LABOR CASE 1

LABOR CASE 2
MECHANICAL DEPART LABOR UNION v. CIR G.R. No. L- 28223 / 24 SCRA 925

Topic: Unit Severance and Globe Doctrine

FACTS:

The case began on 13 February 1965 by a petition of the respondent "Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa, etc." calling attention to the fact that there were three unions in the
Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways: the "Samahan", the "Kapisanan ng
Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company", and the Mechanical Department Labor
Union;

That no certification election had been held in the last 12 months in the Caloocan
shops; that both the "Samahan" and the Mechanical Department Labor Union had
submitted different labor demands upon the management for which reason a
certification election was needed to determine the proper collective bargaining agency
for the Caloocan shop workers.

The petition was opposed by the management as well as by the Mechanical

Department Labor Union, the latter averring that it had been previously certified in two
cases as sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees and laborers of the
PNR'S mechanical department, and had negotiated two bargaining agreements with
management in 1961 and 1963; that before the expiration of the latter, a renewal
thereof had been negotiated and the contract remained to be signed; that the
"Samahan" had been organized only in 21 January 1965; that the Caloocan shops unit
was not established nor separated from the Mechanical Department unit;

That the "Samahan" is composed mainly of supervisors who had filed a pending case to
be declared non-supervisors; and that the purpose of the petition was to disturb the
present smooth working labor management relations.

TRIAL COURT: reviewed the collective bargaining history of the Philippine National
Railways and allowed the establishment of new and separate bargaining unit in one
company, even in one department of the same company

the Mechanical Department Labor Union appealed to this Court questioning the
applicability under the circumstances of the "Globe doctrine" of considering the will of
the employees in determining what union should represent them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employees at the Caloocan Shops can desire the
respondent union, "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops", to be
separated from the Mechanical Department Labor Union, with a view to the former
being recognized as a separate bargaining unit, applying the Globe Doctrine

RULING: Yes, the Globe Doctrine is applicable in this case.

Yes because even though Appellant Mechanical contends that the application of the
"Globe doctrine" is not warranted because the workers of the Caloocan shops do not
require different skills from the rest of the workers in the Mechanical Department of the
Railway Company. This question is primarily one of facts.

The Industrial Court has found that there is a basic difference, in that those in the
Caloocan shops not only have a community of interest and working conditions but
perform major repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and machineries
found in said shops, while the others only perform minor repairs. It is easy to
understand, therefore, that the workers in the Caloocan shops require special skill in the
use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the
workers.

In addition, the record shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by
the appellant union have been in existence for more than two (2) years; hence, such
agreements can not constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of a new
bargaining representative (PLDT Employees' Union vs. Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co., 51 Off. Gaz., 4519).

As to the charge that some of the members of the appellee, "Samahan Ng

Manggagawa", are actually supervisors, it appears that the question of the status of
such members is still pending final decision; hence, it would not constitute a legal
obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At any rate, the appellant may later question
whether the votes of those ultimately declared to be supervisors should be counted.
Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the appellant union with the employer,
during the pendency of the original petition in the Court of Industrial Relations, should
be considered valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan shops is a question that
should be first passed upon by the Industrial Court.

LABOR CASE 3
G.R. No. 77395 Belyca Corporation v. Dir. Calleja, et. al. November 29, 1988

Facts:

On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate

labor organization, filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of Belyca Corporation, a
duly organized, registered and existing corporation, employing approximately 205 rank
and file employees/workers.

Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper, among others,
(1) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported
the filing of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned
after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were
retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious insubordination
and destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped
working; and (2) that the statutory requirement for holding a certification election has not
been complied with by the union.

The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union in his
order dated August 18, 1986.

Issue:

Whether or not the statutory requirement of 30% (now 20%) of the employees in the
proposed bargaining unit, asking for a certification election had been strictly complied
with.

Ruling:

Yes. It is undisputed that petitioner Belyca Corporation (Livestock and Agro Division)
employs more or less two hundred five (205) rank-and-file employees and workers. It is
significant to note that 124 employees out of such number have expressed their written
consent to the certification election; much more than the required 30% and over and
above the present requirement of 20% by Executive Order No. 111.

