GROUP 6 CASES (BATCH 2) prohibit the Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a

VIII. ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES private person or under authority of state law. Herein, as the soldiers of the United
States Army, that took and seized certain papers and documents from the residence of
Art. III, Sec. 2 and 3 Alvero, were not acting as agents or on behalf of the Government of the
Purpose and Importance of the guaranty Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that those papers and documents came into the
Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil 637 (1946) possession of the authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the Office
of the CIC of the United States Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said papers
Facts: and documents, as evidence for the prosecution against Alvero, at the trial of his case
On 12 February 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the for treason, before the People's Court, cannot now be legally attacked, on the ground
United States Army, accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed Aurelio of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures, or on any other constitutional
S. Alvero under arrest, having been suspected of collaboration with the enemy, and ground, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in similar cases. (See
seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal. On or about 4 October Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465; Gambino vs. United States, 275 U. S., 310.)
1945, Alvero was accused of treason, in criminal case 3 of the People's Court; after
which, on 1 December 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers
allegedly seized and taken from his house. Alvero also filed a petition for bail, at the
hearing of which the prosecution presented certain papers and documents, which were
admitted as part of its evidence, and said petition was denied. At the trial of the case
on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers and documents, which were
admitted as part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits. On 26 February 1946,
the judges issued an order denying the petition for the return of the documents, and
admitted as competent evidence the documents presented by the prosecution. On the
same date that said order was issued, denying the petition for the return of said
documents, Alvero asked for the reconsideration of said order, which was also denied.
Alvero filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the documents seized by United States Army personnel at Alvero’s
home can be used as evidence against the latter.

Held:
The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest Alvero, as
a collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without any search warrant,
in the zone of military operations, is unquestionable, under the provisions of article 4,
Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military papers in
the possession of prisoners of war; and also under the proclamation, dated 29
December 1944, issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the
United States Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the
Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of
the allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic
influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war.
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is
to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions
of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. But it does not
 To Whom Directed presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
People vs. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991) into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the
Facts: contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer,
On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution. The constitutional
went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
(the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon
filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass
number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the packages simply case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard government.
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening
of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes
forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At
the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box
containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like
(bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge
of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging
custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no
avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office.
Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila
(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of
violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section
2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

Issue:
Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.

Held:
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come
into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same
should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The mere
 Who May Invoke the Right?
Bache and Co., vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 323 (1971)
Facts:
On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search
warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of
Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day,
De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera's letter-request; an
application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an
affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search
warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was
hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court
to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, the
Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer,
upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge
asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be
false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. The Judge signed de
Leon's application for search warrant and Logronio's deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-
70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR
agents served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices of
the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The corporation's lawyers protested
the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was
attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which
yielded 6 boxes of documents. On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed
a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant
be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of
injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera,
Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly
and severally, damages and attorney's fees. After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the
court issued an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In
the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax
assessments on the corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not
entirely, based on the documents thus seized. The corporation and Seggerman filed an
action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of
documents from its office.
Held:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno,
et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly
recognized the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable searches and
seizures; holding that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the
offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. The distinction between the
Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former case, only the officers of the
various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched
and seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the corporation to whom the seized
documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner.
On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the
corporations in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as
First, there was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant
(De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The Judge did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or
not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation
of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70
was thus limited to listening to the stenographer's readings of her notes, to a few words
of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. Second,
the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant
was issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation
of Section 46(a), Section 72 and Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which
are interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes
at source). The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or
occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return of
receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax
due thereon). Even in their classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different
titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections
208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the
search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as
to include all conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could possibly
render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.
 Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
Facts:
Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors
Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases
G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino
(Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First Instance of
Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon
City) issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations of which
they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the said persons and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit: "Books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as "the subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as
the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted
to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the search warrants are
null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et.
al. filed with the Supreme Court the original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated 29 June
1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and
things seized from the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction
was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al.
