RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged indifference to the
urces,” the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT”
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. March 8, 2011
FACTS:
 Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary (the Vinuya decision), the case involving the Filipino
comfort women during the Japanese occupation, the counsel for the
petitioners therein filed, first, a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the
fundamental responsibility of states in protecting its citizens’ human rights
specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms and, second, a supplement
thereto asserting that the Vinuya decision was plagiarized from different
sources and that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by
the ponente, Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice del Castillo), to suit the
arguments laid down in said decision.
 The court formulated an ethics committee tasked to investigate the veracity
of the alleged plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly plagiarized sent
their respective letters to the Supreme Court, noting the misreading or
misrepresentation of their articles. Hence, in their articles, they argue that
the crimes of rape, torture and sexual slavery can be classified as crimes
against humanity, thus attaining the jus cogens status; consequently, it shall
be obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved
citizens. However, the Vinuya decision cited them to support the contrary
stand.
 In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College of Law came up
with a statement entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty
of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” (Restoring
Integrity Statement), which statement alleged plagiarism against Justice del
Castillo, treating the same not only as an established fact, but as a truth.
Said statement was posted online and at the College’s bulletin board and
was submitted to the Supreme Court.
 The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not
only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, but also
directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by
dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. They also attempted to educate this Court on how to go about the
review of the case.
 The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the
petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
respect.
 The manner in presenting the arguments and the language used therein, the
Court believed, were inappropriate considering its signatories are lawyers.
Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause Resolution directing
respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Conversely, compliance to such resolution was unsatisfactory, except for
one respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution denies respondents their
freedom of expression? No.
2. Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violates respondents’ academic
freedom as law professors? No.
RATIO:
A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact
that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one
of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of
the criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not
parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the “proper disposition” and consideration of
the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution
painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and
uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later
submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly,
for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom
from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. Thus, proscribed are the uses of
unnecessary language, which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes
distrust in judicial administration, or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence
of people in the integrity of the members of the Court. In other words, while a lawyer
is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
A long line of cases shows that the Court has held that the right to criticize the courts
and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In
cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence
has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial,
have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

Also, there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents
the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is
not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech,
coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

Respondents cannot successfully invoke academic freedom in this case. The

constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be
circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and
to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. The Court
believes that the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of
lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors. The
Court reiterates that lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the
practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do
not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of
the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against
the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the
Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact
that they are lawyers.