Disengagement from violent extremism

Kate Barrelle
Researcher, Global Terrorism Research Centre and Politics Department
Monash University

Abstract

Most people who join radical or extreme groups leave at some stage. In the landscape of violent
extremism and radicalisation, the exit phenomenon is not well understood, though it seems there
are common elements in the experience of those who leave different types of closed and/or
radical groups. In the context of political terrorism, there is an urgent need to better comprehend
the factors and processes involved in leaving extreme groups and reintegrating with the wider
community. For example, just how easy or hard is it to leave voluntarily? What can be done to
minimise further radicalisation if a person is extracted forcibly from a group? What factors
promote or hinder reintegration? Issues of identity, belonging and purpose are prevalent in the
personal accounts of most ex-members of politically extreme groups. The basic argument of this
paper is that social identity mechanisms implicated in radicalisation may also constitute a
significant and essential component of disengagement, deradicalisation and reintegration – both
as a cause and as a consequence. Prevention policies and disengagement interventions can only
be successful if we understand how and why people leaving violent and extreme groups.

Most extreme groups have a high turnover, and with the exception of the elite or executive
leadership, most members do leave at some point (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009, pp. 5-10; Ebaugh,
1988, p. 1; Thornberry, Huizinga, & Loeber, 2004, p. 10). Common to the personal accounts
of many ex-members of politically extreme groups is the issue of identity. This is evident in
ethno-nationalist militants (dellaPorta & Diani, 2006; Volkan, 1998), Islamist extremists
(Horgan, 2009c; Moghaddam, 2006; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003), right-wing radicals
(Bjorgo, 2009; F. Demant, Slootman, Buijs, & Tillie, 2008; Sprinzak, 1995) and even
environmental extremists (Foreman, 1991; Pickering, 2007; Rosebraugh, 2004; Watson,
2007). It is also apparent in the experience of those exiting from gangs (Bjorgo & Horgan,
2009; Greene & Pranis, 2007), cults (Lalich, 1988; Singer & Lalich, 1994; Wright, 1987) and
fundamentalist religions (Bankston, Forsyth, & Floyd, 1981; Herriot, 2007; Ruthven, 2007).
Whether violent or non-violent there appear to be commonalities if not universal processes
involved in leaving intense closed groups. Changes in personal and social identity, both as a
cause and as an effect, are implicated as important to this experience. Behavioural exit from
radical groups and associated ideological deradicalisation are now beginning to draw research
attention.

1
Identity is implicit in most models of radicalisation, and further, identity is explicit in many
autobiographical accounts of disengagement and deradicalisation from violent extremism.
However, precisely what role identity plays is not well understood. For example, how does a
person shift their sense of self, their identity, so they can become a psychological citizen of a
community again particularly if they have previously rejected the civic society (or its
governing system) to the point of judging that some if not all members of that community
deserve to die? How do members of extremist collectives disengage from the group; and
how, if at all, do they reintegrate with mainstream society? What is their experience of this
enormous identity shift? This paper will explore some of these issues.

At its simplest, being a political activist is about taking your identity as a group member very
seriously and advocating on behalf of, and for the benefit of, the group. Terrorism and other
forms of violent extremism are also group based phenomena (Ashour, 2009; McCauley,
2001; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Moghaddam, 2006). To illustrate: it is because of the
fact that Person A belongs to Group A that Person B, a member of the group B, wants to hurt
or kill Personal A, despite probably never having met them. Their hatred of one another is
based on group identities, not personal attributes, and as such it is group conflict, not personal
conflict. Building on this basic observation, group based mechanisms of radicalisation
become highly relevant. These mechanisms include social identification with a group, social
comparison between your „in-group‟ and their „out-group‟, with accompanying group based
bias, hatred and denigration (Hogg, 1992; Oakes, 1987; Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987; Turner,
1991). Clearly social identity is central to the radicalisation process; by contrast, this research
explores the social identity factors involved in deradicalisation and reintegration.

Even though it is a deceptively complex topic, almost everybody has an intuitive

understanding of the concept of identity, which includes both unique personal attributes and a
sense of self that comes from belonging to different groups. More specifically, „social
identity‟ is a term used in social psychology to refer to that sense of self and purpose that
people derive from feeling that they belong to a meaningful social group (Brewer, 2001;
Brown, 2000; Hogg, 1992; Oakes, 1987; Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987; Turner, 1991).
Depending on the wider personal and socio-political circumstances, identifying as a member
of a social or cause-based group can be either invaluable for positive social and personal
change or inflame existing anti-social attitudes and behaviours. Much has been written about
social identity and conflict (Ashmore, Jussim, & Wilder, 2001; Brown, 2000; Haslam, 2001;
Korostelina, 2007; Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) though relatively

2
few articles have focused on the processes of deradicalisation or social reintegration of
individuals after leaving an extreme group.

