Torts Samesame Midterms

G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000.
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for herself and on behalf of the minors Maria
Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy),
respondents.
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; In negligence cases, the same act or omission can
create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and
civil liability quasi delicto but the offended party can not recover damages under both types
of liability.—In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action
to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy
because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the
accused. This is the rule against double recovery. In other words, “the same act or omission
can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto,
and civil liability quasi delicto” either of which “may be enforced against the culprit, subject
to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover
damages under both types of liability.”
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*EN BANC.
601
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000 601
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs. People
Same; Same; Same; Vicarious liability of the employee is founded in Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code and on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code;
Under Article 2176 the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate
is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of the employee; Enforcement of the judgment against the employer does not require the
employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the
employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.—Private
respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the
accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this
vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law. The
first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would
allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party against the
employer for an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a
preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent
conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the
employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent
since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being
statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, predicated on Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable
for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches
when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found
to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged.
Same; Same; Same; Reservation of the right to file the separate civil action waives other
available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver.—
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the
right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on
the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
602
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
02
Same; Same; Same; Award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of
a separate civil action against the employer.—With regard to the second issue, the award of
damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the
employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, “civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for
the crime committed.” The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is
whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included
therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer
of the accused truckdriver.
Criminal Law; Information; Penalty; No offense of Double Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law under the Revised Penal Code; In
reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willful crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series
of crimes.—Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused “guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136).” There is no such nomenclature of an offense under
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the accused “to suffer
two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as
maximum.” This is erroneous because in reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for
criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime or crimes committed,
but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; Notwithstanding the independent nature of civil

actions falling under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the right to institute the
action must still have to be reserved.—In the recently decided case of San Ildefonso Lines,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Supreme Court has ruled that, notwithstanding the
independent nature of civil actions falling
603
VOL. 329, APRIL 3, 2000 603
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the right to institute the action
must still have to be reserved. In the stern words of the Court: The “past pronouncements
that view the reservation requirement as an unauthorized amendment to substantive law,
i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling.”
Same; Same; Same; The requirement of reservation is not incompatible with the distinct
and separate character of independent civil actions.—In Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court has said that the requirement of reservation is not incompatible with the distinct and
separate character of independent civil actions. Indeed, there is no incongruence between
allowing the trial of civil actions to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and
mandating that, before so proceeding, a reservation to do so should first be made.
Same; Same; Same; Reservation should be made at the institution of the criminal
case.—The civil action is deemed instituted together with the criminal case except when the
civil action is reserved. The reservation should be made at the institution of the criminal
case. In independent civil actions, not being dependent op the criminal case, such
reservation would be required not for preserving the cause of action but in order to allow
the civil action to proceed separately from the criminal case in interest of good order and
procedure. Indeed, independent civil actions already filed and pending may still be sought
to be consolidated in the criminal case before final judgment is rendered in the latter case.
When no criminal proceedings are instituted, a separate civil action may be brought to
demand the civil liability, and a preponderance of evidence is sufficient to warrant a
favorable judgment therefor. The same rule applies if the information were to be dismissed
upon motion of the fiscal.
MENDOZA, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; The reservation of the right to file a separate civil
action ex delicto against the driver was a waiver of the offended parties’ right to institute a
civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner.—Following Rule 111, §1, the
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action ex delioto against the driver was a
waiver of the offended parties’ right to institute a civil action based on quasi delict against
petitioner. The filing of Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 against petitioner was, therefore, without
basis, and its
604
04
dismissal by the trial court in its decision was in order. On the other hand, as the
offended parties had withdrawn their reservation of the right to file a separate civil action
against the driver so that they can pursue their action in the criminal case, the trial court
correctly determined petitioner’s subsidiary civil liability for its driver’s negligence in the
criminal case.
Same; Same; Same; The award of damages by the trial court simply constitutes an error of
judgment.—Even assuming that the right of the offended parties to recover damages ex
delicto had been waived, the award of such damages by the trial court simply constitutes an
error of judgment. Hence, the award of damages ex delicto to the offended parties is not void
and is now final. The Court has not only set aside a final disposition by declaring it void; it
has likewise ordered the reopening of a case already dismissed with finality on the
simplistic reasoning that rules of procedure may be relaxed “in order to promote their
objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceedings.” There is no reason for doing so in this case since, as already
stated, all the parties herein had been duly heard before the trial court rendered its
decision.
G.R. No. 143360.September 5, 2002. *
EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.LUCITA SUYOM,

MARISSA ENANO, MYRNA TAMAYO and FELIX OLEDAN, respondents.
Civil Law; Negligence; Quasi-delict; Requisites to sustain a claim for quasi delict.—To
sustain a claim based on quasi delict, the following requisites must be proven: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; Offended party cannot “recover damages twice for the same act or
omission” or under both causes.—These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto)
may be availed of, subject to the ca-
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*THIRD DIVISION.
446
46
Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom
veat that the offended party cannot “recover damages twice for the same act or
omission” or under both causes. Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and independent
of each other, the failure to recover in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in the
other.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Motor Vehicle Law; Petitioner held liable for the deaths
and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time
of the accident on July 17, 1994; Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered
owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; In
contemplation of law, the owner I operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being considered as merely its agent.—We hold petitioner liable for
the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the
tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994. The Court has consistently ruled that,
regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator
insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and
primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer
being considered as merely its agent. The same principle applies even if the registered
owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service.
G.R. No. 160110. June 18, 2014.*
MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LEONORA
J. GOMEZ and GABRIEL V. GOMEZ, respondents.
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Proximate cause is
defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.—Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Same; Same; According to Manresa, liability for personal acts and omissions is founded
on that indisputable principle of justice recognized by all legislations that when a person by
his act or omission causes damage or prejudice to another, a juridical relation is created by
virtue of which the injured person acquires a right to be indemnified and the person causing
the damage is charged with the corresponding duty of repairing the damage.—Having
settled the fact of Mendoza’s negligence, then, the next question that confronts us is who
may be held liable. According to Manresa, liability for personal acts and omissions is
founded on that indisputable principle of justice recognized by all legislations that when a
person by his act or omission causes damage or prejudice to another, a juridical relation
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
506
06
Mendoza vs. Gomez
is created by virtue of which the injured person acquires a right to be indemnified and
the person causing the damage is charged with the corresponding duty of repairing the
damage. The reason for this is found in the obvious truth that man should subordinate his
acts to the precepts of prudence and if he fails to observe them and causes damage to
another, he must repair the damage. His negligence having caused the damage, Mendoza is
certainly liable to repair said damage.
Same; Same; Vicarious Liability; In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed
negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the
action under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection
or supervision, or both, of his employee.—Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under
the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a person who
has not committed the act or omission which caused damage or injury to another may
nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or subsidiarily under certain
circumstances. In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed negligence is embodied in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action under said article is
the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of
his employee.
Same; Same; Same; In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, 674 SCRA 117 (2012), the
Supreme Court (SC) held that the registered owner is deemed the employer of the negligent
driver, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the
Civil Code.—In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, 674 SCRA 117 (2012), we held that
the registered owner is deemed the employer of the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously
liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code. Citing Equitable
Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, 388 SCRA 445 (2002), the Court ruled that insofar as third
persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the
negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.
Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner
and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law
holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the
operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.507
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 50
7
Mendoza vs. Gomez
Same; Same; Same; With the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the
defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code — that the employee acts beyond the
scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage — are no longer available to the registered owner of the motor vehicle,
because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.—
Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the
supervision over him after the selection (culpa vigilando), or both. The presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may be rebutted. Accordingly, the general
rule is that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and
supervision of his employee he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved of liability. However, with the
enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the defenses available under Article 2180
of the Civil Code — that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage — are no longer
available to the registered owner of the motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle
registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.
Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment,
the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer
of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage caused
by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim.—As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim
vicariously liable with Mendoza. This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any
recourse against Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of unjust
enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the
actual employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for
the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he
has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
508
08
Mendoza vs. Gomez
Same; Same; Damages; Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and
quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.—Article 2202 of the Civil Code
provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is
not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant. Article 2199 of the same Code, however, sets the limitation that,
except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. As such, to warrant an
award of actual or compensatory damages, the claimant must prove that the damage
sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and, moreover, the
claimant must adequately prove the amount of such damage.
Same; Same; Same; Moral Damages; Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but
are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar harm unjustly caused to a person.—Moral damages are awarded to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. In prayers
for moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral
damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To
be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered
damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles
2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate
result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual basis of
the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; In motor vehicle accident cases, exemplary
damages may be awarded where the defendant’s misconduct is so flagrant as to transcend
simple negligence
509
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 50
9
Mendoza vs. Gomez
and be tantamount to positive or affirmative misconduct rather than passive or negative
misconduct.—In motor vehicle accident cases, exemplary damages may be awarded where
the defendant’s misconduct is so flagrant as to transcend simple negligence and be
tantamount to positive or affirmative misconduct rather than passive or negative
misconduct. In characterizing the requisite positive misconduct which will support a claim
for punitive damages, the courts have used such descriptive terms as willful, wanton,
grossly negligent, reckless, or malicious, either alone or in combination. Gross negligence is
the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons
or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort
to avoid them.
Same; Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; The general rule remains that attorney’s fees are
not recoverable in the absence of a stipulation thereto, the reason being that it is not sound
policy to set a premium on the right to litigate.—From the very opening sentence of Article
2208 of the Civil Code, it is clearly intended to retain the award of attorney’s fees as the
exception in our law, as the general rule remains that attorney’s fees are not recoverable in
the absence of a stipulation thereto, the reason being that it is not sound policy to set a
premium on the right to litigate. As such, in Spouses Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA
375 (1990), we held that, the award of attorney’s fees being an exception rather than the
general rule, it is necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law that would bring
the case within the exception and justify the grant of such award. Thus, the reason for the
award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s decision; otherwise, if it is
stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on
appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Cost of Suit; The Rules of Court provide that, generally, costs shall
be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course.—The Rules of Court provide that,
generally, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course, thus: Section
1. Costs ordinarily follow results of suit.—Unless otherwise provided in these rules, costs
shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course, but the court shall have
power, for special reasons, to adjudge that either party shall pay the costs of an action, or
that the same be divided, as may be equitable. No costs shall be
510
10
Mendoza vs. Gomez
allowed against the Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law.
Same; Same; Same; Interest Rates; Moratory Interests; Interest by way of damages has been
defined as interest allowed in actions for breach of contract or tort for the unlawful detention
of money already due. This type of interest is frequently called “moratory interest.”—Interest
by way of damages has been defined as interest allowed in actions for breach of contract or
tort for the unlawful detention of money already due. This type of interest is frequently
called “moratory interest.” Interest as a part of damage, is allowed, not by application of
arbitrary rules, but as a result of the justice of the individual case and as compensation to
the injured party. The legal provision on interests in quasi-delicts is Article 2211 of the
Civil Code which provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as part of the damage,
may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court. Generally, interest is
allowed as a matter of right for failure to pay liquidated claims when due. For unliquidated
claims, however, Article 2213 of the Civil Code provides that interest cannot be recovered
upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. In the case at bar, although the award of exemplary damages is
unliquidated in the sense that petitioners cannot know for sure, before judgment, the exact
amount that they are required to pay to respondents, the award of actual or compensatory
damages, however, such as the truck repairs and medical expenses, is arguably liquidated
in that they can be measured against a reasonably certain standard. Moreover, justice
would seem to require that the delay in paying for past losses which can be made
reasonably certain should be compensated through an award of interest
G.R. No. 189998. August 29, 2012.*
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., petitioner, vs. ELLEN
JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and RIGOBERTO
GILLERA, respondents.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The procedural rules should definitely be liberally
construed if strict adherence to their letter will result in absurdity and in manifest injustice,
or where the merits of a party’s cause are apparent and outweigh considerations of
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
445
VOL. 679, AUGUST 29, 2012 44
5
Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper
non-compliance with certain formal requirements.—The principle of substantial
compliance recognizes that exigencies and situations do occasionally demand some
flexibility in the rigid application of the rules of procedure and the laws. That rules of
procedure may be mandatory in form and application does not forbid a showing of
substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances, because substantial compliance
does not equate to a disregard of basic rules. For sure, substantial compliance and strict
adherence are not always incompatible and do not always clash in discord. The power of the
Court to suspend its own rules or to except any particular case from the operation of the
rules whenever the purposes of justice require the suspension cannot be challenged. In the
interest of substantial justice, even procedural rules of the most mandatory character in
terms of compliance are frequently relaxed. Similarly, the procedural rules should
definitely be liberally construed if strict adherence to their letter will result in absurdity
and in manifest injustice, or where the merits of a party’s cause are apparent and outweigh
considerations of non-compliance with certain formal requirements. It is more in accord
with justice that a party-litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
his claim or defense than for him to lose his life, liberty, honor or property on mere
technicalities. Truly, the rules of procedure are intended to promote substantial justice, not
to defeat it, and should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.
Civil Law; Filiation; Evidence; The Court sustained the Cabais petitioners’ stance that
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had apparently erred in relying on the baptismal certificate
to establish filiation, stressing the baptismal certificate’s limited evidentiary value as proof
of filiation inferior to that of a birth certificate; and declaring that the baptismal certificate
did not attest to the veracity of the statements regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized.—
The Court sustained the Cabais petitioners’ stance that the RTC had apparently erred in
relying on the baptismal certificate to establish filiation, stressing the baptismal
certificate’s limited evidentiary value as proof of filiation inferior to that of a birth
certificate; and declaring that the baptismal certificate did not attest to the veracity of the
statements regarding the kinsfolk of the one baptized. Nevertheless, the Court ultimately
ruled that it was respondents’ failure to present the birth certificate, more than anything
else, that lost them their case, stating that: “The unjustified failure to present the birth cer-
446
46
Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. Harper
tificate instead of the baptismal certificate now under consideration or to otherwise
prove filiation by any other means recognized by law weigh heavily against respondents.”
Same; Hotelkeepers; The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the
public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to
the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business.―The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to the
persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business. Applying by analogy Article 2000, Article 2001 and Article 2002 of the Civil Code
(all of which concerned the hotelkeepers’ degree of care and responsibility as to the personal
effects of their guests), we hold that there is much greater reason to apply the same if not
greater degree of care and responsibility when the lives and personal safety of their guests
are involved. Otherwise, the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangers have
unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors of the guests,
without being held liable should anything untoward befall the unwary guests. That would
be absurd, something that no good law would ever envision.
G.R. No. 143008. June 10, 2002. *
SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING AGENCY CORPORATION,

