NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN JUCO AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Are employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations
governing the civil service?
The background facts of this case are stated in the respondent-appellee's brief as follows:
The records reveal that private respondent (Benjamin C. Juco) was a project engineer of the National
Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. For having been implicated
in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds involving 214 pieces of scrap G.I. pipes
owned by the corporation which was allegedly committed on March 5, 1975. Juco's services were
terminated by (NHC) effective as of the close of working hours on May 14, 1975. On March 25,
1977 he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner (NHC) with Regional Office No. 4,
Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor and Employment) docketed as R04-3-3309-77 (Annex
A, Petition). The said complaint was certified by Regional Branch No. IV of the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration where it was docketed as Case No. RB-IV-12038-77 and assigned to Labor
Arbiter Ernilo V. Peñalosa. The latter conducted the hearing. By agreement of the parties, the case
was submitted for resolution upon submission of their respective position papers. Private respondent
(Juco) submitted his position paper on July 15, 1977. He professed innocence of the criminal acts
imputed against him contending "that he was dismissed based on purely fabricated charges purposely
to harass him because he stood as a witness in the theft case filed against certain high officials of the
respondent's establishment" (NHC) and prayed for 'his immediate reinstatement to his former
position in the (NHC) without loss of seniority rights and the consequent payment of his will back
wages plus all the benefits appertaining thereto. On July 28, 1977, the NHC also filed its position
paper alleging that the Regional Office Branch IV, Manila, NLRC, "is without authority to entertain
the case for lack of jurisdiction, considering that the NHC is a government owned and controlled
corporation; that even assuming that this case falls within the jurisdiction of this Office, respondent
firm (now petitioner) maintains that respondent (Juco), now private respondent, was separated from
the service for valid and justified reasons, i.e., for having sold company properties consisting of 214
pieces of scrap G.I. pipes at a junk shop in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter
appropriating the proceeds thereof to his own benefit."
The pertinent portion of the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reads:
The fact that in the early case of Fernandez v. Cedro (NLRC Case No. 201165-74, May 19, 1975) the
Commission, (Second Division) ruled that the respondent National Housing Corporation is a
government-owned or controlled corporation does not preclude us from later taking a contrary stand
if by doing so the ends of justice could better be served.
For although adherence to precedents (stare decisis) is a sum formula for achieving uniformity of
action and conducive to the smooth operation of an office, Idolatrous reverence for precedents which
have outlived their validity and usefulness retards progress and should therefore be avoided. In fact,
even courts do reverse themselves for reasons of justice and equity. This Commission as an
Administrative body performing quasi judicial function is no exception.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby, set aside. In view,
however, of the fact that the Labor Arbiter did not resolve the issue of illegal dismissal we have opted
to remand this case to the Labor Arbiter a quo for resolution of the aforementioned issue.
The NHC is a one hundred percent (100%) government-owned corporation organized in accordance with Executive Order
No. 399, the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 5, 1951. Its shares of stock are owned by the
Government Service Insurance System the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National
Investment and Development Corporation, and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Pursuant to Letter of
Instruction No. 118, the capital stock of NHC was increased from P100 million to P250 million with the five government
institutions above mentioned subscribing in equal proportion to the increased capital stock. The NHC has never had any
private stockholders. The government has been the only stockholder from its creation to the present.
There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are
governed by the civil service law and civil service rules and regulations.
Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. ...
The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1, Article XI I which stated:
A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by
law.
The inclusion of "government-owned or controlled corporations" within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate
effort of the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed government-owned or controlled corporations to avoid the
full consequences of the an encompassing coverage of the civil service system. The same explicit intent is shown by the
addition of "agency" and "instrumentality" to branches and subdivisions of the Government. All offices and firms of the
government are covered.
The amendments introduced in 1973 are not Idle exercises or a meaningless gestures. They carry the strong message that t
civil service coverage is broad and an- embracing insofar as employment in the government in any of its governmental or
corporate arms is concerned.
The constitutional provision has been implemented by statute. Presidential Decree No. 807 is unequivocal that personnel of
government-owned or controlled corporations belong to the civil service and are subject to civil service requirements.
It provides:
SEC. 56. Government-owned or Controlled Corporations Personnel. — All permanent personnel of
government-owned or controlled corporations whose positions are now embraced in the civil service
shall continue in the service until they have been given a chance to qualify in an appropriate
examination, but in the meantime, those who do not possess the appropriate civil service eligibility
shag not be promoted until they qualify in an appropriate civil service examination. Services of
temporary personnel may be terminated any time.
The very Labor Code, P. D. No. 442 as amended, which the respondent NLRC wants to apply in its entirety to the private
respondent provides:
ART. 277. Government employees. — The terms and conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries shall be standardized by the
National Assembly as provided for in the New Constitution. However, there shall be reduction of
existing wages, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by them at the
time of the adoption of the Code.
Our decision in Alliance of Government Workers, et al v. Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment et all. (124 SCRA
1) gives the background of the amendment which includes government-owned or controlled corporations in the embrace of
the civil service.
We stated:
Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention show that in the deliberation held relative to what is
now Section 1(1), Article XII-B, supra, the issue of the inclusion of government-owned or controlled
corporations figured prominently.
The late delegate Roberto S. Oca, a recognized labor leader, vehemently objected to the inclusion of
government-owned or controlled corporations in the Civil Service. He argued that such inclusion
would put asunder the right of workers in government corporations, recognized in jurisprudence
under the 1935 Constitution, to form and join labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining with
their employers in the same manner as in the private section (see: records of 1971 Constitutional
Convention).
In contrast, other labor experts and delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention enlightened the
members of the Committee on Labor on the divergent situation of government workers under the
1935 Constitution, and called for its rectification. Thus, in a Position Paper dated November 22, 197
 1, submitted to the Committee on Labor, 1971 Constitutional Convention, then Acting Commissioner
of Civil Service Epi Rey Pangramuyen declared:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the
public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessary regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not
applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated
that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interests
of all people in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting
interests as are present in private labor relations could not exist in the relations
between government and those whom they employ.
Moreover, determination of employment conditions as well as supervision of
the management of the public service is in the hands of legislative bodies. It is
further emphasized that government agencies in the performance of their duties
have a right to demand undivided allegiance from their workers and must
always maintain a pronounced esprit de corps or firm discipline among their
staff members. It would be highly incompatible with these requirements of the
public service, if personnel took orders from union leaders or put solidarity
with members of the working class above solidarity with the Government. This
would be inimical to the public interest.
Moreover, it is asserted that public employees by joining labor unions may be
compelled to support objectives which are political in nature and thus
jeopardize the fundamental principle that the governmental machinery must be
impartial and non-political in the sense of party politics. (See: Records of 1971
Constitutional Convention).
Similar, Delegate Leandro P. Garcia, expressing for the inclusion of government-owned or controlled
corporations in the Civil Service, argued:
It is meretricious to contend that because Government-owned or controlled
corporations yield profits, their employees are entitled to better wages and
fringe benefits than employees of Government other than Government-owned
and controlled corporations which are not making profits. There is no
gainsaying the fact that the capital they use is the people's money. (see:
Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention).
