G.R. No. 143439. October 14, 2005.* proving that the accused Maximo Alvarez
committed all the elements of the crime being
charged particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ, respondent. pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house
located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan,
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Words and Phrases; Marital Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his
Disqualification; During their marriage, neither the husband nor the sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and
a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the set it on fire; that the accused at the time he
latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.—Section 22, Rule 130 of successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan
the Revised Rules of Court provides: “Sec. 22. Disqualification by Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan
reason of marriage.—During their marriage, neither the husband nor Ramirez, the members of the family as well
the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the
the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or accused; that as a consequence of the accused in
in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan
the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.” The reasons given for Ramirez, the door of said house was burned and
the rule are: 1. There is identity of interests between husband and together with several articles of the house,
wife; 2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is including shoes, chairs and others.
consequent danger of perjury; 3. The policy of the law is to guard the
security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an COURT:
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and 4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility You may proceed.
there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony
of the other. Alvarez vs. Ramirez, 473 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 143439 xxx
October 14, 2005
DIRECT EXAMINATION
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the
the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. name of that person, if you know?
Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion[5] to For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained
disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification. tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such
harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
Respondent filed an opposition[6] to the motion. Pending resolution identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
of the motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be
the presentation of the other witnesses. nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void
in the unhappy home.[12]
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order
disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting
her testimony from the records.[7] The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated
October 19, 1999.[8] In Ordoo vs. Daquigan,[13] this Court held:
SO ORDERED.
Page |4
G.R. No. 143340. August 15, 2001.* action not having been brought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased.
Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane Liquefied action, the SEC being the agency that has original and exclusive
Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought
and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite),
under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Respondent On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this
allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to time on the ground that the claim for winding up of partnership
Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership affairs,
counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits would be accounting and recovery of shares in partnership assets/properties
equally divided between them. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto should be dismissed and prosecuted against the estate of deceased
as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister Jacinto in a probate or intestate proceeding.
of the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy. As compensation, Jacinto would
receive a manager's fee or remuneration of 10% of the gross profit
On August 16, 1993, the trial denied the second motion to dismiss for
and Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in addition to her
lack of merit.
wages and other remuneration from the business.
On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial
ran out the alibis and reasons to evade respondent's demands, she conference and set the hearing of the case of January 17, 1996.
disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000.00 Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were
and partially paid the same to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth considered to have waived their right to present evidence for their
allegedly informed respondent that the P200,000.00 represented failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence despite
partial payment of the latter's share in the partnership, with a notice.
promise that the former would make the complete inventory and
winding up of the properties of the business establishment. Despite On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for
such commitment, petitioners allegedly failed to comply with their respondent. The dispositive of the Decision reads:
duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income
of Shellite to the damage and prejudice of respondent. "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:
On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila, (1) DIRECTING them to render an accounting in
not the Regional Trial Court in Zamboanga del Norte had jurisdiction acceptable form under accounting procedures
over the action. Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. and standards of the properties, assets, income
and profits of the Shellite Gas Appliance Center
On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in Since the time of death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from
from and substance denied the motion to dismiss. whom they continued the business operations
including all businesses derived from Shellite Gas
On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Appliance Center, submit an inventory, and
Counter-claims, contending that they are not liable for partnership appraisal of all these properties, assets, income,
shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and attorney's profits etc. to the Court and to plaintiff for
fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against them, approval or disapproval;
Page |6
(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the latter'' invitation and offer and that upon his death the
partnership any and all properties, assets, income partnership assets and business were taken over by
and profits they misapplied and converted to petitioners.
their own use and advantage the legally pertain
to the plaintiff and account for the properties 2. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion
mentioned in pars. A and B on pages 4-5 of this that laches and/or prescription did not apply in the instant
petition as basis; case.
(3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the 3. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion
plaintiff ½ shares and interest of the plaintiff in that there was competent and credible evidence to warrant
the partnership of the listed properties, assets the finding of a partnership, and assuming arguendo that
and good will (sic) in schedules A, B and C, on indeed there was a partnership, the finding of highly
pages 4-5 of the petition; exaggerated amounts or values in the partnership assets
and profits."5
(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned
but unreceived income and profits from the Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court
partnership from 1988 to May 30, 1992, when the and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between
plaintiff learned of the closure of the store the respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the
sum of P35,000.00 per month, with legal rate of absence of any written document to show such partnership between
interest until fully paid; respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were
proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his
(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after
partnership and terminate its business activities Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the
pursuant to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule
the ½ interest, shares, participation and equity in 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
the partnership, or the value thereof in money or
money's worth, if the properties are not "SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of
physically divisible; adverse party. – Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan executor or administrator or other representative of a
guilty of breach of trust and in bad faith and hold deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
them liable to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
as moral and exemplary damages; and, deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind,
cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the death of such deceased person or before such person
sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's (sic) and became of unsound mind."
P25,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of
NO special pronouncements as to COSTS. respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been
admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto),
now represented by petitioners.