Issue:
Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the contested warrants that
allowed seizure of documents, papers and other effects in the corporate offices, and
other places besides their residences.
Held:
Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof
are null and void. No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with
in the contested warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized the
search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill,
et. al., regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the corporate officers and the corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. However, the
documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of Stonehill,
et. al. As regards the first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices
they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom
the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. With respect to the documents,
papers and things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962
Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by the Court on the documents, papers and things seized
in the residences, in effect, restrained the prosecutors from using them in evidence
against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the Court held that the warrants for the search of 3
residences are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal;
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the
documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences is made permanent,
that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects
so seized in the residences are concerned; and that the petition herein is dismissed and
the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized
in the 29 places, offices and other premises.
 Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547 (1978)
Facts:
On 9 April 1971, officers of the Palo Alto Police Department and of the Santa
Clara County Sheriff's Department responded to a call from the director of the Stanford
University Hospital requesting the removal of a large group of demonstrators who had
seized the hospital's administrative offices and occupied them since the previous
afternoon. After several futile efforts to persuade the demonstrators to leave
peacefully, more drastic measures were employed. The police chose to force their way
in at the west end of the corridor. As they did so, a group of demonstrators emerged
through the doors at the east end and, armed with sticks and clubs, attacked the group
of nine police officers stationed there. All nine were injured. The officers themselves
were able to identify only two of their assailants, but one of them did see at least one
person photographing the assault at the east doors. On April 11 (Sunday), a special
edition of the Stanford Daily (Daily), a student newspaper published at Stanford
University, carried articles and photographs devoted to the hospital protest and the
violent clash between demonstrators and police. The photographs carried the byline of
a Daily staff member and indicated that he had been at the east end of the hospital
hallway where he could have photographed the assault on the 9 officers. The next day,
the Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office secured a warrant from the
Municipal Court for an immediate search of the Daily's offices for negatives, film, and
pictures showing the events and occurrences at the hospital on the evening of April 9.
The warrant issued on a finding of "just, probable and reasonable cause for believing
that: Negatives and photographs and films, evidence material and relevant to the
identity of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault
with Deadly Weapon, will be located [on the premises of the Daily]." The warrant
affidavit contained no allegation or indication that members of the Daily staff were in
any way involved in unlawful acts at the hospital. The search pursuant to the warrant
was conducted later that day by 4 police officers and took place in the presence of
some members of the Daily staff. The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing
cabinets, desks, and wastepaper baskets were searched. Locked drawers and rooms
were not opened. The search revealed only the photographs that had already been
published on April 11, and no materials were removed from the Daily's office. A
month later the Daily and various members of its staff brought a civil action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the police officers who conducted
the search, the chief of police, the district attorney and one of his deputies, and the
judge who had issued the warrant. The complaint alleged that the search of the Daily's
office had deprived respondents under color of state law of rights secured to them by
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The
District Court denied the request for an injunction but, on the newspaper staff's motion
for summary judgment, granted declaratory relief. The court did not question the
existence of probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and to believe
that relevant evidence would be found on the Daily's premises. It held, however, that
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments forbade the issuance of a warrant to search
for materials in possession of one not suspected of crime unless there is probable cause
to believe, based on facts presented in a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena duces tecum
would be impracticable. The District Court further held that where the innocent object
of the search is a newspaper, First Amendment interests are also involved and that
such a search is constitutionally permissible "only in the rare circumstance where there
is a clear showing that (1) important materials will be destroyed or removed from the
jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would be futile." Since these preconditions to
a valid warrant had not been satisfied, the search of the Daily's offices was declared to
have been illegal. The Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam, adopting the opinion of
the District Court. Zurcher, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the Fourth Amendment is to be construed and applied to the "third
party" search, the recurring situation where state authorities have probable cause to
believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of crime is located on identified
property but do not then have probable cause to believe that the owner or possessor of
the property is himself implicated in the crime that has occurred or is occurring.
