.[24]
On 15 March 2002 TOP RATE moved for reconsideration of this Courts Resolution of 30 January 2002 by granting Top Rates timely
filed motion for extension of time, and requiring the respondent PAXTON to comment on the timely filed Petition for Review on Certiorari.
[25]
The motion, which was signed again by the same Gana and Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer
E. Manlangit, did not mention the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 awaiting decision in the Court of Appeals.[26]
 Surprisingly, on 3 April 2002, TOP RATE filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 2
April 2002 contending that the filing of its petition before this Court was premature. For the first time, TOP RATE bared to this Court the
existence of its Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 pending in the Court of Appeals which had allegedly superseded
its Petition for Review filed with this Court as the Manifestation and Motion was taken up by a Division of Five of the Court of Appeals
composed of Associate Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos, Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., with Associate Justices
Teodoro P. Regino and Mariano C. del Castillo as additional members. [27] The Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on
Certiorari prayed for the withdrawal of TOP RATEs petition for review without prejudice to its refiling in the future if warranted.
On 24 April 2002 this Court denied with finality TOP RATEs motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 30 January 2002, and
noted without action its Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002. It also appears that the denial of the motions for
extension of time to file petition for review separately filed by BAIKAL and HI-TONE had become final and executory.[28]
Meanwhile, on 22 April 2002 the Division of Five of the Court of Appeals resolved to defer action on the Manifestation and
Motion dated 21 December 2001 until after the Supreme Court has acted on [Top Rates] Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review on Certiorari.[29]
On 31 May 2002, apparently in response to the above-mentioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals, TOP RATE filed with the
appellate court a Manifestation informing the Division of Five that it may now proceed to resolve TOP RATEs Manifestation and
Motion dated 21 December 2001 in light of the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 24 April 2002 which noted without action
its Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari of 2 April 2002.[30] The Manifestation was signed by TOP
RATEs lawyer of record Gana & Manlangit Law Office through the same lawyers Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.[31]
On 3 May 2002 this Court made an entry of judgment for its Resolution of 6 March 2002 denying TOP RATEs Petition for Review on
Certiorari.[32]
On 2 August 2002, notwithstanding the previous denial with finality of TOP RATEs motion for extension of time to file petition for
review and its Petition for Review itself, the Division of Five of the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision granting the appeal
of TOP RATE and modifying the Joint Decision of RTC-Br. 21 of Imus, Cavite, thus -

(1) TOPRATE is hereby declared to be the true and lawful owners (sic) of Lots 5763-A and 5763-B, and the Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 147755 for Lot No. 5763-A, and 147756 for Lot No. 5763-B, issued in the name of defendantappellant TOPRATE, are hereby
proclaimed to be valid and lawfully issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite; and (2) The Cavite Register of Deeds is
hereby ORDERED to cancel PAXTONs Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-557274 for Lot 5763 of the Imus Estate, and any and all titles
issued covering the subject properties, for being spurious and void, and of no force and effect (underscoring and emphasis in the original).
[33]

Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos penned a Dissenting Opinion averring that the Manifestation and Motion dated 21
December 2001 of TOP RATE should have been dismissed since it was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration under Sec. 2, Rule
52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[34]
On 23 August 2002 PAXTON filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Amended Decision.[35] This was followed on 13 September
2002 by a Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by BAIKAL.[36]
On 22 October 2002 the Court of Appeals received a Letter of Transmittal from the Judicial Records Office of this Court directing the
Clerk of Court of the appellate court to return the records of [the instant case] to the x x x court of origin and to submit to this Court proof of
such remand, both within five (5) days from notice hereof.[37]
On 8 November 2002 TOP RATE filed with this Court an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment through the same Gana &
Manlangit Law Office as represented by Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit.[38]
On 9 December 2002 this Court denied TOP RATEs Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment and required TOP RATE and its
counsel to show cause why they should not be held liable for forum shopping within five (5) days from notice. [39]
On 27 January 2003 TOP RATE represented by its President Alfredo S. Hocson and its lawyer Gana & Manlangit Law Office
through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit filed their Compliance asserting that they had no intention to commit the
abhorrent and detestable practice of forum shopping; assuming that there was forum shopping, they did so neither willfully nor deliberately
but solely to protect the interest of TOP RATE as shown by the filing of the Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on
Certiorari dated 2 April 2002 as soon it was certain that their Petition for Review on Certiorari was premature; the Manifestation and
Motion dated 21 December 2001 filed with the Court of Appeals could have been denied as a prohibited second motion for reconsideration,
and with such denial TOP RATE would have also lost its period to file an appeal by certiorari to this Court; and, finally, neither litis
pendentia nor res judicata would have arisen in the instant case since the Supreme Court may still review the pertinent decision or
resolution of the Court of Appeals on their Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001.[40]
 On 4 February 2003 TOP RATE filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution dated 9 December 2002, praying that its motion
to recall entry of judgment be granted.
In the meantime, on 27 March 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution directing its Clerk of Court to return the records
of this case to the court of origin, without however making any ruling on what the court of origin would be executing as the final and
executory decision, nor any statement on the status of PAXTONs Motion for Reconsideration of the Amended Decision.
[41]
This Resolution seems to be a belated response to the Letter of Transmittal coming from the Judicial Records Office of this Court
directing the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals to return the records of the instant case to the trial court.
On 3 April 2003 PAXTON filed a Manifestation informing this Court of the 27 March 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
purportedly setting aside its Amended Decision of 2 August 2002, although nothing in that Resolution validated PAXTONs submission.
On 6 May 2003 PAXTON filed another Manifestation with this Court alleging that TOP RATE moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution with RTC-Br. 21 of Imus, Cavite, which was signed this time by a certain Atty. Carmelo M. Mendoza in behalf of TOP RATE.
On 16 June 2003 this Court issued a Resolution denying with finality TOP RATEs motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of 9
December 2002 which in turn denied petitioners urgent motion to recall entry of judgment, and further requiring TOP RATE to comment on
the twin Manifestations of PAXTON.
In its Comment dated 18 July 2003, TOP RATE asserted that nowhere was it stated in the 27 March 2003 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals that the appellate court was invalidating its Amended Decision of 2 August 2002, and that since the filing of its Petition for
Review with this Court was premature, the subsequent dismissal thereof did not set aside the Amended Decision, which allegedly stands as
the decision to be executed by the trial court.
The issues to be resolved herein are: (a) whether Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., and its counsel Gana &
Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit are guilty of forum shopping, and whether such
transgression is willful and deliberate; (b) whether Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit are administratively liable for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and, (c) whether the Amended Decision of 2 August 2002 may be reversed and set
aside in the instant proceedings for being void on its face.
We have no doubt that Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. and its lawyer Gana & Manlangit Law Office through
Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangitare guilty of forum shopping. Although TOP RATE as principal party executed the
several certifications of non-forum shopping, Attys. Gana and Manlangit cannot deny responsibility therefor since Atty.
Manlangit notarized the certifications and both of them definitely knew the relevant case status after having invariably acted as counsel of
TOP RATE before the trial court, the Court of Appeals and this Court.
Clearly, in seeking to reverse the 13 March 1998 Joint Decision of the trial court and the 21 May 2001 Decision of the appellate court
and to perfect ownership of Lots 5763-A and 5763-B upon similar causes and the same reliefs, TOP RATE and its lawyers committed forum
shopping when they resorted simultaneously to both this Court by means of their Petition for Review on Certiorari and the Court of Appeals
through their Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001. This misdeed amounts to a wagering on the result of their twin devious
strategies, and shows not only their lack of faith in this Court in its evenhanded administration of law but also their expression of disrespect
if not ridicule for our judicial process and orderly procedure.
Furthermore, while TOP RATE and its counsel moved to withdraw their Petition for Review for whatever such maneuver was worth,
they did so only after they had been rebuffed in this Court. In doing so, they themselves proved that their coordinated actions were carried
out purposely to increase their chances of securing a favorable decision. As has been held, a party is said to have sought to improve his odds
of obtaining a sympathetic decision or action where after an unfavorable decision has been rendered against him in any of the cases he has
brought before the courts, he seeks to abandon the adverse proceeding and concentrate his attention on the remaining case. [42]
The instant case is similar to E. Razon, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority.[43] In E. Razon, Inc., petitioners after filing a petition for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in the Supreme Court filed an hour later a similar petition before the
Regional Trial Court and, having been assured of a favorable action by the latter court, then sought the withdrawal of the petition in this
Court. Petitioners were found guilty of forum-shopping, the Court holding that (t)he acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-
shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. [44]
What aggravates the transgression perpetrated by TOP RATE and its lawyers is that they deceived the highest court of the land. In all
the certificates of non-forum shopping they presented to this Court, they did not reveal the existence of their Manifestation and
Motion dated 21 December 2001 which they claimed was still pending before the Court of Appeals. They divulged this secret only after
their motion for extension of time to file a petition for review and their Petition for Review on Certiorari were denied by this Court, and
only after they had filed their motion for reconsideration of such denials.
If TOP RATE and its counsel genuinely believed that their recourse to this Court was premature, why then did they still ask for a
reconsideration of the Resolutions denying their motion for extension and Petition for Review? Evidently they were venturing on two (2)
fronts, and presumably simply awaiting auspicious word or two on their Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 before finally
disclosing their real intent.
Worse, in their attempt to extricate themselves from the prejudicial Resolutions of this Court, TOP RATE and its counsel had the
temerity to ask for the withdrawal of their Petition for Review, again on the insolent assertion that their resort to this Court was premature.
For the record, it took them four (4) months from 21 December 2001 when they filed their Manifestation and Motion up to 3 April 2002
when they submitted their Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari, to concoct the theory of prematurity!
To be sure, there is no merit in the claim that the Petition for Review initiated by TOP RATE and its lawyers was premature. TOP
RATE and its lawyers are estopped from claiming that this initiatory pleading was premature for it was their unwavering representation
before this Court that the Court of Appeals had already rendered a final and appealable decision when they filed their motion for extension
of time and ultimately their Petition for Review. The filing of such petition presupposes the finality of the judgment subject of appeal.
In any event, Sec. 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (which is a restatement of Sec. 8, Rule 9, of the old Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals) explicitly provides that (n)o motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted upon if the
movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If
such petition or motion is subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned. Verily,
although a motion for reconsideration is still before the Court of Appeals, the motion is deemed vacated once the jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked.
The lawyers of TOP RATE are not excused from engaging in forum shopping for the reason that their clients interests were then
paramount. On the contrary, this assertion coming as it does from their Compliance of 25 January 2003 in reply to our show cause order,
very well confirms the identical causes and their reliefs of their Petition for Review on Certiorari and Manifestation and Motion dated 21
