IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 17, NO.
2, MAY 2002
Controlling Grid Integrity After
Power System Emergencies
W. R. Lachs, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—An emergency strategy for dealing with multiple con-
tingencies that can lead to system voltage instability has been in-
corporated into a program for studying post-disturbance power
system dynamic events. Pattern recognition allows simple logic for
a practical and reliable means of safeguarding the grid and of-
fering a means for preventing the multimillion dollar collapses that
befall worldwide interconnected systems. The proposed automatic
arrangement only needs low cost measures and is able adapt to
multiple contingencies. The timely responses to emergencies would
allow higher power flows on lines constrained for system voltage
stability as well as raising security levels by taking advantage of
the initial system resilience without need for its costly augmenta-
tion.
Index Terms—Automatic emergency control, multiple contin-
gencies, system collapse, system voltage instability.
I. INTRODUCTION
P OWER systems are replete with automatic controls and
protections to ensure fast, timely responses to multitudes
of shocks that constantly strike power systems. But for more
severe unexpected disturbances, no automatic supports are pro-
vided leaving slow manual responses of operators to deal with
fast post-disturbance phenomena, mostly without success. The
Electricity Supply Industry devotes effort and capital to ensure
that the power system is sufficiently robust to survive a range of
severe disturbances at periods of highest demand. Nonetheless,
interconnected power systems throughout the world are being
subjected to widespread and lengthy blackouts, such as those to
the North American Western Interconnection on July 2, 1996
and August 10, 1996, which interrupted millions of consumers
costing the community one billion dollars [1]. The most costly
interruptions have occurred after the EHV transmission line net-
work has been disrupted and this has invariably followed mul-
tiple contingencies, more severe than any considered in planning
the power system.
This has highlighted a deficiency of existing protections that
safeguard individual system elements but not the integrity of
the transmission grid. By default, system operators form the last
line of defense against such unpredictable multiple contingen-
cies but their inability to initiate timely responses, not unexpect-
edly, has culminated in the demise of power systems [2]–[4]. It is
clearly unsatisfactory that operators do not have automatic sup-
port for disturbances more severe than those against which au-
tomatic controls and protections are provided. The deficiency is
as a consequence of existing measures only having been devised
Manuscript received October 17, 2000; revised August 9, 2001.
The author is with the School of Electrical Engineering, University of New
South Wales, Sydney, Australia (e-mail: w.lachs@ieee.org).
Publisher Item Identifier S 0885-8950(02)03817-8.
0885-8950/02$17.00 © 2002 IEEE
445
against predicted disturbances. The paper develops a strategy
that would allow timely, automatic responses able to adapt to
unexpected multiple contingencies that can occur anywhere on
an interconnected grid. The process of developing the strategy
meant uncovering deficient assumptions, questioning present
approaches, and properly defining the task. A general strategy
for most power system emergencies is outlined, but the specific
objective has been to control system voltage stability, the most
prevalent cause of disruption on interconnection power systems.
II. AUTOMATIC EMERGENCY CONTROL
Considerable research effort continues to be devoted to power
system breakdown and collapse without as yet gaining its prac-
tical resolution. The approach taken has been to divide the task
into separate compartments in an effort at simplification but this
approach fails to gain a perspective on the overall power system
issues. Also assumptions embedded as “accepted wisdom” have
impeded efforts to resolve the task. Instead it has been assessed
as a total system problem with all assumptions being critically
questioned. Just as important is the clear formulation of the ob-
jectives, to resolve the following issues.
— Planning criteria only assess predictable disturbances.
— Extensive blackouts have followed multiple contingen-
cies more severe than those considered by planning cri-
teria.
— Multiple contingencies can occur anywhere on the
grid.
— Disturbance identification is only possible after the
event.
— After its identification, timely and appropriate re-
sponses must be triggered if grid integrity is to be
sustained.
— The control arrangement must be reliable insofar that
it functions correctly when it is needed.
A. Engineering Solution
Underlying the efforts is the need to find a satisfactory engi-
neering solution within the following guidelines.
— Engineering is the art of finding practical and cost-
effective solutions.
— The first step is to correctly understand the problem
that is being addressed.
— The path to a solution needs an intimate understanding
of problem phenomena.
— The best engineering solutions are simple, reliable, and
of minimal cost.
446
A primary step is to assess the reasons why present power
system planning methods are unable to deal with multiple con-
tingencies and find a better approach. A practical control of
system voltage stability must incorporate a means of timely
identification as well as devising measures to deal with post-dis-
turbance phenomena. To achieve these objectives there must be
a full understanding of the post-disturbance phenomena by sim-
ulating the events leading to collapse. There is also need to re-
assess present methods of hierarchical control to find a simpler
and more reliable approach.
III. DANGER OF MULTIPLE CONTINGENCIES
With the importance of reliable electricity supplies to the
community, considerable effort and expense is devoted to pro-
tecting and reinforcing the power system. Planning criteria have
been developed to define a wide range of disturbances that must
be successfully withstood. Power systems are most vulnerable
on the day of annual peak so planning criteria consider a number
of single contingencies at the heaviest demand. To allow for
its continuing evolution the power system is reviewed annually,
using the forecast peak demand for the studies. If the system is
found vulnerable to any of the examined disturbances, it is re-
inforced or specific measures are devised to overcome such a
weakness. The next question is why planning criteria that have
previously proven satisfactory can no longer avoid blackouts.
Planning criteria were devised in an era when many utilities
were self-sufficient in generating resources and power stations
were operating in cities, near the main load concentrations. The
power stations were in service at peak periods and could sup-
port city loads whenever there were disturbances. As the power
system could handle single contingencies at annual peak de-
mand, it was assumed capable of handling more severe distur-
bances at lesser load periods. The character of power systems
has been altered with the steadily increasing importance of the
EHV transmission network. In the immediate post-World War
II era, EHV interconnections mainly served to share generator
reserves and were usually not heavily loaded except under rare
emergencies. The 1973 to 1974 oil crisis led to reducing oper-
ation of costly oil fired power stations and in turn led to much
higher loading on the EHV grid. Subsequently, community en-
vironmental concerns have led to the permanent retirement of
city power stations so that the interconnected EHV has become
the critical link between electricity consumers and the now dis-
tant power stations. With the present power system evolution,
keeping interconnected grid integrity is essential, yet multiple
contingencies continue to disrupt grids and so cause extensive,
long duration blackouts.
System planning criteria that assess single and double con-
tingencies are proving inadequate and this becomes clear by
considering a small 30 element grid. Although small, this has
2 or over one billion connection modes with only one not
an outage. This network can have 30 single contingencies and
30 29 double contingencies, or a total of 900 that could be
examined by planning criteria. This leaves one billion multiple
contingencies not examined and until this deficiency is tackled,
all power systems remain at risk of disruption.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 17, NO. 2, MAY 2002
A knee-jerk reaction has been to consider the low probability
of such dangerous multiple contingencies. Probability methods
have estimated such blackouts can occur once in 50 years yet
the two 1996 North American Western Interconnection black-
outs occurred within six weeks. If anything it demonstrates the
incorrect assumptions incorporated into probability evaluations.
Regrettably the situation will become progressively worse if the
problem is not tackled, with the greater vulnerability of grids to
such disturbances as line power flows increase. This will be in-
evitable with a continual growth of electricity demand coupled
with the almost impossible task of gaining additional transmis-
sion lines to reinforce the EHV grid. An approach is described
which can deal with the unpredictable multiple disturbances that
pose the prevailing threat to power systems and for this three
guidelines have been followed.
1) to question areas of “accepted wisdom” and assumptions;
2) to gain better understanding of post-disturbance phe-
nomena;
3) to devise simple and practical solutions.