Held:
First, a State is not prevented by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
from issuing a warrant to search for evidence simply because the owner or possessor
of the place to be searched is not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement. The
critical element in a reasonable search is not that the property owner is suspected of
crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the "things" to be searched for
and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought. Second, the District
Court's new rule denying search warrants against third parties and insisting on
subpoenas would undermine law enforcement efforts since search warrants are often
used early in an investigation before all the perpetrators of a crime have been
identified; and the seemingly blameless third party may be implicated. The delay in
employing a subpoena duces tecum could easily result in disappearance of the
evidence. Nor would the cause of privacy be served since search warrants are more
difficult to obtain than subpoenas. Lastly, properly administered, the preconditions for
a search warrant (probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched
and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness), which must be applied with
particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the
search, are adequate safeguards against the interference with the press' ability to
gather, analyze, and disseminate news that respondents claim would ensue from use
of warrants for third-party searches of newspaper offices.
 Wilson v. Layne, 98-0083, May 24, 1999
Facts:
In early 1992, the Attorney General of the United States approved "Operation
Gunsmoke," a special national fugitive apprehension program in which United States
Marshals worked with state and local police to apprehend dangerous criminals. This
effective program ultimately resulted in over 3,000 arrests in 40 metropolitan areas.
One of the dangerous fugitives identified as a target of "Operation Gunsmoke" was
Dominic Wilson, the son of Charles and Geraldine Wilson. Dominic Wilson had
violated his probation on previous felony charges of robbery, theft, and assault with
intent to rob, and the police computer listed "caution indicators" that he was likely to
be armed, to resist arrest, and to "assault police." The computer also listed his address
as 909 North StoneStreet Avenue in Rockville, Maryland. Unknown to the police, this
was actually the home of Dominic Wilson's parents. Thus, in April 1992, the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County issued three arrest warrants for Dominic Wilson, one
for each of his probation violations. The warrants were each addressed to "any duly
authorized peace officer," and commanded such officers to arrest him and bring him
"immediately" before the Circuit Court to answer an indictment as to his probation
violation. The warrants made no mention of media presence or assistance. In the early
morning hours of 16 April 1992, a Gunsmoke team of Deputy United States Marshals
and Montgomery County Police officers assembled to execute the Dominic Wilson
warrants. The team was accompanied by a reporter and a photographer from the
Washington Post, who had been invited by the Marshals to accompany them on their
mission as part of a Marshal's Service ride-along policy. At 6:45 a.m., the officers,
with media representatives in tow, entered the dwelling at 909 North StoneStreet
Avenue in the Lincoln Park neighborhood of Rockville. Charles and Geraldine Wilson
were still in bed when they heard the officers enter the home. Charles Wilson, dressed
only in a pair of briefs, ran into the living room to investigate. Discovering at least 5
men in street clothes with guns in his living room, he angrily demanded that they state
their business, and repeatedly cursed the officers. Believing him to be an angry
Dominic Wilson, the officers quickly subdued him on the floor. Geraldine Wilson next
entered the living room to investigate, wearing only a nightgown. She observed her
husband being restrained by the armed officers. When their protective sweep was
completed, the officers learned that Dominic Wilson was not in the house, and they
departed. During the time that the officers were in the home, the Washington Post
photographer took numerous pictures. The print reporter was also apparently in the
living room observing the confrontation between the police and Charles Wilson. At no
time, however, were the reporters involved in the execution of the arrest warrant.
Charles and Geraldine Wilson sued the law enforcement officials in their personal
capacities for money damages, and contended that the officers' actions in bringing
members of the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest
warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied the police
officers' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. On
interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, a divided panel reversed and held that
the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The case was twice reheard en banc,
where a divided Court of Appeals again upheld the defense of qualified immunity. The
Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the actions of the police violated the
Fourth Amendment. It concluded instead that because no court had held (at the time
of the search) that media presence during a police entry into a residence violated the
Fourth Amendment, the right allegedly violated by petitioners was not "clearly
established" and thus qualified immunity was proper. 141 F. 3d 111 (CA4 1998). Five
judges dissented, arguing that the officers' actions did violate the Fourth Amendment,
and that the clearly established protections of the Fourth Amendment were violated.
