SURVIVAL
etropC)litan-~rea clear Attacks
On May 25, 1961, in his message to ing itself from the residual radioac- when quite remote from the actual
Congress on "Urgent National tivity ("fallout") that would result ground zero of a large-yield thermo-
Needs," the President called for a new from a nuclear attack. nuclear detonation. They can pro-
and revitalized · civil defense program It is agreed * that "fallout shelters" vide all the immediate protection that
to protect the civilian population of will provide useful protection only is required for a large segment of the
the United States from the hazards of population (20 million rural inhabi-
nuclear war. Since that time, many • The au t hor a cknowledges tha t the factua l
d a ta upon which this study is b ased were stitu te a specific set of r eco mme nd a tions.
pamphlets, books, and articles have derived from U . S. Government a nd other bu t a r e a n aggregation of facts fr o m which
appeared urging the population to publica tions lis ted at the conclusion of this the r eader m ay deter m ine his own course of
begih providing the means for shelter- paper. The sta tements herein do not con- action .
A MILES FROM GROUND ZERO AT WHICH VARIOUS STRUCTURES WILL BE DESTROY ED BY BLAST
o 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
150 PSI
100 PSI-ALL ABOV E-GROUND STRUCTURES
20 PSI-MASSIV E MULTISTORIED OFFIC E BUILDINGS-95 ,,/o HUMAN MORTALITY
5 PSI-A PARTM ENT BUILDINGS- 15,,/o HUMAN MORTALITY
V) 3 PSI-WOOD OR BRICK HOUSES-THRESHOLD OF HUMAN MORTALITY
f-
U 1 1 1.8 PSI- MODERATE DAMAGE TO HOUSES
W ~......,r----'r--;
l.L
l.L
W
MT
tn 10 MT
«
;i 50 MT
~ 50 MT
U
t±: 10 MT
l.L
W
I MT
....J
« 1' 8 ca l/cm2 - CRUMPL ED NEWSPAPERS- 2nd-D EG REE BURN S (HUM AN )
L
~ 10 ca l/cm 2 -D RY ROTTED WOOD-GRASS-3rd-DEGREE BURNS (HUMAN)
I 15 cal/cm 2 -TREE LEAVES
f-
20 ca l/cm 2 -CARDBOARD BOXES-BURLAP
25 cal/cm 2- W EATHERED WOOD SIDING
35 ca l/cm 2- UPHOLSTERY-WOOL RUGS
cal/cm 2 -ALL CO MBUSTIBLES
o 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
MILES FROM GROUND ZERO AT WHICH VARIOUS MATERIALS WILL BE IGNITED BY THERMAL RADIATION
C
10 5 r-------r--r-.~-.----r----------r--------~ 100 r-------~~--~~~--------~
V)
V)_
~ ] 80 t----------r
....JW ~ u
~O 104 ~--------~----~--~~--------~--------_1 u Qi
~o Vi -E= 60 t-----------,
Z
-z O~
<Q U~ 40 t--------..,
O~ 103 ~---------+--~----~~--~~---+--------~
f-O 3J0
«
0<: 3~ 20
10 2 ~ ______ ~~ ______ ~ ____ ~ __ ~~ ______ ~
z
o I~ 2~ 3~ 200 400 600 800
DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (miles) ACUTE RADIATION DOSE (r)
Fig. I-Lethal effects of nuclear weapons: (A) thermal and blast effects on structures and materials at various radii; (B) radii of radiation
effects for 1-, 10-, and 50-MT yields; (C) physiological effects of radiation for increasing doses.
reaches a maximum of about NUCLEAR ATTACK PATTERNS STUDIED FOR THE WASHINGTON, D. C. AREA
M ay - June 1963 21
It is evident that the regions within
14 which there is a high probability of
having incident thermal energy
12
sufficient to cause ignitions (termed
primary ignitions) in common materials
i extend to about the same or greater
~ 10 distances as those associated with
~ blast damage. Conditions suitable to
'-+-
0 widespread secondary ignitions (those
-DQ)
resulting from blast damage to heating
~:J
elements, fuel lines, etc. ) are also to be
.L expected throughout the zones heavily
6
Vl
cY
damaged by blast, although these may
0 be less widespread than the primary
>
:>
cY
4 ignitions.
::::J
Vl
NO MORE THAN THIS MAN Y
Detonation of even a few megatons
SURVIVORS IF PO PULATI ON IS UN SHELTERED in the Washington area is capable of
2
initiating fires over a great area while
at the same time destroying or
0 severely disrupting most ordinary
0 10 20 30 40 50 means of fire fighting. The post-
YI ELD (megatons)
attack spread of fires may be expected
Fig. 3-Estimates of probable (0.9) nuclear-burst survivors among sheltered and un- to follow an expanding trend from
sheltered populations in Washington, D. C. (single- burst; aim point, Washington
the massive destruction and the great
Monument; 1.0-nautical-mile C. E. P.).
number of fires in the central area.
were protected by even a minimum- the Washington area resulting from If uncontrolled, ignitions even in the
strength (35-psi) blast shelter, and these arbitrary strikes is heavily areas remote from ground zero might
stronger shelters would reduce the dependent upon a number of factors develop into building fires, block
casualties even more. It has become that cannot be predicted satisfac- fires, or area fires. With the hazard
clear from examination of the various torily. Such physical factors as of early fallout in the downwind
attacks, that no one combination of moisture content and reflectivity of direction, it does not appear possible
aim points and weapon yields is exposed materials, transmittance of to prevent widespread enlargement of
overwhelmingly more destructive to the atmosphere, presence or absence the fire area. Surface winds would
the city than any of the others. of clouds and snow cover, shadowing continue to drive the fires until a
Throughout all of the District of effect of foliage, structures, and natural or artificial firebreak (a park,
Columbia and well into the Maryland topographic features, etc., all will river, wide street, reservoir, etc.),
suburbs, there is clear indication substantially affect the radius of where there is insufficient fuel to
that the stronger the shelter, the ignition of primary fires. However, propagate the flames, is reached.
higher the assurance of survival. the potential destruction under con- Even their efficiency as firebreaks
However, since any protection will ditions favorable to the attacker may may be severely dependent upon the
improve the chances of survival, the be estimated. season, weather conditions, orienta-
standards should not be set so high Figure IA includes the approxi- tion with respect to the direction of
that shelter efforts are, in fact, dis- mate radiant exposure required for fire travel, etc. It seems clear that
couraged. ignition of household materials and destruction by fire of a very large
Attack Case IV probably represents dry vegetation. Almost any thin, part of the metropolitan area must
an upper limit to the number of flammable , household material will be anticipated. No section can expect
weapons that would be expended on ignite if exposed to thermal radiation immunity.
a single city. (It should be assumed of about 10-20 cal/cm2• Dry vegeta-
that the Virginia suburbs, being as tion will ignite at about the same A fire resulting from a nuclear ex-
thickly populated as the Maryland exposure. The distances from the aim plosion over a major metropolitan
areas, will receive equal attention from points at which these thermal radi- area will reach its peak and begin to
the attacker.) Thus, beyond about 15 ation levels would probably be die down after three hours. Generally,
miles from the city center, it appears reached are indicated below. (These individual buildings will be destroyed
that expected blast forces would be figures presume a reasonably clear in about one hour; collapsed buildings
reduced to an extent that would atmosphere. ) may continue to smolder and burn for
permit survival in fallout-type shelters. days. Where fires develop into fire -
However, the fires that result from Distance jrom storms or conflagrations, they will
the attack may necessitate much more Aim Point jor 0.9 continue to burn with great intensity
Yield (single Probability oj at Least until all the fuel has been consumed.
elaborate precautions than are pro-
surface bursts) 10-20 cal/cm 2 (miles)
vided for in some of the designs The lethal capacity of these massive
1 MT 2.0-3.3
described in the available literature. 10 MT 8 . 6-12.2 fires is emphasized by data from cities
The extent of thermal damage to 50 MT 19.0-27.2 burned by firebomb attacks during
3. Masses of hot rubble and debris Fig. 4-(A) A representative family shelter that meets the minimum standards for austere
from destroyed structures choked accommodations and that will survive 65-psi overpressures; (B) thickness of combined
concrete and earth cover required to attenuate the initial radiation of 100 r inside the shelter
all passageways in the more densely and to withstand the crushing forces associated with the indicated blast overpressures.
built-up sections of the cities.
4. Communications within the stem directly from the provision of computations since estimates of sur-
cities, necessary for any coordinated "hard" shelters-and the harder the vival should be based as nearly as
attempt to fight fires, were completely better. The minimum standards for possible on the true ultimate strength
destroyed. such shelters are discussed in the of the shelter) :
5. Existing shelters were inadequate sections that follow. Details of con- Overpressure Wall and Ceiling
from the standpoint of resistance to struction, cost, equipment, etc., are (psi) Thickness (in.)
high temperature and noxious gases. not included since meaningful defini- 35 8.0
Many persons, who might have left tion is not possible in a study as 100 13.0
the area before the fires spread, were broad in scope as this. 150 16.0
trapped in the shelters. These are preliminary figures in
THE SHELTER MUST BE STRUCTURALLY
which only the gross strength of the
Shelter Design Requirmnents STRONG ENOUGH TO ~AND
structure has been estimated. It is
ANTICIPATED BLAST LOADS
Hypothetical attacks against the to be expected that detailed design
Washington area have been examined, A schematic example of an under- (see "Design of Structures to Resist
and the lethal nature of the resulting ground shelter is shown in Fig. 4. the Effects of Atomic Weapons,"
environment has been described. An estimate of the wall and ceiling for example) for a particular shelter
From such information, criteria for thickness required to withstand the will be based upon the individual
shelter designs may now be developed. blast load, together with adequate needs of the builder.
Admittedly, while no advance prepa- earth cover for attenuation of the
THE SHELTER IIlJST BE THEJUfALLY
rations can guarantee survival, it initial radiation, is also shown.
INSULATED AND SEALED FROM THE
seems possible for a very large number For the shelter design overpressures
EFFECTS OF FIRES RESULTING FROM
of the metropolitan-area residents to illustrated in Fig. 2, the following
THE BURST
improve vastly their probabilities of figures are appropriate (no factors of
survival. This improvement will safety have been included in these I t will be necessary to seal the
Ma y - Jun e 1963 25
exit from the shelter and to guide equipment; clothing and bedding; transportation equipment, portable
the evacuation to safe areas. An sanitation supplies, disinfectant and radio with spare batteries, complete
externally mounted instrument that insecticide; infant care supplies; camping equipment, materials for
can be read without exposure of the first aid kit, medical information, and water purification, weapons and
shelter occupants would be most special medicines that may be re- ammunition, etc.
desirable for monitoring external quired for particular cases; such Preparations for evacuation of the
radiation. recreational equipment as books, shelter area and long-range survival
It is possible that debris in some games, toys, etc. for children and planning should be done with the
form may block the exit from the adults; tools that might be required constant realization that familiar
shelter. Therefore, such tools as a for repair of equipment within sources of power, heat, light, water,
shovel, crowbar, hack saw, wood saw, the shelter; sources of information transportation, food -in short, most
sledge hammer, chisel, hand ax, etc., (books, magazines, maps, etc.) perti- of the things depended upon for the
should be provided within the shelter. nent to survival in the post-attack customary way of life-will have been
Instructions for evacuation, which environment; and spiritual or re- destroyed or at least severely curtailed
may be received by radio from Civil ligious articles. This list of supple- and will probably remain so for a
Defense or other Government agencies, mentary supplies should include considerable period of time. For the
will most probably designate safe whatever will best maintain the well- absolute necessities of life, one can
passageways and safe areas with being and morale of the individuals. depend upon only those things which he
reference to local area maps. For this Outside the shelter, but close to it has prepared in advance, which can be
reason it is essential to have detailed and well protected, should be stored transported, if need be, under his
maps covering the area within at those items judged necessary and own power, defended by his own
least 50 miles of the city so that this useful for evacuation from the shelter strength, and maintained through
vital information can be charted. area and for long-range survival plans. his own resourcefulness. Since in-
For guidance in unfamiliar areas, These might include a larger and dividual capabilities are limited, the
or where familiar landmarks have more elaborate supply of the items advance preparations must be
been destroyed, a reliable compass listed for the shelter, plus fuel for thorough.
will be useful.