G.R. No.

152807 August 12, 2003

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN, DANILO S.

SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ
LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY
SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR., petitioners,
vs.
ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO,1 REMEDIOS COMORPOSA,
VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO,1a BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just because a piece of evidence is
admitted does not ipso factomean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the August 7, 2001
Decision and the February 27, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60645. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Decision dated 22 June 2000
rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Su[r]."4

The assailed Resolution5 denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case as follows:

"A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against [respondents] before the
Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.

"The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275
located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his
heirs, his children and grandchildren.

"In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from his job. The
termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of
[Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saez's son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband
of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed
Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors
and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several
people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos
Saez' property without paying any rental.

"Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the respondents who
likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through petitioners' tolerance.

"On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter
refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful
possessor[s] of the premises. A [C]omplaint was filed with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,] Davao del Sur,
but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to File Action
was issued by the said barangay and an action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against
respondents.
 "Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the [C]omplaint and alleged that they
entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and
owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have acquired just and valid
ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional
Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in question when it ruled
that they [were] the rightful claimants and possessors and [were], therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.

"The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the
Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision. x x x"6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. The
appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional executive director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) remained in full force and effect, unless declared null
and void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENR's community environment and natural resources
(CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet
allocated to any person.

According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, because they have sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. The appellate court deemed as self-serving, and therefore incredible,
the Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.

Hence, this Petition.7

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Court's consideration:

"I

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in sustaining the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the regional executive director?

"II

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the Regional Trial Court's ruling
giving weight to the CENR Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a
certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter raised for the first time on appeal?

"III

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in holding that the land subject matter of this
case has been acquired by means of adverse possession and prescription?

"IV

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, 'neither is there error on the
part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the affidavits by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel
[Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self serving?'"8

To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and the third issues shall be discussed in reverse sequence.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
The DENR Order of April 2, 1998

Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon the April 2, 1998 Order issued by the regional director of the
DENR was erroneous. The reason was that the Order, which had upheld the claim of respondents, was supposedly
not yet final and executory. Another Order dated August 23, 1999,9 issued later by the DENR regional director,
allegedly held in abeyance the effectivity of the earlier one.

Under the Public Land Act,10 the management and the disposition of public land is under the primary control of the
director of lands11 (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau or LMB),12 subject to review by the DENR
secretary.13 As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of
the LMB.

The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does not, however, divest
regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants to protect their respective
possessions and occupations.14 The power to determine who has actual physical possession or occupation of public
land and who has the better right of possession over it remains with the courts.15 But once the DENR has decided,
particularly through the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a certificate of title, its decision on these
points will normally prevail.16

Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to a piece of public land remains pending with
the DENR, the question of recovery of possession of the disputed property is a matter that may be addressed to the
courts.

Second Issue:
CENR Officer's Certification

Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the signature of
the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr.17and argue that the
Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on appeal.

We are not persuaded.

In Garvida, the Court held:

"A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or
tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. x x x"18

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not
admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.19

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose
F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here
refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as
valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.20

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998:

"x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a 'CERTIFICATION' dated 22 July 1997, certified among others,
that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x x was not allocated to any
person x x x."21
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in
his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the
latter was under the former's direct control and supervision.

Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial
conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence for
respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order.22 The Certification was not formally offered, however, because
respondents had not been able to file their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure23 nor jurisprudence24 would sanction the admission of evidence that has not been
formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by
the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.25

Third Issue:
Affidavit of Petitioners' Witnesses

Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the Rule on
Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file their
position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of
whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of
whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.26 Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.27

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses' respective testimonies, the failure of the
adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the
burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.28

Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription

Petitioners claim that the court a quo erred in upholding the defense of prescription proffered by respondents. It is
the former's contention that since the latter's possession of the land was merely being tolerated, there was no basis
for the claim of prescription. We disagree.

For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first to prove that the possession of respondents was
by mere tolerance. The only pieces of evidence submitted by the former to support their claim were a technical
description and a vicinity map drawn in accordance with the survey dated May 22, 1936.29 Both of these were
discredited by the CENR Certification, which indicated that the contested lot had not yet been allocated to any
person when the survey was conducted.30 The testimony of petitioners' witnesses alone cannot prevail over
respondents' continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a considerable length of time.

Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a rule, be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45.31

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 193531 December 14, 2011

ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION, represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA,
JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Petitioner Ellery March G. Torres seeks to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated April 22, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110302, which dismissed his petition seeking reversal of the Resolutions dated
June 23, 20082 and July 28, 20093 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Also assailed is the CA Resolution4 dated
July 30, 2010 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings
(CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot
machine and internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers,
respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity
of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the first
digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot
machine with an actual CMR of ₱5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of either ₱50,000.00 or
₱35,000.00.5 Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF
Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were
responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein petitioner.6

On May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of Charges7 for dishonesty, serious misconduct,
fraud and violation of office rules and regulations which were considered grave offenses where the penalty
imposable is dismissal. The summary description of the charges stated:

Sometime between November 2006 and March 2007, you facilitated and actively participated in the fraudulent
scheme with respect to irregular manipulation of Credit Meter Reading (CMR) which, in turn, led to the
misappropriation of money earmarked for the slot machine jackpot at CF Hyatt Manila. These anomalous
transactions were consummated through your direct participation and active cooperation of your co-employees and
customers. With malice afterthought, you embezzled and stole monies from PAGCOR, thereby resulting in
substantial losses to the proprietary interest of PAGCOR.8

On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges9 signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF
Hyatt Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot
receipts). Petitioner was then required to explain in writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof why he
should not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately
until further orders.

On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation10 of the charges against him. He
denied any involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or padding of the slot machine
receipts, and he asked for a formal investigation of the accusations against him.

On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter11 dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head
of PAGCOR's Human Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from the service. The letter reads in
part, to wit:

Please be informed that the Board of Directors, in its meeting on July 31, 2007, approved the recommendation of
the Adjudication Committee to dismiss you from the service effective upon approval due to the following offense:
Dishonesty, gross misconduct, serious violations of office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best
interests of the company and loss of trust and confidence, committed as follows: For actively and directly
participating in a scheme to defraud the company in conspiracy with co-employees and SM customers by padding
slot machine Credit Meter Reading (CMR) receipts in favor of co-conspirator customers who had said (sic) CMR
receipts paid at the teller's booth on numerous occasions which caused substantial losses to the proprietary
interests of PAGCOR.12

On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint13against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim
Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. The complaint alleged among others:
(1) that he denied all the charges against him; (2) that he did ask for a formal investigation of the accusations
against him and for PAGCOR to produce evidence and proofs to substantiate the charges, but respondent
PAGCOR did not call for any formal administrative hearing; (3) that he tried to persuade respondent PAGCOR to
review and reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to the Chairman, the
members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board; and (4) that no resolution was issued
on his letter reconsideration, thus, the filing of the complaint. Petitioner claimed that as a result of his unlawful,
unjustified and illegal termination/dismissal, he was compelled to hire the services of a counsel in order to protect
his rights.

Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged, among others, that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal
within the period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law.

On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating petitioner's complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR's decision dismissing
petitioner from the service, issued Resolution No. 081204 denying petitioner's appeal. The dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of Ellery March G. Torres is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the decision contained
in a letter dated August 2, 2007 of Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head, Human Resource and Development
Department (HRDD), PAGCOR, finding him guilty of Dishonesty, Gross Misconduct, Serious Violation of Office
Rules and Regulations, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Loss of Trust and Confidence
and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service, is hereby AFFIRMED. The penalty of dismissal
carries with it the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility, perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service, and bar from taking future Civil Service
Examination.14

In so ruling, the CSC found that the issue for resolution was whether petitioner's appeal had already prescribed
which the former answered in the positive. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he sent a facsimile
transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service. It found PAGCOR's denial of having received petitioner's letter more credible as it was
supported by certifications issued by its employees. It found that a verification of one of the telephone numbers
where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration disclosed that such number did not belong to the
PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors; and that petitioner should have mentioned about the alleged facsimile
transmission at the first instance when he filed his complaint and not only when respondent PAGCOR raised the
issue of prescription in its Comment.

Petitioner's motion for a reconsideration was denied in CSC Resolution No. 09-1105 dated July 28, 2009.

Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the twin
resolutions issued by the CSC.

On April 22, 2010, the CA issued its assailed decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

In dismissing the petition, the CA found that petitioner failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that he had
filed a motion for reconsideration. It found insufficient to merit consideration petitioner's claim that he had sent
through a facsimile transmission a letter/reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to PAGCOR's Chairman,
members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board; that assuming arguendo that a letter
reconsideration was indeed sent through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile transmission is inadmissible as
electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000; and that a review of the CSC assailed resolution
revealed that the telephone numbers where petitioner claimed to be the recipient of the faxed document sent was
not that of PAGCOR's Office of Board of Directors. The CA found baseless and conjectural petitioner's claim that
PAGCOR can easily deny having received the letter by giving orders to their employees to execute an affidavit of
denial under pain and threat of administrative sanction or termination from service.

The CA then concluded that PAGCOR's decision which was contained in a letter dated August 4, 2007 dismissing
petitioner from the service had already attained finality since there was no motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner in the manner and within the period provided for under the Revised Uniform Rules on the Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 30, 2010.

Hence, this petition where petitioner states the errors committed by the CA in this wise:

The first issue that should be resolved is:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the dismissal of petitioner based merely on
technicality without considering the allegations on summary and arbitrary dismissal based on fabricated and
unfounded accusations.

Next to be raised were the issues propounded in petitioner's Memorandum dated 29 January 2010 but were not
tackled upon by the Court of Appeals, thus:

A. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in ruling that there was no valid letter/motion for
reconsideration submitted to reconsider petitioner's dismissal from the service;

B. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in giving more weight to PAGCOR's denial of having
received petitioner's letter of reconsideration;

C. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in not acting/resolving the Ex-Parte Motion to Issue
Subpoena Duces Tecum;

D. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in ruling that petitioner's failure to send his letter
reconsideration through mail or by personal service as set forth in the Rules of Court, he forfeited his right to
appeal; and

E. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in favoring PAGCOR"s dismissal of petitioner from
employment based on hearsay, imaginary and non-existent evidence.15

The threshold issue for resolution is whether the CA erred when it affirmed the CSC's dismissal of the appeal for
being filed beyond the reglementary period.

Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his dismissal16 on August 13, 2007, which was within
the 15-day period for filing the same; and that he did so by means of a facsimile transmission sent to the PAGCOR's
Office of the Board of Directors. He claims that the sending of documents thru electronic data message, which
includes facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Petitioner
further contends that since his letter reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then filed his complaint
before the CSC.

We are not persuaded.

Sections 37, 38, 39, and 43 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which are
applicable to this case, respectively provide, to wit:

Section 37. Finality of Decisions - A decision rendered by heads of agencies whereby a penalty of suspension for
not more than thirty days or a fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary is imposed, shall be final and
executory. However, if the penalty imposed is suspension exceeding thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days’ salary, the same shall be final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion
for reconsideration or an appeal and no such pleading has been filed.

Section 38. Filing of motion for reconsideration. - The party adversely affected by the decision may file a motion for
reconsideration with the disciplining authority who rendered the same within fifteen days from receipt thereof.

Section 39. When deemed filed. - A motion for reconsideration sent by mail shall be deemed filed on the date shown
by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case and in case of personal delivery,
the date stamped thereon by the proper office.

Section 43. Filing of Appeals. - Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and
other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty (30) days’ salary, maybe appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.

Clearly, a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for
reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the
envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the
motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt
of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.

Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration
should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007. However, records
do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of
petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through
a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in
filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we
stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.

In Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,17 we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled
that:

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic
matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area
by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via
microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and
the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper
referred to as a facsimile.

x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an
original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine
and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x18 1avv phi1

Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act.
In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation,19 We determined the question of whether the
original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the
Electronic Commerce Act, and We said:

We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission
cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. (Italics ours.)20

We, therefore, found no reversible error committed by the CA when it affirmed the CSC in dismissing petitioner's
appeal. Petitioner filed with the CSC a complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of backwages and other benefits on September 14, 2007. The CSC treated the complaint as an appeal
from the PAGCOR's dismissal of petitioner. Under Section 43 which we earlier quoted, petitioner had 15 days from
receipt of the letter of dismissal to file his appeal. However, at the time petitioner filed his complaint with the CSC,
which was considered as petitioner's appeal, 41 days had already elapsed from the time he received his letter of
dismissal on August 4, 2007; hence, the CSC correctly found that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since
petitioner's dismissal had already attained finality. Petitioner's dismissal from the service became final and executory
after he failed to file his motion for reconsideration or appeal in the manner and within the period provided for under
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

In Peña v. Government Service and Insurance System,21 We said:

Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted
by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. In other
words, appeal is a right of statutory and not of constitutional origin. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure of a party to conform
to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable, for it is more
important that a case be settled than it be settled right. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that final and executory
judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest
court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the
winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.22

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 22, 2010 and the Resolution dated July 30, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200148 June 4, 2014

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA D. RIVERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

For review is the instant Petition1 filed by Ramon A. Syhunliong (Syhunliong) seeking the reversal of the
Decision2 rendered on July 11, 2011 and Resolution3 issued on January 6, 2012 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 110335. The CA set aside the Orders dated December 4, 20084 and June 18, 20095 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, which denied the Motion to Dismiss/Quash on Jurisdictional
Challenge6 (Motion to Quash) filed by the herein respondent, Teresita D. Rivera (Rivera), in Criminal Case No. Q-
07-147802, an action for libel.

Antecedents

Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802.
Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF) and likewise owns interests in
construction, restaurant and hospital businesses. On the other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of
BANFF. She was hired in September of 2002 with a monthly salary of Php 30,000.00.

About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on
February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of the same year to complete
the turn over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas), who succeeded her.

Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and
incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was
still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.7

On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text message to one of BANFF’s official cellular
phones held by Lumapas:

I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talagasufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha nglast pay ko. I don’t deserve this
[because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras[.]8 [S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real
meaning.9 (Italics ours)

Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:

Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyanincluding incentive up to the last datena nandyan ako para di
na kami abot sa labor.10 (Italics ours)

Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint
against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund in the
total sum of Php 698,150.48.11

On April 16, 2007,12 pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a
complaint for libel, the origin of the instant petition. The information, dated June 21, 2007, charged Rivera with the
following:

That on or about the 6th day of April, 2006, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with malicious intent of
impeaching the honor, virtue, character and reputation of one RAMON A. SYHUNGLIONG [sic] and with evident
intent of exposing the complainant to public dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously publish in the form of text messages and/or caused to be publish[ed] the
following defamatory statements through the company’s cellular phone, to wit:
 xxxx

that with the said text message, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in fact she did mean and
convey, malicious and offensive insinuations and imputations that tends [sic] to destroy the good name and
reputation of Ramon Syhunliong, with no good or justifiable motive but solely for the purpose of maligning and
besmirching the good name, honor, character and reputation of the said complainant and to expose it, as in fact [he]
was exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.13

Rivera filed a Motion to Quash14 the aforequoted information. She argued that the text message, which was the
subject of the libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she had suffered due to the delay in the release of
her unpaid salaries, benefits and incentives. Further, the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime
of libel as the elements of malice and the making of defamatory imputation for public consumption were wanting.
Her text message was not prompted by ill will or spite, but was merely sent as part of her duty to defend her own
interests.

During the arraignment on October 11, 2007, Rivera entered a plea of not guilty.15

The Orders of the RTC

On December 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 denying Rivera’s Motion to Quash on these grounds:

[T]he grounds raised by [Rivera] in the motion to quash [are] evidentiary in nature[,] which can only be threshed out
in a full blown hearing to determine if said [t]ext message falls squarely within the parameters of "Privileged
Communication" or the elements of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code [are] not fully established by the
Prosecution’s evidence.

The Rule on Criminal Procedure in the prosecution of any felony or offense requires only the existence of probable
cause in order to indict an accused of the crime charged. x x x [P]robable cause was established seasonably during
the preliminary investigation. [Rivera] should have participated during the preliminary investigation or filed a Motion
for re-investigation [if] she was not accorded such right and raised these grounds, before she enter[ed] her plea
during arraignment.

The Supreme Court ruled that "[i]t should be noted that the libelous material [or text] must be viewed as a whole. In
order to ascertain the meaning of [the] published article [or text message], the whole of the article must be
considered, each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication."

The Supreme Court held that "writing [or texting] to a person other than the person defamed is sufficient to
constitute publication, for the person to whom the letter [text message] is addressed is a third person in relation to its
writer and the person defamed therein. In this case, the wife of the complainant[,] who received the unsealed letter[,]
is held a third person to whom the publication is made.[ ]17 (Citations omitted)

The RTC thereafter issued an Order18 on June 18, 2009 denying Rivera’s motion for reconsideration to the
foregoing. Citing Lu Chu Sing and Lu Tian Chiong v. Lu Tiong Gui,19 the RTC explained that the privileged character
of a communication merely does away with the presumption of malice. However, the plaintiff is not precluded from
proving the existence of such malice. The RTC once again concurred with the Public Prosecutor’s finding that there
was probable cause to indict Rivera for having ascribed to Syhunliong the possession of a vice or defect, or for
having committed an act, tending to cause dishonor or discredit to the latter’s name.

Rivera challenged the orders issued by the RTC through a Petition for Certiorari20 filed before the CA. Quoting Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), she emphasized that "every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown," except in "a private
communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty."21 Citing
Brillante v. Court of Appeals,22Rivera enumerated the requisites, compliance with which would make a statement fall
within the purview of a qualified privileged communication, viz: (1) the person who made the communication had a
legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may
either be his own or of the one [for] whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or
superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3)
the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.23 Rivera likewise stressed that
under Sections 3(a)24 and 9,25Rule 11726 of the Rules of Court, an accused may move to quash the information even
after arraignment if the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense. She thus concluded that the text message
she sent to Lumapas was in the nature of a qualified privileged communication, it being merely an expression of her
legitimate grievances over the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries and other entitlements. Rivera texted
Lumapas because the latter was in the best position to help expedite the release of the checks. Rivera had no intent
to injure anyone’s reputation. Lastly, Rivera labeled as erroneous the RTC’s declaration regarding the necessity of a
full blown trial since facts sufficient for the resolution of the case were allegedly already extant in the records. The
CA Ruling

On July 11, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision27directing the dismissal of the information for libel
filed against Rivera. The CA favorably considered her argument that when the facts in an information fail to charge
an offense, the said ground can be invoked by the accused in a motion to quash filed even after arraignment. The
CA likewise explained that:

The focal issue to the parties in the present case is whether the facts charged in the information[,]as well as the
undeniable facts appearing on the record[,] show that an offense of libel has been committed. Our criminal law
convincingly provide us with a definition of libel – It is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect ... or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt
of ... a person. x x x.

The first procedural requisite in the determination of the existence of libel is whether there is a defamatory
imputation. The history of the law on libel abounds in examples of utterances or statements that are not necessarily
considered libelous because they are a [sic] mere expression[s] of an [sic] opinion[s] of a [sic] person[s] in
connection with a [sic] plea[s] or grievance[s]. Libel is inherently a limitation on the liberty of speech and press
freedom, and must be construed in a manner that does not trench upon constitutionally protected freedoms.

x x x There can be libel only if the words used are calculated to induce the hearer or reader to suppose and
understand them as impeaching the honesty, virtue or reputation of another. The question is not what the writer or
speaker meant by his words but what they convey to those who heard or read them.

xxxx

We can break up the text message of [Rivera] to [Lumapas] into three parts. The utterance is mercifully short so that
it could not be difficult to infer the whole sense and understanding of the message from the standpoint of Lumapas
to whom the message was conveyed. In context, [Rivera] was seeking payment of her wage claims consequent to
her resignation and receiving [BANFF’s] response through Lumapas. [Rivera] retorted with three things in her
message to Lumapas – (1) that she suffered a lot in collecting her last pay from [BANFF] Grabe talaga sufferings ko
dyan hanggang pagkuha ng lastpay ko.[;] (2) that she does not deserve to suffer this way [because she] did [her] job
when [she was] still there[;] and (3) turning to [Syhunliong] himself [she] said – God bless ras[.] [S]ana yung
pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.

If libel is to be understood as an imputation of a crime, vice or defect to another, there can be no libel in the first two
of the three statements which announced only the sufferings, albeit undeserved[,] of [Rivera]. The proposition gets
to be dicey in the third statement because now she makes a distinct reference to [Syhunliong][,] [b]ut is the
imputation defamatory? We hesitate to reach this conclusion, and all doubts in criminal law, we are basically taught,
must be resolved in favor of the accused. To articulate the legal wisdom, [Rivera] has the right to express an opinion
in a matter in which she has an undeniable interest.

[Rivera said] in the last part of the text that [Syhunliong] should understand the real meaning of the masswhen he
goes to attend it. It is in this tail end of the message that [Syhunliong] is mentioned. But what is conveyed by the
words ["]sana alam niya real meaning?[ ] Does it impute a crime, vice or defect in [Syhunliong], either directly or by
way of innuendo? But the innuendo can only be explanatory of a libelous imputation and cannot alter the sense of
the words claimed to be libelous. If the publication is not actionable per se, an innuendo cannot make it so, and if
the publication is actionable per se, the innuendo would not even be necessary.
We hold that the text message is not actionable libel. It does not serve to cast a shadow on [Syhunliong’s]character
and integrity[,] there being no direct and personal imputation of a venality to him. At best, the statement that
[Syhunliong] should understand the meaning of the mass suggests that [Syhunliong] should be more compassionate
and caring to the employee. But is being the converse of compassionate and caring suggestive of a vice or defect in
the person alluded to? We do not think so. Otherwise, even courts should be exposed to contempt and ridicule for
reaching at times decisions in favor of capital and against labor. x x x To follow the intent of the message as
ordinarily conveyed by the words and the context in which they are said, it can only suggest the intention of [Rivera]
to describe [Syhunliong] as strict and selfish. But[,] there are legitimate reasons why a person who acts in the
interest of the employer may appear strict and selfish to the other side. One may have to be so to protect the
interest of his company and, indeed, the outcome of the labor case vindicates the stand of [Syhunliong] against
giving [Rivera] the claims she sought after.

A responsible officer whose decisions may affect the fortunes of others and who is faced with criticism such as in
this case should not be so onion-skinned as to react through the criminal law. Instead, he should use methods of
discussion and persuasion to dispel the misgivings over his decisions. He should, in particular, explain through the
same source that told him of the comment why [BANFF]cannot satisfy all [of Rivera’s] claims.

x x x The matter contained in the text message is privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code which [negates] the existence of malice in – a private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, [moral] or social duty. x x x It was Lumapas who told her of the stand of [Syhunliong] on
the matter of her wage claims, and her reaction through the text message may be deemed a part of her duty to seek
redress of her grievances through the same source. She was speaking in response to duty and not out of an intent
to injure the reputation of the person who claims to be defamed. There was no unnecessary publicity of the
message beyond the necessity of conveying it to the party concerned.28(Citations omitted and italics supplied)

The CA denied Syhunliong’s motion for reconsideration to the above through the herein assailed Resolution29 dated
January 6, 2012.

Issues and Arguments of the Parties

Undaunted, Syhunliong now presents to this Court the issues of whether or not: (a) the trial court’s denial of a
motion to quash information may be validly assailed through a special civil action for certiorari; (b) Rivera may
validly question the denial of her motion to quash before the CA after voluntarily allowing herself to be arraigned
even during the pendency of such motion to quash; (c) the CA may validly review on certiorari what was, at best, an
error of judgment made by the RTC; (d) the CA correctly ruled that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute the offense of libel; and (e) the CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of Criminal
Case No. Q-07-147802 on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were privileged
communication.30

In support of the petition, Syhunliong cites Soriano, et al. v. People, et al.31 where the Court declared that in assailing
the denial of a motion to quash an information, the accused should not file a special civil action for certiorari.
Instead, the accused should enter a plea, go to trial sans prejudice to present the special defenses he or she had
invoked in the motion to quash, and if an adverse decision is rendered, file an appeal therefrom.

Syhunliong further avers that Rivera was arraigned on October 11, 2007. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
clearly provides that the accused may only be allowed to file a motion to quash at any time before entering a plea. In
Rivera’s case, she had already voluntarily entered a plea;

hence, it was tantamount to an effective abandonment of her motion to quash.

It is also Syhunliong’s argument that the CA improperly arrogated unto itself the power to review the Public
Prosecutor and RTC’s uniform finding of the existence of probable cause. Even if it were to be assumed that the
RTC erred in its disposition, it was a mistake of judgment and not of jurisdiction.

Syhunliong also refutes the CA’s finding that the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of libel.
The text message was apparently an indictment of his personality and character since it portrayed him as a
hypocrite.
Lastly, Syhunliong invokes People v. Judge Gomez32 which enunciated the doctrine that in a libel case, the
privileged nature of a communication is not a ground for a motion to quash, but is merely a matter of defense to be
proven during the trial.

In Rivera’s Comment,33 she reiterates the arguments in the Motion to Quash filed with the RTC. Additionally, she
contends that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Syhunliong’s complaint. The text message
was sent on April 6, 2006.Per Syhunliong’s narration in the instant petition, his complaint was filed on August 18,
2007,34beyond the one year prescriptive period for instituting actions for libel provided for in Articles 9035 and 9136 of
the RPC.

Further, the ground that the facts charged in the information did not constitute an offense can be raised even after
arraignment and is broad enough to cover within its ambit lack of probable cause. This, the court can re-assess in
the exercise of its inherent power of judicial review.

Rivera also laments that she was deprived of due process and of the opportunity to submit countervailing evidence
during preliminary investigation.

Our Ruling

There is no merit in the instant petition.

Prescription had set in.

Syhunliong raised five issues before this Court, but the Court’s resolution of the same would be a superfluity in the
light of Rivera’s unrefuted averment that prescription had set in before the complaint for libel was instituted.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,37 the Court, partially quoting People v. Moran,38 stressed the reason behind and the
character of prescription of penal offenses, to wit:

"Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no
longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but
an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence; x x x that from henceforth[,] he
may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence[,] it is that
statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of
construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition
and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned
to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it must be
remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public
justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the
law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously
maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity
from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained."

Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal construction of
prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of the State. x x x Any doubt on this
matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused.39 (Italics supplied)

In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera more than one year
after the allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas. Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16,
2007 or August 18, 2007,40 it would not alter the fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period
provided for in Article 90 of the RPC. The Court finds no persuasive reason why Rivera should be deprived of the
benefits accruing from the prescription of the crime ascribed to her.

People v. Castro,41 on the other hand, is instructive anent the effect in criminal proceedings of the failure of an
accused to raise prescription as a ground in a motion to quash an information, viz:
Does the failure of the accused to move to quash before pleading constitute a waiver to raise the question of
prescription at a later stage of the case?

A case in point is People vs. Moran, 44 Phil., 387. x x x [T]he court ruled that the crime had already prescribed
holding that this defense can not [b]e deemed waived even if the case had been decided by the lower court and was
pending appeal in the Supreme Court. The philosophy behind this ruling was aptly stated as follows: "Although the
general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in that
case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always of
absolute application in criminal cases, such as that in which prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law,
for the State not having then the right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue punishing,
the offense, or to continue holding the defendant subject to its action through the imposition of the penalty, the court
must so declare."

And elaborating on this proposition, the Court went on to state as follows:

"As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish the same, it is absolutely
indisputable that from the moment the State has lost or waived such right, the defendant may, at any stage of the
proceeding, demand and ask that the same be finally dismissed and he be acquitted from the complaint, and such
petition is proper and effective even if the court taking cognizance of the case has already rendered judgment and
said judgment is merely in suspense, pending the resolution of a motion for a reconsideration and new trial, and this
is the more so since in such a case there is not yet any final and irrevocable judgment."

The ruling above adverted to squarely applies to the present case. Here, the rule provides that the plea of
prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the accused pleads to the charge, as otherwise the
defense would be deemed waived; but, as was well said in the Moran case, this rule is not of absolute application,
especially when it conflicts with a substantive provisions of the law, such as that which refers to prescription of
crimes. Since, under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has only the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and cannot cover substantive rights
(section 13, article VIII, of the Constitution), the rule we are considering cannot be interpreted or given such scope
or extent that would come into conflict or defeat an express provision of our substantive law. One of such provisions
is article 89of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the prescription of crime has the effect of totally
extinguishing the criminal liability. And so we hold that the ruling laid down in the Moran case still holds good even if
it were laid down before the adoption of the present Rules of Court.42(Italics supplied)

While Castro is an old jurisprudence, it still finds application in the case at bench in view of Section 9, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, which in essence partially provides that the defense of extinction of criminal action or liability,
e.g., prescription, is not deemed waived even if the accused had not raised the same in a motion to quash. In
Rivera’s case, the issue of prescription is raised in her comment to the instant petition before this Court. Syhunliong
does not specifically refute Rivera’s averment, thus, it is deemed admitted.

In sum, even if the Court were to sustain Syhunliong’s stance that Rivera availed of the wrong remedy when she
resorted to filing a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the RTC orders denying the motion to quash, the
result would only prove circuitous. Even if the trial proceeds and an adverse decision is rendered against Rivera,
she can appeal the same, but the CA and this Court would still be compelled to order the dismissal of the
information on account of prescription of the crime. 1âwphi1

Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to order the dismissal of the libel information,
but the Court still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified
privileged communication.

"The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in
which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having
a corresponding duty."43

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354,
No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or
social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own
or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having
some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements
in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.44

In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the latter's claims for
payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera expressed through the subject text message her
grievances to Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite the release of Rivera's
claims.

Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration that Rivera's text message falls
within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she "was speaking in response to duty [to protect her
own interest] and not out of an intent to injure the reputation"45 of Syhunliong. Besides, "[t]here was no unnecessary
publicity of the message beyond [that] of conveying it to the party concerned."46

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision rendered on July 11, 2011 and Resolution
issued on January 6, 2012 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110335 ordering the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 84, to dismiss the information for libel filed by Ramon A. Syhunliong against Teresita D. Rivera
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.