156 VOLUME80,NUMBERS3 & 4

POINT: THE WESTPHALIA LEGACY

AND THE MODERN NATION-STATE

By JASON FARR

EndingtheThirty Years'Warin 1648,thePeaceofWestphalia is oftenviewedas thepro-

genitorof modern nation-state The
sovereignty. war completed declineoftheHabsburg
the
Empire which had already lost power in Western Europe followingthe revoltin the
Netherlands andthedefeatoftheSpanishArmada.TheendofHabsburgdominance altered
thebalanceof powerin Europe.Coincidingin partwiththeProtestant Reformation, the
Peace of Westphaliafurther weakenedPapal authority throughout much of Europe.
Consequently, mostscholarsview 1648as a turning pointinhistory andinternational rela-
tionsmarking thetransition fromfeudalprincipalitiesto sovereignstates.1
TheWestphalian
systemis thusviewedas thefoundation forunderstanding moderninternational relations.
Thesignificance ofWestphalia hasnevertheless
beenscrutinized bypoliticalsci-
recently
entistStephenKrasnerandotherswhoquestionthewholenotionofcontinuity in statesov-
for
Theynote, example,
ereignty.2 thattheHoly Roman Empire did not enduntil
officially
theNapoleonicWars.The recenttriumph of internationalismand globalization presents a
moreformidable The
challenge. increasing of
power organizations liketheUnited Nations
(UN), theWorldTradeOrganization (WTO), and theEuropeanUnion(EU) suggestthat
nation-statesovereignty is decliningandperhapsservedmerelyas an interlude in a world
dominated byimperialistic institutions.
ForKrasner, theEU is simplythe"newRome."3
Priorto thePeace ofWestphalia, mostpolitiesin Europewereruledbyan emperor, a
leadingclergyman, or a feudallord.Although thePapacyand feudalaristocracy retained
somepower,afterWestphalia theHolyRomanEmpire'sabilityto enforceitsecclesiasti-
cal and politicalhegemony was virtuallydestroyed.WithSpainacknowledging theinde-
pendence of theNetherlands, the German states and
gainingpoliticalautonomy, Austria's
failureto seize controlof CentralEurope,the mostdominantempirein Europewas
severelydebilitated. As a result,theverynatureof Europeanpoliticschangedfollowing
Westphalia. This endedanychanceof Europebeingunitedunderan emperor, norwould
theRomanCatholicChurcheveragainenjoya monopolyon politicalor spiritual power.
After1648,nationalsovereignty, characterizedby autonomy and interstatecompetition,
becametheprimary governing systemamongEuropeanstates.
The Papacyalso lostmuchof itspoliticalpowerfollowingthePeace of Westphalia.
Underthe Habsburgs,especiallySpanishKing PhilipII, the RomanCatholicChurch
enjoyedenormouscontrolovermuchofEuropedespitetherisingtideofreform.Priorto
WestphaliaandtheProtestant Reformation, a Papal Bull issuedin 1302byBonifaceVIII
arguedthatthe Pope was a higherauthority thanany temporalruler.4 The Peace of
Augsburg(1555) challengedthatauthority by granting each GermanPrincetherightto
designatewhether his statewouldbe Catholicor Lutheranaccordingto theprincipleof
cuiusregio, eius religio(whoseregion,hisreligion);individuals had no sayin thematter
andotherfaithswerenotrecognized.WhilethePeace ofAugsburgwas certainly a chink
in thePapal armor, theRomanCatholicChurchretained muchof itsauthority in Europe.
The Peace of Westphalia,however,damagedthe Papacy by extendingthe Peace of
Augsburgto recognizing Calvinism.After1648,"religionand ideologywereto be con-

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.177 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 15:11:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 SOCIALSCIENCEREVIEW
INTERNATIONAL 157

sideredwithinthedomesticjurisdiction of each territorial stateand to be eliminated as

