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Beyond Smile Dynamics: Mimicry and Beliefs in

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Emotion © 2011 American Psychological Association
2011, Vol. 11, No. 1, 181–187 1528-3542/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0022596

BRIEF REPORT

Beyond Smile Dynamics: Mimicry and Beliefs in Judgments of Smiles

Marcus Maringer Eva G. Krumhuber
University of Amsterdam University of Geneva

Agneta H. Fischer Paula M. Niedenthal

University of Amsterdam CNRS and the University of Clermont-Ferrand, France

The judgment that a smile is based on “true,” usually positive, feelings affects social interaction. However, the
processes underlying the interpretation of a smile as being more or less genuine are not well understood. The
aim of the present research was to test predictions of the Simulation of Smiles Model (SIMS) proposed by
Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, and Hess (2010). In addition to the perceptual features that can guide the
judgment of a smile as genuine, the model identifies the conditions that the judgments rely on: (a) the
embodiment of the facial expression and its corresponding state, and (b) beliefs about the situations in which
genuine smiles are most often expressed. Results of two studies are consistent with the model in that they
confirm the hypotheses that facial mimicry provides feedback that is used to judge the meaning of a smile, and
that beliefs about the situations in which a smile occurs guides such judgments when mimicry is inhibited.

Keywords: mimicry, emotion embodiment, social judgement, smile genuineness

The smile is one of the most important signals in human inter-
action. People smile frequently, and smiles are expressed in a wide
range of social contexts. People smile at others while waiting for
an elevator, when showing their ticket to a bus driver, or when they
run into a familiar person at a shopping mall. Smiles often signal
that individuals are happy or that they like the specific individual
to whom they address the smile (Ekman, 1992, 1994). Conse-
quently, smiling individuals are perceived as being happier (Otta,
Abrosio, & Hoshino, 1996; Otta, Lira, Delevati, Cesar, & Pires,
1994), receive higher ratings of attractiveness, kindness, honesty,
and competence (Hess, Beaupré, & Cheung, 2002; Reis et al.,
1990), are liked more (Young & Beier, 1977; Palmer & Simmons,
1995), and are responded to with more cooperative behaviors,
increased responsiveness, and affiliative signals (Gonzaga, Kelt-
ner, Londahl, & Smith, 2001; Patterson & Tubbs, 2005; Scharle-
mann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001) than people who do not
smile.
However, in some Western cultures, the interpersonal benefits
for smiling are even greater when the smile is considered to be
indicative of positive feelings. People who display smiles that are
judged to be false receive less favorable personality ratings and
are responded to with fewer cooperative behaviors compared to
Marcus Maringer and Agneta H. Fischer, Department of Psychology,
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Eva G. Krumhu-
ber, Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva
Switzerland; Paula M. Niedenthal, CNRS and Department of Psychology,
University of Clermont-Ferrand, Clermont-Ferrand, France.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Marcus
Maringer, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam,
Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail:
m.maringer@uva.nl
those whose smile is judged to be genuine (Frank, Ekman, &
Friesen, 1993; Harker & Keltner, 2001; Johnston, Miles, & Mc-
Crae, 2010; Krumhuber et al., 2007; Krumhuber, Manstead, &
Kappas, 2007). Hence, the processes that underlie the judgment
that a smile is genuine versus not genuine are important.
To date, research on smiles has almost exclusively emphasized
the perceptual-descriptive differences between different types of
smile (Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Frank & Ekman, 1993). In this
research, it has been shown that smiles judged as genuine involve
the activation of certain muscle regions (Frank, Ekman, & Friesen,
1993; Miles & Johnston, 2007), have smooth and more regular
facial movements (Hess & Kleck, 1994), and are longer in onset,
apex, and offset durations (Krumhuber & Kappas, 2005; Krumhu-
ber, Manstead, Cosker, Marshall, & Rosin, 2009) than smiles that
are judged as less genuine.
However, differences in the morphology cannot account for the
fact that the judgment of a smile as genuine is highly variable
across individuals and cultures (Thibault, Leveque, Gosselin, &
Hess, 2009). In our view, the emphasis on facial musculature has
resulted in a relative neglect of other processes that might be
involved in judgments of smile meaning (e.g., as genuine or not
genuine). In the present research we focus on two such processes,
following the Simulation of Smiles Model (SIMS) model of Nie-
denthal, Mermillod, Maringer, and Hess (2010): the simulation of
the facial expression and the corresponding internal state in the
self, and the application of beliefs about the likelihood of a
particular type of smile appearing in a particular social context.