SO ORDERED."3
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other does not diminish the value of her testimony since relationship per se,
mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.16
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account
of the transaction.9 But before this rule can be successfully invoked to Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat
bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: respondent's claim cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial
persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted. evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and
the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or sufficient to prove the formation of partnership, albeit an informal
other representative of a deceased person or a person of one.
unsound mind;
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand trial. By the weight of judicial precedents, a factual matter like the
against the estate of such deceased person or against finding of the existence of a partnership between respondent and
person of unsound mind; Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on review.17 This Court
can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties
and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which
the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this
occurred before the death of such deceased person or
or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.18 It must be also
before such person became of unsound mind."10
pointed out that petitioners failed to attend the presentation of
evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot now turn to this Court to
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to question the admissibility and authenticity of the documentary
this case. evidence of respondent when petitioners failed to object to the
admissibility of the evidence at the time that such evidence was
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim11 against offered.19
respondents in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing
of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this With regard to petitioners' insistence that laches and/or prescription
case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute".12 Well entrenched should have extinguished respondent's claim, we agree with the trial
is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or court and the Court of Appeals that the action for accounting filed by
representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the respondents three (3) years after Jacinto's death was well within the
plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an action to enforce
death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.13 Moreover, as an oral contract prescribes in six (6) years20 while the right to demand
defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from an accounting for a partner's interest as against the person continuing
testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the the business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any
deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the contrary agreement.21 Considering that the death of a partner results
estate or representatives of the deceased.14 in the dissolution of the partnership22 , in this case, it was Jacinto's
death that respondent as the surviving partner had the right to an
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's account of his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that
Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a while Jacinto's death dissolved the partnership, the dissolution did
party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." not immediately terminate the partnership. The Civil Code23 expressly
Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to provides that upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal
establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and personality is retained until the complete winding up of its business,
Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of culminating in its termination.24
respondent does not make her an assignor because the term
"assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership
arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners maintain that said
action has arisen."15 Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of partnership that had initial capital of P200,000.00 should have been
respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff. registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since
registration is mandated by the Civil Code, True, Article 1772 of the
We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's Civil Code requires that partnerships with a capital of P3,000.00 or
testimony lacks probative value because she was allegedly coerced more must register with the SEC, however, this registration
coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor, requirement is not mandatory. Article 1768 of the Civil
Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by Code25 explicitly provides that the partnership retains its juridical
respondent to testify and that if she were not requested to do so she personality even if it fails to register. The failure to register the
would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude from contract of partnership does not invalidate the same as among the
this candid admission that Josephine's testimony is involuntary when partners, so long as the contract has the essential requisites, because
she did not in any way categorically say that she was forced to be a the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and
witness of respondent. it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents
of their contract.26 In the case at bar, non-compliance with this
Page |8
SO ORDERED.
Page |9
G.R. No. 179786. July 24, 2013.* professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, petitioner, vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN, at the trial. To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery
respondent. procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the
advice or treatment he gave him — would be to allow access to
Remedial Law; Evidence; Physician-Patient Privileged Communication
evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician
Rule; The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially
memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing
means that a physician who gets information while professionally
them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify
attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient,
patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s
without the latter’s prior consent. Chan vs. Chan, 702 SCRA 76, G.R.
reputation.―The physician-patient privileged communication rule
No. 179786 July 24, 2013
essentially means that a physician who gets information while
professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined
without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the DECISION
latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to
open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and ABAD, J.:
give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for
diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear the production and submission in court of the respondent husband's
that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court hospital record in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where
and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.
might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at
great risk. The Facts and the Case
Same; Same; Objection to Evidence; Section 36, Rule 132, states that On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed
objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a
for admission in court.―The case presents a procedural issue, given petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent
that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene
could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that
evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
patient’s health problems. Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had
to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification
admission in court. Thus: SEC. 36. Objection.—Objection to evidence and rehabilitation.
offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds
in her wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage
therefor shall become reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in
counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men
writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the
forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection.
offer unless a different period is allowed by the court. In any case, the
The marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily
grounds for the objections must be specified. Since the offer of
detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after
evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces
the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could
tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before
no longer be repaired.
making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are
produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth
not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was
disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form
above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters. carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point,
on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the
Same; Same; Physician-Patient Privileged Communication Rule; To
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City,
allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The
records ― the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave
evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. 2
him ― would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible
without the patient’s consent.―The right to compel the production
of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were
privileged.” Josielene of course claims that the hospital records covered by physician-patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the
subject of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also
evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special
24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
without the consent of the patient, be examined” regarding their 97913, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
P a g e | 10
On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made
that, if courts were to allow the production of medical records, then after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:
patients would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant
disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be
confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also made immediately after the offer is made.
affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. The CA added
that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds
purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.
therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
Question Presented
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3)
days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by
The central question presented in this case is: the court.
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s
hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for
privileged character of the physician-patient communication.
subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to
begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
The Ruling of the Court tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are
produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object,
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their
the hospital records of Johnny’s confinement, which records she disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted
wanted to present in court as evidence in support of her action to above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted
her request for subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character 2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance
of those records. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion
Evidence which reads: for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a
litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— provides:
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases: SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of
any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action
xxxx is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in
capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient. his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant
object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially
and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and
means that a physician who gets information while professionally
photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are
attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
just. (Emphasis supplied)
patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s
reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up
to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him But the above right to compel the production of documents has a
access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."
of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a
physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this
narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might case are not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule
risk.4 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the
to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the
physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the
entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems. hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
P a g e | 11
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be
said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in
evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene
into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement.
Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he
filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records
would again be premature.
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in
denying Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s
hospital records.
SO ORDERED.