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Journal of Behavioral Finance

ISSN: 1542-7560 (Print) 1542-7579 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hbhf20

Investors' Personality Influences Investment


Decisions: Experimental Evidence on Extraversion
and Neuroticism

Andreas Oehler, Stefan Wendt, Florian Wedlich & Matthias Horn

To cite this article: Andreas Oehler, Stefan Wendt, Florian Wedlich & Matthias Horn (2017):
Investors' Personality Influences Investment Decisions: Experimental Evidence on Extraversion and
Neuroticism, Journal of Behavioral Finance, DOI: 10.1080/15427560.2017.1366495

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15427560.2017.1366495

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Published online: 26 Sep 2017.

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Download by: [Purdue University Libraries] Date: 26 September 2017, At: 15:45
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
https://doi.org/10.1080/15427560.2017.1366495

Investors’ Personality Influences Investment Decisions: Experimental Evidence


on Extraversion and Neuroticism
Andreas Oehlera, Stefan Wendtb, Florian Wedlich a
, and Matthias Horna
a
Bamberg University; bReykjavik University

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The authors analyze the impact of individuals’ degree of extraversion and neuroticism on their Investor personality;
decision making in an experimental asset market. To establish this link between research on Investment behavior;
experimental asset markets and social psychology the authors use a unique approach that Decision making; Behavioral
combines a questionnaire designed to assess individuals’ degree of extraversion and neuroticism finance; Experimental asset
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markets
and an experimental asset market to assess individual financial decision making. The dataset
combines 364 undergraduate business students’ questionnaire responses and their trading
behavior in the asset market. The authors find that extraversion and neuroticism significantly
influence individuals’ behavior in the experimental asset market. Specifically, more extraverted
individuals pay higher prices for financial assets and they buy more financial assets when assets are
overpriced than less extraverted individuals do. More neurotic individuals hold less risky assets in
their financial portfolios than less neurotic individuals do. Although a large part of the explanatory
power appears to be driven by gender differences, the authors still find significant impact of
extraversion and neuroticism after controlling for gender effects. The study findings suggest that
further research on financial markets could benefit from including personality of market
participants as a crucial explanatory factor.

Introduction
tradition in social psychology (e.g., Goldberg [1993],
“The goals of experimental finance are to understand Pervin [1996], Hogan, Johnson, and Briggs [1997], John,
human and market behavior in settings relevant to Robin, and Pervin [2008]) and has been integrated into
finance” (Asparouhova and Bossaerts [2015]). In this research in behavioral finance in general (e.g., Durand,
study we provide, to our knowledge, the first analysis Newby, and Sanghani [2008]). However, individual per-
that combines 2 large strands of research in this manner. sonality has barely been integrated into studies that apply
We focus on investors’ personality as a fundamental experimental asset markets so far.2 With our study we
research agenda in social psychology and on experimen- focus on this gap in the literature.
tal asset markets which have been addressed in the We analyze causal effects of individual investors’ per-
finance literature for more than 3 decades to gain deeper sonality on their decision making in financial markets.
insight into investor behavior. The application of an experimental asset market is of
Experimental asset markets have been designed to particular interest: It allows us to diminish the influence
examine informational efficiency (e.g., Miller, Plott, and of external effects such as heterogeneous information.
Smith [1977]), detect allegedly irrational behavior as Specifically, we match individual trading behavior in a
cause of price bubbles and crashes (e.g., Smith, Suchanek, computerized experimental asset market with data on
and Williams [1988]), and identify factors that influence the individuals’ personality traits, extraversion and neu-
price deviations from fundamental values (e.g., King roticism. Among the 5 personality traits that later on
[1991], Haruvy and Noussair [2006]),1 or to reveal were integrated in the Big Five taxonomy3 (Goldberg
behavioral biases, such as the disposition effect (e.g., [1981, 1993])4, extraversion and neuroticism had turned
Weber and Camerer [1998], Oehler, Heilmann, L€ager, out to be most influential on individual decisions (e.g.,
and Oberl€ander [2003]) or overconfidence (e.g., Kirchler Eysenck and Eysenck [1969] and Costa and McCrae
and Maciejovsky [2002]). The analysis of individual per- [1980]). Because extraversion and neuroticism interact
sonality, on the other hand, reflects a long research with individuals’ emotional states and their locus of

CONTACT Andreas Oehler andreas.oehler@uni-bamberg.de Bamberg University, Kaerntenstrasse 7, Bamberg 96045, Germany.
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on publisher’s website.
© 2017 The Institute of Behavioral Finance
2 A. OEHLER ET AL.

control, which in turn also influence individual invest- individuals do. Third, although individuals’ gender has
ment behavior (e.g., McInish [1980], Lo, Repin, and strong explanatory power regarding their behavior in
Steenbarger [2005]),5 we control for these factors in our experimental asset markets, we find that extraversion
analysis. Because women and men appear to differ from and neuroticism even influence behavior beyond gender
each other with respect to personality (e.g., Rammstedt, differences. The results provide implications for financial
Kemper, Klein, Beierlein, and Kovaleva [2012]) and service providers and academics alike. Financial service
investment behavior (e.g., Barber and Odean [2001], providers might consider offering more personalized
Dorn and Huberman [2005], Mayfield, Perdue, and financial advice to reflect that, for example, investors
Wooten [2008]) we also control for gender effects. with high values in neuroticism prefer less risky portfo-
Our empirical analysis combines data from a ques- lios than less neurotic investors do. This can help finan-
tionnaire and an experiment among 364 undergraduate cial service providers to obey the Markets in Financial
business students. The questionnaire is configured to col- Instruments Directive (MiFID), which requires that, for
lect data on the participants’ degree of extraversion and example, individuals’ ability to bear losses and their
neuroticism and their locus of control and emotional investment objectives including their risk tolerance be
states. The experiment is designed to identify the partici- taken into account. In this sense, assessing personality
pants’ investment decisions and the underlying return traits can give hints with respect to risk preferences and
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expectations and risk behavior. We base the experiment risk profile. Moreover, as more extraverted individuals
on the well-established asset market structure of Smith buy more financial assets when these assets are over-
et al. [1988], which allows an examination of price devia- priced than less extraverted individuals do, financial ser-
tions from fundamental values. While many studies that vice providers might consider to focus more clearly on
use this asset market structure examine market outcomes explaining—in particular to more extraverted individu-
at an aggregate level (e.g., Caginalp, Porter, and Smith als—that present performance is no predictor of future
[2001], Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux [2001], Andrade, performance, and therefore, can call attention to the risk
Odean, and Lin [2012]), we focus on market participants’ of buying overpriced assets. Academics should consider
behavior at the individual level. The dividend-paying our results in further research, for example, to explain
nature of Smith et al.’s [1988] asset market structure and predict investors’ behavior more accurately or to
appears to be particularly appropriate to analyze patterns check results’ robustness by considering differences in
of individual financial decisions because it “captures a personality traits. The influence of negative or positive
structure found in many assets traded in the field, such affect on financial decisions, for example, should be
as dividend-paying stocks” (Noussair et al. [2001], p. 88). revisited with respect to potential interaction with indi-
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, viduals’ degree of extraversion and neuroticism.
we contribute to a largely underexplored research area The article is organized as follows. In the second sec-
and provide, to our knowledge, the first study that tion we present related research on the impact of extra-
directly links personality traits with individual invest- version and neuroticism on financial decision making. In
ment decisions in an experimental asset market. We ana- addition, we discuss research on the relationship among
lyze a unique dataset including data on 364 individuals’ these personality traits and gender, age, locus of control,
degree of extraversion and neuroticism and their deci- and emotional states. We derive the hypotheses for our
sions in the experimental market. Second, the combina- empirical analysis in the third section. We describe our
tion of data from the questionnaire and from the questionnaire, the experimental design, and the method-
experiment allows us to directly analyze how individuals’ ology in the fourth section. In the fifth section we present
degree of extraversion and neuroticism influences their our empirical results. In the sixth section we discuss the
holdings of risky assets and their trading activity depend- implications of our findings and conclude.
ing on the price of risky assets. Third, in a comprehen-
sive analysis we are able to differentiate the impact of
individual extraversion and neuroticism from gender dif- Related literature
ferences in personality and from individuals’ locus of
Extraversion
control and their emotional states.
The main results of our analysis are as follows. First, Extraverted subjects tend to be more optimistic, excite-
more extraverted individuals pay higher prices for finan- ment seeking, and active (e.g., Costa and McCrae
cial assets and buy more financial assets when assets are [1992]) and they appear to pay more attention to positive
overpriced than less extraverted individuals do. Second, and less attention to negative information (Noguchi,
more neurotic individuals hold a smaller number of risky Gohm, and Dalsky [2006]) than do introverted (i.e.,
assets in their financial portfolios than less neurotic hardly extraverted) subjects. A number of studies focuses
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 3

on potential impact of the degree of extraversion on conducted a survey among undergraduate business stu-
financial decisions and, in particular, on the attitude dents. Both studies did not find a significant influence of
toward financial risks. The results of these studies, how- the degree of sensation seeking on risk taking in the con-
ever, are mixed. text of portfolio decisions. Kowert and Hermann [1997]
Durand et al. [2008] conducted a mail survey and found similar results for sensation seeking, but did not
found that extraversion has a positive relationship to find significant evidence for an overall positive relation-
stock exposure in a sample of 21 survey respondents. ship between extraversion and risk taking. Pan and
Assuming that stocks are generally considered as a risk- Statman [2013] conducted a questionnaire among more
ier asset class, individuals with higher degrees of extra- than 2,500 subjects and found that more extraverted sub-
version appear to take more risk to achieve higher jects are more willing to accept risks than less extraverted
returns; however, when calculating realized standard ones are. Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, and Kosse
deviations of investors’ portfolios as simple ex post vola- [2012] found similar results as Nicholson et al. [2005]
tility measure, they did not find a significant impact of when employing the design proposed by Dohmen, Falk,
extraversion. Durand, Newby, Peggs, and Siekierka Huffman, and Sunde [2010] to elicit risk attitudes.
[2013] addressed the results of Durand et al. [2008] and Eysenck [1967] explained the risk-taking behavior of
conducted an experiment among 115 students to study extraverted subjects with their demand to raise their state
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their investment behavior. They did not find a significant of arousal. Because extraverted individuals seem to be
relationship between extraversion and portfolio risk. chronically under-aroused, they accept higher degrees of
Mayfield et al. [2008] conducted a survey among busi- risk to reach their optimal level of arousal (see also
ness school undergraduates and discovered that more Eysenck [1981]).
extraverted subjects tend to invest a higher proportion of Furthermore, Pan and Statman [2013] found that
their money in the stock market and trade more fre- more extraverted individuals exhibit more overconfi-
quently than less extraverted subjects do. Moreover, they dence than less extraverted individuals do. This means
found a negative, but statistically insignificant relation- that extraverted individuals are overoptimistic with
ship between extraversion and risk aversion. The results respect to their skills and knowledge, their estimates, and
of Brown and Taylor [2011] suggest that more extra- potentially favorable events.6 Nosic and Weber [2010]
verted individuals are indebted at higher levels in, for and Merkle [2011] found a positive relationship between
example, personal loans, and they hold less financial overconfidence and risk taking, for example, in the con-
assets, such as bonds, than less extraverted individuals text of financial decisions, and in this sense provided
do. In this sense, more extraverted individuals appear to empirical evidence for Heath and Tversky’s [1991] com-
be more optimistic to be able to repay their debts. In petence hypothesis. The competence hypothesis postu-
addition, their findings indicate that more extraverted lates that subjects prefer betting on an uncertain event in
individuals primarily finance current consumption fields which they consider themselves to be competent
instead of reducing long-term risks by investing in, for and knowledgeable in, whereas they tend not to bet on
example, retirement provisions which implies that more uncertain events in fields in which they feel uninformed
extraverted individuals are willing to take more risks and not competent. Moreover, people who feel compe-
than less extraverted individuals are. tent and knowledgeable even tend to pay a premium to
Nicholson, Soane, Willman, and Fenton-O’Creevy bet on their judgments, which, in turn, indicates more
[2005] analyzed the influence of personality on risk risky behavior.
behavior in a broader context. They employed a ques-
tionnaire, the Risk Taking Index, to measure overall and
Neuroticism
domain-specific risk propensity and combined these
data with personality traits. They found that high scores Subjects with a high degree of neuroticism tend to be
in extraversion predict financial and overall risk taking. more pessimistic (e.g., Williams [1992]) and more anx-
In particular, sensation seeking as one subscale of extra- ious, are more depressed (e.g., Bolger [1990], Costa and
version appears to influence risk taking (see also McCrae [1992]), and appear to pay more attention to
Zuckerman [1979]). Using a self-designed questionnaire negative information and less attention to positive infor-
Wong and Carducci [1991] focused on the influence mation (Noguchi et al. [2006]) than subjects with a
of sensation seeking on risk taking in gambling and low degree of neuroticism do. Cloninger [2000] and
everyday financial matters. They found that high sensa- Lommen, Engelhard, and van den Hout [2010] sup-
tion seekers are more willing to accept risks than low ported this argument and found that more neurotic
sensation seekers. Morse [1998] used a similar design subjects exhibit more fear of uncertainty and ambiguity
as Wong and Carducci [1991] and Belcher [2010] than less neurotic subjects do and want to avoid such
4 A. OEHLER ET AL.

situations. In a financial context, Niszczota [2014] found think they are able to influence the outcome of
that investors from countries with higher scores in neu- events. The findings on the influence of locus of con-
roticism invest less in foreign equities and foreign debt trol on investment behavior are mixed. McInish
securities. Niszczota [2014] argued that more neurotic [1980] found that students with an external locus of
investors want to avoid uncertainty, which is associated control prefer less risky portfolios than subjects with
with foreign investments. Gambetti and Giusberti [2012] an internal locus of control do, whereas McInish
found that more anxious subjects prefer less risky asset [1982] found that individual investors with an exter-
classes and portfolios than less anxious subjects do. nal locus of control choose riskier portfolios than
However, the findings with respect to the impact of investors with an internal locus of control do.
neuroticism on risk behavior are partly contradictory. Moreover, emotional states such as positive or nega-
Durand, Newby and Sanghani [2008] found that the tive affect appear to significantly correlate with extraver-
portfolios of more neurotic investors exhibit higher stan- sion and neuroticism (e.g., Costa and McCrae [1980],
dard deviations of daily returns than portfolios of less Larsen and Ketelaar [1989]). According to these findings,
neurotic investors.7 This finding indicates that neurotic extraversion is positively correlated with positive affect,
individuals invest more in stocks with more volatile while neuroticism is positively correlated with negative
returns, which implies higher riskiness. Durand, Newby, affect. Emotional states influence, for example, risk tak-
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Peggs, et al. [2013] confirmed these results and found ing (e.g., Isen and Patrick [1982], Forgas [1995], Grable
that more neurotic investors bear a higher portfolio risk and Roszkowski [2008]), the judgment of subjective
than less neurotic investors do. On the other hand, Nich- probabilities of positive and negative events and expecta-
olson et al. [2005] found that low scores in neuroticism tions (e.g., Wright and Mischel [1982], Johnson and
predict financial and overall risk taking in the sense that Tversky [1983], Brown [1984]), information processing,
more neurotic individuals behave less risky than less and the application of heuristics (e.g., Schwarz and Clore
neurotic ones do. Becker et al. [2012] found similar [1983], Ruder and Bless [2003]).
results and document a negative relationship between
neuroticism and risk-taking behavior. Mayfield et al.
[2008] indicate that more neurotic individuals invest Hypotheses development
smaller amounts in more risky assets, trade less, and are
Impact of extraversion
more risk averse than less neurotic individuals are.
As initially developed in the literature analyzed previ-
ously, more extraverted investors appear to be more opti-
Relationship to age, gender, locus of control
mistic and assign higher subjective probabilities to both
and emotional states
higher dividend payments and asset sales that result in a
Age and gender appear to influence financial decisions in financial gain, which in turn is consistent with the find-
the sense that, for example, younger subjects hold more ings of positive correlation of extraversion with positive
risky (Barber and Odean [2001], Dorn and Huberman affect and overconfidence. Given these findings on the
[2005]) and less diversified portfolios than older subjects relationship between extraversion and risk behavior, we
do (Goetzmann and Kumar [2008]) and men tend to assume that more extraverted investors are more willing
trade more excessively (Barber and Odean [2001]) and to invest in risky assets than less extraverted investors
invest in a riskier way than women do (e.g., Jianakoplos are. In addition, investments in risky assets might fulfill
and Bernasek [1998], Hariharan, Chapman, and Domian the more extraverted investors’ need for excitement and
[2000], Mayfield et al. [2008]). Furthermore, individuals’ raise their state of arousal which leads us to hypothesize:
degree in extraversion and neuroticism differs with Hypothesis 1: The higher the degree of investors’ extra-
respect to age and gender. Rammstedt et al. [2012] found version, the higher the number of risky assets they
that older individuals are less extraverted than younger hold in a financial portfolio is.
individuals and that women are more extraverted and With respect to trading activity, we expect that more
neurotic than men.8 extraverted investors are willing to pay higher prices for
According to, for example, Morris and Carden assets than less extraverted investors are, because they
[1981] and Kovaleva et al. [2012], an internal locus of are more optimistic regarding dividend payments and
control is positively related to extraversion, whereas future prices at which they can resell their assets.
an external locus of control is positively related to Hypothesis 2 summarizes these effects:
neuroticism. This means that neurotic subjects Hypothesis 2: The higher the degree of investors’ extra-
assume that events are influenced by external forces version, the higher the price at which they buy finan-
and not by themselves, whereas extraverted subjects cial assets is.
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 5

In a neoclassic fully rational setting, overpriced assets Hypothesis 4: The higher the degree of investors’ neu-
would be characterized by prices above the level that is jus- roticism, the lower is the number of risky assets they
tified by expected dividend payments. A sufficient number hold in a financial portfolio.
of investors would sell overpriced assets or refrain from Because neurotic investors tend to be pessimistic
buying them and, instead, try to identify and buy under- about future prices and dividend payments, they poten-
priced assets. These market mechanisms would practically tially fear to be unable to sell their assets at all or that
instantaneously adjust prices to the justified price level. they would achieve only unfavorable low prices for their
However, Greenwood and Nagel [2009] and Griffin, assets. Consequently, more neurotic investors would be
Harris, Shu, and Topaloglu [2011] showed that professional willing to sell their assets at lower prices than would less
and retail investors buy overpriced assets in bubbly mar- neurotic investors:
kets. The behavioral explanation for this pattern reflects Hypothesis 5: The higher the degree of investors’ neu-
that individuals might still act (boundedly) rationally— roticism, the lower the price at which they sell financial
although buying at prices above the level that is justified by assets is.
the expected dividend payments—as long as they expect In a neoclassic fully rational setting, underpriced
further price increase in the sense of an even stronger devi- assets would be characterized as assets with prices below
ation from prices justified by expected dividend payments. the level that is justified by expected dividend payments.
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Shiller [2000], Fisher and Statman [2002], and Vissing-Jor- A sufficient number of investors would buy underpriced
gensen [2003] provided survey evidence that, indeed, a assets or refrain from selling them to not forgo the
considerable part of market participants buys stocks expected dividend payments. These market mechanisms
although knowing that stocks are already overpriced, how- would practically instantaneously adjust prices to the jus-
ever, assuming that the trend of price increases will con- tified price level. However, in his review regarding asset
tinue. This means that these investors would assign rather markets following the design of Smith et al. [1988], Palan
low probabilities to short-term price reversals and that they [2013] stated that assets in these markets typically trade
are optimistic about being able to sell the assets before the below the level justified by the expected dividend pay-
reversal (implicitly—probably overconfidently—thinking ments in the first trading periods. Furthermore, Breaban
they were skillful enough to time the burst of the bubble). and Noussair [2013] showed that scared participants are
If investors supposed to have such superior market timing willing to sell underpriced assets. The behavioral expla-
skills, overpriced purchases would—for these investors—be nation for this pattern reflects that individuals might still
characterized by prices even beyond market-wide expecta- act (boundedly) rationally—although selling at prices
tions about future price developments, although these mar- below the level that is justified by the expected dividend
ket-wide expectations might already deviate from expected payments—as long as holding the risky asset causes
dividend payments. However, Griffin et al. [2011] show more subjectively perceived discomfort (e.g., fear and
that most retail investors are not that skillful and still buy stress) than receiving the expected dividend payments
assets after the peak of a bubble was reached and prices could offset. More neurotic people are more likely to feel
start to crash. We assume that more extraverted individuals fear and anxiety and are furthermore more pessimistic
are more optimistic regarding further price increases and regarding the uncertain outcome of future events such as
their ability to sell their assets at higher prices and that they dividend payments. In addition, they might only assign
consider the threat of short-term price reversal to a lesser low probability to price reversal that would allow them
degree. We, therefore, hypothesize:9 to benefit from selling at a later point in time. We assume
Hypothesis 3: The higher the degree of investors’ extra- that more neurotic individuals sell more financial assets
version, the higher the number of overpriced financial at times when assets are underpriced because holding
assets they buy is. risky assets causes them more discomfort and due to
their pessimism regarding future price increases and div-
idend payments. Therefore, we hypothesize:10
Impact of neuroticism
Hypothesis 6: The higher the degree of investors’
With respect to the literature we expect that neurotic neuroticism, the higher the number of underpriced
investors are reluctant to hold risky assets because they financial assets they sell is.
are more pessimistic about future asset prices and divi-
dend payments than nonneurotic investors. Further-
Questionnaire and experimental design
more, holding fewer risky assets allows them to reduce
uncertainty with respect to the development of future We analyze the impact of extraversion and neuroticism
asset prices. We hypothesize the impact of the degree of on individual investment decisions with a combination
neuroticism on investment behavior as follows: of a questionnaire and an experimental asset market.
6 A. OEHLER ET AL.

Questionnaire Questionnaire section, the participants get a detailed


instruction about the mechanism of the experimental
The questionnaire is distributed to participants before
asset market including, for example, how to accept and
the start of the asset market and includes sections on
post offers and the dividend structure. The subjects trade
sociodemographics, on the personality traits extraversion
one dividend-paying asset at a time in a continuous dou-
and neuroticism, on positive and negative affect, and on
ble-auction market. Any participant can submit an offer
internal and external locus of control. As sociodemo-
to sell or to purchase an asset or accept offers from other
graphic variables we include age and gender. To measure
subjects. All offers and transaction prices are shown to
personality traits, we use the German version of the Big
all market participants. The number of trades per trading
Five Inventory-10 (hereafter BFI-10, see Rammstedt and
period is only restricted by the availability of sufficient
John [2007], Rammstedt et al. [2012]) which is a short
cash and units of the risky asset. Short selling and bor-
version of the BFI developed by John, Donahue, and
rowing are not allowed.
Kentle [1991]. Rammstedt and John [2007] show that
The asset market consists of 15 trading periods,
the BFI-10, which has been developed especially for
each period lasts 1 minute. We do not allow any
experiments with limited assessment time, is able to
practice rounds. All subjects receive an initial endow-
measure the Big Five dimensions in a valid and reliable
ment of 5 identical risky assets and 3,000 units of
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way and they report high correlations between results


experimental currency. Dividends, Dt, on the risky
based on the BFI-10 and results based on the full BFI as
assets are drawn with equal probability (25%) out of
well as corresponding items from the more extensive
4 potential outcomes of 0, 8, 28, and 60 units of
Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) of
experimental currency independently after each trad-
Costa and McCrae [1992].11 We select items of Krohne,
ing period t. All assets in a market receive the identi-
Egloff, Kohlmann, and Tausch’s [1996] German version
cal dividend payment. The expected dividend in each
of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
period is 24 units of experimental currency. Each
suggested by Watson, Clark, and Tellegen [1988] to mea-
subject knows the distribution of potential dividend
sure positive and negative affect.12 To measure the
payments and can easily calculate the expected divi-
degree of internal and external locus of control we use
dend payment, E(Dt), of an asset as the number of
the questions developed by Kovaleva et al. [2012], which
remaining periods times 24. To avoid potential mis-
contain 2 items to measure internal and external locus of
calculation or misunderstanding, we additionally pro-
control, respectively. The items on the personality traits
vide all subjects with a table that for each trading
extraversion and neuroticism, on internal and external
period includes the expected dividend payment for
locus of control and on positive and negative affect are
the remaining trading periods. The assets expire
measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1
worthless after the last trading period. At the end of
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
each period, the subjects additionally get a minimal
In light of the overall empirical design as combina-
riskless interest rate of 1 per mill on the amount of
tion of questionnaire and experimental asset market,
cash held in the account used for the experiment (if
we choose to employ short item batteries instead of
an amount of cash is held during the entire length of
the full item batteries of, for example, the BFI to
the experiment of 15 periods, the interest rate
measure the personality traits extraversion and
amounts to 1.5%). Whereas the interest rate on the
neuroticism to avoid cognitive overstrain and task
amount of cash held is riskless, holding the dividend-
overload among participants.
paying asset is risky for the subjects due to uncer-
tainty with respect to dividends and future trading
prices.
Experimental design
In 13 of the 17 markets (or 283 of the 364 students)
For the design of the experimental asset market we fol- participants receive a fixed show-up fee of €5. In the
low Smith et al. [1988]. The experiment is programmed remaining 4 markets (81 students) participants receive a
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher variable fee that is determined on the basis of the amount
[2007]). Participants are students enrolled in the under- of experimental currency gathered on the individual
graduate corporate finance course in the winter term account during the experiment. These 4 markets are
2014/2015 at Bamberg University. We run 17 separate used as control group to analyze potential influence of
markets, each consisting of 15–23 participants who fixed versus variable payment. The variable fee is calcu-
are drawn randomly and assigned to one of the lated with a rate of 1,000 units of experimental currency
markets. Overall, the experiment includes 364 students. being equal to €1. Given the structure of the experiment,
After answering the questionnaire as described in the the expected variable payment is €4.80.13
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 7

Methodology for the empirical analysis number of outstanding assets, A, in that market:
PT
Variable description 1
A
tD1 i;t
Ai D T
(1)
The questionnaire provides us with 2 items on individu- A
als’ degree of extraversion and 2 items on individuals’ where Ai;t is the number of assets held by individual i at
degree of neuroticism, respectively. We combine the the end of trading period t and T is the total number of
items on extraversion and determine the median value of periods (T D 15).
individual i’s responses to get the variable EXTRAVERTi. To calculate the average price paid by individual i for
Following the same approach, we calculate the combined purchases during the experiment we adjust for the
variable NEUROTi for individual i’s degree of neuroti- remaining expected dividend payments, Vt , as approxi-
cism.14 The variables INTLOCUSi and EXTLOCUSi mea- mation of the assets’ fundamental value at the beginning
sure the degree of individual i’s internal and external of each trading period (Equation 2a).15 Beyond this
locus of control, respectively. Again, the variables are exogenous variable, however, we also take into consider-
determined as the median value of the responses to the 2 ation that individuals might regard the actual (endoge-
items from the questionnaire, respectively. Furthermore, nous) price level in the market as benchmark. This is
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the questionnaire includes 3 items to measure individual why we additionally adjust the prices paid for the ex post
i’s positive affect and 3 items to measure individual’s calculated mean transaction price in this trading period,
negative affect. We use the median value of individual i’s Pt (Equation 2b). This means that we analyze relative
responses to form the variables POSAFFECTi and NEG- price deviation from the fundamental value and from the
AFFECTi. The dummy variable GENDERi is assigned a price level in the market.
value of 1 for male subjects and a value of 0 for female
q 1 PT Pq q
Pi;t;n ¡ Vt
i;t
subjects. PiAdjV D tD1 nD1
(2a)
Table 1 provides an overview of the variables used in Qi Vt
our analysis. q 1 PT Pq i;t
q
Pi;t;n ¡ Pt
PiAdjP D (2b)
The experiment provides us with key figures of indi- Qi tD1 nD1
Pt
vidual trading behavior (e.g., assets held, transaction pri-
q
ces, number of asset purchases and sales). where Pi;t;n is the price paid by individual i for purchase
To determine the average number of assets held by n in period t, qi;t is the number of purchases by
individual i during the experiment, Ai , we adjust for the individual i in period t, Qi is the total number of

Table 1. Overview and description of variables.


Variable Description

Panel A: Questionnaire
AGEi Age in years
EXTLOCi External locus of control; determined as median value of 2 items based on Kovaleva, Beierlein, Kemper, and Rammstedt [2012]
EXTRAVERTi Extraversion; determined as median value of 2 items based on the BFI-10
GENDERi Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when individual i is male and zero otherwise
INTLOCi Internal locus of control; determined as median value of 2 items based on Kovaleva et al. [2012]
NEGAFFECTi Negative affect; determined as median value of 3 items based on the PANAS
NEUROTi Neuroticism; determined as median value of 2 items based on the BFI-10
PAYMENTi Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when individual i gets variable fee and zero otherwise
POSAFFECTi Positive affect; determined as median value of 3 items based on the PANAS
Panel B: Key figures of individuals’ trading behavior
Ai Average number of assets held during the experiment adjusted for the number of outstanding assets in the respective market
q
PiAdjV Average price paid for purchases during the experiment adjusted by remaining expected dividend payments
q
PiAdjP Average price paid for purchases during the experiment adjusted by mean transaction price
s
PiAdjV Average price received for sales during the experiment adjusted by remaining expected dividend payments
s
PiAdjP Average price received for sales during the experiment adjusted by mean transaction price
QPrem
iAdjV Number of purchases when assets trade above the price justified by remaining expected dividend payments
QPrem
iAdjP Number of purchases when assets trade above mean transaction price
SDisc
iAdjV Number of sales when assets trade below the price justified by remaining expected dividend payments
SDisc
iAdjP Number of sales when assets trade below mean transaction price

Note. Table 1 provides an overview of variables used in the analysis. Panel A includes variables ascertained with the help of the questionnaire for each individual i.
Panel B includes variables from the experimental asset market determined for each individual i. In the left column, we provide the names of the variables in an
alphabetic order. In the right column, we provide the respective descriptions of the variables.
8 A. OEHLER ET AL.

purchases by individual i during the experiment, Vt assumed bounded rationality. We additionally adjust for
stands for the remaining expected dividend payments the number of outstanding assets, A, in that market.
and is an approximation of the assets’ fundamental value
at the beginning of each period t, Pt is the mean transac-
PT Ps i;t
sDis
nD1 i;t;n
tion price in the market in period t. SDisc
iAdjV D tD1
;
We follow the same approach to calculate the average (A (5a)
s
0 if Pi;t;n  Vt
price received by individual i for sales during the experi- where sDisc D
i;t;n
ment and adjust for the remaining expected dividend s
1 if Pi;t;n < Vt
payments, Vt (Equation 3a). Again, we additionally PT Ps i;t
adjust the prices received for the ex post calculated mean sDis
nD1 i;t;n
SDisc
iAdjP D tD1
;
transaction price, Pt (Equation 3b). (A (5b)
s
0 if Pi;t;n  Pt
s 1 PT Ps i;t
s
Pi;t;n ¡ Vt where sDisc
i;t;n D
PiAdjV D tD1 nD1
(3a) s
1 if Pi;t;n < Pt
Si Vt
s 1 PT Ps i;t
s
Pi;t;n ¡ Pt
PiAdjP D (3b)
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Si tD1 nD1
Pt Correlation analysis
s
where Pi;t;n is the price received by individual i for sale n We calculate nonparametric Spearman correlation coef-
in period t, si;t is the number of sales by individual i in ficients and Kendall’s Tau coefficients between the
period t and Si is the total number of sales by individual i variables EXTRAVERTi and NEUROTi from the ques-
during the experiment. tionnaire and the key figures of individual trading
We define 2 types of overpricing and calculate the behavior generated in the asset markets.
number of purchases by individual i when assets are
overpriced with respect to (1) the exogenous remaining Regression analysis
expected dividend payments, Vt , (Equation 4a) and (2)
the endogenous ex post calculated mean transaction We conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis to mea-
price in the current period, Pt ; (Equation 4b). We make sure the influence of individual’s degree of extraversion
this adjustment following findings in research in behav- and neuroticism on their investment behavior in the
ioral finance that individuals use other benchmarks than experimental asset market. In a stepwise approach we
remaining expected dividend payments and in this sense control for gender and age and for other cognitive
“deviate” from fully rational (neoclassic) behavior. We aspects such as emotional states and locus of control.
additionally adjust for the number of outstanding assets, Additionally, we run regressions including all explana-
A, in that market. tory variables.
To gain insights on Hypothesis 1, we regress the aver-
PT Pq i;t age number of assets held, Ai , on EXTRAVERTi and the
qPrem
n D 1 i;t;n
QPrem
iAdjV D tD1
; series of control variables as independent variables.
( A Additionally, we control for the fixed versus variable
q (4a)
0 if Pi;t;n  Vt payments that our subjects receive. Equation 6 displays
where qPrem
i;t;n D q
1 if Pi;t;n > Vt the full regression model:
PT Pq i;t
qPrem
nD1 i;t;n Ai D b0 C b1  EXTRAVERTi C b2  INTLOCUSi
QPrem
iAdjP D tD1
;
( A q (4b) C b3  EXTLOCUSi C b4  POSAFFECTi
0 if Pi;t;n  Pt
where qPrem
i;t;n D q
1 if Pi;t;n > Pt C b5  NEGAFFECTi C b6  AGEi

C b7  GENDERi C b8  PAYMENTi C e (6)


Following the same approach, we define 2 types of
underpricing and calculate the number of sales by indi-
We also apply the baseline model as given in
vidual i when assets are underpriced with respect to (1)
Equation 6 to test our further hypotheses related to
the exogenous remaining expected dividend payments, q q
Vt , (Equation 5a) and (2) the endogenous ex post calcu- extraversion. We employ PiAdjV / PiAdjP as dependent
lated mean transaction price in the current period, Pt ; variables (instead of Ai ) to test Hypothesis 2 on the influ-
(Equation 5b). Again, we make this adjustment due to ence of individuals’ degree of extraversion on prices paid
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 9

for purchases. We use QPrem Prem


iAdjV /QiAdjP as dependent varia- an ordinal scale. However, related to the discussion in
bles to test the influence of individuals’ degree of extra- the literature whether or not Likert-type scales may be
version on their purchases of overpriced assets interpreted as interval data Jaccard and Wan [1996] con-
(Hypothesis 3). clude that the use of Likert-type scales as interval data
We follow a similar approach to test our hypotheses are not expected to affect Type I and Type II errors sub-
related to neuroticism. We apply Equation 7 as full stantially.
regression model to gain insight in Hypothesis 4: To detect potential multicollinearity in our regression
models we calculate the variance inflation factors (VIFs)
Ai D b0 C b1  NEUROTi C b2 INTLOCUSi for the explanatory variables, respectively. Because the
VIFs exhibit values far below 10, we do not assume that
C b3  EXTLOCUSi C b4  POSAFFECTi
(7) multicollinearity significantly influences our results (see,
C b5  NEGAFFECTi C b6 AGEi for example, Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black [1995]).
C b7  GENDERi C b8  PAYMENTi C e

s s
We employ PiAdjV /PiAdjP as dependent variables (instead Results
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of Ai ) to test Hypothesis 5 on the impact of individuals’ Descriptive statistics


degree of neuroticism on prices received for sales. We
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of subjects’ charac-
use SDisc Disc
iAdjV /SiAdjP as dependent variables to test the influ-
teristics based on the questionnaire for our full sample
ence of individuals’ degree of neuroticism on their sales (364 participants) in Panel A. The median age is 22
of underpriced assets (Hypothesis 6). (mean: 22.3) years with a minimum of 19 years and a
When the dependent variables’ values cannot be nega- maximum of 31 years. Our dataset includes slightly
tive, this means when using Ai , QPrem Prem Disc Disc
iAdjV , QiAdjP , SiAdjV or SiAdjP more women (n D 197) than men (n D 167). We use the
as dependent variables, we provide tobit regressions; same version of the BFI-10 as used in Rammstedt et al.
otherwise we use ordinary least squares regressions. We [2012] and developed by Rammstedt and John [2007] to
are aware of the fact that due to the application of measure EXTRAVERTi and NEUROTi. The median
Likert-type scales most of our explanatory variables have value of EXTRAVERTi is 3.5 (mean: 3.6) whereas the

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.


N Mean Med Max Min Std

Panel A: Questionnaire
GENDERi 364
Male 167
Female 197
AGEi 361 22.3 22.0 31.0 19.0 2.0
EXTRAVERTi 364 3.6 3.5 5.0 1.5 0.9
NEUROTi 364 2.8 3.0 5.0 1.0 0.9
INTLOCUSi 364 4.2 4.0 5.0 2.5 0.5
EXTLOCUSi 364 2.2 2.0 4.5 1.0 0.6
POSAFFECTi 364 3.2 3.3 5.0 1.0 0.8
NEGAFFECTi 364 1.5 1.3 4.0 1.0 0.6
Panel B: Key figures of individuals’ trading behavior
Ai .047 .041 .154 .005 .028
q
PiAdjV .659 .566 5.964 –.851 .737
q
PiAdjP –.025 –.021 .768 –.881 .241
s
PiAdjV .758 .604 3.947 –.666 .718
s
PiAdjP .024 .046 1.200 –.585 .238
QPrem
iAdjV .118 .105 .435 .000 .077
QPrem
iAdjP .069 .054 .323 .000 .057
SDisc
iAdjV .036 .023 .185 .000 .039
SDisc
iAdjP .066 .054 .308 .000 .054

Note. Panel A displays descriptive statistics of the variables ascertained with the help of the questionnaire. For each variable we provide the number of individuals’
responses (N), mean value (Mean), median value (Med), maximum value (Max), minimum value (Min), and standard deviation (Std). Example: the median value
of the participants’ level of extraversion (EXTRAVERTi) is 3.5. Panel B displays descriptive statistics of the experimental asset market variables. For each variable
we provide the mean value (Mean), median value (Med), maximum value (Max), minimum value (Min), and standard deviation (Std). Example: The median value
q
of the average price paid by the individuals for purchases adjusted by the remaining expected dividend payments, PiAdjV , is .566.
10 A. OEHLER ET AL.

median value of NEUROTi is 3.0 (mean: 2.8). Both values remaining expected dividend payments is higher than the
are within 1 standard deviation from values reported by number of transactions with a trading price above the
Rammstedt et al. [2012], who documented a mean value average transaction price. With respect to sales below the
of 3.7 with a standard deviation of 0.89 for EXTRAVERTi price justified by remaining expected dividend payments,
and a mean value of 2.4 with a standard deviation of 0.84 we find that the median value for SDisc
iAdjV is .023 (mean: .036)
Disc
for NEUROTi, for subjects in the age range from 18 to and the median value forSiAdjP is .054 (mean: .066), indicat-
35 years. Values for NEUROTi range from 1 to 5, ing that only few individuals sold assets below the price
whereas values for EXTRAVERTi range from 1.5 to 5. justified by remaining expected dividend payments.
The median value for INTLOCUSi is 4.0 (mean: 4.2) We provide nonparametric Spearman correlation coef-
whereas the median value for EXTLOCUSi is 2.0 (mean: ficients and Kendall’s Tau coefficients between the varia-
2.2). Our results are within 1 standard deviation from bles generated from the questionnaire in Table 3 to reveal
those of Kovaleva et al. [2012] who developed the scale statistically significant interdependencies between our
which we also apply and report a mean value of 4.3 (std: independent variables. Similar to Borkenau and Osten-
0.76) for INTLOCUSi and a mean value of 2.5 (std: 0.97) dorf [1993], K€orner, Geyer, and Br€ahler [2002], Roth
for EXTLOCUSi (age group 18–35 years). Our subjects [2002], Rammstedt and John [2007], and Mayfield et al.
exhibit a median value of 3.3 for POSAFFECTi (mean: [2008] EXTRAVERTi and NEUROTi are negatively corre-
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3.2) and a median value of 1.3 for NEGAFFECTi (mean: lated at statistically significant levels. EXTRAVERTi is
1.5). Based on the full PANAS questionnaire, Krohne positively correlated with INTLOCUSi and POSAFFECTi
et al. [1996] report a mean value of 2.7 of current positive and negatively correlated with EXTLOCUSi, NEGAF-
affect and 1.5 for current negative affect. FECTi and GENDERi. NEUROTi is negatively correlated
We provide descriptive statistics of the key figures of with INTLOCUSi and GENDERi and positively correlated
individuals’ trading behavior in the experimental asset with EXTLOCUSi and NEGAFFECTi. Furthermore, NEU-
market in Panel B of Table 2. The median value of Ai is ROTi is negatively correlated with AGEi and with POSAF-
.041 (mean: .047). Values range from .005 to .154, meaning FECTi. Except for the correlation between EXTRAVERTi
that the individuals hold between 0.5% and 15.4% of the and AGEi all correlations between the 2 personality traits
q
groups’ assets over time. The median values of PiAdjV and and the other questionnaire variables are statistically sig-
s
PiAdjV are .566 (mean: .659) and .604 (mean: .758), respec- nificant at least at the 10% level.
q s
tively. The median values of PiAdjP and PiAdjP are –.021
(mean: –.025) and .046 (mean: .024), respectively, which
Correlation analysis
indicates that the majority of participants bought the risky
assets below and sold them above the average trading Table 4 reports nonparametric Spearman correlation
price. Because the average prices, which are adjusted by coefficients and Kendall’s Tau coefficients between the
the remaining expected dividend payments, reach higher variables EXTRAVERTi (Panel A) and NEUROTi (Panel
median and mean values than the average prices which are B) and the key figures of individuals’ trading behavior.
adjusted by the mean transaction price per period, we con- We find a negative correlation between EXTRAVERTi
clude that trading prices exceed the price justified by and Ai which would contradict Hypothesis 1; this corre-
remaining expected dividend payments in most periods lation, however, is statistically insignificant. The positive
and asset markets. The median values of QPrem Prem
iAdjV and QiAdjP and statistically significant correlations between EXTRA-
q q
are .105 (mean: .118). This means that the number of pur- VERTi and PiAdjV and PiAdjP support Hypothesis 2, which
chases with a trading price above the price justified by states a positive relationship between individuals’ degree

Table 3. Correlations between questionnaire variables (full sample).


GENDERi AGEi EXTRAVERTi NEUROTi INTLOCUSi EXTLOCUSi POSAFFECTi NEGAFFECTi

GENDERi .142 ***


–.210***
–.259***
–.006 –.040 .013 .061
AGEi .124*** .018 –.132** .088* .056 .010 .009
EXTRAVERTi –.185*** .013 –.171** .290*** –.164*** .251*** –.096*
NEUROTi –.228*** –.101** –.133*** –.180*** .238*** –.118** .180***
INTLOCUSi –.005 .070* .235*** –.146*** –.191*** .209*** –.150***
EXTLOCUSi –.036 .044 –.132*** .193*** –.162*** –.045 .176***
POSAFFECTi .012 .007 .206*** –.100** .181*** –.039 .024
NEGAFFECTi .059 .007 –.082* .154*** –.134*** .156*** .023

Note. We report Spearman correlation coefficients (above the diagonal) and Kendall’s Tau coefficients (below the diagonal) between the variables ascertained with
the help of the questionnaire. The symbols , , and  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Example: The Spearman cor-
relation coefficient between the participants’ level of extraversion (EXTRAVERTi) and their level of internal locus of control (INTLOCUSi) is .290 with statistical sig-
nificance at the 1% level.
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 11

Table 4. Correlations of EXTRAVERTi and NEUROTi with individual trading behavior.


q q
Ai PiAdjV PiAdjP QPrem
iAdjV QPrem
iAdjP

Panel A: Extraversion
EXTRAVERTi –.068 (–.047) .094* (.067*) .120** (.084**) .090* (.064*) .115** (,084**)
n 364 364 364 364 364
q q
Ai PiAdjV PiAdjP QPrem
iAdjV QPrem
iAdjP

Panel B: Neuroticism
NEUROTi –.108** (–.079**) –.125** (–.091**) –.079 (–.059) .10** (.087**) .080 (.048)
n 364 364 364 364 364

Note. We report Spearman correlation coefficients and Kendall’s Tau coefficients (in parentheses) between participants’ level of extraversion (Panel A) and neurot-
icism (Panel B) and the variables ascertained with the help of the experimental asset market. N denotes the number of individuals. The symbols , , and 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Example: The Spearman correlation coefficient between the participants’ level of
q
extraversion (EXTRAVERTi) and the average price paid for purchases adjusted by the remaining expected dividend payments, PiAdjV , is .094 with statistical signifi-
cance at the 10% level.

of extraversion and their purchase prices. Positive and Table 5. With respect to Hypothesis 1, we find no signifi-
statistically significant correlations between EXTRA- cant influence of EXTRAVERTi on the number of risky
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VERTi and QPrem Prem


iAdjV and QiAdjP support Hypothesis 3 on a assets in a financial portfolio. GENDERi appears to be
positive relationship between individuals’ degree of the only variable that exerts statistically significant influ-
extraversion, and the number of assets bought when ence on Ai in the sense that men hold more risky assets
assets are overpriced. At the 5% level, NEUROTi is nega- than women do.
tively correlated with Ai which supports Hypothesis 4 In Table 6, we report results of the regression analysis
that higher degrees in neuroticism lead to a lower num- regarding the impact of extraversion on prices paid for
ber of risky assets in the financial portfolio. Results purchases. Panels A and B contain the results for the
q q
regarding Hypothesis 5 are less clear cut. The negative regressions with PiAdjV and PiAdjP as dependent variable,
s
correlation between NEUROTi and PiAdjV is statistically respectively. Supporting Hypothesis 2, we find a positive
q q
significant at the 5% level, whereas the negative correla- impact of EXTRAVERTi on PiAdjV as well as on PiAdjP , the
s
tion between NEUROTi and PiAdjP is insignificant. NEU- first effect, however, being statistically insignificant.
ROTi is positively correlated with SDisc
iAdjV at the 5% level These results indicate that higher extraverted individuals
which supports Hypothesis 6 on the positive relationship pay higher prices for their asset purchases. The impact of
between individuals’ degree of neuroticism and the num- EXTRAVERTi gets smaller and less statistically signifi-
ber of sales of underpriced assets. However, the positive cant when we include GENDERi as independent variable.
correlation between NEUROTi and SDisc iAdjP is insignificant. The full regression model, however, reveals a significant
impact of extraversion even after accounting for
gender effects. In addition, POSAFFECTi has a negative
Regression analysis influence on prices paid for purchases, which is signifi-
cant at least at the 10% level.
We report results for the regression analysis with the Table 7 contains the results of the regression analysis
number of risky assets held, Ai , as dependent variable in regarding the impact of extraversion on the number of

Table 5. Influence of extraversion on number of assets held.

Dependent variable: Ai (i.e., average number of assets held by individual i during the experiment adjusted for the number of outstanding assets in the respec-
tive market)

b0 .052*** .044*** .0451*** .0477*** .052*** .052*** .038**


EXTRAVERTi –.002 –.000 –.001 –.002 –.002 –.002 –.001
GENDERi .010*** .010***
INTLOCUSi .001 –.001
EXTLOCUSi .002 .003
POSAFFECTi .003* .003
NEGAFFECTi –.002 –.002
AGEi –.000 –.000
PAYMENTi .004 .004
***
Likelihood ratio chi-square .85 11.49 1.45 3.97 1.10 1.92 17.14**

Note. We provide regression coefficients and likelihood ratio chi-square for the regression analysis using Equation 6 with the number of assets held, Ai , as depen-
dent variable. Due to nonnegativity of the dependent variable we apply Tobit regressions. In a stepwise approach we combine EXTRAVERTi with the further
explanatory variables separately. The last column includes the results for the full regression model. The symbols , , and  denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Example: Regressing Ai on participants’ level of extraversion (EXTRAVERTi) as sole independent variable yields a coeffi-
cient of –.002 with no statistical significance.
12 A. OEHLER ET AL.

Table 6. Influence of extraversion on purchase price.


q
Panel A: Dependent variable: PiAdjV (i.e., average price paid by individual i for purchases during the experiment adjusted by remaining expected dividend pay-
ments)

b0 .449*** .700*** .440 .729*** .403 .483*** .537


EXTRAVERTi .059 .025 .056 .088* .059 .069 .043
GENDERi –.282*** –.298***
INTLOCUSi .011 .072
EXTLOCUSi .012 –.019
POSAFFECTi –.118** –.106**
NEGAFFECTi –.001 .009
AGEi .002 .020
PAYMENTi –.317*** –.340***
R2 (adj.) .002 .034 –.003 .013 –.001 .031 .070
q
Panel B: Dependent variable: PiAdjP , (i.e., average price paid by individual i for purchases during the experiment adjusted by mean transaction price)

b0 –.148*** –.040 –.103 –.065 –.165 –.145*** –.098


EXTRAVERTi .034** .020 .041*** .043*** .034** .035** .030*
GENDERi –.121*** –.120***
INTLOCUSi –.025 –.012
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EXTLOCUSi .017 .012


POSAFFECTi –.035** –.029*
NEGAFFECTi .000 .000
AGEi .001 .007
PAYMENTi –.028 –.034
R2 (adj.) .012 .070 .012 .020 .009 .012 .070

Note. We provide regression coefficients and adjusted R2 for the regression analysis using Equation 6 with the average purchase price as dependent variable.
q
Panel A displays results for the average purchase price paid by individual i adjusted by remaining expected dividend payments, PiAdjV , as dependent variable
q
and Panel B for the average purchase price paid by individual i adjusted by mean transaction price, PiAdjP , as dependent variable. In a stepwise approach we
combine EXTRAVERTi with the further explanatory variables separately. The last column includes the results for the full regression model. The symbols , ,
and  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Example: Regressing PiAdjV on participants’ level of extraversion (EXTRAVERTi) as
q

sole independent variable yields a coefficient of .059 with no statistical significance.

Table 7. Influence of extraversion on number of purchases.

Panel A: Dependent variable: QPrem


iAdjV (i.e., number of purchases by individual i when assets trade above the price justified by remaining expected dividend pay-
ments)

b0 .085*** .0104*** .130*** .061** .085*** .083*** .129***


EXTRAVERTi .009* .006 .010* .009* .009*** .008* .006
GENDERi –.022*** –.023***
INTLOCUSi –.008 –.008
EXTLOCUSi –.007 –.011
POSAFFECTi .002 .003
NEGAFFECTi .012* .014**
AGEi .000 –.000
PAYMENTi .016 .016*
Likelihood ratio chi-square 3.39* 10.21*** 4.84 6.95* 3.48 6.04** 19.5**
Panel B: Dependent variable: QPrem
iAdjP (i.e., number of purchases by individual i when assets trade above mean transaction price)

b0 .038*** .064*** .057* .039** .038*** .037*** 0.77**


EXTRAVERTi .008** .005 .010** .010*** .008** .008** .007*
GENDERi –.029*** –.029***
INTLOCUSi –.007 –.005
EXTLOCUSi .003 –.001
POSAFFECTi –.006 –.005
NEGAFFECTi .008 .009*
AGEi .000 –.000
PAYMENTi .007 .007
** *** ** **
Likelihood ratio chi-square 4.77 26.23 6.54 9.34 4.87* 5.67* 32.46*****

Note. We provide regression coefficients and likelihood ratio chi-square for the regression analysis using Equation 6 with number of purchases of overpriced assets
as dependent variable. Panel A displays results for the number of purchases by individual i when assets trade above the price justified by remaining expected
dividend payments, QPrem
iAdjV , as dependent variable and Panel B for the number of purchases by individual i when assets trade above mean transaction price,
iAdjP , as dependent variable. Due to nonnegativity of the dependent variable we apply Tobit regressions. In a stepwise approach we combine EXTRAVERTi
QPrem
with the further explanatory variables separately. The last column includes the results for the full regression model. The symbols , , and  denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Example: Regressing QPrem iAdjV on participants’ level of extraversion (EXTRAVERTi) as sole independent
variable yields a coefficient of .009 with a statistical significance at the 10% level.
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 13

purchases of overpriced assets. The positive coefficients specifications in Panel A (impact on SDisciAdjV ), which would
for EXTRAVERTi in Panel A reveal that more extra- support Hypothesis 6, the findings are not convincing in
verted individuals purchase more financial assets when particular due to an insignificant coefficient in the full
assets are overpriced. However, statistical significance in regression model. However, we find a negative and statisti-
Panel A is considerably weaker than in Panel B. The pos- cally significant impact of INTLOCUSi on the number of
itive coefficients for EXTRAVERTi in Panel B are statisti- sales below the price justified by remaining expected divi-
cally significant at least at the 10% level in most of the dend payments. Again, the coefficient for GENDERi is sig-
specifications which supports Hypothesis 3. Again, most nificant at the 1% level.
of EXTRAVERTi’s positive influence is covered by GEN- In all regression models GENDERi seems to have
DERi. Nevertheless, EXTRAVERTi and NEGAFFECTi the strongest explanatory power. We find statistically
s
have a statistically significant influence on QPrem iAdjP even significant positive impact of GENDERi on Ai , PiAdjV
s
beyond GENDERi. and PiAdjP . This indicates that men hold more risky
Table 8 shows the results of the regression analysis assets in their financial portfolios and sell their risky
with Ai as dependent variable and NEUROTi as indepen- assets at higher prices than women do. The statistically
q
dent variable. The negative coefficient for NEUROTi is significant negative influence of GENDERi on PiAdjV and
q
statistically significant in all specifications at least at the PiAdjP indicates that men buy risky assets at lower prices.
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10% level, which supports Hypothesis 4 meaning that When assets are overpriced, men make fewer purchases
more neurotic individuals hold a smaller number of than women do and they sell fewer assets than women
assets. This influence stays significant, even after includ- do when assets are underpriced.16 Different behavior of
ing GENDERi as explanatory variable. The coefficients men compared with women is in line with findings for
for all other variables are statistically insignificant. financial asset markets with respect to, for example,
The results in Table 9 do not indicate a clear-cut trading (e.g., Barber and Odean [2001]) and riskiness of
impact of neuroticism on the prices at which individuals investments (e.g., Jianakoplos and Bernasek [1998],
sell assets. We find statistical significance of the coeffi- Hariharan et al. [2000], Mayfield et al. [2008]). Further-
s
cient for the impact of NEUROTi on PiAdjV (Panel A) in more, Eckel and F€ ullbrunn [2015] showed for experi-
most specifications, but not in the full regression model. mental financial asset markets that men produce
Furthermore, we mostly find insignificant negative greater price bubbles than women do.
s
influence of NEUROTi on PiAdjP in Panel B. Although the We find a negative relationship between AGEi and
s
tendency of the negative influence is in line with PiAdjP in the sense that older individuals tend to sell their
Hypothesis 5, support for this hypothesis is weak. assets at lower prices. This might be interpreted as older
According to the results in Table 10, neuroticism is not individuals’ preference for less risky portfolios (in line
a significant factor regarding the number of sales when with Barber and Odean [2001], Dorn and Huberman
assets trade below the price justified by remaining [2005]), because they accept lower prices to sell risky
expected dividend payments (Panel A) or mean transac- assets as early as possible. Overall, however, we do
tion price (Panel B). Although we get a statistically signifi- not find a consistent impact of age on our dependent
cant and positive coefficient for NEUROTi for some variables.

Table 8. Influence of neuroticism on number of assets held.

Dependent variable: Ai (i.e., average number of assets held by individual i during the experiment adjusted for the number of outstanding assets in the
respective market)

b0 .059*** .051*** 0.60*** .052*** .059*** .058*** .049***


NEUROTi –.004** –.003* –.005*** –.004** –.004*** –.004** –.003*
GENDERi .009*** .009***
INTLOCUSi –.002 –.003
EXTLOCUSi .004 .004
POSAFFECTi .002 .002
NEGAFFECTi –.000 –.002
AGEi –.000 –.000
PAYMENTi .003 .004
Likelihood ratio chi-square 6.37** 14.28*** 8.90** 7.50* 6.87** 7.22** 20.15***

Note. We provide regression coefficients and likelihood ratio chi-square for the regression analysis using Equation 7 with the number of assets held, Ai , as depen-
dent variable. Due to nonnegativity of the dependent variable we apply Tobit regressions. In a stepwise approach we combine NEUROTi with the further explan-
atory variables separately. The last column includes the results for the full regression model. The symbols , , and  denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Example: Regressing Ai on participants’ level of neuroticism (NEUROTi) as sole independent variable yields a coefficient of
–.004 with a statistical significance at the 5% level.
14 A. OEHLER ET AL.

Table 9. Influence of neuroticism on sale price.


s
Panel A: Dependent variable: PiAdjV (i.e., average price received by individual i for purchases during the experiment adjusted by remaining expected dividend
payments)

b0 1.044*** .842*** 1.047*** 1.206*** 1.627*** 1.130*** 1.314**


NEUROTi –.102** –.068 –.088* –.109** –.112** –.107** –.066
GENDERi .231*** .231***
INTLOCUSi .028 .097
EXTLOCUSi –.074 –.062
POSAFFECTi –.050 –.051
NEGAFFECTi .014 .014
AGEi –.025 –.024
PAYMENTi –.337*** –.329***
R2 (adj.) .012 .039 .011 .010 .016 .048 .071
s
Panel B: Dependent variable: PiAdjP (i.e., average price received by individual i for sales during the experiment adjusted by mean transaction price)

b0 .082* .001 .070 .069 .371** .085** .227


NEUROTi –.021 –.007 –.017 –.021 –.025* –.021 –.007
GENDERi .092*** .101***
INTLOCUSi .008 .021
–.015 –.012
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EXTLOCUSi
POSAFFECTi –.002 –.001
NEGAFFECTi .007 .007
AGEi –.012** –.015**
PAYMENTi –.015 –.012
R2 (adj.) .003 .035 –.001 –.002 .013 .001 .042

Note. We provide regression coefficients and adjusted R2 for the regression analysis using Equation 7 with the average sale price received as dependent variable.
s
Panel A displays results for the average price received by individual i adjusted by remaining expected dividend payments, PiAdjV , as dependent variable and
s
Panel B for the average price received by individual i for sales adjusted by mean transaction price, PiAdjP , as dependent variable. In a stepwise approach we com-
bine NEUROTi with the further explanatory variables separately. The last column includes the results for the full regression model. The symbols **, , and  and
 s
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Example: Regressing PiAdjV on participants’ level of neuroticism (NEUROTi) as sole
independent variable yields a coefficient of –.102 with statistical significance at the 5% level.

The results for the dummy variable PAYMENTi, up fee, hardly reveal a statistically significant influence of
which is assigned a value of 1 when participants receive a the type of payment on individuals’ behavior in the
variable payment and zero if they receive a fixed show- experimental asset market. However, the negative and

Table 10. Influence of neuroticism on number of sales.

Panel A: Dependent variable: SDisc


iAdjV (i.e., number of sales by individual i when assets trade below the price justified by remaining expected dividend payments)

b0 .012 .031*** .060** .007 .012 .012 .078***


NEUROTi .007** .003 .006* .006** .007** .006** .001
GENDERi –.022*** –.023***
INTLOCUSi –.010** –.011**
EXTLOCUSi –.002 –.003
POSAFFECTi .000 .002
NEGAFFECTi .004 .006
AGEi .000 –.000
PAYMENTi –.000 –.001
Likelihood ratio chi-square 4.94** 22.77*** 8.84** 6.14 4.98* 4.95* 30.63***
Panel B: Dependent variable: SDisc
iAdjP (i.e., number of sales by individual i when assets trade below mean transaction price)

b0 .053*** .076*** .087*** .051*** .053*** .054*** .110***


NEUROTi .004 .000 .004 .003 .004 .004 –.001
GENDERi –.026*** –.028***
INTLOCUSi –.006 –.007
EXTLOCUSi -–.003 –.004
POSAFFECTi –.001 –.001
NEGAFFECTi .006 .008*
AGEi .000 –.000
PAYMENTi –.003 –.004
Likelihood ratio cci-square 1.52 20.74*** 2.86 3.18 1.57 1.70 26.40***

Note. We provide regression coefficients and likelihood ratio chi-square for the regression analysis using Equation 7 with number of sales as dependent variable.
Panel A displays results for the number of sales by individual i when assets trade below the price justified by remaining expected dividend payments, SDisc iAdjV , as
dependent variable and Panel B for the number of sales by individual i when assets trade below mean transaction price, SDisc iAdjP , as dependent variable. Due to
iAdjP and SiAdjV we use the Tobit methodology. In a stepwise approach we combine NEUROTi with the further explana-
nonnegativity of our dependent variables SDisc Disc

tory variables separately. The last column includes the results for the full regression model. The symbols , , and  denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Example: Regressing SDisc iAdjV on participants’ level of neuroticism (NEUROTi) as sole independent variable yields a coefficient of
.007 with statistical significance at the 5% level.
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 15

highly statistically significant coefficients of PAYMENTi est values in extraversion which is in line with
q s
with respect to PiAdjV and PiAdjV , this means for the influ- Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, highly extraverted individu-
ence on prices relative to the remaining expected dividend als make more purchases when assets are overpriced
payments, indicate that individuals with a variable com- than individuals with the lowest values in extraversion
pensation pay lower prices for purchases and accept lower do. Therefore, the results also support Hypothesis 3.
prices for sales than individuals with fixed compensation Panel B displays results for the subsamples regarding
do. Because the average price level is above the price justi- neuroticism. We find that the mean and median values
s s
fied by remaining expected dividend payments, we inter- of Ai , PiAdjV and PiAdjP in the top subsample are lower than
pret these results in the sense that a payment scheme that in the bottom subsample, the difference being statisti-
includes at least some financial incentive can influence cally significant at least at the 10% level, which supports
individuals to trade at prices that are closer to the price Hypotheses 4 and 5. Individuals with the highest values
justified by remaining expected dividend payments. The in neuroticism hold fewer assets in their financial portfo-
form of the payment, however, does not appear to inter- lios and they sell their assets for lower prices than indi-
fere with the impact of extraversion or neuroticism. viduals with the lowest values do. With respect to
Hypothesis 6, which states that individuals with higher
values in neuroticism sell more underpriced assets than
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Robustness check
individuals with lower values do, we find further support,
As robustness check and in addition to the full sample because the mean and median values of SDisc Disc
iAdjV and SiAdjP in
analysis, we compare the asset market figures between the top quintile are higher than in the bottom quintile at
the top and bottom quintiles of individuals according to statistically significant levels.
extraversion and neuroticism. Table 11 reports respective
results for pairwise tests of equality of the asset market
Discussion and conclusion
variables according to extraversion (Panel A) and neu-
roticism (Panel B). With respect to the average number Our analysis is, to our knowledge, the first that estab-
of the assets in the financial portfolio we find no statisti- lishes a link between the large strands of research on per-
cally significant difference between the extraversion sub- sonality in social psychology and on experimental asset
q q
samples. The mean and median values of PiAdjV , PiAdjP , markets. More specifically, we examine how individuals’
QPrem Prem
iAdjV and QiAdjP in the top extraversion quintile are degree of extraversion and neuroticism influences their
higher than in the bottom quintile. These differences are investment behavior. Therefore, we analyze a unique
statistically significant at least at the 5% level. The results dataset including data on 364 individuals’ degree of
indicate that individuals with the highest values in extra- extraversion and neuroticism and their decisions in an
version pay higher prices than individuals with the low- experimental asset market.

Table 11. Pairwise test of equality between top and bottom quintiles of extraversion and neuroticism.
Top Bottom

Mean Med Mean Med Significance U test

Panel A: Extraversion
Ai .042 .038 .048 .045
q **
PiAdjV .754 .646 .515 .467
q
PiAdjP .046 .053 –.069 –.035 ***

QPrem
iAdjV .127 .115 .103 .086 **

QPrem
iAdjP .077 .069 .058 .046 **

Panel B: Neuroticism
**
Ai .041 .038 .055 .049
s ***
PiAdjV .558 .463 .948 .790
s
PiAdjP –.028 –.016 .043 .056 *

SDisc
iAdjV .048 .031 .029 .015 ***

SDisc
iAdjP .079 .062 .061 .046 **

Note. We report mean (Mean) and median (Med) values of the experimental asset market variables for the top and bottom quintiles with respect to participants’
level of extraversion (Panel A) and neuroticism (Panel B). In addition, we provide results of the U-test as test of equality between the top and bottom quintiles.
The symbols , , and  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Example: The mean value of the participants’ average
number of assets held by individual i adjusted for the number of outstanding assets Ai is .042 in the top quintile of extraverted participants and .048 in the bot-
tom quintile of extraverted individuals. The subsamples do not differ from each other regarding Ai at statistically significant levels.
16 A. OEHLER ET AL.

We find evidence that more extraverted individuals 5 See, for example, Rotter [1954, 1966] for early research on
tend to pay higher prices for risky assets and make the concept of locus of control. See also Oehler [1995] and
more purchases when these assets are overpriced than the literature cited therein for the explanations of illusion
of control and locus of control.
less extraverted individuals do. We attribute the 6. See, for example, Glaser and Weber [2007] or Moore and
observed behavior to higher risk propensity of more Healy [2008] for an overview of different manifestations
extraverted individuals. Hence, our results are consis- of overconfidence.
tent with Nicholson et al. [2005], Durand, Newby 7. Durand et al. [2008] deviated from the typically used
and Sanghani [2008], Mayfield et al. [2008], Becker nomenclature and employed the term negative emotion
instead of neuroticism.
et al. [2012], and Pan and Statman [2013]. In addi-
8. Vianello, Schnabel, Sriram, and Nosek [2013] found simi-
tion, we find that more neurotic individuals hold lar results regarding the impact of gender.
fewer risky assets in their portfolio than less neurotic 9. At this stage, we do not further differentiate between over-
individuals do, which is contrary to the findings of pricing as deviation from expected dividend payments and
Durand, Newby and Sanghani [2008] and Durand, overpricing as deviation from market-wide expectations
Newby, Peggs, et al. [2013], but is in line with Clo- about price developments. Please see the methodology
section for our approach to deal with different definitions
ninger [2000], Nicholson et al. [2005], Mayfield et al. of overpriced assets.
[2008], Lommen et al. [2010], Becker et al. [2012],
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10. Please see the Methodology section for our approach to


and Niszczota [2014]. Furthermore, results indicate deal with different definitions of underpriced assets.
that more neurotic individuals sell financial assets at 11. Rammstedt and John [2007] found correlations between
lower prices and make more sales when financial the items of the BFI-10 and the full BFI of up to 0.89 for
extraversion and 0.86 for neuroticism.
assets are underpriced. Additionally, our results sup-
12. Specifically, we choose 6 items from the original 20 items
port the findings of, for example, Eckel and F€ ullbrunn to measure positive and negative affect. To measure posi-
[2015], Mayfield et al. [2008], and Barber and Odean tive affect, we choose the 3 items active, interested, and
[2001] that men behave basically different regarding determined. To measure negative affect, we choose the 3
investment decisions than women do. items distressed, nervous, and jittery.
We chose an experimental asset market setting because 13. If individuals do not trade at all during the experiment,
the interest on the cash held during the 15 trading periods
it allows us to diminish the influence of external effects would result in an additional payment of €0.05. To sim-
such as heterogeneous information. Future researchers plify payment procedure, we round payable amounts on
should address external effects that are obvious in real half/full Euros.
financial markets and analyze the impact of personality 14. Similar to Rammstedt et al. [2012] we recode the reversed
traits in the presence of, for example, information over- items in the questionnaire to calculate the median value of
EXTRAVERTi and NEUROTi, respectively.
load or interfering financial decisions of other investors
15. Because the participants receive a riskless interest pay-
(e.g., Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and Weisbenner [2008]). In ment on cash holdings of 1 per mill for each trading
addition, future researchers may include a further and period, we additionally use the discounted value of the
more developed analysis of the relationship between gen- expected dividend payments as approximation for the
der, personality, and financial decision making. Beyond assets’ fundamental value. This procedure, however, does
this, research on, for example, bubbles in financial markets not significantly alter our results; we therefore do not sep-
arately report the results based on the discounted value of
could benefit from including personality of market partici- the expected dividend payments.
pants—both at the individual and the aggregate market 16. This behavior results in a higher portfolio value after the
levels—as a crucial explanatory factor. last trading period for men (mean: 5,657 units of experi-
mental currency; median: 5,737) than for women (mean:
4,005; median: 4,368).
Notes
1. See Palan [2013] for a literature review of impact factors Acknowledgments
on bubbles in experimental asset markets.
2. One exemption is Durand, Newby, Tant, and Trepongkar- The authors would like to thank Benjamin Hartl, Tim A.
una [2013], who employed an interactive-simulated for- Herberger, Martin Abrahamson (discussant), Deborah
eign exchange market that is similar to the mechanism of Trask (Managing Editor), an anonymous referee, partici-
an experimental asset market. pants of the 52nd Annual Meeting of the Eastern Finance
3. The 5 personality traits include conscientiousness, extraver- Association, the 2016 Behavioural Finance Working Group
sion, agreeableness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. Conference, and seminar participants at Bamberg Univer-
4. Early on, personality scientist used these 5 factors (e.g., sity (Germany) for helpful comments and suggestions.
Fiske [1949], Tupes and Christal [1961], Norman [1963]); They further thank Sebastian Hilker and Robert Stein for
however, Goldberg [1981, 1993] made the term Big Five technical support. All remaining errors are the authors’
popular. own.
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 17

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