Thus, the aim of the present research is to demonstrate that crucial
processes underlying judgments of smile genuineness go beyond
the face of the sender (i.e., the description of empirically based
“genuine” and “not genuine” smiles), and are also found in the
mind of the perceiver.

181
182 MARINGER, KRUMHUBER, FISCHER, AND NIEDENTHAL
Simulation of the Smile Expression
One way that a facial expression could be interpreted is by
reference to an embodied simulation of the expression and its
corresponding internal state. Niedenthal and colleagues (2010)
specifically define this as occurring when a “facial expression has
triggered a simulation of a state in the motor, somatosensory,
affective and reward systems that represents the meaning of the
expression to the perceiver.” Hence, from the perspective of the
SIMS (Niedenthal et al., 2010), mimicry plays a fundamental role
in the representation of how a smile feels (Atkinson & Adolphs,
2005; Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001; Ober-
man, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2007). Facial mimicry can
be understood as an internal simulation of the perceived facial
expression, which supports understanding of other people’s emo-
tions (Atkinson & Adolphs, 2005; Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt,
& Innes-Ker, 2001; Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran,
2007). It is the input from specific regions associated with the
production of the emotional expressions and the emotional re-
sponse to it that support the recognition of different types of
emotional expressions. Hence, individuals are able to distinguish
happy expressions from angry expressions because those expres-
sions feel different in terms of the somatosensory and affective
experiences they produce (Niedenthal et al., 2009).
This assumption finds some support in a number of publications.
For instance, in a recent neuroimaging study, Botulinum Toxin
(BOTOX) was injected into the brow area of half of the partici-
pants (Hennenlotter et al., 2009). These participants, as well as
control participants who had not received BOTOX injections, were
then instructed to mimic angry and sad facial expressions pre-
sented in photographs. During the anger (but not sadness) mimicry
task, BOTOX participants showed significantly less limbic system
activation compared to the control. This result causally links facial
mimicry to emotional state, in that disabling the facial musculature
decreased activation of regions of the brain associated with emo-
tion processing. In a related study by Lee and colleagues (2006),
participants mimicked faces expressing smiles, as well as other
expressions. The more participants mimicked the smiles, the
greater the activations in their striatum and amygdala, suggesting
that mimicry was related to the production of a corresponding
emotional state.
In behavioral studies, Stel and Knippenberg (2008) demon-
strated that participants recognized facial expressions of emotions
more slowly when they were unable to mimic facial expressions
than when they were free to mimic the expression. Others have
demonstrated that when mimicry is blocked, individuals are less
able to recognize happy and disgust expressions (Oberman et al.,
2007), and slower to detect changes in sad and happy facial
expressions (Niedenthal et al., 2001).
According to the SIMS model, however, it is likely that somato-
sensory simulations not only facilitate emotion recognition, they
probably also contribute to how perceivers experience the meaning
of these facial expressions, specifically, as a genuine or a false
emotion. A “true” smile will thus be judged as genuine on the basis
of input from the positive feelings that such a smile produces. For
a “false” smile the process is similar, but the mimicry may be
attenuated to a certain degree (Surakka & Hietanen, 1998) and the
smile is therefore felt as less positive by the perceiver, grounding
the judgment of a smile as rather false. Hence one of the predic-
tions of the SIMS model is that when mimicry is inhibited, the
affective input from the somatosensory experience is absent, ren-
dering people less able to determine whether a smile is genuine or
false. If input from mimicry is inhibited, however, other informa-
tion, such as beliefs might serve as alternative input to ground
one’s judgment.