petitioner, vs. CATALINO BORJA and INTERNATIONAL TOWAGE AND
TRANSPORT CORPORATION, respondents.
Common Carriers; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Negligence is
conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that other person
suffers injury.— Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances
justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury. Petitioner’s vessel was carrying
chemical cargo—alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing that
their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to
take all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was, therefore,
negligent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Three Elements of Quasi-Delicts.—The three elements
of quasi delict are: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages inflicted on the plaintiff. All these elements were established in
this case. Knowing fully well that it was carrying dangerous chemicals, petitioner was
negligent in not taking all the necessary precautions in transporting the cargo.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The owner or the person in possession and control of a vessel
and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons and
property by reason of negligent management or navigation.—The owner or the person in
possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate
damage caused to persons and property by reason of negligent management or navigation.
Damages; Life Expectancy; Factors in determining reasonableness of damages awarded
under Article 1764 in conjunction with Article 2206 of the Civil Code.—Both parties have a
point. In determining the reasonableness of the damages awarded under Article 1764 in
conjunction with
_______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
342
42
Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corporation vs.
Borja
Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the factors to be considered are: (a) life expectancy
(considering the health of the victim and the mortality table which is deemed conclusive)
and loss of earning capacity; (b) pecuniary loss, loss of support and service; and (c) moral
and mental sufferings. The loss of earning capacity is based mainly on the number of years
remaining in the person’s expected life span. In turn, this number is the basis of the
damages that shall be computed and the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs shall
be fixed. The formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is as follows: Net
earning capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross
annual income)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased).
Same; Same; Loss of Income; It is net income (or gross income less living expenses
which is the one used in the computation of the award for loss of income; When there is no
showing that the living expenses constituted a smaller percentage of the gross income, the
Court fixes the living expenses at half of the gross income—to hold that one would have used
only a small part of the income, with the larger part going to the support of one’s children,
would be conjectural and unreasonable.—Petitioner is correct in arguing that it is net
income (or gross income less living expenses) which is to be used in the computation of the
award for loss of income. Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals explained that “the amount
recoverable is not the loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the
earnings which the beneficiary would have received.” Hence, in fixing the amount of the
said damages, the necessary expenses of the deceased should be deducted from his
earnings. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered; that
is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income, less living and other incidental expenses. When there is no showing that the living
expenses constituted a smaller percentage of the gross income, we fix the living expenses at
half of the gross income. To hold that one would have used only a small part of the income,
with the larger part going to the support of one’s children, would be conjectural and
unreasonable.
Same; Same; Same; Retirement; Life expectancy should not be based on the retirement
age of government employees, which is pegged at 65; In calculating the life expectancy of an
individual for the purpose of determining loss of earning capacity under Article 2206(1) of
the Civil Code, it is assumed that the deceased would have earned income even after
retirement from a particular job.—Counsel for Respondent Borja is also correct in saying
that life expectancy should not be based on the retirement age of government employees,
which is pegged at 65. In Negros Navigation Co, Inc. v. CA, the Court resolved that in
calculating the life expectancy of an individual for the purpose of determining loss of
earning capacity under
343
VOL. 383, JUNE 10, 2002 343
Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corporation vs.
Borja
Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, it is assumed that the deceased would have earned
income even after retirement from a particular job. Respondent Borja should not be
situated differently just because he was a government employee. Private employees, given
the retirement packages provided by their companies, usually retire earlier than
government employees; yet, the life expectancy of the former is not pegged at 65 years.
Same; Same; Same; A person’s demise earlier than the estimated life span is of no
moment for purposes of determining loss of earning capacity, life expectancy remains at
80.—Petitioner avers that Respondent Borja died nine years after the incident and, hence,
his life expectancy of 80 years should yield to the reality that he was only 59 when he
actually died. We disagree. The Court uses the American Experience/Expectancy Table of
Mortality or the Actuarial or Combined Experience Table of Mortality, which consistently
pegs the life span of the average Filipino at 80 years, from which it extrapolates the
estimated income to be earned by the deceased had he or she not been killed. Respondent
Borja’s demise earlier than the estimated life span is of no moment. For purposes of
determining loss of earning capacity, life expectancy remains at 80. Otherwise, the
computation of loss of earning capacity will never become final, being always subject to the
eventuality of the victim’s death. The computation should not change even if Borja lived
beyond 80 years. Fair is fair.
G.R. No. 175540. April 7, 2014.*
DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO, petitioner, vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO,
respondent.
Civil Law; Damages; Organ Transplants; Permission or authorization to retrieve and
remove the internal organs of the deceased was being given only if the provisions of the
applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that petitioner acted
prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of locating the
relatives of the deceased.—Petitioner instructed his subordinates to “make certain” that “all
reasonable efforts” are exerted to locate the patient’s next of kin, even enumerating ways in
which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also
clearly stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs
of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law had been
complied with. Such instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his
subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He
could not have made his directives any clearer. He even specifically mentioned
that permission is only being granted IF the Department of Surgery has complied with
all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have been faulted for having
full confidence in the ability of the doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the
instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the requirements
of the law.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Preponderance of Evidence; In civil cases, it
is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence.—It is respondent’s failure to adduce adequate evidence that
doomed this case. As stated in Otero v. Tan, 678 SCRA 583 (2012), “[i]n civil cases, it is a
basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.” Here, there is to proof
that, indeed, the period of around 24 hours from the time
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
666notices were disseminated, cannot be considered as reasonable under the
circumstances. They failed to present any expert witness to prove that given the medical
technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980’s, the doctors could or should have
waited longer before harvesting the internal organs for transplantation.
Civil Law; Damages; Organ Transplants; Internal organs of the deceased were removed
only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by respondent
due to the death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner.—Finding petitioner
liable for damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the internal organs of the
deceased were removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional
pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to
petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence on record to show that respondent’s
emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her son’s lifeless body
be categorically attributed to petitioner’s conduct.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; View that as
a general rule, only questions of law are to be considered in a petition for review under Rule
45.—As a general rule, only questions of law are to be considered in a petition for review
under Rule 45. There are, however, recognized exceptions to the rule, one of which is when
“the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion x x x.”
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; View that in order to be actionable, the act should have been
committed with the intention of injuring the plaintiff or was committed recklessly or
negligently or one which, even when done with the proper care, held such high risk for injury
to others that it will be presumed by law to be actionable.—In cases involving quasi-delict
and torts, the plaintiff complains that the acts of a defendant caused him or her injury. In
order to be actionable, the act should have been committed with the intention of injuring
the plaintiff or was committed recklessly or negligently or one which, even when done with
the proper care, held such high risk for injury to others that it will be presumed by law to
be actionable.
667
Same; Same; View on the elements of quasi-delicts.—The elements of a quasi-delict are:
(1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault or negligence in the performance or non-
performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal connection between the negligent act and the
injury; and (5) no pre-existing contractual relation. Jurisprudence, however, specifies four
(4) essential elements: “(1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation.”
Same; Same; Human Relations; View that Article 19 of the Civil Code is the general
rule which governs the conduct of human relations.—Article 19 is the general rule which
governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an actionable tort.
Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort may arise when it
is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.
Same; Same; Damages; Organ Transplants; Doctrine of Informed Consent; View that
the Supreme Court ruled that liability may arise in cases where the physician fails to obtain
the consent of the patient before performing any medical procedure.—The doctrine of
informed consent was introduced in this jurisdiction only very recently in Dr. Li v. Spouses
Soliman, 651 SCRA 32 (2011). This court ruled that liability may arise in cases where the
physician fails to obtain the consent of the patient before performing any medical
procedure, thus: The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient
relationships goes far back into English common law. As early as 1767, doctors were
charged with the tort of “battery” (i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if
they had not gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery or
procedure. In the United States, the seminal case was Schoendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital which involved unwanted treatment performed by a doctor. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo’s oft-quoted opinion upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to any
medical procedure or treatment: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages.” From a purely ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a general
principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably
prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care
would disclose
668to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from
a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his
own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or
alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by
reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable
benefits. Subsequently, in Canterbury v. Spence[,] the court observed that the duty to
disclose should not be limited to medical usage as to arrogate the decision on revelation to
the physician alone. Thus, respect for the patient’s right of self-determination on particular
therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians
may or may not impose upon themselves.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that those who consent to using their organs upon their
death for the benefit of another can make their consent known prior to their death by
following the requirements of the law.—Those who consent to using their organs upon their
death for the benefit of another can make their consent known prior to their death by
following the requirements of the law. Should a patient die prior to making his or her
informed consent known, the law provides a list of persons who may consent on his or her
behalf, that is, “substituted” informed consent. Since the incident in this case occurred in
1988, Republic Act No. 349, as amended by Republic Act No. 1056, is the law that applies.
Section 2 of the law states that: SEC. 2. The authorization referred to in section one of this
Act must: be in writing; specify the person or institution granted the authorization; the
organ, part or parts to be detached, the specific use or uses to which the organ, part or parts
are to be employed; and, signed by the grantor and two disinterested witnesses. If the
grantor is a minor or an incompetent person, the authorization may be executed by his
guardian with the approval of the court; in default thereof, by the legitimate father or
mother, in the order, named. Married women may grant the authority referred to in section
one of this Act, without the consent of the husband. After the death of the person, authority
to use human organs or any portion or portions of the human body for medical, surgical or
scientific purposes may also be granted by his nearest relative or guardian at the time of
his death or in the absence thereof, by the person or head of the hospital, or institution
having custody of the body of the deceased: Provided, however, That the said person or
head of the hospital
669or institution has exerted reasonable efforts to locate the aforesaid
guardian or relative. A copy of every such authorization must be furnished the Secretary
of Health.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that consent to organ retrieval after the patient’s death
may be given first and foremost by the patient’s nearest relative or guardian at the time of
death. It is only in the event that these relatives cannot be contacted despite reasonable
efforts that the head of the hospital or institution having custody of the body may give
consent for organ retrieval on behalf of the patient.—Under this law, consent to organ
retrieval after the patient’s death may be given first and foremost by the patient’s nearest
relative or guardian at the time of death. It is only in the event that these relatives cannot
be contacted despite reasonable efforts that the head of the hospital or institution having
custody of the body may give consent for organ retrieval on behalf of the patient. Failing
this, liability for damages arises. Considering that Republic Act No. 349, as amended, does
not provide a remedy in case of violation, an application of the doctrine of informed
consent vis-à-vis Article 20 of the Civil Code may give rise to an action for damages. In this
case, Dr. Alano must first be shown to have acted willfully and negligently to the damage
and prejudice of Zenaida.
Same; Same; Negligence; Words and Phrases; View that negligence has been defined by
law as the failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree
of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.—Negligence has been defined by law as “[t]he failure to observe,
for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.”
Same; Same; Organ Donations; View that the organ retrieval performed by the National
Kidney Institute cannot be termed as “disrespect to the dead.” Organ donation is allowed by
law. A sterile medical operation surely is not tantamount to grave robbery or mutilation.—
The lower courts are also in agreement that Dr. Alano did not cause the death of Zenaida’s
son. Neither is this case analogous to any of the situations mentioned in the provision.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, this situation is also not covered by Article 309 of
the Civil Code, which states: Article 309. Any person who
670shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable
to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral. The organ retrieval
performed by the National Kidney Institute cannot be termed as “disrespect to the dead.”
Organ donation is allowed by law. A sterile medical operation surely is not tantamount to
grave robbery or mutilation.
Same; Damages; Exemplary Damages; View that since Zenaida has not proven her
claim to moral damages, she is also not entitled to exemplary damages.—Since Zenaida has
not proven her claim to moral damages, she is also not entitled to exemplary damages.
Article 2234 of the Civil Code provides: Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary
damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded.
Same; Same; Quasi-Delicts; Attorney’s Fees; View that since the award of exemplary
damages is not justified, there is no reason to award attorney’s fees, in accordance with
Article 2208 of the Civil Code.—Since the award of exemplary damages is not justified,
there is no reason to award attorney’s fees, in accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil
Code, which allows the award of attorney’s fees only “when exemplary damages are
awarded.”
G.R. No. 205090. October 17, 2016.*
GREENSTAR EXPRESS, INC. and FRUTO L. SAYSON, JR.,

petitioners, vs. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION and NISSIN UNIVERSAL
ROBINA CORPORATION, respondents.
Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Vicarious Liability; Negligence; When by evidence the
ownership of the van and Bicomong’s employment were proved, the presumption of
negligence on respondents’ part attached, as the registered owner of the van and as
Bicomong’s employer.—In the present case, it has been established that on the day of the
collision — or on February 25, 2003 — URC was the registered owner of the URC van,
although it appears that it was designated for use by NURC, as it was officially assigned to
the latter’s Logistics Manager, Florante Soro-Soro (Soro-Soro); that Bicomong was the
Operations Manager of NURC and assigned to the First Cavite Industrial Estate; that
there was no work as the day was declared a national holiday; that Bicomong was on his
way home to his family in Quezon province; that the URC van was not assigned to
Bicomong as well, but solely for Soro-Soro’s official use; that the company ser-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
126
Greenstar Express, Inc. vs. Universal Robina Corporation
vice vehicle officially assigned to Bicomong was a Toyota Corolla, which he left at the
Cavite plant and instead, he used the URC van; and that other than the Cavite plant, there
is no other NURC plant in the provinces of Quezon, Laguna or Bicol. Applying the above
pronouncement in the Caravan Travel and ToursInternational, Inc. v. Abejar, 783 SCRA
368 (2016), it must be said that when by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong’s
employment were proved, the presumption of negligence on respondents’ part attached, as
the registered owner of the van and as Bicomong’s employer. The burden of proof then
shifted to respondents to show that no liability under Article 2180 arose. This may be done
by proof of any of the following: 1. That they had no employment relationship with
Bicomong; or 2. That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or 3. That
they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Bicomong.
Same; Same; Common Carriers; Diligence Required of Common Carriers; When the van
began to swerve toward his bus, he did not reduce speed nor swerve his bus to avoid
collision. Instead, he maintained his current speed and course, and for this reason, the
inevitable took place. An experienced driver who is presented with the same facts would have
adopted an attitude consistent with a desire to preserve life and property; for common
carriers, the diligence demanded is of the highest degree.—Despite having seen Bicomong
drive the URC van in a precarious manner while the same was still a good 250 meters away
from his bus, Sayson did not take the necessary precautions, as by reducing speed and
adopting a defensive stance to avert any untoward incident that may occur from Bicomong’s
manner of driving. This is precisely his testimony during trial. When the van began to
swerve toward his bus, he did not reduce speed nor swerve his bus to avoid collision.
Instead, he maintained his current speed and course, and for this reason, the inevitable
took place. An experienced driver who is presented with the same facts would have adopted
an attitude consistent with a desire to preserve life and property; for common carriers, the
diligence demanded is of the highest degree.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The collision was certainly foreseen and avoidable but
Sayson took no measures to avoid it.—Sayson took no defensive maneuver whatsoever in
spite of the fact that he saw Bicomong drive his van in a precarious manner, as far as 250
meters away — or at a point in time and space where Sayson had all the op-
127
VOL. 806, OCTOBER 17, 2016 127
Greenstar Express, Inc. vs. Universal Robina Corporation
portunity to prepare and avert a possible collision. The collision was certainly foreseen and
avoidable but Sayson took no measures to avoid it. Rather than exhibit concern for the
welfare of his passengers and the driver of the oncoming vehicle, who might have fallen
asleep or suddenly fallen ill at the wheel, Sayson coldly and uncaringly stood his ground,
closed his eyes, and left everything to fate, without due regard for the consequences. Such a
suicidal mindset cannot be tolerated, for the grave danger it poses to the public and
passengers availing of petitioners’ services. To add insult to injury, Sayson hastily fled the
scene of the collision instead of rendering assistance to the victims — thus exhibiting a
selfish, cold-blooded attitude and utter lack of concern motivated by the self-centered desire
to escape liability, inconvenience, and possible detention by the authorities, rather than
secure the well-being of the victims of his own negligent act.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Words and Phrases; The doctrine of
last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.—The doctrine of last clear chance
provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably
later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence.
G.R. No. 120027. April 21, 1999. *
EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the minors RIANNA and
REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners, vs. FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA,
respondents.
Civil Law; Negligence; Negligence and Proximate Cause Defined.—“Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something,
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.” Proximate cause is “that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”
Same; Same; Same; Court finds that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence
of the victim.—We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the
victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the
vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with
headlights to enable him to see what was in
_____________
*FIRST DIVISION.
103
VOL. 306, APRIL 21, 1999 103
Raynera vs. Hiceta

front of him. He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was
less than that in the highway.
Same; Same; Same; Drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are
presumed to be “the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence.”—It has
been said that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to
be “the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence.” The rationale behind
the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he
is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
Same; Same; Same; The driver who had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident is
deemed negligent.—Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself
since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had
the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

[No. 12219. March 15, 1918.]
AMADO PICART, plaintiff and appellant, vs. FRANK SMITH, jr., defendant and
appellee.
1. 1.NEGLIGENCE; CRITERION FOR DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF NEGLI-

GENCE.—The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act
whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain
from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so con
810
8 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
10
Picart vs. Smith.
1. stitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the

admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive f act in negligence.
1. 2.ID.; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; SUCCESSIVE NEGLIGENT ACTS.—

Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds
that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last
reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
other party.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.—The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge, Seeing
an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right.
The driver of the automobile, however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without
diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He then turned to the right
but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around
and was killed by the passing car. Held: That although the plaintiff was guilty of
negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the defendant was nevertheless
civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair
opportunity to avoid the accident af ter he realized the situation created by the
negligence of the plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the
plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a position of greater safety.
G.R. No. 140698. June 20, 2003. *
ROGELIO ENGADA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former

Fourteenth Division, Manila, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Law; Serious Physical Injuries; Vehicles; Overtaking; It is a settled rule that a
driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle has the duty
to see to it that the road is clear.— It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper
lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to
see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. This
rule is consistent with Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136 as amended, otherwise known
as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
479
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 479
Engada vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Emergency Rule, Explained.—An individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence
if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Last Clear Chance, Explained.—The doctrine of last
clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding
an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.
G.R. No. 115024. February 7, 1996. *
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD

LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 117944. February 7, 1996. *
RICHARD LI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. LOURDES

VALENZUELA, respondents.
Appeals; Evidence; As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, and the Court will not normally disturb
such factual findings unless the findings of the said court are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.—It
is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no substantial
questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court review are factual findings
of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals finding Richard Li grossly negligent
in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the early morning hours of
June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are binding and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such
factual findings unless the findings of fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
304
04
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals
Torts; Motor Vehicles; Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses—
physiological “fight or flight” mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not
dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.—One will have to suspend disbelief in
order to give credence to Li’s disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The
average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car
traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and
the road conditions on a principal metropolitan throroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li
would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert—
as every driver should be—to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the
senses. Physiological “fight or flight” mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms
were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li’s failure to react in a
manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either
or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a “very fast” speed as testified by
Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor working
independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally
he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela’s car, rather than be in a situation
forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Contributory Negligence, Defined.—Contributory
negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for
his own protection. Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which,
according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own protection was
not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Same; Same; Same; “Emergency Rule,” Explained; An individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he
fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.—Courts have traditionally been
compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held
up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation.
The law takes stock of impulses
305
VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 7, 1996 30
5
of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require
the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual
and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under the “emergency rule” adopted by this Court
in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire
on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to
do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists.—A woman driving a vehicle suddenly
crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is
both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not
expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or
alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to
stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a
no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to
other motorists.
Same; Same; Same; “Negligence,” Explained; Negligence, as it is commonly understood,
is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others—it is the failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.—Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence
ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. “Negligence, as it is
commonly understood, is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others.” It is the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila
Railroad Company, that negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.
Same; Employer-Employee Relationships; The liability of an employer for the negligence
of his employee is not based on the principle of respondeat superior but that of pater
familias.—We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not
based
306
06
on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the
servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer,
for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of his employees.
Same; Same; Once evidence is introduced showing that the em ployer exercised the
required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer’s burden is overcome,
but the question of diligent supervision depends on the circumstances of employment.—The
employer’s primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in
relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His
liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced
showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees,
half of the employer’s burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however,
depends on the circumstances of employment.
Same; Same; Company Car Plans; Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the
employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the
latter’s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180
in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.—Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the
employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the
latter’s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to exercise
supervision over either the employee’s private activities or during the performance of tasks
either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee’s tasks. The case at bench
presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large
companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
Same; Same; Same; When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to
its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its
employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively.—Most pharmaceutical
companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan, require rigorous tests of
road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over
307
VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 7, 1996 30
7
the car (subject of company maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like
a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that
the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for company
or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company or to others.
When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to
[No. 10107. February 4, 1916.]
CLARA CEREZO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF & PACIFIC
COMPANY, defendant and appellant.
1. 1.MASTER AND SERVANT; EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO

SERVANT; EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—
When a statute has been adopted from some other state or country and such
statute has previously been construed by the courts of such state or country, the
statute is usually deemed to have been adopted with the construction so given it.
The Employers' Liability Act having been adopted from the Massachusetts act,
which in turn (as well as similar statutes in some other States of the United States)
was adopted from the English act, decisions of the high courts in those jurisdictions
construing and interpreting- the Act should receive the careful attention of this
court in the application of our own law.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT UPON COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER.—

Under the common law in the United States, an employer was obliged to provide
reasonably safe ways, works, and machinery for his employees. He could defend an
action for damages arising out of an industrial accident by proving his own freedom
from negligence, the plaintiff's contributory negligence, that the injury was caused
by the negligence of a fellow servant, or that it happened through one of the risks
assumed by the employee. The Employers' Liability Act did not affect his duty to
provide safe ways, works, and machinery; nor the doctrines of assumption of risks
and contributory negligence. It did abolish, in part, the fellow servant doctrine, that
is to say, so far as it related to the negligence of a superintendent, with a special
clause of even greater scope in favor of railroad employees.
426
4 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
26
Cerezo vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT UPON THE LAW IN THIS COUNTRY.—The act was not
intended to curtail any of the rights which an employee had under the preexisting
law. Its provisions may be resorted to or not as the injured person may deem fit.
Under the act the defense of contributory negligence would defeat an action for
damages, whereas, under the Civil Code, as heretofore inter-preted by this court it
would not.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFECTS IN WAYS, WORKS, AND MACHINERY.—An employee

cannot recover for a defect in the ways, works or machinery when he was not called
upon to encounter the danger for the reason that it was in fact located at a point
upon the premises where his duties did not call him and where he had no right to
be.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER.—After providing reasonably safe ways,

works, and machinery and exercising the care of a good father of a family, the
employer's liability is limited, under the Civil Code, to those accidents which could
have been foreseen.
1. 6.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; FACTS OF THIS CASE.—The plaintiff's son was engaged in filling
in a trench in which a gas main had been. laid. He entered a portion of the trench
at a point a little distance away from where he was working for purposes of his
own, and while there the trench caved in and buried him, causing suffocation
before he could be rescued. The trench was only a little over four feet deep, and its
walls had stood, unshored, for over a week. There was no evidence that the walls
showed signs of giving way. Furthermore, had the deceased been erect in the
trench his head could not possibly have been covered with the dirt and it is
probable that he would have escaped without serious injury whatever. The accident
was a most unusual one and must be considered one that could not have been
foreseen. Hence, the employer cannot be held liable therefore.
VOL. 291, JUNE 22, 1998 111
Co vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124922. June 22, 1998. *
JIMMY CO, doing business under the name & style DRAGON METAL
MANUFACTURING, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and BROADWAY
MOTOR SALES CORPORATION, respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Pre-trial; The rule that the determination of issues at a pre-
trial conference bars the consideration of other issues on appeal, except those that may
involve privilege or impeaching matter, is inapplicable to this case.—Contrary to the CA’s
pronouncement, the rule that the determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the
consideration of other issues on appeal, except those that may involve privilege or
impeaching matter, is inapplicable to this case. The question of delay, though not
specifically mentioned as an issue at the pre-trial may be tackled by the court considering
that it is necessarily intertwined and intimately connected with the principal issue agreed
upon by the parties, i.e., who will bear the loss and whether there was negligence.
Petitioner’s imputation of negligence to private respondent is premised on delay which is
the very basis of the former’s complaint. Thus, it was unavoidable for the court to resolve
the case, particularly the question of negligence without considering whether private
respondent was guilty of delay in the performance of its obligation.
Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a
fortuitous event.—It is not a defense for a repair shop of motor vehicles to escape liability
simply because the damage or loss of a thing lawfully placed in its possession was due to
carnapping. Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The fact that a
thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from another’s rightful possession, as in cases of
carnapping, does not automatically give rise to a fortuitous event. To be considered as such,
carnapping entails more than the mere forceful taking of another’s property. It must be
proved and established that the event was an act of God or was done solely by third parties
and that neither the claimant nor the person alleged to be negligent has any participation.
________________
*SECOND DIVISION.
112
12
Co vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event
rests on him who invokes it.—In accordance with the Rules of evidence, the burden of
proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it—which in
this case is the private respondent. However, other than the police report of the alleged
carnapping incident, no other evidence was presented by private respondent to the effect
that the incident was not due to its fault. A police report of an alleged crime, to which only
private respondent is privy, does not suffice to establish the carnapping.
Same; Same; Same; Pursuant to Articles 1174 and 1262 of the New Civil Code, liability
attaches even if the loss was due to a fortuitous event if “the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk.”—It must likewise be emphasized that pursuant to Articles 1174
and 1262 of the New Civil Code, liability attaches even if the loss was due to a fortuitous
event if “the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk.” Carnapping is a
normal business risk for those engaged in the repair of motor vehicles. For just as the
owner is exposed to that risk so is the repair shop since the car was entrusted to it. That is
why, repair shops are required to first register with the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) and to secure an insurance policy for the “shop covering the property entrusted by its
customer for repair, service or maintenance” as a pre-requisite for such
registration/accreditation. Violation of this statutory duty constitutes negligence per se.
G.R. No. 166640. July 31, 2009.*
HERMINIO MARIANO, JR., petitioner, vs. ILDEFONSO C. CALLEJAS and
EDGAR DE BORJA, respondents.
Civil Law; Damages; Common Carriers; Negligence; The death of the wife of the
petitioner in the course of transporting her to her destination gave rise to the presumption of
negligence of the carrier; To overcome the presumption, respondents have to show that they
observed extraordinary diligence in the discharge of their duty or that the accident was
caused by a fortuitous event.—In accord with the above provisions, Celyrosa Express, a
common carrier, through its driver, respondent De Borja, and its registered owner,
respondent Callejas, has the express obligation “to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances,” and to observe extraordinary diligence in the
discharge of its duty. The death of the wife of the petitioner in the course of transporting
her to her destination gave rise to the presumption of negligence of the carrier. To overcome
the presumption, respondents have to show that they observed extraordinary diligence in
the discharge of their duty, or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 22, 2007 27
College Assurance Plan vs. Belfranlt Development, Inc.
G.R. No. 155604. November 22, 2007. *
COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN and COMPREHENSIVE ANNUITY PLAN and