December 2001 as both were calculated to quash the adverse decisions of the Court of Appeals.
It bears stressing that a lawyer truly worth his oath pledges allegiance not only to his clients but also to society, the legal profession
and the courts, for the clients cause is not all encompassing nor perpetually overriding. Moreover, if their purpose in filing the Petition for
Review even while the Manifestation and Motion was pending with the Court of Appeals is to protect some entitlements of TOP RATE, are
they implying that the Supreme Court is incapable of defending such asserted right? But the court a quo can? We certainly cannot unfold
our compassionate mantle in this instance, and instead, we must lay our disciplinary hand to strike down the reprehensible ploy employed
by TOP RATE and Attys. Gana and Manlangit.
TOP RATE and its lawyers cannot rectify their forum shopping by arguing that litis pendentia and res judicata would not have arisen
in the instant case since the Supreme Court may still review the pertinent decision or resolution of the Court of Appeals on
their Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001.
This argument is patently misplaced. For precisely, the concurrent pleadings of TOP RATE and its lawyers exhibit the element of litis
pendentia and res judicata alleged by them to be absent, i.e., the result of the first action is determinative of the second action in any event
and regardless of which party is successful, since the action of this Court on the Petition for Review will surely bind the other pending
action on the same cause in the court a quo. Moreover, how can this Court still resolve on appeal such subsequent decision when it has
already decided with finality the same cause upon which the later decision was supposedly based? The purported review by this Court of the
ensuing decision would have been barred by res judicata. Incidentally, in Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange Commission [45] where
forum shopping was detected, the infringing cases were filed with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
We also rule that the forum shopping pulled off by TOP RATE and its lawyers is willful and deliberate. As reflected in the Secretarys
Certificate authorizing the President of TOP RATE to file the necessary pleadings in court to question the adverse decisions of the Court of
Appeals, Atty. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana as TOP RATE Corporate Secretary attested to the collective desire to file the Petition for Review even
while the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 was still pending with the Court of Appeals.
In addition, the Manifestation and Motion filed with the Court of Appeals which prayed for the same reliefs as the Petition for
Review before this Court was deemed filed as early as 21 December 2001, yet its existence was disclosed to this Court only on 3 April 2002
when TOP RATE and its lawyers submitted their Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari. What is more,
this underhanded sense of honesty was triggered only after the adverse Resolutions of this Court were promulgated. Prior to this confession,
TOP RATE as abetted by its lawyers executed certificates of non-forum shopping in its motion for extension of time to file petition for
review and its Petition for Review itself, which contained no reference to the filing or pendency of the Manifestation and Motion filed with
the Court of Appeals. In fact, even as TOP RATE moved to reconsider the denial of its motion for time and Petition for Review, there was
no mention whatsoever of its existence.
We also keenly observe how Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit instigated the Court of Appeals to rule on
their Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001, thereby consummate and realize the fruits of their forum shopping, when they
nonchalantly alleged in one of their Manifestations before the Court of Appeals that the appellate court may already proceed to resolve TOP
RATEs Manifestation and Motion despite their knowledge that their Petition for Review had been denied with finality and that their motion
to withdraw such petition was not granted.
 Obviously, under the foregoing state of facts, forum shopping was crafted willfully and deliberately with the sole objective of
endorsing whichever proceeding would yield favorable consequences to TOP RATEs interests.
On the second issue, we hold that Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit of the Gana and Manlangit Law Office,
counsel of record of TOP RATE, are administratively liable for grotesque violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In arriving
at this conclusion, we strongly note how Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit prompted the Court of Appeals to rule on
their Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 and thereby complete the process of forum shopping, despite their knowledge that
their Petition for Review had been denied with finality and that their motion to withdraw such petition was not granted.
Under Sec. 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, willful and deliberate forum shopping constitutes direct contempt of court
and a cause for administrative sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in the same case where the forum shopping is found. [46]
The lawyers of record of TOP RATE, as all other lawyers, should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration thereof contravenes their oath of office.
A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, promote respect for law and legal processes; [47] shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening the confidence in the legal system; [48] shall observe the rules of procedure and not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice; [49] shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause; [50] shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness; [51] shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law; [52] and, shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client x x x x[53]
This Court has time and again warned counsel of litigants not to abuse court processes, especially not to resort to forum shopping for
this practice clogs the court dockets. Regrettably, TOP RATEs counsel of record failed to internalize and observe with due regard the
honorable tenets of the legal profession and the noble mission of our courts of justice.
In previous cases[54] the penalties imposed upon erring lawyers who engaged in forum shopping ranged from severe censure to
suspension from the practice of law. In the instant case, the suspension of Attys. Gana and Manlangit from the practice of law for six (6)
months from finality of this Resolution should make them realize the seriousness of the consequences and implications of their abuse of
judicial process and disrespect for judicial authority.
Finally, on the third issue, this Court has no choice but to reverse and set aside the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 2 August 2002 for being void on its face.To be sure, the instant proceeding is a collateral attack on such decision since the
issue of its validity is involved in this action only as a mere incident. [55] Of course, this attack is proper only when the assailed judgment is
null on its face, as where it is patent that the court which rendered the judgment in question has no jurisdiction. [56] Parenthetically, forum
shopping is consummated although the court in which one of the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action. [57]
In Macabingkil v. Peoples Homesite and Development Corporation [58] we held that a collateral attack is proper against a challenged
judgment which is void upon its face or where the nullity of the judgment is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. The nullity must be
shown from the averments of the questioned decision or the documents in the record itself, and not upon mere errors of judgment but on the
ground that the court had no power or authority to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or both. [59] A
proceeding for contempt of court is an appropriate collateral vehicle for declaring a judgment void, provided that the aforementioned
requisites for such action are present.[60]
When the Division of Five of the Court of Appeals promulgated the Amended Decision of 2 August 2002, TOP RATE had already filed
with this Court its motion for extension of time to file petition for review and thereafter its Petition for Review. What is worse, even before
the Amended Decision was handed down, this Court had already denied TOP RATEs motion for extension of time to file petition for review
for lack of service of a copy of the motion on the Court of Appeals x x x x; thereafter denied its Petition for Review for petitioners failure to
take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 (a), Rule
56, in view of the denial of petitioners motion for extension of time to file petition in the resolution of 30 January 2002; and, denied with
finality TOP RATEs motion for reconsideration of the adverse Resolutions, as well as noted without action its Manifestation and Motion to
Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court of Appeals has lost jurisdiction to rule on the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December
2001. As earlier mentioned, Sec. 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals bluntly affirms that no motion for reconsideration or
rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for
extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court
shall be deemed abandoned. As the jurisdiction of this Court had been summoned, it was too late in the day for the appellate court to act
upon the Manifestation and Motion and enter a new decision on the merits.
Our ruling in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals [61] is instructive. In that case, the trial court granted plaintiff a writ of
preliminary injunction against defendants, which the latter challenged before the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the immediate lifting thereof. While the certiorari petition to review the writ was still pending in the appellate court,
defendants filed in the trial court a joint petition to dissolve the writ, offering to post a counterbond for that purpose. As prayed for, the trial
court dissolved the writ and denied plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals upon being apprised of the trial
courts action dismissed the petition for certiorari for having become moot and academic.
The issue in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. was whether the trial court continued to have control of the writ of preliminary injunction
even after the same had been raised to the Court of Appeals for review. This Court ineluctably ruled