A. Clue From the July 2, 1996 Incident
Identical multiple contingencies on July 2 and 3, 1996, offer
a vital clue for dealing with system voltage instability. Shortly
after 2 p.m. on both days, a flashover tripped a 345 kV between
Wyoming (Jim Bridger Power Station) and Idaho when a pro-
tection malfunction at the power station tripped another, leaving
only one 345 kV line to Idaho. On July 2, this led to system
voltage instability, disrupting the North American Western In-
terconnection; 11 power stations shut down and 2 million con-
sumers were lost [2]. On July 3, with no automatic support and
only guided by increase of excitation and reduction of voltage,
operators shed 700 MW at Boise, so holding the interconnec-
tion. If operators have responded, the same indicators can also
be used to drive an arrangement that can automatically safe-
guard system voltage stability.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE PHYSICAL PHENOMENA
The first need has been to understand the post-disturbance
phenomena that culminate in loss of system voltage stability
and collapse. Predominantly, efforts have concentrated on the
use of a complex mathematical model of the power system, in-
corporating assumptions to more readily gain a computer solu-
tion. Assumptions create a divergence from real situations and
undermine the understanding of post-disturbance events. Inci-
dents culminating in collapse have reported an initial stable pe-
riod lasting up to several minutes with a normal level of fre-
quency until the final seconds of collapse [3], [4]. The suc-
ceeding disruptive phase has described sudden widespread ef-
fects throughout the interconnected network that caused its dis-
ruption. Consequently, the total network must be considered, as
a simplified model could not properly assess the overall reac-
tive power changes in the post-disturbance period. Therefore,
a load flow approach has been adopted as it allows the en-
tire network to be modeled without simplifications or assump-
tions. Each load flow study evaluates and records the current and
voltage on every system element, so providing a computer ana-
logue of the power system. All incidents of system voltage insta-
LACHS: CONTROLLING GRID INTEGRITY AFTER POWER SYSTEM EMERGENCIES
bility have described a similar chain of stochastic changes and
these have been used as blueprint for a series of a power system
load flows that have replicated both the first slow and the second
disruptive phases. To reach this point required a careful assess-
ment of the responses to post-disturbance events of individual
elements, such as generators and transformer tap changers. Post-
disturbance phenomena leading to system voltage instability are
simulated as a series of discontinuous events. To ensure accurate
reactive outputs on all rotating units, all generator transformers
were included so that excessive overexcitation on just one unit
could be identified [5], [6].
The output of each of the load flows culminating in break-
down was minutely scrutinized to determine the locations and
the system elements where significant changes had occurred.
During the first slow phase, the high reactive power output of
rotating units in the vicinity of the affected region effectively
shielded the remainder of the network from the disturbance ef-
fects, making it initially a local problem. With the onset of
the second disruptive phase, when one rotating unit’s reactive
output was abruptly curtailed and then additional units were re-
stricted, the voltage reductions drew increasing amounts of re-
active power from ever widening areas of the network, making it
a system problem. Such detail, which has been essential for de-
vising a solution, has been inaccessible when complex software
is used to model the collapse process so demonstrating a pitfall
with such methods in gaining a practical engineering solution.
The simulation has been essential for testing different measures
and then devising a control strategy.
V. POWER SYSTEM BREAKDOWN
As well as correctly identifying the problem it is just as im-
portant to ask the right questions.
The key question is “how does the power system break-
down?”
There are multitudes of automatic protections provided on
the power system. For a direct fault on any line or piece of
equipment, its protection trips in a fraction of a second, both
to safeguard it from further damage as well as to safeguard the
power system itself. The power system has sufficient resilience
to withstand a direct fault on an EHV line, when the protection
acts correctly. Yet when no fast protection acts, the danger of
power system breakdown arises. This shows that when the dis-
turbance is not dealt with promptly, uncontrolled after effects
will continue to flow through the network and will actuate re-
sponses from back-up control devices. These are widely dis-
tributed throughout the power system and include turbo-gen-
erator governors, automatic voltage regulators, boiler controls
with coal-fired power stations and automatic transformer tap
changing. During uncontrolled post-disturbance events, the de-
vices have the following three intrinsic deficiencies
1) Each group functions at different rates, seconds to min-
utes
2) Each individually has actions that respond only to
changes in its immediate vicinity
3) Not one of them acts in coordination with any other.