Beliefs About Smile-Genuineness
Belief-driven approaches to emotion recognition hold that con-
ceptual processes play an important role in how facial expressions
are interpreted. In this view, when individuals see an emotional
expression, they may interpret its meaning in terms of the specific
situations, events and behaviors that they know to be associated
with the expression. In other words, people’s beliefs reflect their
theories about the causal relationships between different types of
social situations, social motives, and resulting emotions and emo-
tional expression (Adolphs, 2002; Fischer & Manstead, 2008;
Jakobs, Manstead, & Fischer, 1999; Robinson & Clore, 2002;
Saxe, 2005). For example, an individual may hold the belief that
when expressed during a sales interaction a smile is probably false
in nature, whereas a smile that occurs as a result of a successful
sale is probably genuine. This belief is based on the assumption
that the act of selling involves the intent to manipulate whereas the
completion of a sale involves the experience of satisfied pleasure.
Indeed, since individuals expect certain events to usually cause
people to display genuine versus false smiles, such knowledge
might influence the perception of smile genuineness.
But when are people likely to use such beliefs to infer whether
a smile they see is based on true feelings? An interesting prediction
has been made in the Accessibility Model of Emotion Self-reports
(Robinson & Clore, 2002). This model assumes that people use
two different sources of information for their judgments about
their own emotions in a given situation. One source of information
is experiential knowledge, which is the direct experience of the
event and the resulting emotions of that event. The other source of
information is people’s conceptual knowledge about the emotions
they expect to occur as a result of a specific event. The model
predicts that if the direct experience of the emotion is absent, and
hence not accessible (e.g., in future events), people are more likely
to use conceptual knowledge about how they expect them to
emotionally react in a given situation.
The SIMS model makes similar predictions for judgments re-
garding the emotions of others. In this case the emotional experi-
ence of an event is the observers’ reenacted affective state of the
other person (Atkinson & Adolphs, 2005; Niedenthal et al., 2001;
Oberman et al., 2007). However, when the affective state of the
sender cannot be simulated for some reason, people will use other
sources of information to determine the emotion’s genuineness.
Specifically, when individuals’ mimicry is experimentally inhib-
ited and the possibility of relying on the simulated feeling of the
facial expression in judgments is reduced, then individuals will
rely on stereotypes or beliefs about the smile meaning (Niedenthal
et al., 2010). Put differently, when mimicry of a smile is inhibited,
the judgment of whether the smile is based on true feelings will be
more likely to be grounded in people’s beliefs about the causal
relationship between specific events and the likelihood of smiles.
 BEYOND SMILE DYNAMICS
Overview and Hypotheses
Although there is some evidence that inhibiting facial mimicry
per se can influence people’s efficiency in recognizing facial
expressions (Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001;
Stel & Van Knippenberg, 2008), there is no research to date
demonstrating that blocking facial mimicry affects people’s judg-
ments about the genuineness of an expression. Furthermore, it is
still unclear how embodied processes might interact with other
impression formation processes, such as the integration of people’s
beliefs into their judgments (Goldman & Sripada, 2005; Nie-
denthal et al., 2010; Saxe, 2005).
We report two studies that address these issues. In Study 1 we
test the hypothesis that facial mimicry influences the judgment of
the genuineness of smiles. We presented participants with video
clips of dynamic smiles with different structural qualities that had
previously been rated as “true” or “false.” The participant’s ability
to mimic the smiles was manipulated, and the judgment of the
genuineness of each smile was assessed. Our prediction was that
true smiles would be rated as more genuine than false smiles, but
only when individuals could freely mimic the smiles. We expected
that participants who could not mimic the smiles would rate both
true and false smiles as equally genuine.
In Study 2 we tested the hypothesis that when mimicry is
inhibited, beliefs about smiles in specific situations will influence
judgments of genuineness. For this purpose the smiles were pre-
sented either in a positive context in which true smiles would be
expected or in a context that was ambiguous with respect to the
likelihood of a true smile. We again manipulated the possibility to
mimic the smiles, and assessed the participant’s judgment of the
smile’s genuineness. We predicted that judgments of participants
who could not mimic the smiles would be strongly influenced by
the context, but not those of participants who could mimic the
smile.
Study 1
Participants and Design
Undergraduate students (n ⫽ 64) at the University of Amster-
dam served as participants in exchange for course credit, or 3.50
Euros. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a
2 (Smile Type: true, false) by 2 (Mimicry: free, inhibited)
between-subjects factorial design.
