Canonizado vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, January 25, 2000 Canonizado vs. Aguirre GR. No.

L-
133132, January 25, 2000

FACTS:

The NAPOLCOM was originally created under RA No. 6075 (An Act Establishing The Philippine National
Police Under A Reorganized Department Of the Interior And Local Government, And For Other Purposes-
).

Petitioners Edgar Dula Torre, Alexis Canonizado, Rogelio Pureza and respondent Jose Adiong were
members of the NAPOLCOM under RA 6975. Dula Torres was first appointed on January 8, 1991 for a six
year term and was reappointed on January 23, 1997 for another 6 years. Canonizado was appointed on
January 25, 1993 to serve the unexpired term of another Commissioner which ended on Dec. 31, 1995.
On Aug. 23, 1995, he was re-appointed for another 6 years. Pureza was appointed on Jan, 2, 1997 for
similar term of 6 years. Respondent Adiong’s appointment was issued on July 23, 1996. None of their
terms had expired at the time the amendatory law was passed. On March 6, 1998, RA 8551 took effect; it
declared that the terms of the current Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity.
Consequently, President Ramos appointed Romeo Cairme on March 11, 1998 as member of the
NAPOLCOM for full 6 year term. Adiong was also given a term extension of 2 years since he had served
less than 2 years of his previous term. Completing the membership of the NAPOLCOM are Leo Magahum
and Cleofe Factoran. Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of Sec. 8 of RA 8551 violates
their security of tenure. Public respondents insist that the express declaration in Sec. 8 of RA 8551 that
the terms of petitioners’ offices are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to impliedly abolish
NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975 pursuant to bona fide reorganization.

ISSUE:

1. Whether petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by Congress?

DECISION:

NO.

RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners’ positions.

This is precisely what RA 8551 seeks to do-declare the offices of the petitioners vacant, by declaring that
-the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired,- thereby removing petitioners
herein from the civil service. Congress may only be conceded this power if it is done pursuant to a bona
fide abolition of the NAPOLCOM. RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners’ positions. In order to
determine whether there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine th e changes
introduced by the new law in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM. The creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. It is acknowledged that Congress may abolish
any office it creates without impairing the officer’s right to continue in the position held and that such
power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds or in the interest of economy.
However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith, not for political or personal
reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.
 An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently, as the
word -abolished- denotes. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with
similar functions, the abolition is legal nullity.

Public Interest vs. Elma G.R. no. 138965 March 5 2007

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES, and JOCELYN P.CELESTINO, vs.MAGDANGAL B.
ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, and RONALDOZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, Accused Appellant
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

Sec. 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art. IX-B, 1987
Constitution)

Facts:

Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as
PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second
appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.

Petitioner questions Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC. They contend that
the appointments contravene Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices.
Elma alleged that the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other public officials given the rank of
Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.

He also claimed that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be applied in
his case. This provision, according to him, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the
law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary functions of either
position allows such concurrent appointment. Since there exists a close relation between the two
positions and there is no incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would
allow respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to both positions. He further add that the
appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an accepted practice.

Issues:

1. Can the PCGG Chairman concurrently hold the position of CPLC?

2. Is the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applicable to the PCGG
Chairman or to the CPLC?

3. Does the ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional,
for being incompatible offices, render both appointments void?

4. Is there a need to refer the case to the Court en banc?

Held:

1. No. The concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. An incompatibility exists between the positions
of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial
legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review
investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential
appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the
actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent Elma will be
required to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation
conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In
such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the situation that the law seeks
to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible offices.
2. The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the
PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant
secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.

Granting that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is applicable to the
present case, the defect in respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to the incompatible offices of
the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC would even be magnified when seen through the more stringent
requirements imposed by the said constitutional provision. The said section allows the concurrent
holding of positions only when: (1) provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) the second post is required by
the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity [which denotes
an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office]. Although respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration
for the second appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require his
appointment as CPLC.

Appointment to the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC,
and vice versa. The primary functions of the PCGG Chairman involve the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and associates, the investigation of
graft and corruption cases assigned to him by the President, and the adoption of measures to prevent
the occurrence of corruption. On the other hand, the primary functions of the CPLC encompass a
different matter, that is, the review and/or drafting of legal orders referred to him by the President. And
while respondent Elma did not receive additional compensation in connection with his position as CPLC,
he did not act as either CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an ex-officio capacity. The fact that a separate
appointment had to be made for respondent Elma to qualify as CPLC negates the premise that he is
acting in an ex-officio capacity.

In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to respondent
Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant
secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to respondent
Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG appointments in question
are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited
under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the incompatibility
between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. (Public Interest Center
vs. Elma, G. R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006)

3. The ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for
being incompatible offices, does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on
incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman
when he accepted the second office as CPLC.
4. There also is no merit in the respondents’ motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What is in
question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments, and
not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement. The mere application of constitutional
provisions does not require the case to be heard and decided en banc. (Public Interest Center vs.
Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007)

Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18,
2011
RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as -Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon
as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate- against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman
of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that -[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.- Petitioners
cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held
that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited
his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of
the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition
in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of
Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover,
the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run
charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are
private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he
was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and
1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the
1935 Constitution states that -[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or
controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.- The Court thus directed
the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
 WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95,
as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of

the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the
PNRC Charter.

II. THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision
by deleting the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because
it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly
a GOCC nor a private corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among
the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have
reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP
Resources, Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC
Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since
there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the
PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even
originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of
existence in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11,
1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No.
6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the
PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the
creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a
private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms
of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State
and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui
generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained
valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its
amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this
case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect
the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has
the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be
reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter
to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any
other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under
international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging
its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
can neither -be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality-
as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international
humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government,

nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly
allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a -private corporation- within the contemplation
of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-
case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government
in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court
cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the
PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a
substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The
Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only
have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but
also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections
of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the
dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution .]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ULDARICO P.
ANDUTAN, JR.
G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.

FACTS:
Pursuant to the Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to
vacate their positions, Andutan resigned from the DOF as the former Deputy Director of the One-Stop
Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF. Subsequently, Andutan, et al. was criminally
charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents, and violations RA 3019. As government employees, Andutan et al.
were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The criminal and administrative
charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia,
among others. The Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been
separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement
and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and
controlled agencies or corporations. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman,
ruling that the latter -should not have considered the administrative complaints- because: first, Section
20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman -may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one
year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of-; and second, the administrative case
was filed after Andutan’s forced resignation

ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative
investigation a year after the act was committed.

2. Whether the Ombudsman has authority to institute an administrative complaint against a

government employee who had already resigned.

HELD:
1. No. Well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative
offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining
public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but
the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our
government. Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was
committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period
stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative
investigation.

2. No. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the
latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed. It is irrelevant, according to the
Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the
operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service.
The SC observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render
moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. However, the facts of those
cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the public
officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case
already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains. First, Andutan’s
resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan
resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1,
1999, exactly one year and two months after his resignation. What is clear from the records is that
Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case
against him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official – even if he has
been separated from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of
his superiors, ad infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the
interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.

Pagano vs Nazzaro

Esther S. Pagano, Cashier IV of the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet, it was
discovered that in her accountabilities she had incurred a shortage of P1,424,289.99. On 12
January 1998, the Provincial Treasurer wrote a letter directing petitioner to explain why no
administrative charge should be filed against her in connection with the cash shortage and
petitioner may still be held administratively liable for dishonesty, grave misconduct
and malversation of public funds through falsification of official documents.
Petitioner was already deemed resigned when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy on 16.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS BEEN SEPARATED FROM THE CIVIL
SERVICE BY OPERATION OF LAW MAY STILL BE ADMINISTRATIVELY CHARGED
Held : Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee
charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the
administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability
when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the
finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable. A case
becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. [22] The
instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioners separation from government
service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service -
may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed
on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a government employee in
effecting his or her separation from service, soon after an administrative case has been initiated
against him or her. An employees act of tendering his or her resignation immediately after the
discovery of the anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in criminal cases

Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times
the highest sense of honesty and integrity for no less than the Constitution mandates the
principle that a public office is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency.[24] The Courts cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and accountability in
the acts of government officials.

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001

FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis -Chavit- Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged
that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known
as -Jose Velarde- – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy
across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case
against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment
complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed,
with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded -not guilty-.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,
bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan
and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations
joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew
their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing
that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada -constructively resigned his post-. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had -strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president-, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being
an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition
for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from -conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment -confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only
in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.-
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner
Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as -those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.-
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand
of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely,
the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987
constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question
of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial
review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that
struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the
Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued
regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its
legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that
petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner
is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987
Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-
sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed
while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the
immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

Aguinaldo vs. Santos

Post under Alter ego doctrine , Doctrine of Condonation , Local Government , Political Law Case Digests ,
Power of Control , Powers of the President

Facts:
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup
d’état was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram c letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him
to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A
sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts
committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel
soldiers.

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the
formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and
ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.

Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government.
Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local
government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution;
(2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former
could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed
by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of
evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he
had been removed from office.

The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the
Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a
landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor
of Cagayan.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration
case moot and academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the
President

3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.

Held:

1. Yes. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative
case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the
most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public
official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the
Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by
Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local
governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the
acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was
repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to
the legislature the power and authority to enact a local government code, which provides for the manner
of removal of local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court had
the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present
Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of
the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.

3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof
required is only substantial evidence. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992)

G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO
I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO
OBEÑA, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments
in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse
with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the -Oakwood Incident,- petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 03-2784, -People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al.-
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his hat in the political
arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.3

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 148, an -Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions
and Related Requests-4 (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at
the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the
regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings,
consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc.,
which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial
Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);

(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig,
Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and
the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in
order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at
the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working
area and the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the
budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;

(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of
detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at
reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings,
briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him
in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the
press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while
at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public
policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks
and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government;

(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be
allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the
media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion
at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or
when the Senate is not in session; and

(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate
and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the
Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.5

By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim
them down to three.7 The trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18,
2007.8

Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and
for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource
persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as
Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and
guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner
preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to
convene his staff, resource persons and guests9 at the Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio
Calunsag; Philippine Marines’ Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks
Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).

Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30,
2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the
foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the day before or on November 29, 2007.

Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-
named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof would be without practical value and use.
Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this
Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising
custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or
continued the assailed actions of the former custodians.12

Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the trial court:

I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY

INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A.

UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY
CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL
ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

B.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2)
COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF -COUP D’ETAT-,
A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;

C.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO

BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY
 SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;

II.

GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE

BRIG’S COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE
SESSIONS;

III.

ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR

SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK
AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;

- AND -

IV.

MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT

OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH -ERAP- ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR
MISUARI.13

The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out
that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending
appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner’s Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is
a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the
presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e.,
two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup
d’etat which is regarded as a -political offense.-

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of
Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other
circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election
to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.15
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.16 (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,17 or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action.18

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable
by reclusion perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude
involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail21 or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction,22 justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is -regardless of
the stage of the criminal action.- Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense23 applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos.

As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between convicted
prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes
their rights more limited than those of the public.

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the
pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail
or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention
or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement
restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos,
which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could
somehow accomplish legislative results.27

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the
full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of
innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court
in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the
accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a
promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate ofpresumption of innocence
prevails.28

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his
agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his
proclamation by the Commission on Elections.29

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk
since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous
times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on
November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the
courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the -Manila
Pen Incident,-30 proves that petitioner’s argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape
ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the
reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail.31 In cases involving non-
bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.32

Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike
petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution.
Notatu dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that -if denial of bail is authorized in capital
cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.-35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only
capital offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious
reason that -one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee.-
37Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his

requests which are akin to bailing him out.

Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeña’s
recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment38 of Obeña
that he interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for
deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s duties,
flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political
office inside a military installation owing to AFP’s apolitical nature.39

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may
justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.40 The officer with custodial
responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to
secure the safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the
detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the
same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his
mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that
denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of
proper representation, denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the
mandate of the people.

Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that -a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor.-42

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is
no -prior term- to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does
not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the
voters elected him to the Senate, -they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison.-44

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it is opportune to wipe out the lingering
misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of
lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord
may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the -mandate of the people-
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.46 (Underscoring supplied)

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who
have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and
former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend -social functions.- Finding no rhyme and
reason in the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps
on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner
expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed
under Senate custody or house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house
arrest to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.48 That this discretion was gravely abused,
petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter
in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007,
be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt
to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-
around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions
and blanket authorizations.

Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner’s case
fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings

for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.51

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015

(RE: Validity of 1st and 2nd paragraphs of RA 6770)
FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition,
and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts
from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite
the usage of the general phrase -[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court,- the Ombudsman
herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules
of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing,
took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of
judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of
the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus,
stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions,
such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation
of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular
case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the
court is hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against -decision or findings- of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770-
attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce,
invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated
Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they -cover the same specific or particular subject
matter,- that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of
the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent
proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to
resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected
unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be
raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right
to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.

QUINTO vs COMELEC
FACTS:

The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

BACKGROUND:

Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional.

Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.

The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: -Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in GOCCs
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his certificate of candidacy-
ISSUE:

Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of the
constitution.

HELD:

The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec
13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
constitutional.

RULING:

These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits civil service
officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in
partisan political campaign is unmistakable.

The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated different from the other.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privelege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under
like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective officials
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464, 472, December 2, 1991Petitioner:

Facts:
Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988
local elections. He assumedoffice immediately after proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado,
Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local
Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution approving the recommendation
of Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall against Evardone. Evardone
filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the Comelec nullified the signing process for being violative of
the TRO of the court. Hence, this present petition.

Issue 1:
WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its powers under the Constitution
and BP 337 (Local Government Code) was valid.

Held:
Yes
Ratio:
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there was, during the period material to this case, no
local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for
that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no
basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.
The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does not refer only to a local government code which
is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the guidelines which Congress will consider in amending
the provisions of the present LGC. Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local
Government Code remains operative. Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides
that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987Constitution shall remain operative, until amended,
repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Codeof 1991, approved
by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four
of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore
the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the
enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P.Blg. 337 was expressly recognized
in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We therefore rule that Resolution No.
2272promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the COMELEC had the
authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.

Issue 2:
WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held
pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.

Held:
No
Ratio:
In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or
about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following
up and determining the outcome of such notice. Evardone alleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990
that he came to know about the Resolution of the COMELEC setting the signing of the petition for recall
on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for
prohibition only on 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the
petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the COMELEC and
Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its
Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested
by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about
34x signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary there is no turning back the
clock. The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the right of
suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public
functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public office is -burdened- with public interests
and that the representatives of the people holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the
people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their
respective offices. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is
a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. -Loss of
confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his
office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The constituents have made a judgment and
their will to recall Evardone has already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus,
the signing process held last 14 July1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is
valid and has legal effect. However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local
election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in ArticleXVIII, Sec. 5 on the second
Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the
regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code.

TAAS kayo ang IN RE: REYES wala na nako giapil

Ombudsman vs. Mojica GR 146486

The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a
formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of
allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica,
committed the following: 1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting money
from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against all
employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints in
Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, were
dismissed.

Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court -a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an
original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules,

ISSUE: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution?

RULING: The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law
experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has
likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution
as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree
in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986
Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members
of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
(see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative
enactment.

The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which
constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.Hence, the moment
he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can
be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative
investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the
petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions
of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

RODANTE D. MARCOLETA vs. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA AND ROMEO

A. BRAWNER , A.C. No. 7732, March 30, 2009 involved a complaint for disbarment which
was filed by Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta (complainant) against respondents Commissioners
Resurreccion Z. Borra (Borra) and Romeo A. Brawner (Brawner) of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) charging them with violating Canons 1 (1.01, 1.02 and 1.03) and 3 (3.01, 3.02, 3.05 and
3.06) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Additionally, complainant charges respondents of violating Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

During the 2007 National and Local Elections, the warring factions of complainant and Diogenes
S. Osabel (Osabel) each filed a separate list of nominees for the party-list group Alagad.

With Alagad winning a seat in the House of Representatives, the two protagonists contested the
right to represent the party. By Omnibus Resolution of July 18, 2007, the dispute was resolved by
the Comelec’s First Division in favor of Osabel. Commissioner Borra wrote the ponencia while
Commissioner Brawner concurred. The dispute was elevated to the Comelec En Banc which, by
Resolution of November 6, 2007, reversed the First Division Resolution and reinstated the
certificate of nomination of complainant’s group. For failing to muster the required majority
voting, however, the Comelec ordered the re-hearing of the controversy. Notwithstanding the
conduct of a re-hearing, the necessary majority vote could not still be obtained. The Comelec’s
First Division’s Omnibus Resolution was eventually affirmed.

Respondent Brawner, in his Answer dated April 2, 2008, asserted in the main that -the remedy
of complainant is not to file a complaint for disbarment, but to file an appeal before [the Supreme
Court] via [p]etition for [c]ertiorari,- and that being members of a constitutional body enjoying
presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions, he and co-respondent Borra -
are supposed to be insulated from a disbarment complaint for being impeachable officers.-

In his Comment, respondent Borra contended that the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons of
Judicial Ethics could be made to apply to him and his co-respondent, they not being members of
the judiciary; and that since they performed quasi-judicial functions as well as administrative
duties, they were bound by the Comelec’s own set of internal rules and procedure over and
above a Code of Conduct that prescribed the norms and standards of behavior to be observed by
the officials and employees of the Comelec, a constitutional body.

Respondent Borra further contended that present complaint was premature as -the validity and
legality of the resolutions are still subject to review;- and that the complaint was meant to -harass
[him] and punish him for exercising his judgment on the case filed before him.-

The Court took notice that respondent Borra had retired from the Comelec on February 2, 2008
while respondent Brawner passed away on May 29, 2008.

As regards respondent Brawner then, the present case was already moot.