aspects of international relations."5This not only solidified national sovereignty, it also
laid thefoundation forthemoderncompetitive statesystem.
Withthepoliticalandreligiousauthority oftheHabsburgsessentially destroyed andthe
Papacy weakened the
by Thirty Years' War,wealthy aristocrats realizedthe importance of
the
befriending newly established monarchs and secular leaders.Governments also under-
stoodtheneedforfinancialsupport, especiallyin thearea of defense.Changesin mili-
tarytechnology and theexpenseof fighting warsin theseventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turiesmade this alliance imperative.6 As a result,the inchoatestatesformedafter
Westphaliagainedthefinancialbackingtheyneededto becomeviable. Because states
neededto acquiregreater wealthto financemilitary andpoliticalendeavors, a competitive
statesystembased on thesupportofwealthyaristocrats emerged.Thiscontributed to the
riseofmercantilism, and,ultimately, a moderncapitalisteconomy.7
Aristocrats andmonarchs understood theneedformutualcooperation.Becausenewly
established statesneededrevenue,theysolicitedmoneyfromthe aristocracy to finance
imperialconquests for bullion and formed alliancesand traderelationswith other nation-
states.Europeangovernments sought favorable tradebalances bycontrollinglargerportions
oftheworld'sresources.Aristocrats supported thestatetoensuretheirowneconomicwell-
beingwhilethestateincreaseditspowerwithinthecompetitive international system. The
alliancebetweenthegoverning classandthewealthy thusprovedmutually beneficial.
DuringthereignofLouis XIV (1643-1714),theFrenchwereespeciallyskilledatusing
publicworksto makecitizens,particularly thearistocracy, feeleconomically accountable
fortheirnation'ssuccess.This contributed to therise of nationalism. These aristocrats
ofteninfluenced bothdomesticand foreign policiesofthestate.Similarly in theGerman
statesin CentralEurope,cameralists reliedon economicincentives to securesupportfor
thegovernment. Accordingto some criticsof moderncapitalism,thealliancebetween
government and the wealthyis stilla commonfeature oftheWestphalian system.8
The aristocracy demonstrated prodigiousloyalty theirstate.Thoughmotivated
to by
economicself-interest, suchdevotionnevertheless represented a changein politicaliden-
tity.PoliticalscientistHans Morgenthau has examinedhow loyaltyand identity helped
sustainthe nation-state model. Nationalism,he observes,flourished afterthe French
Revolution, butoriginated withthePeace ofWestphaliawhenaristocrats used theireco-
nomicpowerto influencenationalgovernments in orderto preservetheirwealthand
power.9 Westphalia thusinitiated a long-term trendtowardthesovereignty ofnation-states.
Morgenthau further that
argues during this evolution of national peoplebegantofeel
identity
a personalconnection to theirstate.10 Ratherthanreceiving thisfromtheRomanCatholic
Church, whichhadlostmuchofitspowerfollowing Westphalia, manypeoplebegantodevel-
op "national systems ofmorality." Becausecitizensviewedthese"national systems ofmoral-
ity"as universal, thisconnection to one'sstate,ifandwhenitwas challenged, couldleadto
conflict.
Consequently, warswerenowfought overideology, firmly rootedin concernsover
balanceofpower,rather thansimply territorial acquisition orreligiousconcerns. Theturning
point was marked by France's entrance into the Thirty Years' War on the side of the
Protestants.This,too, is a modern feature of international relationswhich had its genesisin
theWestphalian system. Although there are exceptions, most "modern" wars such as World
WarII, theCold War,andtheWaron Terrorism are all examplesof ideologicalstruggles.
Even imperialwarshavebeen fought againstthebackdropof theWestphalian system, as
nation-statesweresimplytrying to increasethewealthofthemother country.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.177 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 15:11:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
158 VOLUME80,NUMBERS3 & 4

A perceivedmonopolyon "systemsof morality" is onlyone aspectof sovereignty.

