Cayetano vs.

Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 , September 03, 1991

Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; “Practice of law” defined.—Practice of law

means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”, particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construc-tion intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Same; Same; Judicial review of judgments rendered by the Commission on Appointments.—The

Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Isenhardt vs. Real, 666 SCRA 20 , February 15, 2012

Attorneys; Notary Public; Code of Professional Responsibility; A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signs it is the same person who executed it, personally appearing
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.—Respondent violated
his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he made it appear that
complainant personally appeared before him and subscribed an SPA authorizing her brother to
mortgage her property. It cannot be overemphasized that a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signs it is the same person who executed it, personally appearing
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. This is to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the party’s free act.

Same; Same; By notarizing the questioned document despite the absence of one of the parties, the
notary public engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.—The duties of a notary
public is dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It is not a meaningless ministerial
act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It
is of no moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was intended
because the property was allegedly transferred from complainant to her brother by virtue of a deed of
sale consummated between them. What is being penalized is respondent’s act of notarizing a
document despite the absence of one of the parties. By notarizing the questioned document, he
engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. A notarized document is by law entitled
to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic
requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in notarized documents
will be undermined.

Ui vs. Bonifacio, 333 SCRA 38 , June 08, 2000

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; Practice of law is a privilege; Requisites for admission to
the practice of law.—The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to
enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that
can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are: (a) he must be a citizen
of the Philippines; (b) a resident thereof; (c) at least twenty-one (21) years of age; (d) a person of good
moral character; (e) he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court; (f) possess the required educational qualifications; and (g) pass the bar examinations.

Same; Same; Same; Possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice.—Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior
to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.—Simple as the facts of
the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will
have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case
lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising
situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui’s
personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Same; Same; Same; To warrant disciplinary action, conduct must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.—All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with
Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to
warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.—We have held that “a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards.” Respondent’s act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no
intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant’s bare
assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence. This, herein complainant miserably failed to do. [Ui vs. Bonifacio, 333 SCRA
38(2000)]

Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr., 276 SCRA 445 , July 31, 1997
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Gross Immorality; Words and Phrases; A person’s engaging in premarital
sexual relations with another, making promises to marry, suggests a doubtful moral character but the
same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct; A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.—Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971 because of the charges of
gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but
the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral
act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as
to be reprehensible to a high degree.” It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.

Same; Same; Same; Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment
to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of the former, is neither so
corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if
as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.—We find the ruling in Arciga v.
Maniwang quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess
no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is
neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him,
even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.

Same; Same; Same; Marriages; The Supreme Court cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner
of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of
love, not for any other reason.—Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations
were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s assertions that she had been forced into
sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent’s girlfriend even after she had
given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute
her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult
who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could
be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another
woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred
and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

Same; Same; Same; Even assuming that a person’s indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
he has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor.—We cannot
help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to
the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing
the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are
ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute
sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to
him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take
the lawyer’s oath.
 Barrios vs. Martinez, 442 SCRA 324 , November 12, 2004
Attorneys; Duties; Gross Misconduct; Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of
the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any of
the following reasons.—Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

Same; Same; Same; “Moral Turpitude,” Defined.—Moral turpitude “includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It involves “an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Issuance of a check knowing that he or she does not have sufficient funds is
a manifestation of moral turpitude.—The act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check
in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence
in law and lawyers.—The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same
constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law
and lawyers. And while “the general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the
court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or
private capacity, where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so
gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the
office of attorney.”

Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; The Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or
private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor—or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.—The purpose of a proceeding for
disbarment is “to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.” “A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve
no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministrations of persons unfit to practice them.” “Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor—or to
be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and
judges for willful disregard of its orders to file comments or appellant’s briefs, as a penalty for
disobedience thereof.—In Pajares v. Abad Santos, we reminded attorneys that “there must be more
faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which provides
that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that
it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes that for a willful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action. It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has
disciplined lawyers and judges for willful disregard of its orders to file comments or appellant’s briefs,
as a penalty for disobedience thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, demanding a high degree
of good moral character.—We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege, demanding
a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent falls short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold
the laws.—In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. “Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for
him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to
ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.”

NO COUNSELING TO DEFY LAW- RULE 1.02

Donton vs. Tansingco, 493 SCRA 1 , June 27, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.—The Court
finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code. A lawyer should not render
any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to
uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the
law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.

Same; Same; The act of a lawyer in using his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end
amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.—Respondent had sworn to
uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for
which he may be suspended.

Velez vs. De Vera, 496 SCRA 345 , July 25, 2006 (supra)

In re Terell, 2 Phil. 266

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465 , November 25, 2003

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Court will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of
our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to
practice law in the Philippines.—The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce
criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded can truly have constructive effects in
the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s
faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.

Same; Same; A lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers
and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others.—Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister
and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of
justice.

Same; Same; Attorney Allan Paguia is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.—WHEREFORE,
Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

NOT TO ENCOURAGE LAWSUIT OR PROCEEDINGS- RULE 1.03

Saburnido vs. Madrono, 366 SCRA 1 , September 26, 2001

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private
capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.—A lawyer may be
disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue
to be an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers
to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the
Code provides: Rule 7.03.—A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Same; Same; A lawyer’s act of filing multiple complaints against the complainants reflects on his
fitness to be a member of the legal profession.—Clearly, respondent’s act of filing multiple complaints
against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act
evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as
complainants were instrumental in respondent’s dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondent’s
tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has been
grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.

Same; Same; Disbarment; The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.—
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the practice of
law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against
respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to
protect the public and the legal profession.

Linsangan vs. Tolentino, 598 SCRA 133 , September 04, 2009

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Malpractice; Solicitations; Advertisements; Time and time again,
lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business—lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.—Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all
lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known.
Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides: CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES
SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS. Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow a
lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in
the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to
which every member of the bar is called.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, an actuation which constitutes malpractice, a
ground for disbarment.—Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides: RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR
PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence, lawyers are
prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ambulance Chasing; Words and Phrases; Ambulance chasing is the
solicitation of almost
any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain
employment.—Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: RULE
1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to
retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.—With regard to
respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result
or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these
seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s “referrals.” Furthermore, he never
denied Labiano’s connection to his office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Same; Same; Lending to Clients; The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client;
Exception.—The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees
for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he
is handling for the client.

Same; Same; Solicitations; Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.—As previously
mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus, in this jurisdiction,
we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Same; Same; Advertisements; Calling Cards; Professional calling cards may only contain the following
details: (a) lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address; (d)
telephone number; and, (e) special branch of law practiced.—A final word regarding the calling card
presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers
are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number; and, (e)
special branch of law practiced.

In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, “pirated” a
client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty.
Linsangan’s allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s calling card which appears as
follows:
FRONT

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

BACK

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing the
printing of such calling cards.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional services of
Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano.
HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty.
Linsangan’s clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another’s legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he
actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his
law office. Through Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was benefited. Hapless
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that Atty.
Tolentino could produce a more favorable result.
Labiano’s calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will finance
legal actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided
attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer
in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery
rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
client’s cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states “w/ financial assistance“, was clearly used to
entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans
to finance their legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal
and direct hand in the printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished with severity. At
any rate, for all the infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the
Supreme Court for one year.

ENCOURAGE CLIENT TO AVOID CONTROVERSY- Rule 1.04

De Ysasi III vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 231 SCRA 173 , March 11, 1994
Ethics; Lawyers; A lawyer should be a mediator for concord and conciliator for compromise, rather
than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.—The conduct of the respective counsel of
the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel
may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes
beyond merely presenting their clients’ respective causes in court. It is just as much their
responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties
between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to
conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is
often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He
should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.

Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; A lawyer should encourage his client to avoid, end or settle
the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.—Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.” On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell
short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records
do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochment between
their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated
the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.

Labor Law; Labor Arbiter; A labor arbiter shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a
labor dispute within his jurisdiction.—In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled
this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating
that a labor arbiter “shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within
his jurisdiction.” If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the
proceeding in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

231 SCRA 173 – Legal Ethics – Duty of a Lawyer To Encourage Settlement of Suits
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The elder Ysasi owns a
hacienda in Negros Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as the farm
administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III underwent surgery and so he missed work.
He was confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was terminated, without due
process, by his father. De Ysasi III filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the
National Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked that his son actually abandoned
his work.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute
abandonment, there must be a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship,
with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some
overt acts. No such intent was proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the lawyers for both camps failed to
exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and
especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their
clients especially considering that the parties involved are father and son. This case may
have never reached the courts had there been an earnest effort by the lawyers to have both
parties find an off court settlement but records show that no such effort was made. The
useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible
by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic
exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord
and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.” Both counsel fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed
duties as officers of the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who handled this
regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter “shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a
labor dispute within his jurisdiction.” If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought,
the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the
same.