At the outset, the Court, guided by its pronouncements in Jarque v. Ombudsman, A.C. No. 4509,
December 5, 1995, 250 SCRA xi, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988, 160
SCRA 771, and Cuenco v. Fernan, A.C. No. 3135, February 17, 1988, 158 SCRA 29, has laid down
the rule that an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without
first being impeached. (Sec. 2, Art. 11, 1987 Constitution).

As an impeachable officer who is at the same time a member of the Bar, respondent Borra must
first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment before he may be held
to answer administratively for his supposed errant resolutions and actions.

The Court thus found respondent Borra’s contention that the grounds-bases of the disbarment
complaint, fastened on supposed errors of judgment or grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts, were proper for an appeal, hence, complainant’s remedy was judicial, not
administrative.

The Court stated that the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary applied only
to courts of law, of which the Comelec was not, hence, sanctions pertaining to violations thereof
were made exclusively applicable to judges and justices in the judiciary, not to quasi-judicial
officers like the Comelec chairman and members, who have their own codes of conduct to steer
them.

Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of respondent Borra under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, no specific incidents and sufficient evidence can be gathered to show
that respondent did engage in dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in his capacity as a lawyer.
It bears reiteration that the acts particularized in the complaint pertain to respondent Borra’s
duties as a Comelec commissioner.

As for the release of retirement benefits to respondent Borra, there was nothing irregular
therewith, the same being in line with Memorandum Circular No. 10 (series of 1995) of the Office
of the Ombudsman reading:
x x x a person retiring from the government service, whether optional or compulsory, needs only
to present a certification from this Office whether or not he has a pending criminal or
administrative case with it. In the event the certification presented states that the prospective
retiree has a pending case, the responsibility of determining whether to release his retirement
benefits, as well as the imposition of necessary safeguards to ensure restitution thereof in the
event the retiree is found guilty, rests upon and shall be left to the sound discretion of the head
of the department, office or agency concerned. (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Francisco vs House of Representatives

Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice -to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court for -culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes.- The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to
the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was -sufficient in form,- but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance.

The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a -Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment- signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that -[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.-

Issues:
Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power
of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes
an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.

The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that -The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.- Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase -to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.- Hence,
these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other
specific limitations on its power to make rules.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have
the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in
the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within
a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with
the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred
under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989

AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989

CRESENCIO D. DATA, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

Paredes Law Office for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which
follows this majority opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice
Griño-Aquino as a working basis for the Court's deliberations when the case was being discussed
and for the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on the action proposed by the report.

There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions
to be drawn from those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The
majority is of the view that Messrs. Arias and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable
doubt. The Court feels that the quantum of evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data
beyond reasonable doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue injury to the
Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been
satisfied.

In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General 1 who, in 80 pages of his
consolidated manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of
the crime charged, with costs de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F.
Guerrero had also recommended the dropping of Arias from the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made
the bidding out and construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal
inefficiency in the public eye. However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may
have ordered the project, who signed a document incident to its construction, or who had a hand
somewhere in its implementation. The careless use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail
even innocent persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who
engineered the defraudation.

Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission
chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of
conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon
or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and
deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.

The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of
land purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was
intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.

The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of -riceland- in Rosario, Pasig which
had been assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land- in 1978 for
P80.00 a square meter. The land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase,

We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of
land in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for
conviction.

Herein lies the first error of the trial court.

It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public
documents or preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the
Government and giving a private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence.

The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00
a square meter instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and
fixed by the municipal assessor, not by the landowner.

The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per
square meter value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the
Mangahan property and if the Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows
that it must have suffered undue injury.

The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:

1. No undue injury was caused to the Government

a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and
reasonable.
 It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase.
It was, therefor, nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase
price had to be arrived at by agreement between the parties and could never be left
to the discretion of one of the contracting parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For
it is the essence of a contract of sale that there must be a meeting of the minds
between the seller and the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the contract
and upon the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to
negotiate the reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other
factors as location, potentials, surroundings and capabilities. After taking the
foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have, thus, arrived at the amount
of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable price for the Agleham
property.

It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true
and fair market value in 1978 of the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square
meter only as stated by the assessor in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the
contrary, the prosecution's principal witness Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal
Assessor of Pasig, admitted that the purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid
for the Agleham property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is reasonable (tsn,
August 19,1983, p. 20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that 'the value of lands within the town of
Pasig ranges from P80.00 to P500.00' (Ibid, p. 21); that the Agleham property is -
around 300 meters- from Ortigas Avenue, -adjacent to the existing Leongson
[Liamson] Subdivision ... and near Eastland Garment Building- (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that
said property is surrounded by factories, commercial establishments and residential
subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of
the Agleham property appearing on the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on
actual use only (lbid, pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate for all ricefields in Pasig
irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and did not take into account the
existence of many factories and subdivisions in the area (Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74),
and that the assessed value is different from and always lower than the actual
market value (Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)

A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of
expropriation proceedings.

In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the
martial law decree that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value
stated by a landowner in his tax declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower.
Other factors must be considered. These factors must be determined by a court of justice and not by
municipal employees.

In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no
participation, was used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms
the basis for a criminal conviction.

The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978
would be a fair evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a
competent court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the
decision, insofar as it says that the -correct- valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis
convicted that petitioners of causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the Government
because of gross overpricing, is grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during
orderly proceedings has been presented and accepted.

The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the
respondent court.

We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-
dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally
examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the
motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving
authority.

There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were
falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The
registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield.
But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing
undue in injury and damage to the Government?

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received
procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office
could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be
asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent 'on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily
expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was
present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served and
otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency.
There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any
executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of
papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting paper that
routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more
appalling.

There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to
sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.

Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to
defraud the government?

Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property
started in 1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the
Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already been consummated before
his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of
October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his signature linking him to the signature on the
voucher, there is no evidence transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did
not know him personally and none approached him to follow up the payment.

Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains
of the transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already
worth P80.00 a square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner
alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00
a square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by changing -riceland- to -residential' was
done before Arias was assigned to Pasig besides, there is no such thing as -riceland- in inner Metro
Manila. Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or kangkong but this
is only until the place is dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If
the Sandiganbayan is going to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based on
firmer foundation.

The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982.
Arias explained that the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d
documents and under no circumstance to relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of
the Bureau of Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal
turnover of custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who
succeeded him as auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.

The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the
Government is the alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project.
Assuming that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:

Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness

of the price of the property?

A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been
consummated and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of little had
been issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines.
The auditors have no more leeway to return the papers and then
question the purchase price.

Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by

the government to private individuals there should be a pre-audit of
the papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?

A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there

is.

Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the
government without paying the price Did you not consider that rather
odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27,1987).

A No, Your Honor.

Q Why not?

A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a

condition that no payments will be made unless the corresponding
title in the payment of the Republic is committed is made.

Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the
government?
 A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether
there is an appropriation set aside to cover the said specification. As
of the price it is under the sole authority of the proper officer making
the sale.

Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of

property to be bought by the government; the sale was
consummated; the title was issued in favor of the government without
the price being paid first to the seller?

A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the

government comes later than the transfer.

Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?

A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).

Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is

also that function you are also called upon by going over the papers .
. . (TSN, page 22, April 27,1987). I ... vouchers called upon to
determine whether there is any irregularity as at all in this particular
transaction, is it not?

A Yes, Ma'am.

Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only
the tax declaration but also the certification by Mr. Jose and Mr.
Cruz?

A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?

Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A

They are not required documents that an auditor must see. (TSN,
page 23, April 27,1987).

and continuing:

A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the

authority of the auditor because it is inasmuch as the amount
involved is beyond his counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April
27, 1987). (At pp. 15-16, Petition. Underlinings supplied by petitioner)

The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:

As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that
as the then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District he created a
committee, headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso
Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district
office, as members, specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project, gather
and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with the owners for the sale of
their lots, process claims and prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any
 direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the
committee which determined the authenticity of the documents presented to them for
processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale;
thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting
documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified
documents which appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as
head of the office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not
approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the approval thereof was the prerogative of
the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter transmitted the signed deed of sale with
its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who in
turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public Works; the deed of
sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a review and re-
examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the deed of sale by the higher
authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which petitioner
Data signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her during
the processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-24,
31-32). (At pp. 267-268, Rollo.)

On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:

It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive
and convincing evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused.
There was no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the
alleged existence of conspiracy merely upon the purported 'pre-assigned roles (of the
accused) in the commission of the (alleged) illegal acts in question is not supported
by any evidence on record. Nowhere in the seventy- eight (78) page Decision was
there any specific allusion to some or even one instance which would link either
petitioner Arias or Data to their co-accused in the planning, preparation and/or
perpetration, if any, of the purported fraud and falsifications alleged in the information
That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the Pasig District
Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the general
voucher covering the subject sale, respectively, does hot raise any presumption or
inference, that they were part of the alleged plan to defraud the Government, as
indeed there was none. It should be remembered that, as aboveshown, there was no
undue injury caused to the Government as the negotiated purchase of the Agleham
property was made at the fair and reasonable price of P80.00 per square meter.

That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the
purchase price in the deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not
prove conspiracy. It may be noted that there was a reduction in the affected area
from the estimated 19,328 square meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by
the Land Registration Commission, which resulted in the corresponding reduction in
the purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to Pl,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of
sale were simple corrections that even benefited the Government.

Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular
in the use of the unapproved survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale
because the approval of the survey plan/ technical description was not a prerequisite
to the approval of the deed of sale. What is important is that before any payment is
made by the Government under the deed of sale the title of the seller must have
already been cancelled and another one issued to the Government incorporating
therein the technical description as approved by the Land Registration Commission,
as what obtained in the instant case. (At pp. 273-275, Rollo)
We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the
petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate
evidence on record is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences
petitioners Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data
are acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Albert vs Gangan, G.R. No. 126557

March 6, 2001, J. Buena

FACTS: An inter-agency committee among Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council
(HUDCC), Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), NHMFC, and Home Insurance
Guarantee Corporation (HIGC) was formed an to conceptualize and prepare the guidelines and
procedures for the Community Mortgage Program (CMP), an innovative scheme in mortgage
financing where an undivided tract of land may be acquired by several beneficiaries through the
concept of community ownership. Carlos P. Doble, then Vice President of HIGC, issued an
appraisal policy for the CMP which was concurred in by the HIGC President, Federico Gonzales,
herein petitioner, NHMFC OIC/EVP, and HUDC Teodoro Katigbak The Sapang Palay Community
Development Foundation Inc., (Foundation) applied for accreditation with the NHMFC as
originator of land and housing project through a Purchase Commitment Line. The application
consists of sixteen (16) project sites situated in different parts of the country. Among these is the
AMAKO Project which was submitted for accreditation to the NHMFC. The AMAKO project refers
to seventy-three (73) hectares of land, which was offered by Severino H. Gonzales, Jr.
Construction, Co, Inc. (SHGCCI). Mr. Concepcion, the Foundation’s president, submitted an
application for Purchase Commitment Line in the amount of P36,794,250.00, specifically for the
AMAKO project. The Officer-in-charge of the Credit and Collection Group, NHMFC, recommended
to petitioner the grant of an additional line in favor of Sapang Palay Community Development
Foundation, Inc., in the total amount of P36,8000,000.007 – approved by the NHMFC Credit
Committee. The NHMFC, upon the recommendation of the CMP Task Force, together with the
Certification of Mortgage Examinations, issued a Letter of Guaranty in favor of SHGCCI.
Thereafter, the disbursement voucher was prepared by the CMP Task Force in favor of SHGCCI.

The Petitioner instructed the Community Mortgage Management Office (CMMO) to conduct a
routine inspection of the AMAKO Project. Upon verification, it was discovered that the AMAKO
project was three (3) months in arrears in their amortization. The COA Resident Auditor of NHMFC
disallowed the loan granted to the AMAKO Project. Petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a letter-
complaint against his subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible for the fraud with
respect to the AMAKO loan transaction. Petitioner also filed a civil case for sum of money,
annulment, damages and attorney's fees with preliminary attachment, against SHGCCI, AMAKO,
Sapang Palay & Development Foundation, Inc., and other persons responsible for the
 misrepresentation, tortious and fraudulent acts in connection with the loan granted to AMAKO
project. The COA rendered Decision finding petitioner as among the persons liable for the amount
representing the payment of the loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO.

ISSUE: WON petitioner can be held personally liable for the amount of P36,796,11.55 representing the
loan proceeds to AMAKO

RULING: No. The mere fact that a public officer is the head of an agency does not necessarily mean that
he is the party ultimately liable in case of disallowance of expenses for questionable transactions
of his agency. Petitioner, as head of the agency, cannot be held personally liable for the
disallowance simply because he was the final approving authority of the transaction in question
and that the officers/employees who processed the same were directly under his supervision.25
Though not impossible, it would be improbable for him to check all the details and conduct
physical inspection and verification of the application of AMAKO considering the voluminous
paperwork attendant to his office. He has to rely mainly on the certifications, recommendations
and memoranda of his subordinates in approving the loan. The processing, review and evaluation
of the loan application passed through the responsible and authorized officers of the CMP Task
Force.

There is no evidence on record to show that petitioner had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme
perpetrated by some employees of the NHMFC. In fact, petitioner immediately filed a complaint
before the Ombudsman against the subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible for
the fraud. He also directed the filing of a civil case against the originator and other persons
responsible for misrepresentation. All these acts are indicative that he had no knowledge of the
fraudulent scheme perpetrated by certain officials or employees of his agency. The actions taken
by petitioner involved the very functions he had to discharge in the performance of official duties.
He cannot, therefore, be held civilly liable for such acts unless there is a clear showing of bad faith,
malice or gross negligence.34 Inasmuch as no evidence was presented to show that petitioner
acted in bad faith and with gross negligence in the performance of his official duty, he is presumed
to have acted in the regular performance of his official duty. Similarly, it is a basic tenet of due
process that the decision of a government agency must state the facts and the law on which the
decision is based

3. Cruz v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 174599-609

February 12, 2010

Facts:
 In 2001, acting on reports of irregularities, respondent Special Presidential Task Force 156 (Task
Force) investigated the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Draw back Center (One-
Stop Center) of the Department of Finance.The Task Force found that certain officials of the One-
Stop Center had been issuing tax credit certificates (TCCs) to entities that did not earn them through tax
overpayments.

According to respondent Task Force, the Diamond Knitting Corporation (DKC), a textile
manufacturer, completely shut down its operations in 1993 yet the DOFs One-Stop Center issued to it
TCCs totaling P131,205,391.00 from 1994 to 1997. DKC in turn sold a number of these TCCs to Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) with the approval of the One-Stop Center. Pilipinas Shell then
used these TCCs to pay off its excise tax obligations to the BIR.

Believing that petitioner Pacifico R. Cruz, the General Manager of Pilipinas Shells Treasury and
Taxation Department, was a party to the fraud, respondent Task Force included him in its complaint for
plunder against certain officials of DKC and of the One-Stop Center before respondent Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB). The OMB dismissed the plunder case but caused the filing of separate informations
for multiple violations of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against petitioner Cruz
and the others with him. Before being arraigned, however, Cruz sought the reinvestigation of the
cases, claiming that he had been unable to seek reconsideration because of the hasty filing of the
informations. The Sandiganbayan granted his motion and ordered the OMB to submit a report of its
reinvestigation within 60 days.

After reinvestigation, respondent Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) submitted a

memorandum to the OMB, recommending the dropping of the charges against Cruz for lack of evidence
that he supplied the false documents used for processing the transfers to Pilipinas Shell of the subject
fraudulently issued TCCs. The OSP found that Cruz could not have known that DKC had long stopped its
business operations. The recommendation was approved by the OMB and it filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan to drop Cruz from the informations filed. This was not acted on by the Sandiganbayan.

More than five months later, respondent OSP, acting through Prosecutor Galisanao, filed another
motion with the Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance action on the OSPs motion to drop petitioner Cruz
from the charges. At the hearing of the motion on May 15, 203, when neither Cruz nor his counsel was
present, Prosecutor Monteroso orally moved to withdraw the OSPs motion to drop Cruz from the
informations. The Sandiganbayan promptly granted Monterosos oral motion and approved the
withdrawal. Yet, on May 26, 2003 the OSP still filed a motion to withdraw its motion to drop Cruz from
the informations.

On May 30, 2003 Cruz eventually received the Sandiganbayans May 15, 2003 order that already
allowed the withdrawal of respondent OSPs dropping of Cruz from the informations.

On June 16, 2003 petitioner Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans May
15, 2003 order on the ground that he had no notice of the hearing set on that date. He also complained
of lack of notice respecting the formal withdrawal motion set on June 4, 2003. Cruz also challenged
Galisanao and Monterosos authority to countermand the OMBs approval of the dropping of the charges
against him.
 On July 17, 2006 the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny petitioner Cruzs motion for reconsideration.
The court held that Cruz was not entitled to notice since it was the OSPs prerogative to withdraw its earlier
motion to drop him from the charges. The Sandiganbayan also pointed out that Cruz ultimately had the
opportunity to ventilate his objections since he filed a motion for reconsideration of the courts order
granting the withdrawal. With regard to the authority of the mentioned prosecutors, it was confirmed by
SP Villa Ignacio on behalf of the ombudsman that Galisanao and Monterosos acted on verbal orders of
the OMB. .Unsatisfied, Cruz filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Simulatenous with the case, this Court rendered judgment in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. CIR. The court rules that Pilipinas Shell was a transferee in good faith and for value and may
thus not be unjustly prejudiced by the transferor’s fraud committed in procuring the transfer of those
TCCs.

Petitioner Cruz filed a manifestation invoking the Courts ruling in the above tax case as res
judicata with respect to his alleged criminal liabilities relating to the subject TCCs.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in allowing respondent OSP to
withdraw its earlier motion to drop petitioner Cruz from the criminal informations even after the OMB
had approved such withdrawal on ground of lack of probable cause; and

2. Whether or not the findings of the Court in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue that Pilipinas Shell was a transferee in good faith and for value of the TCCs in question
bar the prosecution of Cruz in the criminal cases subject of this petition.

