170 William Lane Craig

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GENERAL RELATIVITY AND THE LENGTH OF THE PAST

In a recent issue of this Journal G. J. Whitrow [1978] argues, on the basis of

purely a priori or conceptual considerations, that the universe must have a
finite past. But he also takes comfort in the fact that, 'According to current
views, theoretical world models . . . based on general relativity must contain
singularities, e.g. an initial singularity corresponding to an epoch of "world-
creation" at a finite past epoch. [And] "world creation" signifies a finite past. To
claim more than that takes us beyond science into theology.' (Whitrow [1978],
P- 358).
However, I think Whitrow is wrong in taking comfort in general relativity.
First of all, rather than supporting the view that the past must be finite, according
to general relativity there are circumstances under which the past would be
infinite. And secondly, the so called 'initial' singularity mentioned by Whitrow
does not imply a finite past. Let us discuss these in turn.
1. If we assume that the large scale structure of the universe can be represented
by one of the Robertson Walker models (space is isotropic and homogeneous,
so that the 3 dimensional spatial metric is of the form R(t)2dcr2, do-independent
 General Relativity and the Length of the Past 171

of /), the distribution of the galaxies can be represented as a continuous perfect

fluid, and the cosmological constant is zero, then the general relativity field
equations imply (letting R/t, R/t/t be the first and second time derivatives),
(i)R/tit<o,forallt
(2) For physically realistic matter-energy densities, R/t can be zero only if
space is of constant positive curvature (finite but unbounded), but if space is
either flat or of constant negative curvature, R/t cannot change sign.
Now from the observed red shift in the light from distant stars, we conclude

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that the universe is now expanding, i.e., that R/t > o. This along with (1),
that R/t/t < o for all times, immediately implies that the rate of the expansion
of space increases as we go back in the past, which means that R -*• o in a finite
amount of past time. On the other hand, whether the future is finite or infinite
depends on whether space is spherical or not. If it is spherical, then R/t can
decrease through zero to negative values and space will recontract and the
future will be finite. But if space is flat or of zero curvature, R/f must remain
positive and space will continue to expand into an infinite future.
This, of course, is the usual textbook account. But what if, instead of observing
a red shift, we observed a blue shift indicating that space was now contracting,
i.e., that R/t < o? Then (1) and (2) would imply that R -> o in a finite amount
of time in the future, but that the past is either finite or infinite depending on
whether space was spherical or not. Thus, if we observed a blue shift and had
evidence that space was not spherical (based, say, on measurements of the
density of the universe), then the very general relativistic world models Whitrow
alludes to, that we use today to understand the large-scale structure of the
universe would lead us to conclude that the past is infinite.
2. Assuming that the universe is now expanding, the Robertson Walker models
do imply that the past isfinite,the universe having 'started' in an initial singularity.
But the Robertson Walker models assume that to a good approximation, the
large scale structure of space is homogeneous and isotropic. One is thus naturally
led to ask whether, in the actual universe, small departures from the high degree
of symmetry of the Robertson Walker models would invalidate the conclusion
that there must be a past singularity. (Indeed, in the early universe, with its
violence and high density, there might have been large departures from maximal
symmetry even if today there is not.) And the answer to our question is no. The
theorems of Penrose and Hawking,1 which make use of very plausible physical
assumptions not depending on the symmetry of the Robertson Walker models,
imply that there is indeed a singularity in the past of our universe. But contrary
to Whitrow's suggestions, we cannot conclude just from this that the past is
finite, because the singularity theorems do not specify the nature of the singularity.
In particular, they leave open the possibility that the past singularity is time like,
being associated with a 'bridge' to an earlier (i.e., earlier than the singularity)
contracting phase of the universe analogous to the 'bridges' between successive
asymptotically flat regions of some of the maximal Reissner-Nordstrom and
Kerr space-times (see Hawking and Ellis [1973], especially section 10.2).
In view of these facts, I suggest that if, on the basis of general relativity, we
1
See Hawking and Ellis [1973].
172 Robert Weingard

are willing to accept the possibility of the past being finite, then we must also
accept the possibility of an infinite past. Thus, I think general relativity provides
good reason for thinking that if the past is finite, it is not so because of logical
or physical necessity. However, it does help us to understand, or make sense of
the idea of the past being finite, in the following sense. In the history of philo-
sophy many philosophers have argued against space having a boundary. But
really, what they were arguing for was that space be inextendible, i.e., that there
is no space of the same dimension that we can conceive physical space to be a
proper part of.1 This does, I think, capture a strong intuition we have. Thus,
when we conceive of physical space to be euclidean, say, we don't think of it

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being just an incomplete piece (for example, as a sphere 10 trillion miles in
diameter, even without its boundary), but as being extended completely in all
directions (the extension may not be unique). Now, according to general relativity,
4 dimensional space-time is the basic spatiotemporal structure. In accord with
our above mentioned intuition, let me propose as a metaphysical hypothesis
that space-time is inextendible—that there is no 4 dimensional locally lorentzian
space-time manifold of which the space-time of the actual world can be conceived
to be a proper part (or extended to). Then the relevant question is: Can space-
time be inextendible and yet have afinitepast? And according to general relativity,
the answer is yes. Those Robertson Walker models containing a finite past are
examples.
ROBERT WEINGARD
Rutgers College

REFERENCES
HAWKING, S. W. and ELLIS, G. F. R. [1973]: The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time.
Cambridge University Press.
HALDANE, E. S. and Ross, G. R. T. [1955]: Philosophical Works of Descartes. Dover
Publications.
WHITROW, G. J. [1978]: 'On the Impossibility of an Infinite Past', British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 29, 39-45.
1
For example, Descartes writes in the Principles, part II, principle XXI, 'We likewise
recognize that this world, or the totality of corporeal substance [ = space], is extended,
without limit, because wherever we imagine a limit, we are not only still able to imagine
beyond that limit spaces indefinitely extended, but we perceive there to be in reality
such as we imagine them, . . .' (Haldane and Ross, [1955], p. 264).