ANNUITY PLAN and PENSION CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BELFRANLT
DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondent.
Lease; Fortuitous Events; Presumptions; Article 1667 of the Civil Code creates the
presumption that the lessee is liable for the deterioration or loss of a thing leased, and to
overcome such legal presumption, the lessee must prove that the deterioration or loss was
due to a fortuitous event which took place without his fault or negligence.—Article 1667 of
the Civil Code, which provides: The lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the
thing leased, unless he proves that it took place without his fault. This burden of proof on
the lessee does not apply when the destruction is due to earthquake, flood, storm or other
natural calamity—creates the presumption that the lessee is liable for the deterioration or
loss of a thing leased. To overcome such legal presumption, the lessee must prove that the
deterioration or loss was due to a fortuitous event which took place without his fault or
negligence.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Requisites; If the negligence or fault of the obligor
coincided with the occurrence of the fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or the
aggravation thereof, the fortuitous event cannot shield the obligor from liability for his
negligence.—Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as that which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. Whether an act of god or an act
of man, to constitute a fortuitous event, it must be shown that: a) the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the obligor to comply with its
obligations was independent of human will; b) it was impossible to foresee the event or, if it
could have been foreseen, to avoid it; c) the occurrence rendered it impossible for the obligor
to fulfill its obligations in a normal manner; and d) said obligor was free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. If the negligence or fault of the obligor
coincided with the occurrence of the fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or the
aggrava-
_______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
28
8
tion thereof, the fortuitous event cannot shield the obligor from liability for his
negligence.
Same; Appeals; Review by certiorari under Rule 45 be limited to errors of law only;
Exceptions; The finding that the negligence of the lessee was the proximate cause of the fire
that destroyed portions of the leased units is a purely factual matter which the Supreme
Court cannot pass upon.—The finding that the negligence of petitioners was the proximate
cause of the fire that destroyed portions of the leased units is a purely factual matter which
we cannot pass upon, lest we overstep the restriction that review by certiorari under Rule
45 be limited to errors of law only. Moreover, the established rule is that the factual
findings of the CA affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and binding on us. We are not
wont to review them, save under exceptional circumstances as: (1) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4)
when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the CA, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (7) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the CA
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Witnesses; Res Ipsa Loquitor; Requisites; Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur expert
testimony may be dispensed with to sustain an allegation of negligence if the following
requisites obtain: a) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent; b) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge
and c) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.—Even without the testimony of Fireman Sitchon and the
documents he prepared, the finding of the RTC and CA on the negligence of petitioners
cannot be overturned by petitioners’ bare denial. The CA correctly applied the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur under which expert testimony may be dispensed with to sustain an
allegation of negligence if the following requisites obtain: a) the accident is
29
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 22, 2007 2
9
of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) the cause of
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and c) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured. The fire that damaged Belfranlt Building was not a spontaneous natural
occurrence but the outcome of a human act or omission. It originated in the store room
which petitioners had possession and control of. Respondent had no hand in the incident.
Hence, the convergence of these facts and circumstances speaks for itself: petitioners alone
having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity to ascertain it, and
respondent having no means to find out for itself, it is sufficient for the latter to merely
allege that the cause of the fire was the negligence of the former and to rely on the
occurrence of the fire as proof of such negligence. It was all up to petitioners to dispel such
inference of negligence, but their bare denial only left the matter unanswered.
Damages; Temperate or moderate damages may be availed when some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty—the amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same
should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than
nominal but less than compensatory.—The CA deleted the award of actual damages of P2.2
million which the RTC had granted respondent to cover costs of building repairs. In lieu of
actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.00 were awarded by the
CA. We find this in order. Temperate or moderate damages may be availed when some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty. The amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts but
the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more
than nominal but less than compensatory. Without a doubt, respondent suffered some form
of pecuniary loss for the impairment of the structural integrity of its building as a result of
the fire. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, because of respondent’s inability to
present proof of the exact amount of such pecuniary loss, it may only be entitled to
temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.00, which we find reasonable and just.
30
G.R. No. 199282. March 14, 2016.*
TRAVEL & TOURS ADVISERS, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO

CRUZ, SR., EDGAR HERNANDEZ and VIRGINIA MUÑOZ, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court (SC) is
not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. This rule, however, is not without exceptions.—Jurisprudence teaches us
that “(a)s a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
Appeals x x x is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by
the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such, this Court is not
duty bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. This rule, however, is not without exceptions.” The findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals, which are, as a general rule, deemed conclusive, may admit of review by
this Court: (1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory; (2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (3) when the infer-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
298
Travel & Tours Advisers, Incorporated vs. Cruz, Sr.
ence made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts; (5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the
case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7)
when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of fact are themselves
conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence
on record.
Same; Same; Same; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Well-entrenched is the prevailing
jurisprudence that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by the Supreme Court
(SC) in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
applies with greater force to the Petition under consideration because the factual findings by
the Court of Appeals (CA) are in full agreement with what the trial court found.—The issues
presented are all factual in nature and do not fall under any of the exceptions upon which
this Court may review. Moreover, well-entrenched is the prevailing jurisprudence that only
errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies with greater force
to the Petition under consideration because the factual findings by the Court of Appeals are
in full agreement with what the trial court found.
Common Carriers; Transportation Law; A public utility vehicle can and may veer away
from its usual route as long as it does not go beyond its allowed route in its franchise.—
Petitioner now claims that the bus was not out of line when the vehicular accident
happened because the PUB (public utility bus) franchise that the petitioner holds is for
provincial operation from Manila-Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-Manila, thus, the bus is allowed to
traverse any point between Manila-Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-Manila. Such assertion is correct.
“Veering away from the usual route” is different from being “out of line.” A public utility
vehicle can and may veer away from its usual route as
299
VOL. 787, MARCH 14, 2016 299
long as it does not go beyond its allowed route in its franchise, in this case, Manila-
Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-Manila. Therefore, the bus cannot be considered to have violated the
contents of its franchise. On the other hand, it is indisputable that the jeepney was
traversing a road out of its allowed route. Necessarily, this case is not that of “in pari
delicto” because only one party has violated a traffic regulation. As such, it would seem that
Article 2185 of the New Civil Code is applicable where it provides that: Art. 2185. Unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Same; Vicarious Liability; Quasi-Delicts; When an injury is caused by the negligence of
an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the
part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him
after such selection.—Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code provides
that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The
presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that
it had exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by
an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of
care. In this case, the petitioner failed to do so.
Same; Same; Same; In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand,
due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees, the issuance of proper instructions intended for
the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or
its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case
of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the
business of and beneficial to their employer.—In the selection of prospective employees,
300
employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and
service records. On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes
the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees, the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with
whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted
to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their
employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent
compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions. In this
case, as shown by the above findings of the RTC, petitioner was not able to prove that it
exercised the required diligence needed in the selection and supervision of its employee.
Same; Same; Same; Contributory Negligence; The proximate cause of the death of
Alberto Cruz, Jr. is the negligence of petitioner’s bus driver, with the contributory negligence
of respondent Edgar Hernandez, the driver and owner of the jeepney, hence, the heirs of
Alberto Cruz, Jr. shall recover damages of only fifty percent (50%) of the award from
petitioner and its driver.—The petitioner and its driver, therefore, are not solely liable for
the damages caused to the victims. The petitioner must thus be held liable only for the
damages actually caused by his negligence. It is, therefore, proper to mitigate the liability
of the petitioner and its driver. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s
liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court had sustained a
mitigation of 50% in Rakes v. AG & P, 7 Phil. 359 (1907); 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 (1987), and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 241 SCRA 619 (1995); and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of
Appeals, 216 SCRA 51 (1992), and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals, 269
SCRA 695 (1997). In the present case, it has been established that the proximate cause of
the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. is the negligence of petitioner’s bus driver, with the
contributory negligence of respondent Edgar Hernandez, the driver and owner of the
jeepney, hence, the heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jr. shall recover damages of only 50% of the
award from petitioner and its driver. Necessarily, 50% shall be bourne by respondent Edgar
Hernandez. This is pursu-
301
VOL. 787, MARCH 14, 2016 301
ant to Rakes v. AG & P and after considering the circumstances of this case.
Attorney’s Fees; As to the award of attorney’s fees, it is settled that the award of
attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the general rule; counsel’s fees are not awarded
every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed
on the right to litigate.—As to the award of attorney’s fees, it is settled that the award of
attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the general rule; counsel’s fees are not awarded
every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed
on the right to litigate. Attorney’s fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated to
the amount paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney’s fees represent
the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court
as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. Attorney’s
fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the
Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law that would
bring the case within the ambit of these enumerated instances to justify the grant of such
award, and in all cases it must be reasonable. In this case, the RTC, in awarding attorney’s
fees, reasoned out that [w]hile there is no document submitted to prove that the plaintiffs
spent attorney’s fees, it is clear that they paid their lawyer in the prosecution of this case for
which they are entitled to the same. Such reason is conjectural and does not justify the grant
of the award, thus, the attorney’s fees should be deleted. However, petitioner shall still
have to settle half of the cost of the suit.
G.R. No. 193659. June 15, 2015.*
SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA and HERMINIA VERGARA,

petitioners, vs. ERLINDA TORRECAMPO SONKIN, respondent.
Civil Law; Quasi-delicts; Negligence; Contributory Negligence; Words and Phrases;
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection.—Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. In the case at bar, it
is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara property, and
thus, it is legally obliged to receive the waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article
637 of the Civil Code. This provision refers to the legal easement pertaining to the natural
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
443
VOL. 757, JUNE 15, 2015 443
Vergara vs. Sonkin
drainage of lands, which obliges lower estates to receive from the higher estates water
which naturally and without the intervention of man descends from the latter, i.e., not
those collected artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth carried by the
waters, viz.: Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates,
as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them. The owner of the lower
estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of
the higher estate make works which will increase the burden. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) In this light, Sps. Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance and,
accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their property so as to minimize the burden
created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they disregarded the easement and
constructed their house directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara
property, thereby violating the National Building Code in the process, specifically Section
708(a) thereof which reads: Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.—
(a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy. The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety
percent of a corner lot and eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to the provisions on
Easement on Light and View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2
meters from the property line.
Same; Damages; Moral Damages; While moral damages may be awarded whenever the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to
those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, they are only given to ease the defendant’s
grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused
and the gravity of the wrong done.—In view of Sps. Sonkin’s contributory negligence, the
Court deems it appropriate to delete the award of moral damages in their favor. While
moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is
the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code,
444
VOL. 757, JUNE 15, 2015 444
Vergara vs. Sonkin
they are only given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering and should, therefore,
reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded
where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case
other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.—Anent the issue on
attorney’s fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not
to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s
fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of
bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous
conviction of the righteousness of his cause. In this case, the Court observes that neither
Sps. Sonkin nor Sps. Vergara (thru their compulsory counterclaim) were shown to have
acted in bad faith in pursuing their respective claims against each other. The existence of
bad faith is negated by the fact that both parties have valid contentions against each other.
Thus, absent cogent reason to hold otherwise, the Court deems it inappropriate to award
attorney’s fees in favor of either party.
Same; Quasi-delicts; Negligence; Contributory Negligence; The underlying precept on
contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should
not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own
negligence.—In view of Sps. Sonkin’s undisputed failure to observe the two (2)-meter
setback rule under the National Building Code, and in light of the order of the courts a
quo directing Sps. Vergara to provide an adequate drainage system within their property,
the Court likewise deems it proper, equitable, and necessary to order Erlinda, who is solely
impleaded as respondent before the Court, to comply with the aforesaid rule by the removal
of the portion of her house directly abutting the partition wall. The underlying precept on
contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible
445
VOL. 757, JUNE 15, 2015 445
Vergara vs. Sonkin
for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must therefore be held liable only for
the damages actually caused by his negligence.
G.R. No. 172778. November 26, 2012.*
SABINIANO DUMAYAG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court; Exceptions.―Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.
The Court, however, recognizes several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. Several exceptions obtain in this
case; hence, a departure from the general rule is warranted.
Criminal Law; Reckless Imprudence; Words and Phrases; Reckless imprudence, as
defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.―Reckless imprudence, as defined by our penal law,
consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
348
48
Dumayag vs. People
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. In order to establish
a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there
was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages
complained of. Thus, to constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something
more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton
disregard of the consequences is required.
Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.―Proximate cause is
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Land Transportation and Traffic Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 4136); Motor
Vehicles; Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive and
operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it should
be made only if the highway is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking
while approaching a curve in the highway, where the driver’s view is obstructed, is not
allowed.―Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive and
operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it
should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle.
Overtaking while approaching a curve in the highway, where the driver’s view is
obstructed, is not allowed.
349
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 3
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Dumayag vs. People
Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with
a high degree of care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to
it that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken unaware by his presence
on the side of the road upon which they have the right to pass.
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Contributory Negligence; Considering that the proximate
cause was the negligence of the tricycle driver and that negligence on the part of petitioner
was only contributory, there is a need to mitigate the amounts of the civil liability imposed
on the latter. The determination of the mitigation of the civil liability varies depending on
the circumstances of each case.―Considering that the proximate cause was the negligence of
the tricycle driver and that negligence on the part of petitioner was only contributory, there
is a need to mitigate the amounts of the civil liability imposed on the latter. The
determination of the mitigation of the civil liability varies depending on the circumstances
of each case. The Court allowed the reduction of 50% in Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. 359 (1907), 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. IAC, 148 SCRA 353 (1987)
and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. CA, 241 SCRA 619 (1995) and 40% in Bank of the Philippine
Islands v. CA, 216 SCRA 51 (1992) and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA, 269 SCRA 695
(1997).
G.R. No. 173259. July 25, 2011.*
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC.,
respondent.
Evidence; Witnesses; Oral testimony is not as reliable as documentary evidence.—First,
oral testimony is not as reliable as documentary evidence. Second, PNB’s own witness, San
Diego, testified that in the verification process, the principal duty to determine the
genuineness of the signature devolved upon the account analyst. However, PNB did not
present the account analyst to explain his or her failure to sign the box for signature and
balance verification of the subject applications for manager’s check, thus, casting doubt as
to whether he or she did indeed verify the signatures thereon. Third, we cannot fault the
appellate court for not giving weight to the testimonies of Gallego and San Diego
considering that the latter are naturally interested in exculpating themselves from any
liability arising from the failure to detect the forgeries in the subject transactions. Fourth,
Gallego admitted that PNB’s employees received training on detecting forgeries from the
National Bureau of Investigation. However, Emmanuel Guzman, then NBI senior
document examiner, testified, as an expert witness, that the forged signatures in the
subject applications for manager’s check contained noticeable and significant differences
from the genuine signatures of FFCCI’s authorized signatories and that the forgeries
should have been detected or observed by a trained signature verifier of any bank.
Banks and Banking: Negligence; Where the bank’s negligence is the proximate cause of
the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the damages
between the bank and the depositor on a 60-40 ratio.—Given the foregoing, we find no
reversible error in the findings of the appellate court that PNB was negligent in the
handling of FFCCI’s combo account, specifically, with respect to PNB’s failure to detect the
forgeries in the subject applications for manager’s check which could have prevented the
loss. As we have often ruled, the banking business is impressed with public trust. A higher
degree of diligence is imposed on banks relative to the handling of their affairs than that of
an ordinary business enter-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
334
34
Philippine National Bank vs. F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc.
prise. Thus, the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their
officials and employees is far greater than those of ordinary officers and employees in other
enterprises. In the case at bar, PNB failed to meet the high standard of diligence required
by the circumstances to prevent the fraud. In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of
Appeals, 269 SCRA 695 (1997), and The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 410 SCRA 562 (2003), where the bank’s negligence is the proximate cause of the
loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the damages
between the bank and the depositor on a 60-40 ratio. We apply the same ruling in this case
considering that, as shown above, PNB’s negligence is the proximate cause of the loss while
the issue as to FFCCI’s contributory negligence has been settled with finality in G.R. No.
173278. Thus, the appellate court properly adjudged PNB to bear the greater part of the
loss consistent with these rulings.
G.R. No. 165279. June 7, 2011.*
DR. RUBI LI, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES REYNALDO and LINA SOLIMAN, as
parents/heirs of deceased Angelica
Soliman, respondents.
Medical Malpractice; Medical malpractice, or more appropriately, medical negligence,
is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed
by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.—The type of lawsuit which has
been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of
claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional
_______________
* EN BANC.
33
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Li vs. Soliman
which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient
must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or
she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that
failure or action caused injury to the patient.
Same; Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of
expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice as defendant physician or surgeon.—This Court has recognized that medical
negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same
general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or
surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from
the former’s realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in
most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence the indispensability of
expert testimonies.
Same; Doctrine of Informed Consent; Informed consent evolved into a general principle
of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the
medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to
whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that
a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of
undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently
exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable
benefits.—The doctrine of informed consentwithin the context of physician-patient
relationships goes far back into English common law. As early as 1767, doctors were
charged with the tort of “battery” (i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if
they had not gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery or
procedure. In the United States, the seminal case was Schoendorff v. Society of New York
Hospitalwhich involved unwanted treatment performed by a doctor. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo’s oft-quoted opinion upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to any
medical procedure or treatment: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is
34
4
Li vs. Soliman
liable in damages.” From a purely ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a
general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent
physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his
patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of
treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a
choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may
intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the
probable benefits.
Same; Same; Proficiency in diagnosis and therapy is not the full measure of a
physician’s responsibility; The physician is not expected to give the patient a short medical
education, the disclosure rule only requires of him a reasonable explanation, which means
generally informing the patient in nontechnical terms as to what is at stake, the therapy
alternatives open to him, the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks that may ensure
from particular treatment or no treatment.—The scope of disclosure is premised on the fact
that patients ordinarily are persons unlearned in the medical sciences. Proficiency in
diagnosis and therapy is not the full measure of a physician’s responsibility. It is also his
duty to warn of the dangers lurking in the proposed treatment and to impart information
which the patient has every right to expect. Indeed, the patient’s reliance upon the
physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those
associated with armslength transactions. The physician is not expected to give the patient a
short medical education, the disclosure rule only requires of him a reasonable explanation,
which means generally informing the patient in nontechnical terms as to what is at stake;
the therapy alternatives open to him, the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks that
may ensue from particular treatment or no treatment. As to the issue of demonstrating
what risks are considered material necessitating disclosure, it was held that experts are
unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient’s decision on treatment, or
to the reasonably, expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision. Such unrevealed risk
that should have been made known must further materialize, for otherwise the omission,
however unpardonable, is without legal consequence. And, as in malpractice actions
generally, there must be a causal relationship between the physician’s failure to divulge
and damage to the patient.35
VOL. 651, JUNE 7, 2011 3
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Li vs. Soliman
Same; Same; Four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action
based upon the doctrine of informed consent.—There are four essential elements a plaintiff
must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: “(1) the
physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately
disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the
patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff
was injured by the proposed treatment.” The gravamen in an informed consent case
requires the plaintiff to “point to significant undisclosed information relating to the
treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Medical Malpractice; Doctrine of Informed Consent; The doctrine of informed consent
requires doctors, before administering treatment to their patients, to disclose adequately the
material risks and side effects of the proposed treatment; it is distinct from the doctor’s duty
to skillfully diagnose and treat the patient.—The doctrine of informed consent requires
doctors, before administering treatment to their patients, to disclose adequately the
material risks and side effects of the proposed treatment. The duty to obtain the patient’s
informed consent is distinct from the doctor’s duty to skillfully diagnose and treat the
patient.
Same; Same; Two standards by which courts determine what constitutes adequate
disclosure of associated risks and side effects of a proposed treatment: the physician
standard, and the patient standard of materiality.—There are two standards by which
courts determine what constitutes adequate disclosure of associated risks and side effects of
a proposed treatment: the physician standard, and the patient standard of materiality.
Under the physician standard, a doctor is obligated to disclose that information which a
reasonable doctor in the same field of expertise would have disclosed to his or her patient.
x x x Under the patient standard of materiality, a doctor is obligated to disclose that
information which a reasonable patient would deem material in deciding whether to
proceed with a proposed treatment.
Same; Same; In order to determine what the associated risks and side effects of
proposed treatment are, testimony by an expert
36
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Li vs. Soliman
witness is necessary because these are beyond the common knowledge of ordinary
people.—In order to determine what the associated risks and side effects of a proposed
treatment are, testimony by an expert witness is necessary because these are beyond the
common knowledge of ordinary people. In Canterbury, the Court held that, “There are
obviously important roles for medical testimony in [nondisclosure] cases, and some roles
which only medical evidence can fill. Experts are ordinarily indispensable to identify and
elucidate for the fact-finder the risks of therapy.” The Court also held that, “medical facts
are for medical experts.”
Same; Same; Under the patient standard of materiality, a doctor obligated to disclose
that information which a reasonable patient would deem material in deciding whether to
proceed with a proposed treatment.—Again, under the patient standard of materiality, a
doctor is obligated to disclose that information which a reasonable patient would deem
material in deciding whether to proceed with a proposed treatment. Stated differently,
what should be disclosed depends on what a reasonable person, in the same or similar
situation as the patient, would deem material in deciding whether to proceed with the
proposed treatment.
Same; Same; Dr. Li impliedly admits that she failed to disclose to Reynaldo and Lina
many of the other associated risks and side effects of chemotherapy, including the most
material—infection, sepsis and death.—Dr. Li impliedly admits that she failed to
disclose to Reynaldo and Lina many of the other associated risks and side effects
of chemotherapy, including the most material—infection, sepsis and death. She
impliedly admits that she failed to disclose as risks and side effects (1) rashes; (2) difficulty
in breathing; (3) fever; (4) excretion of blood in the mouth; (5) excretion of blood in the anus;
(6) development of ulcers in the mouth; (7) sloughing off of skin; (8) systemic lupus
erythematosus; (9) carpo-pedal spasm; (10) loose bowel movement; (11) infection; (12) gum
bleeding; (13) hypovolemic shock; (14) sepsis; and (15) death in 13 days.
Same; Same; Infection, sepsis and death are material risks and side effects of
chemotherapy.—Clearly, infection, sepsis and death are material risks and side effects of
chemotherapy. To any reasonable person, the risk of death is one of the most important, if
not the most
37
VOL. 651, JUNE 7, 2011 3
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Li vs. Soliman
important, consideration in deciding whether to undergo a proposed treatment. Thus,
Dr. Li should have disclosed to Reynaldo and Lina that there was a chance that their 11-
year old daughter could die as a result of chemotherapy as, in fact, she did after only 13
days of treatment.
BRION, J., Separate Opinion:
Medical Malpractice; Philippine jurisprudence tells us that expert testimony is crucial,
if not determinative of a physician’s liability in a medical negligence case; Expert testimony
is, therefore, essential since the factual issue of whether a physician or surgeon exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is generally a matter of
expert opinion.—Philippine jurisprudence tells us that expert testimony is crucial, if not
determinative of a physician’s liability in a medical negligence case. In litigations involving
medical negligence as in any civil action, we have consistently ruled that the burden to
prove by preponderance of evidence the essential elements—i.e., duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation—rests with the plaintiff. Expert testimony is, therefore, essential
since the factual issue of whether a physician or surgeon exercised the requisite degree of
skill and care in the treatment of his patient is generally a matter of expert opinion.
Same; In the present case, expert testimony is required in determining the risks and or
side effects of chemotherapy that the attending physician should have considered and
disclosed as these are clearly beyond the knowledge of a layperson to testify on.—In the
present case, expert testimony is required in determining the risks and or side effects of
chemotherapy that the attending physician should have considered and disclosed as these
are clearly beyond the knowledge of a layperson to testify on. In other words, to prevail in
their claim of lack of informed consent, the respondents must present expert supporting
testimony to establish the scope of what should be disclosed and the significant risks
attendant to chemotherapy that the petitioner should have considered and disclosed; the
determination of the scope of disclosure, and the risks and their probability are matters a
medical expert must determine and testify on since these are beyond the knowledge of
laypersons.
Same; Dr. Balmaceda’s testimony failed to establish the existence of the risks or side-
effects the petitioner should have disclosed to
38
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Li vs. Soliman
them in the use of chemotherapy in the treatment of osteosarcoma.—Unfortunately for
the respondents, Dr. Balmaceda’s testimony failed to establish the existence of the
risks or side-effects the petitioner should have disclosed to them in the use of
chemotherapy in the treatment of osteosarcoma; the witness, although a medical
doctor, could not have testified as an expert on these points for the simple reason that she is
not an oncologist nor a qualified expert on the diagnosis and treatment of cancers. Neither
is she a pharmacologist who can properly advance an opinion on the toxic side effects of
chemotherapy, particularly the effects of Cisplatin, Doxorubicin and Cosmegen—the drugs
administered to Angelica. As a doctor whose specialty encompasses hospital management
and administration, she is no different from a layperson for purposes of testifying on the
risks and probabilities that arise from chemotherapy.
Same; Sufficiency of disclosure can be made only after determination and assessment of
risks have been made.—The ponencia concludes that “there was adequate disclosure of
material risks of the [chemotherapy administered] with the consent of Angelica’s parents”
in view of the fact that the petitioner informed the respondents of the side effects of
chemotherapy, such as low white and red blood cell and platelet count, kidney or heart
damage and skin darkening. I cannot agree with this conclusion because it was made
without the requisite premises. As heretofore discussed, sufficiency of disclosure can be
made only after a determination and assessment of risks have been made. As discussed
above, no evidence exists showing that these premises have been properly laid and proven.
Hence, for lack of basis, no conclusion can be made on whether sufficient disclosure
followed. In other words, the disclosure cannot be said to be sufficient in the absence of
evidence of what, in the first place, should be disclosed.
Same; Specific disclosures such as life expectancy probabilities are not legally necessary
or required to be disclosed in informed consent situations.—A third consideration is that
specific disclosures such as life expectancy probabilities are not legally necessary or
“required to be disclosed in informed consent situations,” thus the respondent Lina
Soliman’s testimony on this point cannot be given any probative value. Thus, in the
landmark case of Arato v. Avedon, —where family members of a patient who died of
pancreatic cancer
39
VOL. 651, JUNE 7, 2011 3
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Li vs. Soliman
brought an informed consent action against defendant physicians who failed to provide
the patient material information (statistical life expectancy) necessary for his informed
consent to undergo chemotherapy and radiation treatment—the Supreme Court of
California “rejected the mandatory disclosure of life expectancy probabilities” on account “of
the variations among doctor-patient interactions and the intimacy of the relationship
itself.”
ABAD, J., Concurring Opinion:
Medical Malpractice; Doctrine of Informed Consent; The claim that Dr. Li gave
assurance that Angelica had 95% chance of recovery after chemotherapy cannot be believed—
it would be most unlikely for someone of Dr. Li’s expertise to make such a grossly reckless
claim to a patient who actually had only a 20% chance of surviving the first year. She would
literally be inviting a malpractice suit.—The claim that Dr. Li gave assurance that Angelica
had a 95% chance of recovery after chemotherapy cannot be believed. The Solimans knew
that their daughter had bone cancer. Having consulted with other doctors from four medical
institutions, the Ago Medical and Educational Center in Bicol, the UERM Medical Center
in Manila, the National Children’s Hospital in Quezon City, and finally the St. Luke’s
hospital, all of whom gave the same dire opinion, it would be quite unlikely for the
Solimans to accept Dr. Li’s supposed assurance that their daughter had 95% chance of
returning to normal health after chemotherapy. In fact, it would be most unlikely for
someone of Dr. Li’s expertise to make such a grossly reckless claim to a patient who
actually had only a 20% chance of surviving the first year. She would literary be inviting a
malpractice suit.
Same; Same; Respondents are arguing from hindsight. The fact is that they were
willing to assume huge risks on the chance that their daughter could cheat death.—The
Solimans are arguing from hindsight. The fact is that they were willing to assume huge
risks on the chance that their daughter could cheat death. They did not mind that their
young daughter’s left leg would be amputated from above the knee for a 50% chance of
preventing the spread of the cancer. There is probably no person on this planet whose
family members, relatives, or close friends have not been touched by cancer. Every one
knows of the travails and agonies of chemotherapy, yet it is rare indeed for a cancer patient
or his relatives not to take a chance with
40
0
Li vs. Soliman
this treatment, which had proved successful in extending the lives of some.
Unfortunately for the Solimans, their daughter did not number among the successful cases.
Same; Same; Respondents accepted the risks that chemotherapy offered with full
knowledge of its effects on their daughter.—The Solimans accepted the risks that
chemotherapy offered with full knowledge of its effects on their daughter. It is not fair that
they should blame Dr. Li for Angelica’s suffering and death brought about by a decease that
she did not wish upon her. Indeed, it was not Dr. Li, according to Reynaldo, who convinced
him to agree to submit his daughter to chemotherapy but Dr. Tamayo. The latter explained
to him the need for her daughter to undergo chemotherapy to increase the chance of
containing her cancer. This consultation took place even before the Solimans met Dr. Li.
G.R. No. 159132. December 18, 2008.*
FE CAYAO-LASAM, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CLARO and EDITHA RAMOLETE,
respondents.**
Administrative Law; Double Jeopardy; Requisites; The principle of double jeopardy
finds no application in administrative cases.—The principle of double jeopardy finds no
application in administrative cases. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid
indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. These
elements were not present in the proceedings before the Board of Medicine, as the
proceedings involved in the instant case were administrative and not criminal in nature.
The Court has already held that double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases.
Same; Physicians; Board of Medicine; Appeals; The right to appeal from a decision of
the Board of Medicine to the Professional Regulation Commission is available to both
complainants and respondents.—Section 35 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Regulation and Practice of Professionals cited by petitioner was subsequently amended to
read: Sec. 35. The complainant/respondent may appeal the order, the resolution or the
decision of the Board within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof to the Commission whose
decision shall be final and executory. Interlocutory order shall not be appealable to the
Commission. (Amended by Res. 174, Series of 1990). Whatever doubt was created by the
previous provision was settled with said amendment. It is axiomatic that the right to
appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but a mere statutory privilege that
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. In this case, the clear intent of the
amendment is to render the right to appeal from a decision of the Board available to both
complainants and respondents.
Same; Statutory Construction; It is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, for any interpretation.—Such conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in 2006, the
PRC issued Resolution No. 06-342(A),
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
** The Court of Appeals is deleted from the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
440
40
or the New Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigations in the Professional
Regulation Commission and the Professional Regulatory Boards, which provides for the
method of appeal, to wit: Sec. 1. Appeal; Period Non-Extendible.—The decision, order or
resolution of the Board shall be final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the decision, order or resolution without an appeal being perfected or taken by
either the respondent or the complainant. A party aggrieved by the decision, order or
resolution may file a notice of appeal from the decision, order or resolution of the
Board to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and serving
upon the adverse party a notice of appeal together with the appellant’s brief or
memorandum on appeal, and paying the appeal and legal research fees. x x x The above-
stated provision does not qualify whether only the complainant or respondent may file an
appeal; rather, the new rules provide that “a party aggrieved” may file a notice of appeal.
Thus, either the complainant or the respondent who has been aggrieved by the decision,
order or resolution of the Board may appeal to the Commission. It is an elementary rule
that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence
of legislative intent to the contrary, for any interpretation. Words and phrases used in the
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage or meaning.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 conferred upon the Court of
Appeals (CA) exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC).—The PRC is not expressly mentioned as one of the agencies
which are expressly enumerated under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However,
its absence from the enumeration does not, by this fact alone, imply its exclusion from the
coverage of said Rule. The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from
awards, judgments final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions. The phrase “among these agencies” confirms that the
enumeration made in the Rule is not exclusive to the agencies therein listed. Specifically,
the Court, in Yang v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 287 (1990), ruled
that BatasPambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 conferred upon the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over appeals from decisions of the PRC.
Physicians; Medical Malpractice; Words and Phrases; Medical malpractice is a
particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply
to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the
profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances; There
are four elements involved in medical negligence cases—duty, breach, injury and
proximate441
, 441
causation.—Anent the substantive merits of the case, petitioner questions the PRC
decision for being without an expert testimony to support its conclusion and to establish the
cause of Editha’s injury. Petitioner avers that in cases of medical malpractice, expert
testimony is necessary to support the conclusion as to the cause of the injury. Medical
malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or
surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily
employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding
circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the
physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or
surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; The breach of professional duties of skill and
care, or their improper performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in
body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice, and as to this aspect of medical
malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert
testimony is essential.—A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha
employed the services of the petitioner. As Editha’s physician, petitioner was duty-bound to
use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat
a condition under the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill
and care, or their improper performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is
injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical
malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert
testimony is essential. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to
causation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have
acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by
the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience.—In the present
case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that
petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would
have done. Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M.
Manalo, who was clearly an expert on the subject. Generally, to qualify as an expert
witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject442
42
matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities
on the subject or by practical experience. Dr. Manalo specializes in gynecology and
obstetrics, authored and co-authored various publications on the subject, and is a professor
at the University of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Negligence; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Medical malpractice,
in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, and the defenses in an action for damages are provided for under Article 2179;
Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.—Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action for
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The defenses in an action for damages,
provided for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are: Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Proximate cause
has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever
it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part
in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage
was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the immediate cause of an accident resulting
in an injury is the plaintiff’s own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of
its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury; Contributory negligence is
the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured,
which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.—
Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the
part of the person injured, which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the
proximate cause of the injury. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of
the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. Where the
immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff’s own act, which
contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover
damages for the injury. Again, based on the evidence presented in the present443
, 443
case under review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the
petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury was
her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of
petitioner’s orders. The immediate cause of Editha’s injury was her own act; thus,
she cannot recover damages from the injury.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Service of Notice; Burden of Proof; It is a well-settled
rule that when service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the notice
was served must prove the fact of service—the burden of proving notice rests upon the party
asserting its existence.—It is a well-settled rule that when service of notice is an issue, the
rule is that the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service.
The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. In the present
case, respondents did not present any proof that petitioner was served a copy of the
Memorandum on Appeal. Thus, respondents were not able to satisfy the burden of proving
that they had in fact informed the petitioner of the appeal proceedings before the PRC.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Failure of the appellant to furnish the appellee a copy
of the Memorandum of Appeal submitted to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
constitutes a violation of due process.—In EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 409 (2007), in which the National Labor Relations
Commission failed to order the private respondent to furnish the petitioner a copy of the
Appeal Memorandum, the Court held that said failure deprived the petitioner of procedural
due process guaranteed by the Constitution, which could have served as basis for the
nullification of the proceedings in the appeal. The same holds true in the case at bar. The
Court finds that the failure of the respondents to furnish the petitioner a copy of the
Memorandum of Appeal submitted to the PRC constitutes a violation of due process. Thus,
the proceedings before the PRC were null and void.
Physicians; Doctors are protected by a special rule of law—they are not guarantors of
care and they are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences.—Doctors are
protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care. They are not insurers
against mishaps or unusual consequences specially so if the patient herself did not exercise
the proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
G.R. No. 126297. February 2, 2010.*
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, respondents.
G.R. No. 126467. February 2, 2010.*
NATIVIDAD [substituted by her children Marcelino Agana III, Enrique Agana, Jr.,
Emma Agana-Andaya, Jesus Agana and Raymund Agana] and ENRIQUE AGANA,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN FUENTES, respondents.
G.R. No. 127590. February 2, 2010.*
MIGUEL AMPIL, petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, respondents.
Medical Negligence; Corporate Negligence; Ostensible Agency; Court holds that
Professional Services, Inc. (PSI) is liable to the Aganas not under the principle of respondent
superior for lack of evidence of an employment relationship with Dr. Ampil but under the
principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil and pro hac vice under the
principle of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital.—After
gathering its thoughts on the issues, this Court holds that PSI is liable to the Aganas, not
under the principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employment
relationship with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible agency for the negligence
of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure to
perform its duties as a hospital.
Same; Same; Same; While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice
medicine, in reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of
its business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment; Three legal relationships
crisscross
_______________
* EN BANC.
283within that reality.—While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice
medicine, in reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of
its business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment. Within that reality, three legal
relationships crisscross: (1) between the hospital and the doctor practicing within its
premises; (2) between the hospital and the patient being treated or examined within its
premises and (3) between the patient and the doctor. The exact nature of each relationship
determines the basis and extent of the liability of the hospital for the negligence of the
doctor.
Same; Same; Same; Regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be
held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to follow established
standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation.—Where an employment
relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code or the principle of respondeat superior. Even when
no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient
that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in
relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent
authority. Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the hospital may be held
directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to follow established standard
of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Employer-Employee Relationship; Court still employs the “control
test” to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between hospital and
doctor.—This Court still employs the “control test” to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between hospital and doctor. In Calamba Medical Center,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 571 SCRA 585 (2008), it held: Under
the “control test,” an employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital if
the hospital controls both the means and the details of the process by which the physician is
to accomplish his task.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Control as a determinative factor in testing the employer-
employee relationship between doctor and hospital under which the hospital could be held
vicariously liable to a patient in medical negligence cases is a requisite fact to be established
284by preponderance of evidence.—To allay the anxiety of the intervenors, the Court
holds that, in this particular instance, the concurrent finding of the RTC and the CA that
PSI was not the employer of Dr. Ampil is correct. Control as a determinative factor in
testing the employer-employee relationship between doctor and hospital under which the
hospital could be held vicariously liable to a patient in medical negligence cases is a
requisite fact to be established by preponderance of evidence. Here, there was insufficient
evidence that PSI exercised the power of control or wielded such power over the means and
the details of the specific process by which Dr. Ampil applied his skills in the treatment of
Natividad. Consequently, PSI cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr.
Ampil under the principle of respondeat superior.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Factors that Determine Apparent Authority.—There is,
however, ample evidence that the hospital (PSI) held out to the patient (Natividad) that the
doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. Present are the two factors that determine apparent
authority: first, the hospital’s implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to
conclude that the doctor was the hospital’s agent; and second, the patient’s reliance upon
the conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
G.R. No. 187926. February 15, 2012.*
DR. EMMANUEL JARCIA, JR. and DR. MARILOU BASTAN,
petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Res Ipsa Loquitor; The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means
“Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.”—
This doctrine of res ipsa loquiturmeans “Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care.” The Black’s Law Dictionary defines the said doctrine. Thus: The
thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent,
which arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in defendant’s
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in
absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the
alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
337
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 15, 2012 3
37
Jarcia vs. People
fact that the accident happened provided the character of the accident and
circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of negligence it
would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under
the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer. Under this doctrine, the happening
of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial
evidence that the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive
control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is unusual to
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.—The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is unusual to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine, however, is not a rule of
substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule,
when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It
merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and helps the
plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for the Application of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur.—The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution of the person injured.
Same; Same; “Negligence,” Defined; Words and Phrases.—Negligence is defined as the
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and
338
38
Jarcia vs. People
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.
Same; Same; “Reckless Imprudence,” Defined; Words and Phrases.—Reckless
imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act.
Same; Same; Simple Negligence; Elements of Simple Negligence.—The elements of
simple negligence are: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender, and (2)
that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly
manifest.
Same; Reckless Imprudence; The Court finds the petitioners civilly liable for their
failure to sufficiently attend to Roy Jr.’s medical needs when the latter was rushed to the ER,
for while a criminal conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.—Although the Court
sympathizes with the plight of the mother and the child in this case, the Court is bound by
the dictates of justice which hold inviolable the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court, nevertheless, finds the
petitioners civilly liable for their failure to sufficiently attend to Roy Jr.’s medical needs
when the latter was rushed to the ER, for while a criminal conviction requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.
Taken into account also was the fact that there was no bad faith on their part.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Issues raised for the first time on appeal
cannot be considered because a party is not permitted to change his theory on appeal.—This
Court cannot also stamp its imprimatur on the petitioners’ contention that no physician-
patient relationship existed between them and patient Roy Jr., since they were not his
attending physicians at that time. They claim that they were merely requested by the ER
nurse to see the patient while they were passing by the ER for their lunch. Firstly, this
issue was never raised during the trial at the RTC or even before the CA. The petitioners,
therefore, raise the want of doctor-patient relationship for the first time on appeal with this
Court. It
339
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 15, 2012 3
39
Jarcia vs. People
has been settled that “issues raised for the first time on appeal cannot be considered
because a party is not permitted to change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is
unfair to the other party and offensive to the rules of fair play, justice and due process.”
Stated differently, basic considerations of due process dictate that theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will
not be, considered by a reviewing court.
Civil Law; Physician-Patient Relationship; When a patient engages the services of a
physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated; Thus, in treating his patient, a
physician is under a duty to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians
in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess
and exercise in like cases.—In the case of Lucas v. Tuaño, 586 SCRA 173 (2009), the Court
wrote that “[w]hen a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient
relationship is generated. And in accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and
purposes, represents that he has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training, care, and skill
in the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to
exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in
like cases. Stated otherwise, the physician has the obligation to use at least the same level
of care that any other reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition
under similar circumstances.”
Same; Same; Medical Ethics; Established medical procedures and practices, though in
constant instability, are devised for the purpose of preventing complications.—Article II,
Section 1 of the Code of Medical Ethics of the Medical Profession in the Philippines states:
A physician should attend to his patients faithfully and conscientiously. He should secure
for them all possible benefits that may depend upon his professional skill and care. As the
sole tribunal to adjudge the physician’s failure to fulfill his obligation to his patients is, in
most cases, his own conscience, violation of this rule on his part is discreditable and
inexcusable. Established medical procedures and practices, though in constant instability,
are devised for
340
40
Jarcia vs. People
the purpose of preventing complications. In this case, the petitioners failed to observe
the most prudent medical procedure under the circumstances to prevent the complications
suffered by a child of tender age.
Same; Negligence; While no criminal negligence was found in the petitioners’ failure to
administer the necessary medical attention to Roy Jr., the Court holds them civilly liable for
the resulting damages to their patient.—While no criminal negligence was found in the
petitioners’ failure to administer the necessary medical attention to Roy Jr., the Court holds
them civilly liable for the resulting damages to their patient. While it was the taxi driver
who ran over the foot or leg of Roy Jr., their negligence was doubtless contributory.
Same; Damages; Actual Damages; Claims for actual damages must be adequately
supported by receipts.—It appears undisputed that the amount of P3,850.00, as expenses
incurred by patient Roy Jr., was adequately supported by receipts. The Court, therefore,
finds the petitioners liable to pay this amount by way of actual damages.
Same; Same; Moral Damages; It is settled that moral damages are not punitive in
nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person.—The Court is
aware that no amount of compassion can suffice to ease the sorrow felt by the family of the
child at that time. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of Roy Jr.
in the amount of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively, is proper in this case. It is
settled that moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and
alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury unjustly inflicted on a person. Intended for the restoration of the psychological or
emotional status quo ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate
emotional injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good.—The Court, likewise, finds the petitioners also
liable for exemplary dam-
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VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 15, 2012 3
41
Jarcia vs. People
ages in the said amount. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999. *
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural
guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON
RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS
MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DRA. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practice; When a party is represented by counsel, all
notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer at his given address.—It is elementary that
when a party is represented by counsel, all notices should be sent to the party’s lawyer at
his given address. With a few exceptions, notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel
on record is no notice at all. In the present case, since a copy of the decision of the appellate
court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner, there can be no sufficient notice to
speak of. Hence, the delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken
against petitioner.
Same; Evidence; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.—Res ipsa loquitur is
a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” The
phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing which caused
the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defen-
________________
*FIRST DIVISION.
585
VOL. 321, DECEMBER 29, 1999 58
5
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals
dant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or
was caused by the defendant’s want of care.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Ipsa Loquitur is applied in conjunction with the
doctrine of common knowledge.—The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of
the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of
certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person
who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by
the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of
ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge,
negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa
loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence; Requisites before resort to the doctrine
may be allowed.—Much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law
and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability.
Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. It is
regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of
negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of
such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough
of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption
of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the
proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which
would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
586
86
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur is availed by the
plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence.—Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied
upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has
deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the
injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the
necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of
medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind
which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and
surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been
treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as
to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest
conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied depending upon the circumstances of
each case.—Despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably
enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to
mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the
ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily
used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It
is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care
were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the
only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.—
It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit
against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any
particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not
produce
587
VOL. 321, DECEMBER 29, 1999 58
7
the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the
only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.
Hospitals; Damages; Proximate Cause Defined.—Proximate cause has been defined as
that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or
damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct
result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. It is the dominant,
moving or producing cause.
Same; Same; For the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases,
an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians.—Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting “consultant” staff. While “consultants” are not, technically
employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
patient’s condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants
all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception
of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose
of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship
in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. This being
the case, the question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily
liable with respondent doctors for petitioner’s condition.
Same; Same; The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence
of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code.—The basis for holding an employer
solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of
others based on the former’s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such
responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed
the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In other words, while the
burden of proving negligence rests
588
88
on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents
(parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Same; Same; Amount of damages awarded may be a continuing one where the injury is
chronic and continuing, as when the patient is comatose.—In these cases, the amount of
damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the
injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up
to the time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but
which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. In other words,
temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages
in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature
of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
G.R. No. 126297. January 31, 2007. *
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE

AGANA, respondents.
G.R. No. 126467. January 31, 2007. *
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, respondents. NATIVIDAD (Substituted by

her children MARCELINO AGANA III, ENRIQUE AGANA, JR., EMMA AGANA
ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA, and RAYMUND AGANA) and ENRIQUE AGANA,
petitioners, vs. JUAN FUENTES, respondent.
G.R. No. 127590. January 31, 2007. *
MIGUEL AMPIL, petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA,

respondents.
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
479
VOL. 513, JANUARY 31, 2007 479
Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana
Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; The leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in
the wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the
operating surgeon.—An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not
complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of
sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at
least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is
considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence. There are
even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.
Same; Same; Same; To the mind of the Court, what was initially an act of negligence by
Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient.—Here, Dr.
Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even
misled her that the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her
operation. Had he been more candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and
appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was
initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of
deceiving his patient.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Requisites for the Applicability of
the Doctrine.—Literally, res ipsa loquiturmeans “the thing speaks for itself.” It is the rule
that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may
permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Stated
differently, where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, is
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not have
occurred if he, having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care, and the
burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence.
From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2)the thing which caused the injury
was under the control and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that
in the ordinary course of things, would
480
80
not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care;
and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most
instrumental is the “control and management of the thing which caused the injury.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence,
does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a
mere evidentiary rule.—In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive
law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate ground of
liability, being a mere evidentiary rule. In other words, mere invocation and application of
the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the
negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.
Same; Same; Same; Professionals are considered personally liable for the fault or
negligence they commit in the discharge of their duties and their employer cannot be held
liable for such fault or negligence.—A prominent civilist commented that professionals
engaged by an employer, such as physicians, dentists, and pharmacists, are not “employees”
under this article because the manner in which they perform their work is not within the
control of the latter (employer). In other words, professionals are considered personally
liable for the fault or negligence they commit in the discharge of their duties, and their
employer cannot be held liable for such fault or negligence. In the context of the present
case, “a hospital cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of a physician or surgeon in
the treatment or operation of patients.”
Same; Same; Same; In this jurisdiction, the nature of the relationship between the
hospital and the physicians is rendered inconsequential in view of the pronouncement in
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999), that for purposes of apportioning
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.—In our shores, the nature of
the relationship between the hospital and the physicians is rendered inconsequential in
view of our categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999),
that for purposes of apportioning responsibility in
481
VOL. 513, JANUARY 31, 2007 48
1
medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
Same;Same; Same; PSI’s liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of
apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence.—But
the Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining PSI’s liability. Its liability is
also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the
doctrine of corporate negligence which have gained acceptance in the determination of a
hospital’s liability for negligent acts of health professionals. The present case serves as a
perfect platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our
jurisprudence. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the “holding out”
theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of
agency. It imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but
rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the
public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists. The concept is essentially
one of estoppel and has been explained in this manner: “The principal is bound by the acts
of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the agent to assume,
or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing. The question in every case is
whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a
person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature of the
particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the
particular act in question.
Same; Same; Same; In cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has
held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a patient has accepted
treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of
the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician’s negligence.—The applicability
of apparent authority in the field of hospital liability was upheld long time ago in Irving v.
Doctor Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (1982). There, it was explicitly stated
that “there does not appear to be any rational basis for excluding the concept of apparent
authority from the field of hospital liability.” Thus, in cases where it can be shown that a
hospital, by its actions, has held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee
and
482
82
that a patient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that
it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the
physician’s negligence.
Same; Same; Same; By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising
their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its agents, authorized
to perform medical or surgical services for its patients.—In this case, PSI publicly displays
in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians
associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with
the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it “is now estopped from passing all the blame to the
physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public to
believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.” Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount to
holding out to the public that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited physicians,
offers quality health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its
agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected,
these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief
that such were being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants.
G.R. No. 160110. June 18, 2014.*
MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LEONORA
J. GOMEZ and GABRIEL V. GOMEZ, respondents.
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Proximate cause is
occurred.—Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Same; Same; According to Manresa, liability for personal acts and omissions is founded
on that indisputable principle of justice recognized by all legislations that when a person by
his act or omission causes damage or prejudice to another, a juridical relation is created by
virtue of which the injured person acquires a right to be indemnified and the person causing
the damage is charged with the corresponding duty of repairing the damage.—Having
settled the fact of Mendoza’s negligence, then, the next question that confronts us is who
may be held liable. According to Manresa, liability for personal acts and omissions is
founded on that indisputable principle of justice recognized by all legislations that when a
person by his act or omission causes damage or prejudice to another, a juridical relation
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
506
06
Mendoza vs. Gomez
is created by virtue of which the injured person acquires a right to be indemnified and
the person causing the damage is charged with the corresponding duty of repairing the
damage. The reason for this is found in the obvious truth that man should subordinate his
acts to the precepts of prudence and if he fails to observe them and causes damage to
another, he must repair the damage. His negligence having caused the damage, Mendoza is
certainly liable to repair said damage.
Same; Same; Vicarious Liability; In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed
negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the
action under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection
or supervision, or both, of his employee.—Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under
the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a person who
has not committed the act or omission which caused damage or injury to another may
nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or subsidiarily under certain
circumstances. In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed negligence is embodied in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action under said article is
the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of
his employee.
Same; Same; Same; In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, 674 SCRA 117 (2012), the
Supreme Court (SC) held that the registered owner is deemed the employer of the negligent
driver, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the
Civil Code.—In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, 674 SCRA 117 (2012), we held that
the registered owner is deemed the employer of the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously
liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code. Citing Equitable
Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, 388 SCRA 445 (2002), the Court ruled that insofar as third
persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the
negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.
Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner
and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law
holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the
operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.507
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 50
7
Mendoza vs. Gomez
Same; Same; Same; With the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the
defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code — that the employee acts beyond the
scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage — are no longer available to the registered owner of the motor vehicle,
because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.—
Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the
supervision over him after the selection (culpa vigilando), or both. The presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may be rebutted. Accordingly, the general
rule is that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and
supervision of his employee he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved of liability. However, with the
enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the defenses available under Article 2180
of the Civil Code — that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage — are no longer
available to the registered owner of the motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle
registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.
Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment,
the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer
of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage caused
by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim.—As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim
vicariously liable with Mendoza. This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any
recourse against Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of unjust
enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the
actual employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for
the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he
has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
508
08
Mendoza vs. Gomez
Same; Same; Damages; Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and
quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.—Article 2202 of the Civil Code
provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is
not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant. Article 2199 of the same Code, however, sets the limitation that,
except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. As such, to warrant an
award of actual or compensatory damages, the claimant must prove that the damage
sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and, moreover, the
claimant must adequately prove the amount of such damage.
Same; Same; Same; Moral Damages; Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but
are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar harm unjustly caused to a person.—Moral damages are awarded to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. In prayers
for moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral
damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To
be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered
damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles
2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate
result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual basis of
the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; In motor vehicle accident cases, exemplary
damages may be awarded where the defendant’s misconduct is so flagrant as to transcend
simple negligence
509
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 50
9
Mendoza vs. Gomez
and be tantamount to positive or affirmative misconduct rather than passive or negative
misconduct.—In motor vehicle accident cases, exemplary damages may be awarded where
the defendant’s misconduct is so flagrant as to transcend simple negligence and be
tantamount to positive or affirmative misconduct rather than passive or negative
misconduct. In characterizing the requisite positive misconduct which will support a claim
for punitive damages, the courts have used such descriptive terms as willful, wanton,
grossly negligent, reckless, or malicious, either alone or in combination. Gross negligence is
the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons
or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort
to avoid them.
Same; Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; The general rule remains that attorney’s fees are
not recoverable in the absence of a stipulation thereto, the reason being that it is not sound
policy to set a premium on the right to litigate.—From the very opening sentence of Article
2208 of the Civil Code, it is clearly intended to retain the award of attorney’s fees as the
exception in our law, as the general rule remains that attorney’s fees are not recoverable in
the absence of a stipulation thereto, the reason being that it is not sound policy to set a
premium on the right to litigate. As such, in Spouses Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA
375 (1990), we held that, the award of attorney’s fees being an exception rather than the
general rule, it is necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law that would bring
the case within the exception and justify the grant of such award. Thus, the reason for the
award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s decision; otherwise, if it is
stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on
appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Cost of Suit; The Rules of Court provide that, generally, costs shall
be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course.—The Rules of Court provide that,
generally, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course, thus: Section
1. Costs ordinarily follow results of suit.—Unless otherwise provided in these rules, costs
shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course, but the court shall have
power, for special reasons, to adjudge that either party shall pay the costs of an action, or
that the same be divided, as may be equitable. No costs shall be
510
10
Mendoza vs. Gomez
allowed against the Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law.
Same; Same; Same; Interest Rates; Moratory Interests; Interest by way of damages has
been defined as interest allowed in actions for breach of contract or tort for the unlawful
detention of money already due. This type of interest is frequently called “moratory
interest.”—Interest by way of damages has been defined as interest allowed in actions for
breach of contract or tort for the unlawful detention of money already due. This type of
interest is frequently called “moratory interest.” Interest as a part of damage, is allowed,
not by application of arbitrary rules, but as a result of the justice of the individual case and
as compensation to the injured party. The legal provision on interests in quasi-delicts is
Article 2211 of the Civil Code which provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as
part of the damage, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
Generally, interest is allowed as a matter of right for failure to pay liquidated claims when
due. For unliquidated claims, however, Article 2213 of the Civil Code provides that interest
cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. In the case at bar, although the award of exemplary
damages is unliquidated in the sense that petitioners cannot know for sure, before
judgment, the exact amount that they are required to pay to respondents, the award of
actual or compensatory damages, however, such as the truck repairs and medical expenses,
is arguably liquidated in that they can be measured against a reasonably certain standard.
Moreover, justice would seem to require that the delay in paying for past losses which can
be made reasonably certain should be compensated through an award of interest.
G.R. No. 190022. February 15, 2012.*
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION, JAPHET ESTRANAS and
BEN SAGA, petitioners, vs.PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC VIZCARA,
CRESENCIA A. NATIVIDAD, HECTOR VIZCARA, JOEL VIZCARA and
DOMINADOR ANTONIO, respondents.
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Article 2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability
for damages caused by a person’s act or omission constituting fault or negligence.—Article
2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person’s act
or omission constituting fault or negligence. It states: Article 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another,
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
364
64
Philippine National Railways Corporation vs. Vizcara
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Same; Same; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.—In Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363
(1988), negligence was defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do,
or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. To determine the existence of negligence, the time-honored test was:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied
by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy,
or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; In petitions for review on certiorari, only
questions of law may be put into issue.—In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions
of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. To distinguish one
from the other, a question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the
law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Certainly, the finding of negligence by
the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass
upon as this would entail going into the factual matters on which the negligence was based.
Moreover, it was not shown that the present case falls under any of the recognized excep-
365
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 15, 2012 3
65
tions to the oft repeated principle according great weight and respect to the factual
findings of the trial court and the CA.
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; A reliable signaling device in good condition, not
just a dilapidated “Stop, Look and Listen” signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is
the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in
working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence.—Both courts ruled
that the petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into consideration the
nature of its business, to forestall any untoward incident. In particular, the petitioners
failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in order to
give way to an approaching train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the “Stop, Look
and Listen” signage installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence, inadequate to alert
the public of the impending danger. A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a
dilapidated “Stop, Look and Listen” signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the
responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in
working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. Having established the
fact of negligence on the part of the petitioners, they were rightfully held liable for
damages.
Same; Same; Same; Contributory Negligence; Words and Phrases; Contributory
negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his
own protection.—As to whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the
respondents, this court rule in the negative. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part
of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. It is an act or
omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which,
concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. Here, we
cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their injury when they were not
even aware of the forthcoming danger.
Same; Same; Same; At this age of modern transportation, it behooves the Philippine
National Railways (PNR) to exert serious efforts to catch up with the trend, including the
contemporary stan-
366
66
dards in railroad safety.—At this age of modern transportation, it behooves the PNR to
exert serious efforts to catch up with the trend, including the contemporary standards in
railroad safety. As an institution established to alleviate public transportation, it is the
duty of the PNR to promote the safety and security of the general riding public and provide
for their convenience, which to a considerable degree may be accomplished by the
installation of precautionary warning devices. Every railroad crossing must be installed
with barriers on each side of the track to block the full width of the road until after the
train runs past the crossing. To even draw closer attention, the railroad crossing may be
equipped with a device which rings a bell or turns on a signal light to signify the danger or
risk of crossing. It is similarly beneficial to mount advance warning signs at the railroad
crossing, such as a reflectorized crossbuck sign to inform motorists of the existence of the
track, and a stop, look and listen signage to prompt the public to take caution. These
warning signs must be erected in a place where they will have ample lighting and
unobstructed visibility both day and night.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Words and Phrases; The doctrine of last
clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.—The doctrine of last clear chance
provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably
later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence. To reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision was the
petitioners’ negligence in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross
the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have any
participation in the occurrence of the unfortu-
367
VOL. 666, FEBRUARY 15, 2012 3
67
nate incident which befell them. Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act
manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of
the respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied.
G.R. No. 186412. September 7, 2011.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ORLITO VILLACORTA,
accused-appellant.
Witnesses; The determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when
affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if
not conclusive effect.—It is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the
credi-
_______________
** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Raffle dated
July 19, 2010.
*** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Raffle
dated August 31, 2011.
**** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, per
Special Order No. 1076 dated September 6, 2011.
* FIRST DIVISION.
271
VOL. 657, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011 2
71
People vs. Villacorta
bility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and
credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect. Such determination made by the trial
court proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses,
their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the
unique position to assess the witnesses’ credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness,
honesty and candor.
Denials; Alibi; Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak and
if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence.—Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating
justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like
alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.
Proximate Cause; Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.”—Nevertheless, there is merit in the
argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz,
he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon
Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous
which the result would not have occurred.”
Criminal Law; Physical Injuries; When such intent is lacking but wounds were
inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.—The intent must be
proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal (or
murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-appellant but on
the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such
intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical
injuries only.272
72
People vs. Villacorta
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery exists when an offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend
directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the
defense that the offended party might make.—Treachery exists when an offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly
or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense
that the offended party might make. This definition sets out what must be shown by
evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such means of
execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation;
and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.
G.R. No. 190601. February 7, 2011.*
SPOUSES LUIGI M. GUANIO and ANNA HERNANDEZ-GUANIO,
petitioners, vs. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL and RESORT, INC., also doing
business under the name of SHANGRI-LA HOTEL MANILA, respondent.
Civil Law; Contracts; Breach of Contract; Words and Phrases; Breach of contract is
defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract.—Breach of
contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to cmmomply with the terms of a
contract. It is also defined as the [f]ailure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise
which forms the whole or part of the contract. The appellate court, and even the trial court,
observed that petitioners were remiss in their obligation to inform respondent of the change
in the expected number of guests. The observation is re-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
592
92
Guanio vs. Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc.
flected in the records of the case. Petitioners’ failure to discharge such obligation thus
excused, as the above-quoted paragraph 4.5 of the parties’ contract provide, respondent
from liability for “any damage or inconvenience” occasioned thereby.
G.R. No. 184905. August 28, 2009.*
LAMBERT S. RAMOS, petitioner, vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION,
respondent.
Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; If the master is injured by the negligence of a third
person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s
negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third
person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury of which complaint is made; The act of crossing an avenue which is prohibited by law
constitutes negligence.—Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in
this case, viz.: Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
527
VOL. 597, AUGUST 28, 2009 52
7
Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty Corporation
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation. If the master is injured by the negligence of a third
person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the
latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against
the third person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury of which complaint is made. Applying the foregoing principles of law to
the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda
constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate
cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by
respondent from the accident.
Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Proximate cause is defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.—
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
G.R. No. 182201. November 14, 2016.*
UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (BVI) LIMITED,

petitioner, vs. RAY BURTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 185815. November 14, 2016.*
UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (BVI) LIMITED,

petitioner, vs. RAY BURTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Civil Law; Contracts; If the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the lit-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
452
Universal International Investment (BVI) Limited vs. Ray
Burton Development Corporation
eral meaning of its stipulations shall control.—If the terms of the contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control. In this case, the very words of Section 6 of the Contracts to Sell
refer only to situations of (1) force majeure or (2) substantial delay in the condominium
project, Elizabeth Place.
Same; Damages; In order to recover damages, the claimant must prove (1) an injury or
a wrong sustained (2) as a consequence of a breach of contract or tort and (3) caused by the
party chargeable with a wrong.—In order to recover damages, the claimant must prove (1)
an injury or a wrong sustained (2) as a consequence of a breach of contract or tort and (3)
caused by the party chargeable with a wrong. As Universal claims actual damages, it is
only entitled to such pecuniary loss as it has duly proved.
Same; Same; To justify a grant of compensatory damages, it is necessary that the actual
amount of loss to be proved with a reasonable certainty, premised upon competent proof and
the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.—Assuming that the condominium units
were utilized for profit, this Court finds no iotaof evidence as to the amount of profits that
Universal would have earned from the properties. To justify a grant of compensatory
damages, it is necessary that the actual amount of loss to be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party.
Proximate Cause; Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous
which the result would not have occurred.—The act or omission of respondent must have
been the proximate cause, as distinguished from the remote cause, of the loss sustained by
the claimant. Proximate cause — determined by a mixed consideration of logic, common
sense, policy, and precedent — is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
Civil Law; In order that the debtor may be held to be in default, the following requisite
conditions must be present: (1) the obligation is demandable and already liquidated; (2) the
debtor delays perform-
453
VOL. 808, NOVEMBER 14, 2016 453
Universal International Investment (BVI) Limited vs. Ray
Burton Development Corporation
ance of the obligation; and (3) the creditor requires the performance judicially or
extrajudicially.—The excuse given by RBDC deserves scant consideration. In order that the
debtor may be held to be in default, the following requisite conditions must be present: (1)
the obligation is demandable and already liquidated; (2) the debtor delays performance of
the obligation; and (3) the creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially.
Same; Contracts; Damages; Temperate Damages; Temperate Damages may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot be
proven with certainty.—Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case,
be proven with certainty. In this case, there is no doubt that Universal sustained pecuniary
loss, albeit difficult to quantify, arising from RBDC’s failure to execute deeds of absolute
sale and to deliver the CCTs of the properties.
Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary damages are corrective damages
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.—Exemplary damages are
corrective damages imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The grant
thereof is intended to serve as a deterrent to or negative incentive for curbing socially
deleterious actions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 2232 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides
that in contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.—Article 2232 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines provides that in contracts, the court may award exemplary damages
if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
In this case, we find that respondent indeed acted in that manner when, despite demand for
and full payment of the properties, it refused to execute deeds of absolute sale and release
the CCTs to petitioner without any sound basis.
G.R. No. 117954. April 27, 2000. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ORLANDO ACURAM,

accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Policemen; That a policeman could display such indifference to
a crime committed in his presence—ignoring a shooting incident and going his way—is
highly incredible.—To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the
shooting incident, we find that his behavior proves otherwise. Appellant admits that he was
at the scene of the crime at the time the shooting happened. Considering that he is a law
enforcement officer, the unusual incident should have at least elicited his curiosity and he
should have inquired about it. However, he chose to ignore the incident and go his way.
That a policeman could display such indifference to a crime committed in his presence is
highly
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
130
30
People vs. Acuram
incredible. While it was true that he reported for duty the day after the incident, the
following day, he was ordered by his commanding officer restricted within the camp
pending investigation of the case. By this time, appellant must have learned that his
commanding officer had received a radio message and that he was already a suspect. As the
trial court noted, no superior officer will hold back from any of his men involved, such a
grave charge. Despite these, appellant did not present himself before the police in El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental. Instead, he was conveniently nowhere to be found.
Same; Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Voluntary Surrender; The essence of
voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and
submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or
he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capture; Being restrained by one’s superior to stay within the camp without submitting to the
investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as
contemplated by law.—Appellant’s first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, in our view, is quite untenable. The essence of
voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and
submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt
or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capture. In this case, it was appellant’s commanding officer who surrendered him to the
custody of the court. Being restrained by one’s superiors to stay within the camp without
submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary
surrender as contemplated by law. The trial court is correct in not appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in appellant’s favor.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery cannot be appreciated
where the accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than
from a deliberate act of the will.—On his second assignment of error, however, we find
convincing merit. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the killing
was qualified by treachery. On this point, we agree. For treachery to be considered an
aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode
of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
131
VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 131
People vs. Acuram

himself. In this case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment. As observed by
the trial court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the driver and the passengers of
the jeepney. The shooting was on instantaneous response to the cursing, as appellant
correctly claimed. Treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused shot the victim as a
result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the will.
Same; Same; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites;Direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix where the trial court may draw its
conclusions and findings—from direct evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of
circumstances the mind is led intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, towards a
conviction that from said fact or facts some other facts may be validly inferred.—Appellant
contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was the perpetrator of the crime. He
claims he was not conclusively identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not positively
tested. True, prosecution witnesses did not positively identify appellant as the one who
fired the gun at the victim. Nevertheless, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is
not the only matrix where the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. It
is settled that conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the
following requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial
evidence could be of similar weight and probative value as direct evidence. From direct
evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of circumstances the mind is led intuitively, or
by a conscious process of reasoning, towards a conviction that from said fact or facts some
other facts may be validly inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the
evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that
there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused
committed the crime.
Same; Same; Paraffin Tests; Negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively
show that a person did not fire a gun.—Appellant’s insistence on his innocence in view of
the absence of paraffin and ballistic tests, in our view, is far from convincing. Suffice it to
state that even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person
did not fire a gun. The absence of
132
32
People vs. Acuram
nitrates could be explained if a person discharged a firearm with gloves on, or if he
thoroughly washed his hands thereafter.
Same; Same; Physicians; The perceived delay in giving medical treatment to the victim
does not break at all the causal connection between the wrongful act of the accused and the
injuries sustained by the victim—it does not constitute an efficient intervening cause; Anyone
inflicting injuries is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal act such as death
that supervenes in consequence of the injuries, and the fact that the injured did not receive
proper medical attendance would not affect the malefactor’s criminal responsibility.—We
cannot hold the attending doctors liable for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in
giving medical treatment to the victim does not break at all the causal connection between
the wrongful act of the appellant and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not
constitute an efficient intervening cause. The proximate cause of the death of the deceased
is the shooting by the appellant. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible
for all the consequences of his criminal act such as death that supervenes in consequence of
the injuries. The fact that the injured did not receive proper medical attendance would not
affect appellant’s criminal responsibility. The rule is founded on the practical policy of
closing to the. wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just consequences of his
wrongful act. If the rule were otherwise, many criminals could avoid just accounting for
their acts by merely establishing a doubt as to the immediate cause of death.

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G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000.

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; Notwithstanding the independent nature of civil

MENDOZA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.LUCITA SUYOM,

SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING AGENCY CORPORATION,

GREENSTAR EXPRESS, INC. and FRUTO L. SAYSON, JR.,

Raynera vs. Hiceta

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

1. 1.NEGLIGENCE; CRITERION FOR DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF NEGLI-

1. stitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the

1. 2.ID.; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; SUCCESSIVE NEGLIGENT ACTS.—

ROGELIO ENGADA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former

MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD

RICHARD LI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. LOURDES

1. 1.MASTER AND SERVANT; EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO

1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT UPON COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER.—

1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFECTS IN WAYS, WORKS, AND MACHINERY.—An employee

1. 5.ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER.—After providing reasonably safe ways,

COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN and COMPREHENSIVE ANNUITY PLAN and

TRAVEL & TOURS ADVISERS, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO

SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA and HERMINIA VERGARA,

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE

NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, respondents. NATIVIDAD (Substituted by

MIGUEL AMPIL, petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA,

UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (BVI) LIMITED,

G.R. No. 185815. November 14, 2016.*

UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (BVI) LIMITED,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ORLANDO ACURAM,

People vs. Acuram

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