Held:

1) YES, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in allowing OSP to withdraw it’s earlier motion
to drop Cruz.

The Sandiganbayan pointed out that it was respondent OSPs prerogative, as public prosecutor, to
withdraw the earlier motion it filed for the dropping of the charges against petitioner Cruz. Giving him
notice of such motion, said the Sandiganbayan, was therefore not indispensable. But respondent OSP
did not ask the Sandiganbayan to drop petitioner Cruz from the charges filed in court out of pure whim
or simply because the OSP changed its mind regarding his case. On motion of Cruz and upon orders of
the Sandiganbayan, the OSP conducted a reinvestigation of the case. By its nature, a reinvestigation is
nothing more than a continuation of the OMBs duty to conduct a preliminary investigation for the purpose
of determining probable cause against a person charged with an offense falling under its jurisdiction.

Apparently, the Sandiganbayan forgot that, in ordering the reinvestigation of the charges against
petitioner Cruz, it effectively acknowledged that he had not been accorded his full right to a preliminary
investigation. As it happened, the OMB found after reinvestigation that no probable cause existed against
petitioner Cruz. Under the circumstances, this entitled Cruz to the dismissal of the charges against
him. Unfortunately, acting with grave abuse of discretion, the Sandiganbayan ignored Cruzs right to such
a dismissal. It simply allowed respondent OSP to withdraw its motion to drop Cruz from those charges
even if the OSP made no claim that the state of evidence had changed after it submitted its memorandum.

2. Yes, res judicata applies.

This Court resolved substantially the same issue in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.There, the Court categorically found that Pilipinas Shell, represented in
its acquisition of the TCCs in question by petitioner Cruz, was a transferee in good faith and for value of
those TCCs. This means that neither Pilipinas Shell nor Cruz was a party to the fraudulent issuance and
transfer of the TCCs.

The parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases are substantially the same. Although it was
respondent Task Force that investigated the irregularities in the issuance and transfers of the TCCs, the
ultimate complainant in the criminal case and the party that suffered the injury was the government,
represented by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is also the CIR who represented the government
in the tax case. In short, the parties in the tax case and in the criminal cases represent substantially
identical interests. The principle of res judicata through conclusiveness of judgment applies to bar the
criminal actions against Cruz.

DR. CASTOR C. DE JESUS, G.R. No. 171491

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.
RAFAEL D. GUERRERO III,
CESARIO R. PAGDILAO, Promulgated:
AND FORTUNATA B.
AQUINO, September 4, 2009
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated September 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
83779, and its Resolution[2] dated February 9, 2006 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

Nilo A. Bareza, Records Officer III of the Philippine Council for Aquatic and
Marine Research and Development (PCAMRD), made out a check payable to
himself and drawn against the Asean-Canada Project Fund, a foreign-assisted project
being implemented by PCAMRD. To avoid being caught, Bareza stole Land Bank
Check No. 070343 from the trust fund of the PCAMRD from the desk of Arminda
S. Atienza, PCAMRD Cashier III. He filled out the check for the amount
of P385,000.00, forged the signatures of the authorized signatories, made it appear
that the check was endorsed to Atienza, and with him as the endorsee, encashed the
check that was drawn against the PCAMRD Trust Fund. Then, he deposited part of
the money to the Asean-Canada Project Fund and pocketed the difference.[3]

Atienza discovered that the check in question was missing on the third week
of February 1999 while preparing the Report of Checks Issued and Cancelled for the
Trust Fund for the month of January. Not finding the check anywhere in her office,
Atienza called the bank to look for the same. She was shocked to learn from a bank
employee that the check had been issued payable in her name. When Atienza went
to the bank to examine the check, she noticed that her signature and the signature of
Dir. Rafael D. Guerrero III (Guerrero), PCAMRD Executive Director, were
forged. She also found out that Bareza appeared to be the person who encashed the
check.[4]

Bareza admitted his wrongdoings when he was confronted by Atienza about

the incident, but begged that he be not reported to the management. Bareza also
promised to return the money in a few days. Against her good judgment, Atienza
acquiesced to Barezas request, seeing Barezas remorse over his transgressions. But
Atienza also felt uneasy over her decision to keep silent about the whole thing, so
Atienza persuaded Bareza to inform Fortunata B. Aquino (Aquino), PCAMRD
Director of Finance and Administrative Division, about what he did. Bareza,
however, decided to confess to Carolina T. Bosque, PCAMRD Accountant III,
instead.[5]

When Bareza revealed to Bosque what he had done, he was also advised to
report the matter to Aquino, but, Bareza became hysterical and threatened to commit
suicide if his misdeeds were ever exposed. Due to his fervent pleading and his
promise to repay the amount he took, Bosque, like Atienza, assented to his plea for
her to remain silent.[6]

True to his word, Bareza deposited back P385,000.00 to the PCAMRD

account on February 25, 1999.[7]

On July 27, 2001, following rumors that an investigation will be conducted

concerning irregularities in the said project, Bareza set fire to the PCAMRD Records
Section in order to clear his tracks.[8]

A fact-finding committee was thus created by virtue of PCAMRD

Memorandum Circular No. 30[9] to investigate the burning incident and forgery of
checks by Bareza. After investigation, the fact-finding committee found sufficient
evidence to charge Bareza with dishonesty, grave misconduct and falsification of
official document.[10] The fact-finding committee likewise found sufficient evidence
to charge Atienza with inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties[11] and Bosque with simple neglect of duty.[12]

Concomitant to the above findings, Guerrero formed an investigation

committee to conduct formal investigations on the charges filed against Bareza,
Atienza and Bosque.[13] The investigation committee found Bareza guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct and recommended his dismissal from the
service. It also found sufficient basis to uphold the charge filed against Atienza and
Bosque, and recommended a minimum penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
suspension for Atienza, and a maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension for
Bosque.[14]
 On September 10, 2001 the PCAMRD adopted the findings of the
investigation committee but imposed only the penalty of six (6) months suspension
on Atienza and only three (3) months suspension on Bosque.[15]

Not convinced with the results of the investigation and the penalties imposed
on Bareza, Atienza and Bosque, petitioner exerted efforts to obtain a copy of the
complete records of the proceedings had. Upon reading the same, petitioner was of
the opinion that the investigation conducted by the fact-finding committee and
investigation committee was perfunctorily and superficially done, and made only to
whitewash and cover-up the real issues because the report exonerated other persons
involved in the crimes and omitted other erroneous acts. According to him, these
circumstances led to partiality in deciding the charges. Hence, petitioner filed with
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon(Ombudsman) a complaint against
Guerrero, Cesario R. Pagdilao (Pagdilao), PCAMRD Deputy Executive Director,
and Aquino, among others, for incompetence and gross negligence.[16] The case was
docketed as OMB Case No. L-A-02-0209-D.

In their Joint Counter-Affidavit and Complaint for Malicious

Prosecution[17] dated July 9, 2002, the respondents argued that the complaint is
wanting in material, relevant and substantive allegations and is clearly intended only
to harass them. Furthermore, they contended that petitioner failed to identify the
persons he claims were exonerated, and worse, petitioner failed to state with
particularity their participation in the crimes.[18]

In his Consolidated Reply and Counter-Affidavit[19] dated July 25, 2002,

petitioner belied the allegation of the respondents that his complaint was lacking in
substance. He stressed that the report of the investigation committee that was
submitted by the respondents reinforced his claim that the investigation relative to
the forgery and arson case was indeed perfunctory and superficial, designed only to
whitewash and cover-up the real issues. To bolster his contention, he pointed out
that the sworn affidavit of Bareza revealed that the latter was able to use certain
funds of the Asean-Canada Project by encashing blank checks that were previously
signed by Pagdilao. Thus, he averred that the failure to implicate Pagdilao as a
conspirator to the crime of forgery shows that the investigation was just a
farce. Petitioner also claimed that Atienza and Bosque were not charged with the
proper administrative offense to avoid their dismissal from the service. Petitioner
pointed to the command responsibility of respondents over Bareza, Atienza and
Bosque. He maintained that had they been prudent enough in handling PCAMRDs
finances, the forgery of checks and the arson incident could have been
avoided. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that being the head of PCAMRD, Guerrero
should have pursued investigations on the criminal aspect of the cases of forgery and
arson because a huge amount of government money was involved therein. His act,
therefore, of declaring the cases closed after the conduct of the investigations in the
administrative aspect only is contrary to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Republic Act No. 3019) because its object is to conceal more big anomalies and
issues.[20]

In a Decision[21] dated August 5, 2002, the Ombudsman recommended the

dismissal of the administrative case filed against the respondents for lack of merit. It
agreed with the respondents that the complaint was couched in general terms that
contains no material, relevant and substantial allegation to support the theory of
cover-up or whitewash.The Ombudsman also held that there is nothing to sustain
petitioners allegation that Pagdilao should be implicated in the forgery because
petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the check that was signed in blank by
Pagdilao was Land Bank Check No. 070343, or the subject check encashed by
Bareza. Even assuming that the forged check was the one signed in blank by
Pagdilao, the Ombudsman opined that the latter still cannot be said to have
participated in the forgery because the check was in the custody and safekeeping of
Atienza, the cashier, when it was stolen. In the same vein, the Ombudsman found no
adequate basis in the petitioners allegation that Guerrero charged Atienza and
Bosque with erroneous administrative infractions to lessen their liability, noting
that Guerrero merely adopted the recommendation of the fact-finding and
investigation committees as to what they should be charged with. The Ombudsman
added that Guerrero cannot be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019 or be held administratively liable for his failure to initiate criminal cases against
Bareza, Atienza and Bosque because he had no personal knowledge of the
commission of the crimes allegedly committed by them.[22]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it in an

[23]
Order dated November 25, 2003. According to the Ombudsman, nowhere in
petitioners complaint did he allege that respondents should be blamed for arson and
forgery because of command responsibility. It held that petitioners averment of the
same only in his reply-affidavit and in his motion for reconsideration should be
disregarded altogether since it materially and belatedly alters his original cause of
action against the respondents, which cannot be allowed.[24]

Not accepting defeat, petitioner elevated the matter by way of a petition for
review[25] under Rule 43 before the appellate court. Petitioner claimed that the
Ombudsman gravely erred when it recommended the dismissal of the charges
against the respondents and denied his motion for reconsideration despite the
existence of a prima facie case against them for incompetence and gross negligence.

On September 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming

the August 5, 2002 Decision and November 25, 2003 Order of the Ombudsman in
OMB Case No. L-A-02-0209-D. The appellate court found that the Ombudsman
correctly dismissed the complaint against the respondents. The appellate court held
that petitioner questioned the handling of the PCAMRD finances without specifying
the particular acts or omissions constituting the gross negligence of the
respondents. The charges, being broad, sweeping, general and purely speculative,
cannot, by their nature, constitute a prima facie case against the respondents.[26]

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Decision but it was denied
by the appellate court in the Resolution dated February 9, 2006.

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DENIED IN ITS DECISION PETITIONERS PETITION AND
AFFIRMED THE OMBUDSMANS DECISION OF AUGUST 5, 2002
IN OMB-L[-A]-02-020[9]-D, RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF
THE CASE BY RELYING SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE
GENERAL RULE/PRINCIPLE THAT THE COURTS WILL NOT
INTERFERE IN THE INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORY
POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IGNORING THE EXCEPTIONS
TO THE RULE PRESENCE OF COMPELLING REASONS AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE EXERCISE THEREOF.

II.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND MISAPPRECIATION OF THE
EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO PRIMA
FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST RESPONDENTS, [THAT]
IF CONSIDERED, WILL ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE.[27]

Simply put, we are asked to resolve whether the appellate court erred in
affirming the dismissal of the complaint. We hold that it did not.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding

of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given
credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions,
and fails to substantiate his allegations, the administrative complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit.[28]

Mainly, petitioner ascribes incompetence and gross negligence to respondents

because according to him, the fraudulent use of PCAMRD funds and arson would
not have happened had they not been remiss in the performance of their
duties. Specifically, he averred that Guerrero, being the head of PCAMRD, should
have seen to it that all the resources of the government are managed and expended
in accordance with laws and regulations, and safeguarded against loss and waste;
Pagdilao should have ensured that the signed blank checks were used for what they
were intended; and that anomalies would have been avoided had Aquino supervised
Bareza, Atienza and Bosque, her subordinates, properly and efficiently. In sum,
petitioner argues that they are accountable because of command responsibility.[29]
 We agree with the appellate court and the Ombudsman that the complaint
against the respondents should be dismissed. A perusal of petitioners allegations
clearly shows that they are mere general statements or conclusions of law, wanting
in evidentiary support and substantiation. It is not enough for petitioner to simply
aver that respondents had been derelict in their duties; he must show the specific acts
or omissions committed by them which amount to incompetence and gross
negligence. This, he failed to do. Hence, the complaint was correctly dismissed for
lack of merit.

Petitioners allegation that he has specified the acts and omissions of

respondents which show that they are guilty of dishonesty and falsification lacks
merit. Aside from the fact that nowhere in the records does it appear that he has
indeed shown the particular acts or omissions of respondents constituting dishonesty
or which amounted to falsification of whatever nature, it must be emphasized that
the case he filed before the Ombudsman was an administrative complaint for
incompetence and gross negligence. Hence, these are the two charges he needed to
prove by substantial evidence, not any other crime or administrative infraction. At
the very least, petitioner should have shown how his accusations of dishonesty and
falsification constituted incompetence and gross negligence on the part of the
respondents.

To further persuade us that his complaint was wrongly dismissed, petitioner

argues that he had in his petition established the existence of probable cause to hold
respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[30] He then concludes that if there is sufficient basis
to indict the respondents of a criminal offense then with more reason that they should
be made accountable administratively considering the fact that the quantum of
evidence required in administrative proceedings is merely substantial evidence. [31]

This argument likewise has no merit. It is worthy to note that petitioner is

merely proceeding from his own belief that there exists sufficient basis to charge
respondents criminally. This is not within his province to decide. He could not
arrogate unto himself the power that pertains to the proper authorities enjoined by
law to determine the absence or existence of probable cause to indict one of a
criminal offense.
 More importantly, an administrative proceeding is different from a criminal
case and may proceed independently thereof.[32] Even if respondents would
subsequently be found guilty of a crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in
the present administrative complaint, the same will not automatically mean that they
are also administratively liable.

As we have said in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.

Naldoza[33] and which we have reiterated in a host of cases,[34] a finding of guilt in
the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal will not necessarily exculpate
them administratively. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.[35]

It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from

criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the
public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public
trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal prosecution is the punishment of
crime.[36] To state it simply, petitioner erroneously equated criminal liability to
administrative liability.

Neither will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make

the respondents liable. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross negligence of
the respondents, administrative liability could not be based on the principle of
command responsibility.[37] Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no
administrative liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot
always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latters own
negligence.[38] While it may be true that certain PCAMRD employees were
sanctioned for negligence and some other administrative infractions, it does not
follow that those holding responsible positions, like the respondents in this case, are
likewise negligent, especially so when the contentions of petitioner remain
unsubstantiated.

WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient showing of grave and reversible

error in the assailed decision and resolution, the petition is DENIED. Said Decision
dated September 30, 2005 and Resolution dated February 9, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 229781

SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioner

vs.
HON. JUANITA GUERRERO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, P/DIR. GEN. RONALD M. DELA
ROSA, in his capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police, PSUPT. PHILIP GIL M.
PHILIPPS, in his capacity as Director, Headquarters Support Service, SUPT. ARNEL
JAMANDRON APUD, in his capacity as Chief, PNP Custodial Service Unit, and ALL PERSONS
ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, INSTRUCTION OR DIRECTION IN
RELATION TO THE ORDERS THAT MAY BE ISSUED BY THE COURT, Respondents

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

For consideration is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Status Quo Ante
Order1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Senator Leila De Lima. In it, petitioner
assails the following orders and warrant issued by respondent judge Hon. Juanita Guerrero of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, in Criminal Case No. 17-165,
entitled "People vs. Leila De Lima, et al.:" (1) the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable
cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner De Lima; (2) the Warrant of
Arrest against De Lima also dated February 23, 2017; (3) the Order dated February 24, 2017
committing the petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center; and finally, (4) the supposed
omission of the respondent judge to act on petitioner's Motion to Quash, through which she
questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC.2

Antecedents

The facts are undisputed. The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries
on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates
who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies.3 These legislative inquiries led to the filing of
the following complaints with the Department of Justice:

a) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00313, entitled "Volunteers against Crime and Corruption (VACC),
represented by Dante Jimenez vs. Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al.;"

b) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315, entitled "Reynaldo Esmeralda and Ruel Lasala vs. Senator
Leila De Lima, et al.;"

c) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00331, entitled "Jaybee Nifio Sebastian, represented by his wife
Roxanne Sebastian, vs. Senator Leila M De Lima, et al.;" and
 d) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00336, entitled "National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) vs. Senator
Leila M. De Lima, et al. "4

Pursuant to DOJ Department Order No. 790, the four cases were consolidated and the DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors (DOJ Panel),5 headed by Senior Assistant State Prosecutor Peter Ong, was directed to
conduct the requisite preliminary investigation.6

The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016,7 wherein the petitioner,
through her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of the
Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice
("Omnibus Motion").8 In the main, the petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has the
exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her. Further, alleging evident
partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors should
inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.

A hearing on the Omnibus Motion was conducted on December 9, 2016,9 wherein the complainants,
YACC, Reynaldo Esmeralda (Esmeralda) and Ruel Lasala (Lasala), filed a Joint
Comment/Opposition to the Omnibus Motion. 10

On December 12, 2016, petitioner, in turn, interposed a Reply to the Joint Comment/Opposition filed
by complainants VACC, Esmeralda and Lasala. In addition, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with
Motion to First Resolve Pending Incident and to Defer Further Proceedings. 11

During the hearing conducted on December 21, 2016, petitioner manifested that she has decided
not to submit her counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two motions.12 The DOJ Panel,
however, ruled that it will not entertain belatedly filed counter-affidavits, and declared all pending
incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution. Petitioner moved for but was denied
reconsideration by the DOJ Panel.13

On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and
Certiorari14assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints against her. The petitions,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 149097 and CA-G.R. No. SP No. 149385, are currently pending with the
Special 6th Division of the appellate court.15Meanwhile, in the absence of a restraining order issued
by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation16 and, in its Joint Resolution dated February 14, 2017,17 recommended the filing of
Informations against petitioner De Lima. Accordingly, on February 17, 2017, three Informations were
filed against petitioner De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC ofMuntinlupa City. One of
the Infonnations was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-16518 and raffled off to Branch 204, presided
by respondent judge. This Information charging petitioner for violation of Section 5 in relation to
Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, contained the following
averments:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the
Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Rages, being then the
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of their public office, conspiring
and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then an employee of the Department of
Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over inmates in the
New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug trading, in the following manner: De Lima
and Ragos, with the use of their power, position, and authority, demand, solicit and extort money
from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the senatorial bid of De Lima in the
May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully authorized by law and
through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through
Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00)
Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One
Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from the high profile inmates in the
New Bilibid Prison.19

On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash,20mainly raising the following: the RTC lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the
Information; the Information charges more than one offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts
do not allege the corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies of witnesses
who are not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses
are hearsay.21

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order 22finding probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused.
The Order stated, viz.:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds
sufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE
LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE P ALISOC DAYAN.

WHEREFORE, let Warrants of Arrest be issued against the abovementioned accused.

SO ORDERED.23

Accordingly, the questioned Warrant of Arrest dated February 23, 2017 ,24 which contained no
recommendation for bail, was issued against petitioner.

On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of Arrest on
petitioner and the respondent judge issued the assailed February 24, 2017 Order,25 committing
petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.

On February 27, 2017, petitioner repaired to this court via the present petition, praying for the
following reliefs:

a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated 23 February 2017,
the Warrant of Arrest dated the same date, and the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional
Trial Court - Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the
Philippines versus Leila M De Lima, et al.;

b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from conducting further
proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality;

c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO)
and a writ of preliminary injunction to the proceedings; and

d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior to the issuance of the
Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated February 23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and
restoring petitioner to her liberty and freedom.26
On March 9, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the respondents,
interposed its Comment to the petition.27 The OSG argued that the petition should be dismissed as
De Lima failed to show that she has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Further, the OSG
posited that the petitioner did not observe the hierarchy of courts and violated the rule against forum
shopping. On substantive grounds, the OSG asserted inter alia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
offense charged against the petitioner, that the respondent judge observed the constitutional and
procedural rules, and so did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in the issuance of the assailed
orders and warrant.28

On petitioner's motion, the Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues
raised. The Court then heard the parties in oral arguments on March 14, 21, and 28, 2017.29

In the meantime, the OSG filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 2017,30 claiming that petitioner
falsified the juratsappearing in the: (1) Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping page of
her petition; and (2) Affidavit of Merit in support of her prayer for injunctive relief. The OSG alleged
that while the advertedjurats appeared to be notarized by a certain Atty. Maria Cecille C. Tresvalles-
Cabalo on February 24, 2017, the guest logbook31 in the PNP Custodial Center Unit in Camp Crame
for February 24, 2017 does not bear the name of Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo. Thus, so the OSG
maintained, petitioner De Lima did not actually appear and swear before the notary public on such
date in Quezon City, contrary to the allegations in the jurats. For the OSG, the petition should
therefore be dismissed outright for the falsity committed by petitioner De Lima.

In compliance with an Order of this Court, petitioner filed the Affidavit of Atty. Maria Cecille C.
Tresvalles-Cabalo dated March 20, 201732 to shed light on the allegations of falsity
in petitioner'sjurats.

The parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda on April 17, 2017.33

The Issues

From the pleadings and as delineated in this Court's Advisory dated March 10, 201734 and discussed
by the parties during the oral arguments, the issues for resolution by this Court are:

Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on hierarchy of courts
considering that the petition should first be filed with the Court of Appeals.

B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the trial court renders
the instant petition premature.

C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule against forum shopping
given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ
Panel.

Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the violation of
Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information.
B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding probable cause to issue
the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.

C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo
Ante Order in the interim until the instant petition is resolved or until the trial court rules on the
Motion to Quash.

OUR RULING

Before proceeding to a discussion on the outlined issues, We shall first confront the issue of the
alleged falsification committed by petitioner in the jurats of her Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in support of her prayer for injunctive relief.

In her Affidavit, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo disproves the OSG's allegation that she did not notarize the
petitioner's Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in this wise:

4. On February 24, 2017 at or around nine in the morning (9:00 AM), I went to PNP, CIDG, Camp
Crame, Quezon City to notarize the Petition as discussed the previous night.

5. I met Senator De Lima when she was brought to the CIDG at Camp Crame and I was informed
that the Petition was already signed and ready for notarization.

6. I was then provided the Petition by her staff. I examined the signature of Senator De Lima and
confirmed that it was signed by her. I have known the signature of the senator given our personal
relationship. Nonetheless, I still requested from her staff a photocopy of any of her government-
issued valid Identification Cards (ID) bearing her signature. A photocopy of her passport was
presented to me. I compared the signatures on the Petition and the Passport and I was able to verify
that the Petition was in fact signed by her. Afterwards, I attached the photocopy of her Passport to
the Petition which I appended to my Notarial Report/Record.

7. Since I already know that Sen. De Lima caused the preparation of the Petition and that it was her
who signed the same, I stamped and signed the same.

8. To confirm with Senator De Lima that I have already notarized the Petition, I sought entry to the
detention facility at or around three in the afternoon (3:00 PM). x x x

xxxx

11. Since I was never cleared after hours of waiting, I was not able to talk again to Senator De Lima
to confirm the notarization of the Petition. I then decided to leave Camp Crame.35

At first glance, it is curious that Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo who claims to have "stamped and signed the
[Verification and Certification and Affidavit of Merit]" inside Camp Crame, presumably in De Lima's
presence, still found it necessary to, hours later, "confirm with Senator De Lima that [she had]
already notarized the Petition." Nonetheless, assuming the veracity of the allegations narrated in the
Affidavit, it is immediately clear that petitioner De Lima did not sign the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in front of the notary public. This is contrary to
the jurats (i.e., the certifications of the notary public at the end of the instruments) signed by Atty.
Tresvalles-Cabalo that the documents were "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me."
Such clear breach of notarial protocol is highly censurable36 as Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima in this case, to sign the instrument or
document in the presence of the notary, viz.:

SECTION 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular notarization merely reduces the
evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document, which requires /roof of its due
execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence,"37 the same cannot be considered
controlling in determining compliance with the requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 6538 require that the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition must be verified and accompanied by a "sworn certificate of non-forum shopping."

In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] pleading is verified by
an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records." "A pleading required to be verified which
x x x lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading." Meanwhile, Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and,
to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed." "Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided x x x."

In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping in the presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to properly swear under oath the
contents thereof, thereby rendering false and null the jurat and invalidating the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping. The significance of a proper jurat and the effect of its invalidity
was elucidated in William Go Que Construction v. Court of Appeals,39where this Court held that:

In .this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against Forum Shopping attached to
the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 was not accompanied with a valid
affidavit/properly certified under oath. This was because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did
not indicate the pertinent details regarding the affiants' (i.e., private respondents) competent
evidence of identities.
Under Section 6, Rule II of AM. No. 02-8-13-SC 63 dated July 6, 2004, entitled the "2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice" (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice), ajurat refers to an act in which an individual on
a single occasion:

xxxx

In Fernandez v. Villegas (Fernandez), the Court pronounced that noncompliance with the verification
requirement or a defect therein "does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court
may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such
that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be
served thereby." "Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct."
Here, there was no substantial compliance with the verification requirement as it cannot be
ascertained that any of the private respondents actually swore to the truth of the allegations in the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 given the lack of competent evidence of any of their
identities. Because of this, the fact that even one of the private respondents swore that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt.

For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the certification against forum
shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court explained that "non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or
presence of 'special circumstances or compelling reasons."' Here, the CA did not mention - nor does
there exist - any perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which justifies the rules'
relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the private respondents certified under oath that no
similar action has been filed or is pending in another forum.

xxxx

Case law states that "[v]erification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative." On the
other hand, "[t]he certification against forum shopping is required based on the principle that a party-
litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora." The important
purposes behind these requirements cannot be simply brushed aside absent any sustainable
explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper justification is especially called for in light
of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the remaining private
respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by simply treating the insufficient submissions
before it as compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the submission of
a proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored settled
procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. All things considered, the proper course
of action was for it to dismiss the petition.40 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that the allegations in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. It must
be noted that verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be
sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice,41as what apparently happened in the
present case. Similarly, the absence of the notary public when petitioner allegedly affixed her
signature also negates a proper attestation that forum shopping has not been committed by the filing
of the petition. Thus, the petition is, for all intents and purposes, an unsigned pleading that does not
deserve the cognizance of this Court.42 In Salum bides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,43the Court
held thus:

The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with the requirement of verification and
that of certification against forum shopping. A defective verification shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading and thus produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the
deficiency to be remedied, while the failure to certifv against forum shopping shall be cause for
dismissal without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, and is not curable by amendment of the
initiatory pleading. (Emphasis and italicization from the original.)

Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary. There is, therefore, no
justification to relax the rules and excuse the petitioner's non-compliance therewith. This Court had
reminded parties seeking the ultimate relief of certiorari to observe the rules, since nonobservance
thereof cannot be brushed aside as a "mere technicality."44 Procedural rules are not to be belittled or
simply disregarded, for these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.45 Thus, as in William Go Que Construction, the proper course of action is to dismiss outright
the present petition.

Even if We set aside this procedural infirmity, the petition just the same merits denial on several
other grounds.

PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS

Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by this Court.46 It will not
entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts.47 The Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important component of the orderly
administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons.48 In The
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,49the Court explained the reason for the doctrine
thusly:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that
the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed
to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the
lower courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential
tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and
important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.

xxxx

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that
every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial
courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them.
They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively
perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their
writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-
important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before
them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the
"actual case" that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort
to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed
before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of
facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may
not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating - in
the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusion of bench or bar - existing
precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that
role.50 (Emphasis supplied.)

Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this Court were allowed
in some instances. These exceptions were summarized in a case of recent vintage, Aala v. Uy, as
follows:

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are
present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6)
when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain,
speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that
may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the
order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an
inappropriate remedy.51

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present petition so as to
convince this court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is obviously not
covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The notoriety of a case, without more,
is not and will not be a reason for this Court's decisions. Neither will this Court be swayed to relax its
rules on the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to the minority party in the present administration. A
primary hallmark of an independent judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court is thus loath to
perceive and consider the issues before it through the warped prisms of political partisanships.

That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of her case.
The right to equal treatment before the law accorded to every Filipino also forbids the elevation of
petitioner's cause on account of her position and status in the government.

Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first impression.
Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is she the first defendant to
question the finding of probable cause for her arrest. In fact, stripped of all political complexions, the
controversy involves run-of-the mill matters that could have been resolved with ease by the lower
court had it been given a chance to do so in the first place.
In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should be disregarded as
her case involves pure questions of law does not obtain. One of the grounds upon which petitioner
anchors her case is that the respondent judge erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding probable cause to issue her arrest. By itself, this ground removes the case from the ambit of
cases involving pure questions of law. It is established that the issue of whether or not probable
cause exists for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact,
determinable as it is from a review of the allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/ or evidence appended to the
Information.52 This matter, therefore, should have first been brought before the appellate court, which
is in the better position to review and determine factual matters.

Yet, petitioner harps on the supposed judicial efficiency and economy of abandoning the rule on the
hierarchy of courts in the present case. Indeed, the Court has considered the practical aspects of the
administration of justice in deciding to apply the exceptions rather than the rule. However, it is all the
more for these practical considerations that the Court must insist on the application of the rule and
not the exceptions in this case. As petitioner herself alleges, with the President having declared the
fight against illegal drugs and corruption as central to his platform of government, there will be a
spike of cases brought before the courts involving drugs and public officers.53 As it now stands, there
are 232,557 criminal cases involving drugs, and around 260,796 criminal cases involving other
offenses pending before the R TCs.54 This Court cannot thus allow a precedent allowing public
officers assailing the finding of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants to be brought
directly to this Court, bypassing the appellate court, without any compelling reason.

THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE

The prematurity of the present petition is at once betrayed in the reliefs sought by petitioner's Prayer,
which to restate for added emphasis, provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the interest of substantial justice and fair play,
Petitioner respectfully prays the Honorable Court that judgment be rendered:

a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated 23 February 2017,
the Warrant of Arrest dated the same date, and the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional
Trial CourtBranch 204, Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the
Philippines versus Leila M De Lima et al.;

b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from conducting further
proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality;

c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO)
and a writ of preliminary injunction to the proceedings; and

d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior to the issuance of the
Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated February 23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and
restoring petitioner to her liberty and freedom.55 (Emphasis supplied)

Under paragraph (a), petitioner asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order dated February 23,
2017 finding probable cause, the warrant of arrest and the Order dated February 24, 2017
committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center. Clearly petitioner seeks the recall
of said orders to effectuate her release from detention and restore her liberty. She did not ask for the
dismissal of the subject criminal case.
More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition under paragraph (b) of the
prayer "until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality," is an unmistakable admission
that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion to Quash and the existence of the RTC's authority to rule
on the said motion. This admission against interest binds the petitioner; an admission against
interest being the best evidence that affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.56 It is based
on the presumption that "no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is
true. "57 It can be presumed then that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is her fault if it
does not.58

Moreover, petitioner under paragraphs (c) and (d) prayed for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
and a status quo ante order which easily reveal her real motive in filing the instant petition-to restore
to "petitioner her liberty and freedom."

Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 17-165.
What is clear is she merely asked the respondent judge to rule on her Motion to Quash before
issuing the warrant of arrest.

In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to dismiss the petition on the
ground of prematurity and allow respondent Judge to rule on the Motion to Quash according to the
desire of petitioner.

This Court, in Solid Builders Inc. v. China Banking Corp., explained why a party should not pre-empt
the action of a trial court:

Even Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which SBI and MFII invoke, works against them. Under that
provision, the equitable reduction of the penalty stipulated by the parties in their contract will be
based on a finding by the court that such penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable. Here, the trial court
has not yet made a ruling as to whether the penalty agreed upon by CBC with SBI and MFII is
unconscionable. Such finding will be made by the trial court only after it has heard both parties and
weighed their respective evidence in light of all relevant circumstances. Hence, for SBI and MFII to
claim any right or benefit under that provision at this point is premature.59 (Emphasis supplied)

In State of Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60the Court likewise held that a petition
for certiorari can be resorted to only after the court a quo has already and actually rendered its
decision. It held, viz.:

We note, however, that the appellate court never actually ruled on whether or not petitioner's right
had prescribed. It merely declared that it was in a position to so rule and thereafter required the
parties to submit memoranda. In making such a declaration, did the CA commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? It did not.

xxxx

All things considered, this petition is premature. The CA has decided nothing and whatever
petitioner's vehement objections may be (to any eventual ruling on the issue of prescription) should
be raised only after such ruling shall have actually been promulgated.

The situation evidently does not yet call for a recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.61(Italicization from the original. Emphasis supplied.)

An analogous ruling was made by this Court in Diaz v. Nora, where it ruled in this wise:
x x x In the case of the respondent labor arbiter, he has not denied the motion for execution filed by
the petitioner. He merely did not act on the same. Neither had petitioner urged the immediate
resolution of his motion for execution by said arbiter. In the case of the respondent NLRC, it was not
even given the opportunity to pass upon the question raised by petitioner as to whether or not it has
jurisdiction over the appeal, so the records of the case can be remanded to the respondent labor
arbiter for execution of the decision.

Obviously, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to seek relief from public
respondents but he failed to avail himself of the same before coming to this Court. To say the least,
the petition is premature and must be struck down.62 (Emphasis supplied.)

The dissents would deny the applicability of the foregoing on the ground that these were not criminal
cases that involved a pending motion to quash. However, it should be obvious from the afore-quoted
excerpts that the nature of the cases had nothing to do with this Court's finding of prematurity in
those cases. Instead, what was stressed therein was that the lower courts had not yet made, nor
was not given the opportunity to make, a ruling before the parties came before this forum.

Indeed, the prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-emphasized considering that petitioner
is actually asking the Court to rule on some of the grounds subject of her Motion to Quash. The
Court, if it rules positively in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion to Quash, will be
preempting the respondent Judge from doing her duty to resolve the said motion and even prejudge
the case. This is clearly outside of the ambit of orderly and expeditious rules of procedure. This,
without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the proceedings in the trial court, as the latter abstains
from resolving the incidents until this Court rules with finality on the instant petition.

Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements set before this Court can
exercise its review powers. Section 5 (2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires
the existence of "final judgments and orders of lower courts" before the Court can exercise its power
to "review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari" in "all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue," viz.:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which puts the jurisdiction of the lower
court in issue -- there is no controversy for this Court to resolve; there is simply no final judgment or
order of the lower court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm. As per the block letter provision
of the Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in a vacuum nor issue a definitive ruling
on mere suppositions.

Succinctly, the present petition is immediately dismissible for this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a
non-existent court action. It can only act to protect a party from a real and actual ruling by a lower
tribunal. Surely, it is not for this Court to negate "uncertain contingent future event that may not occur
as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all," as the lower court's feared denial of the subject
Motion to Quash.63

The established rule is that courts of justice will take cognizance only of controversies "wherein
actual and not merely hypothetical issues are involved."64 The reason underlying the rule is "to
prevent the courts through avoidance of premature adjudication from entangling themselves in
abstract disagreements, and for us to be satisfied that the case does not present a hypothetical
injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire."65

Even granting arguendo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 5 (1) of Article VIII, the petition nonetheless falls short of the Constitutional requirements and
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of a final judgment, order, or ruling on the Motion to
Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court, there is no occasion for this Court to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Without a judgment or ruling, there is nothing for this Court to declare
as having been issued without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, it is a basic requirement under Rule 65 that there be "[no] other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy found in law."66 Thus, the failure to exhaust all other remedies, as will be later
discussed, before a premature resort to this Court is fatal to the petitioner's cause of action.

Petitioner even failed to move for the reconsideration of the February 23 and 24, 2017 Orders she is
currently assailing in this Petition. As this Court held in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, "[a]
motion for reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its factual and legal
errors x x x [it] is mandatory before the filing of a petition for certiorari."67The reasons proffered by
petitioner fail to justify her present premature recourse.

Various policies and rules have been issued to curb the tendencies of litigants to disregard, nay
violate, the rule enunciated in Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution to allow the Court to devote
its time and attention to matters within its jurisdiction and prevent the overcrowding of its docket.
There is no reason to consider the proceedings at bar as an exception.

PETITIONER VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

It is settled that forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court. It is considered an act
of malpractice as it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes.68 Thus, as elucidated in Luzon
Iron Development Group Corporation v. Bridgestone Mining and Development Corporation,69forum
shopping warrants the immediate dismissal of the suits filed:

Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies
in different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their
chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another. The rationale against
forum-shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two
different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court processes which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion
of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

xxxx

What is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused the courts
and litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on similar or
related causes and/or grant the same or substantially similar reliefs, in the process creating the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered upon the same issues.

xxxx

We emphasize that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-shopping is the
rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. To avoid any
confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these
rules results in the dismissal of a case. The acts committed and described herein can possibly
constitute direct contempt.70

This policy echoes the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which states that "[i]f
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as
a cause for administrative sanctions."

The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia, or
whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Forum shopping therefore
exists when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration.71

Anent the first requisite, there is an identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same,
or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity.72

Meanwhile, the second and third requisites obtain where the same evidence necessary to sustain
the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or the
nature of the two (2) actions are different from each other. If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two (2) actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the
former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not.73

All these requisites are present in this case.

The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in the criminal
case below, while the respondents in this case, all represented by the Solicitor General, have
substantial identity with the complainant in the criminal case still pending before the trial court.
As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the Motion to Quash will
reveal that the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are essentially the same. In both, petitioner
advances the RTC's supposed lack of jurisdiction over the offense, the alleged multiplicity of
offenses included in the Information; the purported lack of the corpus delicti of the charge, and,
basically, the non-existence of probable cause to indict her. And, removed of all non-essentials, she
essentially prays for the same thing in both the present petition and the Motion to Quash: the
nullification of the Information and her restoration to liberty and freedom. Thus, our ruling in Jent v.
Tullet Prebon (Philippines), Inc. 74 does not apply in the present case as the petition at bar and the
motion to quash pending before the court a quo involve similar if not the same reliefs. What is more,
while Justice Caguioa highlights our pronouncement in Jent excepting an "appeal or special civil
action for certiorari" from the rule against the violation of forum shopping, the good justice overlooks
that the phrase had been used with respect to forum shopping committed
through successive actions by a "party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has [already]
been rendered in one forum."75 The exception with respect to an "appeal or special civil action
for certiorari" does not apply where the forum shopping is committed by simultaneous actions where
no judgment or order has yet been rendered by either forum. To restate for emphasis, the RTC has
yet to rule on the Motion to Quash. Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash before the R
TC are simultaneous actions that do not exempt petitions for certiorari from the rule against forum
shopping.

With the presence of the first two requisites, the third one necessarily obtains in the present case.
Should we grant the petition and declare the RTC without jurisdiction over the offense, the RTC is
bound to grant De Lima's Motion to Quash in deference to this Court's authority. In the alternative, if
the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash in the interim, the instant petition will be rendered moot
and academic.

In situations like the factual milieu of this instant petition, while nobody can restrain a party to a case
before the trial court to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, still such
petition must be rejected outright because petitions that cover simultaneous actions are anathema to
the orderly and expeditious processing and adjudication of cases.

On the ground of forum shopping alone, the petition merits immediate dismissal.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Even discounting the petitioner's procedural lapses, this Court is still wont to deny the instant petition
on substantive grounds.

Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in Criminal Case No. 17-165, the
Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the
Information charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice with
Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the Information is a
violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case
considering that the acts described in the Information were intimately related to her position as the
Secretary of Justice. Some justices of this Court would even adopt the petitioner's view, declaring
that the Information charged against the petitioner is Direct Bribery.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the R TC has exclusive jurisdiction to try
violations of RA 9165, including the acts described in the Information against the petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend, was specifically created as an anti-graft court. It was
never conferred with the power to try drug-related cases even those committed by public officials. In
fact, respondents point out that the history of the laws enabling and governing the Sandiganbayan
will reveal that its jurisdiction was streamlined to address specific cases of graft and corruption,
plunder, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

Before discussing the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is necessary to clarify the crime
with which the petitioner is being charged. For ease of reference, the Information filed with the R TC
is restated below:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

Versus Criminal Case No. 17-165

(NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315 and NPS No.

LEILA M. DE LIMA
XVl-INV-16K-00336) For: Violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
(66 Laguna de Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, 2002,Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj),
South Bay Village, Paraiiaque City and/or Section 26 (b), and Section 28, Republic Act
Room 502, GSIS Building, Financial Center, No. 9165 (lllegal Drug Trading)
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City), RAFAEL
MARCOS Z. RAGOS (c/o National Bureau of
Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila) and
RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, (Barangay
Galarin, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan), Accused

x-------------------------------------x

INFORMATION

The undersigned Prosecutors, constituted as a Panel pursuant to Department Orders 706 and 790
dated October 14, 2016 and November 11, 2016, respectively, accuse LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL
MARCOS Z. RAGOS and RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, for violation of Section 5, in relation to
Section 3 (jj), Section 26 (b) and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002, committed as follows:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the
Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, being then the
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of their public office, conspiring
and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then the employee of the Department of
Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over inmates in the
New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug trading, in the following manner: De Lima
and Ragos, with the use of their power, position, and authority demand, solicit and extort money
from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the Senatorial bid of De Lima in the
May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully authorized by law and
through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through
Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00)
Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One
Hundred Thousand (₱l00,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from the high profile inmates in the New
Bilibid Prison.
CONTRARY TO LAW.76

Notably, the designation, the prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of the Information
repeatedly provide that the petitioner is charged with "Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act
No. 9165." From the very designation of the crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the
crime with which the petitioner is charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this Court clarified in Quimvel
v. People, 77 the designation of the offense in the Information is a critical element required under
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the accused of the offense being charged, viz.:

The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation of the offense as
appearing in the Information. The designation of the offense is a critical element required under Sec.
6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists in apprising the accused of the offense being charged.
Its inclusion in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him of the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. Its import is underscored in this case where the
preamble states that the crime charged is of "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of
R.A. No.7610."78(Emphasis supplied.)

Further, a reading of the provisions of RA 9165 under which the petitioner is prosecuted would
convey that De Lima is being charged as a conspirator in the crime of Illegal Drug Trading. The
pertinent provisions of RA 9165 read:

SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxxx

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text
messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms
or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any other consideration in
violation of this Act.

xxxx

SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

xxxx

SECTION 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. - Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful
acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided
under this Act:

xxxx
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical;

xxxx

SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. - The maximum penalties of
the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual
disqualification from any public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government
officials and employees.

While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of Direct
Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the other allegations
in the Information portray a much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading. The latter crime, described by
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as "a global illicit trade involving the
cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances,"79necessarily involves various
component crimes, not the least of which is the bribery and corruption of government officials. An
example would be reports of recent vintage regarding billions of pesos' worth of illegal drugs allowed
to enter Philippine ports without the scrutiny of Customs officials. Any money and bribery that may
have changed hands to allow the importation of the confiscated drugs are certainly but trivial
contributions in the furtherance of the transnational illegal drug trading - the offense for which the
persons involved should be penalized.

Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately, the
Information against De Lima goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the
RPC.80 As Justice Martires articulately explained, the averments on solicitation of money in the
Information, which may be taken as constitutive of bribery, form "part of the description on how
illegal drug trading took place at the NBP." The averments on how petitioner asked for and received
money from the NBP inmates simply complete the links of conspiracy between her, Ragos, Dayan
and the NBP inmates in willfully and unlawfully trading dangerous drugs through the use of mobile
phones and other electronic devices under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and
Section 28, of RA 9165.

On this score, that it has not been alleged that petitioner actually participated in the actual trafficking
of dangerous drugs and had simply allowed the NBP inmates to do so is non sequitur given that the
allegation of conspiracymakes her liable for the acts of her co-conspirators. As this Court elucidated,
it is not indispensable for a co-conspirator to take a direct part in every act of the crime. A
conspirator need not even know of all the parts which the others have to perform,81 as conspiracy is
the common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of
the crime. 82 As long as the accused, in one way or another, helped and cooperated in the
consummation of a felony, she is liable as a co-principal.83 As the Information provides, De Lima's
participation and cooperation was instrumental in the trading of dangerous drugs by the NBP
inmates. The minute details of this participation and cooperation are matters of evidence that need
not be specified in the Information but presented and threshed out during trial.

Yet, some justices remain adamant in their position that the Information fails to allege the necessary
elements of Illegal Drug Trading. Justice Carpio, in particular, would cite cases supposedly
enumerating the elements necessary for a valid Information for Illegal Drug Trading. However, it
should be noted that the subject of these cases was "Illegal Sale" of dangerous drugs -- a crime
separate and distinct from "Illegal Trading" averred in the Information against De Lima. The
elements of "Illegal Sale" will necessary differ from the elements of Illegal Trading under Section 5,
in relation to Section 3(jj), of RA 9165. The definitions of these two separate acts are reproduced
below for easy reference:
SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxxx

(ii) Sell. - Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical whether for money or any other consideration.

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text
messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms
or acting as a broker in any of such transactions whether for money or any other consideration in
violation of this Act.

It is obvious from the foregoing that the crime of illegal trading has been written in strokes much
broader than that for illegal sale. In fact, an illegal sale of drugs may be considered as only one of
the possible component acts of illegal trading which may be committed through two modes: (1)
illegal trafficking using electronic devices; or (2) acting as a broker in any transactions involved in the
illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs.

On this score, the crime of "illegal trafficking" embraces various other offenses punishable by RA
9165. Section 3(r) of RA 9165 provides:

(r) Illegal Trafficking. - The illegal cultivation, culture, delivery, administration, dispensation,
manufacture, sale, trading, transportation, distribution, importation, exportation and possession of
any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical.

In turn, the crimes included in the definition of Illegal Trafficking of drugs are defined as follows:

(a) Administer. - Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body of any person, with or
without his/her knowledge, by injection, inhalation, ingestion or other means, or of committing any
act of indispensable assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to himself/herself
unless administered by a duly licensed practitioner for purposes of medication.

xxxx

(d) Chemical Diversion. - The sale, distribution, supply or transport of legitimately imported, in-
transit, manufactured or procured controlled precursors and essential chemicals, in diluted, mixtures
or in concentrated form, to any person or entity engaged in the manufacture of any dangerous drug,
and shall include packaging, repackaging, labeling, relabeling or concealment of such transaction
through fraud, destruction of documents, fraudulent use of permits, misdeclaration, use of front
companies or mail fraud.

xxxx

(i) Cultivate or Culture. - Any act of knowingly planting, growing, raising, or permitting the planting,
growing or raising of any plant which is the source of a dangerous drug.

xxxx

(k) Deliver. - Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and
by any means, with or without consideration.
 xxxx

(m) Dispense. - Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or any dangerous drug with
or without the use of prescription.

xxxx

(u) Manufacture. - The production, preparation, compounding or processing of any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, either directly or indirectly or by extraction from
substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination
of extraction and chemical synthesis, and shall include any packaging or repackaging of such
substances, design or configuration of its form, or labeling or relabeling of its container; except that
such terms do not include the preparation, compounding, packaging or labeling of a drug or other
substances by a duly authorized practitioner as an incident to his/her administration or dispensation
of such drug or substance in the course of his/her professional practice including research, teaching
and chemical analysis of dangerous drugs or such substances that are not intended for sale or for
any other purpose.

xxxx

(kk) Use. - Any act of injecting, intravenously or intramuscularly, of consuming, either by chewing,
smoking, sniffing, eating, swallowing, drinking or otherwise introducing into the physiological system
of the body, any of the dangerous drugs.

With the complexity of the operations involved in Illegal Trading of drugs, as recognized and defined
in RA 9165, it will be quite myopic and restrictive to require the elements of Illegal Sale-a mere
component act-in the prosecution for Illegal Trading.

More so, that which qualifies the crime of Illegal Trafficking to Illegal Trading may make it impossible
to provide the details of the elements of Illegal Sale. By "using electronic devices such as, but not
limited to, text messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers
and chat rooms," the Illegal Trading can be remotely perpetrated away from where the drugs are
actually being sold; away from the subject of the illegal sale. With the proliferation of digital
technology coupled with ride sharing and delivery services, Illegal Trading under RA 9165 can be
committed without getting one's hand on the substances or knowing and meeting the seller or buyer.
To require the elements of Illegal Sale (the identities of the buyer, seller, the object and
consideration, in Illegal Trade) would be impractical.

The same may be said of the second mode for committing Illegal Trading, or trading by "acting as a
broker" in transactions involved in Illegal Trafficking. In this instance, the accused may neither have
physical possession of the drugs nor meet the buyer and seller and yet violate RA 9165. As pointed
out by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, as early as 1916, jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who is
simply a middleman, negotiating contracts relative to property with which he has no custody, viz.:

A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating
contracts relative to property with the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiator between
other parties, never acting in his own name, but in the name of those who employed him; he is
strictly a middleman and for some purposes the agent of both parties.84 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

In some cases, this Court even acknowledged persons as brokers even "where they actually took no
part in the negotiations, never saw the customer."85 For the Court, the primary occupation of a broker
is simply bringing "the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is eventually made. "86 Hence, in
indictments for Illegal Trading, it is illogical to require the elements of Illegal Sale of drugs, such as
the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration.87 For the prosecution of Illegal
Trading of drugs to prosper, proof that the accused "act[ed] as a broker" or brought together the
buyer and seller of illegal drugs "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages,
e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms" is
sufficient.

The DOJ' s designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus holds sway. After all, the
prosecution is vested with a wide range of discretion-including the discretion of whether, what, and
whom to charge.88 The exercise of this discretion depends on a smorgasboard of factors, which are
best appreciated by the prosecutors.89

As such, with the designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information, there can be no
other conclusion than that petitioner is being charged not with Direct Bribery but with violation of RA
9165.

Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the elements of
Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as ill this case, possibly bribery and
violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the authority to amend the information at any time
before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been arraigned, then the information subject of
Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court which reads:

SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended, in form or

in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea
and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the Sandiganbayan or the RTC
that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 17-165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.

It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the
manner and form prescribed by law.90 It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.91 Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that Congress may also, by law, provide
that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such would
be a special law that is construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts.92

The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules
provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA
9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with
the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of the RTC as the court with the exclusive
jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the following provisions where it was expressly
mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to hear drug-related cases:

Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including
the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - x x x x

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall
immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense
and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some
other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income:

xxxx

During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived
therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and
the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.

xxxx

Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses to Apply Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. - x x x

A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be dependent on dangerous drugs to a Center
may be filed by any person authorized by the Board with the Regional Trial Court of the province or
city where such person is found.

xxxx

Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with an Offense to Treatment
and Rehabilitation. - If a person charged with an offense where the imposable penalty is
imprisonment of less than six (6) years and one (1) day, and is found by the prosecutor or by the
court, at any stage of the proceedings, to be a drug dependent, the prosecutor or the court as the
case may be, shall suspend all further proceedings and transmit copies of the record of the case to
the Board.

In the event the Board determines, after medical examination, that public interest requires that such
drug dependent be committed to a center for treatment and rehabilitation, it shall file a petition for
his/her commitment with the regional trial court of the province or city where he/she is being
investigated or tried: x x x

xxxx

Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing
Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of
this Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population
and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction.

The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving violations of this
Act.

Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of
drug-related cases. Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals,93this Court categorically named the RTC as
the court with jurisdiction over drug related-cases, as follows:

Applying by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon, People v. De Lara, People v.

Santos, and Ordonez v. Vinarao, the imposable penalty in this case which involves 0.4587 grams
of shabu should not exceed prision correccional. We say by analogy because these cases involved
marijuana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). In Section 20 of RA. No. 6425, as
amended by Section 17 of RA No. 7659, the maximum quantities of marijuana and
methamphetamine hydrochloride for purposes of imposing the maximum penalties are not the same.
For the latter, if the quantity involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000 to PIO million shall be imposed. Accordingly, if the quantity
involved is below 200 grams, the imposable penalties should be as follows:

xxxx

Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 96-8443
would at most be only prision correccional duration is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Does it follow then that, as the petitioner insists, the RTC has no jurisdiction thereon in view of
the amendment of Section 32 of B.P. Big. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties? This Section 32 as
thus amended now reads:

xxxx

The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. x xx
The aforementioned exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases, but also to other laws which specifically lodge
in Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal cases, e. g., (a) Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. Nos. 1289 and 4363 on written defamation or libel; (b)
Decree on Intellectual Property (P. D. No. 49, as amended), which vests upon Courts of First
Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned regardless of the imposable
penalty; and (c) more appropriately for the case at bar, Section 39 of RA No. 6425, as amended by
P.D. No. 44, which vests on Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts concurrent exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving
violations of said Act.

xxxx

That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the
Regional Trial Courts over certain cases is clearly evident from the exception provided for in the
opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691. These special laws
are not, therefore, covered by the repealing clause (Section 6) of RA No. 7691.