Radicalisation and social identity

Disengagement, deradicalisation and social reintegration cannot be considered out of context

of their precursor, radicalisation. There has been much written on radicalisation, much of
which implicitly refers to identity in general and social identity in particular. An effective
working definition of radicalisation is that is it a “social and psychological process of
incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology” (Horgan,
2009c, p. 152). It is important not to restrict any such definition to one form of ideology, to
acknowledge that radicalisation is a process (not an outcome), and, as is the case explicitly in
Lentini‟s (2008, p. 9) definition of radicalisation, to recognise that radicals wish to transform
the existing social order, often but not necessarily using methods that are extreme, anti-social
and illegal.

The co-founder of the Quilliam Foundation and one of Britain‟s high profile ex-Islamist
extremists Maajid Nawaz says of himself at the start of his own radicalisation process,
“Feeling totally rejected by mainstream society, we were looking for an alternative identity”
(Hari, 2009). Captain Paul Watson, creator of The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society
implores followers to “remain a parasite OR become an Earth Warrior. Serve your Mother
[Nature] and prosper OR serve civilization and besmear yourself with the filth and guilt of
ecocide” (Watson, 2007, capitalized emphasis in original). This is a clear statement of
identity, and challenges others to identify either for or against the environment – about as
explicit a statement about in-group vs. out-group as one could make. Almost every personal
account of radicalisation, irrespective of creed, contains the notion of identifying with a
group and its cause, and the more extreme the group, the stronger the concomitant
identification. This seems to be the case regardless of whether the ideology is right wing,
Islamist, ethno-nationalist, revolutionary Marxist or environmental extremism. It stands to
reason that if identity is a core feature of becoming more and more radical, then it may also
play a central role when a person pulls, or is pulled away from, their group.

Despite the enormous range and variety of extreme political groups and movements, there are
a significant number of common factors in the radicalisation process. For example, when he
joins a radical group for whatever reason, a young man (as it frequently is) finds the group
ideology explains a complex and disappointing world, takes action when previously he felt

3
powerless, gains a stronger positive sense of self, experiences belonging and acceptance,
obtains purpose and skills, and as a result of adopting the group beliefs, values and norms,
incorporates the group into his own social identity. This results in a strong sense of „us‟
versus „them‟ where the young man clearly knows who is good and who is bad (based on in-
group/out-group membership), and will fight „the enemy‟ for himself, his comrades and in
the name of his righteous cause. Detailed accounts of right wing radicals (Bjorgo, 2009;
Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009), Marxist revolutionaries (Crenshaw, 2005; Gray, 2003; Hoffer,
1951), Islamist extremists (Horgan, 2009b; Jordán & Mañas, 2007; McCauley, 2001), ethno-
nationalist fighters (Horowitz, 1998), anarchists (Hartwright, 2002; Hoffer, 1951), religious
cults (Bankston, et al., 1981), and environmental/animal rights extremists (Abbey, 2006; FBI,
2008; Jensen, 2006a, 2006b; Long, 2004) attest to this distinction.

To want to understand the world, to want to have an impact, to seek self-esteem and
acceptance, to be good at something, and to take a sense of identity from common purpose
and belonging, as outlined above, are completely normal human desires, and have long been
recognised as fundamental motivators for social change (Bandura, 1977; Maslow, 1943). It is
important that radicalisation be acknowledged as a motivator for positive social and political
transformation – present in every area of human development, from slavery to women‟s
suffrage, from medicine to mathematics, as people champion new and different ideas and
methods, departing radically from the prevailing view. The process of radicalisation is not
inherently problematic, and nor are groups. However, under the right socio-political
conditions such as rejection of the established authority‟s legitimacy and perceived threat,
group radicalisation combined with fundamentalist ideology can be a lethal combination. The
interface between the individual and the social group, and interaction between groups, is at
the foundation of the social identity approach to intergroup conflict, and therefore critically
relevant to violent extremism.

Accordingly, the contribution of behavioural science analysis to the discussion of violent

extremism has moved from single cause explanations (such as poverty or deprivation) to
multi-level pathway models that emphasise the process as opposed to the act (Horgan, 2005,
2008, 2009b; Moghaddam, 2005), as well as the intergroup nature of conflict (McCauley &
Moskalenko, 2008). There is some evidence against the notion that political interest leads to
engagement which leads to activism which in turn leads to political violence (Moskalenko &
McCauley, 2009). There are other factors at play, meaning that some, but not all people
facing the same conditions take on a political cause and become radicalised to the point of

4
intergroup hostility and conflict. The perspective taken in this research is that one key to this
conundrum is in the intergroup nature of the conflict, and that an important underlying
mechanism of radicalisation is social identity.

At its simplest, contemporary social identity theory comprises three core processes of social
categorization, social identity and social comparison (Haslam, 2001; Oakes, 1987; Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). People incorporate a social identity into their sense of self when they feel they
belong to a group. Group membership is a psychological state of self-categorisation (Hogg,
1992). As a result of this self-categorisation there are changes in an individual‟s cognitions,
emotions and behaviours. This change is related to where they are placed at any given time
on a continuum of social behaviour from interpersonal (unique individual A interacting with
unique individual B) to intergroup (group X representative interacting with group Y
representative). In other words, when a particular social identity is salient because of the
given social context, a person thinks, feels and acts from a basis of social group membership,
rather than from the perspective of their unique personal identity (Haslam, 2001; Oakes,
1987; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

The group someone identifies with is called the „in-group‟, as distinct from the „out-group‟
which applies to relevant comparison groups. As a result of these categorizations, intergroup
comparisons result in discrimination and bias in favour of the in-group at the expense of the
out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Building on this, conditions likely to result in social
change and possible conflict include unequal status between groups, limited options for
leaving the group, feeling threatened, unstable relations, and a belief that the other group is
illegitimate in some way (Hornsey, 2008; Sprinzak, 1991, 1995). This essentially describes
the enduring conditions under which all violent extremist groups operate. Further, almost all
accounts of violent radicalisation involve the dominance of a particular (usually
fundamentalist or militant) social identity over all others so that the person loses all other
social reference points.

Returning to radicalisation, there are several pathway models, including the Pyramid model
(Leuprecht, Hataley, Moskalenko, & McCauley, 2009), depicted in Figure 1.

5
 Figure 1: Pyramid Model

This model of jihadi radicalisation involves a wide base of people who are neutral, but who
do not actively speak out against or attempt to stop extremist activities. At the next level of
the pyramid are the sympathizers who lend passive support in practical terms but are not
actively involved. The justifiers are vocal and lend enormous moral support to the cause,
whilst the „terrorist radicals‟ represent the extreme end of not just extreme opinions, but use
of violence to achieve their goals.

Leuprect et al (2009, pp. 29-30) report a UK poll of Muslims in 2005 in which 70% of
respondents equated „Global War on Terror‟ to mean „War on Islam‟ – providing a clear
starting point of „us‟ and „them‟ – highly relevant to the broader social milieu. 5% said that
they agreed that further attacks by British suicide bombers in the UK are justified. According
to the authors this is equivalent to 80,000 people, but by their calculation, there were about 80
people actually involved in violent jihadi extremism in the UK – meaning there were still
close to 80,000 who held these fairly extreme views but did not act on them themselves.

6
Another well developed pathway model of jihadi radicalisation is the six stage Staircase to
Terrorism model (Moghaddam, 2005), illustrated in Figure 2. The Staircase model also
highlights interactions between individual needs, the group dynamics and wider community
support. In this model radicalization is depicted as a staircase, of increasing extremity but
decreasing numbers as one progresses upwards. The ground floor is characterized by
perceptions of injustice and relative deprivation held by the entire population (providing
sympathy for the extremists – as per the lower levels of the Pyramid Models). It is uncertain
who, or why only some, but a percentage of the disgruntled population move to the first floor
where options to fight injustice are considered, but deemed ineffective and unjust. Those who

Figure 2: Staircase to Terrorism model

are prepared to consider physical aggression proceed to the second floor, and violence is
framed as the only option. Black and white thinking that embraces the legitimacy of violence
against the enemy is prominent on the fourth floor, clearly involving social identity
mechanisms such as self-categorisation, group identity and bias, intergroup comparison, and
out-group denigration – all which would have been developing through previous stages. The
fifth and final floor involves actual acts of terrorism and circumventing inhibitory
mechanisms that would otherwise prevent a person from acting in such a way. Unlike the
Pyramid model, the Staircase model makes less accommodation for non-linear progression,
but does offer a useful framework for understanding the role of various social psychological
factors.

7
Another model emphasises the social exclusion aspects of radicalisation (Halafoff & Wright-
Neville, 2009, p. 108). It is depicted in Figure 3 and maps the person‟s increasing separation
from the mainstream as they identify more and more with the extremist group and its cause.

Figure 3: Social Exclusion Model

Ideology plays a less central role in this model. In summary the individual feels they have
been treated unjustly by the „system‟ and in conjunction with feelings of political
helplessness and cultural alienation, religious or ideological extremism plays a catalysing
role, and “provides the already alienated individuals with a common identity (thus cohering
them as a group), and with a pseudo-ethical justification for them to vent pre-existing anger
and hostility towards the society/government that they feel has wronged them and others like
them” (Halafoff & Wright-Neville, 2009, p. 107)

This model visually highlights that radicalisation (and deradicalisation) is actually an

interactive process that involves an „other‟ – in the form of the society/community that the
person is pulling away from. This is rarely discussed in the terrorism literature, and represents
whether the person is, or is not, a member of the wider social group from the perspective of
the wider group, and is particularly relevant to deradicalisation and reintegration, where the
task is essentially becoming a member of the group again.

8
Most pathway models of terrorism, political violence and violent extremism struggle to
explain why only some people who are disgruntled or hold extreme negative views engage in
violence or use it as a method to achieve their goals. It is precisely the gap between
values/attitudes and behaviour that has been the subject of attention in psychology research
for decades (Crano & Prislin, 2006; Leuprecht, et al., 2009; Moghaddam, 2009, p. 280) with
widespread relevance to marketing and advertising, through to racism and prejudice, and also
with clear significance for both radicalisation and deradicalisation. Up to 12 distinct
pathways have been identified (Horgan, 2005; McCauley, 2001; McCauley & Moskalenko,
2008; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), and some of the models allow for non-linear
radicalisation (such as the „magma pipe‟ in the Pyramid model and the social relationships
aspect of the Social Exclusion model). Nonetheless, all models find it difficult to account for
who will escalate, and how they do so at a phenomenological level.