Their disparate actions in response to chaotic post-disturbance
phenomena is the cause of system breakdown. This recognition
447
makes it clear that system breakdown can only be prevented
by effectively diminishing the post-disturbance phenomena. For
this, timely measures must be automatically triggered to prevent
their dangerous uncoordinated responses.
VI. HIERARCHICAL CONTROL
The control of power systems currently uses a hierarchical
communications structure, called the Energy Management
System (EMS), whose intelligence is centralized at the main
control centre. The EMS requires information from the entire
power system and even for operational control under nondis-
turbed conditions, sophisticated programming of the central
computer is required. A severe disturbance that threatens power
system integrity creates an avalanche of extra information that
cannot be corrected by state estimation programs because of the
need for timely responses. Nonetheless, the complex control
software must still resolve the following six issues.
1) The type of emergency must be identified.
2) The severity of the disturbance must be assessed.
3) Measures to deal with this severity must be selected.
4) The locations where they must act must be pinpointed.
5) Delays in sending signals over the communications net-
work must be corrected.
6) All this must be completed in time to give effective re-
sponses.
With lack of accuracy and the large volume of information,
it is an overwhelming task to develop software that can deal
with all these issues by means of a central computer. Added to
achieving timely actions is the basic need for high reliability
in responding to severe, unforeseeable disturbances. These con-
siderations show the insurmountable difficulties associated with
choosing the path of centralized emergency control.
Why then do power systems turn the practical hierarchy up-
side down with control directed from the apex?
This control structure was used more than 50 years ago, when
operators at main control centres supervised operation of the
power system. There was then far less automation without most
of the current technological innovations. The current structure
of EMS is another example of how the assumptions embedded in
“conventional wisdom” hinder a practical solution for the emer-
gency control of interconnected power systems. In contrast, uti-
lizing distributed intelligence for power system emergency con-
trol can overcome these bottlenecks.
VII. DEALING WITH SYSTEM VOLTAGE STABILITY
Any medical practitioner will testify that an ailment cannot
be cured by only treating symptoms—a cure first requires the
cause to be identified. The Western Interconnection was divided
into five separate islands in the July and August 1996 incidents
by reactions to symptoms but not the cause [2]. By the time the
symptoms evolved, intergenerator oscillations were sundering
synchronizing forces and power system disruption was well ad-
vanced. A satisfactory approach must deal with the cause of
breakdown before conditions deteriorate to set up unsustainable
oscillations between separate groups of generators. In tackling
448
system voltage instability that follows multiple contingencies,
the following issues must be dealt with.
— The critical disturbance could occur anywhere on the
grid.
— The disturbance cannot be predicted.
— Disturbance after-effects must be controlled before
uncoordinated responses of back-up devices are acti-
vated.
— The integrity of the grid must be sustained.
Hence a hierarchical control structure with a distributed intel-
ligence would fulfil these needs. To respond effectively, iden-
tifiable changes must be swiftly discerned at localities on the
grid that are affected by a disturbance so as to trigger timely
responses. Essentially countermeasures should be made at af-
fected points while the grid remains intact, as the best means
of eliminating the post-disturbance phenomena that otherwise
lead to its breakdown. Such an approach should be taken to deal
with all causes of power system breakdown, but here the attack
is only focused on dealing with system voltage stability.
A. Seeking the Identifying Parameters
The first requirement in implementing a distributed intelli-
gence for controlling system emergencies has been to unearth
the parameter changes that can identify the danger. Reported
incidents of system voltage instability and collapse have de-
scribed the characteristic symptoms of sustained sharp reduc-
tions of transmission voltage levels in conjunction with increase
of reactive power outputs on rotating units [2]–[4].
The successful simulation of post-disturbance events by a
series of load flows have replicated the reported characteristic
changes of voltages and rotating unit reactive power outputs, re-
ferred to in Section IV [5], [6]. Simulation studies for multiple
contingencies at many parts of an interconnected EHV network,
allowed the parameter changes to be calibrated for identifying
dangerous disturbances. Any direct fault on the EHV grid would
initially provoke similar parameter changes, except they would
disappear when the protection clears the fault. Consequently, a
delay of longer than the slowest protection is needed to correctly
identify the threat to system voltage stability.
B. Developing Effective, Low Cost Countermeasures
The next requirement after devising pattern recognition for
identification has been to devise effective, low cost countermea-
sures. The simulation load flow method that could replicate the
dynamic sequence of post-disturbance events provided the tool
with which countermeasures could be assessed.
The most powerful measure is strategic load shedding which
minimizes the amount shed by finding the optimum locations.
Strategic load shedding could regain system voltage stability
by itself, but with the initial slow phase, there is time for other
measures that can reduce the amount of shedding. Low cost
measures that could respond quickly enough and whose action
would not inconvenience any consumer were examined. For
the power system under investigation, the measures adopted
included fast tap changing on EHV substation transformers,
raising synchronous condenser and generator terminal voltages,
and fast tap changing on generator transformers [6].
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 17, NO. 2, MAY 2002
C. Emergency Strategy
The elements needed for the emergency strategy to safeguard
against system voltage instability have been presented.
— The identifying parameters, voltage reductions and ro-
tating unit excitation increases.
— They are used with a distributed intelligence.
— Countermeasures, including strategic load shedding,
have been assessed.
The method of integrating them into the emergency strategy
has been the culmination of extensive dynamic simulation
studies. The key findings for this purpose have been the
following.
— The magnitude of parameter changes to identify the
threat to system voltage instability.
— Measures are only needed at locations that have shown
substantial parameter changes.
— The grid is saved by preventing the second disruptive
phase.
— The distributed intelligence continues to respond until
not one unit exceeds its rated excitation.
— The voltage reduction at each affected EHV substation
is used to quantify the amount of load (strategic) shed-
ding.
— Most of the selected measures precede load shedding,
with timings based on dynamic studies.
— With the disturbance severity, the power angle across
the grid is unduly large, even after load shedding.
— This requires a measure to reduce the power angle.
— Measures continue to respond until parameter changes
have been practically eliminated as this shows that
post-disturbance phenomena have been damped out.
The definition of system voltage instability was formulated and
proved the key to devising the emergency strategy.
System voltage stability is threatened when a disturbance
increases the reactive power demand beyond the sustainable
capacity of the available reactive power resources [7].
The emergency strategy hinges on pattern recognition as the
driver of the distributed intelligence and its great advantage is
the immediate identification of a disturbance with simple logic.
Parameter changes need to be calibrated to allow control logic to
make a YES/NO decision while simultaneously pinpointing lo-
calities where responses are needed to control post-disturbance
events.
An inadvertent real-life demonstration of the emergency
strategy occurred on July 3, 1996, when operators reacted to
the symptoms of unit excitation increases and reduction of
voltages, by shedding 700 MW at Boise and thereby regaining
system voltage stability and keeping the grid intact.
D. Testing the Emergency Strategy
The simulation program that directed an existing load flow
program was amended to include the emergency strategy. By in-
cluding measures the program provided a prototype of a system
protection for guarding system voltage stability.
Extensive studies have been undertaken on a number of in-
terconnected networks on which multiple contingencies at di-
verse locations of each were examined. In every case the emer-
LACHS: CONTROLLING GRID INTEGRITY AFTER POWER SYSTEM EMERGENCIES
gency strategy prevented disruption of the interconnection from
system voltage stability. Rather than trying to present results of
many studies, one extremely severe outage has been described
to illustrate the spectacular success of the emergency strategy.
This example describes the simultaneous loss of 5 EHV lines
on a 92 bus, 15 000 MW system, that would otherwise have suf-
fered system voltage instability. For a perspective of the emer-
gency strategy, a number of diagrams compare post-disturbance
changes of one selected parameter in the safeguarded and col-
lapse mode [6], [7]. The timing of measures in safeguarding the
grid, including shedding 1000 MW at affected substations as
well as dynamic post-disturbance events, are described.
E. Revolutionizing Reactive Power Planning
The prevailing approach to reactive power planning of large
power systems is extremely time consuming even though it is
limited to annual studies of single and perhaps double con-
tingencies. For each vulnerable case, means must be devised
against the threat to voltage stability, a task made more difficult
by the diversity of disturbance locations. Reinforcing the EHV
grid would be a good solution but now is almost impossible
with the financial and environmental constraints so that one of
three following approaches is usually adopted.
1) Devise a special purpose protection for each situation.
2) Constrain the power flow on an EHV transmission line.
3) Provide additional reactive power compensation.
Each of these approaches has a deficiency, apart from being
only applicable to a foreseeable disturbance.
1) Each special purpose protection must be checked for co-
ordination with other protections.
2) Higher electricity costs result at heavy load periods when
line power flows are constrained.
3) The provision of extra reactive resources requires capital
expenditure yet each addition would only support a lim-
ited region. An unacceptable outlay would be needed to
combat the multitude of disturbances that can occur on
the grid.
In contrast, the emergency strategy offers automatic re-
sponses to multiple contingencies at any point of the grid. The
reason for the emergency strategy’s effectiveness is its ability
to eliminate excessive reactive power demand in the affected
localities within the initial post-disturbance phase. Thereby the
sustainable capacity of existing resources can continue to meet
the interconnected system’s reactive power demand even for
unexpectedly severe disturbances.
Because of its automatic responses as well as its ability to
adapt to any prevailing disturbance it opens a new frontier in
system reactive power planning. These automatic responses in
curtailing the excessive reactive demand can allow the post-dis-
turbance demand (after its action) to met by the available reac-
tive power resources. This inherent ability to adapt to any mul-
tiple contingency would eliminate the tedious task of examining
a multitude of disturbances. Engineers would only need to ex-
amine a sufficient number of multiple contingencies to be as-
sured that the emergency strategy would be effective.
449
F. Planning Resource
The final step has been to integrate the guidance software
into a new load flow program, devised for a Personal Computer,
capable of handling networks with as many as 15 000 busbars
[7]. This program requires the data used for an existing load
flow program, the “bread and butter” tool used by power system
planners. It is also necessary to nominate measures to respond
to the post-disturbance effects of disturbances.
The program allows power systems to be assessed for
multiple contingencies well beyond the scope of disturbances
considered by present planning criteria. This would be an im-
portant step in implementing the automatic emergency control.
The low cost to install the protection would improve operational
security on the EHV grid, and allow a better utilization of
the network’s capability. This contrasts to existing planning
methods that require heavy capital expenditures in reinforcing
the power system to improve its load carrying capability. The
studies would demonstrate that automatic measures, using pat-
tern recognition and responding after otherwise unpredictable
contingencies, could sustain system voltage stability and avert
collapses such as occurred on the Western Interconnection in
July and August 1996.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper shows a method for establishing a system protec-
tion that can automatically safeguard grid integrity against the
threat of system voltage instability. The arrangement responds
to multiple contingencies on the grid with an emergency strategy
that can to adapt to any unexpectedly severe disturbance.
The highest priority is given to its reliability, a vital need of
all practical protection schemes. The intrinsincally simple ap-
proach of the proposal would facilitate its rapid establishment
at a minimal cost.
The 20-year effort toward this development was prompted
by recognizing weaknesses in prevailing methods for tackling
the control of power system emergencies. Consider that power
system development allows for single and double contingencies
whereas system voltage instability has followed multiple con-
tingencies. Current emergency control efforts focus on central-
ized energy management systems at the main control centres for
which elaborate software, incorporating a mathematical model
of the power system must sift through the avalanche of data cre-
ated following a disturbance. This approach is not reliable nor
can it achieve timely responses to prevent the disturbance. Then
the uncoordinated responses of back-up devices would produce
system breakdown when post-disturbance phenomena persist.
The important step on the path to developing the automatic
emergency control has been successful simulation of the post-
disturbance first slow and second fast phases, culminating in
system voltage instability. With this resource the elements for a
system protection arrangement were uncovered, including iden-
tifying parameter changes, effective measures and an emergency
strategy. Threatening situations can be identified by pre-cali-
brated changes of voltage and rotating unit excitation, lending it-
self to a distributed intelligence capable of responding to distur-
bances anywhere on the power system. The emergency strategy
curtails post-disturbance after-effects by directing measures to
450
the affected region. Thereby the excessive reactive demand is
eliminated with the important benefit of permitting existing re-
active resources can maintain voltage control.
An Automatic Voltage Stability program, incorporating the
emergency strategy, has been developed that can evaluate all
post-disturbance dynamic events that follow a multiple contin-
gency. It has been extensively tested, dealing with the simulta-
neous loss of 5 EHV lines on a 15 000 MW, 92 bus system by
shedding 1000 MW [6].
Of particular note are the events of 3rd July 1996 when op-
erators, reacting to excessive unit excitation and low voltages,
shed 700 MW at Boise and so kept intact the North American
Western Interconnection. On July 2, 1996, the identical contin-
gency split the grid into five islands, interrupted 2 million con-
sumers, and shut down 11 power stations [2]. The fact that op-
erators were able to identify the changes and respond without
prior training underlines the intrinsic simplicity of the emer-
gency strategy. This incident confirms that a straightforward ap-
proach can deal with the dynamic phenomena that otherwise
lead to system voltage instability.
Besides offering a low cost, reliable solution to a seemingly
insoluble problem the system protection has practical advan-
tages. The first being that SCADA networks already monitor
EHV voltages and rotating unit power outputs, the very param-
eters needed for the proposal. By contrast with complex EMS
software that takes a year to commission, its simple pattern
recognition software can be quickly tested and commissioned.
When operational, the proposed system protection would
overcome the most intractab le problems bedeviling large
power systems:
1) enhancing operational security without heavy capital ex-
penditures;
2) allowing better use of system capabilities;
3) greatly reducing the danger of multimillion dollar system
collapses;
4) providing automatic operator support for system emer-
gencies (reducing the risk of operator errors).
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 17, NO. 2, MAY 2002
These and other advantages offered by the proposal would
gain multimillion dollar benefits in power system operation and
control. The Electric Supply Industry would be remiss not to
grasp such a practical and cost-effective opportunity.
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[3] A. Cheimanoff and C. Corroyer, “The power failure of December 19,
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[4] Cigre Task Force TF-38-01-03, “Planning against voltage collapse,”
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W. R. Lachs (M’78–SM’85–F’94) received the B.E. degree in mechanical and
electrical engineering and the M.Eng. degree in electrical engineering from
Sydney University, Sydney, Australia, and the Ph.D degree from the University
of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, in 1953, 1972, and 1992, respectively.
Since 1953, he worked in the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority,
Cooma, Australia, in communications, contracts, and system planning
branches. On moving to the Electricity Commission of New South Wales,
Sydney, Australia, he gained experience in substation design, power system
auxiliaries, system operation, system investigations, system planning, and
research and development coordination. Since 1988, he has undertaken full
time research at the University of New South Wales on the automatic control
of power system emergencies.
Dr. Lachs is a member of the IEEE Power System Stability Subcommittee
and of the CICGRE Task Force 38–02–24 “Defense Plans Against Extreme
Contingencies.” He has made submissions to CIGRE Task Forces 38-02-10 and
38-02-12. He is Fellow Search Chairman of the IEEE New South Wales Section
Committee.