Summarizing the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on the inclusion of
Government-owned or controlled corporation Dean Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo de Manila
University Professional School of Law, stated that government-owned corporations came under
attack as g cows of a privileged few enjoying salaries far higher than their counterparts in the various
branches of government, while the capital of these corporations belongs to the Government and
government money is pumped into them whenever on the brink of disaster, and they should therefore
come under the strict surveillance of the Civil Service System. (Bernas, The 1973 Philippine
Constitution, Notes and Cases, 1974 ed., p. 524).
Applying the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the Labor Code as amended, and the Civil Service Decree as
amended and the precedent in the Alliance of Government Workers decision, it is clear that the petitioner National Housing
Corporation comes under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
This becomes more apparent if we consider the fact that the NHC performs governmental functions and not proprietary
ones.
The NHC was organized for the governmental objectives stated in its amended articles of incorporation as follows:
SECOND: That the purpose for which the corporation is organized is to assist and carry out the
coordinated massive housing program of the government, principally but not limited to low-cost
housing with the integration cooperation and assistance of all governmental agencies concerned,
through the carrying on of any or all the following activities:
l) The acquisition, development or reclamation of lands for the purpose of construction and building
therein preferably low-cost housing so as to provide decent and durable dwelling for the greatest
number of inhabitants in the country;
2) The promotion and development of physical social and economic community growth through the
establishment of general physical plans for urban, suburban and metropolitan areas to be
characterized by efficient land use patterns;
3) The coordination and implementation of all projects of the government for the establishment of
nationwide and massive low cost housing;
4) The undertaking and conducting of research and technical studies of the development and
promotion of construction of houses and buildings of sound standards of design liability, durability,
safety, comfort and size for improvement of the architectural and engineering designs and utility of
houses and buildings with the utilization of new and/or native materials economics in material and
construction, distribution, assembly and construction and of applying advanced housing and building
technology.
5) Construction and installation in these projects of low-cost housing privately or cooperatively
owned water and sewerage system or waste disposal facilities, and the formulations of a unified or
officially coordinated urban transportation system as a part of a comprehensive development plan in
these areas.
The petitioner points out that it was established as an instrumentality of the government to accomplish governmental
policies and objectives and extend essential services to the people. It would be incongruous if employees discharging
essentially governmental functions are not covered by the same law and rules which govern those performing other
governmental functions. If government corporations discharging proprietary functions now belong to the civil service with
more reason should those performing governmental functions be governed by civil service law.
The respondent NLRC cites a 1976 opinion of the Secretary of Justice which holds that the phrase "government-owned or
controlled corporations" in Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution contemplates only those government-owned or
controlled corporations created by special law. The opinion states that since the Constitution provides for the organization
or regulation of private corporations only by "general law", expressly excluding government-owned or controlled
corporations, it follows that whenever the Constitution mentions government-owned or controlled corporations, it must
refer to those created by special law. P.D. No. 868 which repeals all charters, laws, decrees, rules, and provisions
exempting any branch, agency, subdivision, or instrumentality of the government, including government- owned or
controlled corporations from the civil service law and rules is also cited to show that corporations not governed by special
charters or laws are not to be brought within civil service coverage. The discussions in the Constitutional Convention are
also mentioned. It appears that at the time the Convention discussed government-owned or controlled corporations, all such
corporations were organized only under special laws or charters.
The fact that "private" corporations owned or controlled by the government may be created by special charter does not
mean that such corporations not created by special law are not covered by the civil service. Nor does the decree repealing
all charters and special laws granting exemption from the civil service law imply that government corporations not created
by special law are exempt from civil service coverage. These charters and statutes are the only laws granting such
exemption and, therefore, they are the only ones which could be repealed. There was no similar exempting provision in the
general law which called for repeal. And finally, the fact that the Constitutional Convention discussed only corporations
created by special law or charter cannot be an argument to exclude petitioner NHC from civil service coverage. As stated in
the cited speech delivered during the convention sessions of March 9, 1972, all government corporations then in existence
were organized under special laws or charters. The convention delegates could not possibly discuss government-owned or
controlled corporations which were still non-existent or about whose existence they were unaware.
Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify the phrase "government-owned or controlled
corporation."
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception It means all possible and all taken one by one. Of course, our
decision in this case refers to a corporation created as a government-owned or controlled entity. It does not cover cases
involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment on these
latter cases when the appropriate controversy is brought to this Court.
The infirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a circumvention or emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B
of the Constitution It would be possible for a regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiary corporations
under the Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature. A government-owned corporation could create several
subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees
would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations
of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraints of the open market nor to the
terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could be
created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporation under the general law. The constitutional amendment
including such corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation
cannot be allowed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is
REINSTATED.
ARABAY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, BRANCH II, THE CITY OF DIPOLOG
and EMILIO L. TAGAILO, in his capacity as City Treasurer of the City of Dipolog, et al., respondents.
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch II,
dismissing the complaint of the herein petitioner Arabay, Inc., for annulment of a tax ordinance of the Municipal Council of
Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, and for refund of the taxes it had paid thereunder. On December 17, 1965 the Municipal
Council of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 amending Section I of Ordinance No. 53 series of 1964. As thus amended
the said Section I reads as follows:
Section 1. There shall be charged for the selling and distribution of refined and manufactured mineral
oils, motor and diesel fuels, and petroleum based on the monthly allocation actually delivered and
distributed and intended for sale, in any manner whatsoever, by the Company or supplier to any
person, firm, entity, or corporation, whether as dealer of such refined and manufactured mineral oils,
motor and diesel fuels, and petroleum or as operator of any station thereof, the following tax payable
monthly:
Gasoline — P0.01 per liter
Lubricating oils — P0.01 per liter
Diesel Fuel oils ¼ centavo per liter
Petroleum or P0.05 per gallon can
kerosene or
— P0.02 per half gallon tin
Provided, however, that retail seller of not more than 5 gallon cans or its equivalent shall be
exempted from the provisions of this ordinance.
Section 2. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1966.
On June 21, 1969 Republic Act No. 5520 was approved. It provided for the creation of the City of Dipolog from the then of
the Municipality of Dipolog, to take effect on January 1, 1970.
On July 28, 1971 the Arabay, Inc., a distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum products, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte a complaint against the City of Dipolog contesting the validity of the above-mentioned
Section 1 of Ordinance No. 53 on the ground that the same imposed a sales tax which is beyond the power of a
municipality to levy under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act of 1959. Said
Section 2 provides:
SEC. 2 Taxation — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all chartered cities,
municipalities and municipal districts shall have authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees
upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising privileges in chartered cities,
municipalities or municipal districts by requiring them to secure licenses at rates fixed by the
municipal board or city council of the city, the municipal council of the municipality, or the
municipal district council of the municipal district; to collect fees and charges for service rendered by
the city, municipality or municipal district; to regulate and impose reasonable fees for services
rendered in connection with any business, profession or occupation being conducted within the city,
municipality or municipal district and otherwise to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes,
licenses or fees: Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts shall, in no case, impose any
percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon nor impose taxes on articles subject
to specific tax, except gasoline, under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue: Provided,
however, That no city, municipality or municipal district may levy or impose any of the following: ...
(emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1972 the Arabay, Inc. filed a supplemental complaint which prayed, among others, for a refund of the taxes
it had paid under the ordinance in question.
On October 30, 1972 the parties entered into a stipulation of facts which, inter alia, states:
2. That plaintiff, pursuant to the above ordinance, paid sales taxes for the sale of Diesel fuel oils,
lubricating oils, petroleum, kerosene and other related petroleum products, to the defendant City of
Dipolog, from December, 1969 to July, 1972 in the total amount of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR
 HUNDRED PESOS (P5,400.00). A schedule of the payments made by plaintiff is hereto attached as
Annex "A" and is made an integral part hereof. However, the payments made from April, 1972 to
July, 1972, in the total amount of P69.80 have been refunded by defendant City of Dipolog to
plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing stipulation of facts and of the Memorandum of
Arguments to be submitted by the parties, the latter, through, their respective counsels, hereby submit
the case for the determination of this Honor.
On January 16, 1973 the court a quo rendered judgment upholding the validity of the questioned provision of Ordinance
No. 53, as amended, essentially on the grounds that the Arabay, Inc. failed to present evidence that the tax provision in
question imposed a sales tax, and the tax prescribed therein was, moreover, not a specific tax on the products themselves
but on the privilege of selling them.
The basic issues in the case at bar are: (1) whether or not the questioned tax provision imposes a sales tax; and (2) if it
imposes a sales tax, whether the Arabay, Inc. is entitled to a tax refund, considering that Dipolog is now a city.
1. It is settled rule in this jurisdiction that for purposes of Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act, supra, a municipal tax
ordinance which prescribes a set ratio between the amount of the tax and the volume of sales of the taxpayer imposes a
sales tax and is null and void for being beyond the power of a municipality to enact.1
prohibitions overlap in the sense that while the first clause of the said proviso forbids the levying of sales taxes of whatever
form or guise, the second clause of the same proviso forbids the levying of "taxes" without any distinction as to the kind of
tax, i.e.' whether percentage tax, sales tax, specific tax or license tax, although this latter prohibition applies only to a
limited class of articles, viz., those subject to the specific tax under the Tax Code.
Such an overlap would probably carry or connote no legal significance but for the exclusion of gasoline from the
prohibition contained in the second clause of the mentioned proviso. For, with the exemption of gasoline from the coverage
of the same, it becomes relevant to determine the effect which such exclusion has on the previous prohibition against the
levying of the sales tax.
In our opinion, a reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question results in the conclusion that
Congress, in excluding gasoline from the general disability imposed on municipalities and municipal districts to exact any
kind of taxes on articles subject to specified tax under the Tax Code, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within
the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes the latter may deem proper to levy on
gasoline including a sales tax or one in that form. There is after all no clearly demonstrable and convincing reason why the
law would allow municipal imposition of taxes on gasoline and yet withhold such power if the imposition is in the form of
a sales tax, when it was a known fact at the time of the enactment of the Local Autonomy Act in 1959 — and this still is
true to this day — that gasoline is of no profitable use to the companies which own it unless turned over to the consuming
public which, perforce, must pay for the right to obtain that commodity.

In our view, the questioned section of Ordinance No. 53 of the Municipal Council of Dipolog levies a sales tax, not only ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is set aside. The City of Dipolog is hereby ordered to refund to the Arabay, Inc. the
because the character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance was admitted by the parties below, but as well because the taxes the latter has paid under Section 1 of Ordinance No. 53, series of 1964, as amended, deducting therefrom the amount
phraseology of the said provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on the sale of oil, gasoline and other representing the taxes paid by the Arabay, Inc. on its gasoline sales. No costs.
petroleum products. Thus, the ordinance provides: "There shall be charged for the selling and distribution of refined and
manufactured oils ... based on the monthly allocation actually delivered and distributed and intended for sale ... by the
Company or supplier to any person ... whether as dealer ... or as operator of any station ... the following tax payable
monthly: ..." It is quite evident from these terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon
or bears a direct relationship to the volume of sales which the owner or supplier of the itemized products generates every
month. The ordinance in question therefore exacts a tax based on sales; it follows that the Municipality of Dipolog was not
authorized to enact such an ordinance under the local Autonomy Act.
2. The obligation of the City of Dipolog to refund the sum collected under the void provisions of an ordinance enacted
while it was still a municipality, is not open to doubt. In San Miguel Corporation vs. The Municipal Council of Mandaue,
Cebu, supra, the Court ordered, the return to the taxpayer of the sums paid under an ordinance enacted under circumstances
similar to the case at bar, and rejected the argument that the municipality of Mandaue had in the meantime been converted
into a city. The Court said:
Respondent however claim that with the conversion of Mandaue into a city pursuant to Republic Act
No. 5519, which was approved on June 21, 1969, the issue has already become moot, since the
prohibition contained in section 2 of Republic Act 2264 applies only to municipalities and not to
chartered cities. The same contention has been rejected in City of Naga v. Court of Appeals,
and Laoag Producers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. vs. Municipality of Laoag, where We
ruled that the legality of an ordinance depends upon the power of the municipality at the time of the
enactment of the challenged ordinance. Since the municipality of Mandaue had no authority to enact
the said ordinance, the subsequent approval of Republic Act No. 5519 which became effective on
June 21, 1969, did not remove the original infirmity of the ordinance. Indeed there is no provision in
the aforecited statute which invests a curative effect upon the ordinances of the municipality which
when enacted were beyond its statutory authority.
The right of the Arabay, Inc. to a refund of the local sales taxes it had paid under the questioned ordinance may not,
however, include those levied on its gasoline sales. The relevant proviso of Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act states:
... Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts shall, in no case, impose any percentage tax
on sales or other taxes on articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code:
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing proviso of Section 2 of R.A. 2264, two courses of action in the exercise of their taxing powers are
denied to municipalities and municipal districts, to wit, (1) to levy any sales tax in whatever form; and (2) to levy any tax
on articles subject to specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code. It is not difficult to see that these two
AGRIPINO DEMAFILES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ANTIQUE, in its capacity as Board of Canvassers
for the newly created Municipality of Sebaste of the Province of Antique, and BENITO B. GALIDO,respondents.
The new municipality of Sebaste1 in Antique province held its first election of officers in the general elections of
November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty.
On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to
section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the election return from precinct
7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according to a
certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of October 30, 1997. At its session
on the following day, November 22, the board, over the objection of one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7
and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as
against 844 for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste.
On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the board's action of rejection of the return
from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board members, Julito
Moscoso and Quirico Escaño, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Acting on the protest, the COMELEC
resolved on November 28, 1967:
To annul the canvass and proclamation of the local officials of the new municipality of Sebaste, Antique, which
was made by the Provincial Board of Antique;
To constitute the Board of Canvassers by appointing the substitutes pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of
the Revised Election Code, which shall canvass anew the results of the election for local offices of Sebaste,
Antique, in accordance with the Instructions to Boards of Canvassers contained in the Resolution of the
Commission No. RR-544, particularly No. 5-K thereof, and thereafter to proclaim the winning candidates for
local offices of said municipality.
In turn, Galido asked for a reconsideration on the ground that the two members of the provincial board who were
reelectionists were disqualified from sitting only when the board was acting as a provincial, but not as a municipal, board
of canvassers and that the COMELEC resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials was issued without
giving him an opportunity to be heard. In its resolution of December 4, 1967 the respondent Commission reconsidered its
previous order and held "that the canvass and proclamation already made of the local officials . . . stands".