Smile Stimuli
All target expressions used for the present purpose were dy-
namic in nature. The stimulus material consisted of 10 male and 10
female characters generated using the Poser 4 (Curious Labs, Santa
Cruz, CA, U.S.A.) character animation software. From this set, 6
male and 6 female Poser figures had already been used in a
previous study (Krumhuber, Manstead, & Kappas, 2007). We
created 4 additional male and 4 additional female characters by
altering the facial structure and type of hair of Poser figures. All
characters expressed a smile over 40 frames at a frame rate of 30
images per section. The smile expression was operationally de-
fined as an open mouth smile and had been previously classified
by two FACS certified coders as a combination of Action Unit
183
(AU) 6 (Cheek Raiser), AU 12 (Lip Corner Puller), and AU 25
(Lips Part). For each character, a smile that possessed the dynam-
ics of a true smile (with 16 frames or 533 ms onset) and dynamics
of a false smile (with 4 frames or 133 ms onset) were constructed.
All stimuli started at a neutral position for 10 frames and then
changed in one of the two onset durations, to a smiling face at a
target intensity of 0.8 (see Krumhuber et al., 2007, for details).
Procedure
The pretext for the research was the development of a virtual
environment in which people could attend meetings and confer-
ences online without the need for additional web-cameras. Partic-
ipants were told that in the current phase we were asking individ-
uals to evaluate features of some of the “test-avatars.” The
experimenter further explained that in order to prevent that a
judgment of one feature influenced judgments of other features, we
were asking participants in different conditions to evaluate the
avatars on a single characteristic. In the present study participants
were asked to evaluate the genuineness of the smile of several
avatars.
The experiment was presented on computers with Macromedia
Authorware 7 using a 1024 ⫻ 768 screen resolution on 17⬙
monitors. Participants were seated in individual cubicles.
Half of the participants learned that previous research had
indicated that individuals form more objective judgments of the
features of faces if their own facial movement is kept to a mini-
mum. The experimenter explained that, to this end, they would
hold a pen sideways between their lips and teeth while they
performed the rating task. In fact, this technique has proven to
reliably inhibit facial muscles used in smiling without inducing an
emotional state in itself (Niedenthal et al., 2001; Oberman et al.,
2007). The experimenter demonstrated the correct way to hold the
pen by touching the pen with the teeth and lips only very gently
and by making sure that the upper and lower lips touches each
other softly in front of the pen. It was emphasized that participants
should make sure that neither their lips nor their teeth exert any
active pressure on the pen. The experimenter also demonstrated the
incorrect way to hold the pen, by compacting the lips and teeth
tightly against the pen.
It should be noted that this blocking procedure differs from the
procedure employed by Oberman et al. (2007), in which partici-
pants were required to exert a constant active pressure (“bite”) on
the pen. Whereas the aim of the procedure used by Oberman et al.
(2007) was to create a constant muscular “noise” that interferes
with the recognition of certain facial expressions, the procedure
used in the present study aimed to prevent the occurrence of a
facial signal (see Niedenthal et al., 2001), which should interfere
with the interpretation of whether a smile is based on true feelings
or not. This mimicry blocking procedure with low facial muscle
tension also makes it less likely that any changes in perceptual
outcomes due to blocking facial mimicry can be explained in terms
of other factors such as distraction due to higher levels of arousal
or effort (see Oberman et al., 2007).
The other half of the participants did not receive such instruc-
tions and were able to freely mimic the facial expression of the
target.
Furthermore, one half of the participants saw a set of “genuine”
smiles and the other half saw a set of “false” smiles. It should be
184 MARINGER, KRUMHUBER, FISCHER, AND NIEDENTHAL
noted that this procedure was different from Krumhuber et al.
(2007), as these authors presented each participant with genuine as
well as false smiles. This procedure, however, enabled participants
to directly compare the facial movements of true smiles with the
facial movements of false smiles. As a consequence of this com-
parison process, people might be more likely to base their judg-
ments directly on the expressive features of the smiles and less on
the simulated affective state of the sender (see Niedenthal et al.,
2010). Each smile appeared on the screen with a start button
underneath and participants were free to start the animation at their
own will, but not to stop it once it had been started.
Judgments of Genuineness
Each smile disappeared from the computer screen after it
reached its end and it was replaced by the request for a judgment.
Judgments of genuineness were made on 5-point scales running
from 1 (not at all genuine) to 5 (very genuine).
Results
Effects of mimicry and smile type on genuineness judg-
ments. We first computed overall genuineness scores by aver-
aging participant ratings of the 20 smiles. Effects of the indepen-
dent variables on these scores were computed by performing a 2
(Smile Type: true, false) by 2 (Mimicry: free, inhibited) Analysis
of Variance (ANOVA). The analysis revealed a marginally signif-
icant main effect of Smile Type F(1, 60) ⫽ 3.40, p ⫽ .07, ␩2 ⫽
.05, indicating that true smiles were perceived as marginally more
genuine (M ⫽ 3.00, SD ⫽ 0.57) than false smiles (M ⫽ 2.77, SD ⫽
0.46). This main effect was qualified by a Smile Type x Mimicry
two-way interaction, F(1, 60) ⫽ 6.74, p ⬍ .01, ␩2 ⫽ .10 (all means
and standard deviations are presented in Table 1).
In order to investigate the interaction, we conducted a test of the
simple main effects. The analysis revealed that among the partic-
ipants who could mimic the smiles, those who saw true smiles
perceived the expressions as more genuine (M ⫽ 3.12, SD ⫽ 0.57)
than those who saw the false smiles (M ⫽ 2.57, SD ⫽ 0.34), F(1,
60) ⫽ 9.76, p ⬍ .01, ␩2 ⫽ .14. This finding confirms the validity
of the empirically derived smile stimuli. However, as predicted,
when the participant’s mimicry was inhibited, no difference in
judgment of smile genuineness as a function of smile type was
observed (F ⬍ 1).
In summary, Krumhuber, Manstead, and Kappas (2007) devel-
oped dynamic smile stimuli that were consensually interpreted as
relatively “true” versus “false” smiles. In the present experiment in
which participants could mimic the smiles, judgment of genuine-
Table 1
Mean (SD) Judgments of Smile Genuineness as a Function of
Smile Type and Mimicry
Smile type True False
Mimicry
Free 3.12 (0.57) 2.57 (0.34)
Blocked 2.88 (0.56) 2.98 (0.47)
Note. Judgments were made on a scale from 1 to 5, with higher scores
indicating more positive judgments.
ness confirmed the validity of the stimulus development such that
the empirically derived true smiles were perceived as more genu-
ine than the empirically derived false smiles. However, consistent
with predictions made by Niedenthal et al. (2009) when the par-
ticipant’s facial mimicry was blocked, this difference disappeared.
That is, the participants who could not mimic rated the two types
of smiles as equally genuine.
Study 2
In addition to simulation, we argued that people’s beliefs about
the causal relationships between different types of social events
and accompanying facial expressions may be used to judge other
people’s emotions (e.g., Gopnik, & Wellman, 1992; Leslie, 1994;
Niedenthal et al., 2009). In Study 2 we tested the hypothesis of the
SIMS Model (Niedenthal et al., 2010) that when mimicry is
inhibited, and along with it the simulated or reenacted affective
state of the sender, the individual’s judgment about smile genu-
ineness should reflect beliefs about a given event and how likely
such an event causes a genuine smile.
Method
Participants and design. Undergraduate students (n ⫽ 48) at
the University of Amsterdam served as participants in exchange
for course credit or 3.50 Euros. Participants were randomly as-
signed to the conditions of a 2 (Mimicry: free, inhibited) by 2
(Context: positive, ambiguous) between-subjects factorial design.
Procedure and dependent measures. The pretext for the
research was the development of training modules that integrate
avatars in virtual environments with more traditional tutoring
techniques. We told the participants that salesclerks increasingly
have problems with customers in sales interactions. The purpose of
the training modules was to improve the interaction between
salesclerks and customers. As in Study 1, participants were further
informed that in the current phase of the project, it was crucial to
collect evaluations of certain expressive features of the avatars,
and that in the present study they would evaluate the genuineness
of the smile of several avatars. The true smiles used in Study 1
served as the target stimuli in all conditions.
Smile context was manipulated by instructing half of the par-
ticipants to imagine that the avatar was a salesclerk who had just
sold them a pair of shoes ( positive smile context). The other half
of the participants was instructed to imagine that the avatar was a
salesclerk who was trying to sell them a pair of shoes (ambiguous
smile context). At the beginning of the experiment, in order to
measure participants’ beliefs about the meaning of a smile, par-
ticipants answered questions about the likelihood of a genuine
smile being shown in a specific context. In order to avoid the
participant’s elaboration on the possibility of other conditions,
participants in the positive context condition were asked to rate
only the likelihood of a genuine smile being shown by a salesclerk
who just sold a pair of shoes, and participants in the ambiguous
context condition were asked to only rate the likelihood of a
genuine smile being shown by a salesclerk who was trying to sell
a pair of shoes. Judgments were made on a 5-point scale ranging
from 1 (0% likely) to 5 (100% likely).
This measurement of participants’ beliefs about a smile in a
specific context was not only used for testing their own adherence
 BEYOND SMILE DYNAMICS
to the belief that a salesclerk would express a smile that was
genuine in the given situation, but also for the purpose of making
participants’ beliefs more accessible prior to the impression for-
mation task. In order to make sure that their beliefs about the smile
context remained accessible throughout the experimental session,
a short sentence reminding them about this context was displayed
underneath each video clip.
As in Study 1, in order to block mimicry, we again instructed
half of the participants to hold a pen sideways between their teeth
and lips while they observed the facial expression of the target.
The other half of the participants was again free to mimic the facial
expression of the target. After the presentation of each smile,
participants rated how genuine the smile seemed to be on a 5-point
scale ranging from ⫺2 (not at all genuine) to ⫹ 2 (very genuine).
Results
Manipulation check. First we investigated the a priori beliefs
of the participants regarding the likely occurrence of true smiles in
a specific context. We conducted a 2 (Smile Mimicry: free,
blocked) by 2 (Smile Context: positive, ambiguous) ANOVA on
the likelihood of the occurrence of a true smile. This analysis
revealed a significant main effect of Smile Context F(1, 44) ⫽
12.41, p ⬍ .01, ␩2 ⫽ .25, indicating that participants in the positive
smile context expected the occurrence of a genuine smile to be
more likely (M ⫽ 3.37, SD ⫽ 0.58) compared to participants in the
ambiguous smile context (M ⫽ 2.72, SD ⫽ 0.67; all other Fs ⬍ 1).
No main effect or interaction with Smile Mimicry was found
(Fs ⬍ 1).
Effects of mimicry and context on genuineness judgments.
Next we averaged the participants’ genuineness ratings across the
20 smiles and submitted these to a 2 (Smile Mimicry: free,
blocked) by 2 (Smile Context: positive, ambiguous) ANOVA. The
analysis revealed no main effects, but the predicted two-way
interaction between Mimicry and Context, F(1, 44) ⫽ 4.05, p ⬍
.05, ␩2 ⫽ .08 (all means and standard deviations are presented in
Table 2). Analyses of simple main effects further revealed that in
conditions in which the participant’s facial mimicry was blocked,
smiles were judged to be more genuine in the positive context
(M ⫽ 3.43, SD ⫽ 0.35), than in the ambiguous context (M ⫽ 3.10,
SD ⫽ 0.30), F(1, 44) ⫽ 3.33, p ⬍ .05, ␩2 ⫽ .07. As expected, in
conditions in which participants were free to mimic the smile, no
difference was found in judgments of smile genuineness as a
function of the context in which it was seen (F ⬍ 1).
In summary, the results of the second experiment demonstrated
that individuals who could not mimic a smile tended to use their
personal beliefs about the relation between smiling and the sales
Table 2
Mean (SD) Judgments of Smile Genuineness as a Function of
Social Context and Mimicry
Social context Positive Ambiguous
Mimicry
Free 3.06 (0.42) 3.25 (0.65)
Blocked 3.43 (0.35) 3.10 (0.30)
Note. Judgments were made on a scale from 1 to 5, with higher scores
indicating more positive judgments.
185
context in order to judge the genuineness of a smile. Because
people believed that the context of having sold a pair of shoes is
associated with the expression of a true smile, they believed that
the smiles were indeed rather genuine. On the other hand, because
people believed that trying to sell a pair of shoes is associated with
the expression of a false smile, they judged the smile as rather
false. However, as predicted, this impact of beliefs was limited
only to conditions in which mimicry was not possible. If respon-
dents could mimic the smile, there was no effect of the context in
which the smile occurred.