Daniel Philpotsuggeststhreefeatures
Politicalscientist ofsovereignty evidentafter1648.
These includethecreationof diplomaticoffices,standards of interstaterecognition, and
non-intervention as a meansof economicself-preservation. Philpot,however, argues that
the developmentof nation-state sovereignty had as much to do withthe Protestant
Reformation as thePeace of Westphaliabutconcedesthatthetwoeventsworkedto the
mutualadvantageof each other.He suggeststhattheProtestant Reformation caused a
schismin the clerical controlof Europe thus allowinglocal rulersto seize power.
Regardlessof itsorigins,nation-state sovereignty was createdin theearlyto middlesev-
enteenth century and established manyofthefeatures ofmoderninternational relations.11
Perhapsthebestexampleof Westphalia's triumph is thefateof theSpanishEmpire.
Spainundoubtedly possessedthemostpowerful empireinEuropebeforetheThirty Years'
War.A seriesofunfortunate eventsledtothedeclineofSpain'sEmpireincluding Britain's
victoryovertheSpanishArmadain 1588,thecollapseof clericalsupremacy duringthe
Protestant Reformation, and defeatin theThirtyYears'War.Yet none of thesefactors
accountforSpain's inabilityto reboundand retainits statusas a dominantforcein
Europeanpoliticsfromtheeighteenth through twenty-first centuries.Instead,thiscan be
explainedby Spain's unwillingness to embracethe Westphalain systemwhichshaped
Europeandiplomacyfromtheearlymodernperiodto thepresent.
CriticsclaimthattheWestphalian systemwas merelyan interlude, if it evenexisted,
betweeninternational dominancebypowerful empiresor institutions. Theyare correctin
assertingthatthereis farlessbalanceofpowerincontemporary international relations.Yet,
suchcriticism oftheWestphalian system failsto that
recognize sovereign states alwaysact
in theirowninterests. Considerthecase of Franceand Germany's refusalto supportthe
UnitedStatesin theSecondIraqWar. Bothcountries, as members ofNATO,arealliesof
theUnitedStates,buttheyarealso sovereign states,obligatedonlyto theircitizenry's best
Thisis a perfect
interest. exampleofthetypeofnation-state sovereignty thatthePeace of
Westphalia hopedto achieve.International relationsspecialistJaniceThompsoncorrobo-
ratesthisviewby describing sovereignty as thedutyand responsibility of statesto act in
theirownbestinterests.12 In short,survivalofthestatesupercedesinternationalism.
Some wouldarguethatefforts to centralizepowerin theEU showthecollapseofthe
Westphalian system. The rejectionoftheEU Constitution in FranceandtheNetherlands,
however, shows that some are
Europeans unwilling to concede theirnationalsovereignty
to a centralized Furthermore,
authority.13 despite theinternationalism of theEU and UN,
do both institutions not relyon a nation-state model in theirfundamental structure?
PoliticalscientistKalevi Holstiarguesthatthisfactmakesthemthe"bulkwork" of the
Westphalian systemrather thantheirantithesis.14 Internationalism andnation-state sover-
eigntycan coexist.The reasonmoststatesparticipate in international organizations and
diplomacyseemsto be rootedin a fundamental desireto preservetheirsovereignty and
increasetheirwealth.
Attributingoverthreecenturies of international relationsto a singledocumentshould
warrant skepticism and reexamination. Yet,the Peace ofWestphalia remainsthefounda-
tionofmoderninternational relations.Peoplestillidentify themselves basedon national-
ity.This phenomenonof nationalidentity began withthe Westphaliansystem.Even
thoughtheEU, theUN, and otherinternational organizations havefacilitated globaliza-
tion,whenit comesto identity, thefactremainsthattheaveragepersonlivingin France
ortheNetherlands viewthemselves as Frenchor Dutch,not"European."

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.177 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 15:11:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 SOCIALSCIENCEREVIEW
INTERNATIONAL 159

ENDNOTES

'Leo Gross,"The Peace ofWestphalia, 1648-1948,"American JournalofInternational

Law 42:1 (January 1948):25-46.
2Stephen D. Krasner,"Westphalia andAll That,"in Ideas and ForeignPolicy:Beliefs,
Institutions,andPoliticalChange,eds. Judith GoldsteinandRobertKeohane(Ithaca,NY:
CornellUniversity Press,1993),235-64.
3Ibid.,261.
4TheBull UnamSanctum(1302) issuedbyPope BonifaceVIII. Thistextis partofthe
InternetMedievalSourceBook, a collectionof publicdomainand copy-permitted texts
relatedto medievaland Byzantinehistory.
5Quincy Wright,"InternationalLaw and Ideologies," American Journal of
International Law 48:4 (October1954):619.
6Geoñrey Parker,MilitaryRevolution:MilitaryInnovationand theRise of theWest,
1500-1800,2nded. (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1996).
7Joyce Appleby,EconomicThoughtand Ideologyin Seventeenth CenturyEngland
(Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,1980).
8G. William Donholf, "State and Ruling Class in CorporateAmerica (1974):
Reflections, Corrections, and New Directions,"CriticalSociology25:2-3 (July1999):
260-65.
9HansJ.Morgenthau, PoliticsAmongNations: TheStruggle forPowerand Peace 6th
ed.(New York: McGraw Hill, 1973),248-53.
10Ibid.,250.
1'Daniel
Philpot,"The ReligiousRoots of ModernInternational Relations,"World
Politics52:2 (January 2000): 213.
12Janice Thompson,"State Sovereignty in InternationalRelations:BridgingtheGap
BetweenTheoryand EmpiricalResearch,"International StudiesQuarterly39:2 (June
1995):213-34.
13"France and theEU: A SevereCrised'Identité," TheEconomist,May 28, 2005, 27-
29.
l4KaleviHolsti,TheState,War,and theStateofWar(NewYork:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1996),75.

COUNTERPOINT: THE WESTPHALIA

OVERSTATEMENT

By ANDREW MacRAE

Westphaliais no more.This is not the resultof any one particularcause, but an

acknowledgement thattheconceptualization of 'theWestphalian statesystem'is a peda-
that
gogicaloversimplification is based on flawed assumptions.By referring to modern
as
politics "Westphalian,"internationalrelations specialistsemploy a termthatno longer
providesan accurateview of historyand is incompatible withthetwo primaryideologies
of internationalrelations,namely,realism and international liberalism.The great

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.177 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 15:11:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions