A Theory of Obligation:

Theoretical and Practical Implications

A generic term for any type of legal duty or liabil
ity.
In its original sense, the term obligation was ver
y technical in nature and applied to the responsi
bility to pay money owed oncertain written docu
ments that were executed under seal. Currently
obligation is used in reference to anything that
anindividual is required to do because of a pro
mise, vow, oath, contract, or law. It refers to a le
gal or moral duty that anindividual can be force
d to perform or penalized for neglecting to perfo
rm.
An absolute obligation is one for which no legal
alternative exists since it is an unconditional dut
y.
A contractual obligation arises as a result of an
enforceable promise, agreement, or contract.
An express obligation is spelled out in direct an
d actual terms, and an implied obligation is infer
red indirectly from thesurrounding circumstance
s or from the actions of the individuals involved.
A joint obligation is one that binds two or more
people to fulfill whatever is required, and a seve
ral obligation requires each oftwo or more indivi
duals to fulfill the obligation in its entirety by him
self or herself.
A moral obligation is binding upon the conscien
ce and is fair but is not necessarily enforceable
in law.
A primary obligation is one that must be perfor
med since it is the main purpose of the contract
that contains it, whereas asecondary obligation
is only incidental to another principal duty or ari
ses only in the event that the main obligation ca
nnot befulfilled.
A penal obligation is a penalty, such as the obli
gation to pay extra money if the terms or conditi
ons of an agreement cannot be satisfied.
OBLIGATION. In its general and most extensiv
e sense, obligation is synonymous with duty. In
a more technical meaning, it isa tie which binds
us to pay or to do something agreeably to the la
ws and customs of the country in which the obli
gation is
made. The term obligation also signifies the ins
trument or writing by which the contract is witne
ssed.
And in another sense, an obligation still subsist
s, although the civil obligation is said to be a bo
nd containing a penalty, with acondition annexe
d for the payment of money, performance of co
venants or the like; it differs from a bill, which is
generallywithout a penalty or condition, though i
t may be obligatory.

2. It is also defined to be a deed whereby a ma

n bindshimself under a penalty to do a thing.
A theory of obligation can be centered
around one foundational assumption: that
there exists a moral imperative to aid the
structurally dispossessed and functionally
abused. Other theories of obligation might
emphasize different, more utilitarian
approaches. We do not think that ours
entertains a highly controversial assumption.
Indeed, the moral imperative to assist others
has been codified in international human
rights laws which have been widely ratified
and have garnered global (even if often
rhetorical) attention and support (Donnelly
2006).
In turn, a theory of obligation structures our
response to the moral imperative to give aid.
At its simplest, obligation is found in basic
human interactions and expectations.
Friendship entails obligation, often
accompanied by feelings of gratitude.
Gratitude, in turn, is expressed for acts of
kindness (Epstein 2006: 69). Such
understandings provide us with a framework
within which we can
operate ethically and effectively not only in
everyday interactions but to benefit the
dispossessed and abused, and to guarantee
their human rights. Thus, our theory of
obligation has two major components: a
moral/ethical element which informs
decisions as to which issues are appropriate
for humanitarianism and which actions are
morally permissible in pursuing them; and a
pragmatic element which guides us in
evaluating the most effective use of
available resources. The overlap between the
two components, the morally possible and
the materially ble, consists of those actions
that we are obligated, as representatives of
humankind, to pursue.