1

The Alexander L. Kielland accident

- 30 years later

“What did we learn - and apply

and
What should we not forget?”

Torgeir Moan
CeSOS, NTNU
e
2

Outline
 Alexander Kielland on the Ekofisk field in March 1980
 The Investigation
 The Causes of the accident
- Technical and Physical Causes-Consequences
- Human and Organizational factors
 Lessons learnt and their implications
- whether they are implemented or not
- how they are implemented
 The Future
- also, in view of other experiences
 Concluding remarks
3

Alexander Kielland on the

Ekofisk field in March 1980
4

The investigation
 Hypotheses
e.g. based on mapping of risks in the ”Safety Offshore Program”
 Evidence
- the failed structure

- record of wave, wind conditions

- design, fabrication and operation logs
- load, response, fatigue, ultimate strength reanalysis
- hearing of designers, fabricators,
classification societies, NMD/NPD
There had been:
- (No Blow-out)

- No overload due to
mooring forces

- No SABOTAGE
5
Important with a dual view on accidents
- Fatalities
- Environmental  Technical-physical
Critical damage
event - Property point of view
damage
- Capsizing or total loss of
Fault Event tree structural integrity
tree commonly develops in a
sequence of events

 Human and
organizational
point of view
- All decisions and actions
made – or not made during
the life cycle are the
Mangement and Oversight and responsibility of
Risk Tree (MORT) individuals and organizations
- nuclear, aerospace experiences (and regulators)
6
The Alexander Kielland Accident (1980)
Brace Technical-physical
D-6 Causes-consequences

fatigue/ fracture in
Fatigue failure
brace D-6
Hydro-
phone
support
rupture/collapse in
Plate of
the brace
the other 5 braces
loss of column D
evacuation
listing escape
flooding

-123 fatalities
-total loss of platform
capsizing
7
The Alexander L. Kielland accident in 1980
Technical causes & Human and organizational
consequences factors
Hydro-
phone
• fatigue failure of • fabrication defect due to
support one brace - bad welding
- initiated by a - inadequate inspection
Plate of gross
the brace
fabrication • no fatigue design check
defect carried out

• ultimate progressive • codes did not require structural

failure of braces robustness (damage - tolerance)

• progressive • damage stability rules did not

flooding cover loss of a column
• failure to shut doors, ventilators
etc. contributed to the rapid
flooding and capsizing

• inadequate • evacuation not planned for an

evacuation accident of this kind
(e.g. lifeboats) • lack of life boats, survival suits
and rescue • long mobilizing time for rescue
operation vessels/helicopters
8

Lessons learnt & their implications

- whether the experiences
- the experiences should be
implemented or not ?
- if implemented, how ?
depending on:
- the background/perspective of
viewing the ALK accident
(in 1980 vs today)

- the experienced accident;

and its probability and Tendency to overreact
consequences (i.e. risk) on a single accident

- ALARP principle of risk acceptance

9
Offshore accident experiences in Norway up to
the Alexander Kielland accident
 System-related accidents on the
Fatalities Norwegian North Sea; i.e. during
the pioneer period of
+123 1966-1980:
- Ekofisk Alpha,
- Deep Sea Driller,
- Helicopter accidents,
- Ekofisk Bravo,
- Alexander L. Kielland

+123 = 215
Environmental damage due to oil releases
10

The five causes of the accident

• fatigue failure and fracture
of one brace
- initiated by a gross
fabrication defect ….. Knowledge

• progressive ultimate Use of

Hydro-
phone
failure of braces knowledge
support and loss of column -common
Plate of
Hydrophone support
the brace practice
• progressive flooding of -attitudes
the deck and capsizing
Acceptance
• inadequate limits
evacuation/escape
and rescue operations

• safety management: HOF

11
The Fatigue Failure: Analyses and Design
Crack behaviour
Fatigue failure: ni
- visible crack =
Dc ∑ N ≤ ∆=d 1 / FDF
ic
- through thickness crack
- member failure
 Fracture

A 24 m long crack

Steel plated structure Truss work with tubular joints

- Knowledge about
-Response,
-Resistance (Effect of initial defects)
- Fatigue design check
- inspection, attitude, uncertainties
12
The Fatigue Failure & Fracture: HOF
Experiences - 1840- 50 First fatigue failures - of vehicle and machine shafts -
documented in journals
& Practices
- 1847- 70 Wöhler’s scientific investigations
before ………………………………..
the ALK - 1895 Kipling’s description of propeller shaft fatigue failure in
”Bread upon the waters”
accident
- 1948 Nevil Shute’s description in ”No Highway” of airplane
loss due to fatigue
………………………………..
- 1953 Comet airplanes loss due to fatigue
- 1950’s Fatigue failures of welded bridges and ship structures –
and R & D
- 1960’s Textbooks on fatigue of welded structures
- 1963 Paris-Erdogan’s law ( fracture mechanics)
- 1969-73 Offshore Rules with fatigue requirements
- 1979 Ranger I jack-up failure in the Gulf of Mexico
- 1980 The Alexander L. Kielland accident in the North Sea
13

The Fatigue Failure: Fracture mechanics analysis

E
Brace
D-6
D

(Moan, ISOPE, 2006)

14
Fracture of brace D-6 and progressive failure
of 5 braces: Structural robustness (ALS)
- Fatigue failure vs final fracture of a member

- Failure of one brace causing ultimate failure of

5 remaining braces and loss of column

- Failure of a
single member was
Alexander Kielland, 1980 critical

”Missing”
brace;
also on the
other side
15
Structural robustness: HOF (practices)

• General statements

Ranger I, 1979

2001
16
Robustness in stability
Damage stability requirements
for floating platforms have existed
since the first rules for floating
(drilling) platforms

• existing damage stability criteria

considered 1 – 2 compartment
damage (flooding) – 400 – 800 t
(typically due to ship collision
damage)

• loss of column D implied a net

loss of buoyancy of 2000 t

Survival would require buoyancy

of the deck

• failure to shut doors, ventilators

etc. contributed to the rapid
flooding and capsizing
NMD: large scale damage condition
17

System Robustness: ALS Criteria

-Including moooring
systems due to
a very high failure rate
of individual lines
(also for DP systems)

- Requires tools for

demonstrating robustness

- Judgement in practical
implementation

(NPD, 1984)
18

In general: PSA’s Management Regulations

 Prevent the occurrence of

accidental events

 Protect against accidental

events or reduce
Practical problem
their consequences
- Provide measures to
in Implementation
detect control and mitigate for:
hazards at an early time - Complex
to avoid escalation. systems where
- Tolerate at least one failure components
or operational error are not easily
without resulting in a major defined
hazard or damage o structure

Robust organisation
19
Escape & Evacuation procedure & system
• Accident
scenarios
− “Marine events”
(listing, …)

− Fire or explosion
(Effect of heat and smoke)

• Issues in platform design Routes from hazardous

− escape ways areas to a lifeboat
stations, or sheltered
− evacuation means: area etc
coverage and quality
(lifeboats, survival suits,
−equipment for safety and life – saving
−annual training sessions

• Implications:
- distance between hazardous areas and accomodation
- location of lifeboats etc
- protection of escape ways and evacuation means
20

Escape & Evacuation procedure & system

 Emergency preparedness for the area

 Rescue helicopter stationed along the coast

 Stand-by vessel in the field

 Annual training sessions

21

Safety Management
 Total assessment of hazards that can cause failure
- from Prescriptive to Goal-based to Prescriptive Approach

 Conceptual – detailed design stages

 Human and organizatonal factors
 Education, training
Critical
event
Fault tree
Event tree
• Risk analyses (QRA, …..)