Neither can it be successfully argued that Section 39 of RA. No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44,
is no longer operative because Section 44 of B.P. Big. 129 abolished the Courts of First Instance,
Circuit Criminal Courts, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts. While, indeed, Section 44
provides that these courts were to be "deemed automatically abolished" upon the declaration by the
President that the reorganization provided in B.P. Blg. 129 had been completed, this Court should
not lose sight of the fact that the Regional Trial Courts merely replaced the Courts of First Instance
as clearly borne out by the last two sentences of Section 44, to wit:

xxxx

Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the "abolition" of the Courts of First Instance carried
with it the abolition of their exclusive original jurisdiction in drug cases vested by Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended by P. D. No. 44. If that were so, then so must it be with respect to Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code and Section 57 of the Decree on Intellectual Property. On the contrary, in
the resolution of 19 June 1996 in Caro v. Court of Appeals and in the resolution of 26 February 1997
in Villalon v. Ba/dado, this Court expressly ruled that Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive
original jurisdiction over libel cases pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. In
Administrative Order No. 104-96 this Court mandates that:

xxxx

The same Administrative Order recognizes that violations of RA. No. 6425, as amended, regardless
of the quantity involved, are to be tried and decided by the Regional Trial Courts therein designated
as special courts.94 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Yet, much has been made of the terminology used in Section 90 of RA 9165. The dissents would
highlight the provision's departure from Section 39 of RA 6425 - the erstwhile drugs law, which
provides:

SECTION 39. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court. - The Circuit Criminal Court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act.

For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" is a clear
indication that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with such "exclusive original
jurisdiction" so that even the Sandiganbayan can take cognizance and resolve a criminal prosecution
for violation of RA 9165.

As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, such deduction is

unwarranted given the clear intent of the legislature not only to retain the "exclusive original
jurisdiction" of the RTCs over violations of the drugs law but to segregate from among the several
RTCs of each judicial region some RTCs that will "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations
of [RA 9165)." If at all, the change introduced by the new phraseology of Section 90, RA 9165 is not
the deprivation of the RTCs' "exclusive original jurisdiction" but the further restriction of this
"exclusive original jurisdiction" to select RTCs of each judicial region. This intent can be clearly
gleaned from the interpellation on House Bill No. 4433, entitled "An Act Instituting the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, repealing Republic Act No. 6425, as amended:"

Initially, Rep. Dilangalen referred to the fact sheet attached to the Bill which states that the measure
will undertake a comprehensive amendment to the existing law on dangerous drugs -- RA No. 6425,
as amended. Adverting to Section 64 of the Bill on the repealing clause, he then asked whether the
Committee is in effect amending or repealing the aforecited law. Rep. Cuenco replied that any
provision of law which is in conflict with the provisions of the Bill is repealed and/or modified
accordingly.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen suggested that if the Committee's intention was only to amend RA
No. 6425, then the wording used should be "to amend" and not "to repeal" with regard to the
provisions that are contrary to the provisions of the Bill.

Adverting to Article VIII, Section 60, on Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs Case, which provides
that "the Supreme Court shall designate regional trial courts to have original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable by this Act," Rep. Dilangalen inquired whether it is the Committee's intention
that certain RTC salas will be designated by the Supreme Court to try drug-related offenses,
although all RTCs have original jurisdiction over those offenses.

Rep. Cuenco replied in the affirmative. He pointed that at present, the Supreme Court's assignment
of drug cases to certain judges is not exclusive because the latter can still handle cases other than
drug-related cases. He added that the Committee's intention is to assign drug-related cases to
judges who will handle exclusively these cases assigned to them.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen stated that, at the appropriate time, he would like to propose the
following amendment; "The Supreme Court shall designate specific salas of the RTC to try
exclusively offenses related to drugs."

Rep. Cuenca agreed therewith, adding that the Body is proposing the creation of exclusive drug
courts because at present, almost all of the judges are besieged by a lot of drug cases some of
which have been pending for almost 20 years.95 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Per the "Records of the Bilateral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill
No. 1858 and House Bill No. 4433," the term "designation" of R TCs that will exclusively handle
drug-related offenses was used to skirt the budgetary requirements that might accrue by the
"creation" of exclusive drugs courts. It was never intended to divest the R TCs of their exclusive
original jurisdiction over drug-related cases. The Records are clear:

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). x x x [W]e would like to propose the creation of drug courts to
handle exclusively drug cases; the imposition of a 60-day deadline on courts within which to decide
drug cases; and No. 3, provide penalties on officers of the law and government prosecutors for
mishandling and delaying drugs cases.

We will address these concerns one by one.

1. The possible creation of drugs courts to handle exclusively drug cases. Any comments?

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). We have no objection to this proposal, Mr. Chairman. As a
matter of fact, this is one of the areas where we come into an agreement when we were in Japan.
However, I just would like to add a paragraph after the word "Act" in Section 86 of the Senate
versions, Mr. Chairman. And this is in connection with the designation of special courts by "The
Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each
judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number of court
designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of pending
cases in their respective jurisdiction." That is my proposal, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). We adopt the same proposal.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). I have no problem with that, Mr. Chairman, but I'd like to call
your attention to the fact that my proposal is only for designation because if it is for a creation that
would entail another budget, Mr. Chairman. And almost always, the Department of Budget would tell
us at the budget hearing that we lack funds, we do not have money. So that might delay the very
purpose why we want the RTC or the municipal courts to handle exclusively the drug cases. That's
why my proposal is designation not creation.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). Areglado. No problem, designation. Approved.96

The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the Sandiganbayan
whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether
the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office. The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in
judgment of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is
circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,97 which
amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.98 As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the following:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986. Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery;
or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related
transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One Million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).

The foregoing immediately betrays that the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a special anti-graft
court pursuant to a specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution.99 Its characterization and continuation
as such was expressly given a constitutional fiat under Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
which states:

SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear drug-
related cases. Even Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted by the petitioner and
the dissents as a catchall provision, does not operate to strip the R TCs of its exclusive original
jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165. As pointed out by Justices Tijam and Martires, a perusal of
the drugs law will reveal that public officials were never considered excluded from its scope. Hence,
Section 27 of RA 9165 punishes government officials found to have benefited from the trafficking of
dangerous drugs, while Section 28 of the law imposes the maximum penalty on such government
officials and employees. The adverted sections read:

SECTION 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation, Misapplication
or Failure to Account for the Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laborat01y Equipment Including the Proceeds or Properties
Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (Pl0,000,000.00), in
addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to account for confiscated, seized
or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the proceeds
or properties obtained from the unlawful acts as provided for in this Act.

Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the trafficking of
dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or have received any financial or material contributions or
donations from natural or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed
in this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually disqualified from holding any elective or
appointive positions in the government, its divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations.

SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. - The maximum penalties of
the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual
disqualification from any public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government
officials and employees. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, provides but the general rule, couched in a
"broad and general phraseology. "100 Exceptions abound. Besides the jurisdiction on written
defamations and libel, as illustrated in Morales 101and People v. Benipayo, 102 the RTC is likewise
given "exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation
of the Omnibus Election Code,"103 regardless of whether such violation was committed by public
officers occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher in relation to their offices. In fact,
offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces in relation to their office, i.e., in the words of
RA 7055,104"service-connected crimes or offenses," are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan but by
court-martial.

Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not determined
solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were committed "in relation to their office." In
determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions, the laws
governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must likewise be considered.

In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to "exclusively try and
hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an exception, couched in the special law
on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA
10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the
latter is to be considered as an exception to the general.105

Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section 90 of RA 9165. However,
a closer look at the repealing clause of RA 10660 will show that there is no express repeal of Section
90 of RA 9165 and well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. It is only
accepted upon the clearest proof of inconsistency so repugnant that the two laws cannot be
enforced.106 The presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two laws involved one is
special and the other general.107 The mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law
prevails over a general law applies regardless of the laws' respective dates of passage. Thus, this
Court ruled:

x x x [I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law -
regardless of their dates of passage - and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
to the general.

So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If reasonable construction
is possible, the laws must be reconciled in that manner.

Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two
statutes should be very clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.108

To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general
law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public
officers in relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter
case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court,
regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public officials' office.

The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive jurisdiction to
RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the technical aspect of
drug-related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation of RA 9165, it is easy to
dismiss them as common and untechnical. However, narcotic substances possess unique
characteristics that render them not readily identifiable.109 In fact, they must first be subjected to
scientific analysis by forensic chemists to determine their composition and nature.110Thus, judges
presiding over designated drugs courts are specially trained by the Philippine Judicial Academy
(PhilJa) and given scientific instructions to equip them with the proper tools to appreciate
pharmacological evidence and give analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary
consideration of RA 9165 is the fact that the substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs, their
plant sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals. Without a doubt, not one of the
Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and technical expertise on matters relating to
prohibited substances.

Hard figures likewise support the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs over violations of RA
9165. As previously stated, as of June 30, 2017, there are 232,557 drugs cases pending before the
RTCs. On the other hand, not even a single case filed before the Sandiganbayan from February
1979 to June 30, 2017 dealt with violations of the drugs law. Instead, true to its designation as an
anti-graft court, the bulk of the cases filed before the Sandiganbayan involve violations of RA 3019,
entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and malversation.111 With these, it would not only
be unwise but reckless to allow the tribunal uninstructed and inexperienced with the intricacies of
drugs cases to hear and decide violations of RA 9165 solely on account of the pay scale of the
accused.
Likewise of special significance is the proviso introduced by RA 10660 which, to reiterate for
emphasis, states:

Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges
damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in
an amount not exceeding One million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).

The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by RA 10660 is to streamline the cases handled
by the Sandiganbayan by delegating to the RTCs some cases involving high-ranking public officials.
With the dissents' proposition, opening the Sandiganbayan to the influx of drug-related cases, RA
10660 which was intended to unclog the dockets of the Sandiganbayan would all be for naught.
Hence, sustaining the RTC's jurisdiction over drug-related cases despite the accused's high-ranking
position, as in this case, is all the more proper.

Even granting arguendo that the Court declares the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165, still it will not automatically result in the release
from detention and restore the liberty and freedom of petitioner. The R TC has several options if it
dismisses the criminal case based on the grounds raised by petitioner in her Motion to Quash.

Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has three (3) possible alternative actions when
confronted with a Motion to Quash:

1. Order the amendment of the Infonnation;

2. Sustain the Motion to Quash; or

3. Deny the Motion to Quash.

The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion to quash is meritorious.
Specifically, as to the first option, this court had held that should the Information be deficient or
lacking in any material allegation, the trial court can order the amendment of the Information under
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which states:

SECTION 4. Amendment of Complaint or Information. - If the motion to quash is based on an

alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall
order that an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall
be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be
granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers
from the same defect despite the amendment.

The failure of the trial court to order the correction of a defect in the Information curable by an
amendment amounts to an arbitrary exercise of power. So, this Court held in Dio v. People:

This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an
arbitrary exercise of power. In People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division): When a motion to quash
is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect may be cured by
amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an amended
Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting
an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated
not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to
cure the defect through an amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By
allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical
grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.

More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As
explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its
day in court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an
Information, where such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and
again in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.112

Notably, the defect involved in Dio was the Information's failure to establish the venue - a matter of
jurisdiction in criminal cases. Thus, in the case at bar where petitioner has not yet been arraigned,
the court a quo has the power to order the amendment of the February 17, 2017 Information filed
against the petitioner. This power to order the amendment is not reposed with this Court in the
exercise of its certiorari powers.

Nevertheless, should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the quashal of the
Infonnation, the prosecution is not precluded from filing another information. An order sustaining the
motion to quash the information would neither bar another prosecution113 or require the release of the
accused from custody. Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court can
simply order that another complaint or information be filed without discharging the accused from
custody. Section 5, Rule 117 states, thus:

Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the motion to quash is sustained, the court
may order that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in Section 6 of this rule.
If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no
order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the
order or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody,
shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another charge.

Section 6, Rule 117, adverted to in the foregoing provision, prevents the re-filing of an information on
only two grounds: that the criminal action or liability has already been extinguished, and that of
double jeopardy. Neither was invoked in petitioner's Motion to Quash filed before the court a quo.

The third option available to the trial court is the denial of the motion to quash. Even granting, for the
nonce, the petitioner's position that the trial court's issuance of the warrant for her arrest is an
implied denial of her Motion to Quash, the proper remedy against this court action is to proceed to
trial, not to file the present petition for certiorari. This Court in Galzote v. Briones reiterated this
established doctrine:

A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed
of by the petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual
course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of
the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is
rendered and the lower court's decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the
denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added
ground to overturn the latter's ruling.

In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his
motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal
from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither
can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an
appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial
of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.114 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

At this juncture, it must be stressed yet again that the trial court has been denied the opportunity to
act and rule on petitioner's motion when the latter jumped the gun and prematurely repaired
posthaste to this Court, thereby immobilizing the trial court in its tracks. Verily, De Lima should have
waited for the decision on her motion to quash instead of prematurely filing the instant recourse.

In the light of the foregoing, the best course of action for the Court to take is to dismiss the petition
and direct the trial court to rule on the Motion to Quash and undertake all the necessary proceedings
to expedite the adjudication of the subject criminal case.

RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE TO
ORDER THE PETITIONER'S ARREST

The basis for petitioner's contention that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the February 23, 2017 Order115 finding probable cause to arrest the petitioner is two-pronged:
respondent judge should have first resolved the pending Motion to Quash before ordering the
petitioner's arrest; and there is no probable cause to justify the petitioner's arrest.

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law.116

In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to
Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to
support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court117 required the
respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence within a limited
period of only ten (10) days, viz.:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint or information.

It is not far-fetched to conclude, therefore, that had the respondent judge waited longer and first
attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to a possible
administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Her exercise of
discretion was sound and in conformity with the provisions of the Rules of Court considering that
a Motion to Quash may be filed and, thus resolved by a trial court judge, at any time before the
accused petitioner enters her plea.118 What is more, it is in accord with this Court's ruling in Marcos v.
Cabrera-Faller119that "[a]s the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to
first and foremost determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused."

This Court's ruling in Miranda v. Tuliao 120does not support the petitioner's position. Miranda does not
prevent a trial court from ordering the arrest of an accused even pending a motion to quash the
infonnation. At most, it simply explains that an accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet
been taken in the custody of law.

Undoubtedly, contrary to petitioner's postulation, there is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial
judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before
issuing a warrant of arrest. As such, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed February 23, 2017 Order even before resolving petitioner's Motion to
Quash. There is certainly no indication that respondent judge deviated from the usual procedure in
finding probable cause to issue the petitioner's arrest.

And yet, petitioner further contends that the language of the February 23, 2017 Order violated her
constitutional rights and is contrary to the doctrine in Soliven v. Makasiar. 121Petitioner maintains that
respondent judge failed to personally determine the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant
of arrest since, as stated in the assailed Order, respondent judge based her findings on the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation and not on the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor.122 This hardly deserves serious consideration.

Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the judge is required before a warrant
of arrest may issue. The Constitution123 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure124 command the
judge "to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct
his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties. "125 This much is clear
from this Court's n1ling in Soliven cited by the petitioner, viz.:

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.126

It must be emphasized, however, that in determining the probable cause to issue the warrant of
arrest against the petitioner, respondent judge evaluated the Information and "all the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case." The assailed February 23,
2017 Order is here restated for easy reference and provides, thusly:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds
sufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE
LIMA x x x.127 (Emphasis supplied.)

As the prosecutor's report/resolution precisely finds support from the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation, this Court cannot consider the respondent judge to have evaded her duty
or refused to perform her obligation to satisfy herself that substantial basis exists for the petitioner's
arrest. "All the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation" encompasses a broader
category than the "supporting evidence" required to be evaluated in Soliven. It may perhaps even be
stated that respondent judge performed her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is required of her
by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence, not just the supporting documents. At the very
least, she certainly discharged a judge's duty in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant,
as described in Ho v. People:

The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v. Diokno, where we
explained again what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence,
the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, 'must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof' At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet
tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient
that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. In Webb v. De Leon we
stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused
and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the
prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence."

xxxx

x x x [T]he judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's
report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and
hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting
evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on
the existence (or non-existence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of
determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged
in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the
burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the
information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the
evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on
whether to issue a warrant of arrest.

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial
courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the
purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have
sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn
statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to
the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives
his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to
personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has
consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the
report of the investigating officer.128 (Emphasis supplied.)

Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the accused.129 She is
given wide latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest.130 A finding of probable cause to order the accused's arrest does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.131 It is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.132

Again, per the February 23, 2017 Order, respondent judge evaluated all the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation and on the basis thereof found probable cause to issue the
warrant of arrest against the petitioner. This is not surprising given that the only evidence available
on record are those provided by the complainants and the petitioner, in fact, did not present any
counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this. Thus, there is nothing to disprove the following
preliminary findings of the DOJ prosecutors relative to the allegations in the Information filed in
Criminal Case No. 17-165:

Thus, from November 2012 to March 2013, De Lima[,] Ragos and Dayan should be indicted for
violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 3Gj), Section 26(b) and Section 28, of R.A. 9165, owing
to the delivery of PS million in two (2) occasions, on 24 November 2012 and 15 December 2012, to
Dayan and De Lima. The monies came inmate Peter Co [were] proceeds from illicit drug trade,
which were given to support the senatorial bid of De Lima.

Also in the same period, Dayan demanded from Ragos money to support the senatorial bid of De
Lima. Ragos demanded and received ₱100,000 tara from each of the high-profile inmates in
exchange for privileges, including their illicit drug trade. Ablen collected the money for Ragos who, in
turn, delivered them to Dayan at De Lima's residence.133

The foregoing findings of the DOJ find support in the affidavits and testimonies of several persons.
For instance, in his Affidavit dated September 3, 2016, NBI agent Jovencio P. Ablen, Jr.
narrated, viz.:

21. On the morning of 24 November 2012, I received a call from Dep. Dir. Ragos asking where I
was. I told him I was at home. He replied that he will fetch me to accompany him on a very important
task.