Discussion
How do people interpret a smile as being genuine, or “true,” in
the sense that it is expressive of positive feelings? Whereas pre-
vious research has focused entirely on the description of the
objective features of various smiles that give rise to different
interpretations (Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993; Hess & Kleck,
1990; Krumhuber & Kappas, 2005), the present research demon-
strated that judging a smile as a genuine expression of positive
feelings is determined by more than just the objective features of
the smile. Consistent with the SIMS model, we showed that
empirically derived “true” smiles were judged to be more genuine
than empirically derived “false” smiles, but only when mimicry of
the smiles was possible. These findings confirm that mimicry of a
smile plays an important role in the interpretation of its meaning.
Since previous research has been limited to the effects of struc-
tural features of facial displays, the processes that underlie judg-
ments of genuineness have remained relatively unclear. We be-
lieve our findings are novel, because they show that although
objective criteria can be used for judging smile genuineness, these
criteria are not the only sources of information when judging a
smile (see also Niedenthal et al., 2010).
We believe the present study also contributes to the question of
whether a simulation-based or a theory-based explanation alone
can account for the variability of outcomes of interpretations of
facial expressions (see Goldman & Sripada, 2005; Niedenthal et
al., 2009; Saxe, 2005). We clearly demonstrated that both pro-
cesses play an important part in the interpretation of facial expres-
sions. People judge a smile as less genuine when they expect it to
be so in a given situation. However, this effect of people’s beliefs
was only found if people were unable to actively simulate the
affective state of the smiling person. This suggests that the reen-
actment of the emotional expression of others provides a strong
basis for people’s interpretations of smiles that can override beliefs
based on conceptual knowledge. If the input from simulation is
absent, however, people’s beliefs are more likely to inform their
judgments. Hence, we believe our research clearly points to the
fact that neither a simulation-based nor a theory-based explanation
alone is sufficient in explaining “when” and “why” people judge
smiles differently. In order to increase our understanding of peo-
ple’s interpretations of emotional expressions, the challenge for
future research is to provide answers to the question as to how
simulation based judgment processes are integrated into basic
cognitive judgment processes.
Another critical challenge for future research will be to deter-
mine what precisely triggers simulation processes. Previous re-
search, for instance, has demonstrated that eye-contact is an im-
portant determinant of simulation processes (Schrammel et al.,
186 MARINGER, KRUMHUBER, FISCHER, AND NIEDENTHAL
2009), such that simulation processes are most likely if eye-contact
with the other person has been established. Interestingly, when
people are asked how truthful messages might be distinguished
from lies, the most common answer is that liars avoid eye contact.
In fact people worldwide believe that averted eye gaze signals
deceit (Bond & The Global Deception Research Team, 2006).
Hence, one interesting candidate for future research on the inter-
play between more simulation based and more belief-based infer-
ences of smile genuineness would be to examine the role of
eye-contact in judgments of smile genuineness (see also Nie-
denthal et al., 2010).
There is also evidence suggesting that the simulation of other
people’s emotional states varies as a function of group member-
ship (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). Interestingly, research by Hess and
Kirouac (2000) implies that if people interpret facial expressions
of out-group members, they tend to resort to stereotypic beliefs
about the group. The present research suggests that understanding
the mechanisms that initiate or block facial mimicry will not only
help to explain “when” and “why” people simulate other people’s
facial expressions, but in addition “when” and “why” people’s
beliefs about facial expressions are more or less likely to be
pronounced in their interpretations of facial expressions. In par-
ticular in the field of intergroup interaction where people often
hold strong and stereotypic beliefs about members of other groups,
it is vital to understand the processes that alter the influence of
such beliefs on people’s judgments.
Behavioral ecologists have argued that smiles are not expressive
of subjective feelings but rather reflect social motives (Fridlund,
1994). This view has encouraged the consideration of the social
situation in theorizing about the emergence of smiles (Fischer &
Manstead, 2008; Jakobs, Fischer, & Manstead, 1999), but has not
solved the problem of how or why individuals interpret smiles
differently. By identifying the different processes involved in the
perception of the smile, the present research has contributed to a
clearer picture of the circumstances under which smiles are dif-
ferentially processed and judged. Such a perspective may lead to a
better understanding of why and how evaluation processes differ
across individuals and cultures.
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Received August 27, 2009
Revision received July 13, 2010
Accepted August 11, 2010 䡲