Social identity has something to offer in this regard – it may be the nature of the social
identification that a person has internalised that distinguishes him from his brothers who face
the same circumstances but do not take action in the way he does. And whilst the issue of
social identity is implied in all of the above models, it is central in none. Additionally, none
of the models deal with deradicalisation. Given how fundamental social identity is to
understanding radicalisation, models that explicitly recognise the role of social identity might
advance the understanding of both radicalisation and deradicalisation. There is one explicit
social identity model of radicalisation that is not often discussed in the wider terrorism
literature, though occasionally referenced. The Five-Step Social Identity Model of the
Development of Collective Hate (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008) is strongly based in social
identity theory.

The first stage is Identification which involves the “creation of a cohesive in-group through
shared social identification, which is the psychological basis of group action where group
members behave in accordance with group beliefs, values and norms, and expect others to do
the same”. This is followed by the second stage Exclusion, where specific groups of people
are excluded from the group and discriminated against. Perceiving and defining the out-group
as a physical or existential threat, “a danger to the existence of the in-group” constitutes the
third stage, Threat. The fourth stage is termed Unique Virtue and involves depicting the in-
group as “uniquely virtuous” which, when contrasted with the “alien and threatening [out-
group] actively facilitated and radicalized out-group hatred” (p. 1336). The final stage,
Celebration, represents the total destruction of the out-group (in perceived defense of the in-

9
group virtue) – “In this moral universe, those who kill have moral strength and those who
don‟t are morally suspect” (p. 1337).

The above discussion clarifies the significance of social identity to the process of
radicalisation, including when it results in violent extremism. The fact that people have a
tendency to align themselves, and in some cases merge themselves, with identity groups is
core to how they view themselves and „outsiders‟ under conditions of threat. I argue therefore
that this observation raises a compelling reason to investigate the role of social identity in
disengagement from violent extremism, as well to explore the implications for
deradicalisation and reintegration after a person has left. These issues will be discussed in the
next section.

Disengagement, deradicalisation & reintegration

Definitions and processes in deradicalisation

The phenomenon of political violence is as old as military and social history. However, an
understanding of deradicalisation is only just emerging, and relatively little consideration has
been given to social reintegration of former violent extremists (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009, p. 1).
Deradicalisation cannot be assumed to simply be the reverse of radicalisation (Horgan,
2009b; Moghaddam, 2010). This principle has also been well established in a comprehensive
study of the process of „role exit‟ from a wide range of social roles and identities (Ebaugh,
1988, p. 181).

Deradicalisation is a poorly defined but critical and emerging topic. As is the case with the
term terrorism, there are many definitions, both academic and political. Implicit in most
definitions is the distinction between cognitive and behavioural components (Horgan, 2009b;
Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Horgan uses the term „behavioural disengagement‟ to refer to
reducing or ceasing physical involvement in violent or radical activities; and the term
„psychological disengagement‟ to refer to a shift in attitude or belief. Deradicalisation is used
by some (including this paper) to mean psychological disengagement, and therefore may not
even feature in a process of behavioural disengagement. This definition highlights the
possibility that many former extremists may cease violent or anti-social behaviour, but still
hold strongly anti-social ideas and political goals. The distinction between behavioural
disengagement and deradicalisation (or psychological disengagement) is pivotal when
assessing success of the various deradicalisation programs that have proliferated in the last

10
decade. There is a pragmatic view that holds that “it is still far more important to change
violent behaviour than change radical attitudes” (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009, p. 3).

Ashour‟s definition of deradicalisation is that is it a process where a person reverses their

ideology, rejects violent methods, and becomes more accepting of a pluralist society (2009, p.
5). In social identity terms this is about how the person no longer strongly identifies with the
extreme group, has increased acceptance (or decreased rejection) of what were formerly
hated out-groups, and has shifted towards the individual (personal) end of the interpersonal
interaction continuum, with a reconsideration of who is afforded membership of the „human
identity‟ group.

Horgan cites five factors that contribute to psychological disengagement (deradicalisation) in

ethno-nationalist and Islamist extremists, including three types of disillusionment
(discordance between their ideal and the reality of the group experience, internal disputes
over tactical decisions and political infighting); burn-out; and changing personal priorities (p.
31). Interviews with former right wing extremists elucidates similar universal factors
associated with disengaging and deradicalisation (Bjorgo, 2009, p. 38). These can be grouped
as push factors or pull factors. Push factors include punishments and negative reactions to
their actions; doubting the ideology and politics of the group; discomfort with the level of
violence, disillusionment with lack of political focus and/or lack of loyalty among members;
loss of status in the group; and burn-out. Pull factors include age, fatigue and maturity (most
over 30 years of age leave unless they can redefine their role), recognising that right wing and
national extremists are screened out of some jobs and not well accepted in the wider
community, and leaving to establish a personal relationship and/or family (Bjorgo, 2009, pp.
39-40). Likewise, Demant, Slootman, Buijs & Tillie (2008) identified three primary factors
(failing ideology, failing movement and adverse living conditions) that play a role in de-
radicalisation for right wing extremists.

