By Richard Nephew

How the Iran Deal Prevents a

Covert Nuclear Weapons Program

O
n July 14, Iran and the six-country
group known as the P5+1 (China,
France, Germany, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States)
reached an agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program that promises to end the 13 years
of escalating tensions that Tehran’s nuclear
ambitions have caused.
The deal, formally known as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, is an
impressive collection of restrictions,
restraints, and monitoring provisions
applied to the Iranian nuclear program.
Under the deal, Iran’s path to a nuclear
weapon using declared facilities is
effectively closed for at least 10 years
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
capabilities and ensure their monitoring.
Although media and public attention
has often focused on the known nuclear
program, experts generally agree that
it is the possibility of a covert program
that causes them most concern. Iran has
a history of building nuclear facilities
in secret and admitting to a range of
Deliberate evasion of monitoring and
transparency measures, which any covert
program would involve, naturally makes
this job even more difficult.
The subtle effectiveness of the
agreement may be most pronounced in
the provisions dealing with potential
covert activities. Critics have latched on
to the issue of how much time it would
take for inspectors from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to gain
access to undeclared sites, but this is
largely a straw-man complaint based on
an erroneous assumption that “anytime,
anywhere” inspections would be
achievable in anything short of a postwar
environment, such as the one in Iraq in
the 1990s.
By focusing on this particular issue,
skeptics miss the fact that the rest of
the agreement is geared to ensure that
no significant undeclared facilities can
exist. This article will describe in detail
the various provisions of the deal that

and in some respects longer. Tehran
could attempt to produce nuclear
weapons material via the declared
nuclear program, but to do so would be
to risk almost immediate detection and
response. This is a result of a combination
of measures that constrain Iran’s
sensitive nuclear activities only after the
fact. The agreement needed to address
this problem.
At a fundamental level, this is
tremendously difficult. It is difficult
to prove the absence of something,
particularly in a country as large as Iran.
serve as a check against the possibility
of covert sites by forming concentric
circles of protection. The article also will
address the few scenarios in which a
potential failure of the system could take
place. In doing so, it will demonstrate
that the likelihood of these scenarios is

Richard Nephew is a fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution. He was a member of the U.S. negotiating team with Iran and director for Iran at the National Security Council. He served as
the Middle East team chief and senior Iran nuclear officer in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the Department
of State from 2006 to 2011 and before that as special assistant for nonproliferation policy at the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear
Security Administration.
8
Joe Klamar/AFP/Getty Images

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (left), French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (third from left), Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi (fifth from left), EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini (center), U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
(third from right), UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond (second from right) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (right)
sit at a table at the Palais Coburg hotel in Vienna on July 6. The officials were representing the group known as the P5+1 in the
final stages of negotiations with Iran on the country’s nuclear program.

sufficiently small as to be implausible
and therefore does not constitute a sound
reason to reject the deal.
Defeating the Covert Option
In order to have a covert nuclear
weapons program, Iran must address
three needs: access to nuclear materials,
access to the equipment and technology
to transform nuclear materials into
weapons-usable materials, and time.
Iran also would need to have a proven
nuclear weapons design and viable
else that would risk the exposure of
illicit activities. that any uranium coming into Iran go
Among the needs of a covert
proliferator, the first and foremost is
finding a way to obtain nuclear materials.
The uranium-monitoring provisions
of the comprehensive agreement will
make it very difficult for Iran to do this
without being caught. Under the terms
of the deal, Iran will permit the IAEA
to “monitor, through agreed measures
that will include containment and
surveillance measures, for 25 years,
July 14 deal. These restrictions dictate
through a procurement mechanism
that is enshrined in the deal. This
procurement mechanism will govern the
transfer of any Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) controlled or dual-use items or
materials to Iran, as well as any items
that a potential exporting state may
determine could contribute to an illicit
Iranian nuclear program. Under the deal,
a transfer is considered illicit if it does not
come through this mechanism.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015

means of delivery, but the longest lead
time and greatest complication are
associated with the production of the
nuclear weapons material itself. To be
truly covert, such a program should
have minimal interactions with declared
Iranian facilities, which will be subject
to inspections and monitoring. Thus, it
is likely that an entirely separate nuclear
fuel cycle would have to be created for
this endeavor, in which there might
be a sharing of knowledge between the
declared and covert programs but little
all uranium ore concentrate produced
in Iran or obtained from any other
sources.”1 As a result, Iran will not be able
to produce a secret stockpile of uranium
from its existing mines because such a
move would be detected by means of the
containment and surveillance measures
that exist, which can be loosely described
as a combination of seals and cameras.
Theoretically, Iran could seek to
procure uranium illicitly, but this would
be contrary to UN Security Council
actions taken before and since the
Iran also can receive uranium as part of
a swap of its enriched-uranium stockpile,
but any such swap would be declared
by Iran and known to other parties in
the agreement. Skeptics may argue that
Iran is capable of evading sanctions
and could similarly evade the rules
established in the agreement. Yet, there is
some historical evidence indicating that
success at evasion should not be assumed.
UN Security Council Resolution 1737,
adopted in 2006, was the first resolution
that prohibited Iran from importing
9
 uranium. During the nine years since
the adoption of that resolution, although
there have been occasional concerns
that Iran could obtain uranium or that
its partial ownership of a uranium mine
in Namibia gives it license to import
uranium from that mine, there has not
been any verified transfer of uranium
to Iran aside from fuel for the Bushehr
power reactor.
[A covert enrichment path by Iran] would require
essentially replicating its current enrichment
program, which is a costly, complicated, and
detectable enterprise.
Assuming that Iran is able to procure
the uranium needed to begin its
clandestine program, it must be able to
modify the uranium into a form useful
for weaponization—the second condition
that clandestine proliferators must meet.
Generally speaking, this means Iran
would have to convert the uranium from
its raw form into material capable of being
enriched or into fuel for a reactor. This
step would require the construction of a
new, covert uranium-conversion plant.
For the next step, it is most likely that
Iran would seek to utilize centrifuge-
based uranium enrichment in its covert
program. Iran has experience in uranium
enrichment with centrifuges and in
the covert construction of facilities for
such enrichment, albeit with facilities
that were exposed long before they
ever became operational. In addition,
centrifuge plants have fewer detectable
signatures than nuclear reactors or spent
fuel reprocessing plants.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
Covert uranium enrichment would
require the construction of a new
covert enrichment facility, which is
prohibited under the deal with the P5+1,
and outfitting with centrifuges. The
easiest supply of these is the stockpile
of centrifuges removed pursuant to the
deal. Fortunately, the deal addresses the
possibility of centrifuges being removed
from storage, requiring continuous
monitoring, including containment and
surveillance measures, of Iran’s stored
10
centrifuges and associated components
and infrastructure for 15 years. With
this kind of monitoring in place, the
IAEA would notice any attempt to divert
these centrifuges well before a plant
could be built.
Instead of taking centrifuges out of its
declared centrifuge stockpile, Iran could
instead decide to build new centrifuges.
To do so, it would need to produce new
rotors and bellows for these centrifuges,
among other parts and pieces. Because
the agreement requires containment and
surveillance of the existing inventory of
both rotors and bellows for 20 years, Iran
would have to produce new centrifuge
components using specialized equipment.
Yet, the deal guards against this route
as well by requiring Iran to provide
a declaration of all locations where
centrifuge component production
could take place and to permit access
to those locations to verify that illicit
production is not ongoing. Furthermore,
the deal requires Iran to provide access
to the flow-forming machines, filament-
winding machines, and mandrels that
are used for production of centrifuge
rotor tubes and bellows. This equipment
is subject to continuous monitoring,
including containment and surveillance.
If the equipment were to be diverted or
misused, the IAEA would know. This
access will persist for 20 years.
In sum, to have a covert enrichment
path, Iran would have to have a
clandestine supply of uranium, a covert
uranium-conversion plant, a covert means
of producing centrifuges, and a place
to install and operate them. This would
require essentially replicating its current
enrichment program, which is a costly,
complicated, and detectable enterprise.
With respect to the covert-reactor
path, there are reactor designs that could
permit Iran to maximize plutonium
production for use in a covert bomb. One
such design is the heavy-water research
reactor currently being built at Arak, but
under the agreement, it will be modified
to produce as little as one-eighth of the
annual plutonium output of its present
design. It is reasonable to suspect that
Iran would seek to build a new heavy-
water reactor like the present Arak
design, given that it has some experience
with it. Yet, Iran’s experience with the
construction of the heavy-water reactor
at Arak does not give any credence to
the notion that such a facility could
be constructed without being noticed,
due to the long lead time required for
construction and fact that the Arak
reactor was itself observed long before it
was completed, as was the heavy-water
production plant located next door.
Reactors themselves require specially
designed parts and materials, at least
some of which Iran would probably have
to procure from non-Iranian sources.
In addition, reactors have unique
construction signatures that can be
spotted with intelligence satellites. It
is not impossible to construct a reactor
clandestinely—the North Korean-built al
Kibar reactor in Syria that was destroyed
in 2007 by Israel is a case in point—but
it is more difficult. The Israeli ability to
spot and destroy the reactor before it was
operational supports the idea that even a
carefully concealed reactor facility can be
stopped before coming online.
Assuming Iran could build a new
reactor that produces weapons-grade
plutonium, Iran still would have to
extract the plutonium from spent fuel.
The absence of a spent fuel reprocessing
capability in Iran and Iran’s inexperience
with spent fuel reprocessing technology
make it unlikely that Tehran would seek
this path for a covert weapons program.
In fact, it could take Iran the full 15 years
 that the reprocessing and associated spent
fuel restrictions of the deal are in place
to learn enough about the technology
and to construct facilities capable of
performing the operation, minimizing its
value to Iran while maximizing risk.
As noted above with respect to
uranium enrichment, Iran would
need to have a way of procuring items
that it needs for work on a covert
reactor program. To a large extent,
the procurement channel established
as a result of the deal ought to guard
against this. Iran will be prohibited
from engaging in any procurement of
items especially designed or prepared
for nuclear uses without going through
the procurement channel. Iran will
likewise be prohibited from procuring
dual-use items listed by the NSG, as well
as any items that a potential exporting
state determines could contribute to
illicit nuclear activities, unless Tehran
obtains these items through the approved
channel. Any identified procurement
outside the channel would be an
immediate red flag once detected. (The
Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif speaks at a press conference at Tehran’s Mehrabad airport on July 15. Zarif and
Ali Akbar Salehi (not pictured), head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, spoke after returning to Tehran from Vienna,
where they reached an agreement with the P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear program.
issue of undetected nuclear procurements
is discussed below.)
Even if Iran obtained illicit uranium,
illicit uranium-conversion equipment,
and illicit uranium-enrichment
equipment and constructed the
necessary facilities, it still would not be
invulnerable to detection. This points
to the last requirement on the list cited
above: time. Every day an illicit facility
operates is another day for a spy, a
wiretap, or a satellite image to catch the
proliferator in the act.
The construction and operation of
these facilities and their associated
activities require time to achieve their
desired results; one weapon’s worth of
highly enriched uranium (HEU) is not
made in a day. A proliferator must have
enough time to ensure its facilities fulfill
their function. If the proliferator fails
to have enough time, it runs the risk
of being caught early and having the
attempt curtailed by diplomatic action
or military strikes. The United States
and its partners have thus far detected
the Natanz facility, the Arak facilities,
and the Fordow facilities before they
were completed, without much of the
access to be provided under the terms of
the comprehensive agreement. Should
another such facility be detected, the
comprehensive agreement provides
yet another tool to address it: required
provision of access.
Under the terms of the deal, Iran is
required to provide access to undeclared
facilities if the IAEA requests such access
and suitable alternative arrangements
cannot be identified. This requirement
is based on the implementation of Iran’s
additional protocol, which Iran will
begin implementing provisionally when
implementation of the deal begins.2
The agreement specifies a process that
the IAEA request would set in motion
once the agency has learned of a potential
covert site or undeclared nuclear-related
activities. This process includes the
provision of information by the IAEA
to Iran on the nature of the suspicions
prompting the access request. The request
could trigger a 24-day clock under which
Iran would provide the requested access
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
11
 or the issue would be sent to the dispute
resolution process stipulated in the
agreement. Iran could head off a request
for access only if four of the eight parties
to the agreement—Iran, the P5+1, and
the European Union—opposed granting
access. Even then, the complaining state
could still take up the matter in the
dispute resolution process. The end result
[A]s the existence of a covert program is one of
the most likely prompts for an Israeli military
strike, it would not be logical for Iran to tempt fate
by engaging in such an activity.
of that process could be the reimposition,
or “snapback,” of UN Security Council,
U.S., and EU sanctions and a resumption
of the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program.
Critics have argued that 24 days is
far too much time to grant for this
procedure because Iran would be able
to use the time to cover up its activities.
Olli Heinonen, the former head of the
IAEA Department of Safeguards, has cited
Iran’s renovation of the Kalaye Electric
Company facility in 2003 as proof that
Iran can rapidly dispose of the evidence
of misdeeds.3 Heinonen noted that, two
weeks after the IAEA requested access
to the facility, where Iran engaged in
undeclared centrifuge experiments, it
had been completely renovated, with new
floors, walls, and air-handling systems.
The problem with this example is
twofold. First, Iran did not have only two
weeks to sanitize the facility. The initial
public revelation of Iran’s clandestine
enrichment program was in August 2002
by the National Council of Resistance of
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
Iran, which subsequently identified the
location of the Kalaye facility in February
2003. The IAEA was denied access at that
time and permitted only limited access
in March 2003. In May 2003, the agency
gained full access to the facility but
without the right to take environmental
samples from the site.4 Iran granted
permission to do this in early August
2003, at which time inspectors noted that
further modifications had been made to
the site since March 2003.5 Even under
the most liberal of interpretations of the
12
comprehensive agreement, within six
months, UN Security Council sanctions
would have snapped back against Iran for
such behavior.
Second, although six months had
passed since the Kalaye facility was
first identified publicly, with extensive
modifications made to the workshop,
traces of enriched uranium still were
found in the facility. Heinonen’s own
example tends to underscore the
likelihood that Iran will not be able
to guard against contamination of
every room of every facility in which
undeclared uranium work takes place if it
is carrying out such work. It was probably
for this reason that when confronted
in 2004 with incriminating evidence
about undeclared work at the Lavisan
site, Iran decided to destroy the facility
completely. Satellite images taken before
and after the destruction underscore that
Iran was sufficiently concerned about
IAEA access and environmental sampling
to essentially remove the location from
the face of the earth, taking three feet
of topsoil with it.6 Iranian sanitization
activities at Parchin show a similar
dedication to eradicating facilities rather
than granting access for fear of what
would result.7
Possible Failure Scenarios
As the preceding section outlines,
although a theoretical opportunity exists
for Iran to engage in a covert program,
the comprehensive agreement was
designed to make this opportunity far
more difficult than it currently is. If the
agreement functions as designed, then
a covert program is likely to be detected
very early in the process. Iran’s awareness
of this risk creates deterrence for a covert
path being pursued in the first place.
Scenarios predicting an Iranian
covert program assume that having
worked hard to achieve a deal with the
P5+1, Iran would be prepared to risk the
consequences of that deal being torn
apart by its actions, consequences that
could include sanctions or military action.
Although this is conceivable in the event
of a near-term, regional security threat
to Iran, no such threat exists at present,
with the possible exception of Israel. Yet,
as the existence of a covert program is one
of the most likely prompts for an Israeli
military strike, it would not be logical for
Iran to tempt fate by engaging in such an
activity. It is also possible that detection
of a covert site during the deal would
provide the impetus for U.S. military
action against Iran.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering
possible covert-path scenarios to identify
potential points of breakdown and to
account for the possibility that Iranian
decision-making does not follow rational
or logical lines. Three scenarios are
worth evaluating here: a catastrophic
failure of the agreement, the current
existence of an undeclared nuclear
program in Iran, and the possibility
that Iran could seek to acquire nuclear
weapons material or an assembled
weapon from another state.
Catastrophic failure. It is possible that
each individual element of the agreement
fails catastrophically. In such a scenario,
Iran would be able to obtain the materials
and equipment it needs and to do so
without being detected by the IAEA or
the intelligence apparatus of the United
States and those of its partners. In such a
scenario, Iran would not be subject to any
particular constraints and could engage
in a breakout at its leisure.
This is theoretically possible yet
difficult. Iran is one of the most watched
intelligence targets for the United States,
let alone U.S. partners in the region and
in Europe. Moreover, past successes in
detecting such activities in Iran long
before they reached fruition should
Action Team 1991-1998 / IAEA
Centrifuges found by an International Atomic Energy Agency team in a warehouse near Tuwaitha, Iraq, during the team’s
inspections following the 1991 Persian Gulf War are shown in this undated photo.
provide some confidence that the size
and scope of what Iran would have to
do to make the attempt would lend itself
to detection. The access granted under
the comprehensive agreement will help
matters by assisting analysts in sorting
legitimate activities from illicit ones. For
example, if Iran were detected procuring
goods for an enrichment plant outside
the authorized procurement channel,
then it would be a rather good bet that
the procurement is intended to support
a clandestine effort. For intelligence
analysts, eliminating legitimate activities
as explanations could be very helpful
in forming judgments on intent, as well
as in establishing priorities for further
investigation.
Notably, it would be a challenge for
Iran to procure for and construct the
relatively large covert program needed
during the 10 to 15 years of the main
restrictions of the deal.
Existing covert program. Iran may already
have a fully constructed covert program
and merely be awaiting the removal of
sanctions to reveal it. This is theoretically
possible but unlikely. Iran has had a
difficult enough time sustaining its
now-declared program, as has been
demonstrated by reports of material
shortages in Iran’s nuclear program for
several years.
Moreover, asserting the possibility
of an existing covert program offers
no guidance on handling the deal
because such an allegation can never be
satisfactorily disproven. Policymakers
can act only on what they know and
what they have good cause to believe.
To do otherwise is to repeat the mistakes
of U.S. policy in Iraq in 2003, when it
was assumed that the Iraqis must have
had a covert program because they were
not adequately assisting UN inspectors
to demonstrate that no such program
existed. With the benefit of hindsight,
one can say that there was very little
Iraq could have done to prove that
something did not exist. The only way
out of this conundrum was by offering
robust access, which the Iraqis were
loath to do. If properly implemented, the
comprehensive agreement will remedy
this problem in Iran.
Buying a bomb or bomb material. It
is also theoretically possible that Iran
could contract for its nuclear weapons
program by buying a nuclear weapon
or the material for one. One such
theory postulates that Iran and North
Korea, which have a long history of
collaboration on ballistic missiles,
could collaborate to mutually develop
nuclear and missile capabilities, with
each providing access to resources that
the other cannot. For Iran, this could
include the covert acquisition of HEU or
plutonium from North Korea.
This scenario is an interesting
possibility but, as with an existing
covert program, offers nothing by way of
guidance for how to interpret the deal.
At a minimum, the deal prohibits such
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
transfers, as would Iran’s commitments
under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), which it joined in 1970.
If one is convinced that Iran would
be prepared to undertake such an
adventure, there is nothing in the public
domain that can provide irrefutable and
unambiguous assurance that no such
activity would ever be contemplated. One
might as easily suggest that Iran could
have a nuclear weapon already designed
and built, ready to be mounted on a
missile tomorrow. It cannot be proved
13
 that this has not happened, just that
no such activity has been detected and
that, circumstantially, it would not make
much sense. The same argument could be
made about other countries but without
proof that it has happened. Policymakers
rarely have complete knowledge; they
have to make their decisions on the basis
of what intelligence reveals and what
logic suggests.
From this perspective, the transfer
The transfer of a nuclear warhead or weapons-
grade material would be a risky proposition
of a nuclear warhead or weapons-grade
material would be a risky proposition
for all concerned. The transfer could be
detected, prompting almost immediate
calls for military strikes against Iran at a
minimum. The associated signatures of
such moves probably would be observed
through intelligence channels. Given the
existence of the Proliferation Security
Initiative—a program launched by
President George W. Bush to increase
cooperation among states in interdicting
transfers of weapons of mass destruction
and their materials and components—
and the widespread presence of the U.S.
Navy and partner navies in the sea lanes
between North Korea and Iran, such
transfers could be met with a military
response of boarding any ship involved.8
As noted above, Iran already has made a
commitment not to seek to acquire nuclear
weapons, including weaponization-related
components, in perpetuity. Iran also has
agreed not to seek to obtain uranium
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
or plutonium metal for 15 years. Under
such a scenario, it is highly doubtful
that there would be any defense of Iran
in the international community. Tehran
would be inviting attack by pursuing
this option. Moreover, there is enough
intelligence focus on Iran and North Korea
that it is highly speculative to assume that
either could pursue such an arrangement
without detection.
Finally, this threat does not diminish
the value of the deal, except if one
assumes that the only way to address the
14
problem is to change the regime. If that
is one’s outlook, then it is fair to suggest
that the deal is poorly equipped to handle
this challenge. In making that argument,
however, one would have to explain how
any reasonably conceivable deal could
prevent that.
The Status Quo
A fair estimate of the value of the
comprehensive agreement in addressing
for all concerned.
the problem of an Iranian covert
program must include a comparison to
the status quo. There is no comparison
possible between the comprehensive
agreement and the two most extreme
failure scenarios—the existence of a
covert program at present and an Iranian
purchase of weapons-usable materials or
a bomb itself. No deal could definitively
address these current threats.
The more interesting point of
comparison is the status quo—or, more
precisely, the situation that persisted
prior to the interim deal of November
2013 because that would likely be the
situation in the event of a collapse of
the comprehensive agreement—against
the risk of a catastrophic failure of the
comprehensive agreement.
• Without the interim and
comprehensive deals, Iran’s provision
of information on its uranium
production would not be required. Iran
also would not be required to permit
the IAEA to undertake any monitoring
activities concerning uranium
production.
• Without the interim and
comprehensive deals, Iran would
not permit IAEA inventorying, let
alone monitoring, of its centrifuge
components and the tools for
producing more of them.
• Without the interim and
comprehensive deals, Iran would not
restrain its production of heavy water
and might not restrain research on spent
fuel reprocessing or construction of a
reprocessing facility. Construction of the
Arak reactor would be restarted, giving
Iran valuable experience that could be
applied to a covert nuclear program.
• Without the interim and
comprehensive deals, there would be
no procurement channel monitoring
what would come into the country
that could aid a covert effort.
• Without the interim and
comprehensive deals, Iran would not
be forthcoming with respect to access
requests, and skeptics could look back
fondly at an opportunity for required
access within 24 days.
Although none of these activities would
be permitted as a legal matter under the
UN Security Council resolutions adopted
prior to July 2015, the entire discussion
of a covert program assumes that Iran
is not fulfilling its legal or political
commitments. Notwithstanding these
facts, some opponents would argue that
the status quo remains preferable because,
without the deal, Iran’s nuclear program
would remain largely illegal under the
Security Council resolutions. Yet, Iran
has not fulfilled its obligations under
these resolutions since 2006. Practically,
the legal prohibition has had little value
in stopping Iran from having a covert
program. The deal, on the other hand,
does much to prevent such covert efforts.
Similarly, many opponents would argue
that without the comprehensive deal,
international sanctions would not have
been relaxed on Iran, and Iran would find
itself under continued economic strain.
Yet, there is no compelling evidence
that such pressure has precluded covert
activities in the past. Moreover, it is
Kazem Ghane/AFP/Getty Images
North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong (left) shakes hands with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani during a meeting in Tehran
on September 16, 2014.
precisely such strain that could convince
Iran’s leadership that its only opportunity
for regime survival is to concentrate on
establishing a nuclear deterrent.
The goal of the sanctions, which they
achieved, was to bring Iran to the table.
Nothing in the last 12 years of negotiating
history with Iran suggests that sanctions
alone will compel Iranian capitulation.
Conclusion
It is inarguable that a covert path to
Iranian nuclear weapons would present
the United States and its partners
with a tremendous security challenge.
It would undermine the terms of
the comprehensive agreement and
consequently prompt a re-establishment
of intense sanctions pressure on Iran,
if not military action. Moreover, a
covert program could spur additional
proliferation in the region and beyond.
These are threats Iran would have to
anticipate and manage before proceeding
with a covert option, probably
precluding it.
The agreement is a material improve-
ment over the status quo across the
board, offering at worst an improved
opportunity to detect such activities. In
doing so, the agreement will deter Iranian
cheating and make succeeding at it a
virtually impossible task.
ENDNOTES
1. “Annex I - Nuclear-Related Measures,” n.d.,
para. 68, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/
docs/iran_agreement/annex_1_nuclear_related_
commitments_en.pdf.
2. The Model Additional Protocol is a
nonproliferation agreement developed
by the international community after
revelations about the extent of clandestine
Iraqi nuclear weapons-related work after the
1991 Persian Gulf War. There is a standard
format for the additional protocol for all
non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to
the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
See International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), “Model Additional Protocol to the
Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards,” INFCIRC/540,
September 1997.
3. Bill Gertz, “Ex-IAEA Leader: 24-Day
Inspection Delay Will Boost Iranian Nuclear
Cheating,” Washington Free Beacon, July 21,
2015, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/
ex-iaea-leader-24-day-inspection-delay-will-
boost-iranian-nuclear-cheating/.
4. Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS), “ISIS Imagery Brief: Kalaye
Electric,” March 31, 2005, http://isis-online.org/
publications/iran/kalayeelectric.html.
5. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran,” August 26, 2003, GOV/2003/63, https://
www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-63.pdf.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
6. ISIS, “Nuclear Sites: Lavisan-Shian (Lavizan-
Shian),” n.d., http://www.isisnucleariran.org/
sites/detail/lavisan-shian/.
7. ISIS, “Nuclear Sites: Parchin,” n.d., http://
www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/parchin/.
8. Air transfer would present different
challenges, given that the air routes would
involve flight over China. Yet, it is not in the
interest of China to permit nuclear weapons or
nuclear weapons material to transit its airspace.
If such a transfer were detected, interdiction
cooperation from China could be arranged.
15
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