Failing to secure a reconsideration of this latter resolution, Demafiles filed the present petition
for mandamus and certiorari to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC, to annull the proclamation of Galido,
and to secure an order directing the COMELEC to appoint substitute members of the provincial board and to order a new
canvass of the returns, including that from precinct 7.
The three principal issues tendered for resolution in this case are: (1) whether the respondent board of canvassers was
within the periphery of its power in rejecting the return from precinct 7 on the strength of an election registrar's certificate
that a less number of voters than that shown in the return had registered; (2) whether the provincial board members, who
were candidates for reelection, were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of
canvassers; and (3) whether the Commission on Elections can order the board of canvassers to count a return from a given
precinct.
These issues, together with the arguments of the parties, will be discussed seriatim, but we must first proceed to dispose of
the preliminary question raised by the respondent Galido, namely, that this case is moot because he had taken his oath and
assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870.
Obviously, the frame of reference is section 2 of the statute which reads:
The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general
elections for local officials and shall have qualified [sic].
In our view, the last portion of the provision — "and shall have qualified" — is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated
jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant the respondent's reading that the term of office of the first municipal
officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their proclamation. It is quite probable that that is what the legislature meant.
But here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from
assuming and, consequently, from supplying.itc-alf "If there is no meaning in it," said the King in Alice in Wonderland,
"that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any." Frankfurter, who himself was fond of quoting this
passage, admonishes that "a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the
statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and
evisceration."2 Accordingly, we have to go by the general rule that the term of office of municipal officials shall begin on
the first day of January following their election,3 and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way
affected the basic issues in this case, which we need not reach and resolve.
First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function — that of compiling and adding the results they appear in
the returns, transmitted to it. This is the teaching in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections:4 "the canvassers are to
be satisfied of the, genuineness of the returns — namely, that the papers presented to them are not forged and spurious, that
they are returns, and that they are signed by the proper officers. When so satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns
because of informalities in them or because of illegal and fraudulent practices in the elections."5 Thus, they cannot pass
upon the validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the
precinct from whence it came are illegal.6
But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the ground that it is "obviously manufactured"
because, contrary to the statement therein that there were 195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the
local election registrar states that only 182 voters had registered on October 30, 1967. Lagumbay v. Commission on
Elections7 is cited in support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns were palpably false as it was indeed statistically
improbable that "all the eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same
number, whereas all the eight candidates of the other party got precisely nothing.itc-alf" In other words, the aid of
evidence aliunde was not needed, as "the fraud [being] so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur — the thing
speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facie value.
On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its face from which the canvassers might conclude that it does
not speak the truth. It is only when it is compared in the certificate of the election registrar that a discrepancy appears as to
the number of registered voters. The return therefore is by no means "obviously manufactured" so as to justify its
exclusion.
This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than registered voters were allowed to vote in precinct 7.
Perhaps that is true, although the petitioner claims that after October 30, 1967 eight more voters were allowed to register
(making a total of 190, voters), and on the day of the election 5 voters erroneously assigned to precinct 6 were allowed to
vote in precinct 7 because that was where they were really assigned. The point is simply that this question should be
threshed out in an election contest.itc-alf Lagumbay itself explicitly says —
Of course we agree that fraud in the holding of the election should be handled — and finally settled — by the
corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence
is necessary. . . .
Consequently, the canvass made and proclamation had should be annulled.8
Second, the canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four members of the board of canvassers were
disqualified from sitting in it, they being candidates for reelection. As this Court held in Salcedo v. Commission on
Elections:9
And added reason for the nullification of the actuation of the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro is the fact
that its members were disqualified to act it appearing that they were all candidates for reelection. This is clear
from Section 28 of the Revised Election Code which provides that any member of the provincial board who is a
candidate for an elective office shall be incompetent to act in said board in the performance of its duties in
connection with the election.
Branding the above statement as obiter dictum, the respondent Galido argues that reelectionist members of the provincial
board are disqualified under section 28 only when the board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to prevent them fro
canvassing their own votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of canvassers.
With respect to the canvass and proclamation made the provincial board of Oriental Mindoro, three issues raised
in Salcedo, in resolving which this Court held (1) that a provincial board cannot act as a municipal board of canvassers
where a municipal council has been formed; (2) that provincial board members who are candidates for reelection are
disqualified to sit in the board and (3) that a board of canvassers which excludes from canvass the return from a precinct
acts "in contravention of law."
At any rate the language of section 28 is all-inclusive Thus:
 Any member of a provincial board or of a municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall
be incompetent to act on said body in the performance of the duties the of relative to said election . . . .
The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a provincial board of canvassers and the same
board acting as a municipal canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the maxim ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.
Third, it is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC has the power to annul an illegal canvass and an illegal proclamation
as when they are based on incomplete returns, and order a new canvass to be made by counting the returns wrongfully
excluded.10 If it has power to direct that certain copies of election returns be used in preference to other copies of the same
returns,11 there is no reason why it cannot direct canvassing bodies to count all turns which are otherwise regular. itc-
alf Indeed, it is its duty to do so, failing which it may be compelled by mandamus. As earlier pointed out, it is the
ministerial function a board of canvassers to count the results as they appeal in the returns which on their face do not reveal
any irregularities or falsities.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions dated December 4 and 8, 1967 of the Commission on Elections are set aside, and the
canvass of returns made and the subsequent proclamation of the respondent Benito B. Galido are annulled. The respondent
Commission on Elections is hereby directed. (1) to appoint new members of the board of canvassers in substitution of
Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escaño, and (2) immediately thereafter to order the board of canvassers as reconstituted to
convene, canvass all votes including those appearing in the return from precinct 7, and, in accordance with the results of
such canvass, proclaim the winning candidates. Costs against the private respondent Galido.
CENTRAL CAPIZ, a corporation, petitioner,
vs.
ANA RAMIREZ, respondent.
This is an original action brought in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is to obtain an interpretation and application of the
intent, purpose and scope of Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land Act," so far as it affects
agricultural lands, privately owned.
The only question presented is, whether or not said Act No. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine
Islands which are privately owned.
There is not dispute about the facts. They are admitted. The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about July
1, 1919, the latter contracted with the petitioner to supply to it for a term of thirty years all sugar cane produced upon her
plantation, which said contract, by agreement, was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of
Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and to be binding upon all future owners of the same. In the interim the
execution of said contract and its conversion into a right in rem upon the respondent's property, said Act No. 2874 became
effective. The respondent, while admitting said contract and her obligation thereunder to execute a deed pursuant thereto,
bases her refusal so to do upon the fact that more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the petitioner is held and owned by
persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States.
It is conceded by the parties that the land involved is private agricultural land, that is, land which is held and owned by the
respondent, for which she holds a Torrens title.
The defendant answered the petition. To the defendant's answer the petitioner demurred. From an examination of the
petition, the answer and the demurrer, it appears that the real issue presented is, whether the said Act (No. 2874) is limited
in its application to agricultural lands of the public domain, or whether its provisions also extend to agricultural lands held
in private ownership.
Inasmuch as the wording of certain sections of said Act (secs. 23, 24, 121 and 122) give rise to a possible construction that
private lands are included within its terms, and inasmuch as said Act specifically provides that any land coming within its
purview cannot be encumbered, alienated or transferred to corporations in which at least 61 per cent of the capital stock
does not belong wholly to citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, the respondent, while not desiring to
evade her contract, fears to assume the risk of giving effect to her said contract in view of the drastic penalty prescribed,
should her action prove unlawful. The penalty provided in section 122 of said Act includes not only a nullity of the contract
but also a reversion of the property and its improvements to the Government.
On behalf of the plaintiff it is argued, first, that the intent of the Legislature, gathered from a reading of Act No. 2874 in its
entirety, is to provide simply for the sale, lease and other disposition of lands of the public domain; that lands held in
private ownership are not affected thereby; and, second, that even had the Legislature intended to include private as well as
public land within the scope of the Act, this intent fails because under the Act as entitled such attempt would be in direct
violation of section three of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which provides that: "No bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
Examining Act No. 2874 in detail, there can be little question but that it was intended to apply to and regulate the sale,
lease and other disposition of public lands only. The title of the Act, always indicative of legislative intent, reads: "an Act to
amend and compile the laws relating to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes." Section one of such act
provides: "That short title of this Act shall be 'The public Land Act.' " Section two, wherein the purpose of the Act is
expressly stated, reads: " The provisions of this Act shall apply to lands of the public domain." Section three provides:
While title to lands of the public domain remains in the Government, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act, through the
Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.
It cannot be contemplated that these officers, charged "with carrying out the provisions of the Act," were intended to
exercise authority and control over the sale or other disposition of lands hold in private ownership.
To the same effect are sections four, five, and eighty-seven of the Act, wherein executive control is vested in the Director of
Lands with respect to the survey, appraisal, classification, etc., of lands of the public domain, with authority to prepare
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act, and to receive all applications filed pursuant thereto,
etc.
Sections 105 contains another indication that said Act does not apply to privately owned agricultural lands. Said section
provides: "All patents or certificates for lands granted under this Act . . . shall issue in the name of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, under the signature of the Governor-General, countersigned by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources." The Legislature certainly did not intend that all sales, leases, etc. of privately owned agricultural lands should
hereafter be "issued in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands, under the signature of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, under the signature of the Governor-General," etc.
Section 23, after describing the persons and corporations authorized to purchase any tract of public agricultural
lands "disposable under this Act," proceeds:
Provided, further, That citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire public lands as to their own citizens, may, while such laws are in force, but not
thereafter . . . purchase any parcel of agricultural land . . . available under this Act.
In other words, it is only necessary for other countries to grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the right to acquire
"public lands," in order that their citizens may have the right to acquire any land available under this Act. This provision
would be altogether anomalous had it been the intent to apply Act No. 2874 to lands held in private ownership.
Referring again to section two of said Act, we find the following:
That nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the government and
disposition of the lands commonly known as "friar lands" and those which, being privately owned, have
reverted to or become the property of the Philippine Government, which administration and disposition shall be
governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted by the Legislature.
The purpose of said provision is obvious. Inasmuch as these friar estates and other real property purchased or owned by the
Government are subject to its control and disposition equally with lands of the public domain, it could be reasonably
argued that they should be subject to and governed by the laws applicable to public lands. Through the insertion of the
provision above quoted, however, this construction of the Act is avoided. If said Act, by express provisions, does not apply
to lands privately owned by the Government, it could hardly have been the intent of the Legislature to make the Act
applicable to lands held in private ownership by individuals.
The Act nowhere contains any direct or express provision applying its terms to privately owned lands. The doubts of
defendant in that regard are caused by inferences drawn from the language used in sections 24 and 121 of the Act. The first
paragraph of section 24 provides:
No . . . corporation . . . other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may acquire or own agricultural
public land or land of any other denomination or classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes,
that is at the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent
improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement.
Said section as worded, and standing alone, presents come question as to the character of land sought to be included
therein. This doubt is dispelled, however, when its provisions are read in connection with other sections of the same
chapter. Chapter five, in which section 24 is found, deals with "Sales," and section 25 thereof specifically provides that:
"Lands sold under the provisions of this chapter must be appraised in accordance with section 114 of this Act." Section 114
confers authority upon the Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to
appraise lands or improvements subject to concession or disposition under the provisions of this Act. Inasmuch as the
Legislature cannot vest authority in the Director of Lands to "appraise" or "sell" lands held in private ownership, it is not
presumed it was the intention to include private lands in the Act or subject them in the manner indicated to any such
authority. The same observations and the same conclusions apply to section 121 of the Act, where much the same language
is used as found in section 24 above quoted.
Whatever interpretation said sections 24 and 121 might receive if standing alone, it is clear they cannot prevail against the
general intent of the Act, derived not only from the language used but from the machinery adopted for giving effect to its
provisions. (See secs. 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 99, 103, 105, and 115.)
We hold, therefore, that the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands
of the public domain, and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner
whatsoever thereby.
Even should the holding of the court upon this question of intent be different, it would not affect the final outcome of the
case. Under the Act as entitled, any attempt by the Legislature to insert provisions in the body thereof relating to lands of
private ownership would be in violation of the provisions of the Jones Law and therefore, null and void.
It is provided in section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress of August 29, 1916): "That no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
Identical provisions to the above are contained in most of the State Constitutions, and have been repeatedly construed. In
the States of Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming, identical provisions are found in the
Constitution.
The purpose of this legislative restriction, and the evils sought to be remedied thereby, are clearly stated by Surtherland in
his valuable work on Statutory Construction. In Section 111 he says that:
In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have kept steadily in view the
correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. The object is to prevent the practice, which was common
in all legislative bodies where no such restrictions existed, of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters
having no relation to each other or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures were often adopted
without attracting attention. Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were combined in order to
unite the members of the legislature who favor either in support of all. These combinations were corruptive of
the legislature and dangerous to the State. Such omnibus bills sometimes included more than a hundred sections
on as many different subjects, with a title appropriate to the first section, "and for other purposes."
The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the legislation often
resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved; and not
only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that legislative provisions were steadily pushed through
in the closing hours of a session, which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by
popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The constitutional
clause under discussion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of
incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject or object; to prevent surprise and inadvertence by
requiring that subject or object to be expressed in the title.
In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329), the Supreme Court of Alabama stated the proposition as follows — citing and
quoting from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations; p. 143:
The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision are well
known. Legislative assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills by their titles only without requiring
them to be read. A specious title sometimes covers legislation which, if real character had been disclosed, would
not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this
provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision the title of a statute was often no
indication of its subject or contents.
An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same statute of
such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all the advocates of
each, thus often securing the passage of several measures no one of which could have succeeded on its own
merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities defining the objects of this provision: "It may
therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was: First, to prevent hodge-podge or log-
rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of
which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and , third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative
proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.' (Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, p. 143.)
To the same effect, in the case of Lindsay vs. U. S. Say. & Loan Ass'n. (120 Ala., 156 [42 L. R. A., N. S., 783]), the court
said:
The purposes of the constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind when it becomes necessary to
determine whether there has been legislative observance of it. The exposition of these purposes by Judge Cooley
 is accepted, we believe, in all the states in which alike limitation prevails. (Then follows quotation from
Cooley, supra.)
In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) where, in the body of an act, provision was made for something not included
in the title, the Supreme Court of California said:
At least, then, two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of which is not expressed in the title, and
they cannot be segregated. The title does not express the objects of legislation embodied in the provisions of the
act. It is, therefore, narrower than the body of the act, and fails to impart that notice of the measures enacted,
which the Constitution requires. To prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of the constitutional
requirement. 'The practice,' says the Supreme Court of Missouri, 'of comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse
and antogonistic nature, in order to combine in their support members who were in favor of particular measures,
but neither of which could command the requisite majority on its own merits, was found to be not a corruptive
influence in the Legislature itself, but destructive of the best interests of the State. But this was not more
detrimental than that other pernicious practice, by which, through dexterous and unscrupulous management,
designing men inserted clauses in the bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which the titles gave no indication,
and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to their passage. These things led to fraud and injury, and it was
found necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of a constitutional provision.' (City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42
Mo., 590.) This provision has been framed in the constitutions of may of the States of the Union; and courts,
whenever it has come before the, have liberally construed it as the will of the people in the interests of honest
legislation.
The authorities are to all intents uniform that this constitutional requirement is mandatory and not directory. Sutherland on
Statutory Construction, section 112, states the rule correctly as follows:
The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has been pointed out, depends
on judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regarded as mandatory, and compliance with it
essential to the validity of legislation. The mischief existed notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of
legislators; it might be expected to continue notwithstanding that that obligation is formulated and emphasized
in this constitutional injunction if it be construed as addressed exclusively to them and only directory. It would
in a general sense be a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the provisions of the constitution may be
obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature unless it is clear beyond all question that
such was the intention of the framers of that instrument. It would seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of
the fundamental law to say that it descends to prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be
followed or disregarded at pleasure. The fact is this: That whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon
as directory merely is very likely to be treated by the legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and to
be therefore habitually disregarded.
In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes (8 Heisk. [Tenn.], 504) Nicholson, C. J., referring to the provision that "No bill shall
become a law which embraces more than one subject," said:
This is a direct, positive and imperative limitation upon the power of the legislature. It matters not that a bill has
passed through three readings in each house on three different days and has received the approval of the
governor, still it is not a law of the State if it embraces more than one subject.
In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) supra, the court said:
It is the settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us unanswerable that this provision of
the constitution is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to the general assembly, but that it is
mandatory, and it is the duty of courts to declare void any statute not conforming to it.
Justice Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179-180) states that our courts have held, without exception,
that such constitutional provision is mandatory.
As heretofore noted, the title of Act 2874, here under constructions, reads: "An Act to amend and compile laws relative to
lands of the public domain, and for other purposes."
In our interpretation of said Act, the words "and for other purposes" contained in its title, must be treated as non-existent.
Under all the authorities wherein the requirement — "That no bill shall embrace more than one subject, which subject shall
be expressed in the title of the bill" — has been considered, the words "and for other purposes" when found in the title,
have been held to be without force or effect whatsoever and have been altogether discarded in construing the Act.
Upon this point, Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 173 - 173, states as follows:
One thing, however, is very plain: That the use of the words "other purposes," which has heretofore been so
common in the title to acts, with a view to cover any and everything whether connect with the main purpose
indicated by the title or not, can no longer be of any avail where these provisions exist. As was said by the
Supreme Court of New York in a case where these words had been made use of in the title to a local bill: "The
words "for other purposes" must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing and amount to nothing as a
compliance with this constitutional requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can be
brought in by their aid."
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 122 says:
The phrase "and for other purposes" expresses no specific purpose and imports indefinitely something different
from that which precedes it in the title. It is, therefore, universally rejected as having no force or effect wherever
this constitutional restriction operates. (Citing numerous cases).
In the case of Ryerson vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269), an Act was construed by the court reading: "An Act to provide for the
preservation of the Muskegon river improvements, and for other purposes." Cooley, C. J., who wrote the opinion, said:
The Constitution (of Michigan) provides that no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be
expressed in its title. We have heretofore had occasion to consider this section, and have said of it that it ought
to be construed reasonably and not in so narrow and technical a sense as unnecessarily to embarrass legislation.
But the only object mentioned in the title of this Act is the preservation of the Muskegon River Improvements,
for which purpose the act authorizes tools to be levied and expended.
The payment of Beard's claim is in no way connected with this object and the title to the act would apprise
neither the legislature nor the public that it covered provisions under which a large sum was to be collected and
disbursed to pay for the original construction of the work. The words "other purposes" in the title can have no
force whatever under the constitutional provision which has been quoted.
In the case of Board of Education vs. Barlow (49 Ga., 232) the title of the Act under consideration read: "An Act to
establish a permanent Board of Education for the City of Americus and to incorporate the same, and for other purposes."
The State constitution prohibited any law which referred to more than one subject, or contained matter different from that
expressed in the title of the act. The court said:
Does this not close the door to any force and effect being given the words "for other purposes?" If these words
were once necessary to permit the introduction of matter in the bill, different from what was expressed in the
order portion of the title, would not that every thing show now that the bill would thereby become obnoxious to
the other clause prohibiting more than one subject matter? The necessity of such words under the provision as it
formerly stood to prevent the bill from containing matter different from the title could only arise because such
matter is something different from what had already been expressed. It shows that something more than one
subject-matter is intended. If so, although it was allowed under the clause as it was formerly, it cannot now be
done.
Equally may it be said of the Act of the Philippine Legislature here involved, the addition of the words "and for other
purposes," contained in its title, can only be explained on the theory that something different was to be included therein
from that previously expressed, i. e., "lands of the public domain."
Another case where the same conclusion is forcibly expressed is that of Spier vs. Baker, (120 Ca., 370). There the court
construed an Act reading: "An Act providing for general primary elections within the State of California and to promote the
purity thereof by regulating the conduct thereof, and to support the privileges of free suffrage thereat, by prohibiting certain
acts and practices in relation thereto, and providing for the punishment thereof, and for other purposes." the California
State Constitution provides: "Every Act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title; but, if any
subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in its title, such act shall be void only as to so much
thereof as shall not be expressed in its title." The court, after citing this constitutional provision, said:
Let us test the title of this act in the crucible furnished by the foregoing provision of the constitution. The
legislature, in framing this title, was above all things candid. Upon its very face the law-making power
challenged the sound policy of this provision of the constitution, and avowedly disregarding it, declared that the
purpose of the act was the creation of a primary election law and "other purposes." Under the cloak of "other
purposes," all and every conceivable kind of legislation could hide and thrive in the body of the act, and thus the
constitutional provision be set at naught. In this state, when these words "for other purposes" are found in the
 title of an act of the state legislature they accomplish nothing, and in reading the title our eyes are closed to
them. We then have before us, tested by its title, an act dealing solely with general primary elections, and
providing penalties for violating the law relating thereto. Any matters of legislation contained in the body of the
act not bearing upon primary elections must go out; the constitutional provision quoted so declares. Weighing
and measuring the legislation found in the act by this test, very many provisions have no place there. It would
seem that the legislature, in using the words "for other purposes" in the title, used those words advisedly, and in
good faith lived up to them fully. For the legislation found in section after section of the act can find no
justification in its title, save under these words of boundless meaning, "for other purposes."
The court, after referring to various matters included in the bill but not specified in the title, said:
Many of these things are totally foreign to any question relating to primary elections, and others are so remotely
connected with that subject as to clearly come within the prohibition of the constitutional provision. These
matters of legislation, not being embraced within the purview of the title, are void and fall to the ground.
Applying the doctrine of the above cases to the Act before us for interpretation, its title must be considered and treated as
though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain."
Inasmuch as agricultural lands in the Philippine Islands held in private ownership, under fee title, constitute no part of "the
public domain." they cannot come within the purview of Act No. 2874 as it is entitled.
The words "public land" are habitually used in our legislation to described such as are subject to sale or other disposal
under general laws.
In the case of Wilcox vs. Jackson (13 Peters, 498 [10 L. ed., 264]) the court, in dealing with the matter of public lands,
stated:
Whensoever a tract of land shall have once been legally appropriated to any purpose, from that moment the land
thus appropriated becomes severed from the mass of public lands; and no subsequent law, or proclamation, or
sale, would be construed to embrace it, or to operate upon it, although no reservation were made of it.
The above case is quoted and applied in the case of United States vs. Blendoner (122 Feb. Rep., 703, 708). In U.
S. vs. Garreston (42 Feb., 22), the court said:
Such lands comprise the general public domain; unappropriated lands; lands not held back or reserved for any
special governmental or public purpose.
In the case of Yakima County vs. Tuller (3 Wash., T., 393), the court said that the term "public lands" in a grant of public
lands for roads, etc., shall be construed to mean strictly public lands, such as are open to entry and settlement, and not
those in which the rights of the public have passed and which have become subject to some individual right of a settler.
In the case of Bardon vs. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. (145 U. S., 535), the court said:
. . . It has long been settled . . . that all land to which any claims or rights of others have attached does not fall
within the designation of public lands.
The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands, in a very elucidated opinion in which the Attorney-General of the United
States agreed, held that "friar lands" purchased by the Insular Government formed no part of the "public domain" and were
not affected by nor subject to the restrictions of the Act relating to public lands.
Section 2 of the Act before us exempts not only "friar lands" from its operation but also all lands which have reverted to, or
become the property of, the Philippine Government.
It is clearly evident, therefore, that under no possible construction of the law can the words "lands of the public domain,"
used in the title of Act No. 2874, be held to include, or be authorized to include, lands held in freehold. While this is true
generally, it is peculiarly applicable to lands held and owned under Torrens title — as are the lands of the defendant herein
— in which all interest of the Government is expressly eliminated. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496)
provides that such registered title "shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and
all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general
description 'To all whom it may concern.' "
The judicial department of the government hesitates to pronounce invalid the Acts of the legislative department, and will
not do so until and unless it is shown that the same exceed the authority conferred upon said department or contravene
some express or necessarily implied provision of the Organic Law of the state. (Case vs. Board of Health, and Heiser, 24
Phil., 250; U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 64; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218, 225, 228; Tajanlangit vs. Peñaranda, 37
Phil., 155.)
In the interpretation and construction of statutes the court should give them the meaning and effect which the legislature
intended, unless that meaning and effect is in conflict with the organic law of the land. The question of the validity of the
statutes is first determined by the legislative department of the government, and the courts will resolved every presumption
in its favor. The wisdom or advisability of a particular statute is within the constitutional powers of the legislature, it will
be sustained, whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the statute covers a subject not authorized
by the fundamental laws of the state, or by the constitution, then the courts are not only authorized but are justified in
pronouncing the same illegal and void, no matter how wise and beneficent such legislation may seem to be. The courts are
not justified in measuring their opinion with the opinion of the legislative department of the government, as expressed in
statutes, upon the question of the wisdom, justice and advisability of a particular law. The courts have no right to dictate
what law shall be adopted by the legislative department of the government, so long as a well defined public policy or an
organic act is not violated. (Case vs.Board of Health, and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)
Our conclusions, therefore, from all of the foregoing are:
1. That it was the purpose and intent of the legislature to comply with the provisions of the Jones Law and to limit the
application of Act No. 2874 to lands of the public domain;
2. That the phrase "and for other purposes," found in the title of said Act (No. 2874), by virtue of the provisions of section
3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (the Jones Law), cannot be interpreted to include, nor be made applicable to
any lands not public;
3. That eliminating the phrase 'and for other purposes" from the title of said Act, the same must be considered and treated
as though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain;"
4. That lands held in freehold or fee title, or private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly
come within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced
in nay manner in the title of the Act.
5. That it is the uniform holding of the United States Supreme Court, and of other courts interpreting the phrase "public
lands," that once such lands have been "legally appropriated" by the Government or by individuals, they become
segregated from the mass of public lands, and no law or proclamation thereafter made or issued relating to "public lands"
operate upon them.
6. That whatever right or authority the Government of the Philippine Islands may have had at any time to assert any right,
title, or interest in and to the lands involved in this proceeding, whether as a part of the "public domain" or otherwise, was
absolutely divested by virtue of the provisions of section 38 of Act No. 496, after such lands were registered in the court of
land registration under the Torrens system.
7. That under said Act (No. 2874) as entitled any provisions or provisions in the body thereof applicable to lands held
under fee title is null and void and of no effect.
8. That inasmuch as said Act (No. 2874) cannot be interpreted to apply to, nor include, lands held in fee title, the penal
provisions thereof cannot be held to apply to leases, sales, concessions, nor any other transaction by the holders.
9. That by virtue of the provisions of section 127, as well as the general jurisprudence upon that subject our conclusions
herein shall not be held to affect any of the provisions of said Act No. 2874 except those provisions which relate to private
agricultural lands, or lands held in private ownership, in contradistinction to lands of the public domain.
Therefore, having demonstrated that said Act No. 2874 does not apply to lands of the respondent, and there being no
objection to the form of the remedy prayed for, the same is hereby granted, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and CONRADO PIRING Y MENDOZA, respondents.
The sole question presented in the three above entitled cases has to do with the authority of Gregorio T. Lantin to sign
informations as assistant city fiscal of Manila. Two judges have rendered two divergent views on the matter. Judge
Fernando Jugo, in cases Nos. L-831 and L-876, upheld the affirmative theory while Judge Rafael Dinglasan, in case No. L-
878, sustained the defendant's contention in an elaborate ruling.
It appears that Gregorio T. Lantin, a doctor of medicine and lawyer, Acting Chief, Medico-Legal Section, Division of
Investigation, Department of Justice, was given an assignment by Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon Quisumbing in a
letter dated October 8, 1945, which reads:
SIR:
Pursuant to the request of the City Fiscal of Manila and in accordance with the provision of section 1686 of the
Revised Administrative Code, you are hereby temporarily detailed to this office effective today, to assist him in
the discharge of his duties with the same powers and functions of an assistant city fiscal.
Following his detail, Doctor Lantin signed and filed informations in the aforesaid case after, presumably, conducting
preliminary investigations. Thereafter, the attorneys for the defendants filed motions to quash on the ground already stated.
When two of these motion were denied and one was sustained, the losing parties instituted the instant proceedings
for certiorari.
Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, provides:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. — The Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either
a subordinate from his office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or
prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by
the Attorney General or Solicitor General.
It will be noted that the law uses general terms. It is a general rule of statutory interpretation that provisions should not be
given a restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated. Just as the express enumeration of persons, objects, situations,
etc., is construed to exclude those not mentioned, according to a well-known maxim, so no distinction should be made
where none appears to be intended. This is not an arbitrary rule but one founded on logic. Was it the purpose of the
legislature to confine the work to be performed by the lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal to certain duties in the fiscal's
office and deny him others? If it was, the law does not say so, and one would be at loss to know what duties were conferred
and what were not. It is fair to presume that if the legislature had wanted to forbid the lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal,
to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions, it would have said so or indicated its intention by clear
implication. We need to be reminded that of all the functions of the fiscal, those referred to are the most important and
outstanding and the ones in which the fiscal usually needs aid.
There is nothing so sacrosanct in thee signing of complaints, making of investigations and conducting of prosecutions that
only an officer appointed by the President or one expressly empowered by law may be permitted to assume these functions.
Certainly a lawyer who is invested with same authority as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General
is presumed to be competent to be entrusted with any of the duties, without exception, devolving on a prosecuting attorney.
That the person designated in a particular instance does not measure up to the educational specifications imposed by law is
beside the point. It does not detract from the conclusion that, in the light of the high standard of training and experience
required, there is no anomaly and no injustice is committed in lodging on the person designated by the Secretary of Justice
those powers of the prosecuting attorney which we have named.
Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they were enacted. The duties of a public office
include all those which truly lie within its scope, those which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for
which the office was created and those which, although incidental and collateral, are germane to, and serve to promote the
accomplishment of the principal purposes. (43 American Jurisprudence, 68, 70.) The authority to sign informations, make
investigations and conduct prosecutions is within the inferences to be gathered from the circumstances which prompted the
passage of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144 and its predecessors.
The historical background of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code is amended and the construction placed on
its precursors confirm our opinion.
The initial legislation on assistance to provincial fiscals is to be found in section 45 of Act No. 136, paragraph (e) of which
provides that "he (Attorney General) shall, when required by the public service, or when directed by the Chief Executive,
repair to any province in the Islands and assist the provincial fiscal there in the discharge of his duties, and shall assist the
provincial fiscal in any prosecution against an officer of the Government." This provision was amended by Act No. 300,
section 1, by adding at the end thereof the following words:
But, whenever it is impracticable for either the Attorney General or Solicitor General personally to repair to any
province in the Islands and assist the provincial fiscal there in the discharge of his duties, or in any prosecution
against an officer of any branch of the Government, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (e) of
section forty-five, it shall be lawful for the Attorney General, with the prior approval of the Civil Governor, to
appoint some person who may be eligible to the office of Attorney General temporarily to represent him in such
prosecution. The person so appointed shall have all the power of the Attorney General or Solicitor General in
conducting the prosecution for which he may have been especially appointed as in this section provided. The
compensation of the person so appointed shall be fifteen dollars per day for the time necessarily employed in the
service of the Government, and actual traveling expenses necessarily incurred in performance of the duties.
Act No. 325, section 1, amending section 47 of Act No. 136, created the position of supervisor of provincial fiscals, whose
duty it was "to assist the Attorney General and under his direction to prepare rules for the guidance of all provincial fiscals,
and when required by the public service or directed by the Attorney General, he shall repair to any province in the Islands
and assist the provincial fiscal there in the discharge of his duties."
The last measure passed on this subject was section 17 of Act No. 867 which reads:
SEC. 17. Fiscals may be aided by lawyers appointed by Attorney General; duties of such appointees;
compensation. — It shall be lawful for the Attorney General to appoint any lawyer, either a subordinate from his
office, or, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance and Justice, a competent person not in the public
service, temporarily to assist the fiscal of a province or district in the discharge of his duties and to represent the
Attorney General in such matters. The person so appointed shall have all the powers of the Attorney General or
Solicitor General in the conduct of causes in which the Government is interested and to which he may be
assigned. . . .
When the administrative laws were reorganized and systematized, some of the foregoing provisions were eliminated and
the rest were condensed into two paragraphs and embodied in the First Administrative Code as section 1686. The latter
section was reproduced in the Revised Administrative Code, also as section 1686, which in turn was amended by section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 144. There has been no material alteration in the law since the administrative laws were
codified, except that, whereas under the former Administrative Code the Attorney General was the officer authorized to
designate a lawyer to assist a fiscal, under the Revised Administrative Code it was the Solicitor General who made the
detail, and by Commonwealth Act No. 144 the authority to designate was put in the hands of the Secretary of Justice.
It will be seen that in the original enactment — section 45 of Act No. 136 — the Attorney General himself was called upon
to assist a provincial fiscal in the discharge of his duties. We have no knowledge of whether the persons assigned by the
Attorney General to assist fiscals under the subsequent legislation signed informations; but it is a fact, of which we may
take judicial notice, that the Attorney General signed such informations. And he did it not by virtue of any express legal
provision but on the strength, as we may suppose, of his authority to assist provincial fiscals. This was a practice that
continued for a considerable length of time.
As contemporaneous construction this practice should carry great weight in the operation of the enactment in question. The
fact that it was the chief law officer and legal adviser of the government who put into effect and that he did it in the
discharge of his duties lends added force to the interpretation. As has been well said, "interpretations by the Attorney
General and legal department of a state have important bearing upon statutory meaning, since the Attorney General and his
office are required by law to issue opinions for the assistance of the various departments of the government administering
the law." (2 Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Third Edition, 517.)
It is not to the point to inquire whether the Solicitor General has now the power to sign informations. Granting that he does
not retain such power, a question which we do not decide, this circumstance nevertheless does not alter the result at which
we have arrived. The reason is that the power to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions is
inherent in the power "to assist" a prosecuting attorney, as these words are used in the Administrative Code. It does not
emanate from the powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General conferred upon the officer designated by the
Secretary of Justice; it is ingrained in the office or designation itself. The powers of the Solicitor General bestowed on the
appointee to assist the fiscal must be held as cumulative or an addition to the authority to sign informations, which is
inherent in his appointment. In other words, the clause "with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the
Attorney General or Solicitor General" does not exclude the latter authority. The former practice of the Attorney General to
which we have alluded portrays a distinction between and separation of the powers or sets of powers. The power of the
Attorney General to sign informations, as we have pointed out, owed its being, not to the powers legitimately pertaining to
his office as Attorney General but to the special provision authorizing him to assist fiscals. And it may be pertinent to know
that when the Attorney General's power to assist provincial fiscals ceased, he stopped signing informations. The
phraseology of section 17 of Act No. 867 before cited also affords an illustration of the idea that the authority to assist is
separate and apart from the general powers of the Attorney General. In the language of this section, the person appointed
was (1) to assist the fiscal in the discharge of his duties and (2) to represent the Attorney General in such matters. If the two
phrases meant the same thing, then one of them would be superfluous. There is no apparent reason for holding that one or
the other was a surplusage.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions in cases Nos. L-831 and L-876 are denied and dismissed, and the petition
in case No. L-878 is sustained. Without costs.