Of the radicalisation models discussed earlier, none address disengagement or

deradicalisation. With the Pyramid model (Leuprecht, et al., 2009), it is assumed that
somehow those who rise to the narrow top, reverse through the stages, but whilst the
progression upwards is intuitive, the progression back is not. Similarly, whilst it is not
explicitly ruled out, the Staircase to Terrorism model (Moghaddam, 2005) does not really
allow a reversal of the escalating steps. Unlike some other models, Moghaddam does offer
broad suggestions at each level to reduce the likelihood of progression to the next level

11
(Moghaddam, 2009, pp. 277-292). The importance of identity for deradicalisation is
emphasised in his model, with an assertion that identity needs are a critical and universal
factor required to develop “psychological citizens” (p. 276 & 287).

Any useful model of disengagement or deradicalisation will need to attempt an explanation of

„why‟, as well as a description of „how‟, a person leaves violent extremism behind. Based on
the role of social identity in radicalisation, it is a reasonable proposition that social identity
plays a role in the process of deradicalisation. There is little primary research or data to
inform our understanding of the internal psychosocial processes that occur when a person
uncouples from a strong and central social identity that involves radical ideology and extreme
methods. In social identity terms, the goals of deradicalisation are to reduce (or remove) the
dominance of the extremist social identity and consider alternate social identity groups, based
around ideological distinctions. This in turn requires a shift towards the interpersonal end of
the communication spectrum (away from the intergroup end of the spectrum). The next
section turns to the few rehabilitation programs for political extremists of different types to
inform this discussion.

Deradicalisation programs for Islamist extremists

A recurrent theme in the commentary about violent Islamist rehabilitation programs the lack
of transparency around outcomes, as well as a lack of reliable measures and definitions
(Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 273). Most of the programs aim to achieve deradicalisation,
but according to experts, could only be said to achieve disengagement at best (Horgan,
2009c; Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 280). The two most comprehensive Islamist extremists
rehabilitation programs are in Saudi Arabia and Singapore (Boucek, 2008; Horgan &
Braddock, 2010). I argue that from a social identity perspective the programs with apparent
success are those that provide opportunities for detainees to interact with out-group members
in a way that dislocates expectations, reduces threat, equalizes status and increases options
for social mobility – the necessary conditions for harmonious intergroup relations.

Exit programs for right wing extremists

There are right wing extremist (RWE) disengagement programs run in Germany, France, and
the Netherlands. The Swedish „Exit‟ de-radicalisation program for right wing extremists is
typical of a number of such programs across Europe and uses a five phase model, with a

12
tailored program for each individual (Bjorgo, 2009; Froukje Demant, Wagenaar, &
Donselaar, 2009).

The first stage is „Motivation‟ in which the person is still in the group but having doubts.
They have made contact with an external support person who has gone through the exit
process themselves. This represents a gap in the dominance of the extremist group social
identity. The second stage is „Disengagement‟, and is when the person decides to leave the
group, but needs support to take action. It is chaotic, and from a social identity perspective,
they are extremely vulnerable as they have expelled themselves from the primary (often only)
group but yet to form new associations with other individuals or groups. The program offers
support in the form of talking, financial or practical help moving away. In the „Settlement‟
phase the break is complete and the person has somewhere to live, as well as financial
stability. They are trying to establish a normal life, but often experience social isolation and
loneliness. Although the person is generally free from violence, crime and hated during the
„Reflection‟ stage, it is a time when many experience emotional distress (anxiety, depression,
sleep disturbance and substance abuse) as they reflect on their previous beliefs and behaviour.
Finally, the „Stabilisation‟ stage is characterized by normal life (work, study, family) but
often with the fear that their past will ruin the future. At this stage they are no longer formally
in the „Exit‟ program, but informal contact is maintained.

Deradicalisation as offender rehabilitation & reintegration

If violent extremism is viewed as a crime, and disengagement occurs as a result of arrest, then
deradicalisation and social reintegration falls squarely the realm offender rehabilitation and
post-release re-entry to the mainstream community. There has been decades of research on
offender rehabilitation with a strong behavioural focus to reduce the offending cycle – not on
changing attitudes or beliefs. This focus can be ascribed to a range of reasons, from practical
ones (for example the difficulty in changing attitudes of someone who does not want to
change their attitudes) to rights based ones like freedom of belief and speech. The dominant
model is called Risk-Needs-Responsivity (RNR). RNR focuses on behaviour modification
and management of acute and dynamic risk factors (Ward & Maruna, 2007, p. 75). Given the
conservative success of the RNR model, there has been a recent movement towards more
humanistic and strengths based approaches to offender rehabilitation. The leading example of
this movement is the Good Lives Model (GLM), in which an offender‟s „narrative identity‟ is

13
seen as central to their offender lifestyle and therefore central to their potential non-offending
lifestyle (Ward & Maruna, 2007, p. 163).

The significance of social connections and networks have been long recognised by
criminologists and sociologists as extremely important in supporting a non-offender „citizen‟
lifestyle (Burchfield & Mingus, 2008, p. 356). A social identity perspective holds that there is
more to this than merely the practical support provided by a supportive social network; that it
is related to social identity transitions and the sense of social inclusion people feel if they can
identify with some aspects of the wider community of which they are now a part. If not, they
are far more likely to drift back to a group they feel they belong to, even if this means
criminal or extremist association.

Deradicalisation as identity change and „role exit‟

In a study of 185 personal narratives of significant identity change, Ebaugh (1988) identified
four central themes common across a wide range of normal and extreme role changes (for
example, leaving criminal lives, marriages, jobs, groups, gangs, prostitution, religion,
ideologies, etc). These themes are very similar to ex-IRA and Islamist extremists interviewed
by John Horgan (Horgan, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Horgan & Braddock, 2010), with a
dominant emphasis on identity. Ebaugh‟s themes include a sense of dissatisfaction with the
person‟s current identity, seeking or being open to an alternative identity/role, the presence of
certain factors or incident to trigger a decision or action to leave or change, and the
opportunity to create a new identity for themselves. These findings mirror the well
documented experiences of former cult members (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009; Lalich & Tobias,
1994), and former right wing extremists (Bjorgo, 2009, 1995, 2005; Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009),
and is beginning to be seen in some Islamist deradicalisation programs.

Cults are a particular example of closed, controlling groups with extreme ideologies, though
are not necessarily political or violent (Mayer, 2001). The psychological and social processes
used in recruitment and control of members by violent political and terrorist groups are
similar to those observed in cults (Bjorgo, 2009; Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009; Lalich, 1988;
Lalich & Tobias, 1994; Singer & Lalich, 1994). Comparable stages to those cited by Bjorgo
and Horgan (2009) are also apparent for people leaving cults – disillusionment, break in
isolation from the outside world, personal relationships that are forbidden with other
members or non-members, lack of success in achieving social or political change, and
disillusionment over behaviour of leaders (Wright, 1987, p. 9, in Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009).

14
Hassan (1988, pp. 148-167) lists seven important factors for helping a cult member break free
of cult‟s ideology, expectations and social control. They include building rapport and trust,
using goal oriented communication, developing models of identity, accessing the pre-cult
identity, prompting the cult member to look at reality from many different perspectives,
circumventing cult defenses by giving information indirectly, visualising a happy future to
undo phobia indoctrination, and offering the cult member concrete definitions of mind
control and characteristics of a destructive cult. The first three of these practices involve
shifting aspects of social identity.

Gang literature is relevant because of the similar recruitment and departure experiences
between gangs and violent extremist groups. Bjorgo and Horgan (2009, pp. 7-8) found that
seeking identity is a primary reason for joining gangs, whilst age/maturity is the primary
reason for leaving. It is harder to leave the longer a person has been in a gang, and the more
stigmatized the group is. As with extremist groups, cults and other groups that are central to a
person‟s identity, it is a lot harder to leave than it is to join. Corresponding with Ebaugh‟s
(1988) findings for people exiting a wide range of core identity roles, a young person will
often not leave a gang until an alternative is found. Finally, the shorter the time in the gang,
the easier it is to adjust to a non-delinquent lifestyle.

The successful Islamist deradicalisation programs, the Exit program for right wing
extremists, the Good Lives Model of offender rehabilitation, Ebaugh‟s stages of role exit and
the literature around leaving cults all implicitly or explicitly invoke mechanisms of social
identity. Yet again these findings underscore the relevance of social identity in understanding
disengagement and deradicalisation.

Theoretical framework for researching disengagement & deradicalisation

The relatively limited direct research into radicalisation and violent extremism has tended to
focus on the individual, the group or the socio-political level of analysis. Rarely has attention
been directed at the intersection between the individual and the group – which is the domain
of social identity. It follows that the even smaller amount of research into disengagement and
deradicalisation from violent extremism (and subsequent social integration) would benefit
from a social identity perspective. The limited amount of direct research into deradicalisation
to date has been based on interviews, and generally phenomenological or grounded theory
work. On the other hand, research driven by social identity theory typically takes the form of
experimental laboratory work, or at least quasi-experimental field work where there are

15
manipulations of social identity (in terms of salience, status and strength) to observe the
effect on dependent variables. It is simply not feasible to conduct quasi-experimental field
research into deradicalization, and nor is the theoretical conceptualization sufficiently
developed. Reliable measures of deradicalisation do not even exist (Horgan & Braddock,
2010, p. 281). What is needed is a sound understanding of the basic phenomenon of
deradicalisation and reintegration. In-depth interviews have been conducted by the
researchers mentioned above to this end. One possible way forward in this field is to conduct
similar in-depth interviews with ex-members of violent extreme groups, thus adding to this
body of data, but to use a theoretical framework of social identity theory to provide
conceptual structure.