More than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for
holding a certification election cannot be a bar to its being granted. In fact, once the
required percentage requirement has been reached, even the employees’ withdrawal
from union membership taking place after the filing of the petition for certification
election will not affect said petition. Also, until a decision, final in character, has been
issued declaring the strike illegal and the mass dismissal or retrenchment valid, the
strikers cannot be denied participation in the certification election.

LABOR CASE 4

G.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION AND
ERNESTO L. PONCE, President V. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA IN
HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
HONORABLE DANILO L. REYNANTE IN HIS CAPACITY AS MED-ARBITER AND
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
FACTS: Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct Certification or
Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of certification
election among the abovementioned employees of the different plants as one
bargaining unit.

San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing
out, among others, the Med-Arbiter’s error in grouping together all three (3) separate
plants, into one bargaining unit, and in including supervisory levels 3 and above whose
positions are confidential in nature.

The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent company’s

Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for
determination of the true classification of each of the employees sought to be included
in the appropriate bargaining unit.

Upon petitioner-union’s motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the reconsideration

prayed for and directed the conduct of separate certification elections among the
supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in
each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company
are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a union.

2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants constitute
an appropriate single bargaining unit.

RULING:
(1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within the term
“confidential employees” who may be prohibited from joining a union.

They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under Article 245
of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. In the
very same provision, they are not allowed membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of
their own.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to
persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of
labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is
to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship must
exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the
prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their
duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal
objective sought to be accomplished by the ”confidential employee rule.” The broad
rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving
a potential conflict of interests. “Management should not be required to handle labor
relations matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the
company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties may
obtain advance information of the company’s position with regard to contract
negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters.”

The Court held that “if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with
a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident
conflict of interest. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence
of managerial employees in Union membership.”

An important element of the “confidential employee rule” is the employee’s need to use
labor relations information. Thus, in determining the confidentiality of certain employees,
a key question frequently considered is the employee’s necessary access to confidential
labor relations information.
(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in
Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando, Pampanga is
immaterial. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or
mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed.

An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as “a group of employees of a given

employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the
collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate
to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.”

A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial,

mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective
bargaining.

LABOR CASE 5

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC. vs. BCI EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION-

PAFLU, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, CIPRIANO CID and
JUANITO GARCIA

G.R. No. L-24711,; Apr 30, 1968

FACTS:

On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union (“BBWU”), for and in behalf of
all Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BENGUET) employees in its mines and milling
establishment located at Balatoc, Antamok and Acupan, Mt. Province, entered into a
Collective Bargaining Contract (CONTRACT) with BENGUET. The CONTRACT was
stipulated to be effective for a period of 4-1/2 years, or from June 23, 1959 to December
23, 1963. It likewise embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause.

3 years later, or on April 6, 1962, a certification election was conducted by the

Department of Labor among all the rank and file employees of BENGUET in the same
collective bargaining units. BCI EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION (UNION) obtained
more than 50% of the total number of votes, defeating BBWU. The Court of Industrial
Relations certified the UNION as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of
all BENGUET employees as regards rates of pay, wages, hours of work and such other
terms and conditions of employment allowed them by law or contract.

Later on, the UNION filed a notice of strike against BENGUET. UNION members who
were BENGUET employees in the mining camps at Acupan, Antamok and Balatoc,
went on strike. The strike was attended by violence, some of the workers and
executives of the BENGUET were prevented from entering the premises and some of
the properties of the BENGUET were damaged as a result of the strike. Eventually, the
parties agreed to end the dispute. BENGUET and UNION executed the
AGREEMENT. PAFLU placed its conformity thereto. About a year later or on January
29, 1964, a collective bargaining contract was finally executed between UNION-PAFLU
and BENGUET.

Meanwhile, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their Presidents to recover the
amount the former incurred for the repair of the damaged properties resulting from the
strike. BENGUET also argued that the UNION violated the CONTRACT which has a
stipulation not to strike during the effectivity thereof.

Defendants unions and their presidents defended that: (1) they were not bound by the
CONTRACT which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with BENGUET; (2) the
strike was due, among others, to unfair labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike
was lawful and in the exercise of the legitimate rights of UNION-PAFLU under Republic
Act 875.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the CONTRACT, particularly
the No-Strike clause, did not bind defendants. BENGUET interposed the present
appeal.

ISSUE:

Did the Collective Bargaining Contract executed between Benguet and BBWU on June
23, 1959 and effective until December 23, 1963 automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon
its certification, on August 18, 1962, as sole bargaining representative of all BENGUET
employees

RULING:
NO. BENGUET erroneously invokes the so-called “Doctrine of Substitution” referred to
in General Maritime Stevedore’s Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines where it was ruled
that:

“We also hold that where the bargaining contract is to run for more than two years, the
principle of substitution may well be adopted and enforced by the CIR to the effect that
after two years of the life of a bargaining agreement, a certification election may be
allowed by the CIR, that if a bargaining agent other than the union or organization that
executed the contract, is elected, said new agent would have to respect said contract,
but that it may bargain with the management for the shortening of the life of the contract
if it considers it too long, or refuse to renew the contract pursuant to an automatic
renewal clause.”

BENGUET’s reliance upon the Principle of Substitution is totally misplaced. This

principle, formulated by the NLRB as its initial compromise solution to the problem
facing it when there occurs a shift in employees’ union allegiance after the execution of
a bargaining contract with their employer, merely states that even during the effectivity
of a collective bargaining agreement executed between employer and employees thru
their agent, the employees can change said agent but the contract continues to bind
them up to its expiration date. They may bargain however for the shortening of said
expiration date.

In formulating the “substitutionary” doctrine, the only consideration involved was

the employees‘ (principal) interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The agent’s
(union) interest never entered the picture. The majority of the employees, as an entity
under the statute, is the true party in interest to the contract, holding rights through the
agency of the union representative. Thus, any exclusive interest claimed by the agent is
defeasible at the will of the principal. The “substitutionary” doctrine only provides that
the employees cannot revoke the validly executed collective bargaining contract with
their employer by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And it is in
the light of this that the phrase “said new agent would have to respect said contract”
must be understood. It only means that the employees, thru their new bargaining agent,
cannot renege on their collective bargaining contract, except of course to negotiate with
management for the shortening thereof.

The “substitutionary” doctrine cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly
certified collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal
undertakings — like the no-strike stipulation here — in the collective bargaining
agreement made by the deposed union. When BBWU bound itself and its officers not to
strike, it could not have validly bound also all the other rival unions existing in the
bargaining units in question. BBWU was the agent of the employees, not of the other
unions which possess distinct personalities.
UNION, as the newly certified bargaining agent, could always voluntarily assume all the
personal undertakings made by the displaced agent. But as the lower court found, there
was no showing at all that, prior to the strike, UNION formally adopted the existing
CONTRACT as its own and assumed all the liabilities imposed by the same upon
BBWU. Defendants were neither signatories nor participants in the CONTRACT.

Everything binding on a duly authorized agent, acting as such, is binding on the

principal; not vice-versa, unless there is mutual agency, or unless the agent expressly
binds himself to the party with whom he contracts. Here, it was the previous agent
who expressly bound itself to the other party, BENGUET. UNION, the new agent, did
not assume this undertaking of BBWU.

Since defendants were not contractually bound by the no-strike clause in the
CONTRACT, for the simple reason that they were not parties thereto, they could not be
liable for breach of contract to plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.

LABOR CASE 6
 LABOR CASE 7
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION v. NLRC, GR No. 103525, 1996-03-29
Facts:
On 23 August 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation, a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in the business of mineral
prospecting, exploration and extraction, and private respondent NAMAWU-MIF, a
labor federation duly organized and... registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), to which the Marcopper Employees Union (the exclusive
bargaining agent of all rank-and-file workers of petitioner) is affiliated, entered into a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from 1 May 1984 until
30 April 1987.
Prior to the expiration of the aforestated Agreement, on 25 July 1986, petitioner and
private respondent executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) wherein the
terms of the CBA, specifically on matters of wage increase and facilities allowance,
were modified
In compliance with the amended CBA, petitioner implemented the initial 5% wage
increase due on 1 May 1986.
On 1 June 1987, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 was promulgated mandating the
integration of the cost of living allowance under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6
into the basic wage of workers, its effectivity retroactive to 1 May 1987.[5]
Consequently,... effective on 1 May 1987, the basic wage rate of petitioner's laborers
categorized as non-agricultural workers was increased by P9.00 per day.[6]
Petitioner implemented the second five percent (5%) wage increase due on 1 May
1987 and thereafter added the integrated COLA.[7]
Private respondent, however, assailed the manner in which the second wage
increase was effected. It argued that the COLA should first be integrated into the
basic wage before the 5% wage increase is computed.[8]
Consequently, on 15 December 1988, the union filed a complaint for underpayment
of wages before the Regional Arbitration Branch IV, Quezon City.
On 24 July 1989, the Labor Arbiter promulgated a decision in favor of the union.
Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision and on 18 November 1991 the
NLRC rendered its decision sustaining the Labor Arbiter's ruling.
It is petitioner's contention that the basic wage referred to in the CBA pertains to the
"unintegrated" basic wage. Petitioner maintains that the rules on interpretation of
contracts, particularly Art. 1371 of the New Civil Code which states that:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
should govern.
Siding with the petitioner, the Solicitor General opines that for the purpose of
complying with the obligations imposed by the CBA, the integrated COLA should not
be considered due to the exclusivity of the benefits under the said CBA and E.O. No.
178.
Private respondent counters by asserting that the purpose, nature and essence of
CBA negotiation is to obtain wage increases and benefits over and above what the
law provides and that the principle of non-diminution of benefits should prevail.
Issues:
what should be the basis for the computation of the CBA increase, the basic wage
without the COLA or the so-called "integrated" basic wage which, by mandate of
E.O. No. 178, includes the COLA.
Ruling:
We rule for the respondents.
The principle that the CBA is the law between the contracting parties stands strong
and true.[17] However, the present controversy involves not merely an interpretation
of CBA provisions. More importantly, it requires a determination of the effect of... an
executive order on the terms and the conditions of the CBA.
It is unnecessary to delve too much on the intention of the parties as to what they
allegedly meant by the term "basic wage" at the time the CBA and MOA were
executed because there is no question that as of 1 May 1987, as mandated by E.O.
No. 178, the basic wage of workers, or... the statutory minimum wage, was
increased with the integration of the COLA. As of said date, then, the term "basic
wage" includes the COLA. This is what the law ordains and to which the collective
bargaining agreement of the parties must conform.
Petitioner's arguments eventually lose steam in the light of the fact that compliance
with the law is mandatory and beyond contractual stipulation by and between the
parties; consequently, whether or not petitioner intended the basic wage to include
the COLA becomes... immaterial. There is evidently nothing to construe and
interpret because the law is clear and unambiguous. Unfortunately for petitioner,
said law, by some uncanny coincidence, retroactively took effect on the same date
the CBA increase became effective.
Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that the computation of the CBA increase on
the basis of the "integrated" wage does not constitute a violation of the CBA.
What E.O. No. 178 did was exactly to integrate the COLA under Wage Orders Nos.
1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 into the basic pay so as to increase the statutory daily minimum
wage.
Integration of monetary benefits into the basic pay of workers is not a new method of
increasing the minimum wage.
The purpose of E.O. No. 178 is to improve the lot of the workers covered by the said
statute. We are bound to ensure its fruition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Principles:
While the terms and conditions of the CBA constitute the law between the parties, it
is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of law
governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of
Article
1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor
and capital, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest,
thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed liberally rather
than narrowly and... technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic
construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated
and purpose which it is intended to serve.