The answer is no. After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction to the Court of Appeals for determination of
the propriety of its issuance x x x the trial court (notwithstanding the absence of a temporary restraining order from the appellate court)
could not interfere with or preempt the action or decision of the Court of Appeals on the writ x x x whose annulment was sought therein by
Phoenix and the LRTA. In petitioning the trial court to lift the writ x x x Phoenix and the LRTA engaged in forum-shopping. After the
question of whether the writ x x x should be annulled or continued had been elevated to the Court of Appeals for determination, the trial
court lost jurisdiction or authority to act on the same matter x x x x They improperly tried to moot their own petition in the Court of Appeals
- a clear case of trifling with the proceedings in the appellate court or of disrespect for said court x x x x Judicial courtesy behooved the trial
court to keep its hands off the writ x x x and defer to the better judgment of the Court of Appeals the determination of whether the writ
should be continued or discontinued x x x x The private respondents application to the trial court for the dissolution of the writ x x x that
was pending review in the Court of Appeals was a form of forum shopping which this Court views with extreme disapproval. The lower
courts proceeding being void for lack of jurisdiction, the writ of preliminary injunction should be reinstated, and the petition to annul the
writ x x x should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping x x x x[62]

The absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo is manifest not only from the voluminous rollo compiled by the Court of
Appeals but also from the four corners of the Amended Decision. From the case record, we will find copies of TOP RATEs motion for
extension of time to file petition for review, its Petition for Review, the adverse Resolutions of this Court denying the motion for extension
of time to file petition for review and the Petition for Review itself. The case record also informs us of the denial with finality of TOP
RATEs motion for reconsideration of the unfavorable Resolutions of this Court as well as the noting without action of its Manifestation and
Motion to Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002. From these circumstances alone, we can clearly infer lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to promulgate the Amended Decision.
Moreover, in the 22 April 2002 Resolution of the Division of Five, action on the Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001
was deferred until after the Supreme Court has acted on [Top Rates] Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on
Certiorari.[63] This implies that the appellate court was well-aware that TOP RATE had summoned the authority of this Court. Finally, in
the Dissenting Opinion which forms an integral part of the Amended Decision, there are unmistakable references to the Petition for
Review which was filed with this Court while the Manifestation and Motion was still pending in the Court of Appeals

On April 24, 2002 this Court deferred action on appellant TOP RATEs Manifestation and Motion dated December 21, 2001 x x x due to the
pendency in the Supreme Court of TOP RATEs Motion to Withdraw the Petition for Review on Certiorari it earlier filed therein x x x x On
June 7, 2002 this Division received a copy of the Supreme Courts Resolution dismissing with finality TOP RATEs Motion for
Reconsideration of its Resolution dismissing TOP RATEs Petition for Review x x x x

Undoubtedly, we can nullify the Amended Decision in the instant case since the dearth of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to rule
upon the Manifestation and Motion can be plainly discerned not only from the case record but also from the text of the assailed decision
itself.
WHEREFORE, we Resolve to (a) REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Amended Decision of 2 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. CV-60656 and REINSTATE its Decision of 21 May 2001 (affirming in toto the Joint Decision of 13 March 1998 of the RTC-
Br. 21, Imus, Cavite); (b) DECLARE Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit of the Gana and Manlangit Law Office as
well as its client Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., in CONTEMPT of this Court and DIRECT Atty. Luis Ma. Gil L.
Gana, Atty. Elmer E. Manlangit and Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., to each pay a fine of P10,000.00 within five (5)
days from finality of this Resolution; and, (c) SUSPEND from the practice of law Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E.
Manlangit for six (6) months effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that any future violation of their duties as lawyers will
be dealt with more severely.
Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. shall PAY double costs in this instance.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the Bar records of Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit, and served
upon the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Br. 21, Imus, Cavite, the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, for proper dissemination among its chapters all over the country, and for whatever appropriate action they may deem proper to
take under the premises.
SO ORDERED.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

EARTH MINERALS EXPLORATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, MALACAÑANG, MANILA, BUREAU OF MINES
DIRECTOR BENJAMIN A. GONZALES, AND PHILZEA MINING AND DEV.
CORP., respondents.

This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking the reversal of the decision1

dated June 27, 1986 and resolution2

dated May 5, 1987 of the Deputy Executive Secretary in O.P. Case No. 3023. The decision and resolution set aside the orders of the
Minister of Natural Resources and Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences dated November 7, 1985 rendered in MNR Case No. 6353 and July
23, 1985 rendered in Mines Sp. Case No. V-183, respectively, that upheld petitioner's action to cancel/rescind the mining contract dated
September 11, 1980 between Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. and private respondent Philzea Mining and Development Corporation.

The antecedent facts and the proceedings that spawned the instant case, are as follows:

Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. (Zambales Chromite, for short) is the exclusive owner of ten (10) patentable chromite mining claims
located in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. On September 11, 1980, Zambales Chromite, as claim-owner, on one hand, and Philzea
Mining and Development Corporation (Philzea Mining, for short, herein private respondent) as operator, on the other, entered into a
"Contract of Development, Exploitation and Productive Operation" on the ten (10) patentable mining claims (Annex "C", Rollo, p. 120).
During the lifetime of such contract, Earth Minerals Exploration, Inc. (Earth Minerals, for short, herein petitioner) submitted a Letter of
Intent on June 30, 1984 to Zambales Chromite whereby the former proposed and the latter agreed to operate the same mining area subject of
the earlier agreement between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining (Annex "D", Rollo, p. 111). On August 10, 1984, Zambales Chromite
and Earth Minerals concretized their aforementioned Letter of Intent when they entered into an "Operating Agreement" (Annex "E", Rollo,
p. 112) for the latter to operate the same mining area. Consequently, the same mining property of Zambales Chromite became the subject of
different agreements with two separate and distinct operators. On November 29, 1984, petitioner Earth Minerals filed with the Bureau of
Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS, for short) a petition for cancellation of the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining,
pursuant t Section 7, P.D. 1281 which provides, inter alia:

Section 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies, partnerships or persons engaged in mining
exploration, development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving:

(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim holder thereof with several mining operators;

(b) . . . .

(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and
conditions thereof.
In its petition, Earth Minerals alleged, among others, that Philzea Mining committed grave and serious violations of the latter's contract with
Zambales Chromite among which are: failure to produce the agreed volume of chromite ores; failure to pay ad valorem taxes; failure to put
up assay buildings and offices, all resulting in the non-productivity and non-development of the mining area.

On December 10, 1984, Philzea Mining filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Earth Minerals is not the proper party in interest and
that the petition lacks cause of action. The motion to dismiss was, however, denied by the BMGS in an order dated January 24, 1985
holding that "there appears some color of right" on Earth Minerals to initiate the petition for cancellation (Annex "G", Rollo, p. 120). A
motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied by the BMGS in an order dated March 4, 1985. Thereafter, Philzea Mining
elevated the case to then Ministry (now Department) of Natural Resources (MNR, for short) which in its order of April 23, 1985 dismissed
the appeal for the reason that the order of the BMGS was an interlocutory order that could not be the proper subject of an appeal.

On May 2, 1985, Philzea Mining appealed to the Office of the President the order of MNR dated April 23, 1985. During the pendency
thereof, Earth Minerals filed with the MNR a motion for execution of the MNR order of April 23, 1985.

On May 30, 1985, the MNR issued an order directing the BMGS to conduct the necessary investigation in order to hasten the development
of the mining claims in question (Rollo, p. 93). In compliance therewith, the BMGS on June 7, 1985, ordered the private respondent Philzea
Mining to file its answer to Earth Mineral's petition for rescission. Philzea Mining moved to reconsider but the motion was denied.

Philzea Mining did not submit its answer. Accordingly, the BMGS resolved the petition for rescission on the basis of documents
submitted ex parte by herein petitioner. Finding that Philzea Mining grossly violated the terms and conditions of the mining contract
between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite, the BMGS rendered a decision on July 23,1985, cancelling said mining contract, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

In view of all the foregoing, this Office finds and so holds that the Operating Agreement dated September 11, 1980 executed by
and between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining should be, as is hereby cancelled. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered
to immediately vacate the mining area subject of the instant case and turn over the possession thereof to the claimowner and/or
herein petitioner. (Annex "K", Rollo, p. 130).

Aggrieved by the decision of the BMGS, Philzea Mining, aside from filing a notice of appeal to the MNR on July 29, 1985, also filed a
petition for certiorari with the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) on July 30,1985, docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No.
06715, to annul or set aside the decision of the BMGS.

On November 4, 1985, the Office of the President promulgated a decision dismissing the appeal of Philzea Mining from the decision of the
MNR dated April 23, 1985, on the ground that an order denying a motion for reconsideration is interlocutory in nature and cannot be the
subject of an appeal (Annex "L", Rollo, p. 137).

On November 7, 1985, the MNR on the other hand, issued another order this time dismissing the appeal of Philzea Mining from the
decision of the BMGS dated July 23, 1985.

On November 18, 1985 Philzea Mining appealed the aforementioned November 7, 1985 decision of the MNR to the Office of the President.

Meanwhile, on December 26,1985, the then Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition filed by Philzea Mining in AC-G.R. Sp.
No. 06715.

Back to the appeal of Philzea Mining to the Office of the President, the disputed decision dated June 27, 1986 was issued by the then
Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, the orders of the Minister of Natural Resources and the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences, dated November 7 and
July 23, 1985, respectively, are hereby set aside. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 92).

A motion for reconsideration dated July 12,1986 (Annex "U", Rollo, p. 190) was filed by petitioner Earth Minerals which, however, was
denied by the then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig in his resolution dated May 5, 1987, which reads in part:

Wherefore, the instant motion for reconsideration by appellee Earth Minerals is hereby denied for lack of merit and the Decision of
this Office dated June 27, 1986 is hereby reiterated. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 98).
Hence, this petition.

In the resolution of the Court dated July 1989, the Court resolved: (a) to give due course to the petition and (b) to require the parties to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 382).

The principal issues in the case at hand are as follows: (a) whether or not the appeal of the private respondent Philzea Mining from the
decision of the MNR dated November 7,1985 to the Office of the President was made out of time and (b) whether or not the petitioner Earth
Minerals is the proper party to seek cancellation of the operating agreement between Philzea Mining and Zambales Chromite.

The petitioner contends that the last day to appeal the decision of the MNR dated November 7, 1985 fell on November 16, 1985, that is five
(5) days from the date of its receipt by the private respondent on November 11, 1985 and since the notice of appeal dated November
15,1985 was filed on November 18, 1985, the appeal was taken beyond the five-day reglementary period.

Public respondent counters that the ground invoked by the petitioner is too technical in view of the fact that November 16, 1985 was a
Saturday and the following day (November 17, 1985) was a Sunday.

The Court, in the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr. (154 SCRA 49 [1987]) resolved the same
issue in this wise:

Saturday was observed as a legal holiday in the Office of the President pursuant to Sec. 29 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended.

The same law provides:

Sec. 31. Pretermission of holiday — Where the day or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a
holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day.

Apart from the fact that the law is clear and needs no interpretation, this Court in accordance therewith has invariably held that in
case the last day for doing an act is a legal holiday, the last day for doing the same, the act may be done on the next succeeding
business day (Gonzaga v. De David, 110 Phil. 463 [1960]; Calano v. Cruz, 91 Phil. 247 [1957]; Austria et al. v. Solicitor General,
71 Phil. 288 [1941]).

In the case under consideration, as the next working day after November 16, 1985 was November 18, 1985 — a Monday, it is evident that
the private respondent's appeal was filed on time.

Be that as it may, the private respondent's appeal within the reglementary period to the Office of the President does not help them much in
the instant case.

The public respondent argues that the petitioner Earth Minerals is not the proper party to file the petition for cancellation of the contract
between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining citing Article 1311 of the Civil Code which provides that a contract takes effect only
between the parties, their assigns and heirs.

The contention is untenable.

Indeed, a contract takes effect only between the parties who made it, and also their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law (Article 1311, New Civil
Code). Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties in
interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant must be parties to said contract. In relation thereto, Article 1397 of the Civil Code lays the general
rule that an action for the annulment of contracts can only be maintained by those who are bound either principally or subsidiarily by virtue
thereof. The rule, however, admits of an exception. The Court, in Teves v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (23 SCRA 1141
[1968]) held that a person who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he
is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which could positively result to him
from the contract in which he had no intervention. This exception to the rule has been applied in Banez v. CA (59 SCRA 15 [1974];
Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 96 SCRA 342 [1980]; Dilson Enterprises Inc. v. IAC, 170 SCRA 676 [1989]).
Petitioner Earth Minerals seeks the cancellation of the contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining, not as a party to the
contract but because his rights are prejudiced by the said contract. The prejudice and detriment to the rights and interest of petitioner stems
from the continued existence of the contract between Zambales Chromite and private respondent Philzea Mining. Unless and until the
contract between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining is cancelled, petitioner's contract with the former involving the same mining area
cannot be in effect and it cannot perform its own obligations and derive benefits under its contract. The Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences
in his order denying Philzea Mining's motion to dismiss the petition for cancellation of the operating agreement between Philzea Mining
and Zambales Chromite stated:

From the documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner, i.e., the Letter of Intent and Operating Agreement between Zambales
Chromite and Earth Minerals, it may be gleaned that, at least, there appears some color of right on the part of petitioner to request
for cancellation/rescission of the contract dated September 11, 1980 between Zambales Chromite and Philzea Mining.

Moreover, the record amply shows that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources was
supported by substantial evidence. As found by the Bureau of Mines in its decision dated July 23, 1985, the violations committed by Philzea
Mining were not only violations of its operating agreement with Zambales Chromite but of mining laws as well.

In affirming the abovementioned decision, the Minister of Natural Resources made the following statements:

Moreover, the appellant by filing a Manifestation on October 1, 1985 wherein it prayed that the decision appealed from be
reviewed motu propio by this Office, is an implied admission that it has no justification whether in fact or in law, for its appeal;
otherwise, it could have specified them in the appeal memorandum that it is bound by law to file. (p. 142, Rollo)

In such cases, the Court has uniformly held that, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence (Ang Tibay v.
CIR, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]). Still in later cases, the Court continued that such finding will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant (Police Commission v. Lood, 162 SCRA 762 [1984]; Atlas Consolidated v.
Factoran, Jr., supra).

The decision, therefore, of the Deputy Executive Secretary reversing the decisions of the Minister of Natural Resources and Director of
Mines cannot be sustained. This is in line with the pronouncement of the Court that the factual findings of the Secretary should be respected
in the absence of any illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition, none of which was proved by the public and private respondents (Heirs of
Santiago Pastoral v. Secretary of Public Works and Highways, 162 SCRA 619 [1988]).

Regarding the issue of forum shopping, the records show that on July 29, 1985, after Philzea Mining had filed its notice of appeal to MNR
from the July 23, 1985 decision of the BMGS, it also filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court on July 30, 1985,
docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715 praying for the annulment of the same July 23, 1985 decision of the BMGS. When the MNR rendered
its November 7, 1985 decision affirming the July 23, 1985 decision of the BMGS, private respondent Philzea Mining, notwithstanding the
pendency of its petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court, filed its notice of appeal to the Office of the President from the
said decision of the MNR stating therein that its appeal was "without prejudice to the pending petition with the Intermediate Appellate Court
docketed as AC-G.R. Sp. No. 06715" (Rollo, p. 80).

The foregoing facts show a case of forum shopping.

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with
litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative
processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable court ruling (Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. Nos. 89095
and 89555, November 6, 1989).