The basic argument of this paper is that social identity mechanisms implicated in
radicalisation may also constitute a significant and essential component of disengagement,
deradicalisation and reintegration – both as a cause and as a consequence. Prevention policies
and disengagement interventions can be successful only if we understand how and why
people leave violent and extreme groups. Future research ought to explore the role of social
identity in disengagement from violent extremism, deradicalisation and reintegration.

References

Abbey, E. (2006). The Monkey Wrench Gang: Harper Perennial Modern Classics.

Ashmore, R. D., Jussim, L., & Wilder, D. (Eds.). (2001). Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and
Conflict Reduction. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ashour, O. (2009). The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements.

Oxon: Routledge.

Bandura, A. (1977). Self-Efficacy: Towards a Unifying Theory of Behavioural Change. Psychological

Review, 84(2), 24.

Bankston, W., B., Forsyth, C. J., & Floyd, H. H. (1981). Toward a General Model of the Process of
Radical Conversion: An Interactionist Perspective on the Transformation of Self-Identity. Qualitative
Sociology, 4(4), 18.

Bjorgo, T. (2009). Processes of disengagement from violent groups of extreme right. In T. Bjorgo &
J. Horgan (Eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement New York,
NY: Routledge.

Bjorgo, T. (Ed.). (1995). Terror from the Extreme Right. Oregon: Frank Cass.

16
Bjorgo, T. (Ed.). (2005). Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, realities, and ways forward. New York:
Routledge.

Bjorgo, T., & Horgan, J. (2009). Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement
Political Violence.

Boucek, C. (2008). Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and
Aftercare (No. 97): Carnegie Institute.

Brewer, M. (2001). The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology.
Political Psychology, 22(1), 10.

Brown, R. (2000). Social Identity Theory: past achievements, current problems and future challenges.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 13.

Burchfield, K., B., & Mingus, W. (2008). Not in my Neighbourhood: Assessing Registered Sex
Offenders‟ Experiences With Local Social Capital and Social Control Criminal Justice & Behaviour,
35(3), 18.

Crano, W. D., & Prislin, R. (2006). Attitudes and Persuasion. Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 29.

Crenshaw, M. (Ed.). (2005). Terrorism in Context: Pennsylvania State University Press.

dellaPorta, D., & Diani, M. (2006). Social Movements: An Introduction (2nd ed.). Malden: Blackwell.

Demant, F., Slootman, M., Buijs, F., & Tillie, J. (2008). Deradicalisation of right-wing radicals and
Islamic radicals. In J. v. Donselaar & P. R. Rodrigues (Eds.), Monitor racisme & extremisme : achtste
rapportage. Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting.

Demant, F., Wagenaar, W., & Donselaar, J. v. (2009). Deradicalisation in practice. Amsterdam:
Anne Frank House; Leiden University.

Ebaugh, H. R. F. (1988). Becoming an ex: The Process of Role Exit. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

FBI. (2008). Putting Intell to Work Against ELF and ALF Terrorists. Headline Archives, (June).
Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june08/ecoterror_063008.html

Foreman, D. (1991). Confesions of an eco-warrior. NY: Crown Publishers, Inc.

Gray, J. (2003). Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern. London: Faber and Faber Ltd.

Greene, J., & Pranis, K. (2007). Gang Wars: The Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for
Effective Public Safety Strategies.

Halafoff, A., & Wright-Neville, D. (2009). A Missing Peace? The Role of Religious Actors in
Countering Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(11), 11.

Hari, J. (2009, Monday, 16 November). Renouncing Islamism: To the brink and back again. The
Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-
hari/renouncing-islamism-to-the-brink-and-back-again-1821215.html

Hartwright, C. (2002). The Red Roots of Terrorism: Symptoms of a critical illness of civilization, and
ways to remedy it. Texas: Cui Bono Books.

17
Haslam, S. A. (2001). Psychology in Organisations: The Social Identity Approach. London: SAGE
Publications.

Hassan, S. (1988). Combatting Cult Mind Control. Vermont: Park Street Press.

Herriot, P. (2007). Religious Fundamentalism and Social Identity. New York: Routledge.

Hoffer, E. (1951). The True Believer. NY: Harper Row.

Hogg, M. A. (1992). The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to Social
Identity. Hertforshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Horgan, J. (2005). The psychology of terrorism. NY: Routledge.

Horgan, J. (2008). Deradicalization or Disengagement: A Process in Need of Clarity and a

Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation. Perspectives on Terrorism, 2(4), 5. Retrieved from
http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/articles/issues/PTv2i4.pdf

Horgan, J. (2009a). Disengaging from Terrorism. In D. Canter (Ed.), The Faces of Terrorism:
Multidisciplinary Perspectives. West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell.

Horgan, J. (2009b). Individual Disengagement: A psychological analysis In T. Bjorgo & J. Horgan

(Eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement (pp. 13). New York, NY:
Routledge.

Horgan, J. (2009c). Walking away from terrorism: accounts of disengagement from radical and
extremist movements. NY: Routledge.

Horgan, J., & Braddock, K. (2010). Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the
Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs. Terrorism and Political Violence, 22, 24.

Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory: A Historical Review.
Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(1), 18.

Horowitz, D. L. (1998). Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict. Paper presented at the World Bank
Conference on Development Economics. Retrieved from
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON1998/Resources/horowitz.pdf

Jensen, D. (2006a). Endgame: Resistance (Vol. II). New york: Seven Stories Press.

Jensen, D. (2006b). Endgame: The Problem of Civilisation (Vol. I). New York: Seven Stories Press.

Jordán, J., & Mañas, F. M. (2007). External Signs of Radicalization and Jihadist Militancy. Jihad
Monitor Occasional Paper. Retrieved from
http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/242/currentpage/7/Default.aspx

Korostelina, K. (2007). Social identity and conflict: structures, dynamics and implications. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lalich, J. (1988). Bounded Choice: True Believers and Charismatic Cults. Berkley: University of
California Press.

Lalich, J., & Tobias, M. (1994). Taking Back Your Life: Recovering from Cults and Abusive
Relationships. Berkley: Bay Tree Publishing

18
Lentini, P. (2008). The Transference of Neojihadism: Towards a Process Theory of Transnational
Radicalisation. Paper presented at the Radicalisation Crossing Borders: New Directions in Islamist
and Jiuhadist Political, Intellectual and Theological Thought and Practice, Melbourne.

Leuprecht, C., Hataley, T., Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2009). Winning the Battle but Losing
the War? Narrative and Counter-Narratives Strategy. Perspectives on Terrorism, 3(2). Retrieved from
http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/articles/issues/PTv3i2.pdf

Long, D. (2004). Ecoterrorism. New York: Facts on File, Inc.

Maslow, A. H. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological Review, 50, 26.

Mayer, J.-F. (2001). Cults, Violence and Religious Terrorism: An International Perspective. Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 24(5), 15.

McCauley, C. (2001). The Psychology of Terrorism. SSRC Essay Forum, 2001(November),

McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward
Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 18.

Moghaddam, F., M. (2005). The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration. American

Psychologist, 60(2), 8.

Moghaddam, F., M. (2006). From the Terrorists' Point of View: What They Experience and Why They
Come to Destroy. Westport: Praeger Security International.

Moghaddam, F., M. (2009). De-radicalization and the Staircase from Terrorism The Faces of
Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell.

Moghaddam, F., M. (2010). Deradicalization and the Staircase From Terrorism. In D. Canter (Ed.),
The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. London: Wiley-Blackwell.

Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. (2009). Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between
Activism and Radicalism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 21(2), 21.

Oakes, P., J. (1987). The salience of social categories In J. C. Turner, M. A. Hogg, P. J. Oakes, S. D.
Reicher & M. S. Wetherell (Eds.), Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory (pp.
117-141). Oxford/New York: Basil Blackwell.

Pickering, L., J. (2007). The Earth Liberation Front: 1997-2002. Portland: Arissa Media Group.

Post, J. M., Sprinzak, E., & Denny, L. M. (2003). The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with
35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(1), 13.

Reicher, S., Haslam, S. A., & Rath, R. (2008). Making a Virtue of Evil: A Five-Step Social Identity
Model of the Development of Collective Hate. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(3), 31.

Rosebraugh, C. (2004). Burning Rage of a Dying Planet: Speaking for the Earth Liberation Front.
New York: Lantern Books.

Rothbart, D., & Korostelina, K. V. (Eds.). (2006). Identity, Morality, and Threat: Studies in violent
conflict. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Ruthven, M. (2007). Fundamentalism: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University
Press.

19
Singer, M., & Lalich, J. (1994). Cults in Our Midst: The Hidden in Our Everyday Lives. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Sprinzak, E. (1991). The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political

Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 3(1), 16.

Sprinzak, E. (1995). Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split

Delegitimization. Terrorism and Political Violence, 7(1), 26.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1986). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In S. W. W. G. Austin
(Ed.), Psychology of intergroup relations (2nd ed.). Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.

Taylor, D., M., & Moghaddam, F., M. (1987). Theories of Intergroup Relations: International Social
Psychological Perspectives (2nd ed.). New York: Praeger Publishers.

Thornberry, T. P., Huizinga, D., & Loeber, R. (2004). The Causes and Correlates Studies: Findsings
and Policy Implications. Juvenile Justice, 9(1).

Turner, J., C. (1991). Social Influence. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Volkan, V. (1998). Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. Colardo: Westview Press.

Ward, T., & Maruna, S. (2007). Rehabilitation. Oxon: Routledge.

Watson, P. (2007). The Politics of Extinction: Remain a Parasite or Become an Earth Warrior.
Retrieved 8 April 2010, 2010, from
http://blogs.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=blog.view&friendId=101198547&blogId=32549773
4

Wright, S. A. (1987). Leaving Cults: The Dynamics of Defection. Washington, DC: Society for the
Scientific Study of Religion.

20