 1978 - Early offshore risk analyses

 1979 - Safety Offshore Program
 1981 - NPD Guidelines for
Quantitative Risk Analysis
Unacceptable region
 1984 - NPD’s Accidental Collapse
Limit State (ALS)
ALARP region - Studies in UK, US
New
installations  1991 - NPD Regulations for risk analysis

Broadly acceptable region

 1992 - HSE Safety case, UK
(ALARP principle)
Negligible Risk
22

Safety Management: Risk reduction actions

Causes Phase Action

• Calculated risk • Design • Increase safety margins of

during design safety factors
(ULS, FLS)

• Errors and • Design • Individual and organizational

omissions • Fabrication knowledge, skills and
• Operation attitudes
• Safety culture
• Quality control
• Robust design
• Unknown (ALS)
phenomena • Design • Research & development
23

Safety Management: HOF

ULS:
 Adequate design, fabr. and
RC/γR > operational basis
γDDC + γLLC + γEEC
 Competence of those who
FLS:
- make regulations
D=Σni/Ni ≤
allowable D (critera, methods, acceptance level etc)
- do the work
in design, fabrication and operation
ALK (training..) software
-no fatigue design check
-inadequate inspection  Quality Assurance and Control of
- the design process and
Hydrophone holder
- the structure (inspection..)
was not a focus area
(”non-structural”)
Recent examples of novel problems:
- Ringing - QA/QC of novel concepts requires
- Flexible riser ”corrosion” fatigue - robust control, i.e. independent reviews
- Tether springing - possibly R&D
- Vortex induced motion - Event Control of accidental events
24
What has been done to avoid catastrophic
accidents of the ALK type ?
• fatigue failure - fabrication defects, fatigue, corrosion/wear,
inspection,

• ultimate progressive failure of braces

- initiating event (explosion/fire, ship
collision..)
• progressive flooding - ballast error,

• inadequate evacuation (e.g. lifeboats)

and rescue operation

ACTION taken:

 Improved and new design criteria

 The main issue is:
- practice the criteria
- QA/QC in fabrication, design
25

Fatalities in Norwegian offshore activities

ALK: 123
26
The Future
in view of the past activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf
and elsewhere

 Pioneer period of 1966-1980 with different accidents:

- Ekofisk Alpha, Deep Sea Driller, helicopter accidents,
Ekofisk Bravo, Alexander L. Kielland

 Safety management in large field development projects: 1980-90

- NPD guidelines for conceptual safety assessment
( -Piper Alpha accident in UK)

 Cost-effective field development and operation: 1990-2000

- NORSOK; NPD regulations for risk analysis;
HSE ”Safety Case” (ALARP)
- new concepts, FPSO
- Sleipner A accident

 Minimum installations and extended operation: 2000-

27

The main issue

Safety culture, attitudes,  Focus on Safety Management
Based on experiences, – tranfer the lessons
Robustness in combined with new experiences
hardware, humanware.. - Sleipner GBS, 1991
- international experiences
need to be considered

- blowouts, fires/explosions!

- indicators monitoring
gas leaks etc
and other ”near accidents”
28
Future challenges – new technolgies
Ageing systems – in general
Financial
downtimes Degradation due to fatigue or corrosion
may imply etc.
service life
- there is time to follow up
extension
- if not properly managed, may imply
structural, pipe, machinery failures -
e.g. with more frequent gas leaks
LNG technology development
 Complex and compact process facility
(fire/explosion hazards)
 Cargo transfer in open seas
 Sloshing of LNG in partly filled tanks
 Operation of vessels close to facilities
may cause collision hazard

Arctic operations
 Cold climate, darkness, ice loading
29

Increased focus on safety of marine

operations

Challenges:
- hydrodynamic modelling
of motions
- automatic control
- reliability and safety
(human factors)
- simulator training
of the crew!
30

Concluding remarks
• Accidents like ALK can be avoided by implementing the knowledge
and practicing established safety principles (the barriers: design,
inspection and repair criteria are available)

• The lesson that still need to be remembered is that human factors

play a decisive role in safety and that proper safety culture and
management are required in the involved organisations

• Focus on ageing due to fatigue, corrosion and wear, also with respect
to process, equipment etc

• The fire and explosion (especially associated with blowouts) and

marine hazards need to be managed since errors/faults may easily
happen during operations. Quality assurance is a challenge.