One last point, the motion to dismiss filed by Philzea before this Court on September 5, 1989, on the ground that the petition has become
moot and academic in view of the expiration on August 10, 1989 of the five (5) year term contract between Zambales Chromite and Earth
Minerals executed by August 10, 1984 should be denied.

The contract between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals provides, inter alia:

5. Others.
 A. During the existence of this agreement, Earth Minerals is free to look for, and negotiate with, an interested party who is
financially capable of operating the CLAIMS on a much bigger scale . . . and in connection therewith, may assign this agreement
in favor of said party; . . . .

In view of such provision, Earth Minerals and Zambales Chromite jointly entered into a "Mining Agreement", dated June 16, 1988, with
Acoje Mining Co., Inc., the salient provisions of which reads:

ZCMC and EMEI jointly desire to protect Acoje from any and all claims (present or future) against it (Acoje) with respect the title
and/or possession of the PROPERTIES and this protection against all claims of third parties or entities during the life of this
Mining Agreement is one of the main considerations why Acoje agreed to enter into this Agreement.

Sec. 1. . . . provided, however, that EMEI obligates itself to continue representing its interest as party in the aforesaid cases pending
with the Supreme Court. (Annex "1", Rollo, p. 397).

The mining agreement between Zambales Chromite and Earth Minerals, on one hand, and Acoje Mining, on the other, expressly recognizes
the pendency of the case at bar, so that herein petitioner Earth Minerals has the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion, and during
the effectivity of such Mining Agreement, both Earth Minerals and Zambales Chromite are under obligation to assure peaceful possession of
the mining properties from the claims of third parties.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby GRANTED; (b) the decision dated June 27,
1986 and resolution dated May 5, 1987 of the Deputy Executive Secretary are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE; and (c) the orders of
the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences dated July 23, 1985 and Minister of Natural Resources dated November 7, 1985 are hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED

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PETRONIO COLLADO and ROMUALDA COLLADO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. HAROLD M. HERNANDO as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Abra, JUANITO F. GO, MAY V. GO, AGRIPINO BRILLANTES and
JULIANA B. BRILLANTES, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the facts are in dispute and, thus, a trial should have been conducted by respondent judge to
ascertain the true facts. A finding of grave abuse of discretion is therefore inevitable. But for reasons to be stated later, this Court is
constrained to hold that, under the circumstances, the writ of certiorari shall not issue.

From the record, the following may be deduced.

On January 16, 1976, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership against private respondents, alleging that they
were the owners of a parcel of residential land situated in Bangued, Abra described and declared under Tax Declaration No. 23174 in the
name of petitioner Romualda Mailed Collation petitioners having purchased the same from Bonifacia Collada on March 20, 1952 and since
then had been in the possession of the land until November 1975, when private respondents spouses Go occupied the same.

In their answer, private respondents claimed that the land formerly belonged to Maria Barreras who sold it in 1942 to respondents-spouses
Brillantes who since then took possession thereof until November 1975 when they sold the land to the spouses Go.
Following a pre-trial conference, respondent judge issued a pre-trial order dated March 17, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by Atty. Agripino Brillantes and in behalf of his co-defendants, they are hereby given a
period of 15 days from today to submit their documentary evidence in support of their defense and Atty. Paterno Aquino
for the plaintiffs is likewise given a period of 15 days from today to submit their additional documentary evidence, after
which, with or without said documentary evidence, the pre-trial conference is closed and terminated and that the parties
by representation of their respective counsels finally agreed to submit the case for decision, hence, this Court, thereafter,
shall consider the same submitted for decision. [Rollo, p. 17].

Said order also stated:

This court therefore ordered the parties to agree ion some undisputed facts already appearing in their pleadings and they agreed as follows:

1. That the parties have the capacity to sue and be sued;

2. That the parties agreed that the property in question is a residential denial land located in the poblacion of Bangued,
Abra, bounded on the north by Maura Felisco; on the east by National Road; on the south by Federico Villamor before but
now Benjamin Aznar; and on the west by Wenceslao Valera de Banez according to the plaintiffs, and Presentacion
Bersamin according to the defendants;

3. That the approximate area of the residential lot in question is, according to the plaintiff, 207 square meters, while
according to the defendants, it is 300 sq. meters, more or less;

4. That the party who will lost (sic) in this case shall pay for attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00 to the winning
party. [Rollo, pp. 13-14.]

xxx xxx xxx

This court further inquired from the plaintiffs, thru counsel, Atty. Paterno Aquino, if what is (sic) the subject matter of the
oral evidence they would intend to present in this case and Atty. Aquino statedthat the land in question originally belonged
to Andres Collado, now deceased, who had been in actual, open, public, continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse
possession in the concept of owner for a period of more than 30 years including the possession of his predecessor in
interest; that after the death of Andres Collado, the property was inherited by Bonifacia Collado who continued the
possession in the same manner as that of Andres Collado in the concept of owner; that in 1952, said Bonifacia Collado
executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Petronio Collado and Romualda B. Mailed covering the land in suit. . . that
since the time of the purchase up to the present, they have been in actual, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of
the land in question in the concept of absolute owner and that they have paid the realty taxes ...

... .This court likewise asked the defendants, thru Atty. Brillantes, the nature or subject matter of their oral evidence and
he informed the court as follows:

That the property in question formerly belonged to Maria Barreras having been in possession of the property for more that
20 years before 1942; that the same Maria Barreras sold the said property to the spouses Atty. and Mrs. Agripino
Brillantes; that the document of sale was notarized by the late Atty. Abraham Cardenas and it was duly registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Abra but all public records were burned during the bombing of the town of Bangued on
March 10, 1945 so that said document is not now available; that the vendees Agripino Brillantes and Juliana Balmaceda-
Brillantes occupied the property physically by allowing Julia Bigornia and Jose Bambilla to stay on the lot until it was
sold to the herein defendants Juanita F. Go and May Valera-Go on October 1, 1975; that after the property was sold to the
defendants Mr. and Mrs. Juanito F. Go, the house of Jose Bambilla and Julia Bigornia was removed and another house of
strong materials was construed by defendants Mr. and Mrs. Juanita F. Go valued at P110,000.00 but is still incomplete;
that the lot in question has been mortgaged by the defendants Mr. and Mrs. Juanito F. Go with the Development Bank of
the Philippines in the amount of P44,000.00; that Andres Collado and Maria Barreras were common-law husband and
wife as they were not legally married and that Bonifacia Collado never occupied the property because she had not been in
Bangued for a long time now but defendant Agripino Brillantes was informed that said Bonifacia Collado is presently in
Manila. [Rollo, pp. 14-16; Emphasis supplied].
On April 21, 1976, the trial court rendered judgment, without trial on the merits, dismissing the complaint on the basis of the documentary
evidence submitted for marking and the manifestation of the parties respective counsels as to what they intend to prove through the oral
evidence they will present.

On April 30, 1976, petitioner filed in the trial court a "Motion for Modification of Order and To Set Aside Judgment" alleging that their
counsel made no representation agreeing to consider the case submitted for decision. The court denied the motion in an order dated May 14,
1976 for lack of interest to prosecute the same as petitioners and their counsel faded to appear during the hearing on the motion. Petitioners
moved to reconsider the order but the same was denied.

Hence, petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari with this Court to annul the pre-trial order dated March 17, 1976 issued
by respondent judge as well as his decision dated April 21, 1976, alleging grave abuse of discretion.

In a resolution dated June 2, 1976, the Court commented that it was "not inclined to sanction the rendition of a judgment based on nothing
more than mere representations of the parties of what they intend to prove, without actually presenting their oral evidence,. particularly
where, as in the instant case, it is evident that their factual theories contradict each other." [Rollo, P. 45]. This observation was reiterated by
the Court in resolutions dated August 4, 1976 [Rollo, p. 56] and October 6, 1976 [Rollo, P. 76].

Subsequently, in his rejoinder received by the Court on August 25, 1976, respondent judge manifested to the Court that petitioners had
appealed his decision to the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 58-65-]. This fact was not disclosed by petitioners in their petition. The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 59738R.

After petitioners waived their right to file a memorandum, private respondents adopted respondent judge's rejoinder as their memorandum
and respondent judge filed his memorandum, the case was submitted for decision on February 7, 1977. In the meantime, the Court of
Appeals had been regularly inquiring from that Tribunal about the status of the instant case [Rollo, p. 90, et seq.]

There is no dispute that the procedure followed by respondent judge in hearing and deciding the case was not in accord with the procedure
prescribed by the Rules of Court. The pertinent section of the Rules of Court could not be more specific:

Sec. 2. Agreed statement of facts. — The parties to any action may agree, in writing, upon the facts involved in the
litigation, and require judgment of the court upon the facts agreed upon, without the introduction of evidence.

If the parties can agree only on soon of the facts in issue, trial shall be held as to the others. [Rule 30; Emphasis
supplied]

As the parties have already agreed on some facts, trial should have been held on the disputed factual issues. Respondent judge, however,
adopted a procedure not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. In lieu of hearing the testimonies of the witnesses of the parties on the disputed
facts, he proceeded to render a decision on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted by the parties for marking as exhibits and their
respective counsel's manifestation regarding the gist of the testimonial evidence they intend to introduce during the trial. The exhibits have
not yet even been formally offered, much less admitted in evidence. Thus, they could not be considered by the court [Rule 132, Sec. 35].

However, in spite of the irregularity of the procedure followed by respondent judge, this Court holds that the issuance of the writ of
certiorari is not proper.

A more fitting factual backdrop that would call for the reiteration of the rule that essential to the issuance of the writ of certiorari is that
there be no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to the petitioner [Rule 66, Sec. 1]
could not be found. In that case, the emergency requisite to the issuance of the writ does not obtain. The remedy of appeal is available, as in
fact an appeal was filed by petitioners in the Court of Appeals.

Perhaps this is the reason for petitioners' failure to state in their petition the jurisdictional allegation that "there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

This Court frowns upon petitioners' omission in not disclosing to the Court that an appeal had been filed in and was pending before the
Court of Appeals. Information on the existence and status of the appeal only came out in respondent judge's rejoinder. Thereafter, unable to
deny its existence, petitioners reasoned out "that the present civil action has not become moot and academic by said appeal because the
appeal is still pending before the Court of Appeals and a long way to termination of the same including possible appeal from said court to
this Court. On the contrary, the grant of the writ of certiorari prayed for in the present special civil action would render moot and academic
the aforesaid appeal." [Rollo, p. 71]. This is a classic case of forum-shopping which this Court definitely cannot and will not countenance.
What aggravates petitioners case is that they chose to trifle with the highest court of the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Counsel for petitioners, Atty. Patemo Aquino, is ADMONISHED for forum-shopping
and with the jurisdiction of this Court. He is WARNED that any further misconduct wig be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
decision be appended to the record of Atty. Aquino.

Respondent judge is REMINDED to comply faithfully with the procedure provided in the Rules of Court. Let a copy of this decision be
appended to his record.

As the appeal in CA-G.R. No. 59738-R is pending in the Court of Appeals, and said Court has desisted from acting on the case before it
pending disposition of the case by this Tribunal, let a copy of this Decision be immediately sent to the Court of Appeals to enable said Court
to dispose of the case with deliberate dispatch.

Treble costs against petitioners.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED