GRECO BELGICA VS.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PACQUITO OCHOA

GR No. 280560

NOTE: Focus on the separation of powers in this case.

FACTS:

 The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70,000,000 – for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40,000,000 for “hard
projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.) and P30,000,000 for “soft
projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.)
b. P200,000,000 – for each senator; broken down to P100,000,000 for hard projects and
P100,000,000 for soft projects.
c. P200,000,000 – for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100,000,000 for hard projects and
P100,000,000 for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

“Presidential Pork Barrel”

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project
– this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.

“Pork Barrel Scam Controversy”

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel
system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles.

Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on
Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
RULING:

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it

violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
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As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part
of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was
that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their
PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. That being, legislative power cannot
be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which
his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The
power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and
not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress
can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact
that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the House of Representatives,
what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government meddles with the affairs of the
local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF
becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

“No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

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 Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as
PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation,
to wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-
related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

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JOSE ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
FACTS: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On
Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district. On
November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8,
1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara.
On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly. Angara filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that by virtue of the National Assembly proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued
back by claiming that Electoral Commission proclamation governs and that the Electoral Commission can
take cognizance of the election protest and that the Electoral Commission cannot be subject to a writ of
prohibition from the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
II. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election
protest.
RULING:
The government established by the Constitution follows the theory of separation of powers of the
legislative, the executive and the judicial. The system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions
and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. In cases of conflict between the
several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries. The judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
The the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the government. The Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
Under the organic law prevailing before the (1935) Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective

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members. The (1935) Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission. Such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
The avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional
organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said
contests.
Section 4 of article VI of the (1935) Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and
manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and
expenses of contest.
The confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether
his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy
the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. The confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and
cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest
against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
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BONDOC VS. PINEDA

FACTS: Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4 th District of
Pampanga. Pineda was a member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) while Bondoc was a member of
Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in the election, garnering 31,700 votes while Bondoc reached 28,400
votes, a difference of 3,300 votes.

Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). A year passed and
a decision had been reached declaring him as the winner.

Meanwhile, a member of the HRET, Cong. Juanito Camasura Jr., a member of LDP, confessed to his
Chief, Cong. Jose Cojuangco Jr., Secretary General of LDP, that he voted for Bondoc. His confession resulted
to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda moved that Camasura be withdrawn from HRET to appoint a new
representative. Thereafter, HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera removed Camasura from his
position.

Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because
Camasura‘s removal from HRET is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of
powers, the judiciary may not interfere.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET
without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the
function of the legislature. The issue is a judicial question. What is being complained of is an act of HRET not
the act of Congress. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is an independent organ, separate from
the legislature to exercise exclusive jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election
contests is not to be shared by with the Legislature nor with the courts.

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PEOPLE VS. VERA

FACTS: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied. Thereupon, he sought to have
the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition and
returned the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

While awaiting new trial, he stated that he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Pedro
Tuason referred the appeal to the Insular Probation Office but denied it. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance
of Manila, 7th branch, Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing upon the request of Cu Unjieng. The Fiscal
of the City of Manila countered, alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because
it’s a violation of Act No. 4221 which endows the provincial boards the power to provide a system of
probation to convicted person. According to them, it is also an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces.

ISSUE:

I. Whether Act No. 4221 generate undue delegation of legislative power or not.
RULING: The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, in the
language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the
provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly
on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various
provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at
all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial
boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to
decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is
not susceptible of any other interpretation. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards.

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DAYAO VS COMELEC
FACTS:

LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in the LPG
and energy sector. Its incorporators, officers and members are actually marketers and independent re-fillers of
LPG that control 45% of the national LPG retail. It sought to register as a party-list organization for the 2010
elections and was approved by the Comelec.

Petitioners filed a complaint and petition before the Comelec for the cancellation of LPGMA’s
registration as a party-list organization, arguing that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized sector of the
society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens.

LPGMA argued that Sec 5(2) Article VI of the Constitution does not require that party-list
representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the society.

The complaint was dismissed for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the
petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of RA No. 7941. Second, the complaint is
actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been approved with
finality. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.

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ISSUE:

I. Whether or Not RA No. 7941 require that incorporators, officers and members of a party list
system must be marginalized or underrepresented citizens.
RULING:

The court explained that the laws, rules or regulations referred to in Par 5 includes Sec 2of RA 7941
which declares that marginalized and underrepresented Filipino citizens become members of the House of
Representatives. The party list system was crafted for the marginalized and underrepresented and their
alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is no need to categorically mention that “those who
are not marginalized and underrepresented are disqualified.”

All told, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for
cancellation of LPGMA’s party-list accreditation. In the ordinary course of procedure, the herein complaint
should be remanded to the COMELEC. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 951340
which subjected to summary evidentiary hearings all existing and registered party-list groups, including
LPGMA, to assess their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines set
in Ang Bagong Bayani. The Resolution stated, among others, that the registration of all non-compliant groups
shall be cancelled. LPGMA submitted to a factual and evidentiary hearing before the COMELEC and was
deemed to have complied with all the requirements for registration.

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ANTONIO BENZON III VS HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FACTS:

The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is
not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960 of a Filipino father.
However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith.
He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a
representative.

Bengzon filed a petition claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen under Article VI, Sec 6, of the 1987 Constitution. HRET
decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

I. WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who
have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and
by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
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In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed
to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of
a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

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BAGABUYO VS COMELEC GR. NO. 176970

FACTS:

Rogelio Bagabuyo, petitioner, asserted that the COMELEC should not implement Resolution no. 7837 on the
ground that the law that it seeks to implement, RA 9371- is unconstitutional.

On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House
Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of
Cagayan De Oro." This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro's
legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified
as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents of
each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod.

The petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules,
regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion
of a local government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and
desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837.

RULING:

The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of Cagayan de Oro City into two
districts because the barangays in the first district are mostly rural barangays while the second district is
mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But even if backed up by proper proof, we cannot question the
division on the basis of the difference in the barangays' levels of development or developmental focus as
these are not part of the constitutional standards for legislative apportionment or reapportionment. What the
components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter for the lawmakers to determine as a
matter of policy. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or violation of the established legal
parameters, this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies.

We take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics Office which shows
that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a total population of 254,644, while the second
district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard
in gauging equality of representation. In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative," while ensuring representation for every
province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that
every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are found and does not require their division,
merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are satisfied despite some
numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as practicable.

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The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a
province, not the number of registered voters therein. R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a
reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI,
Section 5(4) of the Constitution.

A plebiscite was also always identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of
boundaries of local government units, never with the concept of legislative apportionment.

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BANAT VS COMELEC GR. NO. 179271

FACTS:

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as quoting the
COMELEC of using the Panganiban formula used in veterans case in allocating party list seats. Banat contend
that article 6 section 5 should be followed and that 20% of party list representatives shall be proclaimed.
COMELEC DENIED said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for certiorari.

RULING:

The court declare unconstitutional the 2% threshold in the distribution of additional party list seats. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of
the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The 20% allocation for party list is merely
ceiling, party list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the house of representatives.
The three seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party list organization may occupy,
remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party list elections.

The Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and
write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow
in poverty, destitution and infirmity as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
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EMMANUEL PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERA 15 SCRA 569

FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities –
this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in
part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that
the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by
Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be
created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue
of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it
is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case,
Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

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TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS)
VS BLAS OPLE 137 SCRA 117

FACTS:The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) and the National
Federation of Labor Unions (NFLU) are unions representing the agricultural and industrial sectors.
They alleged they represent over a million workers all over the country. On the other hand, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 697 is the implementing law of the constitutional provision which states that 3 sectors
are to be represented (youth, agricultural labor, industrial labor).

Each sector must have four representatives, 2 from Luzon, one each from Visayas and Mindanao
respectively. These sectors can submit their nominees to the President for approval/appointment
through the Minister of Labor. TUPAS however questions the constitutionality of the said BP
because it allegedly lacks duly published rules on accreditation, nomination and appointment of
industrial labor representatives. Being so, TUPAS questioned the acts of BlasOple, then Minister of
Labor, in accrediting certain nominations provided by other industrial labor groups. TUPAS claims
that since there are no rules clearly stated in the BP on how the nominations must be handled, the said
law has provided undue delegation to the Minister of Labor and has left him with absolute discretion
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 in carrying out the duty of accrediting such nominations. TUPAS did not submit their nomination
within the given 20 day period of nominating their representation; they instead proceeded to question
the constitutionality of the said BP and the legality of the acts of Ople. Because of their failure to
submit their nominees, Ople did not accredit them.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Minister of Labor by BP 697.

HELD: No. The lack of merit of the contention that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative
power is quite obvious. Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise
of discretion. What is involved then is not a legislative power but the exercise of competence
intrinsically executive. What is more, the official who could make the recommendation is the Minister
of Labor, an alter ego of the President. The argument, therefore, that there is an unlawful delegation
of legislative power is bereft of any persuasive force.

To further test the validity of the said BP, and to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be
a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to be spelled out. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. Such standard is set forth with
clarity in Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 which provides in full the limits and scope
of the functions of the Minister of Labor in carrying out the said provisions.

TUPAS and NFLU were free to submit their nominations to the President by merely writing a letter
coursed through respondent, and their nominees should have been submitted to the President. They
did not do so. In fact, as of May 30, 1984, which was still within the 20-day period, they wrote a letter
to Ople which in effect stated that they were not submitting any nomination and informing him that
they were questioning the validity of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of BP 697. Hence, if petitioners were not
able to submit any nominee they had no one to blame but themselves. And the law cannot be declared
unconstitutional on such ground.

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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

REPUBLIC ACT No. 1793

An act constituting an independent presidential electoral tribunal to try, hear and decide protests
contesting the election of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines and
providing for the manner of hearing the same.

Section 1. There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to be composed of eleven members
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines. It shall be composed of the Chief Justice and
the other ten members of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice shall be its chairman. If on account of illness,
absence, or incapacity upon any of the grounds mentioned in section one, Rule one hundred and twenty-six of
the Rules of Court, of any member of the Tribunal, or whenever, by reason of temporary disability of any
member thereof, or vacancies occurring therein the requisite number of members of the Tribunal necessary to
constitute a quorum or to render a judgment in any given contest, as hereafter provided, is not present, or for
any other good reason for the early disposal of the contest, the Chief Justice may designate any retired justice
or justices of the Supreme Court as may be necessary, to sit temporarily as Member of the Tribunal, in order
to form a quorum or until a judgment in said contest is reached: Provided, however, That if no retired justices
of the Supreme Court are available or the number available is not sufficient, justices of the Court of Appeals
and retired justices of the Court of Appeals may be designated to act as Member of the Tribunal.

Section 2. A majority of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall constitute a quorum to do business. Unless
otherwise specifically provided herein, it may promulgate its own rules and regulations governing the

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procedure to be followed in the filing and hearing of such contest, and may authorize any three of its members
to receive evidence.

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall hear and decide in banc all presidential election contests brought
under this Act and the concurrence of at least seven members of the Tribunal shall be necessary for a final
decision thereon.

Section 3. The Presidential Electorial Tribunal shall decide the contest within twenty months after it is filed,
and within said period shall declare who among the parties has been elected, or, in the proper case, that none
has been elected, and in case of a tie between the candidates for president or for vice-president involved in the
contest, one of them shall be chosen President or Vice-President, as the case may be, by a majority vote of the
members of the Congress in joint session assembled.

The party who, in the judgment, has been declared elected, shall have the right to assume the office as soon as
the judgment becomes final which shall be ten days after promulgation. The promulgation shall be made on a
date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys, personally
or by registered mail or by telegraph. No motion shall be entertained for the reopening of a case but only for
the reconsideration of a decision under the evidence already of record, No party may file more than one
motion for reconsideration, copy of which shall be served upon the adverse party who shall answer it within
five days after the receipt thereof. Any petition for reconsideration shall be resolved within ten days after it is
submitted for resolution. As soon as a decision becomes final, a copy thereof shall be furnished both houses of
the Congress.

Section 4. The Tribunal shall have a Clerk of the Tribunal and such other subordinate officers and employees
as may be necessary for the efficient performance of its functions and duties, all of whom shall be appointed
by the Tribunal in accordance with the Civil Service Law and Rules. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal may
designate the Chief Attorney of the Commission on Elections to act as Clerk of the Tribunal, and may assign
other employees of the Commission on Elections and of the Supreme Court as may be necessary to perform
duties in connection therewith. Such officials and employees when so assigned by the Tribunal, shall perform
their duties and functions under the exclusive supervision and control of the Tribunal.

Section 5. Any registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received not
less than five hundred thousand votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the
case may be, by filing a petition of contest with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
days after the proclamation of the result of the election.

Before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall take cognizance of a petition of contest or counter-contest, the
contestant or counter-contestant shall file a bond with two sureties satisfactory to the Tribunal and for such
amount as it may fix, to answer for the payment of all expenses and costs incidental to said contest, or shall
deposit with the Tribunal cash in lieu of the bond, or both, as the Tribunal may order. Within five days from
the filing of the contest or counter-contest, the Tribunal shall fix the amount of the bond or the cash deposit or
both and if the contestant or counter-contestant fails to file the required bond or cash deposit or both within
ten days from notice, his petition of contest or counter-contest, shall be dismissed. The Tribunal may, for good
reason, order from time to time that the amount of the bond or the cash deposit be increased or decreased, or
order the disposition of such deposit as the course of the contest may require. In case the party who has paid
the expenses and costs wins in the contest, the Tribunal shall assess, levy and collect the same as costs from
the losing party.

Section 6. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall have and exercise the same powers which the law confers
upon the courts or justice, including the issuance of subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, the taking of
depositions, the arrest of witnesses for the purpose of compelling their appearance; the production of
documents and other evidence, the compulsory payment of the costs and expenses which may have been
assessed against the parties and their bonds and the enforcing of said payment through the officers charged
with the enforcement of judicial orders.

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal or any of its Members shall have the power to punish contempts provided
for in Rules 64 of the Rules of Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein
and exercised by superior courts.

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The telegrams and correspondence of the Tribunal shall be transmitted free of charge.

Section 7. The sum of two hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated to carry out the purposes of this
Act.

Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 21, 1957

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MACALINTAL VS. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Facts: Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal filed a petition that questioned the constitutionality of the presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Invoking the constitutional provision which allows the “appointment of additional personnel”.

Contention of the Petitioner: The PET is unconstitutional and that the Supreme Court’s decision in the case
of Buac vs. COMELEC which declared that contests involving the President and Vice-President fell within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, in the exercise of quasi-judicial power. On this constitution of PET,
with the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12,
Article VII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of the
other Courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Contention of the Respondent through the OSG: the petition was unspecified and without statutory basis
and that the liberal approach in its preparation is a violation of the well-known rules of practice and pleading
in this jurisdiction.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
2. Whether or not the Presidential Electoral Tribunal violates Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution.

Held:
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, Paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme
Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this
authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme
Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional provision.
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred
upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representative in having their own tribunals.
The set ups embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election disputes, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial
power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential or vice-presidential election contests, with full
authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by the PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power
allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
The PET is not simply an agency to which Member of the Court were designated. As intended by the framers
of the Constitution, the PET is to be an independent institution, but not separate, from the judicial department.

Decision: The petition is dismissed.

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ORDER OF SUCCESSION-BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 882

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE ORDER OF SUCCESSION TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

IN CASE OF PERMANENT VACANCY OR IN THE EVENT OF TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF
THE PRESIDENT.
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Section 1. In case of permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation of the President,
before the presidential election of 1987, the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa shall act as President
until a President and a Vice-President or either of them shall have been elected and shall have qualified.
In case of death, permanent disability or resignation of the Speaker at the time this vacancy in the
Office of the President occurs or subsequently thereafter, the Prime Minister shall act as President.
However, should the Prime Minister fail or refuse for any cause whatsoever to assume or continue to
act as President, the Deputy Prime Minister shall act as President. In case of his inability, the Speaker
Pro Tempore, or if the Speaker Pro Tempore fails to assume office for any cause as provided herein, the
Members of the Batasang Pambansa shall by a majority vote elect from among themselves a Member
who shall act as President.
Any person who serves as Acting President under the foregoing provision shall be subject to the same
restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Speaker as provided for in Section 9, Article VII of
the Constitution.

Section 2. If at the time fixed for the beginning of his term, the President-elect shall have died, the Vice-
President-elect shall become President.

Section 3. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term,
or if the President shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice-President shall act as President until a
President shall have qualified.

Section 4. When neither the President-elect nor the Vice-President-elect shall have been chosen or shall
have qualified or both shall have died at the time fixed at the beginning of their terms, the Prime
Minister shall act as President. In the event of the death, resignation or permanent disability of the
Prime Minister to act as President, the line of succession shall be as follows: the Speaker, the Deputy
Prime Minister and the Speaker Pro Tempore.

Section 5. In case of permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation of the President,
the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In the event of permanent
disability, death, removal from office or resignation of both the President and the Vice-President, the
order of the presidential succession shall be as follows: the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Deputy
Prime Minister, and the Speaker Pro Tempore. If the Speaker Pro Tempore fails to assume office for
any cause as provided herein, the Batasang Pambansa shall convene immediately without need of a call,
and the Members thereof shall, by a majority vote, elect from among the elected Members, one who is
qualified to be President in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

Section 6. In the event the President transmits to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa his written
declaration that he is temporarily unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until such
time that the President transmits to the Speaker a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. In the event the Vice-President
shall not have been chosen and qualified, the Prime Minister, or in the case of the latter's inability, the
Speaker, shall act as Acting President.

Section 7. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.

Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: December 3, 1985

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ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

ESTRADA VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

Facts: Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of his term, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. From receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage wherein the Congress had to intervene as they had the
investigation of the petitioner conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee. By October of the same year, there

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was already a statement from the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking the petitioner to
step down from presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. Joined by the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines crying for the same. This chaos continued as one by one his appointees resigned
from their designated positions in the government. On December 7, 2000, the impeachment trial started.
January 20, 2001, Estrada and his family left the Malacanang Palace leaving a statement and a letter that he is
unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office, by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President.

Issues:
1. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
2. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a president
on leave while respondent Arroyo is an acting president.
3. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that the petitioner is still
President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
4. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity.

Held: (By issue)

1. In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer
delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question. The case at bar, pose legal not
political questions. The principal issues for resolution requires proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, respondent’s invocation of the Doctrine of Political
Question is but a foray in the dark.
2. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal
question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial
notice. Petitioner denies that he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.
Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her
oath as President. In the case at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 or after the
oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
3. Petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on
leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by this court.
4. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in
the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. He is now
considered a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet
can be the object of a criminal prosecution.

In the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting president, the cases filed
are criminal in character. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability
for unlawful acts and omissions.

In relation to prejudicial publicity, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant tis Court to
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs
to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show weightier
social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision.

Decision: The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada is dismissed.

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POWER TO APPOINT

The POWER of appointment is vested in the President by the Constitution. Under this provision, there are two
kinds of presidential appointments: (1) appointments made during the session of Congress or the so-called
regular appointments or nominations, and
(2) appointments made during the recess of Congress which are also known as ad interim appointments

APPOINTMENT PROCESS

The regular appointments which are contemplated under the first paragraph of Article VII, Section 16 of the
1987 Constitution go through the following stages: (1) nomination, (2) consent, (3) appointment and (4)
acceptance by the nominee. What the President sends to the Commission is just a nomination. After the
Commission has given its consent, the President issues the appointment. It is only when the last stage has been
completed may the officer concerned take his oath of office. The second paragraph of Article VII, Sec. 16, of
the 1987 Constitution also empowers the President to issue appointments while Congress is not in session.
Such appointments are called ad interim appointments, and it goes through the following stages: (1)
appointment
and (2) confirmation.

An ad interim appointment is permanent in nature and takes effect immediately. Thus, one who was issued an
ad interim appointment may immediately enter upon the discharge of his functions.

An ad interim appointment ceases to be valid upon disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or, if not
confirmed, until the next adjournment of Congress.

OFFICERS SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION

Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are two classes of public officers whose
appointments need confirmation. These are: The heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President under the 1987 Constitution. The officers referred to
under this provisions are: The Chairman and Members of Constitutional Commission such as the Commission
on Elections, the Commission on Audit and the Civil Service Commission; the regular members of the
Judicial and Bar Council.

CONFIRMATION FLOW PROCESS

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BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA
Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed.
26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and
violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas
Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement
it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the
Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them,
causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally
which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going
towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from
proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists
were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them
in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop
violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21,
2005. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines
is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to
the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for
which the expression is sought.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the
right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them
and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance
set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880
cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to
this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and
convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to
apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue
would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action
even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the
policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the
Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public
inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral
regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives
the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public
place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it
covers all rallies.

Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

Held: No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right
of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute
ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It
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refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
“peaceable” and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists
and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the
content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has
no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely
confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ
from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void.

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation
of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30)
days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be
required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or
municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.

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POWER OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

ARTICLE VII. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 17. Power of Control and Supervision

Power of Control

The power of an officer to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance
of his duties, and to substitute the judgment of the officer for that of his subordinate. Thus, the President
exercises control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.

The President’s power over government-owned corporations comes not from the Constitution but from
statute. Hence, it may be taken away by statute.

Qualified Political Agency:

1) Since all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads
of such departments, etc. are assistants and agents of the President.

2) Thus, generally the acts of these department heads, etc, which are performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are presumptively the acts of the President.

3) Exception: If the acts are disapproved or reprobated by the President.

4) Under Administrative Law, decisions of Department Secretaries need not be appealed to the President in
order to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

5) Qualified political agency does NOT apply if the President is required to act in person by law or by the
Constitution. Example: The power to grant pardons must be exercised personally by the President.

Disciplinary Powers:

1) The power of the President to discipline officers flows from the power to appoint the, and NOT from the
power control.

2) BUT While the President may remove from office those who are not entitled to security of tenure, or
those officers with no set terms, such as Department Heads, the officers, and employees entitled to security of
tenure cannot be summarily removed from office.

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Power of Supervision

1) This is the power of a superior officer to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed by subordinates.

2) The power of the president over local government units is only of general supervision. Thus, he can only
interfere with the actions of their executive heads if these are contrary to law.

3) The execution of laws is an OBLIGATION of the President. He cannot suspend the operation of laws.

4) The power of supervision does not include the power of control; but the power of control necessarily
includes the power of supervision.
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MONDANO VS. SILVOSA

Facts: Mayor Jose Mondano of mainit, surigao was accused for rape and concubinage by consolacion
mosende( mother of the victim). The complaint reached the assistant executive secretary, who then ordered
the herein respondent provincial governor fernando silvosa to investigate, act and report the matter. Thus,
Silvosa summoned Mondano, gave him a copy of the complaint filed against him , and suspended him from
office by issuing administrative order. Mondano petitioned for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondent for further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against
him and for the declaration that the order of suspension is illegal.

Contention of the Petitioner: In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which
provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue of the order given by the Assistant Executive
Secretary, is with “direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
. . .” and to that end “may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an
official or person who shall conduct such investigations.

Issue: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a
mayor.

Held: No. The Constitution provides:

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”

Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted
only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the
President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for
in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority
to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments
over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.

In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. (*power of
control vs power of supervision)

The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the
provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
Page 18 of 58
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the
accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question.” Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities.

In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondano’s office. If the issue is
not related to his office but involves a crime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case),
there must first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued. The governor must suspend a
mayor not because he’s acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the power granted at him by
the Revised Administrative Code.

Thus, the suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and
without authority of law.
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MARTIAL LAW 2017

Proclamation No. 216

The 2017 proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
whole of Mindanao, issued by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on May 23, 2017.
Declaration
At 10:00 p.m. PST (UTC+08:00) on May 23, 2017, amid a Maute Group-related escalation of conflicts
in Mindanao as well as recent clash in Marawi between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Islamist
group, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte placed the whole of Mindanao, including Basilan, Sulu,
and Tawi-Tawi, under martial law. The proclamation was announced during a press briefing held in Moscow,
where Duterte was on an official visit; the state of martial law will be in effect for 60 days. Presidential
Spokesperson Ernesto Abellasaid the declaration was possible given the "existence of rebellion,"
while Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano explained that the step was taken with "the safety, the lives and
property of people of Mindanao" in mind. Implementation is to be pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, which
provides for a maximum 60 day-state of martial law without Congress approval for extension, the
continuation of government functions, and the safeguard of individual freedoms. However, Duterte insisted
that it will not be any different from martial law under President Ferdinand Marcos.
While the declaration does not currently affect citizens and government units in Luzon or the Visayas, Duterte
suggested that he might extend the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to the Visayas and
martial law to the entire country if needed to "protect the people."
The Congress approved of a resolution supporting the measure on May 31, 2017 President Duterte's
declaration of martial law in the entire Mindanao region was met with polarized views from the citizens with
some reports indicating mixed reactions. However, actual surveys on the ground indicate that majority of
Filipinos are in favor of its imposition.
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EDCEL LAGMAN VS. EXEC. SECRETARY

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in
direct proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public
safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements;
hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed,
variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway
and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain
peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas
where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of
lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines
coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place
where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the
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exercise thereof ineffective and useless.

FACTS: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on
May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for
decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened
with the passing of time. The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and
significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the
possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution expressing full support to
the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in
accordance with the law. In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found no compelling reason to
revoke the same. The House of Representatives likewise issued a resolution expressing its full support to the
President, as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216.
Invoking the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, various citizens filed several
petitions, essentially invoking the Court’s specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216; and seeking to nullify Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional
because it lacks sufficient factual basis.

ISSUES:
1. Are the instant petitions the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution?
2. Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,:
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
b. required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National
Defense; or
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent events
prove the situation to have not been accurately reported?
3. Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus independent of the actual actions that have been
taken by Congress jointly or separately?
4. Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus?
a. What are the parameters for review? b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
5. Is the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the calibration of graduated powers
granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?
6. May Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and void:
a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups”; or
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region?
7. Are the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress
sufficient bases;
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao region?
8. Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public
safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
9. Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region?

RULING:
1. YES. The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be
treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII.
Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different

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rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual
period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is
likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period
within which the Court has to promulgate its decision.
In fine, the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding: appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a
complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court. 2.
a. NO. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension,
the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and
in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts
reported to him due to the urgency of the situation.
To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede
the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the
ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances
obtaining would be able to dictate.
b. NO. Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-
ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law.
A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare
martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that
public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is
made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no
other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution is bestowed.
c. YES. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of the Court
as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of the power to declare martial law and/or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, must be based only on facts or information known by or
available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are
found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on
the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should
be from the present depends on the President.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written
report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial
law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the
President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in
the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of
the factual basis itself.
3. YES. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only
the information and data available to the President prior to, or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed
to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the
Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below,
Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate
proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but
likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be
exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
4. YES. The President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the
culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its
territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogative, leading the President to

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believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public
safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
a. Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1)
actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the
concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual ' bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the
removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the
President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts.
In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
b. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
c. What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
5. NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which
extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion
into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
lies with the President.

6. a. NO. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups"
found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
b. NO. There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or
operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the
Proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders in violation of
the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should be resolved in a
separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed a
trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
7. YES. A review of the facts available to the President that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable
purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory
and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives leading to President to believe that
there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety
requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion
exists. The President’s conclusion was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President
satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard
of probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
8. YES. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid,
there must be concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his report, the
President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only
against government forces or establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and
in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued, road blockades and checkpoints were set up,
schools and churches were burned, civilian hostages were taken and killed, non-Muslim or Christians were
targeted, young male Muslims were forced to join their group, medical services and delivery of basic services
were hampered, reinforcement of government troops and civilian movement were hindered, and the security
of the entire Mindanao Islands was compromised. Based on the foregoing, Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety
requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
9.a. NO. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court’s declaration of a state of national emergency
on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016 where he
called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to
suppress any and all forms of lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.
The President’s calling out power is in a different category from the power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to declare martial law. In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out

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the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to
declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be precluded to a possible future exercise of the latter
powers, as in this case.
b. NO. Under the “operative fact doctrine”, the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative fact”
before it is declared unconstitutional. The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination of
constitutionality is an operative fact that may have consequence which cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the invalidy may have to be considered in
various aspects- with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate and particular conduct, private
and official.

Court Ruling on Martial law on Whole of Mindanao

We revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the
President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the particular
place where the armed public uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial
law is an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the
President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait for another
rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the
President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is infested with rebels before he could
declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario envisioned by the Constitution.
Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose martial law only within
the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he
sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of martial law beyond
the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of
actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical
dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements; hence, the determination of the
territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must
have considered these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the
territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not
limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities
are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi
City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts of
Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion
would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and
useless.
x x x Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in
Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao.
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for
symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the
Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes,
supply lines, and backdoor passages;" there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the
siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his
men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations,
carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel, must also be considered. Indeed, there is some
semblance of truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.
x x x Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.
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BARCELON VS. BAKER, 6 PHIL 87
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being a Prerogative by the
President
In the early 1900’s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained by orders of Baker. Barcelon’s lawyers petitioned
before the court for a writ of habeas corpus demanding Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain
why Barcelon was detained. They alleged that there is no legal authority behind Barcelon’s arrest and it was
w/o due process. The Atty-Gen averred that Baker et al acted only pursuant to the Gov-Gen’s resolution in
1905 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec 5 of The

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Philippine Bill). Barcelon argued that there is no rebellion or invasion or insurrection during his arrest hence
he should be set free.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested w/ due process.
HELD: The SC held that the issue is a political question. Only the president can determine the existence of
the grounds specified in the Constitution for the suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas corpus. This
power is discretionary and therefore not justiciable. The president has superior competence to assess the peace
and order condition of the country. Hence, the determination held by the president (GG) of the Philippines of
the existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that the president (GG), with
all the intelligence sources available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better position than the SC to
ascertain the real state of peace and order in the country.
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED AGENCY

Doctrine of qualified political agency or alter ego principle means that the acts of the
secretaries of the Executive departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. In cases wherein the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or by the law to act in
person or
2. The exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments. All the different executive and administrative organizations are mere
adjuncts of the executive department. This is an adjunct of the Doctrine of Single Executive.
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LACSON-MAGALLANES CO, INC. VS. JOSE PANO

Delegation of Control Power to the Executive Secretary

FACTS: Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land
was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.

Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied
Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office
of the President.

Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary
of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive
Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision
whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is
the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.

HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person. However,
the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may
delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this
allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President.
The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who
acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or
even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of
Lands, may issue.

The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until reversed,
disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting
the land to Paño cannot be reversed.

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CONSTANTINO VS CUISA

Facts: During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to reduce the country’s
external debt, that is, to incur foreign debts. Debt relief options were sought to initiate the program for foreign
debts – they are basically buyback programs and bond-conversion programs. pursuant to the said scheme,
Bangko sentral governor josse cuisia, secretary of finance, national treasurer and others who are all members
of the Philippine panel tasked to negotiate with the countrys foreign creditors negotiated to foreign creditors to
manage our country's external debt.
Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantian(taxpayers) the herein petitioners then averred that the power
to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the
respondents herein, should stop acting to the said scheme for they cannot incur debts on the ground that such
power cannot be delegated to them. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity
specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents
but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country.

Issue: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.

Held: Yes. the President can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of
having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is
made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the
government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to
raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power,
he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming
detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, meeting countless times with creditor
representatives to negotiate, etc. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly
hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government.
As it was, the backdrop consisted of a major policy determination made by then President Aquino that
sovereign debts have to be respected and the concomitant reality that the Philippines did not have enough
funds to pay the debts. Inevitably, it fell upon the Secretary of Finance, as the alter ego of the President
regarding the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of the Government, to
formulate a scheme for the implementation of the policy publicly expressed by the President herself.
thus, The act of the Cuisia et al are not unconstitutional.

Nevertheless, there are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of
executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial
law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that
demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power.
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PARDON

What is pardon?

Pardon is “an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for
whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. A pardon is a deed, to the validity
of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance.”

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What is the effect of pardon?

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The
very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves
forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender’s innocence) as relieving
the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities
based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. “To say, however, that the offender is a
“new man”, and “as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;” is to ignore the difference between
the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned;
he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous
to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his
conviction.”

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”

What is the constitutional basis of pardon?

The power to pardon, which is a form of executive clemency, is given to the President under Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution. It reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress.

What are the Constitutional limitations on the grant of pardon?

The limitations provided under the Constitution are: (1) No pardon may be granted in impeachment cases; (2)
No pardon may be granted when otherwise provided under the Constitution, specifically Sec. 5, Article IX-C,
which provides that “No pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence for violation of elections laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the
[COMELEC]”; and (3) It may only be granted “after conviction by final judgment”.

How is pardon different from probation?

Probation and pardon are not the same. Probation is “a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction
and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation
officer.” Probation is a part of the judicial power, while pardon is a part of the executive power. The
suspension of the sentence under probation simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or
indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become
operative when judgment is rendered.
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TORRES VS. GONZALES

Facts: Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and
was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from 11 years, 10 months 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1
day. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President on condition that
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated,

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he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Torres accepted the conditional pardon and
was consequently released from confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of
the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner for reason that Torres had been charged with twenty counts of
estafa and that the records of the NBI showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the
petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of
swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious
mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with
police functions), some of which having been dismissed.
On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. On 10 October 1986,
the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against Torres. He was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.

Contention of the Petitioner (Torres): He did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been
convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa. In addition, he was not given an opportunity
to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of
his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to
serve the balance of his original sentence.

Resolution: The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The determination of the occurrence of a
breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely
executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it
may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation
of his conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional
vice.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a
subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather the
ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original
sentence. The consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the
conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted
must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. (Tesoro
Director of Prison, Sales vs. Director of Prisons, Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol)
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AGREEMENT Between the GOVERNMENT OF

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and the
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines
Preamble
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to
strengthen international and regional security in the Pacific area;
Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951;
Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may visit the Republic of
the Philippines; Considering that cooperation between the United States and the Republic of

Page 27 of 58
the Philippines promotes their common security interests; Recognizing the desirability of defining the
treatment of United States personnel visiting the Republic of the Philippines; Have agreed as follows:

Article I. Definitions

As used in this Agreement, "United States personnel" means United States military and civilian personnel
temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government. Within
this definition:
1. The term "military personnel" refers to military members of the United States Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard.

2. The term "civilian personnel" refers to individuals who are neither nationals of nor ordinarily
resident in the Philippines and who are employed by the United States armed forces or who are
accompanying the United States armed forces, such as employees of the American Red Cross and the
United Services Organization.

Article II. Respect for Law

It is the duty of United States personnel to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and to abstain
from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in
the Philippines. The Government of the United States shall take all measures within its authority to ensure that
this is done.

Article III. Entry and Departure

1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate the admission of United States personnel and their
departure from the Philippines in connection with activities covered by this agreement.
2. United States military personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations upon entering and
departing the Philippines.
3. The following documents only, which shall be presented on demand, shall be required in respect of United
States military personnel who enter the Philippines:

(a) personal identity card issued by the appropriate United States authority showing full name, date of
birth, rank or grade and service number (if any), branch of service and photograph; and

(b) individual or collective document issued by the appropriate United States authority, authorizing
the travel or visit and identifying the individual or group as United States military personnel.

(c) the commanding officer of a military aircraft or vessel shall present a declaration of health, and
when required by the cognizant representative of the Government of the Philippines, shall conduct a
quarantine inspection and will certify that the aircraft or vessel is free from quarantinable diseases.
Any quarantine inspection of United States aircraft, or vessels, or cargoes thereon, shall be conducted
by the United States commanding officer in accordance with the international health regulations as
promulgated by the World Health Organization, and mutually agreed procedures.

4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa requirements but shall present, upon demand,
valid passports upon entry and departure of the Philippines.
5. If the Government of the Philippines has requested the removal of any United States personnel from its
territory, the United States authorities shall be responsible for receiving the person concerned within its own
territory or otherwise disposing of said person outside of the Philippines.

Article IV. Driving and Vehicle Registration

1. Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without test or fee, a driving permit or license issued by the
appropriate United States authority to United States personnel for the operation of military or official
vehicles.
2. Vehicles owned by the Government of the United States need not be registered, but shall have appropriate
markings.

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Article V. Criminal Jurisdiction

1. Subject to the provisions of this article:

(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses
committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines.

(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal
and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United States over United
States personnel in the Philippines.

2. Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses,
including offenses relating to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines, but
not under the laws of the United States. United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United
States personnel with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the United States,
punishable under the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of the Philippines. For the purposes of
this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses
committed by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3
(b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United
States personnel subject to the military law of the United States in relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely
against the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other government to waive
their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good order and
discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United States, waive
their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines.
If the Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20) days after the
Philippine authorities receive the United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by authorities of
the Philippines against United States personnel arises out of an act or omission done in the
performance of official duty, the commander will issue a certificate setting forth such determination.
This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute
sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this article. In
those case where the Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a
review of the duty certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine authorities shall
consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels may also present any information
bearing on its validity. United States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine
position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action
against offenders in official duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of the actions
taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the
authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the disposition of
all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and the United States have the right to
exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall
assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in the Philippines and in handing them over to
authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.

5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention
of United States personnel who are subject to Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine

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authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of the arrest or detention of any United
States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall
immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the
offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal
notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those authorities
in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been
charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United
States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account. In the
event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall be relieved of
any obligations under this paragraph. The one-year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also,
the one-year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed
because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence
of the accused, fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall assist each other in
the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the
attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper
cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this article and have
been acquitted or have been convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had their
sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same offense in
the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United States military authorities from
trying United States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the act or omission which
constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they
shall be accorded all procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United
States personnel shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them and to have
reasonable time to prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis as nationals of
the Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities, and to
have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless the
court, in accordance with Philippine law, excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in
facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States personnel serving
sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and shall
not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.

Article VI. Claims

1. Except for contractual arrangements, including United States foreign military sales letters of offer and
acceptance and leases of military equipment, both governments waive any and all claims against each other
for damage, loss or destruction to property of each other's armed forces or for death or injury to their military
and civilian personnel arising from activities to which this agreement applies.
2. For claims against the United States, other than contractual claims and those to which paragraph 1 applies,
the United States Government, in accordance with United States law regarding foreign claims, will pay just
and reasonable compensation in settlement of meritorious claims for damage, loss, personal injury or death,
caused by acts or omissions of United States personnel, or otherwise incident to the non-combat activities of
the United States forces.
Article VII. Importation and Exportation

1. United States Government equipment, materials, supplies, and other property imported into or acquired in
the Philippines by or on behalf of the United States armed forces in connection with activities to which this

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agreement applies, shall be free of all Philippine duties, taxes and other similar charges. Title to such property
shall remain with the United States, which may remove such property from the Philippines at any time, free
from export duties, taxes, and other similar charges. The exemptions provided in this paragraph shall also
extend to any duty, tax, or other similar charges which would otherwise be assessed upon such property after
importation into, or acquisition within, the Philippines. Such property may be removed from the Philippines,
or disposed of therein, provided that disposition of such property in the Philippines to persons or entities not
entitled to exemption from applicable taxes and duties shall be subject to payment of such taxes, and duties
and prior approval of the Philippine Government.
2. Reasonable quantities of personal baggage, personal effects, and other property for the personal use
of United States personnel may be imported into and used in the Philippines free of all duties, taxes and other
similar charges during the period of their temporary stay in the Philippines. Transfers to persons or entities in
the Philippines not entitled to import privileges may only be made upon prior approval of the appropriate
Philippine authorities including payment by the recipient of applicable duties and taxes imposed in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines. The exportation of such property and of property acquired in
the Philippines by United States personnel shall be free of all Philippine duties, taxes, and other similar
charges.

Article VIII. Movement of Vessels and Aircraft

1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon approval of the
Government of the Philippines in accordance with procedures stipulated in implementing arrangements.
2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon approval of
the Government of the Philippines. The movement of vessels shall be in accordance with international custom
and practice governing such vessels, and such agreed implementing arrangements as necessary.
3. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces shall not be subject to the
payment of landing or port fees, navigation or overflight charges, or tolls or other use charges, including light
and harbor dues, while in the Philippines. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces shall
observe local air traffic control regulations while in the Philippines. Vessels owned or operated by the United
States solely on United States Government non-commercial service shall not be subject to compulsory
pilotage at Philippine ports.

Article IX. Duration and Termination

This agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the parties have notified each other in writing
through the diplomatic channel that they have completed their constitutional requirements for entry into force.
This agreement shall remain in force until the expiration of 180 days from the date on which either party gives
the other party notice in writing that it desires to terminate the agreement.
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NICOLAS V ROMULO CONSOLIDATED WITH BAYAN V GLORIA ARROYO

Facts: On 4 December 2006, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith was found guilty of raping Suzette Nicolas, a 22-
year old Filipina inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. He was detained at the Makati jail until the Romulo-
Kenney Agreement was signed stating that:
"The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of
America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two nations, upon
transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be
detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of approximately 10
x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and jail
authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) will have access to the place of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with the terms
of the VFA."

Contention of the Petitioner: The Philippines should have custody of Smith because the Visiting Forces
Agreement is void and unconstitutional. The issue is of primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of
the Republic, as well as the provision of the Constitution in Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:
"Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified

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by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as
a treaty by the other contracting State."

Issue: Whether or not the VFA is recognized by the US (in order to comply with the requirements of Art.
XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution)

Resolution: It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec.
25, to require the other contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment and parity with ours. It
was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. With that, it
becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the enforcement of that obligation is left to the
normal recourse and processes under international law.
Ss held by the US Supreme Court, an executive agreement is a treaty within the meaning of that word in
international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-a-vis the United States. Thus, the US Supreme
Court enforced the provisions of the executive agreement granting preferential employment to Filipinos in the
US Bases here.
Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:
1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec.
2 of the US Constitution.
2. Executive Congressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and Congress and need
not be submitted to the Senate.
3. Sole Executive Agreements. These are agreements entered into by the President. They are to be submitted
to Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which
they are recognized by the Congress and may be implemented.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, inasmuch as it is the very
purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days
from their ratification be immediately implemented. Thus, the VFA is recognized as an executive agreement
by the US and therefore compliant with the requirements of the Constitution.
Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.
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ARTURO ABALOS vs. DR. GALICANO MACATANGAY

FACTS:

Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with improvements
located at Azucena St. Makati City consisting of about three hundred twenty-seven (327) square meters. Their
property relations are governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

Armed with a Special Power of Attorney dated June 2, 1988, issued by his wife Esther, Arturo
executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) dated October 17 ,1989, in favor of Dr.
Macatangay, binding Arturo to sell to Dr. Macatangay the property and not to offer the same to any other
party within thirty (30) days. Arturo acknowledged receipt of a check from Dr. Macatangay in the amount of
5,000.00 Php, the amount of which would be deducted from the purchase price of One Million Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (1,300,000.00 Php). Further, the RMOA stated that the full payment would be effected as
soon as possession of the property shall have been turned over to Dr. Macatangay.

On November 16, 1989 Dr. Macatangay sent a letter to Arturo and Esther informing them of his
readiness and willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. The letter contained a demand upon the
spouses to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property to him. On the same date,
Esther, through her attorney-in-fact, executed in favor of Dr. Macatangay, a Contract to Sell the property to
the extent of her conjugal interest for the sum of six hundred fifty thousand pesos (650,000.00 php) less the
sum already received by her and Arturo. Esther agreed to surrender possession of the property to Dr.
Macatangay within twenty (20) days from November 16,1989, while Dr. Macatangay promised to pay the
balance of the purchase price in the amount of one million two hundred ninety thousand pesos (1,290,000.00)
after being placed in the possession of the property.

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 December 7,1989 Dr. Macatangay informed the spouses that he had set aside the amount of One
Million Two Hundred Ninety Thousand Pesos (1,290,000.00) as evidenced by Ctitbank Check as full payment
of the purchase price. Dr. Macatangay reiterated his demand to comply with their obligation to turn over the
possession of the property. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property.

Dr. Macatangay filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against Arturo and Esther.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract of Sale is valid

Ruling:

Article 166 of the Civil Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts or transactions executed against
mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

In San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that neither spouse
could alienate in favor of another, his or her interest in the partnership or in any property belonging to it, or as
for partition of the properties before the partnership itself had been legally dissolved.

As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal property without the wifes consent if such sale
is necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities mentioned in Articles 161 and 162 of the Civil Code. In
Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr. the Court ruled that the husband may sell property belonging to the conjugal
partnership even without the consent of the wife if the sale is necessary to answer for a big conjugal liability
which might endanger the family’s economic standing. This is one instance where the wifes consent is not
required and, impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.

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DAVID PELAYO and LORENZA PELAYO v. MELKI E. PEREZ

FACTS:

David Pelayo, by a Deed of Absolute Sale, conveyed to Melki Perez two parcels of agricultural land
situated in Panabo, Davao. Loreza Pelayo, wife of David, and another one whose signature is illegible
witnessed the execution of the deed. Loreza, however, signed only on the third page in the space provided for
witnesses on account of which Perez application for registration of the deed with the Office of the Register of
Deed in Tagum, Davao was denied. Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed but
she refused, he instituted the instant complaint for specific performance against her and her husband Pelayo.
Pelayo claimed that the deed was without his wife Lorezas consent is null and void in light of Art. 166 of the
Civil Code which provides:

Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale was valid for lack of marital consent

RULING:

Lornza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed
to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.

Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or
implied. A wifes consent to the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit
or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval
was indeed given.

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 In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an
instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza
was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.

Moreover, under article 173 The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.

Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an
action brought by the wife whose consent was not obtained. Lorenza did not file a case for annulment of the
deed of sale despite of respondents repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her signature on all the pages of the
deed of sale. It was only when respondent file a complaint for specific performance when petitioners brought
up Lorenzas alleged lack of consent.

The Court believed that Lorenza knew of the full import of the transaction between respondent and
her husband; and by affixing her signature on the deed of sale, she in effect, signified her consent to the
disposition of their conjugal property.

The deed of sale is valid and enforceable and ordering Lorenza Pelayo to affix her signature on all
pages of said document.

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BUENAVENTURA V CA

Facts:

Noel Buenaventura filed for a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, on the ground of the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura. When his wife filed for answer on
the allegation, he amended his petition claiming that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and
violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property giving and paying to Isabel
Singh Buenaventura fifty percent (50%) of Noel’s separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East
Bank [and] Trust Company; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000
monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his
mother. Noel filed for an appeal of the decision before the Court of Appeals, and while the case was pending
in the appellate court, Isabel Singh Buenaventura filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support
pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. The Court of Appeals issued a resolution increasing the
monthly support of Javy to Php 20,000 and affirmed the Trial Court’s decision in awarding exemplary and
moral damages to Isabel Singh Buenaventura.

Issue:

Whether or not marriages considered null and void under Article 36 of the Family code can be
awarded exemplary and moral damages

Held:

Yes. The trial Court was able to prove that Noel deceived the Isabel into marrying him by professing
true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of
pride he married Isabel; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always
would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to

Page 34 of 58
his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble,
he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving Isabel and their son; that he had no desire to keep Isabel and their
son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned
caused Isabel Singh to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in
those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.

Article 36 of the Family Code gives a definition of Psychological Incapacity as a ground of null and
void marriages The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage
as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. And under Article 21 of the Civil Code, an individual must willfully
cause loss or injury to another. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of
entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party
who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to
have been adduced in this case. For the same reason, the fact that Noel deceived Isabel for the purpose of
marrying him which was based on his will full act was an act that suffices the ground of moral damages.

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AGPAY V PALAND AND DELA CRUZ

Facts:

Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Caralina Vallasterol on July 16, 1949 in Pangasinan.
A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Caralina’s only child, Herminia Plang
was born on May 12, 1950. Miguel returned to the Philippines on 1954 for a year but stayed in Zambales with
his brother and not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. As early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce
Caralina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with Caralina but stayed alone in a
houe in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.

The then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agpay
on July 1973. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda purchased a parcel of agricultural and and a house and
lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan where the transfer certificate of the agricultural lot’s title was later transferred to
Agpay’s name.

Miguel and Erlinda had a son, Kristopher born on December 6, 1977. Miguel and Erlinda were
convicted of concubinage upon Caralina’s complaint.

Two years later, Miguel died.

Caralina and daughter, Hermina filed this petition for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages against Erlinda Agpay. They sought to get back the land and house and lot aallegedly purchased by
Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the petition but the CA reversed the
decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the properties should be awarded to Carlina and Hermenia

Held:

Yes. Sicnce Miguel and Erlinda’s marriage were void due to the valid marriage existing between
Miguel and Carlina, said properties were part of Miguel and Carlina’s conjugal partnership property.
Furthermore, Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to purchase price of Riceland and there is no
reason justifying her co-ownership with Miguel with respect to the contested properties.

Page 35 of 58
 As for the House and lot, it was found out that the deed of conveyance issued for the property
contained falsehood. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money to purchase
price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as vendee.

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SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.,

FACTS:

That on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena
left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and
wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally
brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered. Benjamin
and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and
Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the
ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin Jr. and Sally is bigamous.

HELD:

No,

It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to
Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace
of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void
not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of
bigamy was not committed.

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin
and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.

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PILAPIL vs. HON. IBAY-SOMERA

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national,
were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to
Page 36 of 58
 said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing
the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. Pilapil appealed, hence this petition.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: The court is without jurisdiction since the purported complainant,
a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: Private respondent argued that he could not have brought this
case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that
it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

RULING: No. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets.

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UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100335

FACTS: Private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes (nursing students), thru their mothers, filed a
petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. They alleged that they were not admitted for the
second semester for organizing a student body council which was not allowed by the school which
was allegedly a violation of the school regulations. The school argued that under the Alcuaz Doctrine,
schools have the discretion to admit students for the second semester because upon enrolment of a
student in the first semester, the contract was for that semester only. However a new doctrine was
later on promulgated which abandoned the Alcuaz doctrine which is now the Non doctrine.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: Under the Alcuaz Doctrine, schools have the discretion to admit
students for the second semester because upon enrolment of a student in the first semester, the
contract was for that semester only.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: The new doctrine should be applied retroactively.

ISSUE: Whether or not the new doctrine can be applied retroactively to the case.

RULING: No. The new doctrine shall be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on
the old doctrine and acted on faith thereof. Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non, et al.
v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the
termination of the contract between them had long become fait accompli. Settled is the rule that when
a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion.

Page 37 of 58
 The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before its
promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were
otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied
on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, which recognized the termination of
contract theory.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

HERMOSISIMA VS COURT OF APPEALS 103 Phil 629

FACTS: An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complainant,
filed with the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as a
natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged
breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to
support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry complainant. Complainant Soledad
Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten
years younger than her used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he made
no promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one evening in 1953 when
after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano to which
he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was
pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954,
defendant married one Romanita Perez.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.

HELD: It appearing that because of the defendant-appellant’s seductive prowess, plaintiff-appellee

overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control. In
the present case, the court is unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten years younger but also because the CFI found that complainant
surrendered herself to the petitioner because overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to bind him
by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS COURT OF APPEALS 219 SCRA 115

FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private
respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years
old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and
proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore
agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a
virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started
to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated
the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already
married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner
to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or
agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on
the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.

HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176
of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:

Page 38 of 58
 “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to
marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to
sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of
promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.EMILIO G. GUANZON,

FACTS:

A lower court decision, which on its face ignores the controlling statute as well as the applicable
doctrines of this Court, is appealed by the Republic of the Philippines. It filed an action for the foreclosure of
certain real estate and chattel mortgages executed by defendant Emilio G. Guanzon, now appellee, in favor of
the former Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., as security for the payment of the loans obtained by him from said bank.
The amount involved is P3,722.13, representing the principal and interest as of September 30, 1961, with an
additional sum equivalent to ten percent of the total indebtedness as attorney's fees. The loan transaction took
place in 1943 during the period of Japanese occupation. Upon the liberation of the Philippines in 1945, the
United States, through its Alien Property Custodian, acquired such credit. Thereafter, by virtue of the
Philippine Property Act of 1946, it was transferred to our government. With the statute and the controlling
judicial decisions, clearly pointing to one direction, the lower court, in a hasty and improvident exercise of
judicial power, apparently oblivious of the law, took the other way. It held that the Republic of the Philippines
lacked legal interest over such mortgage loan and dismissed the case. We have no choice but to reverse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines has legal interest over the case.

HELD:

Yes,

In accordance with the Philippine Property Act of 1946, the United States Government transferred, conveyed
and assigned to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines under Transfer Agreements, dated July 20,
1954 and June 15, 1957, all its rights, title and interest to the loans in question. As such transferee, the
Republic of the Philippines acquired the title and interest thereto ... . It follows, therefore, that plaintiff has a
legal interest in the promissory notes and in the real and chattel mortgages and has a cause of action against
the debtor-mortgagor, the defendant herein.

Prior to and preparatory to the approval of said Philippine Property Act of 1946, and agreement was entered
into between President Manuel Roxas of the Commonwealth and U.S. Commissioner Paul V. McNutt
whereby title to enemy agricultural lands and other properties was to be conveyed by the United States to the
Philippines in order to help the rehabilitation of the latter, but that in order to avoid complex legal problems in
relation to said enemy properties, the Alien Property Custodian of the United States was to continue
operations in the Philippines even after the latter's independence, that he may settle all claims that may exist

Page 39 of 58
or arise against the above-mentioned enemy properties, in accordance with the Trading with the Enemy Act of
the United States

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the lower court grievously erred in failing to perceive that
precisely the Republic of the Philippines, contrary to its holding, possesses a legal interest over the subject
matter of this controversy.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as

Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO

FACTS:

On June 1 1991, stories were published regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in
Hong Kong. DOLE Secretary Torres issued a Department Order, temporarily suspending the recruitment by
private employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong, this department order stated
that it was effective on July 1, 1991.

The DOLE through the POEA took over the business of deploying Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong.
POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30 for the guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and
Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong Kong dated July 10, 1991 and another circular which provides that
recruitment agencies hiring domestic helpers to Hong Kong requires accreditation from POEA effective
August 16, 1991.

PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies licensed and
authorized by POEA. PASEI filed a petition to prohibit DOLE and POEA from enforcing and implementing
the department order and memorandum circulars on the ground that it is beyond the rule making power of the
DOLE and POEA and the requirements of publication were not complied with.

ISSUES:

1. WON DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and said administrative orders were
unconstitutional.

2. WON the said department order and circulars need to be published for it to be effective.

HELD:

1. No. Said administrative orders merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business operations by
excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the
establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to
Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong,
petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hong Kong and other countries and all
other classes of Filipino workers for other countries. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of
the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.

2. Yes. They are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also
to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

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Page 40 of 58
MANUEL LARA, ET AL vs. PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR.,

FACTS:

Petronilo Del Rosario, owner of 25 taxi cabs, operated a taxi business named “Waval Taxi”. He employed,
among others, 49 drivers including Manuel Lara. The drivers did not fix their compensation based on hours or
periods of time that they worked. Rather, they were paid on commission and each driver will receive 20 % of
the gross returns or earnings from the operation of his taxi cab. The drivers claim that they worked 12 hours a
day and also on Saturdays, Sundays, and Holidays.

In September 4, 1950, Del Rosario sold his 25 taxi cabs to La Mallorca Transportation Company resulting to
the loss of employment of the drivers because La Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. The
drivers brought an action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond
eight hours and on Sundays and legal Holidays and one month salary (mesada) provided for in Article 302 of
the Code of Commerce because of the failure of their former employer to give them one month notice.

The trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the defendant being engaged in the taxi or
transportation business which is a public utility, came under the exception provided by the Eight-Hour Labor
Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444); and because the plaintiffs did not work on a salary basis, that is to say,
they had no fixed or regular salary or remuneration other than the 20 per cent of their gross earnings, thus,
"their situation was therefore practically similar to piece workers.

For purposes of reference provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law sections 2 to 4.

SEC. 2. This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or
private, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis,
domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the
employer working for him.

SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or impending
emergencies, caused by serious accidents, fire flood, typhoon, earthquakes, epidemic, or other
disaster or calamity in order to prevent loss of life and property or imminent danger to public safety;
or in case of urgent work to be performed on the machines, equipment, or installations in order to
avoid a serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer, or some other just cause of a similar
nature; but in all cases the laborers and the employees shall be entitled to receive compensation for
the overtime work performed at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least twenty-
five per centum additional.

In case of national emergency the Government is empowered to establish rules and regulations for the
operation of the plants and factories and to determine the wages to be paid the laborers.

SEC. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of work shall
compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is paid an
additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration: Provided however,
That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public service such as
supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication.

ISSUE:

WON the plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess of 8 hours a day, Sundays
and holidays included and also for the mesada under Article 302 of the Code of Commerce.

HELD:

No. It will be noticed that the last part of section 3 of Commonwealth Act 444 provides for extra
compensation for over-time work "at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least twenty-five
per centum additional'" and that Section 2 of the same act excludes application thereof laborers who preferred
to be on piece work basis. This connotes that a laborer or employee with no fixed salary, wages or
Page 41 of 58
remuneration but receiving as compensation from his employer uncertain and variable amount depending
upon the work done or the result of said work (piece work) irrespective of the amount of time employed, is not
covered by the Eight-Hour Labor Law and is not entitled to extra compensation should he work in excess of 8
hours a day.

In the case at bar, the conditions of the employment are that they do not have regular wages or salary, the
amount of their commission will depend on the amount of industry, intelligence and experience applied to it,
rather than the period of time employed. Thus they are not entitled to overtime pay.

As to the month pay (mesada) under Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, Article 2270 of the New Civil
Code appears to have repealed said Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce
governing agency. This repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that
is, one year after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by
the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of
Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it were
still in force speaks of "salary corresponding to said month." commonly known as "mesada." If the plaintiffs
herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week or month, then computation of the month's salary payable
would be impossible.

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PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs. HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA

FACTS:

In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine
Veterans Bank (PVB). Thereafter, the PVB employees union, herein petitioner, filed a claim for accrued and
unpaid employee wages and benefits.

On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by Pres. Corazon
Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed
with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank
stating that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio, and no longer had the
authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen. Despite the late
mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings
of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its
publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE: WON RA 7169 became effective on Feb 24, 1992.

RULING:

The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule, laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature
has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”. Citing
Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which
cannot in any event be omitted.

In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:

Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Page 42 of 58
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It is
undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992.
Therefore, said law became effective on said date.

Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it
became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official Gazette,
and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FELIZA P. DE ROY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, daughter of private respondents. Private respondents were warned by petitioners to vacate
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do.

In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. This decision was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals. On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension to
file a motion for reconsideration which was eventually denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal
did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It correctly
applied the rule laid down in a decided case Habulayas vs Japzon.

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested.

Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied due to its non-publication in the
Official Gazette.

ISSUE: WON Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding.

RULING:

No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active
law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the SCRA and law journals.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE

JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
FACTS:

Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan,
Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine.

Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati on August 28, 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and subsequently, a motion for
Page 43 of 58
reconsideration but were denied by the trial court. A petition for certiorari were also denied by the Court of
Appeals and remanded the case to the RTC.

Meanwhile in 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. A Second Motion to Dismiss the petition for
declaaration of nullity of marriage was granted. However, A Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by
the private respondent. An Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was thereafter filed by the
petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between
petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree
of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in
view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14,
1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code, endowing the petitioner
with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, but
was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the
spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.

ISSUE: WON the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects, in matters that spring from a divorce
decree obtained abroad by petitioner.

HELD: Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as
those concerning with support and custody of the children.

In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting
the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best
interests of the children. After all, the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two
children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in
claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS:

Edward Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided (and consequently
was considered a California citizen) for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he
became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this
country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he
instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as her only heir, but left a legacy of sum
of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (who in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been
declared another acknowledged natural daughter of his).

Counsel for the acknowledged natural daughter Helen Claims that under Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code,
California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the
domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be
increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. Upon the other hand,
counsel for the child Maria Lucy contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Art. 16 par.2 of our Civil
Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of
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California on the matter, that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator
could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not
being entitled to anything under California law, the will of the deceased giving the bulk of the property to
Maria Lucy must remain undisturbed.

ISSUE: What law should govern? Philippine law or California law?

HELD:

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term “national
law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate
Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the
internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the validity
of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California of
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable,
and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the
Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American
law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for
its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the contrary in the
place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil

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Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention cannot be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code
is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be
like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict
of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the
internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894,
Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should
be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, and not
by the internal law of California.

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RAMA vs. CA

FACTS:

Osmundo G. Rama, then Vice Governor or Cebu, with co-respondents Mandeola and Castillo, members
Sangguniang Panlunsod of Cebu, adopted Resolution No. 990 which appropriated funds “for the maintenance
and repair of Provincial roads and Bridges and for the operation and maintenance of the office of the
provincial engineer and for other purpose”.

Under this resolution, they declared a policy to economize the expenditure of “Road and Bridge Fund” and to
adopt a more comprehensive, systematic, efficient, progressive and orderly operation and maintenance of the
Office of the Provincial Engineer. To implement such policy, the Provincial Board resolved to abolish around
30 positions and 200 employees were dismissed – the salaries of whom were derived from the “Road and
Bridges” fund.

The Local Government, later on, bought heavy equipment worth 4 million pesos, hired around 1000 new
employees, renovated the office of the provincial engineer and provided him with a Mercedes Benz.

Upon petition by the employees whose positions were abolished, CFI of Cebu declared the Resolution null
and void and ordered the reinstatements of 56 dismissed employees and pay their back wages.

Upon appeal by both parties, then CA affirmed the lower court’s decision, plus an award of moral damages of
P1000 for each of the employees, considering that the case involved quasi-delict. The CA found that the
employees were dismissed because of their different political affiliations – that they were identified with the
Liberal Party of Sergio Osmeña Jr.

ISSUE: WON Rama, Espina, Mendiola and Carillo are personally liable for damages for adopting a resolution
which abolished positions to the detriment of the occupants thereof.

HELD: Supreme Court held that the petitioners are personally liable for damages because of their precipitate
dismissal of provincial employees through an ostensibly legal means.

The Court of Appeals, whose factual findings are binding on this Court, found that the provincial employees
concerned were "eased out because of their party affiliation." i.e., they belonged to the Liberal Party whose
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presidential candidate then was Sergio Osmena Jr. Such act of the petitioners reflected their malicious intent
to do away with the followers of the rival political party so as to accommodate their own protégés who, it
turned out, even outnumbered the dismissed employees.

In Vda de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, a public officer is civilly liable for failure to observe honesty and good
faith in the performance of their duties as public officers or for willfully or negligently causing damage to
another (Article 20, Civil Code) or for willfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs and/or public policy (Article 21, New Civil Code).

The dismissed employees are entitled to damages because they have suffered a special and peculiar injury
from the wrongful act of which they complain.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK VS. VENICIO ESCOLIN

FACTS:

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodgens, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while
she was domiciled in Iloilo City, Philippines, she died. In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate
shall be turned over to her brother and sister. In December 1962, Charles died where he was also domiciled in
the Philippines. Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles, filed a motion before the probate court so that
Avelina Magno may be appointed as administratix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the
Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in
iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have Magno appointed as administratix and
Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion. Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate
was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, administratrix of Linnie’s
estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over
the estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and
sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at
the time of her death; that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s
national law; that under Texas Law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes.

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled
outside Texas at the time of her death.

ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as
to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact
to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however
emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable.

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TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, vs. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C.

BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN,

FACTS:

C.O. Bohonan, the testator in this case, was born in Nebraska, USA and therefore a citizen of that state. He
was formerly married to Magdalena C. Bohanan, a Filipino woman, and had two children namely; Mary
Bohanan and Edward Bohanan. It was however noted that C.O. Bohonan divorced Magdalena Bohonan.

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Prior to his death, C.O Bohonan left a last will and testament in the care of the Philippine Trust Company,
named as the executor of the will, and is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in
the sum of P10, 000.00, let letters testamentary be issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may enter
upon the execution and performance of its trust.

The contents of the will are as follows:

(1) One-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which
consists of several mining companies;

(2) The other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M.
B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining
stock similar to those given to testator's grandson;

(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary
Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments;

(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox,
P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;

It can be inferred from the facts that out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,
639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90, 819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining
companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6, 000
each, or a total of P12, 000.

The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate
that the laws of the form concede to them.

ISSUES:

There are two issues raised in this case:

1. WON Magdalena C. Bohonan have a claim to the testators’ estate?

2. WON the children Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan are deprived of their rights being a legitime?

HELD:

On the first issue, the court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of
Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring
him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:

Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her
estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts.

Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the testator's estate
had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 19, 1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II
Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have
appealed therefrom to question its validity.

Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January
30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C.
Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no
right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court
below had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan,
the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.

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On the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944,
expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as
par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)

It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905,
Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of
partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The law
of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our
Rules, which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer
having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws
of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of
Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us,
without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be
governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national
law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of
all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of
partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants.

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RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, et al. vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

FACTS:

An auditing team from the COA Regional Office No. VIII in Candahug, Palo, Leyte, audited the accounts of
the Catbalogan Water District (CWD) in Catbalogan, Samar. The auditing team discovered that between May
to December 1997 and April to June 1998, members of CWDs interim Board of Directors (Board) granted
themselves the following benefits:
a. Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA),
b. Rice Allowance,
c. Productivity Incentive Bonus,
d. Anniversary Bonus,
e. Year-End Bonus and cash gifts.
These allowances and bonuses were authorized under Resolution No. 313, series of 1995, of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA).
During the audit, the COA audit team issued two notices of disallowance dated 1 October 1998 disallowing
payment of the allowances and bonuses received by petitioners, namely: Rodolfo S. De Jesus, Edelwina DG.
Parungao, Hermilo S. Balucan, Avelino C. Castillo and Danilo B. De Leon as members of the CWD Board as
well as Alice Marie C. Osorio as the Boards secretary (collectively petitioners). The audit team disallowed the

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allowances and bonuses on the ground that they run counter to Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 198 (PD
198).
ISSUES:
Petitioners contend that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in -
1. Motu proprio exercising jurisdiction to declare LWUA Board Resolution No. 313, Series of 1995,
as amended, not in conformity with Section 13 of PD 198, as amended;
2. Ruling that Section 13 of PD 198, as amended, prohibits payment to petitioners of RATA,
extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses (EME), and other allowances and bonuses;
3. Demanding the refund of the disallowed allowances and bonuses received by petitioners as
interim members and secretary of the CWD Board.
HELD:

ON THE FIRST ISSUE

The Constitution and existing laws[5] mandate the COA to audit all government agencies, including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. Indeed, the Constitution specifically
vests in the COA the authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in
disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds.[6] This
independent constitutional body is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of
the governments, and ultimately, the people’s property.[7]
The Court already ruled in several cases[8] that a water district is a government-owned and controlled
corporation with a special charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, PD 198. The COA has the
authority to investigate whether directors, officials or employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations, receiving additional allowances and bonuses, are entitled to such benefits under applicable laws.
Thus, water districts are subject to the jurisdiction of the COA.[9]
ON THE SECOND ISSUE
Section 13 of PD 198, as amended, reads as follows:

Compensation. - Each director shall receive a per diem, to be determined by the board, for each
meeting of the board actually attended by him, but no director shall receive per diems in any given
month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diems of four meetings in any given month. No
director shall receive other compensation for services to the district.

Any per diem in excess of P50 shall be subject to approval of the Administration. (Emphasis
supplied)

This issue was already resolved in the similar case of Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit.
In Baybay Water District, the members of the board of Baybay Water District also questioned the
disallowance by the COA of payment of RATA, rice allowance and excessive per diems. The Court ruled that
PD 198 governs the compensation of members of the board of water districts. Thus, members of the board of
water districts cannot receive allowances and benefits more than those allowed by PD 198. Construing Section
13 of PD 198, the Court declared:

xxx Under S13 of this Decree, per diem is precisely intended to be the compensation of members of
board of directors of water districts. Indeed, words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural,
ordinary, and commonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in which the words
and phrases are used. By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by
limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the same paragraph, providing No
director shall receive other compensation than the amount provided for per diems, the law quite
clearly indicates that directors of water districts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized
by law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.

Page 50 of 58
ON THE THIRD ISSUE

The CWD Board appointed petitioners pursuant to PD 198. Petitioners received allowances and bonuses other
than those granted to their office by PD 198. Petitioners cannot claim any compensation other than the
per diem provided by PD 198 precisely because no other compensation is attached to their office.

Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of
subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed,
no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of
offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the
recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.

Petitioners here received the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that
LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time petitioners received the additional
allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no knowledge
that such payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the
allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed.

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SUBJECT MATTER: EXTINCTION IN GENERAL

In relation to pardon and it’s disqualification
Article 89. (How criminal liability is totally extinguished- 3. BY ABSOLUTE PARDON)

PRINCIPLE:
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment for estafa
thru falsification of public documents. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply
and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. While a pardon has generally been
regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt, it does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime
and the conviction thereof. It cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are historical facts
which, despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, ordinary prudent man
will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor.

MONSANTO VS FACTORAN

Facts: Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto, then assistant treasurer of CalbayogCity,
and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced
them imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional to ten years and one day of
prision mayor. She filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by
then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing
that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government
has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension.

Contention of the State: Acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due
to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
Contention of the Accused: Without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of
office did not attach and the status of her employment remained suspended, and when pardon was issued
before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the President, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.

Held: No. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment for
estafa thru falsification of public documents. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-

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apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. While a pardon has generally been
regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt, it does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. It cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are historical facts which, despite the
public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, ordinary prudent man will take into account
in their subsequent dealings with the actor. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public
office or employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. Even if the offender
pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been expressly
remitted by the pardon.

PRINCIPLE:
In relation to amnesty and pardon as a total extinction of criminal liability.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief executive
with the concurrence of Congress is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.

Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of person or communities who
may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction.

Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office or right of suffrage unless such rights be expressly restored by 10 terms of the pardon and it in no
case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Art.36)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PEOPLE VS. PATRIARCA

Facts: That on or about the 30th day of June 1987 at about 10:00 o‘clock in the evening in the Municipality of
Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with guns, forcibly took
away Alfredo Arevalo from his residence and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and assault and shoot Alfredo Arevalo thereby inflicting upon him mortal
wounds, which directly cause his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

Issue: Whether or not criminal liability is extinguished by amnesty.

Held: The court acquitted the appellant. His application for amnesty was approved and one of the acts
listed in the resolution of the National Amnesty Commission is the killing of the victim in this case. The
approval was pursuant to Proc. No 347 granting amnesty to all persons who shall apply who have committed
crimes on or before June 1, 1995 in pursuit of their political beliefs. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive.
It is a private act, which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief executive with the concurrence of Congress is a
public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while
amnesty is granted to classes of person or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office or
right of suffrage unless such rights be expressly restored by 10 terms of the pardon and it in no case exempts
the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Art.36)

ARTICLE 89: PARTICULAR RULES

In relation to absolute pardon.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis
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for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those
who violate its command.

PRINCIPLE:
In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that ―he will
be eligible for appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving no money or
property responsibility,‖ it is absolute insofar as it ―restores the respondent to full civil and political rights.
Upon other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall
within the purview of the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning
power of the president, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that
there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative
action.
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CRISTOBAL VS. LABRADOR

Facts: Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the president but even prior to his
pardon he was already holding the position as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his
conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors in
Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment ―for any crime against property. This is
pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos is
exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his ―full civil and
political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property
responsibility.

Issue: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.

Held: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative
by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does
not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has
placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only
blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case,
the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from
voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command.
There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities.
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional
in the sense that ―he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in nature
involving no money or property responsibility,‖ it is absolute insofar as it ―restores the respondent to full
civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94
of CA 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the
impairment of the pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead
furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature
except through legislative action.
In relation to conditional pardon in a public office
Conditional pardon refers to the exemption of an individual; within certain limits or conditions from the
punishment which the law inflicts for the offense he had committed resulting the partial extinction of his
criminal liability.

RULING:
The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and attached to the
prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in question.

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PELOBELLO VS. PALATINO

Facts: Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warrant to proceeding
alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was already convicted before and was
even imprisoned.

Contention of Pelobello: Because of such conviction and imprisonment, Pelobello averred that Palatino is
already barred from voting and being voted upon.

Contention of Palatino: Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his
contention.

Issue: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.

Held: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then already after Palatino‘s election but prior to
him assuming office. The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities
imposed and attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the
public office in question.

EXTINCTION UNDER 94
ARTICLE 94. Partial extinction of Criminal Liability- Criminal Liability is extinguished partially:
1. By Conditional pardon
2. By commutation
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive
imprisonment or serving his sentence. (As amended by R.A. 10952)
PRINCIPLE:
Under Sec. 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President is empowered ―to authorize the
arrest and reincarceration of only such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of
his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence In case the convict violates any conditions of the conditional
pardon, the President has the power to order his recommitment.

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ESPUELAS VS. PROVINCIAL WARDEN

Facts: The CFI of Bohol Espuelas is guilty of the crime of inciting to sedition and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 5 years 4
months and 20 days of prision correccional as maximum. He commenced to serve his sentence, but before
serving it to its full extent, the president granted him conditional pardon by remitting the unexpired period of
his sentence on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Sometime
thereafter, he was found guilty with the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions and sentenced to
suffer 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 2 years, 1 month and 1 day of prision correccional
as maximum. On Nov. 8, 1957, upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President
ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired period of his sentence.

Contention of the State: The Sol. Gen. maintains that the President may order the reincarceration of
Espuelas, upon violation of the terms of the conditional pardon granted to and accepted by hi, to serve the
unexpired term or period of his sentence.

Contention of the Accused: He raised and opposed the contention of the state that the President cannot do so.

Issue: Whether or not the President may order the reincarceration of Espuelas to serve the unexpired term of
his sentence.

Held: Yes, under Sec. 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President is empowered ―to authorize the
arrest and reincarceration of only such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of
his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence In case the convict violates any conditions of the conditional

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pardon, the President has the power to order his recommitment. In the case at bar, Espuelas violated the
condition, thus he must serve his unexpired sentence.

In relation to conditional pardon

PRINCIPLE:
When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the state in which he was at the time
the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons. And the rule is well settled that, in
requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had not
suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large
by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence.

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TESORO VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,

Facts: Tesoro was convicted by the Court of First Instance of falsification of an official document, sentenced
to an indeterminate term of 2 years to 3 years, 6 months and 21 days imprisonment, plus Fine of P200. By
virtue of section 64 of the Administrative Code, he was granted pardon on Parole by the Governor General on
any crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner. In the latter part of Sept. 1937, he violated this
condition; he maintained an adulterous relation with the wife of his brother-in-law (Tesoro‘s wife died in
September 18, 1937).

Contention of the State: That Tesoro must serve the unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which
he was originally committed to prison.

Contention of the Accused: The period during which he was out on parole should be counted as service of
his original sentence.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the accused is tenable.

Held: We do not subscribe to the contention of the accused. We said in People vs. Tapel: ―when a
conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the state in which he was at the time the pardon was
granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons. And the rule is well settled that, in requiring the
convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the
time of his release, the court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of
the pardon as time served on the original sentence. From the express terms of the parole that: ―should any of
the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect,it is evident that
the petitioner herein should serve the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the
court.

ARTICLE 100 (CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY)

GENERAL RULE
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

PRINCIPLE:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However,
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.

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QUINTO VS ANDRES, G.R. NO. 155791

Facts:

The accused invited Wilson Quinto, 11 years old to go fishing inside a drainage culvert and later
surfaced carrying Wilson‘s dead body. A case for homicide has been filed against the accused. The accused
filed a demurer to evidence which was granted by the trial court. The court also held that it could not hold the
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respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for
Wilson's death. Wilson‘s mother, Melba appealed the trial court‘s decision but such was affirmed by the CA.
Contention trial court and CA: The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on
a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of.

Issue:

In case of acquittal where the act constituting a criminal offense has not been duly proven, is civil
liability extinguished?

Ruling:

Yes. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment
in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.

PRINCIPLE:
The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides: The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency
of the appeal.

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PHILIPPINE RABBIT V. PEOPLE

Facts: A driver of the Phil. Rabbit Bus line has been found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries, and damage to property and was ordered to pay damages. The accused
appealed but while pending appeal, he jumped bail. The CA upon discovering that said employee jumped bail,
dismissed the appeal. The company being subsidiarily liable, now assails the judgment rendering it civilly
liable.

Issue: If during the pendency of an appeal an employee has jumped bail, is the employer now civilly liable?

Ruling:

Yes. Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or
motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of
Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: The Court of Appeals may
also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they
surrender or submit to the court’s jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial
relief.

SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF OTHER PERSONS

Article 103.Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge
of their duties.

PRINCIPLE:

In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the
criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing
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Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after
conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency.

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CARPIO VS DOROJA, 180 SCRA 1, DEC. 5 1989

Facts: Edwin Ramirez pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting to less serious physical injuries after
he bumped Dionisio Carpio while driving a jeepney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio. Ramirez is
unable to pay any of the damages claimed by Carpio so Carpio claimed for Toribio‘s subsidiary liability but
such was denied by Judge Sergio Doroja.

Contention of Doroja: A separate action to impose civil liability is needed as the nature of the accident falls
under ―culpa-contractual‖ and the dispositive portion of the decision did not include any subsidiary liability
of Toribio.

Contention of Carpio: It is implied that the subsidiary liability of the employer may be enforced in the same
proceeding and no separate action is necessary even if the employer was not mentioned as a party in the
criminal proceeding

Issue: Is a separate action necessary for enforcement of an employer’s subsidiary liability?

Ruling: No, Doroja is mistaken. A separate and independent action is unnecessary as an employer’s liability
is clear and implied from the decision otherwise it would prolong the agony of the victim. The present case is
an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 103 of the RPC and not an action arising
from culpa-contractual or culpa-aquiliana. In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the
employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in
any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he
is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer,
however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's
insolvency.

PRINCIPLE:

Nurses in treating a patient, are not acting as servants of the hospitals because they are employed to
carry out the orders of physicians, to whose authority they are subject.

An industry is an enterprise conducted as means of livelihood or profit. - Any dep‘t or branch of art,
occupation, or business especially one which employs so much labor and capital and is a distinct branch of
trade.

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CLEMENTE VS FOREIGN MISSIONS.

38 OG 1954

Facts: A nurse from a missionary hospital run by Foreign missions has been found guilty of negligence.
Unable to pay to liabilities, she asks for the subsidiary liability of the hosital. The hospital contends that it is
not engaged in industry as a means of livelihood or for profit, hence it is not subsidiarily liable.

Issue: Are hospitals engaged in industry?

Ruling:

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 No, therefore they are not subsidiarily liable for the negligent acts of nurses. Nurses in treating a
patient, are not acting as servants of the hospitals because they are employed to carry out the orders of
physicians, to whose authority they are subject.

*What is industry then? -An industry is an enterprise conducted as means of livelihood or profit. -
Any dep‘t or branch of art, occupation, or business especially one which employs so much labor and capital
and is a distinct branch of trade.

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