22. Approximately an hour later, he arrived at my house. I boarded his vehicle, a Hyundai Tucson,
with plate no. RGU910. He then told me that he will deliver something to the then Secretary of
Justice, Sen. Leila De Lima. He continued and said "Nior confidential 'to. Tayong dalawa lang ang
nakakaalam nito. Dadalhin natin yung quota kay Lola. SM 'yang nasa bag. Tingnan mo."

23. The black bag he was referring to was in front of my feet. It [was a] black handbag. When I
opened the bag, I saw bundles of One Thousand Peso bills. 1âwphi 1

24. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, we arrived at the house located at Laguna Bay corner Subic
Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.

25. Dep. Dir. Ragos parked his vehicle in front of the house. We both alighted the vehicle but he told
me to stay. He then proceeded to the house.

26. From our parked vehicle, I saw Mr. Ronnie Dayan open the gate. Dep. Dir. Ragos then handed
the black handbag containing bundles of one thousand peso bills to Mr. Dayan.

27. At that time, I also saw the then DOJ Sec. De Lima at the main door of the house. She was
wearing plain clothes which is commonly known referred to as "duster."
28. The house was elevated from the road and the fence was not high that is why I was able to
clearly see the person at the main door, that is, Sen. De Lima.

29. When Dep. Dir. Ragos and Mr. Dayan reached the main door, I saw Mr. Dayan hand the black
handbag to Sen. De Lima, which she received. The three of them then entered the house.

30. After about thirty (30) minutes, Dep. Dir. Ragos went out of the house. He no longer has the
black handbag with him.

31. We then drove to the BuCor Director's Quarters in Muntinlupa City. While cruising, Dep. Dir.
Ragos told me "Nior 'wag kang maingay kahit kanino at wala kang nakita ha," to which I
replied "Sabi mo e. e di wala akong nakita."

32. On the morning of 15 December 2012, Dep. Dir. Ragos again fetched me from my house and we
proceeded to the same house located at Laguna Bay comer Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village,
Paranaque City.

33. That time, I saw a plastic bag in front of my feet. I asked Dep. Dir. Ragos "Quota na naman
Sir?"Dep. Dir. Ragos replied "Ano pa nga ba, 'tang ina sila lang meron. "134

Petitioner's co-accused, Rafael Ragos, recounted in his own Affidavit dated September 26, 2016 a
similar scenario:

8. One morning on the latter part of November 2012, I saw a black handbag containing a huge sum
of money on my bed inside the Director's Quarters of the BuCor. I looked inside the black handbag
and saw that it contains bundles of one thousand peso bills.

9. I then received a call asking me to deliver the black handbag to Mr. Ronnie Dayan. The caller said
the black handbag came from Peter Co and it contains "Limang Manoi<' which means Five Million
Pesos (Php5,000,000.00) as a "manoR' refers to One Million Pesos (Php 1,000,000.00) in the
vernacular inside the New Bilibid Prison.

10. As I personally know Mr. Dayan and knows that he stays in the house of the then DOJ Sec. Leila
M. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, I
knew I had to deliver the black handbag to Sen. De Lima at the said address.

11. Before proceeding to the house of Sen. De Lima at the above[-]mentioned address, I called Mr.
Ablen to accompany me in delivering the money. I told him we were going to do an important task.

12. Mr. Ablen agreed to accompany me so I fetched him from his house and we proceeded to the
house of Sen. De Lima at the above-mentioned address.

13. While we were in the car, I told Mr. Ablen that the important task we will do is deliver Five Million
Pesos (Php5,000,000.00) "Quota" to Sen. De Lima. I also told him that the money was in the black
handbag that was on the floor of the passenger seat (in front of him) and he could check it, to which
Mr. Ablen complied.

14. Before noon, we arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay
Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.
15. I parked my vehicle in front of the house. Both Mr. Ablen and I alighted from the vehicle but I
went to the gate alone carrying the black handbag containing the Five Million Pesos
(Php5,000,000.00).

16. At the gate, Mr. Ronnie Dayan greeted me and opened the gate for me. I then handed the
handbag containing the money to Mr. Dayan.

17. We then proceeded to the main door of the house where Sen. De Lima was waiting for us. At the
main door, Mr. Dayan handed the black handbag to Sen. De Lima, who received the same. We then
entered the house.

18. About thirty minutes after, I went out of the house and proceeded to my quarters at the BuCor,
Muntinlupa City.

19. One morning in the middle part of December 2012, I received a call to again deliver the plastic
bag containing money from Peter Co to Mr. Ronnie Dayan. This time the money was packed in a
plastic bag left on my bed inside my quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa City. From the outside of the
bag, I could easily perceive that it contains money because the bag is translucent.

20. Just like before, I fetched Mr. Ablen from his house before proceeding to the house of Sen. De
Lima located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, where I
know I could find Mr. Dayan.

21. In the car, Mr. Ablen asked me if we are going to deliver "quota." I answered yes.

22. We arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima at the above[-]mentioned address at noontime. I again
parked in front of the house.

23. I carried the plastic bag containing money to the house. At the gate, I was greeted by Mr. Ronnie
Dayan. At that point, I handed the bag to Mr. Dayan. He received the bag and we proceeded inside
the house.135

The source of the monies delivered to petitioner De Lima was expressly bared by several felons
incarcerated inside the NBP. Among them is Peter Co, who testified in the following manner:

6. Noong huling bahagi ng 2012, sinabi sa akin ni Hans Tanna nanghihingi ng kontribusyon sa
mgaChinese sa Maximum Security Compound ng NBP si dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa
kanyang planong pagtakbo sa senado sa 2013 Elections. Dalawang beses akong nagbigay ng tig-
P5 Million para tugunan ang hiling ni Sen. De Lima, na dating DOJ Secretary;

7. Binigay ko ang mga halagang ito kay Hans Tan para maibigay kay Sen. Leila De Lima na
datingDOJ Secretary. Sa parehong pagkakataon, sinabihan na lang ako ni Hans Tan na naibigay na
ang pera kay Ronnie Dayan na siyang tumatanggap ng pera para kay dating DOJ Sec. De
Lima Sinabi rin niHans Tanna ang nagdeliver ng pera ay si dating OIC ng BuCor na si Rafael Ragos.

8. Sa kabuuan, nakapagbigay ang mga Chinese sa loob ng Maximum ng PIO Million sa mga huling
bahagi ng taong 2012 kay dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang planong pagtakbo sa senado
sa2013 Elections. Ang mga perang ito ay mula sa pinagbentahan ng illegal na droga.136
All these, at least preliminarily, outline a case for illegal drug trading committed in conspiracy by the
petitioner and her co-accused. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the allegation that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order for petitioner's arrest.

Petitioner would later confine herself to the contention that the prosecution's evidence is
inadmissible, provided as they were by petitioner's co-accused who are convicted felons and whose
testimonies are but hearsay evidence.

Nowhere in Ramos v. Sandiganbayan 137 - the case relied upon by petitioner - did this Court rule that
testimonies given by a co-accused are of no value. The Court simply held that said testimonies
should be received with great caution, but not that they would not be considered. The testimony of
Ramos' co-accused was, in fact, admitted in the cited case. Furthermore, this Court explicitly ruled
in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman138that hearsay evidence is admissible during preliminary
investigation. The Court held thusly:

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.139 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, the admissibility of evidence,140 their evidentiary weight, probative value, and the credibility of
the witness are matters that are best left to be resolved in a full-blown trial,141 not during a preliminary
investigation where the technical rules of evidence are not applied142 nor at the stage of the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, the better alternative
is to proceed to the conduct of trial on the merits for the petitioner and the prosecution to present
their respective evidence in support of their allegations.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the provisional reliefs prayed for, as a consequence, have to be
rejected.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with dispatch with
Criminal Case N6.17-165.

SO ORDERED.

AMANDO A. INOCENTES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. ROLAND B. JURADO, IN

HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON, SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, HON. CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, AS COMPLAINANT; AND HON. FRANCIS H.
JARDELEZA, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), IN ITS CAPACITY AS COUNSEL FOR THE
PEOPLE, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the Petition1 filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court by petitioner Amando A. Inocentes
(Inocentes), assailing the Resolutions dated February 8, 20132 and October 24, 20123 of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 entitled People of the Philippines v. Amando A. Inocentes, et.
al.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Inocentes, together with four (4) others, was charged with violating Section 3(e) or Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019,4 as amended. The informations read: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

That on or about October 2001 or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Tarlac City, Tarlac, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Amando A. Inocentes,
Celestino Cabalitasan, Ma. Victoria Leonardo and Jerry Balagtas, all public officers, being the Branch
Manager, Division Chief III, Property Appraiser III, and Senior General Insurance Specialist, respectively, of
the Government Service Insurance System, Tarlac City Field Office, committing the crime herein charged in
relation to and in taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with Jose De
Guzman, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally [gave] undue preference, benefit or advantage to accused Jose De
Guzman by processing and approving the housing loans of Four Hundred Ninety-One (491) borrowers of
[Jose De Guzman] 's housing project under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program, with a total amount of loans
amounting to Two Hundred Forty-One Million Fifty-Three Thousand Six Hundred Pesos
(Php241,053,600.00), knowing fully well that the said borrowers/grantees were not qualified and were not
under the territorial jurisdiction of the Tarlac City Field Office, thereby giving said borrowers/grantees
unwarranted benefit and causing damage and prejudice to the government and to public interest in the
aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5 chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

and
[...] processing, approving and granting loans under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program to Fifty-Three (53)
borrowers of [Jose De Guzman]'s land development project known as Teresa Homes amounting to Fifty-Two
Million and One Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos (Php52,107,000.00), despite the knowledge of the fact that
the lots covered were intended for commercial purposes and by causing the over-appraisal in the amount of
Thirty-Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos and Thirty-Six Centavos
(Php33,242,848.36) of the land and buildings offered as collaterals, thus causing undue injury to the
Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6 chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary

On May 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a minute resolution finding probable cause and ordered the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused.7 To avoid incarceration, Inocentes immediately
posted hail.

On July 10, 2012, Inocentes filed an omnibus motion (1) for judicial determination of probable cause; (2) to
quash the informations filed against him; and (3) to dismiss the case for violating his right to the speedy
disposition of this case (omnibus motion).8 In this motion, he argued as follows:

First, the informations filed against him were fatally defective because they did not allege the specific
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

acts done by him which would have constituted the offense. All that was alleged in the informations was that
he conspired and cooperated in the alleged crime.

Second, there is no evidence showing how he cooperated or conspired in the commission of the alleged
offense. The findings of the investigating unit revealed that the connivance was perpetuated by the
marketing agent and the borrowers themselves by misrepresenting their qualifications. The GSIS Internal
Audit Service Group Report even said that it was the marketing agent who had the opportunity to tamper
and falsify the documents submitted before Inocentes' office.

Third, the informations filed against him should be quashed because the Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction over the case. At the time of the commission of the alleged offense, Inocentes held a position
with a Salary Grade of 26. He likewise claims that he cannot fall under the enumeration of managers of
GOCCs because his position as department manager cannot be placed in the same category as the
president, general manager, and trustee of the GSIS.

Fourth, Innocentes insisted that the case against him must be dismissed because his right to the speedy
disposition of this case had been violated since seven (7) years had lapsed from the time of the filing of the
initial complaint up to the time the information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.

After the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed its opposition and Inocentes filed his reply, the
Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution. The Sandiganbayan maintained its jurisdiction over the
case because Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,9specifically includes managers of
GOCCs - whose position may not fall under Salary Grade 27 or higher - who violate R.A. No. 3019. It also
ruled that the informations in this case sufficiently allege all the essential elements required to violate
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

Further, it said that it already determined the existence of probable cause when it issued the warrant of
arrest in its minute resolution dated May 10, 2012.

Lastly, it held that the delay in this case was excusable considering that the records of this case were
transferred from the Regional Trial Court in Tarlac City, where the case was first filed.

In his motion for reconsideration, Inocentes reiterated the same arguments he raised in his omnibus motion.
In addition, he asserted that the present case against him should be dismissed because the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the estafa case against him for the same transactions. He also filed a supplemental
motion attaching a copy of the affidavit of a certain Monico Imperial to show (1) that there existed political
persecutions within the GSIS against the critics of then President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia,
and (2) that the GSIS branch manager relies on the recommendation of his subordinates in approving or
disapproving real estate loan applications.

The Sandiganbayan remained unconvinced. On the contents of the affidavit, it agreed with the prosecution
that these are matters of defense that must stand scrutiny in a full-blown trial. With respect to the dismissal
of the estafa case against him, the Sandiganbayan said that the dismissal of that case does not necessarily
result in the dismissal of the present case because the same act may give rise to two (2) or more separate
and distinct offenses.

To contest the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Inocentes filed the present petition asserting, among
others, that the quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause for purposes of holding a person
for trial and/or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest was not met in this case. He argued that absent any
allegation of his specific acts or evidence linking him to the anomalous transactions, probable cause can
hardly exist because it would be imprudent to insinuate that Inocentes knew of the criminal design when all
he did was only to approve the housing loan applications. Obviously relying on his subordinates, Inocentes
claimed that he could not have conspired with them when he had no personal knowledge of any defect.

On April 10, 2013, we required the respondents to comment on Inocentes' petition, and deferred action on
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

In its comment, the OSP counters that what Inocentes asks at this point is for this Court to examine and
weigh all the pieces of evidence and thereafter absolve him of all charges without undergoing trial.

The OSP said that the Office of the Ombudsman did not act arbitrarily in conducting the preliminary
investigation and finding probable cause. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan likewise found probable cause after
considering all the pleadings and documents submitted before it and saw no sound reason to set aside its
finding.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation saying that it will no longer
submit its comment as the OSP, pursuant to its expanded mandate under R.A. No. 6770,10 shall represent
the People before this Court and the Sandiganbayan.

OUR RULING

We find the present petition meritorious.

Preliminary Considerations

The Constitution, under Section 1, Article VIII, empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.11 This is an overriding authority that cuts across all branches and
instrumentalities of government and is implemented through the petition for certiorari that Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court provides.12cha nrob leslaw

Inocentes, through this remedy, comes before this Court asserting that there was grave abuse on the part
of the Sandiganbayan when it exercised its discretion in denying his omnibus motion. This extraordinary writ
solely addresses lower court actions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is a circumstance beyond the legal
error committed by a decision-making agency or entity in the exercise of its jurisdiction; this circumstance
affects even the authority to render judgment.13 c hanrobles law

Under these terms, if the Sandiganbayan merely legally erred while acting within the confines of its
jurisdiction, then its ruling, even if erroneous, is not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. If, on the
other hand, the Sandiganbayan ruling was attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, then this ruling is fatally defective on jurisdictional ground and should be declared null
and void.14chanro bles law

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan denied Inocentes' omnibus motion (1) to judicially determine the
existence of probable cause; (2) quash the information that was filed against him; and/or (3) dismiss the
case against him for violation of his right to speedy trial. In determining whether the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse in the exercise of its discretion, we shall review the Sandiganbayan's judgment
denying the omnibus motion in the light of each cited remedy and the grounds presented by Inocentes to
support them.

The Sandiganbayan hardly committed any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
quash the information.

Inocentes is unyielding in his position that the informations filed against him should be quashed based on
the following grounds: (1) that all the information alleged is that Inocentes conspired and confederated with
his co-accused without specifying how his specific acts contributed to the alleged crime; and (2) that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Inocentes because he was occupying a position with a salary grade
less than 27.

On the contention that the informations did not detail Inocentes' individual participation in the conspiracy,
we have underscored before the fact that under our laws conspiracy should be understood on two
levels, i.e., a mode of committing a crime or a crime in itself.15 chan roble slaw

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,16 we explained that when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of
conspiring and all the elements and all the elements must be set forth in the information, but when it is not
and conspiracy is considered as a mode of committing the crime, there is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense, to wit: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime
must be set forth in the complaint or information.

xxx xxx xxx

The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in
itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar.There is less necessity of reciting
its particularities in the information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The
conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and
makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The
liabilities of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of
others, for the act of one is the act of all. In People v. Quitlong, we ruled how conspiracy as the mode of
committing the offense should be alleged in the information, viz: ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common
design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of conspiracy. Neither is it
necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive
offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the
offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a
manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts.
xxx xxx xxx

Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the
commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word, "conspire," or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is
intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts.17 [italics supplied]
With these guidelines in mind, Inocentes' challenge with respect to the informations filed against him
necessarily fails as he could gather that he is one of those GSIS officials who conspired in approving the
anomalous transactions. Accordingly, the informations filed against Inocentes in this case are valid because
they adequately provide the material allegations to apprise him of the nature and cause of the charge.

On the issue on jurisdiction, it is of no moment that Inocentes does not occupy a position with a salary
grade of 27 since he was the branch manager of the GSIS' field office in Tarlac City, a government-owned or
-controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position falls within the
coverage of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.

The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, and state universities shall be within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.18 We have clarified the provision of law defining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by explaining that the Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those
officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, regardless of
their salary grades.19 Simply put, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions enumerated by the law.20 In this
category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.21 chanrobleslaw

Furthermore, as the Sandiganbayan correctly held, even low-level management positions fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We settled this point in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan22 and Geduspan v.
People23.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying Inocentes' motion to quash;
hence, there was no grave abuse in the exercise of its discretion regarding this matter.

A redetermination of a judicial finding of probable cause is futile when the accused voluntarily
surrenders to the jurisdiction of the court.

In the present case, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan separately found that probable
cause exists to indict and issue a warrant of arrest against Inocentes. However, what Inocentes brings
before this Court right now is only the finding of the Sandiganbayan of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.

Under our jurisdiction, any person may avail of this remedy since it is well-established in jurisprudence that
the court may, in the protection of one's fundamental rights, dismiss the case if, upon a personal
assessment of evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.24 chan robles law

In People v. Castillo,25 we discussed the two kinds of determination of probable cause, thus:
c ralawre d ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination
of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based
on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant.

Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems
that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in turn should not override the public prosecutors'
determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal
justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a
criminal case should be filed in court, and that courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when
the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave
abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.

Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge's determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial
kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued against the accused.
[Emphasis supplied; citations omitted]
Under this ruling, we made it clear that the judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and
has no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of probable cause; rather, he makes a
determination of probable cause independently of the prosecutor's finding.26 Despite the fact that courts
should avoid reviewing an executive determination of probable cause, we are not completely powerless to
review this matter under our expanded judicial power under the Constitution.

We are aware, however, that Inocentes availed of this remedy after he had posted bail before the
Sandiganbayan which, in our jurisdiction, is tantamount to voluntary surrender.27 Simply put, questioning
the findings of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan at this point would be pointless as it has already
acquired jurisdiction over Inocentes.

It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon (1) his arrest or
apprehension, with or without a warrant, or (2) his voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of
the court. For this reason, in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan28 we held that even if it is conceded that the
warrant issued was void (for nonexistence of probable cause), the accused waived all his rights to object by
appearing and giving a bond, viz: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. [...]

By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption from the effect of being subject to the jurisdiction
of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he
himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that
sought other affirmative reliefs.29 [omission and emphasis ours]
Therefore, at this point, we no longer find it necessary to dwell on whether there was grave abuse on the
part of the Sandiganbayan in finding the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. Had
Inocentes brought this matter before he posted bail or without voluntarily surrendering himself, the outcome
could have been different. But, for now, whether the findings of probable cause was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion - thereby making the warrant of arrest void - does not matter anymore as even without
the warrant the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of Inocentes.

The Sandiganbayan should have granted Inocentes' motion to dismiss for violation of his right to
speedy disposition of cases; it took seven long years before the information was filed before it.

The Office of the Ombudsman, for its failure to resolve the criminal charges against Inocentes for seven (7)
years, violated Inocentes' constitutional right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case against
him, as well as its own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it.

A person's right to a speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution: ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as in all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-
judicial.30 In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action of all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice.31 chan roble slaw

In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,32 we held that the long delay of close to three (3) years in the termination of
the preliminary investigation conducted by the Tanodbayan constituted a violation not only of the
constitutional right of the accused under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but also of the
constitutional guarantee to "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights, viz:
ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for
the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the
due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as
embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3)
years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at
bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in
the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the
Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution
of a former high ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double
standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against
the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by
Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating
such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of
unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do
not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the
case.33[emphasis ours]
The Sandiganbayan insists that the delay in this case is justifiable because the informations were initially
filed before the RTC in Tarlac City. However, after going over the records of the case, we find that the period
of time in between the incidents that could have contributed to the delay were unreasonable, oppressive,
and vexatious.

According to the Sandiganbayan, the complaint in the case at bar was filed sometime in 2004. After the
preliminary investigation, on September 15, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding
probable cause to charge Inocentes. Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration on November 14,
2005, the prosecution filed the informations with the RTC of Tarlac City. However, on March 14, 2006, the
Office of the Ombudsman ordered the withdrawal of the informations filed before the RTC. From this point, it
took almost six (6) years (or only on May 2, 2012) before the informations were filed before the
Sandiganbayan.

To our mind, even assuming that transfers of records from one court to another oftentimes entails
significant delays, the period of six (6) years is too long solely for the transfer of records from the RTC in
Tarlac City to the Sandiganbayan. This is already an inordinate delay in resolving a. criminal complaint that
the constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of cases.
Thus, the dismissal of the criminal case is in order.34
chan roble slaw

Moreover, the prosecution cannot attribute the delay to Inocentes for filing numerous motions because the
intervals between these incidents are miniscule compared to the six-year transfer of records to the
Sandiganbayan.

The prosecution likewise blames Inocentes for not seasonably invoking his right to a speedy disposition of
his case. It claims that he has no right to complain about the delay when the delay is because he allegedly
slept on his rights.

We find this argument unworthy of merit, in the same way we did in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan: ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were
unaware that the investigation against them was still ongoing. They were only informed of the March 27,
2003 resolution and information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they
received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have
reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a
plausible reason as to why petitioners never followed up on the case altogether. Instructive on this point is
the Court's observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, to wit: ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they
were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still ongoing. Peculiar to this case, we
reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is
the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four
long years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them
had already been dismissed.

On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or even novel
reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay - the
many layers of review that the case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail - has lost its
novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident before us does not
involve complicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that the subject
computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft
League filed its complaint.
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to
follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's
responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its
mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker
v. Wingo:

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial: the State has that duty as well as the duty of
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.35 chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

Plainly, the delay of at least seven (7) years before the informations were filed skews the fairness which the
right to speedy disposition of cases seeks to maintain. Undoubtedly, the delay in the resolution of this case
prejudiced Inocentes since the defense witnesses he would present would be unable to recall accurately the
events of the distant past.

Considering the clear violation of Inocentes' right to the speedy disposition of his case, we find that the
Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in not acting on the case within a reasonable time after it had
acquired jurisdiction over it.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Inocentes' petition is GRANTED. The resolutions dated February 8,
2013 and October 24, 2012 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For violating Inocentes' right to a speedy disposition of his case, the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the case against him.
DUNCANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 191894, July 15, 2015

Doctrine:

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of
regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

Facts:

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the
Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11
of R.A. No. 6713. Duncano wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002.
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner, Duncano filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest7 before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. He asserted
that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No.
8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an official
of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation
that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.

The OSP argued that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without
indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such
position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP
contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature considering that the Sandiganbayan
has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution denying the
instant Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit. It ruled that the position of Regional Director
is one of those exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not
Salary Grade 27.

Petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional
Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director,
irrespective of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:

Whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only
Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Held:
Petitioner, Duncano is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he
hold any position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues,
his case is, in fact, on all fours with Cuyco.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of
regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. In ruling in
favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with
Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling
petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.

Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although petitioner is a Regional
Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.

Jesus P. Disini vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, The Republic of the Philippines,
as represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) G.R. No. 180564; 22 June
2010

Facts: On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and Jesus P. Disini (Disini) entered
into an Immunity Agreement (the Immunity Agreement) under which Disini undertook to testify for the
Republic and provide its lawyers with the information, affidavits, and documents they needed in its case
against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States District Court of New Jersey and in
the arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed against the
Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second
cousin, Herminio T. Disini (Herminio), as an executive in the latter’s companies from 1971 to 1984. The
Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant,
brokered by one of Herminio’s companies, had been attended by anomalies.

In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse cases, it
would not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic
against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon the Republic’s application,
the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents
before that court in an action that the Republic filed against Herminio. Disini moved to quash the
subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement. The Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new
subpoena directing him to testify before it. Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity
Agreement insofar as it prohibited the Republic from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on,
the Sandiganbayan denied Disini’s motion to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus, brought the matter to the
Supreme Court. The Republic maintained that the PCGG’s power to grant immunity under Section 5 of
Executive Order 14 covered only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution and did not cover immunity
from providing evidence in court.

The Republic argued that Disini’s immunity from testifying against Herminio contravened the state’s policy
to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former President Marcos. The Republic further
argued that under the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which reads: “Nothing
herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini’s obligation to provide truthful information or testimony,” Disini, despite
the immunity given him against being compelled to testify in other cases, was to “provide truthful
information or testimony” in such other cases. For his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through the
PCGG, was estopped from revoking the questioned immunity as it had made him believe that it had the
authority to provide such guarantee. The Republic countered by invoking Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that “(t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppel.”

Issues (as defined by the Supreme Court): (1) Whether or not the PCGG acted within its authority when it
revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement; and (2) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion when it denied Disini’s motion to quash the subpoena.

Held: The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in determining the
extent of the criminal immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal
immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-
gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient
to induce cooperation. Trusting in the Government’s honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his
part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should hold the
Republic on to its promise. If Disini refuses to testify in those other cases as ordered by Sandiganbayan, it
was certain to result in prosecution for criminal contempt (a conduct directed against the authority and
dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends
to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect), punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both. In criminal
contempt, the proceedings are regarded as criminal and the rules of criminal procedure apply. The grant,
therefore, of immunity to Disini against being compelled to testify was ultimately a grant of immunity
from criminal prosecution, something that fell within the express coverage of the immunity given him.
The questioned immunity did not contravene the state’s public policy respecting the recovery of illegally
acquired wealth under the regime of former President Marcos. The authority that adopted such policy,
former President Corazon C. Aquino, was the same authority that gave the PCGG the power to grant
immunity to witnesses whom it might use to recover illegally acquired wealth during that regime. In the
case of Tanchanco vs. Sandiganbayan (______________), the Court regarded as valid and binding on the
government the immunity it gave former National Food Authority Administrator, Jesus Tanchanco, for all
“culpable acts of his during his service in the Marcos government,” which would include possible
prosecution for any illegal wealth that he might himself have acquired during that service.

The Court did not regard such immunity in contravention of the state policy on recovery of ill-gotten
wealth under the auspices of the Marcos regime. The last sentence in paragraph 3 of the Immunity
Agreement that enjoined Disini to “provide truthful information or testimony,” despite the guarantee not
to be compelled to testify against Herminio, merely emphasized the fact that such concessions did not
affect his obligation to “provide truthful information or testimony” in the two Westinghouse cases.
The grant of immunity to Disini against being compelled to testify in “other cases” against Herminio was
quite clear and did not need any interpretation. The estoppel Disini invoked did not have the effect, if
recognized, of denying the state its right to recover whatever ill-gotten wealth Herminio may have
acquired under the Marcos regime. The action against Herminio could continue, hampered only by the
exclusion of Disini’s testimony. And there are other ways of proving the existence of ill-gotten wealth.
Although the government cannot be barred by estoppel based on unauthorized acts of public officers,
such principle cannot apply to this case since PCGG acted within its authority when it provided Disini with
a guarantee against having to testify in other cases.

A contract is the law between the parties; it cannot be withdrawn except by their mutual consent. This
applies with more reason in this case where Disini already complied with the terms of the Immunity
Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the Immunity Agreement at this late stage would run afoul
of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits. The
Court should not allow the Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross Disini. The Immunity Agreement
was the result of a long drawn out process of negotiations with each party trying to get the best
concessions out of it. The Republic did not have to enter into that agreement; it was free not to. But when
it did, it needed to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than any one, the government should
be fair. PCGG’s revocation of the questioned immunity and Sandiganbayan’s denial of Disini’s motion to
quash the subpoena were both annulled.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166355
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
- versus - SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:

May 30, 2011

LUIS J. MORALES,
Respondent.

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:
 We review the petition for review on certiorari, filed by the People of
the Philippines (the People), to assail the Resolution[1] of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27431, entitled People of the Philippines
versus Luis J. Morales.

Background Facts

On June 13, 1991, then President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative

Order No. 223 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the declaration of
Philippine Independence and thereby created the Committee for the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998 (Committee).

In 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128 (EO
128), entitled Reconstituting the Committee for the Preparation of the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998. EO 128 renamed the Committee as the National
Centennial Commission (NCC). The mandate of the NCC was to take charge of the
nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of
the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos
Congress.[2] The late Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as NCC
Chairman.

On March 10, 1996, the NCC and the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA)[3] organized the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation or
Expocorp whose primary purpose was to operate, administer, manage and develop
the Philippine Centennial International Exposition 1998 (Expo 98).[4]

The Philippine Centennial project was marred by numerous allegations of

anomalies, among them, the lack of public biddings. In 1998, Senator Ana
Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing these
anomalies. Because of this speech, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an
investigation on the Philippine Centennial project. In 1999, then President Joseph
Estrada created the Ad Hoc and Independent Citizens Committee (AHICC), also for
the purpose of investigating these alleged anomalies. Both the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee and the AHICC recommended to the Office of the Ombudsman that a
more exhaustive investigation of the Philippine Centennial project be conducted.

The investigation that followed resulted in the filing in 2001 of an

Information[5] by the Ombudsmans Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau against
respondent Luis J. Morales (Morales), the acting president of Expocorp at the time
relevant to the case. This Information served as basis for Criminal Case No. 27431
that we now consider.
The Information against Morales for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019[6] reads:

That on or about September 6, 1997 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto

in Pasig City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Pres. of Expo Corporation,
Pasig City, a government corporation, and as such was issued one (1) Mercede[s]
Benz, Model 1997-C230, bearing Serial No. WDB202023-1F-602122, and Engine
No. 111974-12-027093 for his official use, and while in the performance of his
official functions, acting thru evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted benefits to one
Rodolfo M. Lejano by selling to him said Mercede[s] Benz through Newton
Motors, Inc. represented by its President Exequiel V. Mariano in the amount of
Two Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P2,250,000.00), without the
requisite public bidding nor approval of the Board of Directors of Expo Corporation
and thereafter failed to deposit the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned
vehicle to the account of Expo Corporation, to the damage and prejudice of the
Corporation and the public interest as well.[7]

In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, Morales moved for the

dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over his person and over the offense
charged. He alleged that Expocorp is a private corporation and that he is not a public
employee or official. He also alleged that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
his person or the offense charged as he is a private individual who has not been
charged jointly with other public officials or employees. He added that Expocorp is
not a government-owned or controlled corporation because it was not created by a
special law, it did not have an original charter, and a majority of Expocorps capital
stock is owned by private individuals. He claimed that he did not receive any
compensation from the government as defined in Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 3019, and
the compensation he received as Expocorps acting president was paid from
Expocorps funds.[8]

In its comment to Expocorps motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor,

representing the People, insisted that Expocorp is a government-owned corporation
since its articles of incorporation showed that of its ten listed subscribers, BCDA
held stocks valued at P99,999,100.00, while the stocks held by the rest of the
subscribers had a total value of P900.00. The People further argued, based on the
Courts ruling in Salvador H. Laurel v. Aniano A. Desierto,[9] that NCC Chairman
Laurel was a public officer; thus, Morales was likewise a public officer since his
appointment flowed from the formers exercise of his authority as chairman of both
NCC and Expocorp.

In his reply, Morales averred that upon Expocorps incorporation, BCDA

owned essentially all of Expocorps stocks. Two months after its incorporation,
however, the Board of Directors of Expocorp issued a resolution declaring all its
unissued and unsubscribed shares open for subscription. Global Clark Assets
Corporation (Global) subscribed to essentially all of these unissued and
unsubscribed shares; thus, Global became the majority owner with 55.16% of
Expocorps stocks, while BCDA was left as minority stockholder with 44.84% of
Expocorps stocks. Morales also asserted that the ruling
in Laurel[10] applied exclusively to Chairman Laurel. Morales concluded that since
Expocorp is a private corporation and an entity distinct from NCC, he, as its
president, is not a public officer.
The Sandiganbayan Resolution
 The Sandiganbayan, after considering the arguments of the parties, ruled that
the position of a president of a government-owned or controlled corporation clearly
falls within its jurisdiction. However, before Morales could be held accountable as
Expocorps president, it must first be established that Expocorp is a government-
owned or controlled corporation.

The Sandiganbayan explained in Laurel,[11] that the Court only held

that Laurel is a public officer without ruling on whether Expocorp is a private or a
government-owned corporation. The Court also held that NCC performed executive
functions, hence, it was a public office; consequently, its chairman, Laurel, was a
public officer. Morales, in the case at bar, is being charged as president of Expocorp
only and not as an NCC official.

In ruling that Expocorp is a private corporation, the Sandiganbayan stated that

it was not created by a special law nor did it have an original charter. It was
organized under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. According to the Sandiganbayan, Expocorp could not derive
its public character from the fact that it was organized by the NCC. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that applying the provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, Expocorp is a private corporation because Global owns 55.16% of its
stocks; hence, its officers and employees are private individuals who are outside the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On this basis, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the
information against Morales.

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion the People subsequently

filed;[12] hence, the present petition.

The Issues
 The People submits the following grounds:

(1) Expocorp was organized and created for the sole purpose of performing the
executive functions of the National Centennial Commission and the
sovereign functions of the government, and should be considered as a public
office.

(2) Petitioner, as president of Expocorp, should rightfully be considered as a public

officer, falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandigangayan.[13]

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

The nature of Expocorp

The People submits that Expocorp was an extension of the NCC as provided
in Expocorps Articles of Incorporation, specifically Section 2[14] which states
Expocorps primary purpose. It provides that Expocorps primary purpose was to
establish and operate Expo 98 - an NCC project. The People stated in its petition,
thus -

The position occupied by respondent as President of Expocorp stemmed

from his appointment as such by NCC Chair and Expocorp Chief Executive Officer
Salvador H. Laurel. On the basis of such appointment, respondent served as the
governments representative and Laurels alter ego in running the affairs of
Expocorp. As held in the Laurel vs. Desierto case, even assuming that Expocorp is
a private corporation, petitioners position as Chief Executive officer (CEO) of
Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or
omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and
functions as NCC Chair.

Having established that Expocorp, by extension, performed part of the

sovereign functions delegated to the NCC, it follows that respondent, as President
of Expocorp, performed tasks that likewise fall within the contemplation of the
governments sovereign functions.[15]
 We do not agree with the People.

Expocorp is a private corporation as found by the Sandiganbayan. It was not

created by a special law but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.[16] It is also not a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Although BCDA, which owned
999,991 shares[17] of its shares, was one of Expocorps original incorporators, the
Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed Global to buy 1,229,998 of its unused and
unsubscribed shares two months after its incorporation. With the BCDA as a
minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot be characterized as a government-owned or
controlled corporation. In Dante V. Liban, et al. v. Richard J. Gordon,[18] we
pointedly said:

A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the

government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital
stock must be owned by the government.

The Sandiganbayans Jurisdiction

Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan:[19]
Sec. 5. The [Batasang Pambansa] shall create a special court, to be known
as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.

R.A. No. 8249,[20] which amended Presidential Decree No.

1606,[21] delineated the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as follows:
 Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read
as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as

the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of

the Sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and
other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang Panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department heads;
(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without

prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
 b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a
of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with

Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Underlining supplied.)

Since Expocorp is a private corporation, not a government-owned or

controlled corporation, Morales, as Expocorps president who now stands charged
for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in this capacity, is beyond the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Sandiganbayans June 15,
2004 Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27431, entitled People of the Philippines
versus Luis J. Morales, is AFFIRMED. No costs.