Issue: Whether the police officers were justified to bring along the Washington Post
reporters in the execution of the warrant inside the house of Charles and Geraldine
Wilson.
Held:
No. Although the officers undoubtedly were entitled to enter the Wilson
home in order to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson, they were not entitled
to bring a newspaper reporter and a photographer with them. While it does not mean
that every police action while inside a home must be explicitly authorized by the text
of the warrant (Fourth Amendment allows temporary detainer of homeowner while
police search the home pursuant to warrant), the Fourth Amendment does require that
police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized
intrusion (The purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the permissible extent
of the search). Certainly the presence of reporters inside the home was not related to
the objectives of the authorized intrusion. Inasmuch as that the reporters did not engage
in the execution of the warrant and did not assist the police in their task, the reporters
were not present for any reason related to the justification for police entry into the
home--the apprehension of Dominic Wilson. This is not a case in which the presence
of the third parties directly aided in the execution of the warrant. Where the police
enter a home under the authority of a warrant to search for stolen property, the presence
of third parties for the purpose of identifying the stolen property has long been
approved by this Court and our common-law tradition. The claim of the officers, that
the presence of the Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons' home nonetheless served
a number of legitimate law enforcement purposes ignores, the importance of the right
of residential privacy at the core of the Fourth Amendment. It may well be that media
ride-alongs further the law enforcement objectives of the police in a general sense, but
that is not the same as furthering the purposes of the search. Were such generalized
"law enforcement objectives" themselves sufficient to trump the Fourth Amendment,
the protections guaranteed by that Amendment's text would be significantly watered
down. Although it may be claimed the presence of third parties could serve in some
situations to minimize police abuses and protect suspects, and also to protect the safety
of the officers, such a situation is significantly different from the media presence in
this case, where the Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons' home were working on
a story for their own purposes. Taken in their entirety, the reasons advanced by the
officers fall short of justifying the presence of media inside a home. Thus, it is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other
third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the
third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.
 allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the
Conditions for a valid warrant search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its
Existence of Probable Cause supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984) will not suffice.

Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then
CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were
seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to
question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General
of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as
evidence in Criminal Case Q- 022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may
be the basis of the issuance of search warrants.

Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search
is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating
that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos "is in possession or has
in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended" is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of
such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
 Chandler v. Miller, April 15, 1997, D-96-126
Facts:
The Libertarian Party nominated Walker L. Chandler for the office of
Lieutenant Governor, Sharon T. Harris for the office of Commissioner of Agriculture,
and James D. Walker for the office of member of the General Assembly. In May 1994,
about one month before the deadline for submission of the certificates required by §21-
2-140, Chandler, Harris, and Walker filed an action in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia. They asserted, inter alia, that the drug tests
required by §21-2-140 violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, naming Governor Zell D. Miller and
two other state officials involved in the administration of §21-2-140, as defendants.
Chandler, et .al. requested declaratory and injunctive relief barring enforcement of the
statute. In June 1994, the District Court denied Chandlers' motion for a preliminary
injunction. The provision in the statute of the State of Georgia required candidates for
designated state offices to certify that they have taken a drug test and that the test result
was negative. Chandler, et. al. apparently submitted to the drug tests, obtained the
certificates required by §21-2-140, and appeared on the ballot. After the 1994 election,
the parties jointly moved for the entry of final judgment on stipulated facts. In January
1995, the District Court entered final judgment for Miller, et. al. A divided Eleventh
Circuit panel, relying on the US Court's precedents sustaining drug testing programs
for student athletes, customs employees, and railway employees, the United States
affirmed and judged the Georgia's law to be constitutional.
special need for drug testing must be substantial--important enough to override the
individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion. Miller, et. al.'s defense
of the statute rests primarily on the incompatibility of unlawful drug use with holding
high state office; but notably lacking therein is any indication of a concrete danger
demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule, and nothing in the
record hints that the hazards Miller, et. al., broadly describe (i.e. the use of illegal drugs
draws into question an official's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of
public functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines public
confidence and trust in elected officials) are real and not simply hypothetical for
Georgia's polity. Further, Georgia's certification requirement is not well designed to
identify candidates who violate antidrug laws; nor is the scheme a credible means to
deter illicit drug users from seeking election to state office. What is left, after close
review of Georgia's scheme, is the image the State seeks to project. By requiring
candidates for public office to submit to drug testing, Georgia displays its commitment
to the struggle against drug abuse. The need revealed, in short, is symbolic, not
"special," as that term draws meaning from our case law. Thus, however well meant,
the candidate drug test Georgia has devised diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's
sake. The Fourth Amendment shields society against that state action. In fine, where
the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches
calibrated to the risk may rank as "reasonable." But where, as herein, public safety is
not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search,
no matter how conveniently arranged.

Issue:
Whether the suspicionless searches, required in Georgia’s drug testing for
candidates for public offices, is reasonable.

Held:
Georgia's drug testing requirement, imposed by law and enforced by state
officials, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. (Collection and testing of urine to meet Georgia's certification statute
"constitutes a search subject to the demands of the Fourth Amendment"). As explained
in Skinner, government ordered "collection and testing of urine intrudes upon
expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable." (Skinner and
Von Raab, 489 U.S., at 617). To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search
ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. But
particularized exceptions to the main rule are sometimes warranted based on "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." When such "special needs"--
concerns other than crime detection--are alleged in justification of a Fourth
Amendment intrusion, courts must undertake a context specific inquiry, examining
closely the competing private and public interests advanced by the parties. In limited
circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and
where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed
in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable
despite the absence of such suspicion. Our precedents establish that the proffered
 People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432) (1999)
Facts:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La
Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the
coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao
requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted,
which looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was
poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief
Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach,
conferred with Almoite, and observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger.
When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried
what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. By this time,
Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-
arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into
a run upon seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by
holding on to his right arm. Although Cid introduced themselves as police officers, the
man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano,
Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then
resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag. The
man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded
several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid
wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter
did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and
escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police station, Cid then "recited
and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the
assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, Cid ordered his men
to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the
meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets containing yellowish
crystalline substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through
whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." When the policemen asked
the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely showed
his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents were
sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La
Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, Chua was detained at the
Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa
Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic
packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her qualitative
examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be
positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Chua was
initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the
RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the information was
subsequently amended to allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III
of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his
arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the amended complaint was read to him by a
Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued,
with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to acquire one from
the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua provided a completely different story,
claiming that the bags belong to his employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in
the speedboat; that they decided to dock when they were low on fuel and telephone
battery; that the police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and hand
movements, escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair;
that the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a
bag, which they presented to him; that the police inspected opened the bag, weighed
the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a decision
promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos
of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for
the reversal of the RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other
contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing
boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the
Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the
police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his
speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute "probable cause."
Held:
No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home
and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said
right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle
which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure.
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit:
(1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent
versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag
searched without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise
that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC
never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on
the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when
apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant
smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas,
Chua’s illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted
to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can
return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas,
do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package
emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20 confidential
report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug
and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious
demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by the Court as
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified
information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing
prohibited drug on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a
police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the
process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be denominated as
incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There
was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions
allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was
nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence,
the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chua’s conviction.
 People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19,
2001
Facts:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,
received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in
Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when
a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula
y Malagura (@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@
"Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior to 8 August 1996. At
about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the
alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that morning.
Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3,
Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio
Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and
SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they
would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were
positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina
passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the
pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina were
accosted. The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, Mula,
who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina. Subsequently, SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag.
Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on
opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and
Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused
Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending
that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having
been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the accused, but this was likewise denied. The accused waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the
trial court rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and
sentenced both to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47
of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case
was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify
their arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.
Held:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be
carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search
warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. Complementary to the
foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without
exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest)
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest which must precede the search. Still, the law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. Herein, Mula
and Molina manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding
a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said to be committing, attempting to
commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that Molina responded "Boss, if
possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such
response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that Mula
and Molina were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone
will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were
it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the subject of any
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. Further, it would appear that the names and
addresses of Mula and Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after
they were arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of validity on the arrest effected
by the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of Mula and Molina does
not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on
their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace
officers could not be admitted as evidence against them.
 Partially Valid Warrant
People v. Salanguit, G.R. 133254, April 18, 2001 Held:
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and
drug paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence
Facts: of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable
On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant
Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the residence of Robert the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug
Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue
SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar
2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from
Dolores L. Español. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10 policemen, Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being
along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or
warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguit’s door, but nobody opened it. affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched
They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the "plain view doctrine,"
forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior
occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was
found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been
bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was
total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.
but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took Salanguit
with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they
had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated
evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those
contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves,
one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. Charges
against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for
possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q- 95-64358,
respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. After hearing, the trial court rendered
its decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for
violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum
of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the
grounds that (1) the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence
as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid;
(2) the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to
the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the employment of unnecessary force by the police
in the execution of the warrant.

Issue:
Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support
the seizure of “drug paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as
evidence in light of the “plain view doctrine.”
 Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp., G.R. 140946, be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection
September 13, 2004 against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable
searches and seizures be committed.[33]
Facts: A search warrant shall issue in connection with one specific offense. The
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of articles described must bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that issued.[34] Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must state that the articles subject
Microsoft Softwares (Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and of the search and seizure are used or intended for use in the commission of a specific
packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness offense.
(John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically
The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For their described in the warrant.[44] A search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently
purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. [45]
“Joel Diaz”. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He
brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as
evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto
Pante), a computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the computer
unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated.
RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright
infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the
corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the Court
of Appeals.
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted
the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or Sacriz’ name hence the
proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct & WHETHER THE SEARCH
WARRANTS ARE GENERAL WARRANTS.

Held:
No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and
documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of
probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that
Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice
of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the
counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises,
they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor was it in
Sacriz’ name does not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states
that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule
for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions
obtaining in a given situation.
Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings
simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of
counterfeit goods is not in his name.
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the
objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to
 Held:
Personal determination by judge If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply
cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the
Sta. Rosa Mining Co., vs. Fiscal Zabala, 153 SCRA same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot
367 (1987) impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue appearing
for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or
Facts: a private prosecutor subject to his direction and control. Where there is no other
On 21 March 1974, Sta. Rosa Mining Company filed a complaint for prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence
attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining to the best of his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of
property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan the evidence adduced by both parties. The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had,
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial after reviewing the records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the
Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is denied
Panotes for preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the case.
a resolution dated 26 August 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
Theft be filed against Garrido and Alapan on a finding of prima facie case which dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
resolution was approved by Fiscal Ilustre. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration the Court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
of the resolution but the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated 14 The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
October 1974. On 29 October 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should he addressed to the Court who has
(CFI) of Camarines Norte an Information dated 17 October 1987 (Criminal Case 821), the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after
charging Garrido aand Alapan with the crime of Attempted Theft. In a letter dated 22 the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
October 1974, Garrido and Alapan requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated 26 August 1974 and 14 investigation.
October 1974. On 6 November 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial
Fiscal by telegram to "elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido et al.,
review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review." On 6 March 1975, the
Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of prima facie
case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move
for the dismissal of the criminal case. The Company sought reconsideration of the
directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter dated 11
June 1975. A motion to dismiss dated 16 September 1975 was then filed by the
Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima
facie evidence against Garrido and Alapan and set the case for trial on 25 February
1976. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration of the court's ruling but in an Order
dated 13 February 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewise denied. Trial
of the case was reset to 23 April 1976. Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge
in the CFI of Albay and Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial
Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte. On 19 April 1976, Fiscal Zabala filed a Second
Motion to Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial
court in an order dated 23 April 1976. Whereupon, Fiscal Zabala manifested that he
would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear
therein. Hence, the Company filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the fiscal can refuse to prosecute the case if the Secretary of Justice
reversed the findings of prima facie case by the fiscal.
 Paderanga vs. Drilon, G.R. 96080, April 19, 1991
Facts:
On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the
Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar
Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the
deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son
Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per
Administrative Matter 87- 2-244. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as
charged. The rest of the accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped
from detention and has not been apprehended since then. In an amended information
filed on 6 October 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and
"Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P.
Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed, among others, an
Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the
Arraignment on 14 October 1988. The trial court in an order dated 9 January 1989,
denied the omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the
opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense." In the
course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas
implicated Atty. Paderanga in the commission of the crime charged. The City
Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the
preliminary investigation against Paderanga at the instance of the latter's counsel, per
his resolution dated 7 July 1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice,
dated 24 July 1989, said city prosecutor requested the Department of Justice to
designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation against
Paderanga. In a resolution dated 6 September 1989, the State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation against Paderanga, directed the amendment of the previously amended
information to include and implead Paderanga as one of the accused therein.
Paderanga moved for reconsideration, contending that the preliminary investigation
was not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was
deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional
evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged.
The motion was, however, denied by Gingoyon in his order dated 29 January 1990.
From the aforesaid resolution and order, Paderanga filed a Petition for Review with
the Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with
Memorandum, and then a Supplemental Memorandum with Additional
Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed, attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas
dated 20 June 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of 30 March 1990
wherein he implicated Paderanga. On 10 August 1990, the Department of Justice,
through Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution 648 dismissing the
said petition for review. His motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied,
Paderanga then filed the petition for mandamus and prohibition before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or sufficient
justification to hold Paderangato a tedious and prolonged public trial.
Held:
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The
quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence
sufficient to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a
crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not
the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it
does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court.
Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal
prosecution. The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. cites several exceptions to the
rule, to wit: (a) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is
sub-judice; (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e)
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i) Where the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (j) When
there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied. A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the
present case, however, will readily show that the same does not fall under any of the
aforesaid exceptions.
 Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1987)
Facts:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by
the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-
Narcotics Group, Auxiliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the
Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and
other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later
burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue,
Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of
various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was
"Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita. On 7 December
1983, Pita filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and or restrain
Bagatsing, Cabrera and their agents from confiscating his magazines or from otherwise
preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic
and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is
protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. On
12 December 1983, Pita filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining
order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiffs "Pinoy
Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction in
view of Mayor Bagatsing's pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. The
Court granted the temporary restraining order on 14 December 1983. On 5 January
1984, Pita filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants, and or their agents
can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiff's magazine before any judicial
finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not." The restraining order
lapsed on 3 January 1984, Pita filed an urgent motion for issuance of another
restraining order, which was opposed by Bagatsing on the ground that issuance of a
second restraining order would violate the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 11
January 1983, providing for the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas
Pambansa 129, which provides that a temporary restraining order shall be effective
only for 20 days from date of its issuance. On 11 January 1984, the trial court issued
an Order setting the case for hearing on 16 January 1984 "for the parties to adduce
evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine' alleged
(sic) seized, confiscated and or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or not."
On 3 February 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the
motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit.
Likewise, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the freedom of the
press is not without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications; and that the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes certain exceptions, as when
there is consent to the search or seizure, or search is an incident to an arrest, or is
conducted in a vehicle or movable structure. Pita filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of “obscene” materials as a result
of an anti-smut campaign.
Held:
The Court is not convinced that Bagatsing and Cabrera have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which
mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of
a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2)
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The
fact that the former Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize
property in disregard of due process. Presidential Decrees 960 and 969 are, arguably,
police power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for high-handed
acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin
presidential issuances, from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due
process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically.
Significantly, the Decrees themselves lay down procedures for implementation. It is
basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. The Court finds greater
reason to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or
invalid. The fact that the present case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different
from Burgos vs. Chief of Staff AFP, a political case, because speech is speech, whether
political or "obscene." Although the Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, the
search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account
of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being
readied against any party, under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished". Further, to say
that the Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut
campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal
laws" has been committed, is to make the Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled
into one. Thus, the court mae a resume, to wit: (1) The authorities must apply for the
issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in
order; (2) The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized
are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrant State interference and action; (3) The judge must determine whether or not the
same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and
on His Honor's sound discretion. (4) If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause
exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for; (5) The proper suit is then brought
in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; and (6) Any conviction is
subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties seized
are indeed "obscene." The Court states, however, that "these do not foreclose,
however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable statutes, or remedies against
abuse of official power under the Civil Code or the Revised Penal code."
 Abdula v. Guiani. 326 SCRA 1 (2000)
Facts:
On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder (IS 94-1361) was filed before the
Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against Mayor
Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula and 6 other persons in connection with the
death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao. The complaint alleged that the Abdulas paid the 6 other persons the
total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Dimalen. Acting on this complaint, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda, in a Resolution dated 22
August 1994, dismissed the charges of murder against the Abdulas and 5 other
respondents on a finding that there was no prima facie case for murder against them.
Prosecutor Panda, however, recommended the filing of an information for murder
against one of the respondents, a certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant to this Resolution, an
information for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before the sala of
Judge Japal M. Guiani. In an Order dated 13 September 1994, the Judge ordered that
the case (Criminal Case 2332), be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further
investigation. In this Order, the judge noted that although there were 8 respondents in
the murder case, the information filed with the court "charged only 1 of the 8
respondents in the name of Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required
under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how the investigating
prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion." As such, the judge reasons, the trial court
cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama. Upon the return of the records
of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it was assigned
to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further investigation. In addition to
the evidence presented during the initial investigation of the murder charge, two new
affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the charge of murder against the
Abdulas and the other respondents in the murder complaint. Thus, Prosecutor
Dimaraw treated the same as a re-filing of the murder charge and pursuant to law,
issued subpoena to the respondents named therein. On 6 December 1994, the Abdulas
submitted and filed their joint counter-affidavits. After evaluation of the evidence,
Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28 December 1994, found a prima facie
case for murder against the Abdulas and 3 other respondents. He thus recommended
the filing of charges against the Abdulas, as principals by inducement, and against the
3 others, as principals by direct participation. Likewise in this 28 December 1994
Resolution, Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, who conducted the earlier
preliminary investigation of the murder charge, added a notation stating that he was
inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing the investigating prosecutor to
dispose of the case without his approval. The reasons he cited were that the case was
previously handled by him and that the victim was the father-in-law of his son. On 2
January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December 1994 was filed against
the Abdulas and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama before Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of Judge Guiani. This information
was signed by investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A notation was likewise
made on the information by Provincial Prosecutor Panda, which explained the reason
for his inhibition. The following day, the judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the
Abdulas. Upon learning of the issuance of the said warrant, the Abdulas filed on 4
January 1995 an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest
on 4 January 1995. In this motion, the Abdulas argued that the enforcement of the
warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the information was
prematurely filed and that the Abdulas intended to file a petition for review with the
Department of Justice. A petition for review was filed by the Abdulas with the
Department of Justice on 11 January 1995. Despite said filing, the judge did not act
upon the Abdulas' pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest. The Abdulas
filed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the judge may rely upon the findings of the prosecutor in
determining probable cause in the issuance of search or arrest warrant.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause
"personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of
our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a
greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous
Constitutions. Herein, the Judge admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there
was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant
Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was
found to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an
admission that the Judge relied solely and completely on the certification made by the
fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued
the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and
recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence
of probable cause as his own. Clearly, the judge, by merely stating that he had no
reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor
has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest
should be declared null and void.
People v. Mamaril, G.R. 147607, January 22, 2004
CASE DIGEST

GROUP 6

VIII. ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES