Case Facts Issue Held

Private respondent Echiverri filed against petitioner Asistio a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the
Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City before the MeTC, Branch 52,Caloocan City presided over by
public respondent Judge Arthur O. Malabaguio. Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a resident of
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known to
Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St.,Barangay 15,Caloocan City, the address
be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City
stated in his COC for Mayor in the 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Echiverri, also a
Second District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998,
candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City, was the respondent in a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or
and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in
Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Asistio. According to Echiverri, when he was about to
Whether or not Asistio the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines above enunciated, it
furnish Asistio a copy of his Answer to the latters petition, he found out that Asistios address is non-
should be excluded cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing
existent. To support this, Echiverri attached to his petition a Certification issued by the Tanggapan ng
from the permanent list that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in
Punong Barangay of Barangay 15 Central, Zone 2, District II of Caloocan City. He mentioned that, upon
of voters of Caloocan Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A,Barangay
Asistio vs Aguirre verification of the 2009 Computerized Voters List (CVL) for Barangay 15, Asistios name appeared under
City for failure to 15,Caloocan City.
voter number 8, with address at 109 Libis Gochuico,Barangay 15,Caloocan City. Judge Malabaguio
comply with the
rendered a decision removing the name of Asistio from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City.
residency required by That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-
law existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a
Meanwhile, Echiverri filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification,which was docketed as SPA
voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistios
No. 10-013 (DC). The Petition was anchored on the grounds that Asistio is not a resident of
COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),or an action to
CaloocanCity and that he had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Asistio, in
deny due course to the COC.But they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City,
his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses (Com Memorandum),raised the same arguments with
or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan City.
respect to his residency and also argued that the President of the Philippines granted him an absolute
pardon.

Petitioner Untalum obtained 482 votes while respondent Anni received 35,581 votes out of the 39,801
voters. If the returns of Siasi were excluded, petitioner would have lead of 5,301 votes. Petitioner filed
written objections to the returns from Siasi on the ground that they “appear to be tampered with or
falsified” owing to the “great excess of votes” appearing in the said returns.
COMELEC issued annulling the Siasi List of Voters “on the ground of massive irregularities committed in
Ututalum vs
the preparation and being statistically improbable”, and ordering a new registration of voters for the local
COMELEC
elections.
Petitioner contends that the issue he raised referred to “obvious manufactured returns,” a proper subject
matter for a pre-proclamation controversy and therefore cognizable by the COMELEC; that election
returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results since its original List of Voters had
already been finally annulled.
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was disqualified by the
Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru
Frivaldo vs repatriation. Respondent Lee was the second placer in the canvass and claimed that the votes cast in
COMELEC favor of petitioner should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally
thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or the incumbent
Vice-Governor should take over the said post due to permanent vacancy due to Frivaldo’s ineligibility.
Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. There are two
administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the
Commission on Elections (by Chairman Vicente Santiago) and found the Labo to be a citizen of the
Philippines. It found out that there is no direct proof that the petitioner had been formally naturalized as a
citizen of Australia. The said citizenship was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an
Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as en alien with the CID upon his
return to this country in 1980. The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (by Chairman MDS) and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. Its
decision took into account the official statement of the Australian Government that the petitioner was still
an Australian citizen by reason of his naturalization in 1976 and his taking of oath of allegiance to the
Labo vs Government of Australia.
COMELEC
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he deny that he
obtained Australian Passport, which he used in
coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was
an alien and registered as such under an Alien Certificate of Registration. He later asked for the change
of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence. The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as
"mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship.
Furthermore,the marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground
that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen.
The Siasi returns, however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List of Voters, there is actually a great
excess of votes over what could have been legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted out of the
Whether or not the
39,801 voters.
election returns from
Siasi should be
Petitioner’s cause of action is not a listed ground for a pre-proclamation controversy. To allow the COMELEC to do so
excluded from the
retroactively would be to empower it to annul a previous election because of the subsequent annulment of a
canvass of the results
questioned registry. The list must then be considered conclusive evidence of persons who could exercise the right of
since the original List of
suffrage in a particular election. The preparation of a voter’s list is not a proceeding before the Board of Canvassers. A
Voters had been finally
pre-proclamation controversy is limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of
annulled
Election Inspectors and such challenge should relate to specified election returns against which the petitioner should
have made verbal elections.
The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of
Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of
that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive
process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization,
he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. The
petitioner claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which
enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these is naturalization in a foreign country.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
Whether or not
naturalization, or by repatriationIt does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Petitioner Labo is a
Philippine citizenship. In fact, he was not even a qualifed voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage.
citizen of the
He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government Code.
Philippines.
The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a
stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. Philippine
citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes
in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. If the votes were cast in the sincere belief
that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
 Case Facts Issue Held

Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to
Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the
a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived
local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo
his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s application
Caasi, on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not
for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status
qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of
are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines.
America, not of Bolinao. 2 cases were consolidated 1) petition for review on certiorai of COMELEC's act
1) WON a green card Miguel's answer to a question in the said application regarding his "Length of intended stay was, "Permanently." On its
of dismissing 3 petitions for DQ filed before elections--> "The possession of a green card by the
is proof that the holder face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration
respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
is a permanent resident Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. Such entitled
Philippines. On the contrary, he has suffciently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as
of the US him to reside permanently and work in the US. Miguel's immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an abandonment of
shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality". (1 dissent: he should be the one
2. Whether respondent his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the US merely to visit his children or his doctor
Caasi vs to prove that he has waived status as permanent immigrant) 2) petition for review of CA's decision
Miguel had waived his there, he entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's
COMELEC dismissing the petition for qou warranto filed by the opponent, Mateo Caasi---> "It is pointless for the
status as a permanent (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the
RTC to hear the case questioning the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the
resident of or immigrant U.S., the country in which he resides. This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence
COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and residence
to the U.S.A. prior to therein.
for the elective position
the local elections on
January 18, 1988. Miguel's act of filing a COC did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the US. He
theUS. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing
allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the US for his
his COC. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green
periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of
card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988,
Bolinao, Pangasinan that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987
the Court’s conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and
for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.
void.
 Case Facts Issue Held

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college
degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently,
she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.The essential distinction between residence and
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his
married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was
abode ends The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the
registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in
First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
father brought them to Leyte;
Whether petitioner has
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte satisfied the 1year
Romualdez abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte residency requirement
Marcos vs absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the to be eligible in running
COMELEC 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for as representative of the
mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which First District of Leyte.
origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile
the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her
or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. She obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested.
votes received by Respondent Montejo.
She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
milestones.
Petition to file amended COC denied by COMELEC since filed out of time and involves a substantial
amendment
COMELEC: Granted petition for DQ; cancelled Marcos' original COC- became a resident in many places
in Manila; pure intention to reside not sufficient; denied MR
 Case Facts
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his COC for the position of Representative
for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated
that he was a resident of the district, Makati for 10 months. Move Makati, a registered political party, and connotes “domicile” to
Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less
than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election. Faced with a petition for disqualification, position in the electoral
Aquino vs
Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The
COMELEC
Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition and allowed Aquino to run in
the election. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes. Move Makati
filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of
constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in
the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Cagas filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber
and to cancel the latter’s certificate of candidacy due to the fact that Villaber was convicted by the RTC
for violation of BP22 and was sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment.Cagas further alleged that this
crime involves moral turpitude; hence, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the CA’s Decision. However, in its Resolution, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition.
On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory. Cagas also asserted that Villaber
made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is “Eligible for the office I seek
Villaber vs to be elected” – which false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate
COMELEC pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has
not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for
promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and
executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve
moral turpitude. COMELEC finding merit in Cagas’ petition, issued the challenged Resolution declaring
Villaber disqualified as a candidate and canceling his COC. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for
violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude
Villaber seeks the nullification of 2 Resolutions of the COMELEC: 1) issued by its Second Division
disqualifying him as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of the and cancelling
his COC 2) en banc Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.
Issue Held
Yes, The term “residence” is synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was
applied. The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
1. Whether “residency”
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers
in the certificate of
or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable
candidacy actually
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
warrant the
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in. The SC agreed with the
disqualification of
Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
Aquino from the
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a
registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate
district.
indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district.
2. WON it is proven
Thus his domicile of origin up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a
that Aquino has
permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of
established domicile of
time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other
choice and not just
residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
residence (not in the
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
sense of the COC)in
To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile,
the district he was
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
running in.
correspond with the purpose.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a
newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air.
COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code that any person who has been sentenced
by final judgment for any offense for which he has been sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office.
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or
Whether or not
to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
violation of B.P. Blg. 22
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is
involves moral
ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
turpitude, which would
The element of the crime that the accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
disqualify Villaber as a
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
candidate for and from
presentment constitutes moral turpitude as the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the
holding any public
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
office.
interest. (People vs Atty Fe Tuanda)
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In
effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. There was no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
 Case Facts Issue
Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno from running for Punong Barangay of Brgy
Cabugao, Daram Samar on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary
Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months by
the RTC. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was
immediately granted probation after the judgment before even serving the sentence. Allegedly, the
imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended.
Moreno also argued that under the Probation Law, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to
restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated
Whether or not Moreno
his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right
is qualified to run,
Moreno vs to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections.
which is dependent on
COMELEC
WON his sentence was
The Investigating Officer of the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar recommended that
served
Moreno be disqualified from running. The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On
motion for reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was
affirmed.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a)1 of the LGC applies only to
those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. He alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified
therefore. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under the LGC
does not apply to him.
Sec 40 (b) of LGC which took effect on January 1, 1992, disqualifies a person for any elective position
on the ground that “had been removed from office as a result of an administrative case”.
In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of serious misconduct in
an administrative complaint. He ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of Manila, won
and assumed office for three terms during the Elections of 1988; 992 and 1995. As in the past,
respondent’s right to office was contested (except during his first term). The contest in his second term
was dismissed.
Does Section 40(b) of
the Local Government
On May 13, 1995, petitioner, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification praying in addition for
Code of 1991 apply
Grego vs the suspension of his proclamation and for the declaration of the 7th placer as the 6th duly elected
retroactively to those
COMELEC councilor. He contends that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an
removed from office
administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the
before it took effect on
disqualification applies. Nevertheless, Basco was proclaimed and immediately took his oath of office.
January 1, 1992?
Petitioner then filed an urgent motion seeking to annul the proclamation. Basco in return filed a motion to
dismiss. Respondent contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief because Section 40 par. b of
the LGC may not be validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would
make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights. Moreover,
his 3-time election constitutes an implied pardon by the people.
COMELEC dismissed the petition for DQ and denied MR declaring that there was an implied pardon
already
Held
Moreno’s sentence was not served, hence he is qualified to run for Punong Barangay. The resolution of the present
controversy depends on the application of the phrase “within two (2) years after serving sentence” found in Sec. 40(a)
of the LGC.
The grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office. In the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation. It appears then that during the
period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory
penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
The Court's declaration in the Dela Torre case on the effect of probation ought to be considered an obiter in view of
the fact that Dela Torre was not even entitled to probation because he appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial
Court which, however, affirmed his conviction. It has been held that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of
the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law. The phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general
and common sense, means the confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the
court.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged.
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence.
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is
merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. The Probation Law should be
construed as an exception to the LGC
The Supreme Court held that its refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section 40(b) is already a
settled issue and there exist no compelling reason for the Court to depart therefrom. That the provision of the Code in
question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense should
not deter the Court from applying the law prospectively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be
so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage.
Under the former Civil Service Decree, the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively
dismissed from office, the term “reinstatement” had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position.
Reinstatement is the reappointment of a person who was previously separated from the service through no
delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he was permanently appointed, to
a position for which he is qualified.
In light of this definition, there is no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from running for an elective position
inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas ruling (administrative case) is reinstatement to an
appointive position. The rule on implied pardon does not even apply since Basco is not considered as "disqualified" ,
hence there is really nothing to pardon.
The proclamation is also valid since what is being contested is not the returns but the qualifications of a candidate.
Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and
proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the
votes based on such returns and declare the result.
Obviously, the 7th placer may not be declared a winner. Basco was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to our
disquisition above. Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which put him in sixth place.
 Case Facts
Reyes vs
COMELEC
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes (54k difference).
However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States (was born in California).
Mercado vs From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. The Commission
Manzano on Elections declared Manzano granted the petition and cancelled the COC of Manzano on the ground
that he is a dual citizen (registered as an alien in Bureau of Immigration). Manzano filed a MR.
Accordingly, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998 which effectively
renounced his citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
Pursuant to such reversal, he was then proclaimed as the vice mayor.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Issue Held
The phrase "dual citizenship" must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. The Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
Whether or not a dual country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
citizen is disqualified to condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully
hold public elective complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our
office in the philippines. courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law
may or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of COC sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of
the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.Manzano's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as
an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. Sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
 Case Facts Issue Held

Petitioner Eusebio Lopez was a candidate for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo
City in the synchronized Barangay and SK Elections held on October 29, 2007. On October 25, 2007,
respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province
of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence,
ineligible to run. Petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American,
by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225. He returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay
Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
Lopez vs
COMELEC Petitioner emerged as the winner. On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution
granting the petition for disqualification on the ground that he was not able to regain his Filipino
citizenship in the manner provided by law. Petitioner should have made a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship which he failed to do so.
Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections, petitioner argues that his filing of a COC operated as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
No, the operative facts that led to this Court's ruling in Valles are substantially different from the present case. In
Valles, the candidate, was a dual citizen by accident of birth on foreign soil. He was born of Filipino parents in
Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus soli. As a result, she acquired Australian citizenship by operation
of Australian law, but she was also considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law. She did not perform any act to
swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines. In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately
WON the filing of COC sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring
of Lopez is sufficient Filipino citizenship. More importantly, the Court's 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A.
compliance to run for No. 9225 10 in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino
public office citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines.
The petitioner should make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. In the instant case, respondent Lopez's failure to renounce his American
citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads us to believe that he failed to
comply with the positive mandate of law.

In 1992, Eduardo Rodriguez and respondent BienvenidoMarquez ran for Governor of Quezon
Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for Quo Warranto on the
ground that there is a charge pending against him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent
insurance claims, grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.

COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, it was held that: Fugitive from
justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who
No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who,
after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine
after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.
makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when
the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to
In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for Disqualification
evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at
against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a fugitive from justice. COMELEC then consolidated
least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez
both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA
arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles
Court and of the felony complaint. Consequently he was disqualified from running. Rodriguez' defense
Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly
Rodriguez vs that he cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the Is Rodriguez a fugitive
impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as
COMELEC criminal complaint, and his disappearance must be coupled with the clear desire to avoid and evade the from justice?
there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time.
warrant. This was however not sufficiently proved. On the contrary, the fact of arrest of his wife in the US
by the Fraud Bureau investigators in an apartment paid for Rodriguez in that country can hardly rebut
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province
whatever presumption of knowledge there is against him.
gubernatorial post. His subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission to the jurisdiction of the
former country does not operate to label petitioner automatically a fugitive from justice. As he was a public officer
Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board of
appointed and elected immediately after his return to the country, petitioner Rodriguez had every reason to devote
Canvassers proclaimed him. Marquez filed an "Omnibus Motion To Annul The Proclamation Of
utmost priority to the service of his office. He could not have gone back to the United States in the middle of his term
Rodriguez, To Proclaim Marquez And To Cite The Provincial Board of Canvassers in Contempt" before
nor could he have traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of the public he serves.
the COMELEC. Acting on Marquez' omnibus motion, the COMELEC, in its Resolution nullified
Rodriguez' proclamation and ordered certain members of the Quezon Province Provincial Board of
Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited in contempt. Marquez, also files an "Urgent Motion
For Temporary Restraining Order Or Preliminary Injunction" which sought to restrain and enjoin
Rodriguez "from exercising the powers, functions and prerogatives of Governor of Quezon" Acting
favorably thereon, the Court issued a TRO. Rodriguez' "Urgent Motion To Lift TRO And/Or For
Reconsideration" was denied by the Court.
 Case Facts
Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to compel the
De Guzman vs
Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him
Board of
as the duly elected governor of La Union based on the fact that certificate of candidacy filed by Juan
Canvassers
Lucero was not made under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to
(COC not under
dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on the subject-matter of
oath)
the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the members of the board of
canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to state a cause of action.
On March 23, 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission on Elections his
certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats for councilors in the Second District of Quezon
City. In Item No. 6 of his certificate he gave as his address “B 26 L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City.”
However, he did not indicate in the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct Number and the
Jurilla vs particular Barangay where he was a registered voter. His biodata submitted together with his certificate
COMELEC of candidacy gave his address as “Acacia Street, Mariana, Quezon City,” which is a part of the Fourth
District of Quezon City. In other words, his certificate of candidacy and his biodata filed with the
COMELEC did not expressly state that he was a registered voter of Quezon City or that he was a
resident of the Second District thereof within the purview of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
In November, 1987, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and
Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City, Manuel S. Pineda decided to
run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections scheduled in January, 1988,
and filed the corresponding certificate of candidacy for the position. Objection to Pineda’s being a
candidate while retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC was shortly thereafter registered by Mayor Arturo
Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte.
PNOC vs NLRC
Section 66 of the Election Code provides among others that officers and employees of GOCCs are
considered as ipso facto resigned upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy.
It was the argument of Pineda that PNOC-EDC was not created through a special law, it is not covered
by the Civil Service Law and, therefore, not contemplated under Section 66 of the Election Code.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC)
and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from WON the assailed
Quinto vs
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
COMELEC
(appointive vs
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his being violative of the
elective)
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the
government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and
certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and
void.
Issue Held
No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate of candidacy does not invalidate his election for the
fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of
the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a
prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election
Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for
fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of
the popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity.The rules
WON the failure of
and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them
Lucero in filing his
after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be
certificate of candidacy
mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous
under oath was fatal to
provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government
his proclamation as the
and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply
duly elected governor
because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done
of La Union
their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the
will of the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.
Hence, even if the legal provision in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would
have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate but because the people have already
expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that Lucero who was certified by
the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor has not sworn to his certificate of
candidacy.
Whether or not the
No. It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, earlier quoted,
failure of a candidate to
that the law does not specifically require that a candidate must state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct
indicate his Precinct
Number and the Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in
Number and the
the precinct where he intends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for office. In the case at
particular Barangay
bar, his failure to state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is satisfactorily explained by him in that at
where he was a
the time he filed his certificate he was not yet assigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon
registered voter
City. He was formerly a registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the elections he was
invalidates his
already a resident of “B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates,” admittedly within the Second District of Quezon City
certificate of candidacy.
Whether or not an
employee in a
Yes. If a corporation’s capital stock is owned by the Government, or it is operated and managed by officers charged
government- owned or
with the mission of fulfilling the public objectives for which it has been organized, it is a government-owned or
controlled corporation
controlled corporation even if organized under the Corporation Code and not under a special statute. Employees
without an original
thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are nonetheless “employees in government-
charter falls within the
owned or controlled corporation,” and come within the letter of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, declaring
scope of Section 66 of
them ipso facto resigned from their office upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy.
the Omnibus Election
Code.
No, there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions?
There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people.
It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are
put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of
resoultion is
the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete
unconstitutional for
deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for
which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
equal protection clause
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For
the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature,
whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet
equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
 Case Facts Issue Held
Petitioner was the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte when she filed on
February 27, 2001 with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of
candidacy for mayor of the said municipality.

On February 28, 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with
Whether or not an No. There is nothing in Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must
office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor. Simultaneously therewith, she
affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly
Loreta-Go vs attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for
of candidacy should be with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial
COMELEC mayor. However, the provincial election supervisor refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and
filed with the election election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election
(COC as mayor suggested that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, she should file it with the municipal
officer of the place officer of the said municipality. While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A requires that
and governor) election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.
where the certificate of the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such
candidacy was filed. requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience.
Private respondents filed similar petitions to disqualify petitioner on the ground that petitioner filed
certificates of candidacy for two positions, namely, that for mayor, and that for governor, thus, making her
ineligible for both.

The COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the petitioner from running for both position. When a candidate files his COC, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt.
Since Hans Roger withdrew his COC and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural
requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger.The COMELEC acted with grave
Luna filed her COC for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could
withdrew his COC on the same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the
not be considered to have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may
name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna.
not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a COC filed in due form. The question of
Luna vs Private respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of the COC or disqualification of Luna alleging
WON the substitution eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual
COMELEC that Luna made a false material representation in her COC because Luna is not a
was valid and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or
(valid substitution) registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra. Private respondents also
age in his COC, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such
claimed that Luna's certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because the substitution by Luna for
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code. In this case, there was no petition to deny due course
Hans Roger was invalid. Private respondents alleged that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on election
to or cancel the COC of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid COC and,
day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be substituted by Luna.
thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna's COC. In effect, the COMELEC,
without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger's COC and declared the substitution by Luna invalid.
Whether a candidate 31 days before the election, the protestant ceased to be a candidate by his own voluntary act, and as a matter of fact
who has the boards of election inspectors of the municipality of Miagao were duly notified of his withdrawal. His letter to the
It appears that the protestant withdrew his COC on October 10, 1947, but, on November 7, attempted to
withdrawn his COC Commission on Elections dated November 6, 1947, which he subscribed and swore to before a notary public on
revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The Commission on Elections, however, ruled on November 8
may revive it, either by November 7, whereby he withdrew his withdrawal of his COC, can only be considered as a new COC which, having
Monsale vs Nico that the protestant could no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal. A
withdrawing his letter of been filed only four days before the election, could not legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides
(withdrawal of the canvass of the election returns showed that the protestee Paulino M. Nico received 2,291 votes; another
withdrawal or filing of a that such certificate should be filed at least sixty days before the election.
withdrawal) candidate, Gregorio Fagutao, 126, votes; and the protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because
new COC, after the
the votes cast in his favor had not been counted for the reason that he was not a registered candidate.
deadline provided by The only instance wherein the law permits the filing of a COC after the expiration of the time limit for filing it is when a
Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected
law for the filing of such candidate with a COC duly filed dies or becomes disqualified. The Commission on Elections was, therefore, right in
certificate. holding as it did that the protestant "can no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal."

As an independent Constitutional Commission, it is clothed with the three powers of government — executive or
administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. The administrative powers of the COMELEC, for example,
include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors.
Petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang election. Its legislative authority is found in its power to promulgate rules and regulations
Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002. On the date of the elections, the COMELEC implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws. The Constitution has also vested it with
May theCOMELEC, on
issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation of the Commission's Law Department to deny quasi-judicial powers when it was granted exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
its own, in the exercise
due course to or cancel the COC of several candidates for the SK elections, including petitioners. The returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
of its power to enforce
Cipriano vs ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the other candidates involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
and administer election
COMELEC affected by said resolution were not registered voters in the barangay where they intended to run. officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
laws, look into the
(SK chairman- Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK elections and her name was not deleted
qualifications of a
quasi judicial from the official list of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was proclaimed by the The Commission also exercises other powers expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the
candidate and cancel
function of Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman. authority to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The exercise of such authority, however, must
his COC on the ground
COMELEC) be in accordance with the conditions set by law. candidacy.The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to
that he lacks the
She argued that a COC may only be denied due course or cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent
qualifications
any registered candidate for the same position under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Finally, defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility
prescribed by law?
she contended that she may only be removed by a petition for quo warranto after her proclamation as of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body. It is not sufficient, as the COMELEC
duly-elected SK Chairman claims, that the candidate be notified of the Commission's inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his COC, but he
must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he
seeks. Hence the foregoing resolutions canceling petitioner's COC without proper proceedings, are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and therefore void.
 Case Facts
Alfredo Abcede filed, with the COMELEC, his COC for the Office of the President of the Philippines, in
connection with the elections to be held on November 12 of the same year. On or about said date,
Abcede and other candidates were summoned by the COMELEC to appear before the same, "to show
Abcede vs Imperial
cause why their COC should be considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course," with the
(ministerial duty of
admonition that their failure to so appear would be sufficient ground for the Commission to consider said
COMELEC)
COC as not filed in good faith and not to give due course thereto. After due hearing, at which Abcede
appeared and introduced evidence, the Commission issued a resolution ordering that the COC of the
persons therein named, including that of said petitioner, "shall not be given due course."
Petitioner filed her COC for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo,
Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter, respondent Election Officer, per advice of
Provincial Election Supervisor, disapproved petitioner's COC again due to her age. Petitioner, however,
Garvida vs Sales appealed to COMELEC Regional Director who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner
(Division vs en to run. Respondent issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24
banc) hours to explain why her COC should not be disapproved. Earlier and without the knowledge of the
COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of
COC" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her COC.
Petitioner filed with respondent Commission his COC for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990. 16 days after the election, respondent
Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office
of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy as to his age.
Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent COMELEC has
Loong vs no jurisdiction because such petition is actually one which is to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
COMELEC of candidacy which, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), should have been filed within 25 days following the last day for filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the
subject of this petition.
Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioners filed a petition for disqualification (Pasig City Mayor, Councilor) under Sections 68 and 80 of
the Omnibus ElectionCode against Eusebio before the COMELEC stating that the latter engaged in an
election campaign invarious forms on various occasions outside of the designated campaign period
such as " (1)addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City
Lanot vs government (2)uttering defamatory statements against Lanot (3) causing the publication of a press
COMELEC release predicting his victory (4) installing billboards, streamers,poster, and stickers printed with his
surname across Pasig City and (5) distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce
their parents to vote for him,Eusebio won the election and any other complaints was dismissed by the
COMELEC,
Issue Held
The law give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner's COC. On the contrary, the
Commission has, admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to receive said COC. Of what use would it be to receive it if the
Whether the certificate were not to be given due course? The Constitution fixes the qualifications for the office of the highest
COMELEC commited magistrate of the land. All possessors of such qualifications are, therefore, deemed legally fit, at least, to aspire to
GAD such office and to run therefor. The power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative
questions." In this particular case, however, the action of the Commission as regards petitioner's COC is beyond the
bounds of its jurisdiction, and, hence, void.
Under the Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a COC lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division,
WON the COMELEC
not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number
en banc has jurisdction
of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to
to act on the petition to
reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en
deny or cancel COC
banc. 16 It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases.
No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on
the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall
under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows
the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date
of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body,
Whether or not SPA has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative
No. 90-006 was filed enactment.
within the period
prescribed by law. Ututalum filed the petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify candidate Loong only on 5 March 1990, or forty-nine (49) days
from the date Loong's certificate of candidacy was filed (i.e. 15 January 1990), and sixteen (16) days after the election
itself. Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-
day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely
helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto
within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code.
There is no dispute that Eusebio's acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were committed outside
of the campaign period, the only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December
WON there is a pre- 2003, was a candidate when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.
campaign offense Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a candidate for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code,
committed by Eusebio only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy, Applying the facts as found by Director Ladra
and affirmed by theCOMELEC First Division, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of theOmnibus Election Code
which requires the existence of a candidate, one who has filed his COC during the commission of the questioned facts.
 Case Facts
Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”
places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that
Adiong vs COMELEC fixes. Petitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate, assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits
COMELEC the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his
last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and
print political advertisements.
COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any
other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit
survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President,
results of which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for
ABS CBN vs
Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the
COMELEC
exit survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining
Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further
orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if
any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research
institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social
development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the
other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information including election surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing RA.
SWS vs
No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
COMELEC
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven
(7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the
results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on
the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections
on May 14,2001
Issue Held
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in
the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is
not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for
Whether or not the
overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses
COMELEC may
even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation
prohibit the posting of
are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room or
decals and stickers on
bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated.
“mobile” places, public
Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process
or private, and limit
of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty”
their location or
interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable.
publication to the
The burden is not met in this case.)
authorized posting
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the
areas that it fixes.
electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to
Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private
vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other
moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial
in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. In sum, the prohibition on posting of
decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious. The Court ruled that the holding of exit polls and the dissemination
WON COMELEC acted
of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence,
with GAD when it
the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Moreover,
approved the issuance
the Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls — disorder and confusion in the voting
of a restraining order
centers — does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution was too broad, since
enjoining the petitioner
its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. Concededly, the Omnibus Election
or any [other group], its
Code prohibits disruptive behaviors around the voting centers. There was no showing, however, that exit polls or the
agents
means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither had any evidence been presented proving that the
or representatives from
presence of exit poll reporters near the election precincts tended to create disorder or confuse the voters. Accordingly,
conducting exit polls
the petition was granted and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court was made permanent.
Are the Comelec
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
Resolutions prohibiting
(2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
the holding of pre-polls
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
and exit polls and the
freedom of expression.
dissemination of their
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well
results through mass
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of
media, valid and
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”
constitutional?
 Case Facts
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to
endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up showing petitioner
promoting the products of said establishments.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32:
Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other
materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on
television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or
Chavez vs
display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate
COMELEC
and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing
rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have
conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law
Department. Petitioner replied by asking that he be exempted from the application of Section 32,
considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as
paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.
The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover
them from public view pending the approval of his request.
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days after, the petitioner withdrew his
certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of
Pilar vs COMELEC
contributions and expenditures.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three
days after its filing. Petitioner speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have
entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost".
Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the candidates for the
lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the returns
was made on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed
respondent Ramirez to have been duly elected Representative of the District.
Libanan vs HRET
Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the
absence of the BEI Chairman’s signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots
were not those issued to the voters during the elections thus, indicating that they were spurious and
invalid. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot
before issuing
Issue Held
close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning
and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich
candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying
undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do not announce
nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political
activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a
public office. It includes directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a
private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character
because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of
powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to
be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would
have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do
not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image
models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image
even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against
premature campaigning.
The petition is dismissed. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or quali cation as to
whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to
refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. The court ruled
that the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities
which a candidate may have incurred. Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the
Whether or not a
administrative fine. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and
candidate is excused in
incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too
filing his statement of
remote. Courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.
contributions and
expenditures after he
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the
has withdrawn his
electorate. One way of attaining such objective is t to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of
certificate of candidacy.
candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the
purpose of in uencing the results of the elections. It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the
situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not
excused from ling a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect.
A ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any one of these
Whether or not the other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the
ballots without the BEI Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to
Chairman’s signature the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears extant
are valid. that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection. The law merely renders the BEI Chairman
accountable for such failure.
 Case Facts
Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for
mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 24, 1995, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor. Danilo
Manalastas and Ernesto Punzalan filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga. After hearing the election protests, the trial court rendered judgment on
September 23, 1996 declaring Punzalan as the duly elected mayor. Thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of
Punzalan vs appeal from the aforesaid decision On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution
COMELEC setting aside the trial court’s decision and affirming the proclamation of Meneses by the MBC as the duly
elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. Punzalan filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolution. Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring as
valid the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at the back
thereof, invoking the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bautista v. Castro wherein it was held that the
absence of the signature of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the
rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal.
Issue Held
A ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back is valid. While Section 24 11 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise
known as “An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms,” requires the
Whether or not the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same
ballots without the BEI although it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state
Chairman’s signature that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of
are valid. the members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and
thumbmarking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the
people.